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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 689



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TANZAM'S SHUTDOWN TO HAVE SERIOUS EFFECTS ON TANZANIA, ZAMBIA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Aug 80 p 19

[Text] One of Africa's most prestigious railroad lines is not operating. The Tanzam (Tanzania-Zambia) line, which connects the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salam with the Zambian "copper belt," is in effect paralyzed and has been since 21 July because of "inadequate technology" and financial near-bankruptcy. The bi-national company, TAZARA (Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority), which manages the line on behalf of the two governments concerned, is in danger of failure if new subsidies do not come along between now and September.

The Tanzam, 1,900 km in length, which went into service on 24 October 1975, was built in record time--and at very low cost--by technicians from the People's Republic of China. But it never operated normally. For lack of spare parts, the fragility of the Chinese locomotives, the chronic fuel shortage in Tanzania, the bureaucratic heaviness of a two-headed administration, etc. Though it was supposed to export to Dar es-Salaam a good part of the Zambian copper production, the Tanzam failed in that role, which could have enabled Zambia to be less dependent on the South African railroad infrastructure. Thus, several thousand tons of copper are immobilized in the mining town of Chozi. Other stocks are waiting to be exported on the wharves of Dar es-Salaam, which--as if to darken the picture a little more--is a port that is almost continuously clogged.

For Tanzania, whose financial situation is desperate, and Zambia, which is once again going to have to export via South Africa almost all of its copper production, the Tanzam's bankruptcy is serious.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

UMOA FINANCING IN 1979 REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1969

[Text] The Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) recently published its annual report on the operation of the West African monetary market (Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal and Togo) in 1979.

Founded on 1 July and initially dealing only with "day-to-day" operations, the UMOA [West African Monetary Union] monetary market was extended, as of 1 August 1978, to include one-month and three-month operations.

The monthly volume of the day-to-day operations of the monetary market, offers and demands satisfied, after experiencing a regular increase until 1977, followed by a strong decline in 1978, registered a revival during 1979. During the entire year the total demands exceeded the offers, the average monthly deficit amounting to 380,000,000,000 CFA francs, or a daily average of 14,000,000,000 CFA francs.

Forward operations, of relatively little importance in 1978, were appreciably filled out in 1979, especially on the demand side. On the one-month market, a monthly average of 920,000,000 CFA francs were granted in 1979 and 500,000,000 CFA francs were recycled to the day-to-day. The three-month market was characterized by the insufficiency of offers and the regularity of demands, especially in Abidjan; the daily average of advances amounted to 10,000,000 CFA francs.

In Benin the number of participants since October 1978 has been three institutions. The market is largely in deficit. In the day-to-day the offers, emanating from a single establishment, varied between 1,000,000 and 6,000,000 CFA francs per month, compared to demands for between 1,000,000,000 and 88,000,000,000. The total of advances granted was established at 199,000,000,000 CFA francs, 84 percent of that amount from aid from the other UMOA states. On the one-month market, demands for the year increased to 97,000,000,000 CFA francs, the opposite of a nonexistent local offer; however, a total of 500,000,000 CFA francs could be handled out of aid from Union partners.

In the Ivory Coast 17 banks regularly intervened in the operations of the market. In the day-to-day the volume of operations diminished slightly under 1978; local demands largely exceeded market offers. During 1979 the total of advances granted was 1,800,000,000,000 CFA francs, 650,000,000,000 of which

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came from other partners. On the one-month market the demands also exceeded the local offers and the total advances for the year amount to 4,600,000,000 CFA francs, of which 480,000,000 are aid from the Union. On the three-month market the Abidjan market recorded 1,800,000,000 CFA francs in demands, with no local offer; aid from Togo made it possible to satisfy 400,000,000 CFA francs.

The day-to-day monetary market of Upper Volta was characterized by disequilibrium, the demands exceeding the local offers. The total of advances agreed to was 186,000,000 CFA francs, of which 58,000,000,000 was aid from the other partners (31 percent of the total granted).

In Niger the day-to-market was in excess until April 1979; after May the tendency was reversed. Over the year advances totaled 271,000,000,000 CFA francs, of which 86,000,000,000 was UMOA aid (32 percent of the total). The one-month market was balanced and in May 1979 a total of 500,000,000 CFA francs was recycled to the day-to-day.

In contrast to 1978, Senegal's monetary market was in deficit over the whole of 1979; demands were 1,700,000,000,000 CFA francs, compared to 1,200,000,000,000 in local offers. In all, the advances granted totaled 1,300,000,000,000 CFA francs, 6 percent of it from other Union partners. On the one-month market, which operated from September to December, a balance was realized between demands and local offers. It was the same on the three-month market, where from June to September 2,300,000,000,000 CFA francs in operations were recorded.

Togo remains the only place claiming a surplus since the UMOA monetary market was founded. For 1979 the accumulated total of offers in the day-to-day represented 998,000,000,000 CFA francs, or 24 percent of the total Union offers, compared to 263,000,000,000 CFA francs of local demands; the surplus offers served to feed the markets in deficit. On the forward market Togo's offers, 480,000,000 for one month and 400,000,000 for three months, fed the Abidjan market.

The market rates suffered various raises during 1979, bringing them, since 1979, to 10 percent for day-to-day advances (7.25 percent at the end of 1978), to 10 1/8 percent for one-month advances, and to 10 3/8 percent for three-month advances.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FRENCH OIL COMPANY'S ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1961

[Excerpts] The 1979 fiscal year report of the French Oil Company (CFP) relates the group's various activities in the world. The CFP's presence is manifested in several African countries.

In Angola, subject to the signing of final agreements, a 17.5 percent interest has been taken in one of the blocks offered at sea; another block has been allotted to the local affiliate.

In Cameroon, interests obtained in two are being added to the title acquired in 1978. The two wells drilled during the year resulted in discoveries, one the discovery of two light oil reservoirs in the Victoria permit, the other of substantial gas reserves in the South Sanaga permit. New seismic surveys performed during the year are making it possible to start drillings in 1980 to determine its extent.

In uranium exploration activities the CFP has started operations in Nigeria. Other interventions concerned Namibia, where modifications of the Rossing mine processing plant were completed in the first quarter, as well as repair of the damage caused by the fire that occurred in 1978. Production reached its normal pace in April and the production for the year was 3,834 tons of uranium. In Gabon the COMUF [Franceville Uranium Mining Company] produced 1,100 tons of uranium. In Niger the SOMAIR [Air Region Mining Company] produced 1,777 tons of uranium.

As cultural aid, the CFP took care of three Nigerian scholarship students.

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ANGOLA

COMMISSION APPOINTED TO STUDY STATE STRUCTURES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1990

[Text] An ad hoc commission will be appointed within the Angolan Council of Ministers to study the structures of the central state apparatus, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the chief of state, announced on 27 July.

Mr dos Santos, who presided at the first Council of Ministers meeting held since the 8-12 July reorganization, explained that this commission is expected to propose concrete solutions, with a view in particular to reducing the number of national departments in the economic ministries and to strengthening enterprises by means of better-qualified cadres.

The most recent reorganization did not involve "profound changes" in the government, Mr dos Santos said, but these "adjustments" should lead to a "more dynamic and efficient" government in some technical sectors (construction, energy, state budget).

The chief of state also stressed the need for the drafting of national plans "with a greater realism" in the approach to situations. "The experience gained since independence was won is sufficient for correcting errors," Mr dos Santos specified.

In conclusion, the Angolan president urged the ministers to reduce imports of goods which could be produced in the country "gradually," while devoting special attention to the energy, agriculture, oil and construction sectors. Angola, it will be recalled, exports oil, diamonds, coffee, iron and cement.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

BRAZIL-ANGOLA AIR LINK--The Angolan airline TAAG and the Brazilian Varig airline inaugurated air service on 3 August linking Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro with Luanda, with a stop in Lagos. Henceforth planes will leave Brazil every Sunday, arriving in Luanda the following day. The protocol agreement with Varig providing for this link was signed in 1977, but was never put into effect. Numerous citizens of Brazil are working in Angola as cooperative aids. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1990] 5157

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CAMEROON

EDF AID FOR RAILROADS, CACAO, COFFEE MARKETING

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 6 Jun 80 p 1325

[Text] From 27 to 30 May in Brussels a meeting was held of diverse financial donors involved in projects related to the trans-Cameroon railroad and the Douala-Yaounde road, in order to refine finance plans for additional needed inputs.

We recall that a mission from the European Development Fund (EDF) led by the director general for development, went to Cameroon from 28 to 30 April 1980. The aim of this working visit was, beyond follow-up on projects to which EDF is contributing (in particular the realignment of the Douala-Yaounde railroad and the extension of the port of Douala), to program the Fund's aid for the next 5 years (see MTM of 16 May 1980, p 1157).

Cacao and Coffee: Commercialization

On 26 May, internal purchases of cacao in the Cameroon totalled 115,950.9 tons, against 98,087.8 tons at the same point in the 1978-1979 harvest, for an increase this year of 17,863.1 tons. Of this total, 67,149.3 tons went for export, and 31,549.2 tons were delivered to local factories, leaving 14,252.4 tons theoretically in stock.

Purchases of "robusta" coffee on 23 May totalled 53,153 tons this year, against 60,558 tons the year before, for a decrease in 1979-1980 of 7,542 tons; the total exported was 10,470 tons, to which was added 5,320 tons of cargo in transit, leaving 35,226 tons theoretically in stock. Purchases of "arabica" coffee on 23 May totalled 3,323 tons, of which 2,693 tons were exported, leaving a theoretical stock of 630 tons.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FRANCE SAID TO HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT DACKO

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Aug 80 pp 26, 27

[Article by Francois Soudan: "And if France Abandoned Dacko--"]

[Text] Ten months after Bokassa's eviction, is his predecessor-successor really the man for the situation?

"David Dacko? If 'Operation Barracuda' were to be done again, I am not sure one of our Transalls would be taken on board again. He is too heavy..."

A joke or a confidence, it doesn't matter much. That sentence, thrown out in late July by a highly placed French official, illustrates the feeling of annoyance that the 10 months of power of the Central African president are inspiring in Paris. Even David Dacko's francophilia is scarcely appreciated: it is considered "excessive." "Look, he invited 400 of our paras [paratroopers] to dine at the presidential residence for midnight supper on December 31. They tried to make him understand that this was awkward as far as relations with the population were concerned. There was nothing to be done. He is stubborn, on top of everything else..."

Obstinate, David Dacko? Undoubtedly. Provided, say those who hardly like him, that you add to that semiquality a full-scale fault: indecision. It is true that Central Africa, paralyzed since the public safety government was dissolved on 9 July and led by a cabinet without a prime minister (at least officially), gives a slight impression of being a ship with neither captain nor compass. In Bangui they are even talking of conspiracy and coup d'etat: "Dacko has been abandoned by Paris. He is going to fall..." Of course, those phrases whispered from mouth to ear about "5 km" to Boy-Rabe, are still merely rumors. But they only grow in times of malaise, and Central Africa is in crisis.

Economic malaise first of all: the 1980 budget is in deficit by 4,600,000,000 CFA francs; the public debt is over 75,000,000,000; on the markets, the current prices of foodstuffs are climbing, whereas the average wage of a worker is still 15,000 CFA francs per month. The big backers' conference that was held in Bangui from 23 to 28 June, which proposed (implicitly) to "change Central Africa into a new Gabon," ended in a half-failure. Apart from France, Iraq and--Gabon, no participating state really committed itself.

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The Government for the Taking

A corollary of a worrisome economic situation, the social and political agitation has resumed more vigorously than ever. On three occasions on 7, 27 and 28 June, the high school students, who were the spearhead of the anti-Bokassa protests, took to the streets again, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Bernard Ayandho, who was considered responsible for the crisis, and Vice President Henri Maidou, who was for a long time the closest associate of the former emperor. Simultaneously, clashes between peasants and gendarmes were reported early in June in the regions of Ouham and Ouham Pende, close to Chad. Finally the decision, taken in the interest of austerity, to suspend the integration of young cadres into government service in 1981 was taken very badly.

For the time being these various movements are not coordinated, insofar as the two main opposition organizations, the Ubangian Patriotic Front of Abel Goumba and Ange Patasse's Central African People's Liberation Movement have not managed to federate them. But one is frightened of those Libyan weapons looted at the time of Bokassa's fall, which are circulating on the black market in the people's quarters. One also worries about the methods of governing of a David Dacko who lives surrounded by his Praetorian guard and every morning at 0600 receives his informants: a large, quiet troop in loincloths, tee shirts and boubous [translation unknown], "which shares," a witness recounts, "furtive eyes and a ticket in the pocket."

It was this man alone, rather at bay, who on 9 July announced the dissolution of the public safety government. It was immediately affirmed that this bid for power was dictated by the streets. That all of Bokassa's former associates were going to be excluded from the government and that Bernard Ayandho will also be swept out. That was to be expected. For Dacko, too, it seemed, since he was retiring to his farm 130 km from Bangui. Around Dacko's two henchmen, Bernard Ayandho and Henri Maidou, the atmosphere is feverish.

Some people close to the latter are pushing him to "try something:" "You are not popular, but you are intelligent. The French don't want Dacko any more; the government is there for the taking." On 11 July Dacko returns to Bangui and presents the new government. Economy and Finance Minister Alphonse Koyamba, a former associate of Bokassa's, no longer appears in the government. Surprise: not a word is breathed about the posts of prime minister and vice president. "We are negotiating," they say at the presidential residence.

In fact, although David Dacko undoubtedly wanted, by dissolving his government, "to please the streets," that is, to sacrifice Ayandho and Maidou, he seems momentarily to have gone back on his decision. For what motives? Pressure from Paris, especially in favor of Henri Maidou, are not to be ruled out. Especially when they are murmuring that the middle term replacement of Dacko by Maidou was provided for from the beginning of "Operation Barracuda." It is also recalled that Bokassa's former prime minister enjoys a good image with the French: serious, responsible, in short the man who is needed for Central

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Africa, which since the withdrawal of the French paratroopers from Chad is becoming rather a garrison-state of the French army on the continent.

Men of Quality

Already, in the Franceville talk between Bokassa and Rene Journiac on 1 August 1979, Paris had shown a great deal of interest in Henri Maidou: "You have men of quality in your entourage," Journiac said to Bokassa. "Your prime minister, for example. You might fade into the background behind him." The former minister is known to have refused angrily. Likewise his predecessor and successor, David Dacko, today seems to have found that the presidential fits his measurements. Stubborn, David Dacko? Certainly. After all, Valery Giscard d'Estaing's adviser for African affairs, Martin Kirsch, whose visit was expected on 30 July in Bangui, may give the reason. He who sometimes confides, "Journiac's friends are not necessarily my friends."

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

MULTIPARTYISM FAVORED--The Central African Republic is ready for a multiparty system, said Vice President Maidou in an interview on national radio, on 22 July in Bangui. Nevertheless, he emphasized that multipartyism should be limited to two or three parties and not based on regionalism or ethnic groups which, in his view, might lead to political and social instability. Such a formula, he specified, has the advantage of creating broadly based popular parties and strengthening national unity through the mixing of ethnic groups and the exercise of democratic power. Furthermore, the system will encourage the ruling team to act efficiently if it is to remain in power. "The experience of controlled multipartyism is worthy of being tried and we are deeply convinced that, properly carried out, this experience will protect the country from any upheaval or possibility for a brutal seizure of power," Maidou concluded. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1,924] 5157

LOAN AGREEMENTS SIGNED--Recently, Enoch Derant Lakoue, director general of the Development Bank of the Central African States (BDEAC) signed in Bangui two loan agreements. The first has been granted to the OCPT (Inter-African Posts and Telecommunications Office) for the organization of a temporary assistance service for the telephone system in Bangui. This operation will be carried out by Sofrecom, the French study bureau. It will constitute the first part of a program for modernization of the circuit. The loan totals 240 million CFA, repayable over eight years, with a two-year grace period, and with an interest rate of 8.5 percent. The second loan goes to the SNCT (Central African Public Works National Company); it totals 325 million CFA repayable within five years at 11.5 percent rate of interest. It will enable this public works company to purchase construction and road maintenance materials. On the Central African side the agreements were signed, respectively, by Guy Darlan, chairman of the administrative council of the OCPT, and by Paul Bidet, director general of the SNCT. The Central African state had already approved the two agreements which were countersigned by Mr Koyamba, the then minister of finance. These two loans are the first to be made by the BDEAC to the Central African Republic. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1,924] 5157

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KIRSCH'S VISIT--Mr Martin Kirsch, adviser on African affairs to the president of the French Republic, left Bangui early on the morning of 1 August for Paris, at the end of a 24-hour stay in the Central African Republic. Mr Kirsch, for whom this was the first visit to the Central African Republic since he replaced Mr Rene Journiac, met at length on 31 July with President David Dacko, prior to having an interview with Vice President Henri Maidou and Prime Minister Bernard Christian Ayandho. No details were available in Bangui on the talks Mr Kirsch had with the Central African authorities. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1980] 5157

FRENCH EDUCATIONAL FINANCING AGREEMENT--An agreement involving 1.5 million French francs has just been signed in Paris by Mr Jean-Philippe Ricalens, director of the office of the minister of co-operation, and Dr Jean-Marie Frisat, the Central African Republic ambassador to France. The agreement pertains to a subsidy which will be directed in particular to the Office for Cooperation and University Enrollment to "enable it to deal with some urgent cases and repatriate a certain number of students concluding their studies. The renewal of this aid granted on an exceptional basis is not foreseen," a communique released in Rue Monsieur explained. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1980] 5157

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CHAD

BRIEFS

DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY SITUATION--A group of members of the original FROLINAT, headed by Dr Abba Siddick (nonmilitary training) has decided to join the FAN (Armed Forces of the North) of Hissein Habre which are fighting against some elements represented in the Goukouni Oueddei. Two representatives of this group, Chere Mahmat and Guealbaye Mannasset stated on 25 July, in Paris, that they had decided to join the FAN to fight for the defense of "Chadian integrity and unity." "We want to fight Lybian expansionism and countryless agents and mercenaries in Ndjama," they specified. Furthermore, they criticized "the ambiguous policy pursued by France toward Lybia," as well as the "wait-and-see" policy of Abba Siddick." On the other hand, the AFP has provided the following information on the development of the Chadian conflict in July. Following the attempt launched on 9 and 10 July by the Popular Armed Forces (FAP) of President Goukouni Oueddei to capture by assault the "13 April Camp" located in the center of Ndjama and held by the FAN, the fighting is taking place outside the capital city, in particular along the northern route. On 14 July FAN elements returning from Moito (240 kilometers from Ndjama), on foot, after having abandoned their vehicles, had an altercation with the FAP, south of Massaguet, a settlement occupied by the FAP, located 80 kilometers northeast of the capital. On 16 July other FAN troops were ambushed by elements commanded by Ahmat Acyl (FAC-Joint Action Front) in the proximity of Massaguet. On the political level, observers have noted a general trend toward negotiations, following the trip to Ndjama by Marcel Beaux, French ambassador to Chad (MTM, 18 July 1980, p 1,803). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1,925] 5157

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COMORO ISLANDS

BADEA FINANCIAL AID FOR MUTSAMUDU PORT EXTENSION REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1986

[Text] The BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic Development] board of directors on 28 June approved an \$8,000,000 loan to the Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros, for the Mutsamudu port development project. The project, which is to cost \$33,130,000 overall, is intended to extend the receiving capability of the Mutsamudu port (on Anjucuan Island), which is virtually the only port in the country in a position to receive heavy-tonnage freighters in return for improvements. The anticipated extension will enable the port to serve all the other ports of the islands and put an end to the present extremely costly practice of shipping merchandise through continental ports before their transportation is provided from or to the islands on barges.

The project's main components are as follows: enlargement of the present breakwater and construction of new piers along 250 meters for reception of large ships (170 meters) and tramps (80 meters); dredging of the basin, construction of warehouses, administrative buildings and opening access roads to the port; purchase of materials and equipment for handling, needed for operation of the new port.

The port extension will provide direct access to the islands for large freighters, which will be accompanied by a reorganization of all maritime transport activities and as a consequence will provide important economic advantages, by preventing transfers and costly delays. In addition, in the cyclone season, which extends over four months, barging becomes virtually impossible, depriving the archipelago of vital importation and exportation movement. In this context the interest of the project appears especially demanding, chiefly because, in addition to the security it will ensure for provisions, it will have extremely positive effects on the creation of jobs, foreign currency gains, increased exports, maritime transport costs and air transport costs (in the cyclone season), local commerce, tourism, loss of cargoes and human lives (in transfer operations on high seas) and delivery delays.

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CONGO

OPTIMISTIC FORECAST CONCERNING PETROLEUM CONFIRMED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1926

[Report: "Chalandon Confirms Petroleum Hopes"]

[Text] The optimistic forecasts formulated one year ago in terms of petroleum production have been confirmed, stated Albin Chalandon, president of the Elf Aquitaine Company, on 26 July, during his Congo trip.

Chalandon, who was given an audience in Kinkala by President Sassou Nguesso, added that Congolese petroleum output would rise in the years to come. He emphasized that whereas for the current year the expected output was 3 million tons, the output for the next two years could reach, respectively, 4 million and over 5 million tons.

Chalandon let it be known that the question of the participation of the Elf Congo, 80 percent of which is owned by Elf Aquitaine (the rest being held by the Congolese state) in the development of the Congo in areas other than petroleum, had been discussed with the Congolese president.

Let us recall that the 1979 Congo petroleum output totaled 2.7 million tons.

Petroleum extraction in the country began in 1957 from the Pointe Indienne deposits under which a small natural gas field was located (exploited for local needs).

After producing 700,000 tons in 10 years, the Pointe Indienne deposit began to decline. In 1979 its output was no more than 10,000 tons per year with a total output of about 800,000 tons.

The search rapidly turned to the sea. In 1969 Elf Congo undertook to explore the deep Pointe-Noire sea area. At the same time the Italian company Agip Recherches Congo was given the license for Madingo Marine. The companies granted each other, reciprocally, a 35 percent participation based on their licenses.

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The research was successful and in 1972 Elf Congo undertook the exploitation of the Emeraude underwater deposits. The operation proved to be more difficult than expected. All in all, by the end of 1979 the total output was 13 million tons. The current pace averages 1.3 million tons.

Agip Recherches began extraction at the Loango underwater deposit in 1977. In 1979 production reached a pace of 1.3 million tons.

Last April the Likouala-Marine deposit was opened. It was discovered and developed by Elf Congo holding the license for deep extraction at Pointe-Noire. Over a full year the expected output should total 1.5 million tons.

Future petroleum extraction in Congo also involves the exploitation of the Yanga and Sendji deposits and further prospecting of Pointe-Noire as well as prospecting undertaken on the basis of the following new licenses:

- The High Sea license, granted in 1973 to an association consisting of Elf Congo as the operator (85 percent) and Hydro-Congo National Company (15 percent);
- The Loeme land license, granted in 1973 again to the Elf Congo (85 percent) and Hydro-Congo (15 percent association). The ground exploitation marked an initial success in 1979 by discovering petroleum indications in the Mengo 101 drill; they were confirmed in 1980 with the Mengo 102 drill.

The Elf Congo investments since its establishment total 160 billion CFA francs.

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GAMBIA

BRIEFS

FRG AGREEMENT SIGNED--An agreement on a gift of DM 2.5 million from the FRG to Gambia was concluded on 25 July in Banjul by Lamine Jabang, Gambian minister of foreign affairs, and West German Ambassador Udo Hartmann with embassy in Dakar. The gift will be used for the building of a medium-sized foundry. Let us recall that as a result of the negotiations which had taken place in the FRG last June, the FRG had promised to supply Gambia in 1980 loans totaling DM 15 million (about \$8.6 million), either as outright gifts or loans for financial and technical aid. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1,916] 5157

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GUINEA

BANK LOAN TO FINANCE ALUMINUM OXIDE PLANT MODERNIZATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1972

[Text] Within the framework of the first Lome convention, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has granted a loan with an exchange value of 4.4 million units of account (about 117.35 million sylis or 1.287 billion CFA francs) to help with the modernization of an aluminum oxide plant in Fria-Kimbo, 150 kilometers to the north of Conakry. This loan, which represents the first activity of the EIB in this country, was granted to Friguia, a mixed economic company, in which the state is the main stockholder. The funds are in the form of a 10-year loan at a rate of 8 percent, taking into account an interest rebate from the resources of the European Development Fund.

The investments to which the EIB is contributing are designed to increase the productivity of the plant, which is installed near bauxite deposits the known reserves of which are substantial. Built 20 years ago, this plant initially had a capacity of 480,000 tons of aluminum oxide per year, subsequently increased to a technical maximum of 700,000 tons.

The work, the total cost of which is estimated at about 23.6 million units of account (about 629.41 million sylis or 6.903 billion CFA francs), and which is scheduled to be completed by the end of 1982, will make it possible first of all to improve the certain operation of the plant at its maximal capacity and to reduce pollution risks, thanks among other things to the construction of a holding basin for air residues. This work also involves improvement of the storage and shipping capacities, in particular at the port of Conakry, and technical improvements (furnaces, filters) making a reduction in production costs possible. This work may represent the preliminary phase for future further expansion which is currently under study.

The Central Economic Cooperation Fund is also participating in the financing of these investments.

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KENYA

VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSSES FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROSPECTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 pp 1983-1984

[Text] The EEC as is known has decided to provide very substantial aid to Kenya in the next 5 years to enable it to cope with its current difficulties (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 March, p 634). This aid is to be added to that granted by a number of other international bodies and European and Arab countries. As a result it seemed to us of interest to publish here parts of the answers given by Vice President Mwai Kibaki in the course of an interview reported in the EEC LE COURRIER in the June-July issue, as the lead article in a supplement devoted to this African nation. These carefully considered responses express hope tinged with concern, as the reader will be able to see.

To the question as to whether, current prospects being somewhat gloomy, he would regard Kenya as a "good risk" for investors, Mr Kibaki said:

"Kenya has always been attractive enough to investors, and this is still true today and we hope that it will continue. At present we are recording a reasonable number of investments, particularly in the tourist sector and in the field of industrial processing of our farm products. We would like to continue to welcome an increasing number of such investments, for we lack capital and know-how and are not ashamed to admit it. As you know, in 1964, just after we won our independence, our parliament passed a law protecting private investments providing full guarantees where their capital, foreign remittance of profits and employees' rights are concerned. And so we hope that investors will continue to come to Kenya, for in these inflationary periods, we need them especially."

Questioned subsequently about the implementation of the 5-year development plan (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 April 1979, p 950) the amendment of which will doubtless prove necessary (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 July 1980, p 1807), the vice president admitted that many previously established goals will not in fact be achievable.

"Well," he said, "the 6.3-percent goal (rate of annual economic growth) will not be achieved for the simple reason that we will not have sufficient

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funds to finance a number of projects for which the plan calls. We will also spend a great deal more money for our oil and equipment goods imports, which will involve quantities substantially greater than the plan estimates. This means that we have had to postpone certain investments and because of that we will not achieve our goal. But we have not abandoned the planned strategy. We will make progress along the path of reducing poverty. This is what we have done, in any case, since independence. What the present situation means is that the changes we had planned in the income levels of the people will not be achieved in the course of the next 5 years. This will certainly take more time."

On the subject of unemployment and the steps taken to correct it, i.e. the request that employers increase their personnel by 10 percent (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 26 January 1979, p 205), Mr Kibaki said:

"This decision has in fact been implemented. This was closely supervised by the government, such that only the companies which had the means, which projected investments and thus could take on more personnel, were able truly to develop. Some of them even increased their personnel by more than 10 percent. Because other means of providing incentives for them to employ more manpower instead of borrowing capital, which proved to be too costly in any case. But I must correct one point: while we have such a high number of unemployed in the urban centers, in the farm sector, which is the main base of our economy, job offers are not being filled, and there is even a manpower shortage on the farm. This unfortunately is because of the nature of our educational system, the entire pattern of thinking of our young people, who tend to migrate to the cities instead of working the land."

On the subject of the free distribution of milk in the schools, Mr Kibaki confirmed that this measure is now in full application.

"This is going well for the time being," he said. "Kenya has the means for this policy, for it produces surplus milk which it processes into cheese, butter, etc. Thus the milk is available on the spot, and we should not take it away. Thus everything we have done is to orient milk consumption toward those who need it most. This is truly a welcome measure."

Finally, on the subject of the prospects for Kenyan cooperation with the Arab world, the vice president showed optimism.

"The prospects are excellent," he said. "We are already exporting substantial quantities of flowers, food products and even articles of clothing to the Middle East. We have very good relations with the Sudan, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates, with which we have developed our trade. In fact, our relations with the Middle East existed prior to the colonial era, dating back to the seventh century. Also it is a good thing that we have established this traditional trade current between East Africa and the Gulf, the Middle East in particular. We hope that it will develop."

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"Where the sanctions the Arabs want to impose on the countries trading with Israel are concerned, this pertains only to the member countries of the Arab League, and we are not in a position to tell them how they should deal with this or that company. Where Kenya is concerned, the sanctions do not affect as many companies as is thought. It is a question, strictly speaking, of a few firms which are affiliates of international companies based for the most part in Europe."

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KENYA

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM COMPANY PLANNED--According to a statement made on 31 July by Kenyan Minister for Energy John Okwanyo, certain Arabian Gulf countries want to sell oil direct to Kenya without intermediaries. The Kenya Oil Corporation, which the government will establish shortly, will thus import 23 million barrels of crude oil per year, and the other 23 million Kenya imports every year will be purchased through the intermediary of oil companies already located in the country. The decision to create this Kenyan company was made precisely because of the fact that the producer nations in the Gulf area want to deal directly with Kenya, without intermediaries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1984] 5157

AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL AID--The Australian government has allocated 30 million Kenyan shillings (about \$3.75 million) for the launching of a settlement project in Magarini, near Malindi, in the coastal province on the Indian Ocean. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1984] 5157

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NIGER

PRESIDENT DISCUSSES NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 5-YEAR PLAN GOALS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 pp 1974-1975

[Text] Development Company

Just prior to the 20th anniversary of his country's independence, President Seyni Kountche announced in a speech delivered on 2 August that the national committee for the launching of the development company, a body which to date has had a specific and limited assignment, may in the future on its own initiative submit to the government "recommendations, justified opinions and situation evaluations to supplement and balance the decisions of the administrative authorities or the government in the social and economic sectors or in connection with the major political guidelines of the country."

In addition, when the committee is not in session, its members may "offer the prefect authorities their advice with a view to strengthening the capabilities of our districts to organize massive campaigns of information on subjects of regional or national interest, and to organize in order to see to the still better circulation of information and, finally, in order the better to produce and live."

The committee, created last October, is headed by Maj Moumouni Adamou Djermaakoye, minister of youth, sports and culture, and a member of the Supreme Military Council. Made up of 84 departmental representatives of movements, associations and professions, its initial goal was to define the framework of a policy of "accelerated" economic and social development and to establish institutions based on effective participation by all the social strata in Niger.

Uranium Price and 5-Year Plan Goals

In another connection, President Kountche stated that the sale price for uranium, "the fuel which currently provides for electrical energy production at the lowest cost," has for a certain time been experiencing a rapid drop, "at the very time when the prices of other energy substances are increasing

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constantly." "This paradoxical situation," he stressed, "is the result both of ill-defined political factors . . . and powerful economic interests working subtly are quick, it is said, to play coal against uranium in resolute fashion."

President Kountche added that Niger will do everything possible to ensure the continuation of suitable remuneration on major investments made in the mining sector, but "without a doubt there is a difficult and disagreeable period through which we must pass."

The government of Niger will insofar as possible maintain the investment programs which will dictate the future of the country, but it is possible that the goals of the 5-year plan "will undergo some changes, above all in the non-productive infrastructure sector."

In conclusion, the chief of state announced that the public establishments and mixed economic companies will be subjected to detailed study and the state bodies incapable of demonstrating their viability will be eliminated. "We are determined," President Kountche added, "to place stress on the exclusive search for positive results, guaranteeing remuneration for state investments, at a maximum, and a guarantee in the realm of self-financing, at a minimum."

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NIGER

BRIEFS

FLOODS IN AGADEZ--Following the collapse of about 100 meters of protective dike, the water from the rainfall on the night of 14-15 July in the Agadez region swept into the town, causing major damage. The water, which flowed down from Mount Air, located upstream of the town, destroyed in fact almost everything in its path. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1975] 5157

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RWANDA

PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED NATIONAL STABILITY ANALYZED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 pp 1953-1954

[Text] A poor country but a stable one--these it seems are the characteristics which stand out in the image of Rwanda in business circles.

That the country is poor is a known fact, as are the causes. A landlocked area more than 1,500 kilometers from any maritime coast, Rwanda has terrain such that only a limited arable area is available. Its population density, with nearly 200 inhabitants per square kilometer--doubtless the highest in Africa--is substantial, while because of the low level of the purchasing power of the greater mass of all these potential consumers, the domestic market remains very small.

But it is a stable country. The social revolution prior to the winning of independence marked the end of the hegemony of the Watusi group over the Bahutu masses. Simultaneous with the disappearance of the domination of a feudal type, the largest ethnic group (the Bahutu group) took political power in hand. Wasn't stability guaranteed from then on within the logic of a system firmly based on the largest number? A comparison with Burundi, a neighboring country in which, in the form of an inverted pyramid, the Watusi numerical minority is essentially in control of the political power, can only strengthen confidence in the structural stability of Rwanda, which stability however recently suffered a shakeup.

Stability Challenged

It is generally difficult for a foreign observer to obtain a precise idea of the internal political developments in Rwanda, a country in which, with the exception of the very official Rwandan Press Agency (ARP), there is practically no written press coverage, and in which the news system complex comes to next to nothing. The great reserve of the citizens of Rwanda with regard to strangers, which is but a reflection of the particularism of which Rwandans are proud, represents an additional hindrance to a proper understanding of events. Everything proceeds as if nothing were happening. This was clearly evident in the spring of 1979. The war in Uganda had caused the exhaustion of fuel stocks in Rwanda (since the Mombasa-Kigali

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road leads through Kampala), and yet there was no reference in Kigali to the crisis situation Uganda was experiencing.

In March of 1980, pamphlets circulated in Rwanda which were drafted in violent terms, denouncing embezzlement and incompetence among those closest to the chief of state. Then an attempted coup d'etat is said to have occurred. Certain facts still remain unclear. But this time, the media emerged from their usual silence. The chief of state, Maj Gen Juvenal Habyarimana, president and founder of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development, himself has addressed the nation on a number of occasions. His statement published in the ARP on 6 June 1980 stressed the seriousness of the events and explained the historic "context" in which they should be viewed.

After recalling that the cultural revolution of 1979 had as its goal giving power to the majority ethnic group, the president of the republic also noted that for better or for worse, the coexistence of the three ethnic groups (Bahutu, Watusi and, to a very limited extent, the Batwa) had resisted all threats well, and that it was to safeguard this coexistence that he had to establish the second republic in July of 1973 and assume the highest post in the nation as of then. Without naming him, the president of the republic clearly indicated Major Lizinde, who was in charge of the national security forces for 7 years, as the inspirer of subversive undertakings. His personal ambition, supposedly, led him to arrange the "distribution throughout the country of pamphlets criticizing the regime, the person of the chief of state himself and the policy of unity," a policy to which some were unwilling to rally, the chief of state noted.

We should make it clear that Major Lizinde, put in prison at the end of this pamphleteering campaign, is the author of a book which was published in the course of the summer of 1979 in Kigali. Entitled "The Discovery of Kalinga or the End of a Myth--A Contribution to the History of Rwanda," it is a work whose author does not hesitate to voice a certain mistrust about the sincerity of the support of the Watusi group, and in which he represents himself as the choirmaster of Bahutu resurgence.

The chief of state emphasized that the last word will lie with the courts, whose duty it is, without recourse to emergency measures, to punish those responsible for the subversion and to acquit those who were not.

Remaining a poor country as it has, is it possible that Rwanda ceased a short time ago to be a stable one? It would be doubly threatening to the prospects of economic development because to date, stability has been successfully cited to foreign investors as an advantage likely to compensate for the handicap of poverty.

A Situation Seemingly in Hand

For the time being, despite the large number of arrests which have been made, this frustrated palace revolt does not seem likely to have an

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aftermath. But it would doubtless be an error to see in it only a movement reflecting popular discontent. The calm evidenced by the president of the republic with regard to recent events, his concern with re-establishing his authority in legality are both elements serving as guarantees of complete resumption of control of the situation by the existing authorities.

Rise of the New Social Forces

In the longer range, these events will however doubtless have their effects. In this regard, the following repercussions can be foreseen:

Another challenge to the ethnic balance within the very frontiers of Rwanda, a challenge which certainly inspired the attempted coup d'etat (not to speak of the latent civilian-military opposition), an indication that Rwanda will doubtless not be immune to a new ethnic flareup, should such a flareup develop in Burundi. There is a risk here of destabilization through contagion.

Speaking through the voice of the chief of state himself, the government emerged in March-April 1980 from its usual silence, because it wanted to guarantee itself the support of the masses against its opponents. This appeal to the popular wisdom comes within the policy of democratization of the political system, with regard to which we will mention only the two following indications. At the beginning of 1980, the chief of state invited each of his ministers to make himself available for a press conference providing newsmen representing the national press with an opportunity to ask about the activities of each ministerial department, which activities in some cases were sharply criticized. The preparations for the third national congress of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development led to the establishment of communal committees, and then, in May of 1980, to the election of prefectural committees in each of the 10 prefectures in the country.

On the principal level, the path chosen, that of democratization, cannot be criticized. Let us not forget however that once undertaken, such a process is irreversible, and it can lead to unexpected excesses if the political statements and institutional reforms are not accompanied by some improvement in the fate of the masses. Recent events in Liberia provide a tragic illustration of this. Despite his liberal intentions, didn't Tolbert have to atone for the autocratic actions of the likes of Tubman?

Thus it is indeed in the realm of economics that the government of Rwanda, if it intends to remain master of the situation and to resist any further effort to destabilize the country, must launch and win the political battle.

The recent events have made it clear--as denounced by the opposition--that there exists a rich class--the high officials, officers, merchants and

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shipping agents. Their growing wealth is particularly intolerable to the popular masses because they do not even get the crumbs from the feast, and thus the chasm between the people and the national elite is growing ever wider, in an economic environment which has not yet been able to overcome a certain stagnation.

A Fancy Facade

It is true, in Kigali in particular, that outward indications suggest that the economy is healthy. Without yet truly offering the aspect of a capital city, Kigali has little by little abandoned that village aspect which it long retained. Kanombe, an international airport, will soon be equipped with a runway which can accommodate jumbo jets. The road network, already extremely dense, is being improved with the increase in the number of asphalted roads. The rural environment is being modernized somewhat. Tourism and the hotel trade are developing. The social sector can pride itself on a costly reform, some of the ramifications of which cannot yet be measured, but which must be credited with the increase in the population attending school. Processing industries have been established: plastics, banana wine, nail making, soup production, retreading tires, a pyrethrum distillery--or are soon to be established: textiles, matches, oil plant, cement plant, brick plant, quinine extraction, a new brewery. There is even talk of a possible assembly unit in Rwanda for light automotive vehicles.

In a country which has the sad honor of being one of the poorest in the world and where, as a result, everything remains to be done, these undeniable achievements are hailed as that many successes wrested from underdevelopment, without the realization that in most cases they affect only a limited sector of the economy in which the "country in depth" does not participate. In this regard, basically nothing has changed. The economy is still characterized, as it was in the colonial situation, by the duality of sectors: the masses participate only in the traditional sectors, while a favored group, no longer foreigners but citizens of the country, participate almost exclusively in the modern sector of the economy.

Economic Stagnation in the Country

Underneath the visible surface, the reality of Rwanda in 1980 is that of a poor country, a reality which demands that the anguishing question as to the state, if not indeed the very survival, of Rwanda in the year 2000 be posed immediately.

In less than 20 years the present population of Rwanda will have more than doubled, and will exceed 10 million inhabitants in a country with a total area smaller than that of the former colonial power, Belgium, and lacking a rich subsoil stratum. Already in 1978 an agronomer had written that "the maximal area of crop land having been calculated at 1,250,000 hectares, and the area currently in use being 877,000, there remain 363,000 hectares

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available for future expansion. At the current rate of growth of 3.6 percent (in fact the annual rate of population growth is near 4 percent), i.e. about 30,000 hectares per year, all possible expansion of crops will be exhausted in less than 12 years." In other words by 1990 the average land surface for cultivation per peasant family, an area which is presently 1 hectare, will begin to diminish.

Avoiding an Impasse

The public authorities will have to give evidence of imagination, first of all to establish a clear view of what Rwanda will be in the year 2000, and subsequently to take, beginning now, all the steps within their power to improve a situation which, if things follow their present course, threaten to lead to an impasse. Is there not too much of a tendency on the part of the public authorities to rely on food aid from friendly countries, forgetting that this aid may not perhaps be always available when required, while Rwanda has already experienced, in its not-so-distant history, a number of famines (13 serious ones are said to have been recorded between 1894 and 1924). Farm yields are generally low in traditional cultivation, perhaps because Rwanda is not properly speaking either a tropical or a temperate country, but is very sensitive to climatic variations.

Birth control, presuming as would be desirable that it is effective beginning now, would still be unable to prevent overpopulation in Rwanda by the year 2000, taking the inertia of demographic phenomena into account.

The fact remains that a certain number of options do exist for preparations for the year 2000, in order to enable Rwanda to escape the threats and menaces which loom:

The creation of jobs outside the farm sector, in order to relieve the pressure of the active population in the farm sector and thus make possible the intensification of farm production, which in turn will require a strengthening of farm cadres, better motivation of supervisory personnel and strengthened means of action.

A real policy of cooperation with neighboring countries, to allow industrialization on a regional scale and the transfer of population from the more heavily populated countries (Rwanda, Burundi) toward those less heavily populated (Zaire and Tanzania, among others).

A policy of more deliberate openness to foreign capital, which is certainly welcome in Rwanda, but there is sometimes a tendency to forget that such capital is only attracted to Rwanda to the extent that the investors can make profits there.

A bolder monetary policy favoring the financing of productive investments by nationals and foreigners, even if it means strengthening control over speculative financing of investments (housing, transportation of goods).

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An upward revision of the level of compensation for state and public collective agents. The nominal level of the remuneration of state employees is in fact too low to allow the state, despite the goodwill of the majority, to demand of its servants their entire devotion, with dedication and competence, to the service of the nation.

It will be as a function of the direction Rwanda is able to adopt, in particular in connection with the preparations for and implementation of its next development plan (the 5-year plan in progress runs through 1981), the realism and the example of which its leaders are capable with regard to the masses, that one can in retrospect either consider the events of spring 1980 as the first herald of a deterioration in the situation leading to an impasse or, we would hope, as a healthy warning. The awareness of the socioeconomic situation of the country which recent events have forced us to acquire should in fact aid Rwanda to overcome the difficulties which face it while at the same time safeguarding the stability which has been valuable as an example in the course of the past few years.

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SENEGAL

REASONS FOR FRANCE'S PROMPT ECONOMIC AID NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Aug 80 pp 14-17

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Senegal and France: a Friendship That Pays Off"]

[Text] Like many other African countries, Senegal is going through serious economic troubles. Its leaders make no secret of it. The situation is explained to the people. In addition, President Senghor sent his prime minister to Paris. Where he received more than he went there for.

"Senegal is undeniably going through a very serious economic and financial crisis." This is the admission of Ousmane Seck, the Senegalese minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, who is throwing out a series of figures with the paucity of sentimentalism that characterizes technocrats.

Peanut production has taken a breathtaking plunge: it brought in 70,000,000,000 CFA francs in 1977, followed by 23,000,000,000 in 1978, while prices remained stable.

In 1979, thanks to a rather good harvest (900,000 tons) and despite a decline in world prices, exports contributed 43,000,000,000 CFA francs to export receipts, but this year, in 1980, prices were 25 percent lower and the harvest was short: peanuts will have brought in only some 12,000,000,000 to 13,000,000,000 CFA francs.

In three agricultural seasons, therefore, Senegal's quasi-monoculture, which makes up 45 to 50 percent of its total exports, has "lost" nearly 57,000,000,000 CFA francs, a figure that will eventually make more of a hole in the trade deficit.

An Attentive Listener

Minister Ousmane Seck, according to rumors in Dakar, very nearly lost his position. For sticking to the truth of the figures and for having sounded the

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alarm. The members of Parliament who met in budgetary session in June could not believe their ears: a member of the government who also had responsibilities in the Socialist Party (the majority party) told them bluntly that Senegal was experiencing economic difficulties.

However, Ousmane Seck had an attentive and curious listener: Sheykh Abdoul Ahad Lakhat Mbacke, the general caliph of the Mourides--the most influential religious brotherhood among the 85 percent of Senegalese who are Muslims--, who summoned him and asked him to explain what the crisis was and why the economy was in trouble. "For two hours I explained all the economic mechanisms to him (in Wolof)," Ousmane Seck told us. The lesson has been revealed as paying off. The caliph promised to explain everything in his turn to the believers. President Leopold Sedar Senghor himself suggested that his Finance Minister give the same course in economics to the other great religious head, Serigne Abdoul Aziz Sy, the general caliph of the Tidjane brotherhood.

These popularization meetings certainly express a governmental desire to mobilize public opinion around a theme: hit hard by the international crisis, Senegal, whose economy depends on dry farming (the peanut is queen) and on exports (many peanuts and a few phosphates--13 to 15 percent of exports), is in a bad position.

It can be explained, of course, by climatic disturbance. Since the great drought of 1973-1974 the Senegalese economy has adjusted poorly. Because from one year to the next rain is becoming more scarce. Between 1976-1977 and 1977-1978, for example, the volume of precipitation diminished by 50 percent. The result, a disastrous lowering of agriculture production: peanut production declined by 41 percent, millet by 40 percent and sorghum by 45 percent. Whereas paddy rice--which provides the daily rice for the Senegalese--went from 133,000 tons in 1975-1976 to 112,260 tons in the 1976-1977 season, and fell to 83,671 tons in 1977-1978.

Backward Leaps

However, the number of mouths to be fed continues to increase: the 5,400,000 Senegalese are increased by 156,000 others per year. According to the predictions made by the National Population Commission, 200,000 new Senegalese will be born every year after 1996, and after 2016 the population will increase by at least 262,000 and possibly 351,000 inhabitants per year. Which means that between now and the year 2000 rice production will have to be multiplied by 20. A tour de force that the chronic drought does not seem ready to allow; instead of making forward bounds, production is making backward leaps.

The lowered production has harmed the balance of trade. Exports have gone from 190,000,000,000 CFA francs in 1977 to only 133,000,000,000 in 1978, and then to 121,500,000,000 in 1979. A drastic export restriction policy reduced the trade deficit of 1979 to 54,000,000,000 CFA francs (compared with 59,700,000,000 the year before). But again this year the vital minimum requires that 14,000,000,000 CFA francs' worth of cereals be imported.

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Misappropriations

The theory that Senghor has been trotting out for 20 years is confirmed every day, namely the deteriorating terms of exchange: the peanuts exported by Senegal have lost 25 percent of their value on the world market, while the equipment goods it must import cost 15 percent more than in 1979. President Senghor even stated, "Between 1974 and 1978, our export prices increased by 57 percent, while import prices rose 196 percent."

To which is added the rise in the price of oil. Prime Minister Abdou Diouf said again on 18 July in Paris, "The oil bill (Senegal's), which in 1973 amounted to 5,000,000,000 CFA francs, will be over 50,000,000,000 in 1980." So much foreign currency to be mobilized to maintain economic activity. Just when Senegalese businesses are suffocating. Because they are less and less able to pay for the oil and fuel they need. Because they are less and less able to resort to bank credits that are in default.

The industry slowdown, added to the agriculture slowdown, has reduced all economic activity. Production is inadequate, the volume of trade is dwindling, and money, the oxygen of the economy, is becoming rare. Business firms are earning little and no longer pay the banks, which in their turn do not have enough money to loan it out and start production up again. The circle is complete.

Figures? They are eloquent. In the public sector alone the administration owes (as of 30 June 1980) some 15,000,000,000 CFA francs to its private suppliers; public institutions owe another 15,000,000,000 to the banking sector, to which are added the 7,000,000,000 that the government as such owes to the national banks.

As for the ONCAD (National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development), which is supposed to be the spearhead of the entrepreneur-state in marketing peanuts, it is suffering from two maladies: misappropriation of funds, into which investigations have been ordered; trouble in recovering its debts, which amount to 30,000,000,000 CFA francs--19,000,000,000 is considered permanently lost because the peasants who owe it lack the means to pay.

For, although scarcity is not really rampant, the lowered production has bled the rural world: no peanuts, no rice, no money. Which has led the government to distribute free provisions in the regions most affected by the drought.

The Strangulation of the State

The final consequence of the economic crisis is that the state is out of wind. Commercial activity being in a slowdown, indirect taxes are yielding with increasing difficulty the 60 percent of budgetary income they are traditionally expected to provide. Income is diminishing, collecting the indirect taxes

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that supply 60 percent of those collected is also becoming difficult to do. While the government, the principal employer, must pay its 57,000 civil servants 4,000,000,000 CFA francs per month. The danger of strangulation was such that the Senegalese government imposed a rigorous discipline of austerity by deciding on a stabilization plan (1979-1980) and by restraining its own expenditures. Thus, the 1980-1981 budget, adopted in June by the National Assembly, was almost frozen, at 191,617,000,000 CFA francs, at the level of fiscal year 1979-1980, or 190,715,000,000, the slight 11.1-percent increase serving to cover the rate of inflation, estimated at 12 percent.

Official Automobiles

Among the stabilization measures the freezing of recruitment of civil servants ranks in first place: no commitment is authorized, with the sole exception of Senegalese cadres graduating from training schools, who are considered to be in a pre-employment situation during their studies. The second Draconian measure: a lowering of the government lifestyle. Noblesse oblige, the members of the government must set the example; very probably, the official automobiles, the Peugeot 604s, will be replaced by 504s. Putting the substitution into operation will cost 150,000,000 CFA francs, but at the Finance Ministry it is estimated that the savings in fuel thus realized (the 604s are noted for their voracity) will very largely compensate for the initial expense.

With respect to government-owned or semi-public businesses or corporations, austerity is also standard from now on. This sector, which has grown too fast, is today the subject of systematic investigations.

Except for the misappropriation of funds that is peculiar to certain firms, a general observation has been made: in the good old tradition of all bureaucracy, the personnel of these companies has swelled immeasurably and in six years the mass of the wages they distribute has grown by--80 percent. A disease that requires surgical intervention. Which is recommended in the 100 investigative reports that the government's Inspection General submitted to Mr Senghor in 1979.

But these measures, however courageous, merely serve to close some gaps. They attend to first things first. They do not start the economy up again. Neither new investment nor production activity nor trade exchanges. The state seems to have planned to do all it can. But it cannot do more than that. Before even thinking of launching new investment plans, the Senegalese state has therefore chosen to stabilize the existing ones, to make the economic machine start up again.

Discreetly, the Senegalese leaders prepared a request for emergency aid. On 16 July 1980 Prime Minister Abdou Diouf emplaned for Paris. His mission: to negotiate aid from France to repay the debts of the government and the government-owned sector, owed to the Senegalese private sector--mainly the banks. On his departure from Dakar, Abdou Diouf, flanked by his ministers of Finance, Ousmane Seck, and Planning, Louis Alexandrenne, was not very optimistic. He knew the reserved French technocrats, who balk at President Giscard d'Estaing's prodigality.

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Mr Diouf nevertheless hopes (and his hopes are high) to obtain 15,000,000,000 CFA francs in aid, which could be rounded by a second section of another 15,000,000,000 in several months. The result exceeds his hopes: at the personal intervention of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the French government is granting 21,500,000,000 CFA francs.

Of that total, 4,000,000,000 is granted as discounted loans--payable in 15 years with a five-year grace period--at a rate of 7.5 percent; 7,500,000,000 CFA francs are being advanced by the French Treasury out of the 1981 Stabex program--a mechanism provided for by the Lome Convention between the EEC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (the ACP)--; finally, 10,000,000,000 will be given as guaranteed loans, but not discounted (the rate of interest therefore is 12.5 percent).

The allocations will be divided between payment of domestic debts (11,500,000,000 CFA francs to be paid immediately) and the refloating of Investment Bank funds (10,000,000,000).

A Good Debtor

"This is the first time," Ousmane Seck told us, "that Senegal is the beneficiary of such a significant transfer at one single time." In fact, the Senegalese themselves profess themselves surprised at the promptness with which France has flown to the aid of their economy.

There are three reasons.

The first is Senegal's excellent credibility in international financial circles. The national foreign debt, 300,000,000,000 CFA francs, is heavy, but it has always been paid. This despite unbridled recourse to foreign loans after 1973, at the time when the excellent phosphates run had made Senegal "think too big." Thus, the servicing of the debt has been multiplied by 10 in 7 years: 3,000,000,000 CFA francs in 1973, in the 1979-1980 budget it represents some 30,600,000,000, or 30 percent of export revenue, which is enormous; but Senegal has made it a point of honor never to default on its commitments. Some friendly countries had even advised Senegalese leaders to "do what everyone else does," that is to say, to ask that their debts be erased; but Senghor has not yet resigned himself to that. The very most he is disposed to do is to request that the repayment deadlines be reset. Relations between Paris and Dakar must have been purely "business," for the French leaders to have lent to such a good debtor without batting an eye.

After Senghor--

There is another reason for France's gesture, more sentimental and political: the personality and orientation of Leopold Sedar Senghor. In Paris they are still as determined as ever to support the Senghorian regime. Senegalese diplomacy fits perfectly into the French concern for remaining the "arm" of the West in Africa. By receiving the American vice president, Walter Mondale, in late July, Mr Senghor confirmed it again: Senegal is worried about the

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thrust of the USSR and Cuba in Africa. And the Western strategy for facing it is well known: let France do it. France therefore wanted to show Leopold Sedar Senghor that it can fly to his aid at any moment, on the military level (the French military base at Ouakam is there "for that purpose as on the economic level. The crisis Senegal is going through has been grave enough to make Mr Giscard d'Estaing react very quickly and sweep away the reluctance of his experts.

According to highly placed leaders in Dakar, if the crisis were to last any longer the social situation could become untenable: businesses would close their doors and the unemployed would take to the streets; the purchasing power of the wage-earners, despite salary increases, would not be enough to keep up with exploding prices (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1015); the peasants would be getting even less to eat; and democratic openness would quickly give way to aimlessness. Which would sweep away President Senghor's regime, a prospect that France is not at all ready to resign itself to. "I dare not think what will happen to Senegal after Senghor," a highly placed official in the Quai d'Orsay said to us.

But Senghor is not immortal. He has even prepared for his succession. And France, in rushing to Senegal's bedside, was trying to tell him that it endorsed his choice. It was not Senghor who negotiated the request for aid in Paris. It was his prime minister, Abdou Diouf, the constitutional heir apparent. That man whom Senghor himself calls "too reserved" passed his examination: he obtained from France more than he had come to ask for.

Such French largesse is significant. Tomorrow, when Leopold Sedar Senghor has retired, his successor, Abdou Diouf--a "good choice," Giscard d'Estaing would say--will always be able to count on France's support.

Ulterior Motive

When all is said and done Abdou Diouf's mission served as a test for both parties. In addressing himself only to France (and to Saudi Arabia, for \$100,000,000 in aid), Senghor was anxious to demonstrate that, faithful to his friends, he turns first to his old friends before looking for new allies.

In granting more than was asked, Giscard wanted to show that he, also faithful, can do anything to save his friends. Probably not without some ulterior motive. As the first to aid Senegal, France checkmates the oil-producing countries that would like very much to have privileged relations with such a heavily Islamic state. But, for the moment, while Dakar spends 50,000,000,000 CFA francs per year to import its oil, the aid from the Arab countries scarcely exceeds a total flow of 2,000,000,000 CFA francs.

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SENEGAL

EFFECTS OF DROUGHT PERSIST DESPITE RAINS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1915

[Report: "The Rainy Season: The Rain, Finally"]

[Text] Finally, on 27 July, it rained over Dakar and Senegal, to the greatest possible satisfaction of the Senegalese who had been waiting for weeks for the rainy season to begin. Panic was beginning to show up in the face of the persistent drought which has already decimated cattle and sheep herds and were suggesting famine.

The infrequent rains which had fallen over the past 2 months in the south had been unable, so far, to promote the germination of the crops and it was feared that the 1980 harvest would be even more catastrophic than that of the preceding 2 years. Rain has been steadily falling starting with 26 July in the south and the 27th in the rest of the country. The meteorological services are confident that this "good" weather will remain in the days to come.

The Senegalese herds are hungry and sick, noted LE SOLEIL, the Dakar daily, in its 26 July issue. A number of infectious disease centers may be found virtually everywhere and 164,000 head of cattle have died in the territory. In the areas of Djoloff and the river alone 75,000 sheep and goats have died of hunger. All in all, nearly 500,000 head are threatened and need food. The livestock breeders are looking for bits and pieces in the barren bush. Feeding from the air is the last hope for surviving a particularly long dry spell.

In Sine-Saloum, the millet has sprouted only in some pockets of Nioro department; the other areas are barren. There is a feed shortage in Diourbel which needs 8,000 tons of millet to save the situation. For the past four years this has been the worst rainy season in Casamance. A substantial share of the rural population has become undernourished. The cattle are suffering from physiological deprivations and their mortality rate is very high.

Never before has the threat of a famine, today knocking at the door of the rural world, been so serious. . . . Agriculture, which seems strongly

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compromised this season, accounts for 35 percent of the gross internal product and for one-third of Senegal's exports. The high mortality of the herds will heavily affect the consumption centers whose only source of food is the countryside.

"Since international aid is neither quick nor consistent with our needs," added LE SOLEIL, "we must begin by relying on ourselves. Whereas our food requirements total 118,000 tons, international aid to our country is limited (received and planned) to less than 50,000 tons. The grain reserves of the villages have been exhausted. Millet, which has vanished from the markets, is sold by some speculators for 100 francs per kilogram. . . .

"Therefore, humans and animals must be given food and water if they are to face a difficult period which will certainly be the longest in our 20 years of independence. It becomes necessary to revise our farm policy, to change our agricultural political fabric, preceded by changing our industrial system, and to develop new properly equipped production centers. . . .

"The end of the rainy season could result for the state in a loss of several billion CFA francs used to purchase seeds and subsidize fertilizers. It may also increase the indebtedness of the rural area, assessed currently at almost 7 billion francs. Millions of peasants and breeders are threatened.

"Our country is being severely tried by a persistent drought which could threaten the abandonment of a number of plans whose vitality depends on agriculture. This applies to the administrative reform, the successful collection of rural taxes, and the restructuring of cooperatives based on agricultural production."

The Senegalese government has drafted a program for the delivery of hardship food which would make it possible to feed the population until the next crop and provide seeds to compensate for the sowing of crops which could not germinate for lack of sufficient rain.

The state has also launched a "cattle salvage" operation by supplying feed for the animals at the symbolic price of 10 CFA francs the kilogram. The situation is as severe in livestock breeding, for the drought had long eliminated the meager pasture areas on which cattle and sheep subsist.

Recently a case was cited in the Diourbel area of peasants who, having exhausted all other sources of feed for their cattle, were feeding them the thatch from their roofs. There has also been a strong increase in cattle mortality from thirst. Or else, tortured by hunger, the cattle would eat anything they could find, including bits of plastic, resulting in lethal gastric complications.

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Finally, the drought is threatening the reforestation campaign launched by the state: The seedlings, even though low water consumers, lacked even the minimum of their required moisture to get started and perished soon afterwards.

The struggle against the drought is the priority target of the Senegalese government. However, major reforestation and irrigation programs (the building of dams and the drilling of deep wells) can yield results only on a medium or long-term basis. In order to face the immediate consequences of the severe precipitation shortage, the government must apply prompt measures.

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SENEGAL

■ FAD-FINANCED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1971

[Text] The International Fund for Agricultural Development (FAD) has agreed to finance 75.44 percent of a rural development project the overall cost of which is estimated at 5.256 billion CFA francs. The goal of the operation, which involves the department of Mbour and the region of Louga, is to improve farm production, basically food crops, but also living conditions in the rural sector.

The implementation of the project has been entrusted to the Farm Development and Popularization Company (SODEVA). The government of Senegal and the cooperatives are contributing 21.80 percent and 3.26 percent, respectively, to the financing.

In a 5-year period, the goal is to cover some 910 sections, each section containing 20 farm operations on an average. This means 18,200 operations involving 130,000 persons, 30 percent of the farmers in the project zone.

In addition to the provision of credit for increasing the productivity of local operations, the project calls for the installation of 40 water taps, the planting of 800 hectares in local timber (for heating and construction), the provision of 166 mills and 66 threshers for millet, and 133 peanut shaker-windrowers, as well as the tools for rural craftsmen for the maintenance of all this collective equipment. It will also involve the reduction of the number of cooperatives in the zone from 225 to 106, and the building of 106 shop-offices and 52 silos for the storage of the surplus of marketable millet. Twenty-nine trucks will make it possible to strengthen the reorganized cooperatives so that they can cope with their new activities.

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SENEGAL

DAKAR-MARINE FLOATING DOCK TO BEGIN OPERATING EARLY OCTOBER

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1980

[Text] As we reported in our issue No 1809 dated 11 July (p 1740), the Dakar-Marine floating dock reached Dakar during the night of 4-5 July, towed from Norway in record time by powerful 22,000-horsepower tug Smit-London.

The dock is now moored at the new wet repair wharf of Dakar-Marine (where the photograph we carry on the cover page was taken). This wharf was recently completed and the building of the workshops and offices of Dakar-Marine there will be finished soon.

In view of the importance of the completion of the Dakar-Marine project for Senegal, we have reported on a number of occasions in these recent months on the progress made in the work (see our issues 1792 dated 14 March, 1807 dated 27 June and 1809 dated 11 June, section on Senegal).

At a time when Senegal is experiencing serious economic and financial difficulties, due in part to the international crisis, to an ever-heavier oil bill and to continuing drought, it would be well to stress that the commissioning of the dock and the supplementary Dakar-Marine workshops in October may, through its secondary effects, contribute to re-launching a number of Senegalese industrial and commercial sectors.

The Dakar-Marine project is the work, for the most part, of Minister of Industrial Development and Crafts Cheikh Amidou Kane, and Mr Faly Ba, president and general director, assisted on the financial, technical, organizational and maintenance levels by Cecotrat, a French engineering company headed by Mr Tien Phuc.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

IRON ORE EXPLOITATION--The 24 July Interministerial Council, chaired by Leopold Sedar Senghor, the Senegalese chief of state, discussed a plan for the mining of iron ore in Faleme (Miferso). The council emphasized the need to conduct over the next few months feasibility studies and to optimize the plan. The overall investments preceding the mining are assessed at 215 billion CFA. The plan calls for the creation of a mining center with social infrastructures employing 1,800 people; the laying of railroad tracks (1,500 jobs) to haul the output of 12 million tons of minerals per year; the building of a port (350 jobs) for the docking of ore carriers to haul the output to Europe. The implementation of the various infrastructures will open 3,950 new jobs 7 to 10 years from now. Miferso, the company in charge of mining the iron deposits in eastern Senegal, whose reserves are estimated at 450 million tons, includes the Senegal, the BRGM (Bureau for Geological and Mining Research, a French agency), and the Krupp (FRG) and Kanematzu (Japan) companies. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1,915] 5157

FRANCE DONATES MAIZE--Following the trip to Paris of Abdou Diouf, Senegalese prime minister, an agreement on a gift of 5,000 tons of corn by France to Senegal was signed by Philippe Lagayette, inspector of finance, representing the French government, and Amadou Cisse, on behalf of the Senegalese government. Deliveries will begin as of 18 August 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1,915] 5157

NETHERLANDS WHEAT DONATION--A shipment of 3,400 tons of wheat valued at 200 million CFA francs was presented to Senegal by the Dutch government on 1 August. Ceremonies took place in the Socopao stores with the Dutch charge d'affaires in Senegal, Mr W. Joris Witkam, and Mr Souleymane Ndiaye, commissioner for food aid, participating. This gift will make possible the purchase of millet for free distribution in the regions which have suffered disasters and will lighten the burden of the Senegalese people. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1971] 5157

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SIERRA LEONE

NEW BADEA LOAN FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT GRANTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1920

[Report: "New BADEA Loan for Agricultural Development"]

[Text] On 26 June the Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA) approved a loan of \$8.5 million to Sierra Leone for the financing of an overall agricultural development plan.

Agriculture is in a state of full development in Sierra Leone. Its contribution to the GNP rose from 29.9 percent in 1970-1971 to 39.9 percent in 1976-1977. In 1977 agricultural exports were slightly below 46 percent of total exports in terms of value. Adding the fact that the basic sector accounts for 75 percent of the active population of the country, we can see not only the current role of agriculture in the economy but its potential as well.

The current project which covers a heavily populated area in the eastern part of the country totaling 16,000 square kilometers is focused on the following activities: development of agriculture and rice, corn, and manioc for domestic consumption and coffee, cocoa, and cocoa nuts for export; organization of support agricultural services such as bank loans (intrants), vocational training, research and dissemination of cultivation techniques; and civil engineering projects including the building of personnel housing.

The recent loan granted by BADEA raises the total to \$17.1 million (of which \$5 million for the production of energy and \$3.6 million as urgent aid) for the financial assistance granted to the country. The bank also accounts for 42.9 percent of total Arab aid to Sierra Leone or \$39.8 million.

The loan, repayable over 15 years, with a five year grace period and at 5 percent annual interest, will finance 35 percent of the total cost of the project assessed at \$24 million. The projects will benefit from other

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assistance as follows: AID, \$12 million; PNUD, \$1 million; and Sierra Leone government, \$2.5 million.

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SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCES DESERTER DESCRIBES EXPERIENCES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Jul 80 p 36

[Interview with Janie Jacobs, date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Janie Jacobs, 28, did not impress me very much when I saw him for the first time, sitting at a table with a glass of Carlsberg beer and a plate of fried sausages in a Zurich cafe. It was exactly 7 months ago. Wearing a false moustache and dark glasses he had sneaked away from his South African Defense Forces (SADF, barracks 15 days earlier, to board a Swissair plane using false papers at Ian Smuts Airport in Johannesburg. An Afrikaner and a deserter, he was afraid. "I can tell you nothing now. But I will come to see you one day. Until then, forget me."

I saw him again in Paris. He talked to me about this army, one of the most secret in the world.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Eight months ago you were a noncommissioned officer in the South African army. And then suddenly you made the great leap. Desertion. Why? For political reasons?

Janie Jacobs: No, not at all. I have nothing against apartheid. Of course I think that some aspects of the system should be improved. But I am not a liberal. My desertion was because I love a half-caste from the Cape, and in South Africa this type of love is forbidden. I made my escape and I am preparing for hers.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: How did you come to go into the military?

Janie Jacobs: I am from Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State. My father was a doctor. We had a large villa and four very devoted black servants. I learned later, when I was in the army, that one of them was a member of the ANC and I went myself to arrest him. This was in 1976, at the time of the Soweto affair. I feel a little uneasy about it now, because he was tortured by the BOSS (secret service). Then he disappeared. But he was a terrorist. My military calling? In old Afrikaner families, it is traditional that one of the children become a soldier. But there is something

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else. In 1960, at the time of the Sharpeville uprising, I was 8 years old, and I found my puppy with his throat cut. A note had been left with his body: "After the dogs, it will be the masters' turn." It was that day that I decided to become a soldier to get my revenge.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Also, it is in the Orange Free State that the whites are the most conservative, the most racist.

Janie Jacobs: That is true. There are real fanatics there. When Mugabe won in the elections in Zimbabwe, the teachers taught the white primary school children a song to the tune of "Singing in the Rain." "We hate Mugabe, we hate the terrorists, we will kill them!"

Black as Night

JEUNE AFRIQUE: How is the white South African army organized?

Janie Jacobs: It is forbidden to speak about it. The army is a kind of pyramid which takes you at birth and only abandons you when you die.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: I suppose there are schools and specialized camps.

Janie Jacobs: Of course. For the land army, the Upington camp near the Kalahari Desert, where one trains awhile before being sent to Namibia, and the supersecret Dani Theron combat school, where one is trained in chemical warfare, are the hardest.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What about the blacks?

Janie Jacobs: They are beginning to integrate them in separate units in which only volunteers carefully screened are accepted. They have their own barracks, on the Cape for the half-castes, in Johannesburg (Lenz base) for the blacks, in Durban for the Indians. But they are mistrusted: they train with old rifles and do not have access to the air bases. They are paid 40 percent less than we are.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: How much is that?

Janie Jacobs: About 240 rands (1,300 French francs or 65,000 CFA francs) per month.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Do you receive political training during the 2 years of active service?

Not for Pleasure

Janie Jacobs: Let us say political-military. We are given a little book entitled "Communism and Terrorism in Southern Africa" by a certain Metrowich. Professors from the faculty of military sciences at the

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University of Stellenbosch sometimes come to lecture in the barracks. Until 1975, all of the training was based on the fact that the potential enemy was black, a guerrilla fighter and a communist. Later, there were Cubans and East Germans in Angola. Then it was necessary to change certain passages, such as that which said that our enemy was naturally invisible at night because he was black.

Mutinies

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What were the months of service on the Angolan frontier like?

Janie Jacobs: It was horribly boring. The young recruits drink and there are fights. When a terrorist gets punched up, no one is worried. But sometimes a kind of mutiny occurs. And then watch out! They lock you up for weeks in dark cells. One could go crazy. Myself, I had this experience because I insulted a superior who ordered me up to the front during a raid in Angola early in 1978. I did a 3-month stretch in Grootfontein, there where Savimbi's UNITA guerrilla fighters are trained. But those who rebel for political reasons are locked up in Voortrekkerhooftze, near Pretoria. There it is hell.

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SOUTH AFRICA

COAL EXPORTS TO EEC COUNTRIES DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1642

[Text] In response to written question No 1628/79 from European Parliamentarian Colla concerning EEC-nation imports of South African products, Mr Haferkamp, speaking on behalf of the EEC, stressed the advantages involved in the imports of South African coal in his response dated 5 June 1980.

He wrote in fact that "the commission can state that Community imports of coal ranged from 1.185 million tons in 1974 to 10.682 million tons in 1978. The greater part of these imports were made by member nations whose electrical production companies have a substantial program for converting oil power plants to coal. For security reasons, these companies are maintaining substantial fuel stocks. Such stocks represent a normal operational precaution.

"The price of South African seam coal is attractive for a number of reasons. These include favorable geological conditions and the existence in Richard's Bay of a port at which very large ore vessels can be loaded. Although South African coal is in competition with that produced in the Community, no dumping charge has been made by the Community producers. Consistent with current commercial practices, the differences in thermal value and quality are reflected in the prices of South African coal. The commission is not aware of any exchange operations between South African coal imported into the Netherlands and the oil products exported from Rotterdam to South Africa. The total oil product exports of the Community to South Africa came to 77,000 tons in 1978 and 16,500 tons in the first half of 1979. The corresponding figures for the Netherlands are 17,000 and 2,100 tons."

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

TRADE WITH FRANCE--The development of trade exchange between France and South Africa was contemplated by a Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIP) mission which has returned to France following a 12-day visit to South Africa. During a press conference held in Johannesburg on 22 July, the head of the delegation and president of the CCIP, Mr Jean Theves, stated that he was "very satisfied" with the talks he had had in the course of this trip, the main goal of which was for the members of the delegation to familiarize themselves with the local "economic reality," about which, Mr Theves said, little is known in French business circles. The president of the CCIP also noted that, according to official estimates, South Africa should see a development in 1980 of about 6 percent in its gross national product, and French exporters should derive benefit from this "very favorable" economic situation. Mr Theves also stated that French industrialists should find "solvent clients" today and that South Africa is exactly that. Mr Theves mentioned the substantial inequality in the trade balance between Paris and Pretoria (more than 1.5 billion French francs in favor of South Africa in 1979), but he noted that this was basically due to the rapid increase in French purchases of South African coal because of the energy crisis. The president of the CCIP said he was confident that this balance will correct itself in the future, without however being willing to mention a date in this connection. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1933] 5157

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TANZANIA

PROBLEMS DELAY TRANSFER OF CAPITAL TO DODOMA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1984

[Text] The economic difficulties Tanzania is experiencing are hindering the work of expansion for the new capital, Dodoma, the AFP reports in an "overview" giving a current evaluation of this situation.

The decision to transfer the seat of the government to this little town in the center of the country was made in 1973. What was wanted was to avoid the unbalanced growth of Dar es Salaam, which has almost 1 million inhabitants. The cost of the operation was estimated at that time at 3.7 billion shillings (about \$530 million), spread over 10 years, with an increase in the population of Dodoma from 35,000 to 170,000 persons. But the cumulative effects of a number of periods of drought, rising energy prices and the cost of the war in Uganda have seriously affected Tanzania, which has not had a balanced regular budget for two years.

The next food harvest is not expected to exceed 70 percent of that last year, while 50 percent of the export income is absorbed by the oil bill and 10 percent by the foreign debt service.

Thus it is not surprising that less than a third of the budget planned for the new capital has in fact been spent, and only the departments of the prime minister and the party are in operation in Dodoma, which still has only 80,000 inhabitants. The work is continuing however and President Nyerere recently approved the detailed plan for the urban center, which will include some 20 ministries, but also commercial buildings in order to avoid the creation of an administrative ghetto. Pedestrian traffic will have priority there, and the buildings will be built on the scale of a country with limited resources. None will have more than three floors, thus avoiding the need for electricity-hungry elevators, and they will be ventilated naturally, avoiding the need for air conditioning.

Dodoma, at an altitude of 1,115 meters on the central plateau, enjoys a dry and relatively cool climate. However, the semi-aridity of the region poses a problem in supplying the complex with water, which must be brought from ever-greater distances. Paradoxically, in the rainy season drainage

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is a problem and the installation of the sewage network was one of the first infrastructure projects to be carried out.

The main "industry" in Dodoma continues to be wine, vines having been cultivated in the environs since 1934. The wine has no reputation outside Tanzania, but the vineyards bring the peasants, who can gather two harvests a year, using irrigation, a substantial income.

Established in 1910 by German colonizers who made a stop there on the central railroad from the ocean to Lake Tanganyika, Dodoma offers its promoters the advantage of being more centrally located than Dar es Salaam, being situated 500 kilometers to the east of it. They also hope to breathe new life into a region somewhat lagging in its development.

Consequently access roads to the future capital are being improved. A Brazilian public works enterprise is extending the asphalted road from the coast which currently goes as far as Morogoro, 250 kilometers to the east. This stretch is to be completed within 2 years. After that, the sand track to the north toward Arusha and the Mount Kilimanjaro region will remain to be asphalted.

The present airport on the edge of the old town has been condemned, because its facilities do not meet the needs of a metropolis, even a modest one, and its runway lies where future residential neighborhoods will be located. Thus a full study and construction project for a new international-class airport is needed. This is a burden the more crushing for Tanzania since it has just commissioned Aeroport de Paris to modernize the Dar es Salaam facility, with a French credit allocation of 125 million francs.

While the presidential residence in Chamwino, some 50 kilometers from Dodoma, has just been completed, housing there is still inadequate, since the construction of the needed facilities must be planned for the same period as the construction of the public buildings.

At the present rate, it will doubtless be 5 years before a substantial number of ministries will have moved (6 out of 22) and at least 10 years before the government is fully installed in the new capital.

But the determination of the Tanzanian authorities to carry the operation through to the end has not weakened, and it is a fact that Dodoma will sooner or later be a reality. At that time, the countries represented in Tanzania will have to move their embassies from Dar es Salaam to the new capital. But the diplomats will have plenty of time to plan their move, the AFP concludes, because the diplomatic quarter only exists at present on the master plan for Dodoma.

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

PRESIDENTIAL, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS SCHEDULED--It has been announced that the presidential and legislative elections will be held in Tanzania on 26 October. The Tanzanian parliament voted unanimously to nominate the current president of the republic, Julius Nyerere, and Vice President Aboud Jumbe, as the sole candidates in the presidential elections. President Nyerere has headed the state since Tanzania won its independence in 1961. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1984] 5157

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ZAIRE

BELGIAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 18 Jul 80 p 1806

[Text] The Belgian minister for cooperation and development, Mr Mark Eyskens, will meet at the end of September in Brussels in a "round table" with several Zairean ministers in order to define a new Belgian development policy for the rural sector of Zaire. This decision, taken at a working session on 14 July in Brussels between the Belgian minister and Mr Bo-Boliko Longonga, the Zairean prime minister, who was in Belgium since 11 July on a private visit, "constitutes a new stage in Belgian-Zairean relations," Mr Mark Eyskens said.

The Belgian minister, AFP stresses, contemplates involving Belgian agricultural and social organizations into this new policy. He also proposes to keep up contact with the Commission of the European Community in order to strengthen coordination of aid coming to Zaire from the EEC and Belgian efforts.

A Belgian-Zairean committee will soon be constituted. This committee composed of Zairean representatives from the bureau of planning and the ministry of agriculture, as well as from the Belgian aid mission in Kinshasa, will be responsible for producing, before the end of September, an inventory of all activities in progress in the rural sector, both those on government initiative and those from the private sector.

In other news, the great Belgian-Zairean committee, [in boldface] which meets each year to agree on cooperation between the two countries, met in Brussels from 16 to 18 July in the presence of Mr Charles Ferdinand Nothomb and Mr Nguza Karl I-Bond, the foreign ministers, respectively, of Belgium and Zaire.

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ZAIRE

COFFEE: EXPORT BY AIR FROM GOMA TO MOMBASA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 18 Jul 80 p 1806

[Text] The Bank of Zaire has sent the Zairean Bank Association the following communication dated 7 June 1980:

"With the aim of accelerating the removal of coffee in the eastern part of the country, the Bank of Zaire authorizes air transport for the coffee concerned from Goma to Mombasa by means of Air Zaire and other transporters expressly approved by the Institute of Emission [translation unknown], on the following conditions:

--Shipment costs for aerial shipment cannot exceed 17 Belgian Fr. per kilo and is to be deposited in a resident or non-resident account in foreign currency in the transporter's name.

--No usable waste can be exported by airplane.

--The FOB sale price from Zairean airports cannot be less than market price.

"Banks concerned are responsible to communicate to the Bank of Zaire, department of control and statistics, the external payments, the quantities of coffee removed, by customer, as well as volets [translation unknown] destined for it after validation."

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ZAIRE

MINIMUM AGRICULTURAL PLAN GOALS REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEES in French 1 Aug 80 pp 1926-1927

[Text] Presented last June to the legislative council, the Minimum Agricultural Plan (PAM) is the first phase of realization of the agricultural component of the "Mobutu Plan." It is led by the department of agriculture and rural development, conjointly with seven other departments.

This plan, estimated to cost 240 million zaires, should reach a million peasants over an area of 500,000 hectares, and involves three commodities: cassava, corn, and rice. The goal is production of an additional 250,000 tons of cassava, 10,000 tons of rice, and 22,000 tons of corn. The "corn plan" will be focused in the regions of Shaba, western Kasai, eastern Kasai, and Bandundu; the "rice plan" in Equatorial, Upper Zaire, Kivu, eastern Kasai, and Bandundu; and the "cassava plan" in Lower Zaire and Bandundu.

To reduce the constraints making for stagnation or regression in peasant agriculture, the executive council has decreed a certain number of measures. Included notably are the release of "counterpart funds" by the Commissariat General for Planning in order to finance the production of food commodities, the release of funds from development agreements, the rearrangement of the peasantry and cooperatives, the transformation of agricultural projects into mixed companies endowed with private management, and the restructuring of INERA [National Institute for Agronomic Study and Research] to allow it to assume its role. Guidance for peasants will be provided by the army and the department of agriculture. The former's task will be to struggle against the rural exodus by mobilizing the young people into field work. The second will furnish the peasants with seed, heavy agricultural implements, light agricultural tools, and fertilizers.

Support services of the Minimum Agricultural Plan should also provide for purchase and commercialization of agricultural products, making available to the farmers products and manufactured articles, and cleaning up the economic and public health environment of the "PAM" zone. An important role has been given to the department of transport and communications, which must organize for supplying production centers and shipping out production.

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The shipping out of the produce harvested in the first half of 1980 (corn and rice) is still a pre-condition for launching of PAM. The agricultural season properly speaking should begin in August or September, preceded by the distribution of agricultural implements and seed.

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

ISIRO AIRPORT COMMISSION--The new national airport in Isiro, the capital of the subregion of Haut-Uele, was commissioned on 24 June by State Commissioner for Transport and Communications Mushobekwa Kalimba Wa Katana. The new airport has a runway 2,500 meters long with 2 safety extensions of 60 meters. It can accommodate aircraft of the Boeing 737 or Fokker type and is equipped with ground lighting to make landing at night or in fog possible. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1982] 5157

NEW OIL DEPOSITS--The Zaire-Shell-Amoco affiliates recently undertook exploitation of two deposits, that in Est-Mibale and that in Kinkasi, with a daily production of 1,000 barrels. This association is made up of the Zairep company (30 percent), Shell-Zaire (25 percent) and Amoco Explo-Zaire (45 percent). The Zairian state has 15 percent of the shares in each of these companies, while the remaining 85 percent are held respectively by the Petrofina, Shell and Amoco companies. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1982] 5157

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