

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

19

1980

IH  
34

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9307

19 September 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 34/80)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

For further information on report content call (703) 351-2833 (Near East); 351-2501 (Iran, Afghanistan); 351-3165 (North Africa).

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9307

19 September 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

(FOUO 34/80)

CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

'Arafat Discusses Results of Fourth Conference of Fatah  
(Yasir 'Arafat Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,  
14-20 Jun 80) ..... 1

Briefs  
Oil Company Activity 9

ALGERIA

Chadli Bendjedid Reinforces His Authority  
(Editorial; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,  
1 Aug 80) ..... 10

Preparations for Five-Year Plan Considered  
(Mohamed Razine; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 May 80) ..... 13

SONATRACH-Total Deal Reported  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 Aug 80) .... 16

Briefs  
Negotiations With France 18

IRAN

Fourteen Nominations Approved Including Defense Minister  
(REUTER, 7 Sep 80) ..... 19

Iranian Government Forces Battle Kurds in Northwest  
(REUTER, 30 Aug 80) ..... 21

Convolutd Conditions in Country Explored  
(Faruq Abu Zahr; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Jun-  
4 Jul 80) ..... 22

IRAQ

New Parliamentary Elections Extolled  
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 14-20 Jun 80) ..... 28

- a - [III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LEBANON

Soviet Ambassador Sees Bashir al-Jumayyil, Sham'un (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Jun-4 Jul 80) .....	33
Ex-Prime Minister al-Sulh Discusses Role of Political Islam (Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Jun-4 Jul 80) .....	39
Lebanese Arab Army's History, Goals, Situation Examined (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Jun-4 Jul 80) .....	43

LIBYA

Libyan-Egyptian Border Confrontation Analyzed (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Jun-4 Jul 80) .....	50
--	----

MAURITANIA

Briefs	
Terwan Dam Opened	54
Agreement Regarding Guelbs Project Signed	54
Central Accountancy Service Established	54
Incident Behind Slavery Abolition	55

MOROCCO

Cedies Review of Economy (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 Jun 80) ...	56
Continuation of Cedies Economic Review of 1979 (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 Jun 80) ....	64

PERSIAN GULF AREA

Question of U.S. Bases in Gulf Discussed (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Jun 80) .....	68
--	----

SYRIA

Briefs	
Oil Output Drop	72

TUNISIA

Bourguiba, Wife's Domination Criticized (Adel Wahid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 May 80) .....	73
Briefs	
Discreet Contact	76

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER ARAB AFFAIRS

'ARAFAT DISCUSSES RESULTS OF FOURTH CONFERENCE OF FATAH

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Jun 80 pp 20-23

[Interview with PLO Leader Yasir 'Arafat by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, date and place not given]

[Text] Announcement of the political program, which is considered to be the most important accomplishment of the Fourth Conference of Fatah, the largest and most independent of the Palestinian organizations, did not put an end to questions asked and speculation made, especially in Palestinian circles, concerning the conference and the occasionally sharp discussions which took place in it.

This is not surprising for two reasons. The first is the importance of Fatah, which is the leading Palestinian organization with the widest popular support among the Palestinian Arab people. The second is the fact that security, organizational and political considerations dictate that political programs be drafted cautiously when it comes to details and expansively when it comes to generalities and slogans.

Although the conference ended about two weeks ago, and its recommendations have already been published, questions are still being asked about it. For this reason, it was necessary to meet with Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat], confirmed by the conference as the leader of the movement and the commander in chief of the forces of al-'Asifah, which is a military arm of the organization.

This interview was delayed a little, due to the continuous developments which keep the responsible leader busy. He had hardly finished dealing with the flare-up in the "southern suburb" of the Lebanese capital, which forced him to leave the conference more than once, when he received the ugly news of the assassination attempts on Bassam al-Shak'a, Mayor of Nablus, and Karim Khalaf, Mayor of Ramallah. This is in addition to other issues he has to contend with, such as Lebanese reconciliation and the PLO's efforts to realize it.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The following is the text of our interview with Mr Yasir 'Arafat:

[Question] Your Fourth Conference has aroused the attention and curiosity of both friendly and enemy observers. Many rumors have circulated concerning its atmosphere and the debates which took place in it. Could you give us a true picture of what went on and what is your evaluation of the results?

[Answer] First we should remember that this conference was held nine years after the Third Conference, and that during these years, major events and developments have occurred on the Palestinian, as well as on the Arab and international scenes. These events had their positive and negative effects on the conference of our movement, especially as we have unconditionally adopted the democratic process, based on a revolutionary concept which says, "The greater the responsibility, the greater the confidence."

The exercise of democracy was very evident throughout the sessions of the conference, mainly in the sharp criticisms which dealt with the minutest details. The rules dictated detailed work on all political, military, organizational and financial levels. The conference dealt with (rivalries) within the movement as well as at the level of the PLO and on the Palestinian and Arab scenes in general.

As for the rumors which circulated about disagreements and divisiveness, my response is that any negative aspects of this democratic process are factors which we do not fear. On the other hand, the positive aspects exceeded all expectations. The results of the conference are a good indication of that.

Fatah emerged from the Fourth Conference more united and strong than ever before. The enemies of Fatah and of Palestine, who bet on blowups and division, were disappointed. The conference approved all recommendations, elected a new command and issued a political program. Fatah resumed its role and responsibilities with full strength and confidence.

We Did Not Interfere in the Elections

[Question] A lot has been said about the balance of power inside the movement between the right, the left and the veterans who are nicknamed "the faithful ten," etc. Does the new command have a new political identity, or is it a continuation of the previous command?

[Answer] First, allow me to settle certain matters about the use of names regarding us in Fatah. We have no faithful ten, and there is no such thing as a veteran and non-veteran command. We have a collective command which adheres to its unshaken revolutionary path.

I also would like to stress the point that many names or designations, which are used outside our movement, do not apply to us, such as Right or Left, veteran or non-veteran, and extremist or moderate. Our movement is the reflection of our peoples' values. It is distinguished in the names it

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

uses, in the manner it conducts its struggle, and in its internal and external relations.

The conference was a new move on the road of our revolutionary work. After discussing and evaluating the past phase, the conference decided to renew its confidence in the previous central committee and all its members. The conference then decided to add new blood to the committee by electing five new brothers. This way the growing needs of our struggle will be adequately met. The conference also gave the new committee the right to choose three additional members, if the need arises, with the approval of three-fourths of the members.

The five new members, in order of the number of votes won by each are: Abu al-Walid, Rafiq al-Natshah, Hani al-Hasan, Majid Abu-Sharar and Qadri. Sixteen candidates had been nominated for these positions.

If we review the number of votes received by the nominees, we can see how close they were. The difference between the highest and lowest vote was 30 votes out of a total of 530. This should prove the important fact that the real winner in this election and in the conference as a whole was the unity and integrity of Fatah.

We hope that everyone understands that we the members of the old committee neither interfered in the elections nor tried to influence any member. If there is anything to criticize, it could be our excessive democracy. We are proud of our democracy, and we hope that this democracy will reflect on our political life in our future state.

There Is No Need For a Secretary General

[Question] Since we are talking about the elections and the organizational structure of the movement, could you explain the jurisdictions and responsibilities of the organizational arms of the movement?

[Answer] The general conference is the highest authority in the movement, but the Fourth Conference decided to delegate some of its authority to the new revolutionary council whose membership will reach 78. This was a new move in the history of our movement, but it was adopted for the purpose of strengthening the actual participation of the highest number of our cadres in the struggle, in the execution of the conference's decisions and in monitoring the central committee.

It is important for me to explain that what we call a central committee would be called a political bureau by other organizations. The committee represents the executive power in the nation, although it is directly elected by the general conference.

[Question] Is this the reason why Fatah is the only organization without a position for a security general?



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] This is true.

[Question] What is your official title in the movement?

[Answer] I am the official spokesman of the movement, and the conference unanimously appointed me commander in chief of its armed forces. Brother Abu-Jihad (Khalil al-Wazin), was appointed deputy of the commander in chief.

[Question] You are also the commander in chief of the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the chairman of the executive committee of the PLO. The question arises as to the relationship between Fatah and the PLO, especially as contradictory statements have been made in this regard.

[Answer] The conference made it clear that the PLO is the main structure which includes all the Palestinian people, and that Fatah is considered to be the backbone of the revolution.

What appeared to be a disagreement in the relationship of Fatah with the organization is due to the simple reason that a number of political decisions were made by the national councils of the PLO. The Fatah conference was not in session to approve or modify them. For this reason, and in spite of the fact that all these decisions won the approval of the central committee, the revolutionary council and the military command of Fatah, it was necessary for the conference to confirm them.

This is exactly what happened. After discussing these decisions, the conference approved them and regarded them as a complementary part of its own resolutions and political program, based on the concept that these decisions are not contrary to the goals and principles of the movement.

At this point, I would like to stress that brother Abu al-Lutf (Faruq al-Qaddumi) and myself talked least about this issue, because we are members of the executive committee of the PLO. However, other brothers dwelt on it, especially Abu Ayad (Salah Khalaf) and Abu Sa'id (Khalid Hasan).

We Are Working Toward a Military Unity

[Question] We are going to hold up discussion of your political program until the end of this interview. I would like to pursue the issue of the relationship between Fatah and the other organizations. In other words, what about the national unity?

[Answer] No one doubts that national unity is the basis for achieving victory. The conference stressed its importance and the need to achieve it, especially in the field of military unity. The conference gave special directions on this issue to the new leadership. We have to remember always that this issue concerns other people as much as it concerns us and that its realization requires coordination. I would like to point out that the resolutions of previous meetings of our national councils already

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

indicated the importance of the military unity and gave the forces to be united the name of "the Palestine National Liberation Army." The National Council elected me as commander in chief of the forces of the revolution.

Based on this, we formed the supreme military council of the revolution. Aside from the commander of the liberation army, it includes all top military officials of the Palestinian organizations. During a discussion of the national council concerning the distribution of financial assistance among the Palestinian organizations, I indicated that we have a golden opportunity to realize unity of the fighting men in every way such as in food, clothing, pay, weapons, equipment and training. This would be similar to what the Zionist enemy did when all its organizations were united to become the Israeli army. This project is still under consideration by everyone.

Fatah declared its readiness to form an immediate military unity with any of the Palestinian organizations that share this desire. We are ready to reach an agreement based on any kind of arrangement, and we intend to continue to pursue this subject. We have attained some progress in this respect, since the Supreme Military Council approved the unity of the naval forces, air forces, communications and central operations.

[Question] Some observations have been made concerning the political program as to what it contained and what it did not contain. I will mention these points one by one in order to listen to your comments.

Let us start with what was not included.

It is my opinion as well as the opinion of others that the political program ignored what could be called the livelihood issues of the Palestinian who suffers daily hardship.

[Answer] The fact that this issue was not included in the political program does not mean that it was of no importance to the conference. I believe that we should issue a complete statement on the work of the conference so that all may see the complete picture. The political program can be no more than a framework of prospective action.

Nevertheless, I am going to dwell here on a number of negative factors in our course of action, in order to overcome and correct them. But our negative factors will never overshadow our numerous and marvelous positive accomplishments during the past stages of our revolutionary progress toward the liberation of our nation. These positive aspects represent laurels which we wear with pride and honor.

Among the negative factors is the issue of the daily livelihood of the Palestinians. This issue includes residence, passports, entry visas, work permits and others. We do not forget that in this revolution we wear two hats, the revolutionary hat and the hat of government functions, such as

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNRWA functions, education, health, assistance to the municipalities inside the occupied territories, and other responsibilities which have not borne by any modern revolution as much as by ours. It should not be overlooked by anyone that the Arab countries, or at least some of them, did not abide by their resolutions to ease the life of the Palestinians, inspite of the fact that such resolutions were adopted at the highest level of the Arab league.

The Pursuit of Those Seeking Personal Gain

[Question] What about the negative factor of the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon?

[Answer] This is a fact which is referred to in the political program. It was thoroughly discussed by the conference. The result was the formation of a committee from the revolutionary council to pursue and punish those who are responsible. This decision was based on the fact that the selfish should not be allowed to derive personal gains while the selfless shed their blood in martyrdom. In their march toward their land, our people alone have the right to benefit from the heroism of those who sacrifice themselves for the cause.

[Question] Let us now talk about what was included in the political program.

[Answer] Before we get into this, I would like to say that you have failed to mention another negative factor we now suffer from. It is bureaucracy. This factor is the bane of the revolution, but we recognize that it was not possible for us not to be affected by it in our complex movement. We have made decisions which may not eliminate it, but they will at least control it so that we can channel our potential in the most productive manner.

[Question] You have indicated the possibility of issuing a complete statement on the works of the conference. Awaiting that, the only thing we have is the political program as it was published in the press. The first general observation is that the program contained nothing new. It is almost a repetition of that which we have previously heard or read. Is this true, and what is your opinion?

[Answer] Between our Third Conference, which was held in the wake of the September defeat [of the Palestinians at the hand of the Jordan Government], when we were dressing the wounds of Amman, 'Ajlun and Jarash, and this Fourth Conference, which was held to emphasize the effective existence of the revolution and its military and political activity inside and outside our occupied territory, there was a period of time filled with battles and challenges. We came out of this period stronger and more determined to continue our struggle. A few years ago, Dayan said that our revolution is like an egg in his hand, and that he could crush it whenever he felt like doing so. In 1978, [Israeli commander] Ghor was asked why he was not able to occupy Tyre and al-Nabatyyah. He answered: "What do you want me to do when I am faced with men who have decided to die?"

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

We have been progressing, and there is something new. The conference carefully evaluated developments, such as the October war, the eight day war and the continuing war of attrition. The conference also evaluated the developing escalation of our military operations inside the occupied territories, which led the enemy to form a special Knesset committee to discuss the situation. It also evaluated the magnificent popular struggle of our people in the occupied territories, which caused the enemy to lose his mind and to revert to his original routine of terror and treachery.

New political developments call for a new approach. What we have done over the years has shown our superiority over our enemy. If this was not so, we would not be enjoying this overwhelming international popularity, and the Zionist enemy would not have been in this state of oppressive isolation. We will not relent in repeating our nationalist demands until they are met.

#### Initiatives Require Cool Consultation

[Question] Prior to the conference, there were discussions and differences concerning the European initiatives. We were hoping that the political program would be more definite and precise. What is your opinion?

[Answer] The conference discussed our political moves from all angles. Frankly speaking, this took a lot of our time, especially since there were Arab and non-Arab attempts to undermine and distort these moves. This called for action by the central committee and its submission of detailed explanations. As a result, the conference blessed our political moves and called for intensification of the political effort. The conference held that the political front has to be invaded, especially in the European countries, Japan and Canada.

Of course, our activity in the camp of our friends, the socialist, Islamic, African and non-aligned countries, did not need any decision. The conference pressed for further developing our relationship with all liberation movements in the world. This is a distinguishing feature of the Palestinian struggle.

All resolutions adopted by our national council between the Third and the Fourth general conferences of Fatah were the object of enlightened, zealous and frank discussion, and were approved. It is known that during this period, the national council adopted its resolution to establish the democratic nation. Subsequently, it adopted what became known as the ten point program on the subject of national authority, and resolved to establish an independent Palestinian state. The Fourth Conference of Fatah clearly approved of all that.

The conference devoted time to the matter of the [West European] initiatives. We arrived at the conclusion that the matter requires that we take our time and be more deliberate. This is in view of the fact that this is a period in which: Israeli terrorism and Zionist inflexibility are increasing; the mask is being removed gradually to reveal the ugly face of America and its

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

insolent and shameless support of zionist terror, intransigence and occupation of our land; the Camp David process has reached a dead end; and Western Europe is dragging its feet on adopting a clear policy. The new Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council will follow the situation until we get a complete and clear picture of the situation based on the hectic developments in political and diplomatic activity relating to the Palestine and Middle East question.

For the same reasons, we put off discussion of the idea of forming a provisional government. Such decisions require more reflection. It is also necessary to intensify our deliberations first with our partners on the Palestinian scene, then with the Arab world, and, finally, with the outside world. As I have said before, this decision is being made by the Palestinian command at a time when it feels that its efforts and its revolution may have an opportunity to make headway.

[Question] In spite of clear indication in the political program of the movement's rejection of settlement outside Palestine, some believe that this subject requires more elaboration to support this rejection, especially with regard to rumors circulating in Lebanon.

[Answer] I no longer see any use in restating our position concerning this issue which we have already totally rejected in form and in substance. Everytime we defeat an allegation, another one is made. And when people run out of new allegations, they merely reiterate those which they fabricated previously. In spite of our daily military, political and diplomatic struggle inside and outside our occupied homeland, and in spite of the heavy price which we pay in blood and lives for the sake of our land and nation, we still find those who accuse us of resettlement. We have here a conference, which includes more than 500 of our best young men. It declares its rejection of resettlement, and yet we find those who insist on repeating this false accusation.

I would like to ask these people this question: If Fatah, the other Palestinian organizations and the PLO wanted resettlement, who would there be to oppose them, fight for liberation and for the establishment of the Palestinian nation? Would it be Israel and its agents or its allies at Camp David?

I do not want to elaborate anymore on this broken record. It does not fool us. It fools only those who play it. It may be that those who pretend to be so worried about resettlement want to [suggest it]. But you can quote me and tell those who are spreading this lie that no matter how hard they try to suggest resettlement to us, we reject it, reject it and reject it. We accept no substitute for Palestine.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

8988  
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

OIL COMPANY ACTIVITY--The French Oil Company's (CFP) report for fiscal year 1979 relates various activities of the group in the world. The CFP's presence is manifested in several African countries. In Algeria the tonnage marketed by the affiliate was maintained at 11,550,000 tons, compared with 11,800,000 tons in 1978. The national company's services had to do with seven reopened wells in Hassi-Messaoud, 13 drillings in the Alrar region and six in In-Salah structures. In Tunisia the Thala Maktar permit was granted to the local exploration affiliate. Two wells were drilled at sea in the eastern marine center and four on land in the Sidi-el-Itayem concession whose declining production was 200,000 tons, compared to 250,000 tons in 1978. In Egypt, several permits located in the Gulf of Suez are being added to the marine title in the Mediterranean. In the Sudan, one 6,400-square-km permit was obtained in the Red Sea. In the area of industrial cooperation, new agreements were concluded with Africa concerning aid to SONATRACH [National Company for the Transporting and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] for training personnel, building service stations, transporting products and building warehouses. In the Sudan two contracts were signed, one with the Petroleum Products Pipeline Corporation to improve the operation of a pipeline first put into service in May 1980, the other with the Petroleum General Administration for a general assistance agreement. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1961] 8946

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

CHADLI BENDJEDID REINFORCES HIS AUTHORITY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1831

[Editorial: "President Chadli Bendjedid Reinforces His Authority, After Reorganizing the Algerian Government"—passages in slantlines published in italics]

[Text] The reorganization of the Algerian Government that took place on 15 July, is less extensive (MTM, 18 July) than the reform of the FLN political department (MTM, 4 July, p 1674) which took place over 2 weeks earlier, on 29 June. Yet the two measures complement each other. When the reorganization of the army's staff is added to this, one can see the style of President Chadli Bendjedid. He is trying to establish his authority in using a series of measures that modify systematically, and relatively slowly but surely, the political character of the government.

Since the June movement, the measures adopted by the special congress of the FLN (MTM, 27 June, p 1616) significantly increase the president's power. By reducing the number of people in the Central Committee and in the Political Department, in modifying the latter's role which will be under the control of the secretary general of the party, namely of the head of state, reviewing the important committees of the FLN, constitute a reduction in and a simplification of the party structure, and show that its role will be modified, if not diminished. This review must affect a great many people; the difficult political balance, carefully established by Mr Chadli Bendjedid, who benefited from a compromise election in February 1979, can now be reconsidered by the same individual who, in the meantime, became a head of state with full powers.

Thus one can observe, without great surprise, that a certain number of seasoned politicians are not at the top in the Party anymore. It is true that for some of them it is only a matter of making a distinction between a party post and a governmental post, as shown in the case of Mr Abdelghani. It may be more surprising to see that certain job combinations were kept, and one cannot determine whether this is only a temporary precaution.

10

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

What is, thus, very remarkable is the continued presence in the Political Department, now reduced to seven members, of Messrs Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Mohammed Salah Yahiaoui, protagonists in the two leading rival groups, the liberals and the progressives, who were just as far apart at the time of Mr Chadli Bendjedid's election to the presidency. However, since Mr Bouteflika seems to be rather inactive and very isolated of late, while Mr Yahiaoui, whose post of party coordinator does not exist anymore, seems to have resigned himself to quasi retirement, one can only wonder whether being in the Political Department is as important as it once was, or whether its value is merely symbolic. Next to the president of the Popular National Assembly, Mr Rabah Bitat, and the army inspector general, Colonel Belhouchet who has important duties, Mr Benhamouda would represent Islam and Arabism. Mr Mazouzi would represent the Arab-Berber fact and the appreciation for loyal militancy.

From then on, with a reduction in the splitting of votes, though this is still significant, in the Political Department, one could consider the latter a temporary survival, an ultimate evidence of necessary power-sharing in a period of transition that is coming to an end. However, we cannot ignore the possibility that President Chadli Bendjedid actually wanted to change the Party's executive branch into a high council of the highest authority. Based on this assumption, it seems quite normal that Mr Abdelghani, the head of state, would cease to be a member of the Political Department. Contrary to the expectations of some observers, he was not relieved of his duties as prime minister, and the cabinet reshuffle is very limited, which explains why it took place during Ramadan, a time for political break.

Evidently, President Bendjedid plans to have strong personalities as ministers in the executive branch, men whose strength, efficiency, and loyalty he had evaluated himself. One is not surprised to see the confirmation of the ministers of Planning and Higher Education, Messrs Abdelhak Brerhi and Abdelhamid Brahimi, whose handling of the university unrest and fight against shortages revealed a felicitous energy, and who are, in a way, very popular. One also notes that Mr Boualem Benhamouda, who showed qualities desirable in a minister of the Interior, kept this post and became the only person still a member of both the cabinet and the Political Department.

However, in keeping Mr Mohammed Cherif Kharroubi, minister of Elementary Education, considered to have been partially responsible for the Kabylia crisis, the head of state shows that he has not given in to demagogy in any way and that he does not necessarily object to some show of strength. The choice of Mr Boualem Bessaïeh as minister of Information and Culture, and who was completely trusted by Mr Bouteflika, shows the flexibility and broadmindedness with which these appointments were made.

The number of military men among the ministers of the new Abdelghani cabinet remains unchanged: The new minister of Post and Telecommunication, Mr Abdennour Bekka, comes from the army; on the other hand one notes the departure of Mr Abdelmegid Aouïchiche, who was not successful enough with the difficult tasks in Construction and Housing, for which the cooperation of Eastern countries was disappointing.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Moreover, the president, who is in charge of national defense, has, in this capacity, deputy-ministers who are not cabinet members, Col Abdallah Behouchet (member of the Political Department) and Col Kasdi Merbou, former head of military security; the re-establishment of the military staff completes the appointments, showing that the army has not been forgotten.

An Original Initiative: National Conference on Higher Education

As of 2 July, the relay of the great FLN debates was, to some extent, picked up by an original kind of national conference, due to the initiative of Mr Abdelhak Brerhi, minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research. In order to end a serious crisis at the university that was started by the "Berber affair," he did not hesitate to speak at stormy general assemblies for students. He emphasized the fact that he was applying the directives of the president in order to "give more depth to the democratic debate at its roots," and he gave instructions to the students that would satisfy their desire to express themselves; it was a question of preparing quickly the first "National Conference on Higher Education."

In introducing these new debates, Mr Brerhi declared: /"The university has shown the need for debate by using dialog and democracy."/

Algerianization of higher education and Arabisation would provide the themes for the most impassioned debates. The minister was able to bring out the fact that it was unrealistic to insist on immediate Arabisation and monolingualism, which, according to another cabinet member, Mr Abdelhamid Brahim, would only be /"another form of illiteracy"/. After a year of common-core studies, /"orientation councils"/ will guide the students according to their ability and inclination, keeping in mind the jobs available as well as those scheduled by the plan. With technical help from Jordan, an Institute for Islamic Studies will be created, with a view to placing the teaching of theology on a true scientific level.

The general statement adopted at the close of the conference recognizes that the university reflects the changes and contradictions in the Algerian society, and recommends /"the responsible exercise of revolutionary democracy"/ assuring the peaceful participation of all. The participants, finally, /"express their conviction that the socialist option of the Algerian people is the best way to reassert the value of patrimony of the Arab-Islamic culture and civilization, by opening up towards the outside world and in favoring the generous values of Islam."/

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

9465  
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

PREPARATIONS FOR FIVE-YEAR PLAN CONSIDERED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 May 80 p 13

[Article by Mohamed Razine]

[Text] In a few weeks the National Liberation Front (FLN) Party will hold its special congress, planned since February 1979, to debate and adopt the 5-year plan (1980-84), the first of its kind in Algeria. When they enter the conference hall, the delegates will be thinking about all the economic, social, cultural and everyday problems facing the country and all the questions, sometimes vital, which they are preparing to answer in order to strengthen national independence and to expand the achievements of nearly 20 years of hard work, sacrifice and struggle ... They will not be alone in their work. All around them will be the forces of the people, "the fundamental forces of the revolution," as emphasized in the organic resolution of the FLN Central Committee's last meeting, which calls for their "general mobilization" to combine all efforts to assure the success of this plan. That Central Committee session was the culmination of long and detailed preparatory work carried out under President Chadli Bendjedid's leadership with a concern for efficiency, thus including a rigorous self-critical examination. President Chadli Bendjedid has also been supported unanimously in the efforts which he has made to strengthen party structures and government agencies on the basis of the principle, "the necessary man in the necessary place."

The Three "Unities"

One of the first credits on Chadli's record during the short period of time since he became chief of state is that of having established, in accordance with the guidelines defined by the National Charter approved in 1976, three basic "unities": 1. Unity of political leadership, represented by a 200-member Central Committee, the supreme authority between congresses; 2. Unity of ranks within one party, the FLN, whose not yet totally assumed role is to be the vanguard of society; 3. Unity of political words and actions, those of the National Charter. There will perhaps still be some indecision, particularly with regard to structures and clarification of the prerogatives of political bodies, but certainly the most important thing is that everyone has now become fully aware of the determination of the chief of state, the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FLN's general secretary, to eliminate foot-dragging, fence-sitting, double talk and to use the legal framework for tackling all problems, regardless of their nature. It is within this framework that careful consideration, already at a rather advanced stage, shall lead, through the congress, to the establishment of the major programs of the decade.

The FLN Central Committee's three previous sessions laid down the main guidelines in delicate areas in which the government plans to implement without delay a sustained and versatile program to make up for the former inadequacies seriously affecting all economic sectors: water resources, housing, agriculture, etc.

Solutions have already been derived in the case of the agricultural sector. Before the last Central Committee session opened, everyone agreed concerning agriculture's persistent problems and their effects on the daily lives of citizens: stagnant production in relation to rising incomes and population growth, the inadequacy of supporting structures for business, aging of the agricultural population, etc. Based on these same findings, various recommendations were discussed from the standpoint of strengthening existing production structures. The Central Committee first chose to take action in regard to the business sector: marketing, financing, supplies, etc. Significant improvements will also be made in the case of large self-managed estates whose "hugeness" (1,000 hectares on the average) facilitates neither management nor supervision. In general, the government is being asked to restore order "to free the agricultural sector from the internal and external constraints altering its socialist development." Thus superfluous bureaus and agencies will simply be eliminated. Producers, for example, will be able to freely sell their produce.

One of the most important measures involves the establishment of an agricultural savings bank which will have very broad powers to finance business investments and to grant capital goods and farm loans whose beneficiaries will be able to use them as they see fit without prior supervision, as is still the case at the present time. Through this measure, the aim is to combat in particular the obvious serious lack of investment in agriculture: obsolescence of plantations, maintenance of basic installations, etc., affirming the responsibility of the producer, currently deprived of this by a meddlesome, stifling bureaucracy. In other words, as President Chadli put it: "An agricultural system based on trust and protection of the producer and utilizing the latest experience to assure a considerable degree of self-sufficiency in the area of foodstuffs, an adequate supply of citizens' staple commodities and preparation for the post-oil and -gas period."

One thing can already be learned from this debate on agriculture: Doubt in this respect, actively desired by an alert middle class taking advantage of the state of confusion between neglect and reform, has clearly been rejected. President Chadli stated strongly at the opening of the session: "I have pledged to you and to the Algerian people to respect the National Charter and I will pursue that path at all costs. I will also see to it that all action is taken in the light of the charter and I will take the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

responsibility for demanding an account, under the law, of anyone who should overstep the charter."

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

11915

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

SONATRACH-TOTAL DEAL REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1963

[Text] The national Algerian company, SONATRACH [National Company for the Transporting and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] and the Total group on 24 July signed a partnership agreement for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons on two parcels, Sif Fatima (3,885 square km) and El Merk (3,330 square km), which are located in eastern Erg.

Total Algeria, an affiliate of the French Oil Company (CFP), holds a 17.5-percent interest and is the operator for the exploration work, which will be spread over four years. The national Algerian company, SONATRACH, for its part owns a 65-percent interest and will be the operator if there is any development. BP-Gelsenberg is participating in the partnership also, for the remaining 17.5 percent.

We recall that the Total group, on last 21 May, had already signed an exploration agreement for a parcel of approximately 4,300 square km in the Ber-iane-Hassi R'mel region, and on 16 July another exploration agreement for a parcel of approximately 5,010 square km in the Berkine region (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 May, p 1254 and 18 July p 1788).

The total of the commitments underwritten by the Total group for the four parcels amounts to approximately \$150,000,000.

The SONATRACH-Total agreement for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in Algeria, announced in Paris on 31 July, is the third of its kind to be concluded between the two companies and the eighth concluded by the Algerian company with foreign companies since last 21 May, an AFP dispatch from Algiers emphasizes. These agreements, which mark the relaunching of hydrocarbons exploration activities in Algeria--which has been reduced since 1976--deal with parcels totaling approximately 42,000 square km.

During this period when it was signing three accords with the CFP affiliate, SONATRACH was signing similar accords with four other companies--Braspetro, Standard Oil of Ohio (SOHIO), AMOCO Algeria and Sun Oil, and a West German consortium made up of Saabergwerke, Verba Oel, Union Rheinische Braunkohlen Kraftstoff and Wintersall-AG.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In SOHIO's case, exploitation expenditures to be committed will be financed by the \$3-per-barrel subsidy on crude imposed by SONATRACH on purchases by its customers, who have no exploration activities in Algeria.

Total-Algeria (CFP), one remembers, is not subject to this subsidy, the abolishment of which could be announced soon by all the customers for Algerian crude.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

8946  
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE--Negotiations to resolve the French-Algerian dispute resumed in Paris on 18 August at the level of the secretaries general of each country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The negotiations have been going on since the end of last January and were supposed to result in a 12 July meeting in Algiers between Algerian foreign minister Mohammed Seddik Benyahia and his French counterpart Jean Francois-Poncet. At the last minute, on the request of Algeria, the meeting was pushed back because of "technical scheduling reasons." Explaining the postponement, diplomatic sources in Algiers cited the imminent Algerian government shuffle decreed on 15 July and the tired condition of Algier's top diplomat after a long succession of trips abroad (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 July, p.1787). Actually, various sources in Algiers claims that differences of opinion on the conclusions of the six panels set up since Benyahia's last visit to Paris also have something to do with the postponed meeting between the two Foreign Ministers. Just prior to 12 July, both parties emphasized that only "technical details" remained to be ironed out before reaching a comprehensive agreement on the dispute that has occasioned so much friction between countries for some years. Now it appears that they might be going back to review the entire portfolio in detail (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 July, p 1732). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 22 Aug 80 p 2072]

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

FOURTEEN NOMINATIONS APPROVED INCLUDING DEFENSE MINISTER

JN070808 London REUTER in English 0746 GMT 7 Sep 80

[Text] Tehran, 7 Sep (REUTER)--Deputies were clearly taken aback by the shrunken appearance of the cabinet, because the president had been expected to approve more ministers than he has done. In the early stages of today's debate, which was attended by Mr Raja'i, several members suggested postponing the scheduled vote on the reshaped cabinet.

Aside from the six ministers rejected by Mr Bani-Sadr, no one was proposed for the education ministry. Mr Raja'i had initially pencilled himself in to retain his old post, but after a week's reflection apparently decided that the premiership would keep him fully occupied.

One cabinet job was added to the original list today. The president approved Mahmoud Ahmadaqdeh for the job of minister of state and head of the national steel company. This brings the total cabinet size to 21.

Two days ago, the president received crucial backing from revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, who said he need only approve those ministers he found acceptable.

But Mr Bani-Sadr's reaction to the revolutionary leader's decision was far more bold than was predicted.

An economist by training, Mr Bani-Sadr has refused to give control of Iran's economy to largely untested men.

Mr Raja'i's proposed oil minister, 27-year-old Asghar Ibrahim, was one of today's most significant casualties. Another was Mohammad Nurbakhsh, 32, who was due to become minister of economics and finance.

Two men were at first slated for the commerce ministry, one representing the president and another Mr Raja'i. Neither was put forward today, suggesting that the two leaders also disagreed on that job.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



The following were the 14 proposed ministers approved by the president today and presented to the Majlis:

Minister of Health: Dr Hadi Manafi-  
Minister of State and Head of Welfare: Mohammad Ali Fayyazabakhsh-  
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications: Dr Mahmud Qandi-  
Minister of Roads and Transport: Musa Kalantari-  
Minister of Science and Higher Education: Dr Hasan Arefi-  
Minister of Industries and Mines: Mohammad Reza Nejmatzadeh-  
Minister of Agriculture: Mohammad Salamati-  
Minister of State in Executive Affairs: Behzad Nabavi-  
Minister of State and Supervisor of Ministry of Housing and Urban Development: Mohammad Shahab Gonabadi-  
Minister of Power: Dr Hassan 'Abbaspur-  
Minister of National Guidance: 'Abbas Duzduzani-  
Minister of Interior: Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani-  
Minister of Defence: Colonel Javad Fakhuri-  
Minister of State and Head of National Steel Company: Mahmoud Ahmadzadeh.

CSO: 4920

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

IRANIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES BATTLE KURDS IN NORTHWEST

JN302032 London REUTER in English 2007 GMT 30 Aug 80

[Text] Tehran, 30 Aug (REUTER)--Government forces battled Kurdish guerrillas in and around the Kurdish stronghold of Mahabad today as the four-month-old Kurdistan war appeared to be nearing a climax.

West Azerbaijan Deputy Governor Mojtaba Hashemi said fighting erupted last night and continued through today in several parts of the city and surrounding area.

He said army troops and Revolutionary Guards had not yet launched a full-scale drive to recapture Mahabad, centre of a West Iranian border zone controlled by Kurdish autonomists for the past 10 months, but this was expected soon.

The government side had so far lost one dead and two injured, Mr Hashemi said. He had no figures for insurgent casualties.

The official said the two sides were fighting heavy artillery duels on the hillsides surrounding Mahabad, but the government forces had not so far turned their big guns on the city itself, in an attempt to avoid mass death and destruction.

Speaking by telephone from the West Azerbaijan capital of 'Urumiye, Mr Hashemi said the armed forces were limiting themselves to matching the weaponry being used by the Kurdish "Peshmerga" guerrillas.

Scattered gunbattles continued past nightfall in the streets of Mahabad, whose fall to the government would mark a virtual end to Kurdish control of urban centres and drive the guerrillas back into the mountains.

Mr Hashemi also reported fighting today in several other parts of Kurdistan which he did not identify.

CSO: 4920

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

CONVOLUTED CONDITIONS IN COUNTRY EXPLORED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun -4 Jul 80 pp 46, 47

/Article by Faruq Abu Zahr: "When the Angel Eats the Forbidden Fruit: Iran--The Fall from Heaven to Earth, without a Parachute"

/Text/ There is always a red line separating revolution and chaos. Iran has crossed the red line in broad strides, to find itself on earth once again, in the midst of devils, after having lived through a golden dream with Khomeyni's angels in a world of hopes and destiny.

The political thermometer shows that Tehran is going through a hot summer. The game of tug-of-war among the power centers struggling for control has been going on for 17 months and threatens to turn into heated confrontations which might put the regime of the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeyni in serious danger.

About 2 weeks ago, Khomeyni (age 80) gathered the governors of the provinces around him and started to talk to them in tones which those who had rallied around "the guide of the revolution" had not been accustomed to since Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi fell last year: "I have absolutely never felt the fear I feel today of seeing the Islamic Republic end in failure. Wherever my eye falls I see dispute and struggle. If the situation continues to deteriorate, it will be difficult to continue the revolution."

Khomeyni refers bitterly to the intensifying struggle between forces and says, "There are struggles between students, between men of religion and politicians, between the military army and the Revolutionary Guard, between policemen and revolutionary committees. Everyone is calling for agreement but they do not agree."

Two days had not passed since that meeting when a violent battle broke out in the middle of the capital, Tehran, as groups belonging to the Hezbollah, the extremist wing of the Islamic Republican Party, invaded a festival which the left-wing Islamic Mojahedin-e Khalq organization led by Mas'ud Rajavi had held. As a result of that, some people were killed and dozens were wounded.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

President Abol Hasan Bani Sadr took the opportunity to condemn the practices of the Republican Party partisans and said "Cudgels will not bring infidels back to Islam. One must cast down this stick, because Islam prohibits the use of savage force."

The same day in which blood was flowing at Amjadieh Stadium near the American Embassy, where the clash occurred, Hojjatoleslam Reyshahri, chief of the revolutionary courts in the army, disclosed the arrest of seven persons in the armed forces belonging to an organization which was planning to eliminate the existing regime.

A number of days later Reyshahri returned to point out that 100 people in the armed forces had been condemned or were on their way to trial and that the authorities were punishing 150 others for their connection with a revolutionary conspiracy.

#### Bani Sadr Charges Ayat

However, the apex of the recent Iranian events, and their most provocative event, was the publication of news by the newspaper JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, loyal to Bani Sadr, on a plot hatched by clerics to do away with the president and monopolize power definitively.

The paper, in two instalments, published the details of the tape recordings of a meeting which took place between Dr Hasan Ayat, the official spokesman of the Republican Party and former candidate for the presidency, and a number of student leaders.

The plan of the clerics' party was as follows:

Raise the cry of cultural revolution and crush the universities and cultural institutions on the excuse of purging them of "enemies of Islam."

Make publicity to expel professors who do not have allegiance to the Republican Party, and secure a climate which could guarantee that the universities remained suspended until next September.

Conduct a blitz to paralyze Bani Sadr's movement, incapacitate him, accuse him of cooperating with the Americans, and provide the necessary means within the army for confronting him.

Implicate Khomeyni in the Islamic Republican Party once and for all.

In his alleged conversation, Ayat says "I do not anticipate that Bani Sadr will remain in his position, but we must make use of time and organize ourselves while waiting for the appropriate time." The appropriate time will be when Bani Sadr is compelled to resign and a cleric is appointed in his place. Hasan Ayat recommended Ayatollah Montazeri, the former imam of

23  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Tehran, who recently preferred to withdraw to Qom to devote himself entirely to religious affairs.

Dr Ayat accused Bani Sadr of acting "in accordance with an American plan." He referred to his role in the operation which destroyed the two American helicopters in the desert in the wake of the failure of the operation to rescue the hostages which took place toward the end of April.

The Islamic Party intervened to claim innocence of Ayat's views and to describe what was published as "a conspiracy" against the party, which enjoys a majority of seats in the Consultative Council (parliament). Ayat claimed that what Bani Sadr published was distorted and that he was prepared to go before a firing squad.

Observers in the Iranian capital consider that the recordings which were published, regardless of how true they were, come at the peak of the struggle underway between the two main powers on the political scene and mean that relations have reached the point of no return between two currents:

The political and technocratic current, headed by Abol Hasan Bani Sadr, which calls for the codification and organization of the revolution, in order to rally around "the process of building and remedying the deteriorating economic and social problems."

Bani Sadr's partisans charge that the Islamic Republican Party is made up of a group lacking homogeneity which has agreed to grab power no matter what the cost.

The religious current, led by the Islamic Republican Party, which emerged triumphant from the recent parliamentary elections, led by Ayatollah Beheshti. It stresses the need to follow through with Islamic premises without inhibition until society is purged of the dregs of the past era, without any consideration for the balance of domestic and foreign forces.

#### Issues the Dispute Revolves around

One can state that the millstone of fighting between the two parties is revolving about four main issues: the centers of power, the issue of the hostages, formation of the cabinet and the army.

As regards the centers of power, Bani Sadr claims that it is necessary to establish the central authority and unify the decision-making sources.

The fact is that the clerics rushed in after the fall of the Shah to take over sensitive positions and inherited institutions and, by virtue of their organization and their presence in the front ranks during the uprising against the regime, managed to be closer to daily life than the politicians, who were mostly in prison or exile.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Following his election as president last January, Bani Sadr tried to recoup these positions in order to ensure his authority and strengthen his grip. For example, as president, he issued a number of decrees related to the judiciary authority, on grounds that that was one of his powers according to the constitution and that the revolutionary courts, which Ayatollah Khalkhali was in charge of, could not detain citizens, try them or issue death sentences against them arbitrarily and without providing the necessary guarantees.

However, the clerics resisted him forcefully, until he triumphed over them and sent Khalkhali off to another position.

As regards the issue of the American hostages detained since last 4 November, Bani Sadr considers that the detainment has weakened the revolution and has bluntly accused the clerics of standing behind the students' movement. The Republican Party has considered that it is necessary to try the hostages and treat them as hostages.

With the escalating intensity of the disputes between Bani Sadr and the clerics, the issue of the detainees has been a basic subject in the daily record of Iranian events.

The dispute reached its zenith between the two parties over the designation of the prime minister, although the constitution has granted the president this power, the Republican Party, which emerged triumphant in the elections, refuses to be bound to it and considers the matter to be one of its areas of specialization.

Bani Sadr calls for the establishment of a strong coalition government which will be able to close ranks and deal with the economic, political and social problems the revolution has identified.

The clerics reject this thinking, stating that Khomeyni has insisted it is necessary to unify the government and that this unity makes the elimination of some groups mandatory. One cannot establish such unity between Moslems and Communists or between what is called Islam and what distorts Islamic thinking.

Some observers stress that the timing of the publication of the recordings indicating the Republican Party's implication in the "conspiracy" against Bani Sadr is related to the struggle going on over designation of the premier and members of the cabinet in particular and that Yadollah Sahabi, temporary president of the chamber of deputies, pointed out that parliament would begin serious work next week.

The president wanted to record some points against the clerics in his own behalf in hopes that he might be able to acquire the power to appoint the premier.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

There remains the issue of the armed forces. Bani Sadr, by virtue of constitutional provisions and in accordance with Khomeyni's desire, is the supreme commander of the armed forces and sees a winning card in them which might in the future help him strengthen his status domestically as well as guarantee stability in minority regions.

However, the clerics take a different view. The army, in their view, still is subject to doubts. They anticipate evil consequences from the call to reorganize it and stress that it is necessary to develop the resources of the revolutionary guard and the revolutionary committees and purge the armed forces of senior officers, especially those who had previously received training in the United States.

In this sphere, also, observers state that the operation of publishing the recordings was tantamount to a "password" uttered by Bani Sadr to create radical changes in the army command. He appointed Gen Valiollah Fallahi, commander of the ground forces, to the position of chief of general staff, the place of Gen Mohammad Hadimemhr, who became a consultant to the president, and appointed Gen Qasem Ali Zahernezhad commander of the ground forces. Air force colonel Javad Fakhuri assumed command of the air forces in the place of Col Amir Bahman Baqeri, who had resigned a short time before.

#### Where Does Khomeyni Stand?

There remains a question which is baffling to all: Where does Khomeyni stand, precisely, and alongside whom?

Khomeyni recently got in movement and adopted a group of measures and decisions which seemed to observers like the process of distributing a legacy between two forces, out of his desire not to give either the chance to monopolize power. One can summarize his most conspicuous acts as follows:

In the middle of this month, he agreed to the start of the Islamic cultural revolution "to eliminate the culture and training inherited from the previous regime, which aimed at serving imperialism." The clerics had pressed this demand to "clean" the universities and schools of leftist and secular forces which do not support them. In fact, the operation started recently and 389 university professors and students were expelled on the charge of working as agents of the previous regime.

Khomeyni called on Ayatollah Montazeri to choose three members to the Supreme Judiciary Council. However, the former imam of Tehran rejected the offer, knowing in advance that he would be confronting Ayatollah Beheshti, who heads this council.

Khomeyni appointed three clerics as his personal representatives within the armed forces (the army, police and revolutionary guard); their task is to present him with a weekly report on conditions in the armed forces.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This step has been considered a move on Khomeyni's part to try to reassure the religious establishment that the army will remain under its surveillance.

Tehran sources stressed that Abbas Zamani, "Abu Sharif," commander of the revolutionary guard, resigned his position under direct pressure from Khomeyni, in response to the desire of the Republican Party, on grounds that Abu Sharif was loyal to Bani Sadr.

In compensation, Khomeyni showed Bani Sadr favor and ordered the revolutionary guard forces to obey him; the "guide of the revolution" said that those who broke the laws would be punished, emphasizing "Bani Sadr is my representative and Islamic duty requires you to obey his orders, on grounds that he is the supreme commander of the armed forces."

While all this emphasizes that Khomeyni's survival is the safety valve for maintaining balance between the men of religion and men of the world, any movement toward a coup while he is alive will mean real civil war.

Gen Gholamali Oveysi, the former chief of staff, opposes this thesis, stating, "There is not the least doubt that the existing regime in Tehran is going through its last days. It has defamed Islam as it defamed Iran."

Gen Oveysi, who served in the imperial army for 40 years, is betting on existing contradictions and trying to assemble forces opposed to Khomeyni abroad and domestically in order to bring him down.

However, some observers say "It is early to anticipate whether the opponents will assume the role of the White Russians in the Bolshevik Revolution or whether they will be a real power."

Experts in Iranian affairs add that the opposition's problem lies in its lack of unity and coordination. Shapur Bakhtiar, the most prominent opponent of the Iranian revolution is, like Gen Oveysi, acting without coordination with other forces.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

11887  
CSO: 4902

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAQ

**NEW PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS EXTOLLED**

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Jun 80 pp 28, 29

/Article: "The Iraqis Experience Their First Democratic Experiment in 25 Years"

/Text/ This 20 June the Iraqis will go to the polls to elect their first parliament in 25 years. However, will the Iraqis' preoccupation with their democratic experiment deflect them from their concerns over what is going on beside them in this area of their vital, national concerns?

The most active, vital candidate in the general elections in Iraq is the Iraqi president himself. Mr Saddam Husayn is not letting up or growing weary these days as he traverses the length and breadth of the country, from north to south, receiving tens of thousands of citizens in their towns, villages and rural areas and surprising them in their homes, factories, farms and deserts.

The extreme heat of the summer season does not affect the concern of this young president, on whose face a smile appears whenever he finds himself among his ordinary compatriots, as he shares their meals and talk with them, asks them about their conditions, and even shares their clothes with them.

He appears in an Iraqi rural traditional turban, splendidly exuding intimacy and youth, with his distinctive features and expressions, which have been drawn out by the nature of the rich, fertile Arab soil of Iraq.

Saddam Husayn wants to live with his people, see them, experience them up close, examine their affairs and learn about their sufferings by himself, without barriers, agents or intermediaries and not from behind an elegant desk, a television screen or a radio speaker.

While Saddam Husayn does not actually intend to compete with the hundreds of candidates who are running for 250 seats in the National Council, he is in fact bringing to the hearts and minds of 13 million Iraqis an ambitious political, economic and social program.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

He wants to move this Arab country rapidly forward which even up to nearly the end of the sixties was divided by a few hatreds and political and party traditions, tossed about by foreign and regional caprices, monopolies and aspirations, and put it in the forefront of Arab countries in terms of movement, production and strength.

Today Saddam Husayn is building a country which by everyone's admission is the rising new force in the skies of the Middle East and Gulf area. He believes that this force may not be gained by political bargaining, regional struggles or Arab axes but by building a firm industrial and human base from which Iraq may venture forth to play the regional, national and international role demanded of it.

#### Stability Is the Basis of the Revolution

Saddam Husayn, in the last 12 years, has given the Iraqis, for the first time in the history of this Arab country filled with convulsions, the stability which is the prime basis of the construction process, and he also has, for the first time in the modern history of Iraq, given them self-confidence and confidence in the political leadership.

Stability, in Saddam Husayn's view, is the first condition to bring about revolution and transfer the revolution from the stage in which it was imposed by armed struggle to the stage in which it was implanted and deepened through economic and social achievements.

Perhaps the Iraqis realize today, as they are blessed with stability and are reaping the first fruits of long industrial programs and development and service projects in various fields, why Saddam Husayn has always been anxious to have the stability endure, and why he has not dealt lightly with those who tried to play with the country's security and safety.

Saddam Husayn wants the Iraqis to know the extent of what is expected of them, especially the new young generations, in a short time frame. His government does not hesitate to allocate billions of dollars to train manpower and provide technology and job opportunities. All he wants is that the ordinary Iraqi feel that he is embarking on a battle, a decisive battle against backwardness and dependence, and that he feel that the battle which is developing and advancing him is the battle of all Iraq.

This year Saddam Husayn is embarking on a unique experience in the history of the Iraqi revolution. It is the first democratic experiment in about a quarter century. It is an experiment in direct elections from which this 20 June will emerge the first elected National Council (parliament) which will participate with the government in its responsibilities for legislation, oversight, followup, holding to account and implementation as well.

Although the atmosphere and circumstances caused by the new Iranian regime's position toward Iraq and its political leadership, which has

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

reached the point of devising attempts at individual and group assassination, Saddam Husayn has been insisting that the elections be held at their specified time.

#### Bright Faces and Young Ones

There are for example Messrs Dr Sa'dun Hammadi, minister of foreign affairs, Dr Ahmad 'Abd-al-Sattar al-Juwari, former minister, Iftikhar al-Samarra'i, vice president of the Women's Federation, Dr Sadiq 'Allush, former head of the doctors' trade union, His Eminence Shaykh Nuri 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Mulla Huwaysh, vice president of the League of Iraqi Religious Scholars, Hamid Sa'id Hadi al-Amin, director general of the General Radio and Television Organization, the retired general Khalid Makki al-Hashimi, and 'Ubaydallah al-Barzani, the son of Mustafa al-Barzani.

In addition to these names, which are well known in the world of politics and national and vocational activity, there are candidates who come from various fields of work and activity, including white collar workers, laborers, peasants, writers, artists and party members.

Everyone has agreed to participate in the experiment, out of their faith that its success will provide Iraq with the first pioneering democratic experiment and will be the basis of the development of its free popular exercise and the implanting of its democracy.

The fact is that establishment of the popular constitutional organizations is, in turn, one of the decisive signs of political stability in the country. It also constitutes a sound political link between the political leadership and the mass base, and a lung through which the popular national will breathes and expresses its aspirations, hopes, desires and demands as well.

The prevailing belief is that the more the National Council expresses this popular will, the more proper and real the link between the leadership and the base will be and the more firmly it will be based on relations of citizenship alone.

Perhaps the hope now is that the Iraqis will succeed in choosing their representatives for their future parliament and that these representatives will be honest in embodying the popular will.

#### Iraqi Independence

The Iraqis' concern in building their constitutional and legislative institutions has in no way diverted them from following up on what is happening around them in their regional or Arab area.

They want to assert their independent platform in their Arab and international policy and they want their Arab brothers to follow this platform,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

which causes the higher Arab interest to influence all other interests, including the interests of friends and enemies alike.

It is firm independence which arises from this self confidence and the ability to follow a nonaligned platform in dealing with the various major and minor powers of the world.

This independence, which is based on national faith that the Arabs are one nation, specifically has its regional and international role and personality which derive from its traditions, its cultural and human legacy and its religious values and beliefs. It is this independence which stirs up resentment against Iraq on the part of the proponents of subservience and tactical or strategic connections with the wheels of international forces and those who hide behind a veil of brilliant slogans. It also stirs up the resentment of those who bear grudges against the Arab nation, do not want it to realize its national unity or its national identity, and deny it the characteristics of united nation in order to cast it into a sea of creeds, obscure claims and bombast before its unity is achieved, in order to eliminate its personality and strike out at its faith in its Arab affiliation, while every day, under their religious slogans, they exercise their racist domination of the peoples and minorities whom they have oppressed in the past.

Proceeding from this independence, Iraq, which is always anxious to assert its friendship with the socialist camp, has not hesitated to condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and it is also Iraq which sent the cream of its fighting forces to save Damascus in the 1973 war, cut off its relations with the United States in 1974, and refuses to restore them today as long as the United States does not correct its historic error in supporting and backing Israel and its aggression against the Arab nation.

It is Iraq which is extending its hand to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf, in spite of the difference in political regimes and social platform, in order to stress that the national connection and higher Arab interests are above social allegiances, economic platforms and political connections.

Perhaps it is a source of pride for Iraq that the trust between it and its Gulf brethren is becoming stronger and growing day by day and is based on mutual respect and pure fraternal relations.

Political independence also depends on economic independence. Iraq today sees no embarrassment in economic and commercial cooperation and dealings with other foreign countries, in spite of the difference in their political and economic systems. In Iraq today Indian, Yugoslav, British, American, Japanese and Soviet companies are working in the sphere of implementing development and construction projects. Iraq is anxious to acquire deep expertise, excellent experience, advanced technology and well-constructed

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

equipment from any source as long as these do not constitute a restriction on its political freedom of movement and independence.

Conversely, it exports its energy resources to various countries at a price dictated by national interests and market considerations, and the interests of international economic cooperation. Iraq is a rich country. It possesses oil reserves estimated at 100 billion barrels--that is, it is second to Saudi Arabia in the region from the standpoint of volume of reserves and the volume of production as well (3.5 million barrels a day), guaranteeing it between \$20 and \$30 billion a year.

A shining star glows in the sky of the Gulf, helping to draw up an Arab road to a better future for a nation which has still suffered from the humility of fragmentation, dissension and falsification of its goals toward unity and social justice.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

11887

CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LEBANON

SOVIET AMBASSADOR SEES BASHIR AL-JUMAYYIL, SHAM'UN

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun-4 Jul 80 pp 28-29

[Article: "Soviet Diplomacy Tries Its Luck in Lebanese Minefield; Dialogue Without (Klashnikoffs) Between Lebanese Front and Soldatov"]

[Text] Beirut--Dispatch from AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Bureau--Soviet diplomacy is trying its luck these days in the Lebanese minefield through its dialogue with the Lebanese Front leaders. The Lebanese government, despite its objection to Moscow's encroachment, expects Ambassador Soldatov to endorse the results, if positive, to its account.

At a time when attention was focused on ex-President Camille Sham'un's meeting with Aleksandr Soldatov, the Soviet ambassador in Beirut, the official circles were concentrating on the other meeting held between the Soviet ambassador and Bashir al-Jumayyil, the commander of the Phalanges Party militias.

This meeting took place on the same day as the Sham'un-Soldatov meeting. But the Phalanges, resistance and Soviet Embassy circles have been eager to suppress news of the meeting for fear that the nature of the current talks will be revealed at this delicate phase through which Lebanon is passing.

The Lebanese National Movement--left--circles say that this meeting, which is the third between the Soviet ambassador and Bashir al-Jumayyil, has not produced decisive results because the subjects with which it has dealt cannot be settled so quickly.

The National Movement circles add that the first meeting, which took place last March, came in the wake of the Syrian decision to assemble the Arab Deterrence Forces in Lebanon.

Through that meeting, Bashir al-Jumayyil wanted to establish an initial understanding on the phase following the assembling of the forces. However, when the assembling of forces stopped at the limit which it had reached, the second meeting was an occasion for Bashir al-Jumayyil to make two proposals to the Soviet ambassador:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The first proposal called for adequate Soviet guarantees for the Lebanese Front regarding the establishment of a balanced government with the other forces.

The second proposal called for initiating a mediation with the Syrian officials to reach an understanding on the various issues projected in Lebanon.

Perhaps what has drawn the attention of observers in recent days is the visit made to the border strip by two Soviet reporters, Vladimir (Kopolin) and Oleg (Arzilov), and their meeting with Sa'd Haddad, the deserting officer who is cooperating with Israel.

The two reporters were transported from Beirut by an official Soviet Embassy car for what was called an endeavor to prepare a report on the Middle East situation. Well-informed sources in Beirut say that this visit came as part of the understanding between Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Soldatov and Bashir al-Jumayyil and out of the latter's wish to acquaint the Soviets with the situation in the border strip area.

#### Issue of Dealing With Israel

What is evident so far is that Bashir al-Jumayyil's attempts have been motivated by more than one reason. The issue of dealing with Israel has begun to form for the Marunite Lebanese Front and for Bashir al-Jumayyil in particular a sensitive issue that foreshadows grave consequences. Bashir al-Jumayyil has tried repeatedly to break into a circle through which he can move flexibly toward the other Lebanese forces, the Palestinian resistance and Syria. But the Israeli pressure exerted on him has made him abandon his attempts.

Bashir al-Jumayyil repeats in his councils frequently that the attempts to assassinate members of al-Jumayyil family and leaders of the Lebanese Front could not have been all perpetrated by local Lebanese circles and that Israel may not be far from these attempts. The Phalanges militia commander lets no opportunity pass without declaring that the United States does not support him but supports his brother Amin and that this fact must motivate him to establish a balance among the international forces supporting the Lebanese Front.

If we add to all this the desire to reach an agreement with Syria, then Bashir al-Jumayyil has had enough motives to open the channel of dialogue with the Soviet Union to get new guarantees and to obstruct some roles in which the spell has almost turned against the magician.

The Syrian officials have been aware of what has happened. Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam has stressed this fact to a number of the National Movement members in recent weeks. Khaddam has expected the meetings between the Soviet ambassador and the Lebanese Front leaders to continue because

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

such contracts cannot produce rapid results and because the Soviets are awaiting better conditions to move openly in this sphere.

Goals of Soviet Diplomacy

Sources of the Soviet Embassy in Beirut say that the meetings with Camille Sham'un and Bashir al-Jumayyil are part of endeavors being made by Moscow to bring closer the views of the political forces on the Lebanese arena.

These sources believe that the Soviet ambassador has not offered any commitments of definite guarantees to the Lebanese Marunite political forces even though he has actually conveyed some proposals to Moscow to be discussed with the Syrian officials.

As for Bashir al-Jumayyil, he says that the contacts constitute by themselves a penetration of the wall of isolation imposed on the Phalanges during and after the events and that the goals are not so much the initial results as they are the final results which must secure fundamental guarantees for the future Lebanon.

Bashir al-Jumayyil's sources say that keeping the meeting out of the media limelight was necessary for fear that it could have caused sensitive issues to become subject to the well-known local acts of oneupmanship.

These sources add that an agreement on this approach was reached between al-Jumayyil and Soldatov, provided that future meetings be announced when tangible results are realized.

Even though Bashir al-Jumayyil has been eager to point out, as his sources say, his rejection of the Camp David policy because it constitutes an inlet to resettling the Palestinians in Lebanon, this rejection has not been coupled with a positive stance on the need to create a position of confrontation in which all the forces opposed to the Camp David policy and the U.S. peace process would participate.

Well-informed Phalangist sources say that such a position would constitute a fundamental transformation against the U.S. policy in the Middle East and that this issue is still the subject of study in the Phalanges Party. Two previous attempts to approve such a position had failed and this made it necessary to refer the issue to a retreat which the party will hold later this summer.

The official sources view these developments cautiously. A government source has said in comment that Lebanon used to object to the direct U.S. contacts with the Lebanese political forces and that it has now to object to the direct Soviet contacts with these forces and parties because all this doesn't help the state to regain its role, legitimacy and sovereignty.

The official sources also say that the issues projected deal with sensitive subjects that cannot be brought up without leading to a renewal of the



confrontation between the political forces. The official sources cite as an example of this the issue of the Syrian forces' withdrawal, even gradual withdrawal, from Lebanon and say that this issue was one of the issues brought up in the meetings between Bashir al-Jumayyil, Camille Sham'un and the Soviet ambassador and that bringing up this issue amidst the efforts to renew the stay of the Deterrence Forces will not be helpful.

The official sources further add that Lebanon had previously pointed out in its international contacts the need for the major powers to confine their Lebanese contacts to the official authorities, warning that direct contact [with the parties] under the current circumstances constitutes intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs.

#### View of Security Agencies

Apart of the official position, there seems to be another position that the security agencies are seeking to reach. This position calls on the state to deal with the current contacts with the aim of containing the results and of making them flow into the course of national detente and of what they may offer at the level of pacification.

Reports made by the security agencies say that the logic of international guarantees may constitute one of the positive inlets to the path of detente and that the state must make use of the current contacts because they create bridges of understanding among the Lebanese forces and parties through these middlemen.

These reports recall the role performed by the U.S. and Soviet ambassadors in 1978 during the confrontation between the Arab Deterrence Forces and the Lebanese Front militias in Eastern Beirut and remind that the cease-fire decisions were at times reached through these two diplomats.

The reports also suggest that the issues of the current contacts be discussed openly with the ambassadors of the major powers in order to establish some kind of coordination and to understand the inclination of the Lebanese forces in these meetings.

Dr Amin al-Hafiz, chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, says that he drew the attention of the Canadian Middle East envoy during the latter's stopover in Beirut last month to the role that the major powers perform through their contacts with the parties to the Lebanese conflict.

Dr Amin al-Hafiz has also said that he proposed that the envoy adopt the idea of transforming the contacts with and invitations to these forces into a dialogue aimed at encouraging these forces to join under the banner of legitimacy in Lebanon.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Western diplomatic sources say that this position is not new and that the western diplomats heard it when numerous invitations were issued by the United States to the Lebanese political leaders to visit Washington. These sources add that the Lebanese officials had expected the leaders to return with more moderate positions but that the leaders returned with radical positions which did not give the impression that their contacts had reached positive results.

Will Contacts Realize Their Goal

The diplomatic sources cite as an example of this the visit made by Bashir al-Jumayyil to the United States last year and his statements upon his return from there--statements in which he attacked the U.S. administration for its failure to understand what the Lebanese want.

The diplomatic sources add that the Lebanese officials thought that the United States had initiated direct pressure on Bashir al-Jumayyil to contain him and to give his brother Amin a free hand. But it became later evident that the subject ['unwan] of the contacts was bigger than the fact of the U.S. dealings with Bashir al-Jumayyil and with his brother who visited the United States in the same period.

The western diplomatic sources further add that the Lebanese officials have been eager to refer on several occasions to the need to make use of these contacts, if they continue, to push the political leaders and the leaders of the parties and of the militias in the direction of supporting the legitimate authority. The references came when the officials felt that these contacts have begun to give the forces and the parties large dimensions and a feeling of an international recognition of their presence and when, at the same time, the contacts began to give the parties concerned the impression that there is a roundtable or roundtables to achieve detente under the patronage of this or that state.

It remains to be said that the Soviet contacts with the leader of the Lebanese Front Militias have not brought about so far a mediation for a meeting with the leaders of the national forces and parties, unless we consider that Bashir al-Jumayyil's statements about the presence of constant contacts between himself and all the parties and forces in Western Beirut fall under the heading of the meeting with Soldatov.

The National Movement sources deny these possibilities and the Palestinian resistance sources believe that Bashir al-Jumayyil's statements are exaggerated and a part of a psychological propaganda campaign.

As for the government sources, they believe that a lot of what is happening has surpassed the stage of the question of whether these contacts have started or not because the question now concerns what these contacts, which are taking place at various levels and directly or through middlemen, have achieved.

The Soviets may be smarter than the Americans in the current contacts between the political sides in Lebanon. Or is the smartness in the kinds of roles distributed to the two [U.S. and Soviet] sides now that they have both realized that each of them has an extension on the Lebanese arena which it cannot disregard?

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

8494  
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LEBANON

EX-PRIME MINISTER AL-SULH DISCUSSES ROLE OF POLITICAL ISLAM

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun-4 Jul 80 p 30

[Interview With Ex-Prime Minister Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh; With Candidate No 2; Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh: Silence Is My Weapon in Government"]

[Text] If Dr Salim al-Huss' cabinet doesn't return to government because of the impossibility of forming a detente government, then ex-Prime Minister Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh is ready and waiting. He is now the number two Sunni candidate, after Rashid Karami, to form the next cabinet. He may even become the number one candidate. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has conducted this brief interview with ex-Prime Minister al-Sulh whose answers seem like a brief draft for a cabinet statement.

[Question] What is the role of the political Islam in making the government decision?

[Answer] Since independence, the political Islam has assumed the role compatible not only with the number of the Muslims but also with the rise, awareness and capability of Islam's leaders in guiding the government policy in the various Lebanese internal and external affairs.

This role changed with the change of the men who have represented the Muslims in the government and it hasn't always been easy. This role has clashed, and at times violently, with the will of others, considering that the rule doesn't belong exclusively to one sect and that it is a fair partnership among all.

The periods in which this role was performed best were the periods in which there was concurrence between the two wings of the rule, represented especially in the presidency and the premiership, on the basis of loyalty to Lebanon's supreme interest--a loyalty free of personal and sectarian influences and of disregard for this interest.

[Question] What is the Islamic Grouping's position vis-a-vis the National Movement--the left--and the Lebanese Front--the right?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] The Islamic Grouping's position vis-a-vis the Lebanese Front is completely different from its position toward the National Movement. By structure, the Islamic Grouping belongs to the factional grouping to which the National Movement generally belongs. The National Movement may be disputing with the Islamic Grouping over the representation of this faction. But this is an issue within the same faction. The disagreement over some issues or with some groups in the National Movement may be strong. But in the broad lines, there is agreement between the two sides.

As for the Lebanese Front, it disagrees with the Islamic Grouping and with the National Movement over all the political and ideological issues.

There aren't in the Islamic Grouping, for example, ideas for changing the political, economic and social system, even though the Grouping is not unaware of the shortcomings and drawbacks of this system. But the Grouping does not view the cure as the abolition of the system and the establishment of a new system. The Grouping believes that this system needs reforms that will free it of the impurities and will make it respond more fully to the demand of the Lebanese citizen that his free democratic political, economic and social system be an ideal system.

Though the Lebanese Front adopts the democratic system, there are issues over which disagreement has erupted between the Muslims generally on one hand and the Front on the other, beginning with the Front's use of violence and weapons to solve these issues, the Front's violent opposition to the Palestinian issue to the point of meeting with the enemy, its opposition to the relations with the fraternal Syria in a manner conflicting with the requirements and duties of brotherhood, nationalism and neighborliness, its projection of partitioning and cultural ideas that are alien to the Lebanese reality, its [advocacy of] Arab regionalism and its clinging to privileges whose continued presence is incompatible with the idea of equality, justice and of development toward a modern society and a modern state.

Sign of Success or Failure

[Question] What is the position of the political Islam toward the Arab conditions?

[Answer] The political Islam shoulders a major responsibility in the matter of the Arab relations generally and the Syrian relations in particular. The reason for this is the fact that the political Islam is fully aware of the Lebanese conditions on the one hand and knows the Syrian and Arab conditions with its mind and in its heart. Therefore, the task of the political Islam is to keep Lebanon affiliated and in interaction with the area and to convey to the area the knowledge on how to deal with Lebanon in its well-known social, economic and political structure.

This point is what constitutes the sign of the success or failure of the political Islam. If Lebanon is in disagreement with the Arab countries,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

then this means that the political Islam has not performed its internal and Arab role or has not succeeded in performing it. If Lebanon is in agreement with the area, then this means that the political Islam has done Lebanon and the Arab countries a major service.

The political Islam has always acted on the premise of Lebanon's interest. However, the other Lebanese parties have not always been fair to us and have at times even denied this fact even though the political Islam has always inspired that sound national Lebanese conduct that secures Lebanon's interest, stability and prosperity--a conduct that seeks to make Lebanon a society of justice and equality internally and a society of fraternity and loyalty to the Arab brothers. This has always been in Lebanon's interest.

[Question] What is the impact of the movement of the other sects--the Shi'ites, the Druzes and the Marunites--on the Islamic Sunni movement?

[Answer] When the Sunnis were moving politically almost alone, their movement was guided by the interest of the other Islamic sects and all the other Lebanese sects as well. The Sunna part of the Lebanese political Islam can only be happy with the movement of all these sects. The current Shi'ite movement and the Druze movement should not be in disagreement with the Sunna movement.

So far, rule in Lebanon has been centered in a partnership represented by the Marunite and Sunna sects primarily because these two sects hold together the two positions of the executive authority that shoulders the direct responsibility of dealing with government issues.

This has made it seem as if the Sunna monopolize the power in the name of the other Muslim sects. But this is not true. I would like to remind that shouldering the responsibility of government--the premiership--is not a pure gain and that whoever shoulders it may also incur a loss, and a big loss too.

The advice that I have always voiced is that no sect should try to reap benefits at the expense of disagreement between other sects, be they sects within the same religion or sects belonging to Islam and Christianity. Any faction that thinks any disagreement among the Muslims serves it and that works to create such disagreement is a faction that commits a mistake in its long-range calculations.

[Question] Does al-Murabitun--an armed Arab organization in the Muslim Western Beirut--represent, for example, the political Islam?

[Answer] The phrase 'political Islam' does not apply to al-Murabitun with its structure which is based on armed organization. There is a difference in method, and perhaps even in ideology, between al-Murabitun and the political Islam.

[Question] What are your observations regarding the position of Dr Salim al-Huss, the head of the outgoing [al-mustaqilah] government?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the present prime minister enjoys moral and educational qualities and capabilities that make him trustworthy but there may be disagreement of opinion in judging his work since he assumed the premiership.

He himself has said in his latest statement to the Chamber of Deputies that the current situation in Lebanon is worse than what it was 3.5 years ago. This is the period in which he has been in power. However, nobody can deny that luck has something to do with these results. Had he assumed the premiership under different circumstances, the results would have probably been different.

I prefer to Work Silently

[Question] If you were in power and were facing the same problems, how would you tackle the issue of the army decree and of organizing the army command, the issue of the south, the issue of deploying the army in the various areas, the principles of detente and the security problems?

[Answer] I do not believe in words that harm actions. Therefore, I would not publicize the presence of the problems as much as I would work silently to solve them. This is the difference. The difference is not at all in the positions because they are the same positions on which the Muslims agree.

[Question] Who is responsible for the political fragmentation of the Muslims within the various frameworks and what has the Islamic Grouping done in this regard?

[Answer] Why do you attribute the fragmentation to the Muslims exclusively?

The Islamic fragmentation does not apply to the Islamic society as a whole. This society is one cohesive unit. It is my belief that the rise of the Islamic Grouping has helped greatly not only to highlight this cohesion but also to safeguard and preserve it.

There is a strong, profound and unbreakable bond between the Grouping and this society. If somebody sees fragmentation in the Islamic society, then this is due to the multiplicity of the parties and organizations existing on the Islamic arena and frequently meeting within the framework of the so-called National Movement.

There is no doubt that there are Muslims in the National Movement and that it is among the Muslims. But the movement is not the Muslims.

COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

8494  
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LEBANON

LEBANESE ARAB ARMY'S HISTORY, GOALS, SITUATION EXAMINED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun-4 Jul 80 pp 31-33

[Article: "Castro of Lebanese War; Is There War of Life or Death Between Ahmad al-Khatib and Lebanese Military Intelligence?"]

[Text] Beirut--Dispatch From AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Bureau--Ahmad al-Khatib is an armed manifestation produced by the Lebanese war. At times, this manifestation disappears and is almost forgotten by all those who have and who have not engaged in the fighting and at others it surfaces and is felt and breathed by all those who have and those who have not engaged in the fighting.

Al-Khatib was an ordinary officer of the Lebanese army who, like any Arab youth, was attracted to Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir one day. When the Lebanese war erupted, al-Khatib found himself heading an army which had broken away with its troops, barracks and weapons from the official army to join the National Movement. Al-Khatib has engaged in both war and politics, letting his beard grow like Castro's and, like Castro, swearing that he would not shave it until the revolution triumphs. Cuba's Castro still wears his beard, and so does Lebanon's Castro.

On Monday, (the 16th of the current month of June), elements of the Lebanese Arab army hijacked a Lebanese army truck on the Sidon road. On Tuesday 3 June, the outcome of a clash between elements of the Lebanese Arab Army and elements of the Lebanese army traveling in an army truck in al-Rumaylah Quarter on the Sidon road was the killing of 11 persons and the wounding of 16 others. On the 9th of last May, armed roadblocks of the Lebanese Arab Army in Western Beirut and in al-Rumaylah Quarter kidnaped 22 soldiers, policemen and gendarmes and killed a staff sergeant of the Arab Deterrence Forces.

These are examples of the reports of the internal security forces in the past 2 months. We notice in the reports prominent activity on the part of the Lebanese Arab Army Organization which is led by First Lt Ahmad al-Khatib. Despite the reasons behind such security incidents, what draws the attention of both the officials and the citizens is the way in which



these clashes end only to be renewed again. The latest of these clashes, and perhaps not the last, is the clash which took place with elements of the Shi'ite Amal Movement in al-Nabi Shit town in B'albakk District.

What is the truth of the role performed by the Lebanese Arab Army and what is the role to which its commander, Ahmad al-Khatib, aspires?

At the end of 1975, the war of barracks and of army posts erupted in many parts of Lebanon and produced in al-Biqa' area a broad movement which wanted to correct the image of the Lebanese army. This movement, led by First Lt Ahmad al-Khatib, was able to start a series of uprisings in the various Lebanese military barracks and areas within a period of few weeks.

As soon as Ahmad al-Khatib succeeded in imposing his control on the barracks of B'albakk, Riyaq and Ablah at the beginning of March 1976, a staff sergeant was imposing his control on the position of Arnun and al-Shuqayf [Beauforte Castle] in the south and joining Ahmad al-Khatib's movement on 8 March.

The string of beads then broke. On 9 March, Rashayya Fort joined the Lebanese Arab Army and on 10 March, Marj'uyun and al-Khiyam barracks joined and were followed by the 'Araman barracks near Tripoli.

On 11 March 1976, and while Brig Gen 'Aziz al-Ahdab was declaring his television and radio coup, the Lebanese Arab Army was in the process of controlling Hulayl and Ghanim barracks in Tripoli, the command of al-Qulay'at military airfield in 'Akkar and al-Nabatiyah barracks in the south.

On the following day, the Zughayb barracks in Sidon, the Banu Barakat barracks and 'Adlun barracks in Tyre and the Combat School in Beirut joined the Lebanese Arab Army. Before few weeks had passed, most of the barracks, with the exception of the command of Beirut position and the barracks in the Christian areas from al-Fayyadiyah to al-Batrun, were under the control of First Lt Ahmad al-Khatib.

#### Story of Lebanese Arab Army

The Lebanese Arab Army movement has been clear from the outset. It wants to give Lebanon's army a fundamental role in the Arab battle against the Israeli enemy and wants Lebanon's army to be a national army and not a sectarian army, as was the case at the outset of the bloody events in 1975.

A commander of the Lebanese Arab Army at the time has said that the movement was born in the head of Ahmad al-Khatib and some of his colleagues in the wake of the Lebanese army's confrontation of the fishermen's demonstration in Sidon in April 1975--a confrontation which resulted in the death of a number of fisherman and in the assassination of Ma'ruf Sa'd, a former Sidon deputy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

But this movement did not see the light quickly because of the situation prevailing in the army command and of the inability of the officers to move amidst the constant military alert and watch imposed on the barracks.

With the successive fall of the barracks and their joining the Lebanese Arab Army, the number of officers joining Ahmad al-Khatib swelled to more than 200 officers with ranks ranging from colonel to lieutenant, in addition to a number of the War College cadets. What are the principles that attracted all of them to Ahmad al-Khatib?

Ahmad al-Khatib's colleagues admit that he was an ordinary officer from a major Sunna family in al-Kharrub District in al-Shuf, southeast of Beirut. His colleagues also admit that he was not distinguished at the War College or in his military service, even though he complained at times of the army command's treatment of the military generally and even though his dossier in the intelligence branch came to include references to this behavior.

Ahmad al-Khatib brought nothing new when he marched forth with his movement from al-Biqa'. He himself said in declaration No 6 which defines the main premises of the Lebanese Arab Army's uprising that the uprising was not "a sudden leap or a military whim with narrow goals or personal aspirations." Al-Khatib has also said:

"The Lebanese Arab Army's entity emerges through this army's national and pan-Arab aspirations and principles. The Lebanese people are Arab people and an indivisible part of the Arab peoples. History tells, and even confirms, this truth with which some Lebanese are not pleased. But these Lebanese cannot refute any of the elements of their national components. On this premise, we can assert that the Lebanese homeland is a part of the greater Arab homeland. A part of something means cohesion with this thing in meaning and structure, in body and in spirit. Therefore, Lebanon is a part of the Arab homeland and its people are a part of the Arab homeland's great people. Lebanon's role is compatible with and even fatefully tied to the Arab peoples.

"The recognition and acknowledgement of the Arabism of Lebanon and of its people does not change the reality under which we live. It will remain a superficial recognition and acknowledgement if we don't exercise and stress the common pan-Arab bonds and the popular aspirations, goals and interests of all the Arab peoples.

"Acting on this premise and in honor of the sublime national and pan-Arab interest, the magnificent uprising of the Lebanese Arab Army has been staged to establish right, justice and equality, to highlight the Arab Lebanese identity, to defend the rights of the oppressed and the tormented, to defend the lost homeland which they have wanted to be weak, to defend its sanctities that are violated day and night before the eyes of all, to unite with the deprived people and to stand with the people in one trench on several fronts in the face of the enemy's people at home and in the face of the escalating Zionist danger on the borders."

#### Confrontation With Syrians and Later Retreat

These goals do not stop at this limit. Like the other National Movement factions, Ahmad al-Khatib proceeded to launch virulent attacks against the Marunite Lebanese Front and then against the entry of the Syrian forces into Lebanon to put a stop to the bloody events.

At the time, al-Khatib described the Syrian forces as the "fraternal Syrian invasion" and this angered the Syrian officials at him in the summer of 1976.

An officer of the Lebanese Arab Army has said that the army wages used to be paid by the Lebanese army command in al-Yarzah with the approval of Rashid Karami, the then minister of defense. However, the Lebanese Arab Army used to receive very big aid from the Palestinian resistance.

Ahmad al-Khatib himself admitted this aid in a television interview in the summer of 1976 when he said that "the birth of Lebanese Arab Army came with big contributions from the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian resistance. We have marched forth for the sake of the National Movement and to prevent liquidation of the Palestinian resistance."

Sources of the National Movement, the left, in Beirut have said that the Lebanese Arab Army movement emerged in reaction to the Lebanese army's attempts to strike the Palestinian resistance. The Palestinian resistance has participated in paying the Lebanese Arab Army's salaries only because this army supported it within the framework of the joint forces which were formed of the Lebanese parties and political forces in 1976.

Perhaps what motivated the Syrian officials to get still angrier at Ahmad al-Khatib and the Lebanese Arab Army was the fact that this army's commander confronted the movement of the Lebanese Arab Army Vanguard which was initiated by officers in the area of Riyah and Ablah in coordination with the Syrian army. This anger intensified further when al-Khatib called for confronting the Syrian army which had launched the mountain [Mount Lebanon] offensive against the joint forces.

As the campaigns of the National Movement factions stopped with the entry of the Arab Deterrence Forces into the areas controlled by these factions, so did the Lebanese Arab Army's attacks against the Syrian officials and the Lebanese presidency.

On 7 November 1976, First Lt Ahmad al-Khatib declared his support for the message which President Ilyas Sarkis had addressed to the Lebanese. In his comment at the time, al-Khatib said: "We agree with his excellency the president on every word he has said in his message to the effect that these days in which we live are a delicate and serious historical phase not only for Lebanon but for this entire part of the world."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

After enumerating the plots being hatched against Lebanon, the Arabs and the Palestinian resistance, Ahmad al-Khatib concluded his comment by saying: "The role of the Lebanese Arab Army in the south has now become a unique leadership role and the presence of this army there has become a sacred national presence emanating from the Arab interest, including the Lebanese interest."

Al-Khatib also called on President Sarkis to bolster and bless the role of the Lebanese Arab Army and not to restrict the role of maintaining security to the Arab Deterrence Forces.

Ahmad al-Khatib in Grip of Syrians

Thus, the Arab Lebanese Army forces, or whatever remained of them, moved to the south where the Palestinian resistance forces were present. Ahmad al-Khatib remained extremely cautious in his moves for fear that the Syrian forces would arrest him. However, this didn't last long because the Syrian forces did arrest him at the outset of 1977. He was taken to Shtura and then to Damacus where he stayed under house arrest until November 1978.

The Lebanese Arab Army command tried on 22 January 1978 to avoid a crisis with the Syrian officials and Col Yusuf Mansur, the former chief of staff, issued statement No 68 on the army's goals and principles in which he renounced the army's previous position toward the Syrians and reaffirmed the role of the Deterrence Forces in Lebanon.

But this statement did not change the attitude of the Syrian officials toward Ahmad al-Khatib who remained under house arrest in Syria until he was released in November 1978 when he returned to stay in his house in Beirut and to refrain, in the initial period, from engaging in any political or military action.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese Arab Army's activity had receded and the army had set up its command in al-Nabatiyah area next to the Palestinian resistance positions. During this period, it was subjected to campaigns by the Lebanese army command, its forces, like others who were symbols of war, were denied promotions and the military public prosecution sued them under various charges, including that of grand treason.

Maj Muhammad Salim, the Lebanese Arab Army chief of staff, was sued on a charge similar to that leveled against Maj Sa'd Haddad who is cooperating with the Israeli enemy. This motivated elements of the Lebanese Arab Army to engage in activities hostile to the Lebanese Army.

This confrontation developed with the beginning of the movement initiated by the Lebanese Army command, and by the Intelligence Directorate in particular, against the Lebanese Arab Army. Ahmad al-Khatib has said that the Intelligence Directorate has made numerous attempts at his life and

that it has tried to detonate radio-controlled bombs in al-Bastah Quarter-- attempts which have caused the death of more than 15 of the quarter's inhabitants. This confrontation has reached a stage where not a single week passes without a clash or more between Ahmad al-Khatib's elements and elements of the Lebanese Army.

The Lebanese Army command views this organization as a kind of "military insurgence," considering that its leaders emerged from the heart of the legitimate Lebanese army. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, the organization has turned at present, in the view of the Lebanese army command, into one of the obstacles obstructing the spread of the legitimate authority, especially in the western parts of Beirut and in southern Lebanon.

#### Retreat Followed by Renewed Activity

Sources of the Lebanese Arab Army say at present that the number of this army's elements amounts to 1,800 officers and troops armed with various kinds of weapons and trained well in special centers in southern Lebanon.

These sources also say that most of this army's forces are stationed in al-Nabatiyah, 'Adlun, Tyre, al-Rumaylah and several parts of the capital and of its suburbs. The Lebanese Arab Army has been relying on Arab financial aid to pay the salaries of its troops since the [official Lebanese] army command stopped paying the wages of the troops who have not returned to it. Perhaps this is what has turned this army into a mixture of soldiers, exceeding no more than 400, and armed militias which form this army's backbone.

The same sources say that this army no longer possesses as large a number of vehicles as in the past because it was forced in a certain period to give up those vehicles with the Syrian forces' entry into the barracks of the national areas. This is why this army stages clashes every now and then with the aim of seizing some vehicles and weapons.

The Lebanese Arab Army still includes at present full-time military elements and is in better condition than others insofar as strength and cohesion with the popular bases are concerned. If it has adopted a strict [disciplinary] stance toward its elements recently, then the reward has come in part from the military operations that these elements stage and in which they seize weapons and vehicles.

A few days ago and while Ahmad al-Khatib was visiting the town of al-Nabi Shit in B'albakk District, armed elements of Amal Movement attacked his motorcade and told him to return to Beirut because he has a connection with the Libyan regime. A limited clash ensued but was contained and the Arab Deterrence Forces accompanied al-Khatib and his companions from B'albakk to Shtura.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

With the continuation of the present conditions, the Lebanese Arab Army is gaining new dimensions on the Lebanese arena. Even though some people say that al-Khatib is still within the framework of the factions produced by the war, supported by the resistance and adopted by Syria, it is evident that the manner of his movement is embarrassing all of them. Will new chapters of an old story be begun again or are there chapters and roles that have not ended yet.

Ahmad al-Khatib is a phenomenon that emerged like a meteor in Lebanon's sky. With his personality, his military uniform and his beard, al-Khatib was able to embody the aspirations of many youths who carried the arms in defense of Lebanon's Arabism and of the Palestinian resistance. But this phenomenon has lost a lot of its brightness now for reasons, perhaps foremost among them is the fact that all the Lebanese, both Muslims and Christians, have gotten tired of the armed manifestations and of the interfighting among the organizations--an interfighting which often takes place in populated quarters.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

8494  
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LIBYA

LIBYAN-EGYPTIAN BORDER CONFRONTATION ANALYZED

Paris AL-WATAN AL'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun-4 Jul 80 pp 34-35

[Article: "From July 1977 to July 1980: All Not Quiet on the Western Front"]

[Text] London--AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI--Has the time come for the second round between President Sadat and al-Qadhafi in the Western Desert? What reasons move the two to recall the bitter memories of the 1977 Desert War?

In less than a year, Libyan President Mu'ammr al-Qadhafi found his regime entangled in more than one political and military battle along long front lines, both near and far. They begin in Uganda and Eritrea and end in London, Washington, Rome and Bonn, passing through Tunisia's Gafsa. Al-Qadhafi now turns toward his western borders for the first time in 3 years to find himself about to come to blows with his former staunch ally President Sadat.

In the past, these political and military battles did not disturb the enthusiasm or spontaneity of the fiery young president. He knew how to choose the time and place of battle. Despite tactical reversals, he was at least able to constitute an element of unrest for all of his enemies: France in Chad, King Hassan in the desert, President Bourguiba in Tunisia, President Nimeiri in the Sudan, the British in Ireland, the Palestinians in Libya and Sadat in Egypt.

The reason for the dread which Qadhafi inspires in the hearts of his opponents goes back to the fact that he follows the self-evident military principle of not waging war on two fronts. For example, his guns on the Egyptian Front must be silent so that he can skirmish with Nimeiri on the Sudanese front. Then he makes peace with Nimeiri in order to march on the land of the Chadians, or to move against the desert people.

However, President Qadhafi has forgotten his maxim lately. Today, he finds himself with the whole world rallying against his regime, including Libyans themselves who are fleeing into exile, or who are suffering under the oppression of his revolutionary or popular committees.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Perhaps the most bewildering thing is that most of the crises stirred up by President Qadhdhafi in the past few weeks and months could have been avoided easily if he had tried to curb "slips" of his tongue.

Since it is difficult now to review all of the Libyan president's crises and battles with his adversaries at home and abroad, in view of the multitude of interlocking fronts, it is sufficient now to review the latest of these battles. He fears it will turn into a hot battle with the arrival of July, the month in which a lightning border war was fought 3 years ago between Egypt and Libya.

#### Sadat Takes Threat Seriously

In a recent speech, President Qadhdhafi threatened to direct all of his weapons to overthrow the regime of his neighbor, the Egyptian president. Sadat took the threat seriously, for he moved rapidly to announce martial law in the western region. He turned over its administration to his armed forces and ordered his officers to withdraw several armored battalions from the eastern desert to the western desert, where it is said that Libya is building a defensive line superior in strength to the Israeli Bar Lev line.

It seems that both President Sadat and Qadhdhafi have their reasons for turning the attention of their people toward the empty desert these days. Perhaps they are a little preoccupied with the difficulties facing the two regimes.

Sadat may be more suspicious these days than at any time in the past as a result of the shakiness of the success of Camp David, the worsening of the domestic economic situation, and the rising waves of complaints and criticism against it. Also, there is a sound reason for him to be on his guard. This is the presence of a huge arsenal of weapons in Libya.

However, military experts here think it is unlikely that President Qadhdhafi would resort to moving this arsenal across the borders, because the Libyan army has only 35,000 soldiers, to face a trained army of 400,000 which lacks modern equipment and weapons.

The Libyan arsenal includes 2,000 tanks, most of them of advanced Soviet design, supported by 2,000 armored personnel carriers designed for desert warfare and covered by 250 planes, including Soviet MIG-25, 23 and 21 French Mirage aircraft.

To operate this arsenal, President Qadhdhafi is forced to resort to thousands of experts, soldiers and pilots from various countries and of various nationalities. There are Pakistani and French pilots for the Mirages; Soviets, North Koreans and Palestinians for the MIGs; Cubans and Turks for the tanks; and East Germans for the missiles, which range from SAM short and intermediate range missiles to Frog and Scud long-range missiles.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

What Sadat fears is what Qadhdhafi fears. Sadat says that the Soviets are stirring up Qadhdhafi against him, at the same time that they have incited Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile-Mariam to raise the question of the Nile waters. At the same time Qadhdhafi believes that the West is stirring up Sadat against him to take advantage of his internal difficulties with the Libyan opposition at home and abroad.

Observers here link the tense situation on the Libyan-Egyptian borders with the arrival of a squadron of F-4 fighter planes early in July at a base west of Cairo.

Although the American media have stated more than once that this squadron will be flying over the Arab Gulf, a part of the maneuvers (in which the Egyptian air force will participate) will take place in the western desert within sight of the Libyan borders. This squadron will be accompanied by 400 pilots, maintenance experts and intelligence employees.

As tension escalates on the Egyptian-Libyan borders, the Egyptian media these days are happy to emphasize that Egypt taught Libya an unforgettable lesson in the lightning border war between the two countries in July 1977.

The Egyptians say that they destroyed the Libyan flight school which was founded in 1975 by 2,000 Libyans and 300 Yugoslav experts. As for the Western experts, they say that the Egyptians destroyed 10 Libyan planes on the ground and 30 tanks. Several hundred Libyan soldiers were killed and wounded in the war. As for the Libyans, they shot down three Egyptian planes and destroyed several tanks.

The fighting stopped only through the mediation of the late Algerian President Houari Boumedienne and Yasir 'Arafat. At that time, the Arabs had not yet boycotted Sadat, since he had not yet made his unfortunate trip to the Israeli Knesset.

#### Support of Defiance and Resistance

President al-Qadhdhafi appealed for support from the states of the Front of Steadfastness and Resistance. The foreign ministers of Syria, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria and the PLO met in Tripoli and issued a statement confirming the Front's support for Libya in its anti-Sadat position.

However, the Front members would be in big trouble if large-scale fighting broke out between Egypt and Libya and Qadhdhafi asked them to honor their verbal commitments to support him.

Although Syria sent pilots as reported, to command the Libyan MIG-23's and 21's, it is not willing to send ground forces, since it bears the burden of the presence of 40,000 soldiers in Lebanon, not to speak of a part of its armed forces facing armed and violent religious organizations.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

As for Algeria, which since independence has chosen not to become entangled in Arab disputes, it does not want to find itself involved in an open Arab war.

The PLO has not been on good terms with Qadhafi since he tightened his grip on it. Its functions in Libya were assigned to Palestinian "revolutionary committees" which tried to "elevate" themselves to parallel the Libyan revolutionary committees.

The strong ally on whom President Qadhafi can rely in times of peace and war remains South Yemen. In this field, the Libyan president can rely on one of the Yemeni squadrons which fought beside the Ethiopians against the Eritreans. They could be transported quickly by Soviet planes from Aden to Tripoli or Tobruk.

But where do the other Arabs stand on the Egyptian-Libyan dispute?

The Arab states do not want to see the Libyan regime collapse under the hammer of President Sadat for reasons connected simply and solely with the Egyptian regime's link with the American-Israeli Camp David events. Any Egyptian victory on the Libyan borders will be a setback for the states which rejected the Camp David path and imposed complete isolation on President Sadat and his regime.

Nevertheless, these states which are accustomed to the eccentric behavior of the Libyan regime are quite astonished by the Libyan president's behavior toward his adversaries and opponents and his insistence on threatening them openly with elimination and pursuing them in the capitals of Europe.

These states believe that President Qadhafi has taken a great deal upon himself, and is risking the reputation of the Arabs, at a time when they are in great need of winning the sympathies of international public opinion.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

7587  
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

TERWAN DAM OPENED--The Mauritanian head of state, Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, dedicated the Terwan dam on 7 July. Work was begun in September 1979 and finished in June 1980. The dam is located a few kilometers southwest of the Adrar region. It will irrigate several hundred hectares and help develop palm plantations. "This dam comes at an opportune time, when the region most needs this kind of project to help cooperatives recover," Mr Ould Reggad, governor of the region, said. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1793] 8782

AGREEMENT REGARDING GUELBS PROJECT SIGNED--The National Industrial and Mining Company (SNIM-SEM) and moneylenders for the Guelbs project signed the agreement and the documents governing relations between the parties. The signing took place in the World Bank building in Paris on 7 July. The Mauritanian side was represented by SNIM-SEM and its general administrator-director, Mr Baba Ould Sidi Abdallah; the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, by Mr Seck Mame N'Diak, the Mauritanian ambassador in Paris; and the Central Bank of Mauritania, represented by Mr Mohamed Salem Ould Lekhal. The 12 lending organizations represented were the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the African Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation, the French Bank of Foreign Trade, the Bank of Paris and the Low Countries, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, the OPEC Fund for International Development, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, and the Saudi Fund for Economic and Social Development. At the end of 1983 the Guelbs products refinery will go into production, thus enabling Mauritania to put 6 million tons a year of high-quality concentrates on the market. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1793] 8782

CENTRAL ACCOUNTANCY SERVICE ESTABLISHED--The Mauritanian Council of Ministers adopted on 8 July a draft decree establishing a central accounting service in the ministerial departments. The text is a part of the austerity policy, and its purpose is to reinvigorate central accounting services. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1793] 8782

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INCIDENT BEHIND SLAVERY ABOLITION--The auction of a black female slave on the Atar market at the end of March provoked the righteous indignation of blacks and Mauritanian Haratines. This caused President Khouna Ould Haidalla to "abolish slavery" in the country (the measure was adopted on 5 July by the Military Committee of National Salvation). [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Jun 80 p 32] 8782

CSO: 4400

55  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOROCCO

## CEDIES REVIEW OF ECONOMY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May, 13 Jun 80

[30 May 80, pp 1257-1258]

[Text] Steady Activity in Mining Sector

Moroccan mining sector operations were generally steady in 1979, continuing the recovery trend which began in 1976-77 following the 1975 crisis. This development is more or less reflected in the level of production and exports of various products, although with respect to revenues some occasionally notable performances have been recorded despite a drop in the exported tonnages of certain ores.

In fact, based on the average price for the year, the rise of metal prices was 60 percent in the case of lead (second ore in importance after phosphates), 80 percent for silver, 40 percent for copper and cobalt, 9 percent for fluorine and 4 percent for manganese.

The following table shows, for the various mining operations, the results available for the first 11 months of 1979 in comparison to the corresponding figures for 1978.

Mining Production and Exports

(in 000's of tons)

	<u>Production</u>			<u>Exports</u>		
	Jan-Nov 1978	Jan-Nov 1979	Variation %	Jan-Nov 1978	Jan-Nov 1979	Variation %
Phosphates	17,526	18,141.4	+ 3.5	15,482.2	16,046.5	+ 3.6
Iron	62.9	60.7	- 3.5	39.9	89.5	+124.3
Lead	154	148.9	- 3.5	113	110.6	- 2.1
Chemical	113.1	122.				
Manganese	113.1	122.5	+ 8.3	132	118	- 10.7
Copper	10.9	21.8	+100	10.4	19.3	+ 85.6
Zinc	8.4	12.8	+ 52.4	15.4	16.1	+ 4.5
Cobalt	8	7.3	- 8.7	8.2	6.9	- 15.9
Barite	169.2	243.7	+ 44	185.6	236.5	+ 27.4
Pyrrhotite	186.7	186.6	--	--	--	--

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

On the upswing, we note in particular: --A tonnage increase of approximately 3.5 percent in the production and export of phosphates. However, with respect to revenues there has been a new drop in prices of nearly 8 percent, thus 1.685 billion dirhams were collected for the period in question as opposed to 1.842 billion dirhams in 1978 and 1.878 billion for the entire year as opposed to 2.034 billion for the previous year. This situation is bound to become more favorable in 1980, however, with the expected rise of prices on the world market, --A notable recovery of iron exports, which have more than doubled, rising from approximately 40,000 tons to nearly 90,000 tons. But they are still far below the levels for previous years (429,000 tons in 1977) preceding the effects of the crisis of the European iron and steel industry. --Doubling of copper production and exports; an increase of 44 percent in barite production and 27.4 percent in barite exports. --A substantial increase in the production of zinc (+52.4 percent), but more moderate in the case of exports (+4.5 percent).

On the downswing, we note in particular the decline in the production and export volumes of cobalt (-8.7 percent and -15.7 percent) and lead (-3.3 percent and -2.1 percent). But this development has not affected the revenues collected for these two ores, which have enjoyed very favorable prices, as noted above.

## Strong Increase in Demand for Energy

The increase in the production and sales of electrical energy in 1979 was more or less the same as in 1978 (9 to 10 percent).

With regard to production, the total energy distributed over the ONE (National Electricity Office) network amounted to 4.371 billion kilowatt-hours (GWh [gigawatt-hours]), an increase of 9.4 percent over 1978 (3.997 GWh). The energy supplied by ONE plants represents more than 99 percent of the total energy consumed, or 4.330 GWh, broken down as follows: hydroelectric energy: 1.582 GWh (or 36.5 percent of the total); thermal energy: 2.748 GWh (or 63.5 percent of the total). The contribution of other power suppliers amounted to 41.3 GWh (0.9 percent of the total), an increase of more than half over 1978 (26.6 GWh).

Electricity sales amounted to 3.749 GWh as opposed to 3.399 GWh for the preceding year, or an increase of 10.3 percent. High- and medium-voltage sales represent 94 percent of the total at 3.522 GWh, with 2.105 GWh for distributing subscribers and 1.477 GWh for direct subscribers (businesses, offices, etc.). Low-voltage sales, mainly for public lighting and household consumption, amounted to 227 GWh, an increase of 5.8 percent over 1978.

Petroleum products showed a conspicuous increase in consumption in 1979, contrasting with the rate recorded for the previous year. The highest levels were for sales of fuel oil and gas oil, which respectively increased 22.8 percent and 26.6 percent as opposed to only 14 and 4.6 percent in 1978 in relation to 1977.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

An equally notable fact, essential to this analysis, particularly concerns the increase in gasoline consumption, which reached nearly 10 percent in 1979 as opposed to only 1 percent in 1978, despite the price increase making gasoline practically a luxury consumer item. The rise of petroleum consumption should similarly be noted, recovering at the rate of 8 percent in 1979 after a drop of 9.4 percent in 1978:

	1978	1979	% Variations	
			1978/77	1979/78
Fuel Oil (1,000 tons)	1,417	1,740	+14	+22.8
Gas Oil (1,000 m <sup>3</sup> )	1,230	1,558	+ 4.6	+26.6
Gasoline (1,000 m <sup>3</sup> )	534	586	+ 1	+ 9.7
Kerosene (1,000 m <sup>3</sup> )	75	81	- 9.4	+ 8

## Difficult Economic Situation for Most Industries

An examination of industrial operations shows that if export sectors have more or less continued to resist the international economic trend, those aimed at domestic markets, on the other hand, have felt the drop in the general level of demand as well as the effects of the austerity policy which has been in effect since 1978.

Export industries actually seem to have achieved good performances in 1979 despite the unfavorable trends of foreign markets (development of protectionism and prospects for enlarging the EEC to include Morocco's main competitors). Forecasts for the textile sector, for example, are based on an export turnover of 80 billion centimes as opposed to 75 billion in 1978. Recovery of foreign demand has also become apparent to a certain extent in recent months in the case of canned fish. But this sector is facing numerous difficulties reducing its prospects as a result of structural problems in the regular supply of raw materials, the shortage of refrigeration and storage equipment and rising production costs diminishing the competitiveness of Moroccan prices in relation to foreign competition.

With regard to industrial operations geared to domestic markets (private and public), their development in 1979 was characterized by a trend toward stagnation or decline, depending on the case. The drop in public orders, following the decline in government investment, has indeed affected operations such as public works and metallurgy, whose recovery is closely tied to the resumption of investments and, among other things (which seems to be the case since the beginning of 1980), postponed or delayed programs (road and port projects, sugar, phosphate and cement projects, housing construction program, etc.).

Moreover, if import restriction measures have proved beneficial for certain types of production (such as household appliances), their application has interfered with the operation of a large number of businesses, resulting in problems of supplying basic products, intermediate products and equipment.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Similarly, the general decline in the level of demand and price increases have strongly affected sectors such as automobile manufacturing, whose assembly and sales operations have declined by nearly one-half, especially in the case of commercial vehicles.

Otherwise, the level of economic activity in 1978 was at best maintained or increased slightly, as in the case of general industrial engineering, cement consumption, sugar production and carbonated beverages.

[13 Jun 80, pp 1496-1497]

[Text] Phosphate Industry and Its Development

With nearly 58 billion tons, Morocco has three-fourths of the world's phosphate reserves and ranks first among world exporters with one-third of all exports. Current extraction capacity is 16 million tons annually. It will soon reach 24 million tons with the opening of two new extraction plants, which are in the process of being outfitted. Processing capacity amounts to 19 million tons annually and will be raised to 23 million tons with the completion of the maintenance, storage and drying complex under construction at Oued Zem.

In the case of upgrading, Morocco has the largest industrial complex in the world for phosphoric acid production with Maroc-Chimie I and II and Maroc-Phosphore I. Completion of Maroc-Phosphore II in late 1980 will bring upgrading capacity to 5.5 million tons of phosphates annually for the production of 1.5 million tons of  $P_2O_5$  (instead of 850,000 tons presently).

With regard to prospects, a new expansion plan has been set up to develop extraction plants and to increase upgrading capacity. This program is intended to make the OCP (Moroccan Phosphates Office) group the world's leading producer and, in an initial stage, to make it possible to upgrade 30 percent of national production (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 7 March 1980, p. 561).

Expansion of phosphate production hinges on the following projects: --Exploitation of the Sidi Hajjaj deposit, which will begin in 1984 with production of 3 million tons in an initial stage and 6 million tons thereafter. --Increasing the calcination capacity for "black phosphates" at Youssoufia from 500,000 tons currently (based on production of 6 million tons) to 4 million tons. --Opening a new mining zone at Benguerir, whose first digging operations, intended to supply Maroc-Phosphore II with 2 million tons annually, started in late 1979. This zone's capacity will gradually increase to 10 million tons annually, with additional tonnage to be processed at the Jorf Lasfar site. --Outfitting the Meskala zone, which will gradually reach an annual production capacity of 10 million tons. --Development of the Boucraa zone to reach a 10-million-ton capacity equivalent to that of the already existing Boucraa-Laayoune maintenance installations for transporting phosphates from the mine to the processing plant.\*

\*Unlike the other deposits mentioned here, Boucraa is located outside "Morocco's internationally recognized borders."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Development of phosphate upgrading in turn hinges on a vast chemical complex planned at Jorf Lasfar, whose initial phase will include (1983-85): --A Maroc-Phosphore III plant with a capacity of 4,000 tons/day of  $P_2O_5$  derived from a Kouribga ore (start of production in 1983 and completion of construction in 1985). --A DAP [diammonium phosphate] and NPK [nitrogen-phosphorus-potassium] fertilizer production plant for national agriculture and exports. --A washing and drying plant for Sidi Hajjaj phosphates with a capacity of 3 million tons annually. --All port facilities for exporting the ore and acid and importing sulfur and ammonia.

#### The Fertilizer Industry

The Moroccan fertilizer market's growth is about 13 to 15 percent annually. In relation to arable land, consumption is 27 fertilizer units per hectare, broken down as follows: 10 units of nitrogen (N), 11 units of  $P_2O_5$  and 6 units of potash (K). This consumption, considered very low, represents 20 to 25 percent of Moroccan agriculture's theoretical needs. Plans have been made to raise it to 120 fertilizer units per hectare by the year 2000, with 40 units of N, 42 of P and 38 of K.

To be more precise, the construction of 10 new fertilizer processing and storage plants is planned between now and 1985, which will increase supplies from 600,000 tons at the present time to 1.250 million tons in 1984-85.

In terms of production and marketing, the OCP group is the largest producer of fertilizer in Morocco, with its four plants at Safi: Maroc-Chimie I, whose capacity in 1979 was raised from 130,000 to 180,000 tons/years of  $P_2O_5$ ; production of TSP [trisodium phosphate], ASP [sodium dihydrogen phosphate] and 14-28-14 C [chemical fertilizer]. Maroc-Chimie II, with a capacity of 165,000 tons/year; production of AP [diammonium hydrogen phosphate] and MAP [ammonium hydrogen phosphate] (11-55-0). Maroc-Phosphore I, with a capacity of 495,000 tons/year of  $P_2O_5$  for AP and MAP production. Maroc-Phosphore II (under construction), with a capacity of 495,000 tons/year as well.

The OCP group exports most of its AP and MAP production. Through its subsidiary, Fertima, it markets ASP, 14-18-14 and some TSP for domestic markets (150,000 to 200,000 tons). This company is also responsible for importing all nitrogen and potassium fertilizers, since Morocco possesses only phosphates. These imports amounted to 310,000 tons in 1979, broken down as follows: urea, 46 percent (85,000 tons); ammonium nitrate (60,000 tons); ammonium sulfate (100,000 tons); potassium sulfate (45,000 tons); potassium chloride (20,000 tons).

The Moroccan Fertilizer Company (SCE) provides for the production of simple superphosphate (130,000 tons), chemical fertilizers (50,000 to 100,000 tons), aerated powdered sulfur (1,000 tons/year) and other chemical products such as sulfuric acid, liquid  $SO_2$ , etc. It also handles business transactions for imported fertilizers, various chemical products, seeds for planting and agricultural equipment. Together, SCE and Fertima supply 80 percent of the Moroccan fertilizer market.

60

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Finally, other companies produce mixed and organic fertilizers, the largest being Promagri (50,000 tons/year) and CPCM [expansion unknown] (50,000 tons/year).

#### Salt Derivatives Industries

Morocco has a sizable rock salt deposit at Mohammedia, whose production capacity is estimated at 1 million tons annually. This salt currently supplies the electrolysis plants of the SNEP (National Electrolysis and Petrochemical Company) and Cellulose du Maroc. The third electrolysis plant is located at Tetouan.

The SNEP at Mohammedia is a government-owned business attached to the ODI (Office for Industrial Development). Its production capacity is 25,000 tons/year of chlorine, 28,000 tons/year of soda and 25,000 tons/year of PVC [polyvinyl chloride], with the ethylene needed for MVC [monovinyl chloride] production being imported. This company also produces bleach and disinfectant, hydrochloric acid and crystalline PVC for bottles.

Cellulose du Maroc at Sidi Yahia du Gharb, whose main operation is the production of paper pulp, has absorbed a chemical products company formerly titled Produits Chimiques du Gharb. This company has a sodium-chloride electrolysis plant capable of producing 3,500 tons/year of chlorine and 3,800 tons/year of soda. It also produces sodium chlorate and  $SO_2$  for its own production operations.

Coelma, located at Tetouan, produces hydrochloric acid, soda and bleach and disinfectant. It also has a plant for producing calcium hydrogen phosphate by treating Khouribga phosphates with hydrochloric acid. These defluorinated phosphates are used to feed cattle. The plant's capacity is 2,000 tons/year.

Morocco's current capacities are largely adequate for meeting market needs of chlorine and soda until 1982. Possible imports of these products are explained by the domestic price level, which is not considered competitive in relation to international prices.

#### Paper Pulp Industry and Paper and Cardboard Production

Paper Pulp--This industry is represented by a single company: Cellulose du Maroc, located at Sidi Yahia du Gharb. It produces short-fiber paper pulp from eucalyptus wood and its production capacity is 100,000 tons/year.

Domestic consumers of this paper pulp are CMCP at Kenitra and Papelera de Tetouan. These two companies' consumption of short-fiber pulp is less than 10,000 tons/year, which means that most, or 90 percent, of Cellulose du Maroc's pulp production is exported.

Since the added value does not currently exceed 20 percent, however, Cellulose du Maroc is looking into the possibility of increasing this added value by diversifying its production further down the line. A plant has thus been

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

planned for manufacturing newsprint using short-fiber pulp. Another project for using paper pulp obtained from esparto grass is also being studied by ODI.

It should be noted that the size of the Moroccan pulp market is about 28,000 to 30,000 tons/year. At the present time, imports may be estimated at 18,000-20,000 tons/year.

Paper and Cardboard Production--The largest plant is that of the CMCP at Kenitra, which manufactures cardboard, wrapping paper and cardboard boxes. Its capacity is 45,000 tons/year of paper and cardboard and 30,000 tons/year of cardboard boxes. It is followed by Papelera de Tetouan, whose capacity is 20,000 tons/year.

The sector's added value is approximately 30 percent, whereas per capita paper consumption is 6 to 7 kilograms in comparison to more than 100 kilograms for developed countries. Total consumption is 125,000 to 130,000 tons/year, 60 percent of which is produced domestically and the rest imported. The market's growth is 8 to 10 percent annually.

#### Detergents and Maintenance Products Industry

The detergents and maintenance products industry includes two large plants at Casablanca: IMM [expansion unknown] (a subsidiary of Procter and Gamble), which mainly manufactures sulfonate-base detergents ("Tide"), and Aetco-Lever Maroc (Unilever group), a competitor of IMM ("OMO"). These two plants consume oleum and sodium silicate, with the former being supplied by SCE and the latter by the Silicates et Derives company. The other products needed for their production, TPP [triphenyl phosphate] and sodium sulfate, are imported.

A third plant, Colgate Palmolive, has more diversified operations using imported products.

The sector's added value is 50 percent (1975 figure) and its total production capacity is 25,000 to 30,000 tons, used at the level of 80 to 85 percent. Production value amounts to about 130 million dirhams, including 13 million dirhams for bleach and disinfectant. The market's growth amounts to 10.50 percent annually.

#### Timber and Wood Panels Industry

This sector includes the following industries: plywood construction (Cema), fiberboard manufacturing, particle board manufacturing (Cema), laminated panel and layered panel construction.

The sector's main companies are the following: Cema, located at Casablanca; Panalfa (an OCE subsidiary), manufacturing esparto-base panels; the Maghrebien Timber Company of the Atlas Mountains, located at Meknes, and Sicomarbois, Emballages et Contreplaques du Maroc and Eucopan, manufacturing particle board.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Plans have been made within this sector for construction of a urea-formaldehyde glue plant with a capacity of 8,000 to 10,000 tons/year. Both the urea and methanol needed for the production of formaldehyde will have to be imported.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1980

11915

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOROCCO

## CONTINUATION OF CEDIES ECONOMIC REVIEW OF 1979

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1312

[Report: "Economic Balance for 1979"]

[Text] Food Industry: The 1979 national sugar consumption totaled 595,000 tons, showing a slight increase of 1.2 percent compared with the 1978 volume (588,000 tons). Its breakdown (in rounded 1,000 ton figures) was the following:

	1978	1979	Fluctuation %
Loaves	400	402	--
Lumps	49	44	- 10
Crystal	139	149	+ 7.2
Total	588	595	+ 1.2

The consumption of sugar in loaves has remained on the 1978 level with 402,000 tons. It accounts for 67.5 percent or two-thirds of total national consumption, thus showing active demand (in particular among the broad population strata) for such type of sugar.

This explains, among others, the decline of lump sugar consumption which had reached 67,000 tons in 1977 but has been steadily declining (49,000 tons in 1978 and 44,000 tons in 1979), which motivated the termination of imports of lump sugar in 1979.

As to crystal sugar (powder) it appears to be the only category which is rising gradually (+ 7.2 percent in 1979). However, this is related more to industrial consumption rather than domestic use which shows the same resistance to this product as to lump sugar. Crystal sugar imports, therefore, did not exceed 14,000 tons in 1979 as against 25,000 tons in 1978 and 64,000 tons in 1977.

Domestic sugar production reached 334,000 tons (unrefined and refined), showing a decline of over 12 percent compared with 1978 when it totaled 381,000 tons. Domestic production made it possible to meet close to 60 percent of the country's requirements, the balance being covered by

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

imports which totaled 223,000 tons of unrefined sugar compared with 229,000 in 1978 (to which refined sugar purchases should be added, as follows: loaves, 14,000 tons; sugar in crystals, 14,000 tons).

Let us note, finally, that the price of table sugar, which had been frozen at the 1973 level, was raised by 20 centimes per kilogram of granulated sugar, and 30 centimes per kilogram of loaf or cut sugar. The decision was based on the increased amount of state subsidies and the raise of international prices. Nevertheless, subsidies will remain at the level of 70 centimes per kilogram of sugar.

The balance of output in the products canning industry shows for the 1979 fiscal year a total export volume of about 125,000 tons, worth 424 million dirhams.

The list is headed by olives, accounting for 32 percent of the exported tonnage, followed by canned fruits (27 percent), vegetables (14.5 percent), fruit juices (13.5 percent), gherkins (9 percent), and capers (4 percent).

Let us note that, despite some attempts made to diversify markets, almost all of these exports (over 83 percent of the total) are absorbed by the EEC members. Yet, the CEDIES emphasizes, despite the cooperation agreement between Morocco and the EEC, the community tends to strengthen the restrictive and protectionist measures which make the situation of this sector extremely precarious and vulnerable.

The bread yeast industry has developed substantially thanks to the regular increase in consumption and population growth.

Until 1977 the yeast market was supplied by a Casablanca enterprise. In 1977 a new plant opened in Fes, promoted by the Industrial Development Office (ODI), in association with the Moroccan private sector.

In 1979 the capacity of the two installations was, respectively, 10,000 tons per year for the first and 8,500 tons per year for the second. The Casablanca unit was scheduled to complete an extension by the end of January 1980 increasing its total capacity to 22,000 of yeast per year. Moroccan yeast production would thus reach 30,000 tons per year.

The current Moroccan market is 20,000 tons per year. Starting with 1980 installed production capacities will be able to satisfy quite extensively the needs of the market and the surplus could even be exported. While making use of a domestic raw material (molasses), this would contribute to a substantial savings on imports and, consequently, of foreign exchange.

Public Works and Construction: The activities of the construction and public works sector continued to decline but at a lesser pace. The 1979 output declined 5 percent, compared with nearly 19 percent in 1978, essentially as a result of a slowdown in construction.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Conversely, in cement production and consumption, 1979 showed a positive development resulting in a certain increase in consumption, which reached some 3.63 million tons as against 3.5 million in 1978, or an increase of nearly 4 percent; on the other hand, it was due to the development of domestic output which made a reduction of imports possible.

## Cement Consumption (in thousand tons)

	1978	1979	Fluctuations %
Total Consumption	3,504	3,642	+ 4
of which:			
Domestic production	2,802	3,304	+ 18
Imports	702	338	- 52

In effect, until 1977, one-third of the cement market consisted of imports which had grown to meet the strong increase in demand experienced over the previous 5 years (1973-1977). Since 1978 cement imports have shown a strong decline (702,000 tons in 1978 as against 1 million tons in 1977), as a result, among others, of import restrictions enacted in June of that same year. The trend was intensified in 1979 with a drop of over 50 percent in cement purchases abroad: 338,000 tons as against 702,000 tons in 1978.

This development was made possible with the commissioning of two new cement mills: Oriental (CIOR) and Temara, whose contribution rose domestic production by nearly 18 percent (3.3 million tons as against 2.8 million tons the previous year).

Machine Building, Metallurgical and Electric Power Industries: As to these industries the 1979 results showed a certain improvement in the area of consumer goods (household equipment, etc.), following the imposition of import restrictions.

Conversely, in the area of heavy industrial equipment there has been a substantial regress which affected, in particular, the following:

- A decline in boiler making and metal construction as a result of a slowdown of public investments and of the full completion of several initiated projects;
- Shipbuilding, as a result of aggressive foreign competition;
- Vehicle spring assemblies, as a result of the slowdown in the utility vehicles sector;
- The production of aluminum shapes as a result of the dizzying and frequent increases in the local prices of shaped aluminum and difficulties

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in procuring supplies abroad at substantially lower prices. This state of things would be a serious menace to this sector which is proving to be less and less competitive compared with the production of substitute goods;

- The manufacturing of flexible pipes as a result of massive imports.

The overall financial status of the enterprises has been unsatisfactory. A number of companies continue to suffer from delays in payments, particularly from public agencies. Generally speaking, the social climate has been characterized by an improvement following salary increases which sectorial enterprises have granted despite rather difficult circumstances. Overall 1980 prospects appear average.

Activities in the metal containers sector seem to be related more to the development of canning and exports of canned goods. On the one hand, it is influenced by weather uncertainties which affect agricultural output (for example, the 1979 apricot crop was one-half that of 1978) and, on the other, by the fluctuations in fishing and the marketing of canned fish.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

5157  
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PERSIAN GULF AREA

QUESTION OF U.S. BASES IN GULF DISCUSSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 21-27 Jun 80 p 27

[Article: "The Problem of Foreign Bases in Arab Territory; American Specter at the Neck of the Gulf"]

[Text] News reports concerning American bases and facilities in the Sultanate of Oman have ranged all the way from denial to confirmation. However, it is an established fact that the Omani Government has recently realized its "historical" dream of having a "foreign" base on its Arab territory, a move which pushes the situation in the Gulf to another peak of international tension and polarization.

Omani minister of state for foreign affairs Qays 'Abd-al-Mun'im Al Zawawi revealed the nature of the agreement that has been reached between the Sultanate of Oman and the United States. In a public statement in London at the end of last month, the minister said: "The agreement gives the United States the right to acquire naval and air facilities at Omani bases during states of emergency on the condition that the United States must consult the Omani authorities and obtain their approval."

On several occasions prior to that statement, Al Zawawi had asserted that the Sultanate of Oman had not established and would not establish American military bases on its territory.

According to the agreement, American forces will use the naval base at Jazirah Masirah on the Omani coast, as well as the Tamrit airbase located south of Oman. New fuel storage tanks, new runways and other facilities will be constructed at a total cost of around \$300 million.

Observers feel that this step is part of a new American strategy to gain a military presence in the Indian Ocean in Oman, Somalia and Kenya. They see this move as a response to developments in the international situation following the events in Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Moreover, the American plan has been described as an effort to put some teeth into the "Carter doctrine." This doctrine, announced earlier by the American president, contained a threat to the Soviets that any attempt on their part to gain control over the Gulf would be met with every possible means, including military means.

The fact is that most Arab reactions to the agreement were negative, although they varied in intensity. Some felt that the agreement serves American designs aimed at gaining control over the Gulf countries on the pretext of what has occurred in Iran and Afghanistan. Others, however, saw a link between the Camp David agreements and an attempt to impose a blockade and intimidate the Gulf states. Those who hold the latter viewpoint to the strong relations between President Sadat and Sultan Qabus and to the recent statements made by Egyptian deputy prime minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali, in which he said: "Egypt is offering military facilities to the United States so that it can intervene and help the Arab states in case of need."

An official Iraqi statement rejected the Omani-American agreement. The statement said: "The official statements issued in Washington conflict with the assertion made by Omani minister of state for foreign affairs Qays Al Zawawi during his recent visit to Baghdad to the effect that his government does not intend to offer any facilities to the Americans."

Some Gulf states expressed irritation at recent Omani actions, while affirming the right of every state to choose whatever method it deems appropriate to protect itself.

Sultan Qabus feels that the danger which threatens the Gulf and the oil wells emanates from the Soviet Union. He applauds the Americans' initiative in drawing a strong line of defense to confront the communist threat, which is represented by Ethiopia and South Yemen as well as the presence of 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan just 550 kilometers away from his country.

#### Qabus' Strategic Position

Oman's strategic position has certainly attracted the attention of the two superpowers. The sultanate, which has a population under one million, is located directly south of the Strait of Hormuz, the gateway from the Gulf into the Indian Ocean and a point of extreme importance on the oil route to the West.

Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id (39 years old) actually prefers to cooperate with the West and strengthen his ties with it. He studied in Britain and graduated from Sandhurst military college, and there are 650 British troops in his 11,500-man sultanate forces. These British soldiers helped him considerably in putting down the Omani revolution.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In 1975, Sultan Qabus proposed that the Gulf states cooperate with the West to protect the Strait of Hormuz, which is used by 77 ships a day. The purpose of this cooperation was to confront any Soviet move or terrorist operation in which a ship could be blown up in the middle of the strait.

Most of the Gulf states refused to respond to the sultanate's call, leading Qays Al Zawawi to the remark: "We will protect the strait through cooperation with the Western states, and in practical terms this means that the area will be thrust into the furnace of competition between the Soviets and the Americans."

It can be said that the "time of the Indian Ocean as a region of peace" has begun to vanish, as the United Nations declared a few years ago. Moreover, the call for an end to the arms race in the area issued by President Carter 3 years ago has come to nothing.

#### American-Soviet Competition

The American military presence there consists of 21 warships, including two aircraft carriers and six support ships. There is also the Diego Garcia base located on the British-occupied island in the Indian Ocean. An operation to expand this base is expected to get underway soon, making it capable of receiving B-52 strategic aircraft. Fuel tanks with a capacity of some 640,000 barrels will also be erected.

The Soviet military presence, on the other hand, consists of 12 warships and 15 support ships. South Yemen is considered the cornerstone of the Soviet strategy in the area, providing a base for a number of nuclear submarines which can pursue the American aircraft carriers if necessary.

The United States' loss of its bases in Bandar 'Abbas in Iran was a heavy blow, and it was this loss which prompted it to hurriedly seek negotiations with Omani, Somali and Kenyan officials.

It can be said that up until the end of the 1960's, the military buildup in the Indian Ocean area remained in favor of the West. But the situation started to change with the onset of the 1970's when the Soviets began to dominate the area. Their presence began initially as a political presence when the wave of hostility toward Western colonialism swept through the peoples. Then this presence gradually began to develop into a military force, which made the West anxious about its vital interests in the oil wells.

In a seminar on the Gulf area recently held by the Harvard Institute for Political Studies, the participating experts arrived at a slogan which said in effect: "If you had believed that things will get bad in the Gulf area, than you won't have to wait long, because they will tend to get worse."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Some participants expressed extreme concern over the Soviet role while calling for the necessity of effective American action in the area. They pointed to the fact that the Soviets could gain control over the oil wells without a war, and suggested that Washington's hesitancy could compel the area states to cooperate with Moscow, considering it to hold the stronger hand.

Some pointed out that while Iraq opposes Soviet intervention in the affairs of the area, it also rejects any attempt to transform the area into an American sphere of influence. In this connection, Hermann Eilts, former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt and presently a professor at the University of Washington, said: "Iraq is attempting to lead a Gulf bloc calling for independence from the superpowers and the keeping of the area outside the arena of conflict."

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

8591  
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SYRIA

## BRIEFS

OIL OUTPUT DROP--Syrian oil production has dropped in the last 2 years, but Syria's oil export revenues have risen from \$646 million in 1978 to \$1 billion last year. Syria is relying on American oil companies in the oil exploration and development field. Among the companies now drilling for oil are the Marathon Oil, Shell Oil, Coastal States Gas and Standard Oil of California companies. Senior experts in the Syrian Oil Ministry state that Syria has oil reserves of 2.5 billion barrels, enough for 40 years, in addition to gas reserves of 700 trillion scf/cubic feet. Mr 'Abd-al-Jabbar al-Dahhak, Syrian minister of oil and minerals, points out that his government welcomes these companies and he recently informed American journalists who visited Damascus "We are not politicians when the matter concerns oil." It is well known that Syria says it is now following a "radical" policy and accusing the "trinity" of American imperialism, Zionism and reaction of provoking groups of armed religious violence to overthrow President Hafiz al-Asad's regime. Syria aspires to exploit its mineral resources and has a plan to triple phosphate production in 3 years. Syria's Baniyas Refinery is also nearing completion. Total daily refining, after this refinery joins the one in Hums, will come to 220,000 barrels of oil a day. Syria will mix its heavy oil with Iraqi Light crude to obtain a blend suitable for its consumption and the output of its refineries. In spite of the circumstances through which relations between the two fraternal countries (Syria and Iraq) are now passing, Iraq is pumping a volume ranging from 220,000 to 300,000 barrels a day through the oil pipeline crossing Syrian territory to the Mediterranean; this is one-quarter the line's capacity. Syria receives advantageous compensation for this from Iraq, in addition to Iraq's financial share which it pays Syria annually in accordance with the resolutions of the Baghdad summit conferences. /Text/ /Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Jun 80 p 49/ 11887

CSO: 4802

72

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

BOURGUIBA, WIFE'S DOMINATION CRITICIZED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 May 80 p 14

[Article by Adel Wahid]

[Text] "Bourguiba has definitely not stopped using trickery. His whole strategy is based on reversals and denials. After 10 years of almost total seclusion under the pretext of illness, there he is up and around again, more active than ever. Today he is stepping up his meetings and interviews and intends to be the only captain on board. He has just quietly ended the Nouira period, but what is he preparing for tomorrow? All these changes at party and government levels express the concern of the chief of state to dissociate himself from "Nouiraism," at least from its most glaring abuses. Are we thus heading toward a revision of political, economic and cultural choices? I think that the same policy will continue--with the risk of leading Tunisia into troubled tomorrows--by simply modifying the style used thus far. At any rate, Tunisians will not be satisfied with fragmentary measures. We are aware that the seeds of other Gafsas still exist."

These remarks of a bitter and disillusioned young Tunisian, like thousands of others wandering through the streets of the capital or sitting at outdoor cafes, reflect the mood of a good part of Tunisian public opinion. The Mzali government claims to be one of "efficiency and credibility." It says, discreetly it is true, that it wants to initiate a process of detente and harmonization.

What kind of detente, under whose leadership and in what form? Once again, everything indicates that it is the political style which is involved without getting to the heart of the problem.

One thing is certain--the Mzali government has to deal with the social protest movement. Workers' demands and campaigns were taken up energetically soon after the climate of false national unity which emerged following the Gafsa uprising of 26 January. March and April were marked by several dozen strikes: Sogitex in Moknine, STIA [expansion unknown] and STS [expansion unknown] in Sousse, phosphate mines in Metlaoui, synthetic cement in Tunis, as well as others. In certain parts of the country, the strikes were very severe and management personnel were held illegally in certain cases.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In an attempt to calm the discontent of workers, the government has announced a certain number of measures, including the conditional release of four trade union leaders convicted soon after the riots of 26 January 1978, raising the minimum wage by 10 percent--thus bringing the interoccupational minimum growth wage to 45.5 dinars\* per month--and general application of single-income compensation. In view of the high rise of prices, these increases are still very inadequate.

Will there soon be some new development on the part of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], whose upcoming special congress has been announced? It seems that the leadership wants to terminate the duties of Tijani Abid, catapulted by the Destour Party into the role of leader of the trade union federation. This decision probably means a willingness to compromise. But no lasting compromise is foreseeable without the agreement and participation of the UGTT's Executive Committee, democratically elected during the congress of March 1977.

#### The "Cleanup"

The declaration signed by the UGTT's legitimate Executive Committee, and published on 1 May, is clear. It reaffirms the determination of the committee members to continue the fight and to defend the ideals for which they were convicted.

For the time being, changes in the country's key posts are occurring in rapid succession: almost all governors ([equivalent of French] prefects) have been replaced or switched, particularly those of Tunis and Gafsa. Several departments, including the national bureau of investigation, have been reorganized: its former director, Gen Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, the "eyes" of Washington, has been appointed ambassador ... to Poland. The managerial heads of the most important corporations have been changed. Bourguiba personally conducted this extensive "cleanup," directly participating in all appointments, even those normally reserved for ministers. Mzali's powers thus appear very limited and he seems bound to be second in command to the chief of state, unless Tahar Belkhodja, currently ambassador to the FRG, is still among the top few by the grace of Mrs Bourguiba ...

The Tunisian ambassador to Bonn also recently met with Tunisian citizens residing in the FRG. In the face of harsh criticism of the government by those in attendance, Mokhtar Ben Ismail, a pseudostudent and the Destour Party's press correspondent in the FRG, made threats against one critic. And there is some question of Mr Ben Ismail being appointed Tunisian consul in Berlin. Methods have definitely not changed at a time when the Tunisian Government is trying to assume a "liberal" image. As for Habib Bourguiba Jr., adviser to the president of the republic, he is losing ground and no longer even attends the meetings between Bourguiba and his prime minister, as he did during Hedi Nour's time.

\*One dinar is approximately equivalent to 11 French francs.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Card of Illusion

The atmosphere is therefore a sham of "detente." It must be viewed not as the start of an "opening" of relations, which is altogether unlikely, but as the Tunisian Government's concern with assuring itself of as broad a consensus as possible. But part of the opposition runs the risk of being burned and being cleverly neutralized or manipulated. Holding up promising prospects, always without any future, is one facet of Bourguiban strategy. With more than one string on his bow, the Tunisian chief of state has thus far preferred to shoot poison arrows. Now he no doubt believes that the time has come to play the card of illusion. From this standpoint, political regroupings are not out of the question: the current government is probably preparing for the entry, sooner or later, of members of the MDS (Socialist Democratic Movement) into the government, but without Ahmed Mestiri, that group's leader who has said that he supports a multiparty system and who also reiterated several weeks ago the demand made in June 1978 to form an opposition party. The newspapers of the MDS, ERRAI and DEMOCRATIE, are becoming more conciliatory and the government has toned down its attacks on that official opposition. It is expected that some MDS members will be candidates in the next municipal elections. Finally, the chronic crisis of the student trade union, the UGET [General Union of Tunisian Students], is also bound to come to an end with the holding of a special congress. But a good number of the students do not accept that and remain suspicious and alert to what they consider a shaky solution.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

11915

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



TUNISIA

BRIEFS

DISCREET CONTACT--Tunisian authorities have allegedly met discreetly with Ahmed Ben Salah. So, the former strong man of the 60's, sentenced to ten years of prison in 1970, in exile since his escape in 1971, may be a beneficiary of the current relaxed climate. Things are still in a preliminary stage and it will doubtless be some time before the leader of the MUP (Popular Unity Movement) will be able to return to Tunisia. [Text]  
[Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Aug 80 p 48]

CSO: 4400

END