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- 25 August 1980

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 686

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25 August 1980

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 686

CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Monetary State of Central African States Examined
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jul 80) 1

Report of Merchant Fleets of Africa
(Abdelaziz Barouhi; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Jul 80) 3

Briefs
Guinea Bissau-Mauritanian Cooperation 5

ANGOLA

Angolan-Brazilian Relations Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 Jun 80) 6

Briefs
Elf-Aquitaine Oil Agreements Details 8

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Briefs
France Expanding Military Base 9

CHAD

Briefs
Foreign Pilots Sought 10

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Problems, Progress of Reconstruction Noted
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Jul 80) 11

- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]

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ETHIOPIA		
Briefs		
Swedish Aid to Ethiopia		15
GHANA		
Briefs		
Energy Conservation Still On		16
Prefabricated Housing Production Difficulties		16
GUINEA BISSAU		
Briefs		
PCP Leader's Visit		17
LIBERIA		
Measures Regarding Former President's Family		
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Jul 80)		18
MALI		
Briefs		
West German-Malian Cooperation		19
French Financing Agreements		19
MOZAMBIQUE		
Increased Brazilian Involvement in Economy		
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 Jun 80)....		20
SOMALIA		
Briefs		
IDA Oil Loan		22
ZIMBABWE		
Prime Minister Mugabe Interviewed by 'GUARDIAN'		
(Robert Mugabe Interview; THE GUARDIAN, 30 Jul 80)..		23

- b -

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MONETARY STATE OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1802

[Article--passages between slantlines originally published in boldface]

[Text] The /Bank of Central African States (BEAC)/ has recently published an analysis of the monetary situation as of 31 January 1980 of the states in which it is licensed: Cameroon, Central Africa, Congo, Gabon, and Chad.

For the last 2 years, the /net external position/ of the monetary system has been improving markedly, going from a net deficit of 31.7 billion CFA in exchange value at the end of January 1978, and of 24 billion at the end of January 1979, to a surplus of 11.4 billion CFA at the end of January 1980. The recovery results both from a significant lightening of the external indebtedness of the banks in all the states, with the exception of Gabon, and from a sizeable reduction in Cameroon's trade deficit, as well as from a release of foreign loans.

/Official external obligations/ within the zone increased, in the same period, from an exchange value of 21.5 billion CFA at the end of January 1978 and 30 billion at the end of January 1979 to 36.2 billion CFA at the end of January 1980; in this latter total, recourse to credits from the /International Monetary Fund/ accounts for 34.6 billion CFA. Cameroon shows net currency assets with an exchange value of 20.3 billion CFA, the Congo and Central Africa are both also in a positive-balance position (9.3 billion and 6.4 billion respectively), while Gabon and Chad find themselves indebted: 5.3 billion and 2.7 billion CFA.

Between January 1979 and January 1980 /internal credit/ grew from 489.2 billion to 533.6 billion CFA, expanding at a rate of 9.1 percent.

In overall volume, /national government indebtedness/ declined from 33.8 billion to 10.4 billion CFA, while /credits to the economy/ increased from 455.4 billion to 523.2 billion CFA. The growth in credits to Cameroon can be attributed to the increase in tonnage of commercial agricultural products, the grower's price having gone up, and to financing of equipment

expenses related to oil exploration. In Central Africa, a net deceleration in credit expansion was recorded, due to the general decline in activity. A recovery began in Gabon and in the Congo. The increase in credits results from financing needs of the foodstuffs industry sector.

The exchequer in the Cameroons is in a strong creditor's position on the internal market: 46.9 billion CFA (against 13.5 billion at the end of January 1979). In all the other states, the national exchequers have had recourse to advances from the Institute of Circulation, including 32.5 billion to Gabon (up 102 percent in one year), 13.3 billion in Central Africa, and 11.5 billion in the Congo.

The total of /individual and business deposits/ in the banking system and postal check centers has grown in one year by 5.2 percent. Cameroon has in all 116.6 billion CFA in visible accounts, Gabon shows 50.3 billion, the Congo comes in at 20.3 billion, and Central Africa for 8.6 billion, for an overall volume of 195.8 billion at the end of January 1980.

As for /term accounts/ considered as quasi-monetary, their overall total is 125 billion CFA (up 35.3 percent over the end of January 1979), of which 79.8 billion belongs to Cameroon, 38.1 billion to Gabon, 6.1 billion to the Congo, and only 1 billion to Central Africa.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

REPORT ON MERCHANT FLEETS OF AFRICA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jul 80 p 50

[Article by Abdelaziz Barouhi--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] Long at the mercy of the big international companies, African countries are demanding a new maritime order.

Are African countries going to become more and more the masters of their own maritime traffic? Theoretically yes. Most of them already have maritime companies. But in reality this is not enough. To have a company is not necessarily the same as owning a fleet. Moreover, because of the maritime order presently in force at the international level, the African countries are still far from being in a commanding position.

The Transport Cartel

Despite a significant increase, the share of the African countries in the gross tonnage of the worldwide merchant maritime remains small. It went from 0.4 percent at the beginning of the Seventies to 1.6 percent at the end of the decade. This increase was basically due to the development of fleets of countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Nigeria. Except for Liberia, which occupies a separate niche owing to its policy of flags of convenience (which means that the tonnages carried by the foreign companies which sail under this flag for tax purposes are artificially counted as belonging to this country), the African countries still, almost all of them, submit to the rule of what is called "maritime conferences," cartels of transporters who are organized to control the traffic of the regular maritime lines. Even as recently as 1975 these "maritime conferences" established transport rates or readjusted them unilaterally. Which has resulted in especially high freight costs in the external trade of the African countries. Still more, the "maritime conferences" adjust their rates, naturally, in accordance with their own interests and also with the interests of those countries--in the northern hemisphere--upon which they depend, and with which Africa conducts 90 percent of its trade.

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For example, a heavily forested African country is better off exporting its wood as rough timber rather than processed, because the freight charges favor rough timber over processed wood: How is Africa going to meet this challenge?

On the international scene, the developing countries were able to get, at UNCTAD in April 1974, the elaboration of a code of conduct for maritime conferences, a sort of platform for a new international maritime order. This code was once again the focus of debate at UNCTAD V in June 1979 in Manila. It had not yet entered into force at the time, because of delays in its ratification by most of the maritime powers of the northern hemisphere. Since then, the countries of the European community have announced their intention to ratify it. This code, explains Lamine Fadika, Ivorian shipping minister, means /"that from now on the ships of developing countries (LDC's) will in principle have an equitable share in the traffic in various goods which presently represent 20 percent of world cargo tonnage."/

Better Information

Parallel with this action at the international level, the African countries are trying to organize at the regional level. As a part of this effort the ministerial conference on maritime transport of the eight states of west and central Africa (Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire) set up in 1975 a regional negotiations committee. This committee is the interlocutor of the three main "maritime conferences" which ply the region. Three years of negotiations were necessary to induce the Britannic Maritime Conference UK-West African Lines, in August 1979, to lower its rate of increase in freight charges. Whereas UKWAL had initially decided on a 23 percent increase for the 1979-1980 period, the committee succeeded in holding it back to 12.5 percent. This was the first time such a negotiation took place on this scale between countries of west and central Africa and a maritime conference.

At the national level, as was explained to us by Mr Georges Rawiri, Gabonese minister of transport and merchant marine, the aim is to be able /"to get into the shipping market, to diversify the country's trade, to have better information on and better control over costs and the setting of costs for imported and exported products."/

The fusion of efforts on the international, regional, and national level is under way. The establishment of a new maritime order is also an essential condition for the development of the African countries.

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4
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

GUINEA BISSAU-MAURITANIAN COOPERATION--Guinea Bissau and Mauritania decided to create a "great joint cooperation commission." This decision was taken in Bissau on 10 June at the end of a meeting between Victor Saude Maria, state commissioner for foreign affairs of Guinea Bissau, and Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Hussein, minister delegate to the presidency of the Republic of Mauritania. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1562] 6857

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5

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ANGOLA

ANGOLAN-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 pp 1579, 1580

[Text] Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Guerreiro went on an official visit to Angola from 9 to 11 June. It was the fifth of the "first line countries"--this expression designating the unofficial organization created to carry out a common policy toward the Namibian problem--after Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique.

Guerreiro is the second minister of foreign affairs of a non-communist country to visit Angola, the first having been Jean Simonet, head of Belgian diplomacy, in 1978.

Brazil's foreign policy toward the Namibian problem can only ingratiate it to Luanda. Through the U.N., Brasilia declared itself in favor of Namibian independence following free elections and it recognized SWAPO--headed by Sam Nujoma--as sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people. Brazil also severely condemned several times the military operations conducted by South Africa in Southern Angola. Guerreiro reaffirmed these positions.

Nevertheless, Angola does not seem to be viewing Brazil, a Portuguese-speaking country, as a "brotherly country," due to the latter's other political choices. Guerreiro's trip should help toward finding a solution to the problems raised between the two countries by these choices.

Toward Greater Economic Trade With Brazil

Brazil has become one of the leading partners of Angola to which it sold, last year, close to 350 million dollars worth of manufactured products and food. Brazilian products--from soap to wine--have also invaded Angolan shops. A Brazilian company is currently overseeing the renovation of three hotels in Luanda.

Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Guerreiro's visit will be implemented through increased trading. Two cooperation agreements between Brazil and Angola--one economic, scientific and technical, the other cultural--were signed on this occasion. The joint communiqué published at the end of the ministerial visit reaffirmed the ties established between the two countries.

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The two parties hope to develop their cooperation in agriculture (corn), food, transportation, equipment, energy and the hotel industry. In any case, private Brazilian companies are already participating in many of these industries in Angola.

The Brazilian airline Varig will soon open air travel between Buenos Aires and Luanda.

Oil cooperation will also be increased even though Petrobas, with other foreign companies, is exploiting a bloc north of Angola. Furthermore, the communiqué explains that this bilateral cooperation will also apply to architecture, higher education and the training of middle management.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

ELF-AQUITAINE OIL AGREEMENTS DETAILS--The National Angolan Fuel Company (SONANGOL) and the National Elf-Aquitaine Company (SNEA) signed in Luanda on 11 July an agreement regarding exploration and production of Hydrocarbons in Angola. The contract includes the maritime area called bloc 3, and is of a "shared production" type. According to the terms of the contract, a group of "entrepreneurs," constituted by oil companies, within which SNEA holds 50 percent of the rights and obligations as well as being the main operator, will finance and carry out a minimum of 8 exploratory drillings. In the event of an oil find, part of the production will go to the group of entrepreneurs as reimbursement for expenses and remuneration. SONANGOL reserves the right to select the companies which will hold the other 50 percent of the rights and obligations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1935]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

FRANCE EXPANDING MILITARY BASE--France is enlarging its military base at Bouar, in the north of the Central African Republic, where most of the soldiers who have left Chad are stationed. This expansion (by 3,000-4,500 men) was planned with David Dacko, who was then an advisor to the emperor, a few weeks before Bokassa's fall. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jul 80 p 36] 8782

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CHAD

BRIEFS

FOREIGN PILOTS SOUGHT--Chadians stopped over briefly in London looking for "foreign pilots" for the helicopters and planes of the former national squadron that have been grounded for a year in Mondou (the Southern capital). If these aircraft are brought back into service, they could change the course of the civil war by giving an advantage to the troops of President Goukouni Oueddei and his vice-president, Wadal Kamougue, over those of Hissein Habre. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jul 80 p 36] 8782

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10

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

PROBLEMS, PROGRESS OF RECONSTRUCTION NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jul 80 pp 3-9

[Article: "Equatorial Guinea Has the Floor"]

[Text] End of the Tunnel

"Destroying is easy; rebuilding is difficult." This phrase crops up incessantly in the speeches of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the man who put an end to the absolute reign of Macias Nguema. Equatorial Guinea has indeed been destroyed. It is no longer the paradise of Africa and denying this would serve no purpose. Rather, one should ask whether it can once again become that paradise and how long it will take.

Following the fall of Macias Nguema, Malabo was a deserted city, a Phnom Penh that looked like a scraggly Spanish village. The shops stood empty and the rare exceptions reminded one of ill-fitting clothes: A few Chinese canned goods could not divert one's eyes from the gaping shelves; five shirts or two pairs of shoes can scarcely fill a show window 3 meters wide. There was no fighting in Malabo but the city had nevertheless experienced a debacle. Abandoned vehicles rusted in courtyards and the streets, more numerous than those in use.

Disaster and Aftermath

Trees sprouted in the most unexpected places: on the fire engine at the airport, on sagging rooftops, through a collapsed balcony. Electric lines turned into tangles of vegetation, unwitting works of art. The center of the capital was inaccessible, its finest quarters hidden behind an ugly wall bristling with pillboxes. This no man's land was to protect a presidential palace where the president had no longer appeared for years.

And yet, it had all been pretty, even stylish. Before slipping into oblivion or sinking into neglect, Malabo had known a good life. Its mayor's hall was too flamboyant to be bureaucratic, its benches gleamed against a background of ancient tile, its bars were crowded with youth as golden as colonial. This artificial paradise was obviously reserved for a small

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privileged fringe: Spanish merchants and planters, French settlers who had come from Gabon or Cameroon to spend their vacation. But on the whole, the country occupied a more than honorable rank in Africa. Thanks to its cacao, considered the best in the world, it boasted one of the highest incomes on the continent, leading the group of the poorest countries to which Equatorial Guinea belongs today. Considering the country's small size, the road system and infrastructures were more extensive than in any other nation of a Central Africa scarcely spoiled by French colonialism.

Falling so far to such a low spot, what is Equatorial Guinea's situation today? A year after the coup d'etat that got rid of Macias, the diagnosis is still extremely sad, despite the good will of the new rulers. The country is barely beginning to move again. Only those who have seen the extent of the disaster can find a few encouraging signs. Anyone else would see nothing but desolation. The Bantu Hotel, one of the three "great" hotels of Malabo, would look like a mediocre camp. In June 1980, electric lights were not yet common, cold beer was a dream and, still lacking refrigeration, food remained something to be improvised at the last minute.

Those used to other African capitals would have reason to complain, but to be fair, one must note other details, attend the little celebration marking the advent of new beds, be present at the arrival of the first tiny refrigerator or the setting up of a generator, which is already changing many things.

So it is with everything. A traveler arriving for the first time sees only what is lacking, only the abandoned shops and the empty garages. He would have to be told that the house next door was in the same condition before a recent cleanup, that the line of hollow shops has at least one operating when only a few months before, the street harbored only peddlers whose complete range of goods would fit on a single stool. Equatorial Guinea is coming out of hell; it is normal for it to resemble purgatory. There are those who wonder whether it should be said of a glass that it is half full or half empty. In Malabo, fruit juice does not taste very natural and is definitely not fresh. A year ago, there would not have been any fruit juice at all.

Why should one speak so much about administration? Because that is where the country is right now, because it has to meet immediate needs, needs that seemed simple only to those who have not had them for years. Medicine is a perfect example. Survival came first. From polio to cholera, all diseases were epidemics. The hospital in the capital had beds without legs or sheets; the one in Luba was strewn with garbage. With aid from Spain, an emergency plan was put into effect: massive vaccinations that are now completed; the reconstruction and reequipping of hospitals -- the one in Luba is nearly finished; and the temporary assignment of Spanish doctors to all large population centers.

But while emergencies were handled in this way, the few local doctors were sent to Spain to complete their shaky (6 months) Soviet training. This

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time, it was not a question of immediate needs, but rather, of acquiring the means needed for the future. In all fields, one has to play on both boards and even then, progress is not always as clear as in the area of health.

African Colors

Agriculture must ensure survival but it must also become the driving force of the economy once again, provide foreign exchange resources through export products such as cacao, coffee and wood. Daily bread is not always taken for granted. In order to satisfy the wants of their European customers, the hotels have to work miracles and assign two or three employees to a constant search for housewives who do the baking for their own homes. As for the rest, breaks in supplies are still frequent, but in general, the Malabo and Bata markets are making progress. They are taking on African colors again after a long period exclusively devoted to the greyish brown of dried fish and the scarlet hue of cottage-made palm oil.

The startup is less tangible in speculative agriculture, on the great Rio Muni plantations or on the western coast of the island. Government measures are already being taken: Basically, it is a question of restoring the land to the former owners (the majority Spanish) on the condition that they will get the land back on the road to a prosperity benefiting the entire country. They were receiving the fields but had yet to put the machines into them. Very few have seized the opportunity and it is difficult to make a distinction between distrust and the lack of financial means. The government has therefore gone even further: Insofar as possible, it is supplying the money for the machinery.

"Destroying is easy; rebuilding difficult." The phrase can be applied particularly well here. In addition to the timidity of the former operators, one has to overcome hard obstacles: To destroy what were once the best cacao plantations in the world, it was enough to do nothing. To recover the resource, many new plants and years of patience will be needed.

This is true because the cacao plantations need care, but also because a specialized work force also has to be found. It was the Nigerians who played this role and there were so many of them (30,000 to 50,000), that they made up the majority of the population on the island of Fernando Poo. Under Macias, bad treatment caused them to flee, slowly at first, then en masse in the course of 1976. The government has resumed contact in order to seek new agreements on the importation of labor. It will come, from Nigeria or elsewhere, but more slowly than it left because the country could not withstand an abrupt avalanche of workers who will bring the indispensable arms, but also mouths to feed.

Equatorial Guinea nevertheless has potential wealth. Even if cacao experiences the ups and downs of all raw materials, the Fernando Poo cacao can play the card of quality rather than quantity. That was its strength and can be again, but this is a long-range haul.

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Rebuilding

Are other examples needed? Fishing is also emerging from a long, dark night. Macias had put an end to this other national resource, destroying the fishermen's boats to prevent them from serving those who wanted to leave his domain. The Russians did the rest. Thanks to an agreement too good to be honest, they cleaned out the ocean depths with their fleet based in Luba. The traffic was so heavy that Aeroflot had to set up a line between Malabo and Moscow to rotate the crews. It will take over a year for the fish to come back and in the meantime, boats and motors must be given to those who make their living from the sea.

Everything has to be rebuilt, but no one has ever been able to do everything at once. An electric powerplant is being built in Malabo, the only African capital which, except for a few generators, is plunged into darkness. It is impossible to move faster. If, by some miracle, electricity were to be restored today, the equipment that has never been maintained would not withstand the shock and the first night would be illuminated by fires. Everything is linked together: Without guaranteed power, no industry. Without means of transportation, no sales abroad and imports would remain far below the immense needs (labor and products). On this last point, Macias' heritage is no more brilliant than elsewhere: a single boat and a single airplane, Chinese or Russian trucks in rather pitiful condition despite their natural sturdiness. Every ship that docks in the Malabo port improves the situation, unloading 30 to 50 trucks, pickups or cars (the license plates will come later). The Spanish Air Force has restored a certain regularity in relations between the island and the continent.

This Spanish aid is not alone, moreover. The European Economic Community has also entered the dance, financing the long-awaited construction of the Malabo electric powerplant. This is definitely one of the most positive points of the first year of the new regime. Equatorial Guinea is still uncomfortable, but it is no longer the leper of Africa. Contacts are being renewed, timid but promising. Claude Cheysson himself has just traveled there, marking the return of the EEC which had preferred to break with a country where, under Macias Nguema, forced labor was practiced, among other things. Aid has been sent, the first less than 2 weeks after Macias' ouster. Credits have already been granted, others will come, all making it possible to bind up the innumerable wounds.

This breach in the wall with which the fallen regime surrounded Equatorial Guinea constitutes the best guarantee of more improvements. It also shows that Europe is satisfied with the first steps of the political "reconstruction." Here again, nothing is perfect if measured by the usual parameters. But who will criticize a country for not having an opposition newspaper when the government itself has not yet had the time and the means to establish a press?

Obviously, life is already better than under the "tiger," Macias Nguema. In that domain also, Equatorial Guinea has been badly battered and it will take more than 12 months to make such bruises disappear. "Destroying is easy; rebuilding is difficult."

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ETHIOPIA

BRIEFS

SWEDISH AID TO ETHIOPIA--Sweden promised to send 1.9 million dollars in emergency aid to Ethiopia for draught victims. This aid will be sent through the World Food Program (WFP). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1575] 6857

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GHANA

BRIEFS

ENERGY CONSERVATION STILL ON--Ghanaian Minister of Lands, Natural Resources, Fuel and Energy George Benneh recently stressed again the importance of the country's expenditures for energy which were burdened by the successive increases of the cost of oil. He noted that despite the decrease in foreign purchases, total expenditures are over the billion-dollar mark per year and represents 35 percent of Ghana's export earnings. He therefore stressed the need to continue fuel rationing and even to reduce consumption in every sector possible. The minister acknowledged, however, that the decrease in consumption had had the effect of decreasing demand at the Tema refinery by 20 percent. He also announced that fuel would be shipped to the northern and upper regions by railroad rather than trucks in an effort to save even more energy. It should be noted that the local production of crude oil--already insignificant at the beginning--decreased still further and that, according to the agreement signed with the U.S. exploiting company, Agri-Petco International, Inc., this production is shipped to the U.S. for refining. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1921]

PREFABRICATED HOUSING PRODUCTION DIFFICULTIES--The plant producing prefabricated concrete panels for construction (Prefabricated Large Panel Construction Factory) is facing a series of new difficulties requiring urgent solutions if the factory is to survive. These difficulties derive mainly from local shortages of the necessary construction materials,--mainly concrete--but also from delays in the importation of equipment due to scarce foreign exchange. On 22 May 1980 an agreement for a total of \$240,000 was signed with the USSR for the purchase of these type of equipment, but delivery delays were long due to various reasons. It will be recalled that the plant was first established in 1962 within the framework of a Ghana-USSR agreement. Its initial production was gauged at 70,000 square meters of prefabricated housing per year. Following the 1966 coup d'etat, the plant ceased operations. In 1973, the National Redemption Council renewed cooperation with the USSR and decided to re-activate the factory, which re-opened in June 1976. It is now reportedly ready to work at full capacity if the above difficulties would be solved. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1921]

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16

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GUINEA BISSAU

BRIEFS

PCP LEADER'S VISIT--Alvaro Cunhal, secreteray general of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) toured Guinea Bissau during the second week of May. He headed a delegation of his party to discuss "relations of friendship and solidarity between the PCP and PAIGC." The Portuguese delegation studied problems of common interest for the purpose of strengthening relations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1562] 6857

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LIBERIA

MEASURES REGARDING FORMER PRESIDENT'S FAMILY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jul 80 p 26

[Article: "Alms For The President's Widow"]

[Text] Does Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe have a soft heart? On 7 July he visited Mrs Victoria Tolbert, widow of the president assassinated two months earlier, to give her "expense" money to buy food. Mrs Tolbert, who is under house arrest, affirmed her patriotism and her desire "to work assiduously with the government of the People's Redemption Council (PRC)." With thanks, the former first lady of Liberia asked to see her children and grandchildren. The master sergeant assured her he would "look kindly" upon this request.

The next day, however, the mutual protestations of good will were over. A decree published by the PRC announced that all the property of the late William Tolbert had been confiscated by the government except for the clothing, kitchen utensils, and furnishings of the family home. On 9 July, however, there was a new calm in the Doe-Tolbert relations: the PRC freed the three daughters of the former president.

But the head of state's generosity has its limits: he still does not plan to let Mrs Victoria Tolbert and five other children of hers enjoy the same treatment: "Justice shall take its course." As for her son, Adolphus Benedict, arrested on 14 June at the residence of the French ambassador (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1019), there is no question of releasing him; the most he can count on is "a fair and equitable trial." Meanwhile, the "cleanup" continues; the government has recovered \$2.2 million from the former president's entourage, administration officials, and True Whig Party.

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MALI

BRIEFS

WEST GERMAN-MALIAN COOPERATION--On 9 June, Alioune Blondin Beye, Malian minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation went on an official visit to West Germany. On the economic front, he indicated that "Radio Mali would receive three broadcasting stations--two of which would be short waves, 100 and 50 kW, and one middle waves, 100 kW--and two generating sets." He also called attention to the first phase of the financing contract for the renovation of the equipment of the Malian Navigation Company (COMANAV) scheduled to receive "one tug-boat, six barges, spare parts, three motors for the General Soumare boat and a third boat," from FRG in 1981. The minister also discussed mining research in Mali and the Niger Office. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1562] 6857

FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENTS--Theophile Sangare, Malian director general for international cooperation and Jean Patriat, head of the French cooperation mission in Mali signed 3 financing agreements between France and Mali in Bamako on 24 July, for a total of 270 million Malian francs. The first agreement (200 million Malian francs) is related to French financing of the third phase of a vegetable cultivation project and to a food processing plant in Mali. The second agreement (50 million Malian francs) is a French subsidy to the program in support of Mali's rural development institute aimed at ensuring the gathering of virtually all Malian documentation on rural development, a total of about 7,000 documents. Through the third agreement, France is granting a 20 million Malian franc assistance for the implementation of a water project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1916]

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MOZAMBIQUE

INCREASED BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN ECONOMY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1580

[Text] The official visit of Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Guerreiro to Maputa offers the opportunity to review economic and commercial relations between Brazil and Mozambique. Once passed the "cold era," following Mozambique's accession to independence in 1975, relations between the two Portuguese-speaking countries expanded substantially despite their ideological differences.

Brazilian exports to Mozambique went from 800,000 dollars in 1976 to 423 million dollars during the present year. Maputo imported 21 Brazilian locomotives, 40 trucks, nearly 200 tractors, 27,000 tires and 1,800 tons of paper.

Since 1978, Brazil awarded a 100 million dollar credit line to Mozambique and its increase was on Guerreiro's agenda.

Various projects, of a notably agricultural nature, formulated and financed by Brazil, are underway in the Chokwe region. They include: a 25,000 hectare area of which 20,000 are to be farmed and 5,000 irrigated; the building of dikes and even, perhaps, a dam to protect this region against floods which, until now, have been very numerous; and planning for electrification and a road network.

Brazilian firms also assumed responsibility for developing the community villages of that region, with populations ranging between 4,000 and 5,000 inhabitants, as well as some architectural projects. In this case, it involves integrating Mozambican miners returning from South Africa and raising the productivity level of the region--objectives which were described as "conform to the socio-political goals of Mozambique."

The Chokwe region, located some 200 kilometers from Maputo in the Limpopo Valley, is a relatively fertile, an essentially farming, region. A few years ago, when the territory was still under its domination, the Portuguese government decided to develop this region which was then called "Colonato do Limpopo." These projects were not implemented, due, among other things, to

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the lack of funds of the government of that time, sapped as it was by the colonial war.

Lately, Mozambique also contacted Brazil for the financing and establishment of other agricultural and industrial development projects.

They involve in particular the construction of a dam over the Pungoe river, in the Sofala central province, which will make possible the irrigation of 80,000 hectares of land and the creation of a 10,000 hectare banana plantation.

Brazilian experts are in Mozambique for those various projects. In addition, with the support of the Brazilian minister of foreign relations, the Mining Research Company (CPRM) will begin research in geophysics, map-making and geology and will train Mozambican technicians.

Mozambique is the second commercial partner of Brazil, after Angola, among the countries visited by the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs.

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SOMALIA

BRIEFS

IDA OIL LOAN--International Development Aid (IDA), a subsidiary of the World Bank, recently granted a 6 million dollar loan to Somalia to finance promotion of an oil exploration project. This project is in support of the government's efforts to develop a national oil supply and improve planning for the energy sector. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS In French 20 Jun 80 p 1575] 6857

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ZIMBABWE

PRIME MINISTER MUGABE INTERVIEWED BY 'GUARDIAN'

LD301245 London THE GUARDIAN in English 30 Jul 80 p 6

[Interview with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe by Altaf Gauhar in Salisbury; date not indicated]

[Text] Comrade Robert Mugabe, prime minister of Zimbabwe, sits in an austere office in Milton House on Jameson Avenue, Salisbury. The room is the one which for years was occupied by Ian Smith and later by Bishop Muzorewa. Nothing has changed in the way of furnishings and fittings, I was told by the security officer. "Not even the red carpet?" I asked. He nodded.

Throughout the 45-minute interview Mugabe sat with his arms crossed. I had expected a charismatic revolutionary leader full of fire and rhetoric. Instead I met a man who was thoughtful and seemed to weigh every word before uttering it.

Altaf Gauhar: Prime Minister, yesterday you were a psychopathic killer, a terrorist, an ogre, today, you are a pragmatist, a moderate, and a far-sighted statesman. How have you adjusted yourself to the change?

Robert Mugabe: The change is not in me. I am not the one who has undergone a metamorphosis. The transformation really is taking place in the minds of those who once upon a time regarded me as an extremist, a murderer, a psychopathic killer, as you say. They are the people who have had to adjust to the change. I have remained my constant self. What I was, I still am.

During the war we had to fight against the enemy's propaganda machinery. But all the time we had a definite goal before us: to establish in Zimbabwe a free society in which people of all shades of opinion, regardless of their colour or race or creed, should be able to participate in social, economic and political life at an equal level. And this is precisely what we have set about to achieve.

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Now that we have our independence, and the war is over, we have called upon the people, upon our forces to uphold the principle of reconciliation, because it is on that basis alone that we can establish true peace in the country. We have never been racist in our approach. We have never hated the white man. It was the white man's philosophy of racial superiority that we hated. That philosophy has now been defeated, and the philosophy of a nonracial society, of a society based on the recognition of man as man with equal rights and civil liberties, has prevailed. That is the philosophy we cherish and know.

A.G.: What does it mean in concrete terms?

R.M.: It means we have to forgive those who wronged us. Failure to forgive would perpetuate a state of conflict which we now want to see as past history. Hence I have urged our people, blacks and whites, to get reconciled and to change their attitudes. Of course, reconciliation does not mean just forgiveness. Reconciliation means that blacks and whites, members of the same society, with the same loyalty and commitment to independence, must now accept their obligation to uphold the principles for which we struggled and fought for so long. Those who lost the fight for a racially demarcated society must accept the reality of their defeat, and the reality of the victory of a nonracial society. If they still oppose the principles of a nonracial society, then there will be no reconciliation.

A.G.: Prime Minister, your role, and the kind of society you establish in Zimbabwe will determine the course of events in South Africa. Would you agree with that?

R.M.: Yes, the future of this region depends on how South Africa gets reconciled to the reality of the right of self-determination which has been achieved by her neighbours. What we are trying to consolidate here is independence based on the general will of the people who want to become masters of their destiny in their own areas. But there is always a kind of interaction in society. When we were engaged in our struggle, it was this interaction which brought other forces to our support. All progressive revolutionary forces of our region rallied together and reinforced our struggle.

In my opinion this happened because of the realisation that this region was entitled to establish a definite political pattern of society, a society based on democracy, a society inspired by the principle of self-determination. The South African society is inimical to all these principles. There a minority has set itself up as an ordained entity, deriving some kind of divine power to rule the rest of the community on the basis of racial superiority. Now we are opposed to that kind of society.

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A.G.: Has the change in Zimbabwe encouraged the revolutionary forces in South Africa?

R.M.: Our victory here has been an inspiration to the people of South Africa in a very big way. They have seen racism defeated in this region, in Mozambique and Angola, and they have gathered greater courage than they had, greater inspiration than they had yesterday, to continue their own struggle for the liberation of their own country and the establishment of the right of self-determination. Now we do believe that our success here will promote this trend in South Africa and that it will also consolidate the independence achieved in Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola. Naturally it will promote the same course of events in Namibia.

A.G.: Depending on the success of your model here?

R.M.: Of course, our experiment has to succeed before it becomes a model for the people of South Africa, at least in theory. In other words, we have to succeed in our bid to establish a nonracial society, in our bid to kill the principle of racialism, in our bid to establish civil liberties, a sine qua non of democracy. Once the reconciliation between the races is complete, once we have the opposing forces in harmony, then whatever the differences in the political sphere we will, at least have that oneness which upholds a democratic society. That is what will consolidate our independence.

I think it will also act as a consolidating factor for Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Angola and even for the former high commission territories in Lesotho and Swaziland. The progressive forces in South Africa will have a basis on which to demand that transformation take place as quickly as possible in their society.

A.G.: Assuming that your model succeeds here, what chances do you see of a peaceful transformation in South Africa?

R.M.: I think it depends entirely on how the regime in South Africa reacts to the present demand, which is already manifesting itself for change in political philosophy and for social transformation through democracy. If they react viciously, and do not heed the call for, what one might call, reconciliation, so that people may get together and evolve a formula, then the armed struggle will intensify. You see the more resistant the regime is to change, the greater the impetus there will be to armed struggle. But if they are more accommodating and accept the principle of democracy, the principle that there must be majority rule, they will succeed in getting the political parties to sit at a round table conference and discuss with them the future of South Africa.

A.G.: Prime Minister, do you see this happening in the near future?

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R.M.: No, I don't see this happening. I think the conflict has already assumed antagonistic proportions. One really dreads the prospect of armed hostility gaining momentum in South Africa.

A.G.: In that event, Prime Minister, to what extent would you and the other African states get sucked into direct struggle in South Africa?

R.M.: Africa is already committed to assisting the liberation struggle in South Africa. What form it takes will depend on the people of South Africa themselves. It could be a national struggle without violence, it could be a violent national struggle. If it takes the latter form Africa is pledged to total support of that struggle, in fact Africa has a liberation committee, as you know, of the OAU (Organisation of African Unity), which finances liberation movements.

The support will now be greater because Africa no longer needs the kind of major resources required earlier when the Africans had to fight a war here, a war in South Africa and Namibia, and earlier a war in Mozambique and Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Now we can marshal all our resources and channel them in a more intensive manner toward the intensification of the struggle in South Africa.

A.G.: Is there any way to prevent the struggle taking such a bloody course?

R.M.: It all depends on the South Africa regime. It has got to take cognisance of the wishes of the people of South Africa. The mass demonstrations, the boycotts which are taking place at the present moment are a writing on the wall. If they don't take heed now it will be too late. Then they may not be able to ward off intense armed struggle.

A.G.: To what extent are you committing your resources to the struggle in South Africa?

R.M.: We take cognisance of the wishes of the people of South Africa. There are limitations on us, limitations which derive mainly from our realisation that if we were to provide bases here for the liberation movements, there will be reprisals from South Africa. And these reprisals will be of such a nature that the whole process of reconciliation which we have started here would be set back. It would create divisions in our own society.

In other words we are not strong enough to be able to give bases as such, but through the OAU we shall be able to contribute our bit to the struggle in South Africa. If the struggle were to take a direct form, as you suggested, I see the countries of this region giving political and diplomatic support to the national liberation movement in South Africa.

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They will also provide material support through the OAU but I doubt if they will offer any bases in this region.

A.G.: Prime Minister, on your political philosophy there are two questions I must ask. First, whether you will choose the egalitarian ideals which you enunciated in the past or opt for what one might call the lasting benefits of a mixed economy and a relatively open society. Second: Lord Soames said recently: "Mugabe is in charge and what he wants to do coincides in many ways with what we would like to see him do, but he has many problems."

(A broad smile spread across Mugabe's face. He laughed, but we moved on to the next question.)

A.G.: There is a lurking suspicion, Prime Minister, in the Western press that your reconciliation programme may be no more than a convenient strategy. I think it is pertinent to ask whether you have chosen a rigid Marxist ideological position or a pragmatic position.

R.M.: Let me say that our principles remain as we enunciated them earlier. As a party we stand by the socialist ideology deriving, to an extent, from Marxism and Leninism. We don't hide that. At the same time we are not governed by those principles alone. We also have our own tradition, and the principles that we have developed here under the influence of Christianity, while we were occupied by the West. In other words, while we adhere to definite socialist principles there is a streak or morality that runs through them, and this morality is a synthesis of our tradition and our Christian practice here. It is our belief that you cannot run a society divorced from moral principles, and it is these moral principles on which we would like to found our society.

We hold that society must address itself to common objectives, that man is principally a social being, not an individualist but a collectivist. Our traditions strengthen that belief. We have always lived as a collective society. Land belongs to all individuals. True, each person has his own cattle and goats but there was always a distinction between what was communal, and what the individual acquired as his own property. The rivers and the fruit trees have always been common to us all.

Christianity brought a kind of mixed grill to us in the context of the social nature of man. It also espoused a kind of individualism. Even the churches are divided in the manner in which they organise themselves. The Catholics are collective. I have been brought up by the Catholics. They live together, they don't marry, they eat together, the priests don't have individual property. The Methodists may be more individualistic.

But in respect of our society here we cannot ignore the reality of individualism which we have inherited. That means we cannot ignore the

reality of private enterprise which exists in our society by seizing private property, and making it state-owned or by handing it over to collectives. We can't do that without ruining the socio-economic base on which we want to found our society. We accept its reality, and accept that it must continue.

But there are certain communal aspects we must develop in consonance with the goals that we cherish as a state. If private enterprise must continue, then it must be localised as much as possible. There must be local predominance in the control of the industries.

A.G.: Does that promote a socialist economic system?

R.M.: Not as such. But it promotes national development. Within the enterprises we would want to see the role of the worker developed. That is fundamental. The future thrust must be toward a proletarian society. The worker has got to be organised in industry. We must have workers' committees which consult regularly with the management on various problems. Not always about wages and other benefits but to develop a consultative system in which the worker is involved in decision-making. There must be training facilities for the worker to move up and to develop a sense of belonging so that he is fully committed to the enterprise.

A.G.: To what extent will the state take direct control of the economy?

R.M.: To the extent that the state takes direct control of partner in certain enterprises where this is possible. We have already had certain offers. We are not imposing ourselves. We have only enunciated the possibility of the state becoming a partner.

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