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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MOTIVES BEHIND ETHIOPIA-SUDAN RAPPROCHEMENT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 216, 23 Jun 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Rachid Jawad: "An Unnatural Reconciliation"]

[Excerpt] The various reports from Khartoum and Addis Ababa of a rapprochement between the two capitals are causing obvious unrest in Arab and African left-wing political and diplomatic circles. They are indeed wondering about the reasons for an apparently unnatural reconciliation between a country claiming to be revolutionary and a fascist regime alined with the imperialists and responsible for the torture, imprisonment, persecution and assassination of hundreds of leftist patriots who shed their blood to defend human liberties in Sudan.

Relations between the two countries began to take a new turn early this year when an Ethiopian delegation went to Khartoum to attend the congress of the Sudanese Socialist Union. Two months later, the Sudanese vice president and minister of defense, Hamid Khalil, in turn went to Addis Ababa where he signed a joint communique affirming the two governments' concern for "scrupulously respecting the territorial integrity, sovereignty and national unity" of their respective countries. A joint committee was also set up to examine border disputes. And then on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the so-called Sudanese "May Revolution," on 25 May President Haile Mengistu Mariam went to Khartoum where he told his bloodthirsty counterpart that he was "ready to put an end to passivity and to establish acceptable bases for achieving the national aspirations of the two countries."

500,000 Refugees

Of course, the speeches and communiqes published at the close of Mengistu's visit to Khartoum did not breathe a word about the real goals sought by either partner in this "reconciliation." But for those closely following the events which have characterized relations between the two countries, it is clear that if the goal sought by the Ethiopian chief of state is to neutralize Eritrean guerrillas, whose resistance increases daily, the Sudanese chief of state was aiming on one hand to get rid of the burden represented by the 500,000 Eritrean refugees on Sudanese soil and also to break the isolation into which his pro-Sadat and antinational policy has plunged his corrupt and decadent regime.

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Moreover, according to reliable diplomatic sources in Khartoum, the Eritrean question was the subject of lengthy discussions between Numeiry and Mengistu during their private talks in the Sudanese capital. During these talks, Numeiry allegedly suggested that Mengistu organize a roundtable discussion between Addis Ababa and the Eritrean liberation fronts to prepare the way for the implementation of a plan for Eritrean administrative autonomy, similar to that which Sudan has established in the southern part of the country.

But nothing seems to indicate that Mengistu accepted his host's suggestion. On the contrary, he allegedly pointed out that there was no question of Addis Ababa "compromising on a principle upheld by the Ethiopian people in general." He allegedly added that if Addis Ababa granted autonomy to Eritrea, other parts of the country, such as Ogaden, would demand the same status. The Ethiopian chief of state seems to have forgotten his solemn promises, made a few months after he came to power, that he would enact a law for internal autonomy in several provinces of the country. Be that as it may, the attempted rapprochement by Addis Ababa with Numeiry's regime of terror and repression is tied to its concern for improving a seriously tarnished reputation and opening a dialog with certain conservative Arab countries.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

'JEUNE AFRIQUE' GROUP PLANS NEW PUBLICATIONS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jul 80 p 21

[Text] JEUNE AFRIQUE's newest baby, the 1980 yearbook called "Armies and Defense," (200 French francs or 10,000 CFA, including map) will very likely surprise some of our readers. "What? While Africa is tearing itself apart in wars in the Sahara or Chad, to the point where the very existence of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) is threatened, you're publishing a book on armies?" As if to assess the means a nation commands to defend its independence or its territorial integrity, or to consider the threats of intervention by a foreign country on the continent were tantamount to a call to arms.

Defense and Balance

"War is too serious a business to be left to generals," said Georges Clemenceau, who headed the French government during the last 2 years of World War I. Yes. But only on condition that civilians know how to avoid it. And hence can form an opinion and make their political decisions on a basis of full knowledge and understanding.

The "Armies and Defense" yearbook seeks simply to provide an initiation into the mysteries of defense and of the balance of power for those who are concerned with the future of the nations of Africa and the Middle East on the global geopolitical chessboard. Open the book. In its first portion, "Forum," you will find, in addition to a contribution from Senegal's President Leopold Sedar Senghor, a series of essays from experts of international standing, under the direction of Jean-Paul Vecchierini. They deal with topics as disparate as: the strategic importance of Africa and the Middle East, the influence of foreign staff personnel in the armies of both regions, the

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threat of destabilization posed by the great powers, the growing military might of Saudi Arabia, etc.

The second part, "The Market," contains, among other things, a detailed analysis of the arms industries in the Third World. A revealing (and then some) analysis of the limits to technology transfers. Lastly, the yearbook would not be a yearbook if it did not contain a systematic overview of military potential, country by country.

Don't worry, you economists out there. The next book, scheduled to appear by the end of this year, will include analyses of the latest available data on the African and Middle Eastern economies, 20 years after independence, not to mention the outlook for development for the next 20 years.

Publication of the yearbooks has been assigned to a new department in the Groupe Jeune Afrique. Known as "Research and Development," and headed by Mohamed Mrabet, this department will be in charge of all periodical publications which the Groupe has started or will start, with the exception of the weekly JEUNE AFRIQUE. January 1981 will bring a new look to MARCHES NOUVEAUX. This economic monthly, which will devote considerable space to information on the various sectors of the economy (industry, agriculture, transport, telecommunications, etc.) in Africa and the Middle East, and which will not neglect the international situation, intends to put the accent on the specific problems facing young African middle managers, both at the personnel management and training level, and in the area of their corporate and national development.

Specific Problems

This means that MARCHES NOUVEAUX will be aimed primarily at economic leaders in Africa and the Middle East, whether they work for corporations or in government ministries. Students, however, will find it helpful as a reference, and foreign investors will find discover that it sheds new light on economic realities in Africa and the Middle East. Besides this, the economic guides, PAYS EN EXPANSION, will constitute the indispensable quarterly supplement to those who need complete market studies.

And lastly, a project is just about ready for launching by the Research and Development department: a magazine devoted to defense and diplomatic matters in Africa and the Middle East, to which will be added a newsletter on the same subject.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

TANZANIAN, ZAMBIAN REPAYMENTS TO PRC--Tanzania and Zambia are getting ready to pay a first installment of \$12.4 million to China in 1983 in repayment of the \$360.75 million loan granted to these countries for building the Tanzania-Zambia railroad, which is managed by TAZARA (Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority). The two countries will pay \$12.4 million a year to China beginning in 1983. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1329] 8782

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CHAD

FRENCH AID TO SOUTH REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul 80 pp 1690, 1691

[Text] After the withdrawal of French troops from Ndjamenana and the withdrawal of the French Aid and Cooperation Mission on Maroua in Cameroon, the pursuit of hostilities in the Chadian capital and the insecurity over the largest party (but also the least populated) for the national territory are making difficult the pursuit of the goals of cooperation.

The chief of mission, based in Maroua, is devoting himself first of all to aiding the Chadian refugees with the medical team left in place at Kousseri, opposite Ndjamenana. Starting 15 July civilian and military teams will be united and will be made subordinate to the French minister of cooperation. Assistance in the form of food and medicine continues to be distributed to these refugees. Yet it is in the south of Chad that French cooperation should develop the most easily, since the situation, which is its own, removed from the combat zone, allows it to have a well-ordered economic life, even if it is not truly normal. Let us recall that the south, that is, the zone controlled by the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT), takes in the following regions (with their estimated populations for 1979):

Mayo-Kebbi	871,000
Middle-Chari	590,000
Western Logone	336,000
Eastern Logone	390,000
Tandjile	367,000

Thus it has a total population of 2,562,000 inhabitants, not counting the following zones, more or less under the influence of FAT, in Chari-Baguirmi:

Sub-prefecture of Bousso	58,000
Sub-prefecture of Massenya	40,000
South Chari Baguirmi	35,000

The provisional administration of the south, whose main difficulty is in paying its officials, since relations with Ndjamenana are broken, would thus affect 2.7 million Chadians out of a total of 4 million. The south is run

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by a permanent committee presided over by Colonel Kamougue. The other 23 members of this central organ share the tasks by sector, except for Vice President Roasngar. The secretary general of the permanent committee is Mr Aligue. There is no secession involved here, and the leaders of the south have persisted in recalling regularly their attachment to a unified Chadian state, within its internationally recognized boundaries, and retaining its secular character. It is in this politico-administrative environment that a French consulate was installed in Moundou. An economic counselor of the Aid and Cooperation Mission from Maroua still has to be dispatched there. France sent 4 tons of medicine to the south. It foresees sending several doctors there. Other aid programs could also be set in motion if the situation permitted it.

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COMORO ISLANDS

INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL UNREST IN ENVOY'S RESIGNATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANNEENS in French 1 Aug 80
p 1931

[Text] In our 18 July issue (p 1810) we reported formation of the new Comoran government, established on 12 July by President Ahmed Abdallah. A few days later came word that the Comoros' ambassador to Paris, Mr Said Ali Kemal, had resigned.

One of the Comoros' best-known citizens, Mr Said Ali Kemal was in Moroni for a brief stay after the preceding government had been dissolved, and President Abdallah offered him the Justice portfolio, which he refused because of his total disapproval of the president's domestic policy. Back in Paris, the ambassador on 19 July sent the president a letter of resignation which has since been made public, and which deserves quoting in part here because it is indicative of the current political malaise.

While Mr Said Ali Kemal had just finished his resignation as ambassador, a delegate from the Human Rights League, Counsellor Henry, reported in Paris on a recent inquiry in the Comoros, in the course of which he had occasion to observe "the sorry state of Comoran political prisoners." The ambassador immediately informed him of his refusal to accept the justice portfolio and of his resignation as the Comoran ambassador to Paris, both of which had occurred prior to Mr Henry's press conference.

Since then President Abdallah has made a brief and unofficial visit to Paris, from 26 to 29 July, prior to traveling to his private residence in France for a few days' rest.

Here are some excerpts from Mr Said Ali Kemal's official letter of resignation, dated 19 July and addressed to the president of the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros, Mr Ahmed Abdallah.

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"Through the troubled hours in which the future of our country was compromised, we had worked together to set forth the conditions indispensable to the restoration of civil liberties and political peace, in the context of economic and social development. These new directions were to benefit the greatest possible number of our citizens, and first and foremost our peasant population, with whose extreme poverty you are familiar.

"It had been agreed at that time that, once restored to our country, clemency and an unswerving determination to take the passion out of the political climate would guide the advocates of change. A summons to all, of whatever political school, who could make a contribution to Comoran development was to couch these intentions of change in practical terms.

"During the first few months, the need for firmly laying the fundamental and believable bases for the Comoran state on the international scene might have justified a little stretching of the rule that had been fixed.

"I am still astonished, Mr President, at the political spirit and manners you are introducing. Not only is this behavior still far distant from the line mapped out at the start, but it has engendered the re-emergence, on the political level, of elements from the past which gravely compromise the nation's future.

"I have repeatedly called your urgent attention to this matter, confiding in you not only as your ambassador, but even more as your friend.

"When on 9 July you summoned me urgently to Moroni to announce your decision to dissolve the government, I was the first to applaud it. I spontaneously offered you my help and support. My most important suggestion to you was that you call new men, young men, into the government. By opening the political door wide, you would have shown the Comoran people your readiness to move ahead with a team aware of present-day problems.

"In the event, my disappointment was profound. The new government you were setting up brought back precisely the same men, with the exception of your offering the justice portfolio to me. That position was a snare laid for my feet. At a loss as to what to do about your political prisoners who had become a liability, you were hoping to see me shoulder the responsibility of their trials and sentencing. You will thus comprehend my utter astonishment, my disappointment, and my categorical refusal to be part of such a government.

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"Prior to my return to France, feeling that you were determined to stick to a line of conduct which I could not countenance, but that my duty as ambassador would require me to defend, I sent you a letter in which, in all frankness, I told you of my misgivings. I also asked you to consider my position...

"In order to leave you complete freedom in your choice of 'collaborators,' and to clarify my situation, I ask you, Mr President, to accept my resignation, effective today, as ambassador from the Comoros to France..."

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

1973 CONSTITUTION ABROGATED--Decree No 4 of 3 April 1980 has abrogated the constitution of 10 July 1973 of Equatorial Guinea. It had been drawn up by President Macie as the basis of his absolute power. The more democratic constitution of 22 June 1968 is thus temporarily in force until the committee on legislation drafts texts that are more modern and better adapted to the present needs of Equatorial Guinea. By this political act, the new authorities intend to make another break with the totalitarian rules of the preceding regime and show they are choosing the path of liberalism. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1325] 8782

SLIGHT BUDGET DEFICIT--After 8 months spent restoring order, the Guinean authorities have published the country's first budget since 1975. The budget is almost balanced in expenses (2,025,039,000 ekueles) and receipts (1,951,050,000 ekueles), with a deficit of 64 million ekueles. The document is intended to be proof of a restoration of the country's finances, which have been damaged by 10 years of disorganization and anarchic administration. The fiscal year begins on 1 April in Equatorial Guinea (1 ekuele = Fr 0.06 approximately). The present budget allows for the classification of civil servants in 9 categories (according to their education and qualifications) and sets the base public service salary at 90,000 ekueles a year. The investment budget will be financed by foreign gifts and loans and is being drawn up under the supervision of the State Secretariat for Planning, Economic Development and Cooperation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1325] 8782

POOR CACAO HARVEST--It appears that the 1980-81 cacao harvest in Equatorial Guinea will be compromised because the former Spanish proprietors of the cacao plantations do not seem to be in a hurry to return to the country even though their properties have been restored to them. More than 30,000 hectares of cacao are thus half cultivated. The dispute between the former owners and the Malabo government concerns financing the harvest. The owners want to finance it with loans from local banks; the government wants new money and investment proposals to renew the cacao plantations. A hope appears in that the ADB (African Development Bank) recently granted Equatorial Guinea a loan of 8 million accounting units to renovate 5,500 hectares of cacao plantings

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in the Riaba region. In 1980, 1,000 hectares will be treated. There are a total of 16 proprietors, who will be united in a cooperative. Mechanization will be used to the fullest to compensate for the severe lack of labor on the plantations. The work should continue without interruption. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1325] 8782

FRENCH FINANCIAL RELATIONS--Mr Martin Nkoa, vice-governor of the Central Bank of Equatorial Guinea, while on a trip to Paris, contacted the Bank of France and the Credit Lyonnais to establish financial relations with France. The new Malabo government would very much like to develop its trading relations with France and countries in the franc zone. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1325] 8782

EDF AID--Back from a visit to Equatorial Guinea, Mr. Claude Cheysson, European Commissioner in Charge of Development, declared to the AFP correspondent at Yaounde "that Europe must give maximum help" to this country. The European commissioner insisted on the dramatic situation of Equatorial Guinea after Macie's dictatorship: "This country is the zero state, which makes one nauseous. It finds itself in the situation of the ex-Belgian Congo at its independence," he said. Guinea "has neither framework nor structures, and yet it owns great riches: cocoa, coffee, wood, fishing and breeding grounds for fish, and it has, in addition, a first-rate strategic situation," added Mr Cheysson. "In its favor we are going to do the maximum," he said. "The first European Development Fund (EDF) has been transferred to it, namely two billion francs of the African Financial Community (CFA) of prompt operations, such as the installation of a grid at Malabo, the only capital in the world without electricity." As far as help on the second agreement of Lome, the EDF is going to give Equatorial Guinea three billion CFA, announced Mr Cheysson. Furthermore, Europe will provide it technical assistance, personnel and training, in order "to help this country of 300,000 inhabitants open up to the world." In the next 10 years, the European commissioner added, Equatorial Guinea should find a decent level of development. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul 80 p 1690] 8589

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IVORY COAST

PLOTS TO OUST PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET DISCUSSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jul 80 pp 32-33

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "Three Plots Against Houphouet"]

[Text] Was there a coup d'etat being plotted in the Ivory Coast last April? The question does not seem to be keeping the Ivory Coast leaders awake at night this July, busy as they are in preparing for the great electoral campaigns which will be launched in September with the congress of the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast-section of the African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA, see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1016).

A Calculated Rumor

In the view of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, "one cannot speak of a plot because no concrete steps were ever taken." It is a known fact, however, that a police commissioner, Oulai Zoumana, planned to overthrow the regime on the day of the arrival of Pope John Paul II in Abidjan last 10 May. In mid-April, the conspirator mentioned this to a high-ranking Ivory Coast officer, who immediately informed the chief of state of it.

On 24 April, 4 days before going to Lagos for the first economic summit meeting of the OAU, Houphouet-Boigny was in Yamoussoukro, his native village, where the matter was discussed with the participation among others of the director of the security forces and some higher officers. The conspirator had moreover spoken of his intentions to three non-commissioned army officers. In fact, Oulai Zoumana is a policeman of doubtful reputation who, on various assignments, has worked in recent years at the Presidency of the Republic and at the port of Abidjan, by turns, before being transferred to Bouake. It was at the prison in that town that a violent clash broke out in early April between the policemen under Oulai's orders and civilians serving as volunteer guards for the prisoners. Oulai Zoumana was reported to have authorized his subordinates to release some prisoners illicitly in exchange for a sum which, the investigators said, was paid to Oulai in person. Found guilty of these unscrupulous actions, he was then subjected to disciplinary measures. The Ivory Coast authorities believe

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that Oulai Zoumana was very simply displeased with his dismissal from a post which allowed him to "make himself a good deal of money."

Numerous people in the Ivory Coast believe however that this is a "calculated rumor." Others recall that it was in this period (12 April) that a certain Samuel K. Doe, a master sergeant in his own country, seized power in neighboring Liberia.

For several months now, the whole of the Ivory Coast has been concerned with who will succeed Houphouet. Anonymous letters and tracts accusing this or that minister have been distributed at an unusual rate and personal attacks have become more and more virulent.

Limited Impact

It is in this atmosphere of settling accounts among more or less admitted candidates that the army was to make its voice heard, in turn. And by means of a tract, precisely. This document urged the chief of state of the Ivory Coast to undertake profound changes immediately in order to prevent any imitation of the Liberian example. The distribution of this "open letter" undoubtedly reflected a certain state of mind going beyond the mere expression of displeasure.

It was difficult to determine the origin of the document precisely. Some thought it was the work of Ivory Coast military personnel sent to Kolwezi within the framework of the inter-African force. It is known that the Ivory Coast had agreed to join other African countries asked to aid the government of Zaire in repulsing the attacks of the former Katangan police. In 1978 it had sent 5 doctors and 100 nurses, for whom the exposition served as a kind of sinecure, to that country. On his departure from Abidjan, each doctor found himself the recipient of a bonus of 2 million CFA francs, while each nurse received 1 million.

The members of the Ivory Coast contingent also received their full salaries, plus half again the amount of their wages, paid jointly by the government of the Ivory Coast and the organization established for this temporary operation. The annual equivalent of this compensation was paid to the beneficiaries at the time of their departure for Kolwezi. After the first year, the first Ivory Coast contingent was replaced by a second, which enjoyed the same advantages. But 2 months after the arrival of this latter contingent in the Shaba, the government of the Ivory Coast decided to put an end to the mission.

Should the military, under these conditions, return the amount of the overpayment in the wages paid for a year, since their stay in Zaire did not exceed 2 months? Some high-ranking officers favored this solution. Those involved, on the contrary, believed that they should not be penalized, since they had not asked to be returned to the Ivory Coast. Finally, the

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military won out. And the origins of the "open letter to the president" remain as mysterious as before.

As to the "Oulai affair," it was finally resolved by the arrest of the party involved and the dismissal of the three non-commissioned officers who had failed to report him. Although in the final analysis this affair had only limited impact, the security measures were nonetheless reinforced in connection with the visit of Pope John Paul II to Abidjan. But when he returned from Lagos on 29 April, President Houphouet-Boigny had the situation entirely in hand. "There are still people who value me highly in this country. If three individuals join together to plot against me, one of them will denounce the other."

A Long Tour

It was precisely following a slanderous denunciation that there was talk of a plot in the Ivory Coast for the first time. In May of 1963, President Houphouet-Boigny had left the country to go to Addis-Ababa, where the document establishing the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was to be signed. This was in fact the beginning of a long tour which was to last 4 months. He visited a number of countries at that time. But in that era the president of the Ivory Coast had decided not to fly. Thus it was by sea that he made this "little world tour." But 4 months away from his country--that is indeed a long time!

While he was in Paris, insistent rumors of a plot reached him from Abidjan. Distance contributing, he gave credence in the end to the assertions of the security director, Mr Pierre Goba. While en route home, Mr Houphouet-Boigny ordered the discreet removal from Abidjan, prior to his arrival, of the presumed "brains" of the plot. Earlier, he had been surprised by the silence of his interior minister, Koffi Gadeau, who had not breathed a word of what was reported to be afoot in Abidjan when he visited him in Paris on several occasions. Questioned later, the minister swore by all the gods that he had never heard anything about it.

The Ship of State

Without a doubt the president was not convinced, because he invited this official to join him in his car to make the trip from the port to the office of the Presidency. It went off without incident, but the presumed plotters were arrested and given various sentences nonetheless. Jean-Baptiste Mockey, regarded then as a potential dauphin, was even sentenced to death. It developed subsequently that what was involved was a coup entirely planned by the security director for reasons which remained a mystery. In any case, the victims were released in 1967 and then reinstated. Jean-Baptiste Mockey became minister of state charged with public health and population, in fact, on 4 March 1976.

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When this matter comes up, Felix Houphouet-Boigny recognizes his mistake and admits that "whenever I have to choose between injustice and disorder, I choose the former because it is more easily corrected." And yet it is necessary to have the time to make the correction. But this doctrine may perhaps explain his distaste for causing bloodshed. He is one of the very few African political figures today who has had none of his political adversaries executed. In 1973, when a group of young officers led by Cpt Sio Koulahou organized ritual sacrifices, a practice which is widespread in the Ivory Coast but the purpose of which in this case was the overthrow of the regime, the seven conspirators who received death sentences were pardoned the following year. Once again, it is true, the plot died a-borning. But in 17 years, rumors of plots have circulated in the Ivory Coast on 5 occasions. The foundations of the regime were not really shaken thereby. Each time, the president of the Ivory Coast has answered candidates to succeed him with spectacular and often popular measures. The decision adopted to turn over a good part of his assets to the state in 1977, and the more recent decision to democratize the regime (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1016), were among these lightning moves which always take everyone by surprise. Houphouet-Boigny seems for his part to know full well where he is headed. With the assurance of a sailor who knows his route, he has sworn to guide the "Ivory Coast ship of state" into safe harbor, despite wind and seas. "Problems keep me in form," he admits. "When I have a week without any, I worry that God has forgotten me."

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KENYA

BRIEFS

FRENCH-KENYAN RELATIONS HAILED--On 24 July, Chief of State Daniel Arap Moi received the French parliamentary delegation that arrived in Nairobi on 17 July (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 25 July, p 1867). Moi expressed satisfaction with the good relations existing between the two countries and thanked the French Government for the financial and technical aid which Kenya has received for the completion of various projects. He said that the delegation's visit constituted encouragement for the continuation of such aid and bilateral cooperation. For his part, Emmanuel Aubert, head of the delegation, was impressed with the development achieved by the local infrastructure and by the Kenyan people's sense of responsibility. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1928] 11,464

MINISTER ON KENYANIZATION PROSPECTS--On 25 July, Zachary Onyonka, Kenyan minister of economic planning and development, announced that his government intended to make "a substantial modification" in its policy on foreign investments "in order to enable citizens to control the country's economy better," he said. Speaking before members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Onyonka said that the modifications would involve the joint public and private enterprises, "which do not bring in enough," and concessions made to foreigners. On the subject of joint ventures in which the government joins in partnerships with foreign capital, the minister substantially said: "Foreigners who generally control the management of these enterprises do not invest a great deal in Kenya and tend to keep all profits for themselves. In some cases, they have even made the government lose money." However, the minister emphasized that reforms would be gradual and orderly. "We shall not take draconian and radical measures," he said. In the face of the rising discontent and the xenophobic demonstrations of students, one might be led to think that the reforms envisaged must come soon. Moreover, despite the assurances of authorities, such reforms risk going further than expected and bringing about a much more far-reaching transformation of the extremely liberal regime that Kenya has had thus far. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1928] 11,464

PRESIDENT HAILS FRG RELATIONS--A delegation from the Federal Republic of Germany visited Nairobi during the latter half of July and on 23 July was

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received by Chief of State Daniel Arap Moi. The president described the bonds of friendship and cooperation existing between the two countries and emphasized the similar views of the governments on many international problems. President Moi also recommended to his visitors the organization of a conference bringing together industrialized countries and oil-producing countries for the purpose of examining the deterioration of the world economic situation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1928] 11,464

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MALI

ECONOMY REVIEWED IN CONTEXT OF COUP D'ETAT RUMORS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 pp 1779-1781

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Conditions of Growth in Mali"]

[Text] Resorting to computers to pinpoint the next coup d'etat in Africa would probably not be any more effective than the old method of the diplomats who, with the latest dispatches in hand, would try to narrow it down on the map. The inadequacy or absence of regulative mechanisms such as parties and trade unions or, on the other hand, the ineffectiveness of police forces have resulted, by encouraging the intervention of weapons -- sometimes nothing more than a revolver -- in bestowing a high degree of uncertainty, even unpredictability, on the outcome of political antagonisms, as was recently the case in Liberia.

Nevertheless, it so happens that the anxiousness of foreign ministries joins the unconscious tendency of the media to contribute to the event in order not to risk missing it and consequently, the situation of a government may suddenly be deemed precarious. Naturally, such circumstances presume previous symptoms of social unrest or financial disorder, but it is their simultaneous occurrence, the interpretation of the links supposedly uniting them and the interreaction of worry and alarmism that give the phenomenon its relief. Dramatization then takes over: Agitation turns into revolution and penury into bankruptcy. It is generally at such a time that the coup d'etat takes place, but to the general surprise, on the opposite side of the continent, where no one expected it.

Consequently, there can be no question of recommending laxity to African leaders. Those in the Sahel in particular would be ill advised to adopt such an attitude. The risks of the moment, whether it be a question of a spread of the conflict pitting Morocco against the POLISARIO Front or the activities of Colonel Qadhafi, devoting revenues derived from the Libyan subsoil to the pursuit of a Pan-Saharan dream, should suffice to discourage them from any such policy. The same is true in the Sahel of the steadily increasing poverty since the 19th century, although long concealed by the federal colonial regime and resulting from its total lack of adaptation to the market economy, lacking exportable production. This increasing poverty must inevitably generate social disturbances in precisely that part of Africa where men are by tradition most inclined to banding together into political groupings.

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While these coup d'etat alerts are not to worry governments excessively or undermine their vigilance, it is, on the other hand, within the historical context described above that one must visualize the position of a country such as Mali. The bitterness of the struggle imposed on a nation of 6 million individuals in order to bring forth from its soil a justification for its existence obviously does not constitute a factor of social pliancy, and the changes that have occurred since independence demonstrate this. Rather than seeing in the convergence of inflation, the drop in certain types of production, the budgetary imbalance and a student strike the premises of a popular uprising, it appears preferable, in examining the facts, to rid them of the exaggerations that distort them and thereby avoid worsening -- by compromising the image of a country abroad -- the difficulties it encounters in overcoming the crisis. It is even a duty for those who consider man to be the supreme purpose of all economic effort.

Food Self-Sufficiency

Agriculture and livestock raising, which contribute 44 percent of the gross national production, constitute obvious priorities for Mali inasmuch as due to the fact that it is hemmed in, the insufficiency of food has resulted in imports that weigh heavily on the trade balance. Agriculture and livestock raising are also the basis of all exports, with cotton alone representing 57 percent in value. The Malian economic policy is therefore measured by the amount of resources, whether domestic or foreign, that are devoted to development of the primary sector. The comparative results obtained give an idea of the quality of the structures, equipment and management.

The first 5-year plan for 1961 to 1964, drafted and carried out under the regime of Modibo Keita, devoted 25.2 percent of all spending to the sector, meaning 16.4 billion CFA francs out of 65 billion. This distribution had to be revised several times, and the total amount finally reached 78 billion, including 30 percent for agriculture. Furthermore, these means were strengthened by the Five-Year Program for Aid to Production and Diversification financed by the FED [European Development Fund], in the amount of 5 million European accounting units. Coinciding with the policy of collective fields, the results of this financial effort, measured in tonnages compared with those from 1960, were unfortunately disastrous: a drop of 31 percent for millet, 29 percent for rice, 19 percent for peanuts and 42 percent for cotton.

The 1969-1972 Three-Year Plan, designed by the new military regime, set as its essential goal the rectification of this situation. The primary sector accounted for 22 percent of the updated allocations, or 26.4 billion Malian francs out of 111.5 billion. As early as 1971-1972, the 1960 performances had been reached once again for millet, sorghum, paddy rice and peanuts and exceeded for cotton (74,000 compared with 12,000 tons), a result all the more remarkable because the program only received half of the planned financial allocations.

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Taking the two updates into account, the 1974-1978 Five-Year Plan devoted 32 percent of all allocations (917 billion Malian francs) to the rural economy. For 1978, it set agricultural production objectives of 931,000 tons for millet, 300,000 tons for paddy rice, 114,000 tons for corn, 137,000 tons for cotton and 228,000 tons for peanuts. The figures published in May for the 1979-1980 season indicate that these objectives have been achieved for millet, sorghum and corn and far exceeded for cotton (9 percent). The results are 18 percent lower than plans for peanuts and 39 percent for paddy rice, which suffered from several unsatisfactory harvests after reaching the level set in 1977.

This necessarily summary picture of the results obtained by Malian agriculture nevertheless calls for several observations. A certain slump in the rate of production observed from 1973 to 1976 is explained by the years of drought that struck the Sahel and resulted, depending on the region, in a relative discouragement with regard to certain crops such as peanuts and a partial return of rural workers to urban centers. Outside of the controlled areas, it is difficult to ascertain actual levels of food production based on marketing statistics alone, which usually involve only a very low percentage (some 3.9 percent for grain). Moreover, the production-marketing ratio tends to broaden in terms of inflation or the scarcity of imported products on the markets.

Finally, it should be noted that the production objectives themselves attribute to the Malians themselves only a modest food ration: 150 kilograms per person annually for grain, plus 10 kilograms of peanuts and 30 kilograms of paddy rice, meaning that any drop in production for climatic reasons makes its effects felt immediately on the cities.

The very attention with which Malian authorities are following this problem sometimes tends to exaggerate its seriousness in the eyes of foreigners. In December 1979, the grain deficit for the 1979-1980 season was an estimated 259,300 tons. In January 1980, a World Food Program (WFP)-FAO mission placed the figure at 250,000 tons, based on official information. In May 1980, it was reduced to 167,000 tons, a third of which will be covered by foreign aid. In fact, the threshold of food self-sufficiency, which in Mali is 1.2 million tons of grain, should be rather easily attained in the coming years.

Unfortunately, seasonal increases mean that this reassuring observation is somewhat theoretical for city dwellers. In August 1979, rice and millet prices were 67 and 54 percent higher than official rates. A new increase of 15 to 30 percent affected these prices in February. Procedures for the regulation of prices could be improved if the Malian Agricultural Products Office (OPAM), which is in charge of them, had the necessary means, which is not always the case.

The balance sheet of Mali's food possibilities must also take its cattle into account. Even after the heavy blows of the drought, herds still number 3 million head. The marketing and even exportation of the dried

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and smoked fish production escapes all control, but annual totals very likely exceed the official estimate of 100,000 tons. With international aid financing 90 percent of their infrastructure, numerous projects now in production (Office of the Niger, Mali-South, Millet-Mopti, Haute-Vallee, and so on) or others soon to be operational should provide self-sufficiency by 1982. The recent startup of the Selingue Dam means that by that date, some 55,000 hectares should gradually be irrigated. For its part, U.S.-AID is subsidizing a 2,420-hectare project at Dire, based on wheat. This means nearly 65,000 more land under irrigation (not including Manantali), whose development should soon free Mali from the need to import any more food.

Industrial Crops

The spectacular development of cotton production -- spectacular both in its extent and regularity -- is the work of the CFDT (French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers), now the CMDT (Malian Textile Company) since 1974, with 40-percent participation in its capital by the French joint venture. In 1961, production of cottonseed totaled 6,403 tons, which figure rose to 41,000 tons in 1969 and 127,000 tons in 1979. Figures recently published for the 1979-1980 season show a record harvest of 150,542 tons, produced on 118,612 hectares, or a yield of 1,268 kilograms per hectare (dry farming), 91 percent of which from the Mali-South operation, where cotton growing is done together with food and other crops such as peanuts and *dah*, the textile fiber for sacks used at San by SOMASAC (Malian Sack Company).

In 1979-1980, cotton represented for Malian growers a contribution of 12 billion Malian francs, with the 56,540 tons of fiber obtained from ginning going to the credit of the trade balance of 43 billion. And yet, its advantages are not solely economic. Within the framework of the Mali-South operation, it supplied the central theme for initiating growers into the practices of organic and mineral fertilizer and harnessed plowing and weeding. In addition, it provided an opportunity for teaching them modern agricultural management methods adapted to the particular conditions of the regions.

For Mali as a whole, peanuts have reached a ceiling of 200,000 tons, with marketing amounting to approximately only a quarter of that tonnage. Once the prime export product, it is increasingly consumed locally, at the expense of the country's oilworks. Production of *dah* is some 2,000 tons. It could increase without any problem because it currently meets only 60 percent of the needs of the national market. Initiated in 1966 with Chinese aid at Dougabougou, sugar cane growing has gradually developed within the framework of an irrigated operation directed by the Office of the Niger. It is meant to meet local demand (30,000 tons per year). The objective seems two-thirds met, with plantations of 2,800 hectares supplying two sugar mills. French aid anticipates supporting construction of a third unit in the Sikasso region. In a later phase, a fourth plant could be built at Dire.

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In sum, the judgment one might make of efforts made in Mali in the field of agriculture has no reason to be harsh, although it must necessarily be one of nuances. The size of the problem has never been underestimated. The structures adopted from 1960 to 1968 and the limitations characterizing them have naturally yielded deplorable results to be made up for at the expense of the general growth rate. But allocations provided in the successive plans and programs have been adequate and while financing difficulties have delayed their implementation, it is not the government's fault. It is not clear that a distribution of resources more favorable to the primary sector would have been effective, considering the length of time it takes for agricultural projects to mature. Finally, one must not forget the very harsh blow, both technical and psychological, dealt to agriculture by the years of drought.

Despite a number of inevitable abuses and scandals -- which are not the exclusive province of Mali -- severely dealt with, this agricultural policy has been prudent, sometimes excessively so. We have already noted that one of the weak points of the system resided in the poor organization of official organizations entrusted with the marketing of products and the stabilization of prices, but it is not necessarily their responsibility, insofar as their funds come from the government and their prices are determined by social considerations unrelated to the law of the market.

Over the next decade, new water projects for agriculture should ensure Mali of food self-sufficiency as well as appreciable surpluses for agricultural industries and export. While there are still dark spots in the picture, nothing justifies the pessimistic descriptions of Malian agriculture given at the end of 1979 by certain organs of the press. In particular, one should note the announcement made on 22 December by a major Parisian evening newspaper, concerning a cotton harvest totaling "under 30,000 tons," while the harvest, with 150,000 tons, beat all records and surpassed all hopes.

Social and Political Context

Malian industry has been the subject of major allocations for successive development plans and programs: 4 billion CFA francs for the first, 27.6 billion Malian francs for the 1969-1972 Three-Year Program and 240 billion for the 1974-1978 Five-Year Plan, with financing and completions coming only irregularly. It now contributes some 19 percent of gross national production but is not a part of exports, consisting totally of an industry replacing imports based, for its healthiest portion, on the processing of the products of the soil. Another characteristic is that out of 50 enterprises exceeding the number of workers in commerce or handicrafts, 20 are national or joint public and private enterprises, while they use two-thirds of a total of some 19,000 workers.

It is the food industries that have achieved the most remarkable growth rates over the past 5 years. From 1973 to 1977, their turnover went from 8.5 billion Malian francs to 32.6 billion. The growth of the textile

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industries is more modest, going at the same time from 5.1 to 10.2 billion Malian francs. These two categories of industries alone represent 65 percent of the cumulative turnover. The evolution of the industrial development index (base figure of 100 in 1974) shows within the branches, from 1976 to 1979, an increase from 132 to 142 for the national sector, from 171 to 280 for the mixed sector and from 129 to 215 for the private sector, thereby accenting the underlying evils which, in Mali as in other African countries, undermine the operation of national companies.

Considering the scarcity of investors, it is unfortunately difficult here to envisage operations of reform, merger, restoration of private ownership or outright suppression decided upon elsewhere. Gen Moussa Traore recently deemed it necessary to deny certain rumors on this subject, stating that "it was not a question of selling off the enterprises that remain the backbone of the Malian economy." Such measures, insofar as they affect oligarchies of civil servants all the more powerful because the economic structures are less liberal, contain an explosive charge encouraging caution.

The poor management of national companies obviously heightens the deficit in public finances. The largest ones -- food and textile industries -- also experienced a disturbing regression in 1979. The disorders noted in Bamako at the end of the year are nevertheless only remotely linked to the situation in the industrial sector, whose activity on the whole remains marginal, even if its concentration in the cities increases its social impact. The fact is that through corporative student demands, incited and maintained by the teaching corps, these disorders stem much more from a financial crisis than from strictly economic difficulties. No latent defect can be pointed out in the agricultural or industrial structures, except for management. However, the financial weakness appears in the high figure of the foreign debt: 185 billion Malian francs, or 61 percent of the gross national production, and in the consistent deficit in the balance of goods and services since 1970. In 1978, that deficit exceeded 87 billion Malian francs, and the balance was restored, with respect to the balance of payments, only by means of the high total of transfers without counterpart funds (50 billion) and capital transfers, all elements characteristic of a way of living exceeding the country's means.

Foreign Debt in Mali on 31 December 1979 (in millions of Malian francs)

World Bank	31,126.2
U.S.-AID	2,650.8
France	15,966.1
Federal Republic of Germany	22,408.6
USSR	66,091.2
China	38,156.8
African Development Fund	4,157.7

At the government level, this weakness is expressed in an annual budget deficit that has varied between 1 and 5 billion Malian francs since 1960, with peaks of 10 and 11 billion in 1975 and 1976. The policy of austerity

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applied in 1979 apparently made it possible to reduce the debt to .73 billion francs, which unfortunately also explains the end-of-year riots. For 1980, the budget has been drawn up to total 70.8 billion francs in receipts and expenditures, but it is now anticipated that 7 billion francs in special receipts will be needed at the end of 1980 to wipe away a deficit stemming from 1979 as well as the regular fiscal year.

Mali's Balance of Payments (in billions of Malian francs)

	1971	1976	1978
A. Goods and services	- 18.5	- 46.1	- 87.7
B. Transfers without counterpart funds	+ 13.1	+ 24.6	+ 49.8
A + B	- 5.4	- 21.5	- 37.9
C. Long-term capital movements	+ 2.9	+ 17.8	+ 29.9
A + B + C	- 2.5	- 3.7	- 8
D. Short-term capital movements	- 0.8	- 12.2	- 0.8
Total Balance	- 3.3	- 15.9	- 8.8

While the context of the December riots is first of all financial, it is also political. The abolition of the "common portion" of secondary education acted only as a pretext, on both sides, one might say, for the government did not hesitate to yield on this point in order to restore calm, which was accomplished by payment of the back salaries to teachers and scholarships to students, not only in Bamako, but in the Malian embassies in Paris and Brussels as well. Beyond that, the demand for the elimination of competitive exams for entry to the major professional schools, as absurd as it may essentially be, expresses the rancor of the "subsidized" young people, who believe they have the right to some wealth and even diplomas, on a par with their comrades in other nations more favored by geography. It is this rancor that is expressed by the demonstrations of school children and students and also by the opposition of the men of the old regime, followed by that of the former comrades of Gen Moussa Traore, who find that the future is a long time coming.

The only response one can give to this rejection of reality, which should not give way to resignation, is that Mali's relatively simple economic structures should facilitate a basic reconsideration of government structures in the sense of a compression and that beyond a certain degree of development, this economy does not require the unlimited use of foreign investment characterizing the Ivory Coast. Another response is the one given in 1979 by France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada by canceling their Malian debts and initiating the conversion of operations begun with loans into operations using grants.

Nothing would apparently justify any change in regimes in Mali. At least there is no sign of the far-reaching improvements a change might make in

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the country, barring the discovery of oil or uranium. But such a change might be heavy with consequences at a time when the Sahara is echoing with the sounds of war to which the Sahelian nations as a whole would be well advised to pay attention.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

NEW ENERGY SOURCES--Fields of peat have been discovered, in the Senegalese regions of Cap-Vert, Louga (Center-North) and in Casamance (South), it was revealed on 17 June by Mr Cheikh Hamidou Kane, Senegalese Minister of Industrial Development. Studies on the importance of the fields will be launched this year, the minister explained, in a speech given on the occasion of the kickoff of a campaign to conserve energy. Mr Kane indicated, on the other hand, according to the AFP, that the results of the oil prospecting being conducted by seven companies in Senegal, would be forthcoming in the next 2 or 3 years, and that the analyses of the heavy-oil field discovered off shore of Casamance and the studies of its being exploited would soon get under way. According to the minister, Senegal, which, as we know, will spend 50 billion CFA to pay its oil bill in 1980, and, thereby, has "reached and even crossed the limit of the supportable," is going to concentrate on exploiting its new resources in order to insure its energy independence. In other respects, indicated Mr Kane, in less than two years bioenergy (utilization of the energy of plants) will be utilized beginning with the peanut shell for the production of electricity and even of "shell coal: in two Senegalese oil works. Nevertheless, the anticipated coal production is only 25,000 tons, whereas the Senegalese consumption of wood and charcoal is estimated at one million tons. While waiting for the exploitation of these resources which the oil crisis has made profitable, Mr Kane presented as an imperative the reduction of Senegalese energy consumption. He announced in this regard the improvement in charcoal manufacturing techniques, the perfection of new coal stoves, the broader use of diesel for certain vehicles, speed limits and tax increases on the big gas guzzlers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1624]

WATER RUNOFF STORAGE STUDY--The African Development Fund (FAD), an organ dependent on the African Development Bank (BAD), recently granted Senegal a loan of 1.02 million units of currency (approximately 263.2 million CFA) to finance the possibilities of stocking the streams in the regions of Casamance, of western Senegal and of Sine-Saloum. The loan is to be paid back over a 13-year period including a 3-year deferred amortization. The goals of the study are: to harness all the water resources available on the territory south of the 800 mm isohyet; to correct the poor geographic

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distribution of the usable water resources by providing hill reservoirs to the areas lacking in other sources of water each time the topography, the geography, the geotechnology and the hydrology permit it; to recharge the underground water-tables of the coastal regions and to protect them against the invasion of the salt waters; to harness the irrigable zones beginning with the streams thus accumulated. The study of stream stocking involves in all a territory of 75,000 km² located south of the 800 mm isohyet. It will be accomplished in two phases. This study comes under the goals of the government's regional development and the projects to be identified will give it the means of attaining these goals. It will be carried out in 12 months by a consultant chosen following an international appeal for offers according to the FAD's usual procedure. The person responsible is the Senegalese Minister of Equipment, Directorate of Hydraulic Engineering, in Dakar. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1624]

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL SITUATION 1979-80--Last year, Tanzania showed fair results in agriculture, but the production of rice, grains, and sugar will soon be insufficient. The 1978-79 year was better than the year before for cloves and tea. Coffee production was estimated at 51,000 metric tons, 3/4 of which was Arabica. It is to be improved in quality and quantity by a 4-year plan financed by the EEC. Tea production was 17,500 tons; pyrethrum was down to 1,603 tons; cotton was 55,000 tons at most. Sisal production was 92,000 tons; 1979-80 forecasts of 115,000 tons were considered optimistic by specialists. The 1979 clove harvest should exceed that of 1978 by 12,000 tons and earn 700 million shillings in exports. But only 17,100 tons of tobacco have been harvested instead of the 20,000 tons expected; some 23,000 tons are forecast for 1980. At 70,000 tons, the cashew nut harvest was well below that of 1977-78. Because of fraud, only 370 tons of cardamum could be sold, instead of 580 tons. The harvest of sim-sim (oil-bearing seeds) came to 6,500 tons and was entirely exported for 52 million shillings. Only 100,000 tons of sugar were produced instead of the 130,000 tons planned. Wheat had to be imported--15,000 tons of it from Canada--because the harvest came to only 26,300 tons for 75,000 tons consumed. Similarly, 79,000 tons of rice had to be imported from Japan and the United States to add to the 23,000 tons sold on the domestic market. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1329] 8782

MINING PROSPECTS--A new mining law was passed at the end of October; it increases the role of the state in developing geological resources. Plans have been made to tap a 30 billion cubic meter sea-bed gas deposit discovered at Songo-Songo in 1974; they involve building a fertilizer factory, which will produce 300 metric tons of ammonia and 400 tons of urea a day; it will be built with the aid of Indian capital. Although only traces of hydrocarbons have been found, AGIP [Italian Petroleum Enterprise] and the American firm Amoco are participating in petroleum exploration in Tanzania. The UNDP [UN Development Program] is contributing to nickel and copper exploration in the Northwest, on the Burundi border. The very large iron ore deposits will soon be opened up. The southwestern part of the country is estimated to have 50 million tons of coal. A West German firm has gotten a monopoly on uranium

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prospecting, and the Union Carbide Exploration Corp. has a monopoly on niobium and rare earths. Diamonds are still the main source of mining income in Tanzania. Some 2,979 diamonds were mined in the first 10 months of 1979 and brought in 252 million shillings. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1329] 8782

TEA FARMING PROSPECTS--In 1977, Tanzania produced 16,730 tons of tea, .9 percent of world production. Exports totaled 12,000 tons, bringing in 177.8 million shillings, 4 percent of all foreign exchange receipts. The purchasing countries were Great Britain (78.9 percent), followed by the Netherlands, Canada and Pakistan. Total tea production in Tanzania should reach 25,000 tons by 1985, which will represent about 1 percent of world tea production. The Tanzania Tea Authority (TTA), a public organization under the Ministry of Agriculture, has its main office in Dar es Salaam and its four plants are located in Rungwe (Katumba region), Njombe (Lupembe region), Bukoba (Bukoba region) and Lushoto (Mponde region). In 1977, the TTA produced 4,000 tons of tea, 24 percent of national production. The TTA heads tea development programs in Tanzania. During the 1980-1984 period, the IDA [International Development Association] (\$1 million), NORAD [Norwegian Aid to Development] (\$1.3 million) and the Tanzanian Government (\$3.2 million) anticipate financing the following operations: construction of a new plant in Ukalawa, completion of the Mwaketili plant, expansion and reequipping of the plants in Katumba, Lupembe, Bukoba and Mponde (\$6.2 million); constitution of a vehicle pool for the tea harvest, a stock of spare parts and the granting of transportation facilities for the main office and the plants (\$2.8 million); replacement of energy production units using fuel by units using wood (\$0.5 million); a program to plant 200 hectares of tea in Njombe (\$1.2 million); construction of two warehouses in Dar es Salaam (\$0.3 million); construction and maintenance of 176 kilometers of roads in order to ship tea; and the financing of foreign technical assistance (\$1.5 million). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1929] 11,464

FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR POLICE REORGANIZATION--According to a 5-year plan to reorganize Tanzanian police recently published by the Dar es Salaam government, 5,000 police officers will be recruited in the next 5 years, 500 vehicles will be purchased by the police, along with radio equipment and walkie-talkies, and 350 residences will be built for police officers. In 1979-1980, the Tanzanian Government noted an increase in crime, armed robberies in particular (1,751 for the fiscal year, 185 more than the preceding year), in the country. Rustling is also on the increase: 2,235 cases reported compared with 1,117 for the previous fiscal year. The establishment of a police unit to fight livestock thefts has reportedly resulted in a drop in the number of animals stolen: 45,133 head of livestock in 1979-1980, compared with 48,467 head in 1978-1979. The government's effort on behalf of the police can be explained in view of this statement. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1929] 11,464

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