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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 684

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OUTCOME OF OAU SUMMIT IN FREETOWN REPORTED

Lack of Dialog Deplored

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 9

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado]

[Text] Fourteen chiefs of state and eight chiefs of government made the trip to Freetown, capital of Sierra Leone, to attend the 17th OAU summit. Two days earlier, the local press had announced "an exceptional participation by 45 chiefs of state." However, the participation revealed itself to be exceptionally weak and--with due respect to the ministers who headed the other delegations--this summit will be recorded in the annals as the one which aroused the least enthusiasm.

In July 1977, in Libreville, the number of conflicts in progress had mobilized energies to attempt to close the gaps in the facade of unity: Libya-Chad, Sudan-Ethiopia, Ethiopia-Somalia, the Eritrean war, without overlooking the crisis in the Sahara. In July 1978, in Khartoum, the same scenario, the same obsession with saving face and unity. In 1979, in Monrovia, two serious conflicts dominated the 16th summit: the conflict in the Horn of Africa and that in the Western Sahara. During the last 3 years, finally, unit was more or less safeguarded thanks to the obsessive desire to liberate southern Africa. However, Zimbabwe has become independent; and Namibia will be independent one day. And the liberation of South Africa seems so far away to some persons that their condemnation of the aggression against Angola by the South Africans seems derisory.

What is the reason for this disaffection? Why is there a lack of enthusiasm in the debates except when there is a question of subjects which are highly emotional in nature? Dare we say that it is because conflicts have become less numerous? Or is it because, on the contrary, the conflicts are so serious and the epidemic seems so irresistible that Africa finds itself unable to face up to the situation? Doubtless it is also due to the fact that an unprecedented economic crisis is destabilizing African states more than they were ever threatened by putsches. This is true to the point that many states have fallen back upon themselves and have too much to do at

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home. This confirms the following terrible statement made by a diplomat:  
"Before, it was simple. We fought between progressives and moderates about almost anything, then we embraced one another at the end of the summit. Today, everyone is in torment, and the problems are such that we do not have time any longer for dialog."

Summit's Surprises

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 16

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado and Abdelaziz Dahmani]

[Text] The organization by Sierra Leone of the 17th OAU summit (1-4 July 1980), which was preceded by the 35th ministerial conference (17-19 June), is certainly the least pretentious and the least costly (everything is relative!) of similar summits held over the last 5 years. Operation prestige has been reduced to a minimum. The streets are decorated; however, they are not cluttered with "posters" of chiefs of state, each more handsome and braver than all the others. Only a few streamers and signs offer a welcome to the OAU, which were paid for by such-and-such company: Heineken, Pepsi, etc.

The host government, in fact, was not authorized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which provides assistance in financial management, to exceed the limit of \$100 million for the organization of the summit. And President Siaka Stevens doubtless did not wish to repeat the experience of extreme expenditures of Monrovia in July 1979 which had been one of the reasons for the coup d'etat against William Tolbert. To lighten the burden of Sierra Leone, assistance has been provided principally by Algeria (50 Mercedes and \$5 million) and from a few Gulf countries (the Arab Emirates, Qatar...). Because of the absence of the Algerian, Egyptian and Libyan presidents who customarily are followed by hundreds of advisers, journalists and bodyguards, it is the Moroccan delegation which is the largest in Freetown.

The people of Sierra Leone, who are very dignified, have greeted this summit without outbursts of enthusiasm but with gentleness and good nature.

However, all is not sweetness and light--for from it. The cost of living in Freetown is prohibitive, and the delegates themselves have been able to experience this. Hotel rates have tripled, increasing from 30 leones (1 leone is worth about \$1 or 4 French francs) to more than 100 leones. The smallest meal costs 20 leones and, even for modest purses, a sandwich at 4 leones is no bargain. For their part, taxi drivers who take journalists from their hotel (the Stadium built by the Chinese) to Africa Hall where the summit is being held have quadrupled their fares. It is true that there are about 15 kilometers to cover....

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Senghor Shakes Conference

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 17

[Text] At the opening of the 17th summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone on 1 July, the new president of the OAU, Siaka Stevens, asked the representatives of the 50 member states to observe a moment of silence in memory of his predecessor, Liberian President William Tolbert and of Angolan President Agostinho Neto. Only the Liberian delegation remained seated, under the look of reprobation of those in attendance.

However, Senegalese President Leopold Sedar, departing interim president of the Organization since the death of Tolbert, created a sensation by a speech which lifted the summit out of its doldrums.

First, he reproached the new Liberian leaders, not for having seized power, but for having done so by means of assassination, "a very serious act."

The OAU is not accustomed to this kind of language. Senghor's speech next took up Zimbabwe which had discovered a statesman, Robert Mugabe; the Lagos economic summit; the Western Sahara affair which requires "a dynamic compromise a l'African"; Chad; the ambiguity of Israeli policy--in favor of peace with Egypt but expansionist with regard to Palestine and her other neighbors. Finally, Senghor shook the audience by a profession of faith in the rights of man, recalling the Wolof proverb: "Man is the cure for man."

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Test of Freetown

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 7 Jul 80 p 34

[Article by G.C.]

[Text] It was with particular interest this year that we awaited the outcome of the work of the 17th summit of the Organization of African Unity which met on 1-5 July in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone.

Several problems which are decisive for the future of the continent were in fact on the always very full agenda of these meetings, and the answers which would be found for them once again would permit the measurement simultaneously of the degree of maturity and independence of the African organization and the balance of political forces.

Although it was not theoretically inscribed on the agenda the problem of the Western Sahara could not be avoided, since the Saharan-Arab Democratic Republic [SADR] before the summit had officially placed its name in the hopper as a candidate for the 51st seat in the organization. The

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crushing victories won by the POLISARIO Front and the increasingly broad support enjoyed by the SADR, which as we write these words on the eve of the Freetown summit is already recognized by 23 African states and which has now imposed itself even with the most "moderate" countries as an irreversible reality, made foreseeable the possibility of a positive outcome. Under the terms of Article 28 of the OAU's charter, the admission of a country requires the approval of a simple majority; i.e., 26 "yes" votes out of 50; therefore, 3 additional "yes" votes in fact were enough to attain its objective.

Nevertheless, there was no doubt that the debate--particularly in the corridors--promised to be stormy and that the suspense was going to last until the end, with Morocco ready, as it had demonstrated during the ministerial conference, to resort to all kinds of maneuvers--ranging from a fallacious legal argument to the blackmail of withdrawal--to attempt to block the request of the SADR. The entry of the latter in the community of African nations would in fact be a clear-cut defeat at the diplomatic level for the Sherifian kingdom and would greatly contribute to acceleration of the inevitable victory of the Saharan people.

The Chadian conflict, whose gravity and complexity no one is underestimating, could not impose itself as a priority concern of the Freetown summit. Nevertheless, as recognized by the report of its secretary general, the Organization of African Unity has up to now appeared powerless to influence the course of events. And the proposal offered by a certain number of countries, during the preparatory work of the ministerial conference of sending "blue helmets" from the United Nations to Chad, apart from the fact that the proposal is not without danger, would merely confirm this impression. Also, a certain number of countries, including progressive states such as Angola, were actively militating in favor of the establishment at any price of a Pan-African peace force.

In any case, we could expect that the debate on this point would permit clarification of the real facts of a problem which most often one makes an effort to muddle, and to establish the positions of each party.

Marked by the entry into the Pan-African organization of independent Zimbabwe, the 17th summit was to have been situated under the sign of the total liberation of southern Africa. In this sector, too, and more than ever at a time when the liberation of Namibia becomes a pressing imperative and when armed struggle seems to be the only way to put an end to the apartheid regime, more concrete and more effective overall measures are expected from the OAU by the peoples concerned. The decisions made on this subject should constitute a test of the determination of all parties to bring their deeds into line with their words.

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Neocolonial Cyst

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 7 Jul 80 pp 34-35

[Article by Mamdy Fall]

[Text] The year 1960 which had witnessed the surge of African independence was described by certain journalists and aficionados of labels as the "Year of Africa." Twenty years later, 1980 also seems worthy of note by history. Does that mean it will continue to be marked by a white stone? Nothing is less certain. The fact remains, nevertheless, that in the course of this year conferences at the highest level, summits, (economic summits or not) will be held at an unprecedented rate.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) which met on 28-29 April in Lagos for a "special summit" devoted to economic questions, has just held its annual summit of chiefs of state. In between times, in Nice, from 8-10 May, the French-African conference took place in which 25 African states participated; i.e., more delegations than customarily attend this meeting. Because of this fact, the Nice conference seemed to take on an almost Pan-African dimension. It was decided there, moreover, to call a conference of Francophone countries in the near future, the preparatory meeting for which (at the level of ministers of foreign affairs) is to be held on 5 November in Dakar.

What was are to think of this profusion of "diplomacy at the heights," and of its effectiveness, in the face of the crucial problems which are posed today for Africa and the African peoples? The most casual observer cannot fail to note that, from one summit to the other, the objective proclaimed above all is that of promoting the development of Africa, which leaves it clearly understood that this development has not made particular progress in 20 years. At the time of the Lagos summit, the OAU secretary-general, Edem Kodjo, said: "Africa is exposed to the problems of its survival." Some French colonial sectors which are rather inclined toward complaisance go one step further and describe the record of 20 years of independence in Africa as "consternating." It is true that they immediately thereafter add that in Lagos the African chiefs of state have had "finally demonstrated realism."

Summarily, these French colonialist sectors, whose interests quite understandably for over 20 years have commanded them to put up the most implacable fight against African revolutionaries and progressives, are forced to note that the African reality today is distressing. The figures offer too long commentaries. In fact, we observe that the average mortality rate is 190 percent; i.e., the highest in the world; that life expectancy there is the lowest: 47 years, compared to a world average of 55 years; that industrial production there rarely reaches 15 percent of the gross domestic product; that trade between African countries has been in continuing regression for the last 10 years (this means that African countries are trading more with foreign countries than between themselves);

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doubtless a symbol of the derisory weight of Africa in world economy, its share of world industrial production is barely 1 percent. Vying with one another in the repetition of the phrase that Africa "is making leaps forward" does not change any of this sad evidence.

At the time the OAU was being set up (May 1963), a clairvoyant Pan-African, namely Ghanaian President Kwame N'Krumah, was energetically opposed to those who then were advocating, as a solution to the basic problems that the continent would encounter (including the problem of development), the establishment of an African Common Market. He said: "African unity is above all a political kingdom which we can only achieve by political means. The economic development of Africa will proceed from that political development; the inverse is not true."\* We know that, since then, under various guises ("common economic front," "great African economic entities"), the same thesis of "economic unity before political unity" periodically resurfaces. At times, in the speeches of those which already put them ahead of their time 17 years ago.

#### Another Analysis

Why then should we not be astonished by such stubbornness in following a course which we know will lead to an impasse? By contenting ourselves with recalling that "the existing regional economic communities will have to be strengthened," we are much afraid that the Lagos summit only maintained this deadendcourse. During that same meeting, some progressive chiefs of state put forth another analysis. Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, for example, noteworthy said that any "action plan" adopted should be passed through "the national control, by each country, of its own resources and the commitment to a struggle for real economic independence." He condemned European-Arab-African cooperation by means of which there was an intent "to use the resources of the underdeveloped countries to exploit other countries who are in the same situation." The integration of almost all the countries of Africa in the European Common Market (EEC) is not, quite to the contrary, of a nature to contribute to committing each country to a struggle for its real economic independence." He condemned European-Arab-African cooperation by means of which there was an intent "to use the resources of the underdeveloped countries to exploit other countries who are in the same situation." The integration of almost

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\* p 35: 1. Addis Ababa, May 1963: "Summit Conference of Independent Countries," published in 1964 by Presence Africaine, pp 117-118.

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all the countries of Africa in the European Common Market (EEC) is not, quite to the contrary, of a nature to contribute to committing each country to a struggle for its real economic independence.

For its part, the French-African conference in Nice "took note with satisfaction of the progress made in the development of initiatives for the European-Arab-African 'trilogy' as regards the cultural, economic and political sectors." The summit, "by confirming its active support for the plan, expressed the wish of seeing a continuation in the direction of the Arab world and the African countries of the information activities undertaken to promote the functioning of the trilogy."\*

All of these episodes, all of these facts, demonstrate sufficiently that, among African countries there is no unity of thought, action and behavior which would be necessary for any serious initiative within a framework as the OAU.

The primary merit, in such a context, of the book, "Pan-Africanism and Neocolonialism"\*\*, which was recently rewritten in a supplemented and published version, is to show as regards the various conceptions extant of the method to follow to liberate and unify Africa that these "divisions" and "quarrels" are not of today's date. The first chapter in the book, which is devoted to a historical review, demonstrates, with the help of statements by participants in the process, that these "divisions" and "quarrels" were already in existence in 1961; i.e., well before the establishment of the OAU. And that there was a refusal, in those days, by progressive African parties to take these "divisions" into consideration, to take them for what they were and what they continue to be, namely the clear manifestation of social class oppositions--it is that refusal which had led to the provisional victory which neocolonialism has won over almost the totality of African countries.

The following three chapters (300 pages), also supported by figures and a rigorous economic analysis, show not only the mechanisms of imperialist dominations but also the objective foundations of the network of "cooperation relations" between various African states, relations which increasingly lead to agreements between states to the detriment of activists and organizations which are combatting the neocolonial regimes. "Pan-Africanism and Neocolonialism" is certainly not the first book written on the evolution of Africa, African unity and Pan-Africanism. It certainly will not be the last. However, it has a dual particularity: on the one hand, it encompasses in a unifying process the essential questions which are being posed in Africa and which reveal its unsuspected interconnections.

\* See AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 216

\*\* By Elenga M'buyinga, distributed by Harmathan and Presence Africaine.

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The Africa of the neocolonial chiefs of state does not come out of it with a better image. On the other hand, the book recalls, at a time when some African statesmen, whether they are voluntary or involuntary puppets of the imperialists, are going through the motions of constructing African unity and promoting the development of this continent, that the fundamental thesis of Kwame N'Krumah (according to which "Africa must unite" and unite politically, form a union of African socialist states) continues to be the only serious position capable of giving dignity and real freedom to a continent which has been held up to ridicule for centuries.

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OAU: Problems of Credibility

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1719

[Editorial: "OAU Deeply Divided"]

[Text] Two burning issues had been reserved by the preparatory ministerial conference for examination by the chiefs of state who came in small numbers--there were 14 of them this year compared to 25 last year in Monrovia--to Freetown, 1-4 July, for the 17th "summit" of the Organization of African Unity: Chad and the Western Sahara.

The summit decision with respect to the subject of Chad was not surprise. The Lagos accords continue to be the basis of all settlement and, consequently, the demilitarization of Ndjamena must be imposed at a time when, for the moment, fighting continues between the supporters of Goukouni Oueddei, who are said to be assisted by a Libyan colonel, according to a dispatch from the AFP, and the supporters of Hissein Habre. If the Inter-African peacekeeping force made up of Benin, Guinean and Congolese contingents cannot be established under the aegis of the OAU and sent to Ndjamena within a 1-month time frame, an appeal will be made to the "blue helmets" of the UN which will be called upon to recruit them from Africans. It is doubtful that the OAU will be able in a short time to assemble the \$60 million needed for establishment of an inter-African force, its dispatch to Chad and its maintenance, since it has been unable to do so since the Lagos conference. Although Goukouni Oueddei, who headed the only official Chadian delegation admitted to Freetown, has said that he is opposed to any "form of foreign interference" in what continues to be a purely Chadian problem, we cannot now exclude the possibility that the OAU will find itself forced to ask the UN to take its place.

Will recourse to the UN one day be necessary to find a solution to the problem of the Western Sahara, which is the basic subject of the "summit" debates in Freetown and which very nearly brought about the break up of the OAU? Following the theatrical coup, namely the official request for

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admission of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, 26 states; i.e., exactly a simple majority, came out in favor of the request. Morocco called attention to the fact that under the terms of the OAU's charter only a "sovereign state" can be recognized as a member of the Organization and that he would challenge these two characteristics of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. Still relying on the charter, Morocco next asked that a two-thirds majority define the interpretation to be given to the term "sovereign state." In the heat of debate, an answer was given to Morocco to the effect that it was not appropriate to worry about legal niceties. A certain number of states among those which are customarily described as "moderates" then declared a la Morocco that they would leave the OAU if the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic were admitted to the Organization.

The fever abated and the "summit" took up a compromise motion prepared by Nigeria. The conciliation commission made up of Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, the Sudan and Tanzania, under the chairmanship of Siaka Stevens, current president of the OAU, will continue its efforts "to reconcile the parties to the conflict and find a peaceful and lasting solution to this question." That was very nearly the same proposal which had been made by President Senghor and which had been rejected the day before and in which he advocated direct negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, but also the AOSARIO, Association of Natives of Saguia, El Hambra and Rio de Oro, which is favorable to the Moroccans and the elected officials of the Sahara who were chosen in elections organized by Morocco.

In the face of the extraordinary complexity of the problem, we cannot refrain from noting that the historical and legal arguments advanced by Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania in the past have led to an impasse and have not permitted the reaching of the "peaceful and lasting" solution which the conciliation commission was seeking and if it were found to have it endorsed by an extraordinary "summit" of the OAU in Freetown "in a 3-month time frame." There is compelling evidence that such a solution can be nothing but political. That, moreover, is the conclusion adopted by the conciliation commission at the end of two meetings held under the chairmanship of General Nimeiry, president of the Sudan and then-sitting president of the OAU, and of its third meeting held in December 1979. The commission advocated a cease-fire and the organization of a referendum in the Western Sahara. It is very unlikely that the conciliation commission will reverse its decision in such a short time, all the more so because Sierre Leone has officially recognized the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic which permits Morocco to challenge the impartiality of its president, Siaka Stevens.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to dispute the fact that the Sahara conflict has now taken on an international dimension and an ideological character which has come to superimpose itself upon the political and economic interests of the only African states in the region. The fundamental question, in fact, is knowing whether it is or is not a question in the Western Sahara of a decolonization problem and whether, in consequence thereof, the peoples concerned should have the opportunity of

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freely choosing their own future. Forty-three countries, including 26 African countries, by officially recognizing the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic have answered in the affirmative. They are all members of the movement of nonaligned countries and are members of the group of countries considered as "progressive." But other countries, which have not recognized the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic have come out in favor of a vote of the peoples concerned by means of a referendum. That is the position of France in particular. And that is also the position of the UN, whose two 1975 resolutions, one of Algerian origin and the other supported by Morocco, both state that "the inalienable right of the Saharan peoples to self-determination."

The war which has been going on in the Sahara for 5 years is bringing suffering to all the peoples concerned. It is arresting the economic and social development of the countries of the region. The war permits Libya to intervene directly in the Western Sahara as it did in Chad. The war is poisoning relations between the African states most directly concerned by the conflict and the European powers which formerly were colonizers or protectors. Arms deliveries are made to each side directly or indirectly by each of the two superpowers which are concerned one about maintaining its political influence in the region and the other about weakening the opposing bloc. The war, as the Freetown "summit" debates have just shown, is profoundly dividing Africa which is split in two between supporters and opponents of admission to the OAU of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. Like the war in Chad, the Saharan war has become a threat to the political balance and stability of the whole of Africa.

The OAU has been unable to reestablish in Chad the conditions of a peaceful settlement, and it appears to be headed toward recourse to the UN. Barring a last-minute miracle which would be an agreement between the interested parties under the aegis of the OAU's conciliation commission, there is only a choice between continuation of the war or an appeal to the UN which up to now has sent the problem back to the OAU but whose jurisdiction cannot be ruled out since Morocco itself had requested arbitration by the Security Council.

In both cases, it is the credibility of the OAU and its capacity to resolve Inter-African conflicts which will have been profoundly affected.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

WESTERN SAHARA, CHAD, LIBERIA TROUBLE OAU

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 80 p 41

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "The Three Ghosts Who Haunt OAU"]

[Text] The Western Sahara affair, civil war in Chad, Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe's "trial"; so many points of dissension forming the back-drop of the OAU's ministerial conference, which opens on 18 June in Freetown (Sierra Leone). Many subjects which, once again, cast the shadow of dissension on the organization.

First the Sahara, the most pressing question. The ministers view it with a faint smile, while waiting for the struggle of the chiefs, the summit, which opens on 1 July. This time the subject is not the POLISARIO and Moroccan partisans' oratorical contests to which we have become accustomed, some holding forth on the Saharan right to self-determination, the others on the historical and inalienable rights of the Moroccan Kingdom. The first do not intend to propose the recognition of the POLISARIO as a liberation movement, as they did in the past, but the adherence of the SADR [Saharan Arab Democratic Republic] to the OAU. Their winning trump: the charter of the organization which stipulates that the adherence of a new member is decided by a simple majority (26 of the 50 states); the number of states (23) which have already recognized the SADR, which could be joined by other members at the last moment.

In opposition, Morocco and its friends intend to do everything in their power to oppose what they consider a "coup de force." Their argument: first, OAU's decision to entrust the Saharan question to an extraordinary summit, while the Freetown meeting is only an ordinary session; in addition, and especially, a judicial argument which concedes that a state exists only if it contains a population (which the Saharans do not have), an institution (which the SADR is not), and also a territory (which Morocco states positively it controls). Even worse, the adversaries of the POLISARIO, according to the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, M'Hamed Boucetta, are ready to take "all the necessary measures" if the Saharan republic is recognized by the OAU. Perhaps, withdrawal is feared...And it would be the end of OAU if about 20 countries would have to follow Morocco in the "secession."

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Two are only too real, the third could be used as a diversion.

Second crucial point: Chad is only a state in name. Seeking to reconcile two enemy brothers bent on slaughtering each other is not the point any longer. What is needed is to know whether OAU is capable of making them stop the carnage, even by force. Actually, the contrary prevails: due to the lack of means, the neutral African force which was to serve as a buffer was never established; the Congolese units sent to Ndjamena were never joined by the Guineans and the Beninese troops and packed up and went off in March when the first shots were fired. Some countries, most of them, had proposed to appeal to the UN's blue helmets. Nigeria opposed it, or at least recommended to wait, before deciding, for the Freetown summit (J.A. No 1014). Hoping no doubt that within the following 2 weeks the member states would find the funds needed for the establishment of an African force. But one knows in advance that these means do not exist. Doubly so since the only states in a position to pay are those that are most suspected of coveting all or part of Chad. Such as Libya, willing at the same time to pay and willing...to send troops. Which is what the other states have refused categorically.

Failing to reach an agreement on these two crucial subjects, the Sahara and Chad, a diversion is sought: Liberia. But there again, if in the name of African dignity condemnation of the spectacular execution of the former leaders was unanimous, it will not be in giving the silent treatment to Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe's government. The proven friends of the late William Tolbert are preparing to deliver a violent indictment to have the man who brought about his fall banned from the organization. They will be wrong: it would be like condemning a posteriori the majority of the leaders of the member states who themselves took the power by a coup d'etat, more often than not, by killing. However, sometimes with more discretion than Samuel Doe (J.A. No 1014).

Finally, for the first time in its history the OAU is divided by what was its essential element; the formation of a state. Can the POLISARIO form a state? Is Chad still a state? Is Liberia not a member state any longer? To answer these questions would be to make too many countries and too many state leaders uneasy. Everyone can have its POLISARIO. Everyone risks to become a new Chad. Everyone is menaced by a Samuel Doe.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OAU'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH NEUTRAL AFRICAN FORCE FOR CHAD RAPPED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 18

[Article by S.A.]

[Text] "I tell you that my country will not contribute to the financing of a neutral African force for Chad." During a closed-door meeting of the Council of Ministers, the head of the Rwandan diplomatic corps said aloud what his colleagues are saying under their breaths. The bill in fact is steep: no less than \$62 million (12 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs). And, up to now, barely \$375,000 have gathered. What is the reason for such parsimony? "We are 6 months into our budgetary year, and we are being asked to lay out supplementary funds. We do not have them." we are told very diplomatically by the Voltan Minister of Foreign Affairs.

A Question of Price

However, our interlocutor did not say that in 1981 his country would give priority to anything other than Chad. A Malagasy diplomat made us understand: "We are against an appeal to a United Nations force for Chad. But we cannot pay for an African force." The African force has even less chance of being established because of the three countries which were to furnish troops, only the Congo has sent a contingent of 500 men.

However, the OAU is adamant: no question of appealing to the UN as this would be a hard blow to African pride. What is more, that is the official position of Goukouni Oueddei's government whose representatives in Freetown told us: "We do not wish to internationalize the conflict."

And the Blue Helmets?

The FAN (Northern Armed Forces) of Hisssein Habre have come out in favor of the Blue Helmets. Their representative in Freetown, Mahamat Saleh, has gone so far as to tell us: "We are in a position of strength; therefore, we are for peace." On the contrary, still according to Mahamat Saleh, the FAP (Popular Armed Forces) of Goukouni, the FAT (Chadian Armed Forces) of Col Abdelkader Wadal Kamougue and the FAC (Common Action Forces) of Acyl Ahmat

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are "opposed to an appeal to the UN because they still have hopes of massacring us; however, the war could last 10 years; and there will be no victor."

While awaiting a hypothetical settlement of the conflict, the OAU does not wish to face up to reality. The resolution adopted in Freetown by the conference of ministers is a manifesto of irresponsibility. Goukouni Oueddei's emissaries are delighted that the OAU is not making an appeal to the United Nations. Hissein Habre's emissaries are pleased because "the condemnation of interference by African countries in Chadian affairs is a condemnation of Libya." This generalized satisfaction means that all the conditions are present for intensification of the war, while the OAU proclaims that we must "once again" (an expression preferred over "one last time"!) attempt to find an African solution.

In 2 months, a determination will be made with respect to whether the hiatus for reflection should be extended 2 additional months. However, a Central African diplomat told us: "The civil war resumed over 2 months ago and has caused 2,500 deaths. In 2 more months, there will be 5,000, in 4 months 7,500, in 6 months 10,000. In 12 months 20,000. And this will be the OAU's 18th summit!" Are you cynical, Mr Minister? Most certainly. However, not more than the OAU which has succumbed to cowardice in the name of I know not what "African pride."

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INTER-~~AFRICAN~~ AFFAIRS

FRANCOPHONE MEMBERS SEEN LOSERS WITH ELECTION OF NEW ADB OFFICIAL

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 pp 26-27

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] The 16th annual meeting of the council of governors of the ADB (African Development Bank) which was anxiously awaited for a year, after having been postponed last May following the tragic events in Monrovia, did not depart from the ambience of the big Pan-African conferences. This meeting, which was held in the Ivory Coast from 23 to 27 June within the sumptuous framework of the conference room of the Ivory Hotel in Abidjan, was, as expected, marked by the electricity and fever of holidays.

In The Absence Of A Salary...

Of course, the menu of this conclave which assembled the finest flower of the African world of finance was not lacking in substance: there were no fewer than 21 courses. It was not the admission of Angola and Mozambique which was to pose a problem. Such admissions brought the number of ADB members to 50. On the other hand, the case of Dr Kwame Fordwor was to be much thornier.

Forced to leave his post as president of the ADB in June 1979, as the result of a serious conflict which placed him in opposition to the majority of the council of administration, the Ghanian did not consider himself defeated.

He planned to remain in his post, at least until the end of his term (August 1981). And, failing that, to obtain payment of his entire salary until that date. After two hours of debate, it was decided that the former president had been "definitively dismissed." Tempers were somewhat overheated, and a delegate was heard to shout in the midst of the brouhaha: "Let Fordwor go plead his case wherever he pleases. We will see what court will judge the representatives of the 50 independent states of Africa!" The Ghanian had indeed threatened to institute legal action against the ADB. However, it is not very likely that the case will actually come to trial. He is making ready, nonetheless, according to

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his friends, to publish a book giving his side of the story. The manuscript is said to be already in the hands of a London publisher...

Another subject: the celebrated question of the granting of ADB capital to "nonregional members"; i.e., non-African states. A difficult question which caused already known divisions to appear. As in 1979, Algeria and Libya indicated their opposition to this plan. The former stated that it would yield to the will of the majority, while the latter threatened the Bank with retaliation and said that it would not concur. Does this mean that Libya effectively will boycott the ADB if a majority were to approve the granting of capital?

#### After The Hors D'Oeuvres

In the corridors of the conference, bets on this subject were rampant. In any case, the decision to grant capital would require a three-quarters majority. The Bank is far from that figure since it has only a 53 percent majority. The position of Nigeria, whose delegate reserved the right to change his mind will be decisive. From now to 31 December 1981, the closing date for ratification, many things can happen...

With account taken of the circumstances, a debate of this kind should not have aroused emotions. Similarly, the Bank's operational policy was quickly dispatched.

We had just eaten the hors d'oeuvres. The main dish, of course, was the election of the president. This subject which had kept the African diplomatic sector busy for months, passed then from the ministries of finance to the ministries of foreign affairs, before being taken in hand by the chiefs of state. "Never has the election of an ADB president been so politicized," one of its administrators confided to us. While it is traditional for the divisions which place Francophone, Anglophone and Arabophone Africa in opposition to show up on the occasion of each of these elections, this time such was not the case. It was immediately apparent that each of the groups was profoundly divided on the eight candidates, even though the eighth candidate, the interim president, Malawian Goodall Edward Gondwee, was not officially taking part in the competition, despite the fact that a certain number of countries had sounded him out.

#### From Eight To Three

The resolution which had made him the interim president in replacement of Dr Fordwor in June 1979 had at the same time barred the way to him by stipulating that he could not be a candidate for the presidency in 1980. This resolution was brought up by the Nigerian delegate to have the Kenyan proposal calling for a one-year extension for Dr Gondwee declared out of order.

What is certain is that Nigeria was opposed at any price to the Gondwee solution. Was it because the Malawian in June 1979 was placed above the

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Nigerian vice president, Mr Segunro, who was chosen by the council of administration to succeed Dr Fordwor? In any event, at the end of the third ballot, Niger attempted to have its big neighbor reverse its position. In vain. "Anyone but Gondwee," the Nigerian delegate replied. Eliminated, Gondwee, it is said, is preparing to join the International Monetary Fund. Therefore, seven official candidates remained.

Not for long, as from the first ballot it was clearly apparent that the choice was to be limited to three candidates: Guinean N'Faly Sangare was leading with 26 proxy votes, followed by Malian Djim Sylla with 23 percent, then Zambian Willa Mung'Omba with 20 percent.

Strange Dialog

Despite slight variations, the order of this trifecta remained unchanged at the start of the second ballot. At that time serious negotiations took place, particularly in the Francophone group. Should not its candidates in the competition who were, moreover, both from West Africa, reach an understanding? In the absence of the ability to be subjected to the criteria of competence (still debatable), should not regional solidarity be imposed upon the Malian and Guinean? Between them, they had nearly 60 percent of the votes; i.e., more than required for one candidate to win the election.

As it turned out, N'Faly Sangare took it upon himself to exhort Djim Sylla to stand aside in his favor. "I would like to," the latter replied; "but even if I do, you have no chance because some of my supporters including the most powerful, Algeria, have already made it known that they will not for anything in the world support the Guinena candidacy." In fact, for Algiers it was not a question of combining its vote with those of Morocco and Egypt, even if these two countries were not in such bad company by siding with Libya to support the brother-in-law of President Sekou Toure. This did not prevent Colonel Qadhafi's delegate from demanding the expulsion of "traitorous Egypt"! A strange dialog in the middle of comic scenes in which supporters and opponents of the two enemy brothers went all out to ensure the withdrawal of the less favored on behalf of the one in a better position vis-a-vis the Zambian.

Too late. Under the pressure of giant Nigeria, Mung'Omba was to come out number one on the slate with 46 percent of the votes at the end of the third ballot. The Malian agreed at once (perhaps wrongly) to immolate himself on the altar of regional solidarity, leaving the Guinean the honor of confronting the Zambian by himself. In fact, the outcome was known in advance. Resolved to do everything possible to keep the Guinean from the presidency, Algeria went right down to the wire. At a time when most of Sylla's supporters elected to abstain in the fourth ballot, the Algerian delegate gave his vote to the Zambian candidate who was elected by a vote of 50 percent compared to the 36 percent of the Guinena, with 13 percent abstentions!



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Who Made You King?

Willa D. Mung'Omba was, by his own admission, the most surprised. With his tall figure, his intellectual eyeglasses and his refined appearance, this 41-year-old Zambian is not lacking in class. A graduate of the universities of Makerer (Uganda) and London, an attorney by training, a sometime diplomat, he was an administrator of the International Monetary Fund before taking the post of director of the Zambian affiliate of the Standard Bank (British).

The victory of this former member of parliament and a great lover of music and the fine arts is above all a victory for Nigeria. However, at the same time the victory is a resounding defeat for the Francophone countries which were unable to overcome their lack of discipline and their disagreements. Not to mention the CEAO (West African Economic Community) and the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) which were unable to reach an agreement on a single candidate.

France itself, whose diplomatic corps did not hesitate to commit itself completely on behalf of the Guinean candidate, has nothing of which to be proud. With all of this accumulated bitterness, Mung'Omba will have a difficult job putting the pieces back together and restoring peace within the Bank, a condition sine qua non for his success.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

TANZANIAN CONDITIONS FOR KENYAN TRADE--The Tanzanian Commerce Minister, Ibrahim Kaduma, said on 5 July in the Tanzanian Parliament that Dar-es-Salaam set four conditions for resuming trade with Kenya that has been suspended since February 1977, the date the border was closed between the two countries after the explosion in the East African Economic Community. The four conditions, to which Kenya has subscribed in part, according to Mr Kaduma, are: that commercial exchanges between Tanzania and Kenya be carried out according to the same rules as trade with other states; that Tanzania does not suffer a significant trade deficit in its exchanges with the neighboring country; that commercial exchanges between Kenya and the landlocked states, going through Tanzania, be subject to that country's legislation; that a trade agreement be signed that states the Tanzanian positions. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1754] 8946

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ANGOLA

JOURNALIST REPORTS ON ANGOLAN ECONOMIC SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Jun 80 pp 1643, 1644

[Excerpts] The INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE of 20 May drew a rather alarming picture of the economic situation in Angola, while ascribing it to the aftermath of the decolonization.

Once prosperous Luanda, "Africa's Rio de Janeiro," has become a ghost town in which everything is deteriorating: buildings are in disrepair, auto bodies are rusting in the streets, elevators no longer run and goods are rotting in the port, writes David Lam, author of the article.

Things are not any better in the four Angolan provinces visited by the journalist during a 3,000-kilometer trip. "Angola is a fragile and wounded country, in a state of total disrepair. Almost nothing escapes this deterioration, stagnation, incompetence and inefficiency. Most people obey and appear bored."

Lamb further wrote that Angola was victim of both its past and its present. It has at its disposal a tremendous economic potential which it is placing in jeopardy.

Angolans can purchase their food from governmental shops only if they can present a work permit. Coffee production dropped substantially. Coffee is earmarked for Cuba and the fish for Russia. Luckily, the mining wealth, particularly petroleum, remains.

Oil production from Gulf Oil, in the Cabinda enclave, gives Angola a daily income of 5 million. However, according to western economic sources, 60 cents out of each dollar earned are earmarked for military expenses and for the reimbursement of the debt incurred by Angola from the Soviet Union.

"There are over 40,000 soldiers and civilians from communist countries and not one of them came for free. For example, each Cuban teacher costs the Luanda government \$600.00 per month." Angola has not published a budget since 1977. The same is true of the annual development plan.

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Despite these many negative aspects, the Angolan economic situation has certain assets which can be credited to its leaders. Unlike many African governments, Luanda has not wasted the country's resources nor did it embark on prestigious projects. Corruption is practically unknown. Public authorities encouraged the creation of an egalitarian society in which no one --whether black or white, rich or poor--receives special privileges. The ministers earn modest wages, \$800.00 per month, to which are added a few advantages due to their position.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

DECLINING ANGOLAN COFFEE EXPORTS--We must expect a 20 percent decrease in Angolan coffee exports in 1980. They would thus drop from 60,000 tons last year to 48,000 tons this year. This figure represents less than a quarter of the 219,000 tons exported in 1973, the last year before independence. This year, Angola will generate 160 million dollars in coffee revenues. Some 25,000 tons were exported during the first 5 months of this year. According to Jaime de Oliveira, director of the National Coffee Company (Encafé), the expected drop in the 1980 exports is the consequence of reduced production due to the draught and to "the deficient structure of the exportation system inherited from the Portuguese." Approximately one-third of the Angolan coffee is purchased by the United States, the Netherlands and Portugal. The remainder is earmarked for Algeria, East Germany and the Soviet Union. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1644] 6857

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

PRESIDENT HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1633

[Text] At a press conference in Bangui on 20 June President Dacko painted an encouraging picture of the economic situation in the Central African Republic.

According to the chief of state, domestic and foreign opening up has been the major preoccupation of the Central African authorities, who have put priority effort into repairing the national axes.

Agricultural activities since early 1980 have tended toward clearly increased production. The figures of the program for cutting back coffee have exceeded predictions and this year production should reach approximately 14,000 tons, compared with 12,000 tons in 1979.

Concerning cotton production, estimates for this year approach 37,000 tons, as compared with 30,000 tons in 1979. A huge technical assistance program promised by the Central African government should relaunch cotton production by rapidly increasing the cultivated areas.

The Central African forest, which has not been extensively exploited, covers 5,000,000 hectares. The government is encouraging reforestation of the exploited areas.

All cattle-raising production is experiencing a high rate of growth. Several projects are being devoted to relaunching beef raising, an especially dynamic sector of the Central African economy. Apiculture, aviculture and pig raising are going to be encouraged at the family level, to improve the daily diet.

In addition, the Central African Republic is undoubtedly going to realize a record year in the field of diamond production. In fact, for the first quarter of 1980 the estimated results are as high as 174,468.50 carats (against 156,049.51 carats for the whole of 1979). This remarkable production has brought in over 5,000,000,000 CFA francs, of which the state received about 969,000,000.

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In the field of tourism the Central African government has taken measures to protect wildlife, which until recently was handed over to unparalleled carnage.

Lastly, commercial activity is regaining its dynamism. Merchants, national or foreign, are finding again the atmosphere of confidence that had been lacking, Mr Dacko stated. Imports, even though they are not often primary food-stuffs, are coming in at a regular pace.

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CHAD

BRIEFS

FAN OFFICIAL RESIGNS--Ousman Djidda, an Arab world relations official in the command council of the Northern Armed Forces (FAN), announced on 3 July in Lagos that he was leaving the movement directed by Hissene Habre. In a communique to the press Mr Djidda accuses the leader of the FAN "of unspeakable intrigues in his determined opposition to the enforcement of the Lagos accords." He also mentions "the deteriorating situation in the movement," affirms in addition that "Hissene Habre, who personifies the FAN movement, has always been and still is the only official of the polluting situation who continues to act ruthlessly." The former FAN official appeals in his communique "to the countries that believed in Hissere Habre's sincerity and nationalism to revise their initial position." Ousman Djidda finally stated that he "was not counting on joining any group," but that he "was putting himself at the service of his country within the framework of the institutions that emerged from the Lagos accords." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1749] 8946

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COMORO ISLANDS

NATIONAL FRONT LEADER'S OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun 80 p 11

[Editorial: "Comoro Islands: Out With the "Dogs of War"]

[Text] The National United Front of the Comoro Islands published an open letter to the president of the Islamic Republic of the Comoro Islands: Ahmed Abdallah Abdereman. Below are major portions of the letter.

On 13 May 1978, a group of white mercenaries, headed by Bob Denard, invaded the Comoro Islands and overthrew the legitimate government of Ali Soilih, whom it then assassinated so that you could come to power. After more than 2 years under absolute rule, it is our duty and determination to show you your responsibilities and to let you know about the people's awareness of your illegal government and of your personal actions.

The Comorian people, faced with a government that was imposed on it against its wishes, has only one conviction, and only one: to free itself quickly and to get back its national sovereignty thanks to the dynamic elements in the nation.

Why did this fierce opposition to you and to the power you represent come about? It is quite simple. The Comorian nation was attacked by a group of mercenaries led by the "awful" Bob Denard, and who put you in power solely by the force of arms. The Comorians sent an urgent appeal to all international bodies, and asked that proceedings be started against you and the clique that took power. For the Comorian people it is impossible to exercise power after such accusations have been made, even for the head of the mercenaries. The Comorian people cannot be deceived: these accusations are levelled first and foremost at imperialistic France. Don't you see that your system creates unemployment and thus emigration of manpower? The Comorians are subject to your voracious, egotistical power that relies on repression and arbitrary arrests. Censorship is still implacable, and famine is rampant on all the islands. For want of drugs and personnel, the

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death rate beats all world records. The coffers of the state are empty, the services paralyzed, while the petrodollars and all kinds of aid flow to your office. Where does it all go? They say that "Only Mountains Never Meet". Rest assured that the people will ask for an accounting.

In view of such paralysis, we insist on reaffirming our point of view. The Comorians are not bloodthirsty. We would not wish that French troops be sacrificed on a soil that is not theirs. Neither do we wish, Mr President, that your personal guard should die. We would be happy to see the Comorians win their freedom through peaceful means. We only say: out of the Comorian Islands with Bob Denard's "dogs of war". French influence must be stopped as soon as possible. The honor and dignity of the Comorians are at stake. And peace in the Indian Ocean and in all of Africa is threatened. The children of the Comoro Islands are quite determined to have the last word, should you insist on remaining a deaf-mute.

One thing is certain: Ali Soilih left us, but other Ali Soilihs were born. In order to make sure that you reign as absolute ruler, you let the worthy sons of the Comoro Islands die in your prisons, but others are still free to act, and you will not escape their anger. The Comorians can no longer tolerate an illegal government that exists because of the mercenary-masters and its threats of death.

The day of reckoning is near, our faithless Mr President. And finally we say to you that in a Comorian society, where peace and justice must reign, there will be no room for a renegade, a traitor of the nation. Today we peacefully ask that you retire from the Comorian political scene, before the angry Comorians point a finger at its enemies, of which you are one....

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CONGO

1980 BUDGET AMENDED; DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATING EXPENDITURES REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1751

[Text] As announced in our issue of 27 June 1980, p 1635, the People's National Assembly of the Congo, during its ordinary May session in Brazzaville, examined the amended first finance bill for the year 1980.

Successive rises in the price of oil, as well as new production estimates, have in fact brought with them a considerable increase in the petroleum resources as compared with the original budget.

They are going up from 35,000,000,000 CFA francs to 58,700,000,000 (+ 6,000,000,000 for taxes and +17,700,000,000 for taxes on oil companies, for a total of 23,700,000,000 additional).

To this should be added under operating budget a draft on the fiduciary funds of the IMF of 400,000,000 and under the investment budget a withdrawal on the American loan of 8,200,000,000 CFA francs and financial proceeds of 8,000,000,000, for a total of 32,700,000,000 in new resources.

The operating budget goes up from 69,800,000,000 to 93,900,000,000 and the investment budget from 16,420,000,000 to 33,110,000,000.

Overall, the 1980 budget thus goes from 86,000,000,000 to 127,000,000,000, or a net of 119,100,000,000 when the contribution of the operating budget to the investment budget is subtracted.

Operating expenditures are now distributed as follows (in billions of CFA francs):

Public debt.....	10.78 + 7.43 = 18.21
Personnel.....	35.70 + 1 = 36.70
Equipment.....	6.75 + 0.79 = 7.54
Ordinary expenses.....	2.79 + 3.15 = 5.94
Transportation.....	13.78 +11.32 = 25.10

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The principal new expenditures in the investment budget concern:

ATC (Transcongolese Communications Agency), 5,000,000,000 CFA francs  
(1,000,000,000 for CFCO [Congo-Ocean Railroad] realignment)

Etsouali-Obouya road, 6,000,000,000

Brazzaville centenary, 1,423,000,000 (900,000,000 for lighting)

Bouenza-PN [expansion unknown] electricity line, 1,200,000,000

Presidential palace (section 80), 800,000,000

We recall that the Assembly also examined the recent financial data on the CFCO realignment.

A meeting of the backers of the realignment project was held in Paris on 16 and 17 April under the chairmanship of Hilaire Mounthault, the Congolese minister of Transportation and Civil Aviation.

At that meeting, in accordance with the conclusions of the conference of 14 and 15 June 1979, the Congolese government and the ATC presented to the delegations from the states and the financing organizations:

The new estimate of the cost of the realignment project, now set at 75,000,000,000 CFA francs, a figure that was agreed upon by the delegates present

A provisional financing plan, proposing that the additional costs be distributed between the various financing organizations with participation by the Congolese government amounting to 8,800,000,000 CFA francs.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

FRANCE DONATES SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL--On 2 July France made a gift of scientific equipment amounting to 32,500,000,000 CFA francs to the Congo; this equipment was intended for the Congolese Geographic Institute. It consisted of technical and administrative equipment and equipment for working in the field (three photographic reproduction apparatuses, editing equipment, preproduction and map-drawing equipment). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1751] 8946

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

COUNTRY COMPLETELY DISORGANIZED--Gabonese President Omar Bongo will be the guest of honor at the celebration of the first anniversary of the overthrow of Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea. The ceremonies are to be held at the beginning of August; however, nothing is ready. In fact, the country is still in a state of total disorganization. [Text] [Paris: JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 41] 8143

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GABON

ECONOMY BACK ON RIGHT COURSE FOLLOWING 1976-1977 CRISIS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1018, 9 Jul 80 pp 52, 54, 55

[Article: "Gabon: the Time of Wisdom--an Endurance Race"]

[Excerpts] The exploitation of oil had made people believe that anything was possible. A better perception of the realities has engendered greater prudence.

The big celebration planned for 17 August 1979 at Part-Gentil to celebrate the 19th anniversary of Gabon's independence has been postponed...to 1982. Officially because it was impossible to get the necessary infrastructure ready in time. In fact, as an austerity measure. But the inhabitants of Gabon's economic capital have not held any resentment against the president of the republic, since this sacrifice corresponds to a savings of 1 to 2 billion CFA francs for the state.

Euphoria

Gabon is carrying on its recovery effort with remarkable discipline. Several months ago, Mr Nana Sinkam, one of the administrators of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] for French-speaking Africa, told us upon his return from a mission to Libreville: "It is rare for a country to adhere so scrupulously to the austerity program that it has set for itself." Today, Gabon seems to be coming out of the tunnel. The recently published foreign-trade indicators attest to this. The trade balance shows a surplus again: 40 billion CFA in 1979 as against a deficit of 2.4 billion in 1977. The balance-of-payments deficit was reduced considerably in 1978, dropping from about 30 billion in 1977 to 8 billion. In June 1979, equilibrium was re-established--at the cost of Draconian limitation of imports for a high-income country that buys a lot of equipment abroad and brings in from the outside the main part of its food consumption and manufactured products. The wager of getting Gabon through the difficult period that began in 1976, without calling on the international organisms and while honoring the state's financial commitments, therefore appears to have been won.

Since the alarm bell was sounded, the Gabonese authorities have taken rigorous measures, but without thereby running the risk of breaking the rate of

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growth. Overly strict measures affecting in particular the equipment budget of the state--the principal investor and employer--would have resulted in a recession as abrupt as the preceding expansion.

While the state's credit seems to be restored, Mr Bongo nonetheless intends to keep the recovery plan in force for as long as necessary--perhaps until 1982. He has assured himself of the assistance of a "recovery committee," commonly referred to as the "hatchet committee"--it hacks mercilessly--which in the next 2 years is to maintain better management of the public debt, identify the priority investment projects, develop a new 5-year plan and initiate a reorganization of the state companies and the various administrations (Treasury, Customs, etc).

Despite these encouraging results, it is estimated that it will not be possible to start out again on solid foundations until 1982-1983.

#### Real Development

In any case, the shock of 1976-1977 will probably prove to have been salutary. For President Bongo, it will have made possible a real stocktaking and a change of attitude among the Gabonese cadres and officials. The search for efficiency has become the driving force of activity. President Bongo wants to make his "second decade" that of a renaissance of "democratic and concerted progress." His objectives: improving the standard of living, better distribution of the national wealth to all levels of society, priority for "real development" as distinguished from spectacular growth. Attention will be given to four main priorities:

--the Trans-Gabon railway (nearly 185 billion CFA already invested), the economic and social fallout from which will be decisive for the country's future;

--the cellulose plant of SOGACEL [Gabonese Cellulose Company] at Kango, in which 100 to 120 billion CFA will be invested for a capacity of 270,000 tons of paper pulp per year. Negotiations are in progress with the foreign partners, who are hesitating, not about the profitability of the plant itself, but about that of the project as a whole, which comprises a number of ancillary infrastructures; nevertheless, in the view of the Gabonese officials, the creation of SOGACEL is irreversible;

--agriculture, with the Ntoun banana-plantation project, the rice-growing project at Ndende in the south, stock-raising in the Haut-Ogooue and the palm-plantation project at Lambarene;

--social equipment; the emphasis will be placed on housing. Thus, the government made the decision to commit a package of 1 billion CFA last year for socioeconomic housing. The chief of state has specified that starting from 1980, the state budget will include 3 billion CFA for this sector each year, in addition to the credits in the development budget for urban development and preparation of rehousing zones and new neighborhoods.

For the Gabonese leaders, the new philosophy is that development must no longer be a speed race but an endurance race.

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

PLANS FOR ALUMINUM PLANT--Documents related to the construction of an aluminum plant in Ayekoye were signed in Conakry on 1 June between the Guinean government and its partners: Algeria, Nigeria, Romania, 2 U.S. firms, one Swiss firm and a Yugoslav one. According to previous information, the plant will help the development of the Ayekoye bauxite reserves, estimated at 500 million tons, through the production of 1,200,000 tons of alumina and 150,000 tons of aluminum. Electricity will be furnished by a dam on the Konkoure River with an output of 300 MW. The studies for the dam have been undertaken by the Electricite de France Company. A company had been set up in 1976 for the exploitation of the Ayekoye bauxite reserves grouping Guinea, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1318]

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

BRAZILIAN-GUINEA BISSAU COMMERCIAL VENTURE--Guinea Bissau and Brazil decided to create a joint commercial company to develop bilateral trade. President of Guinea Bissau Luis Cabral, in official visit in Brazil, discussed the creation of this company with representatives of the Brazilian Exporters Association. Seventy percent of its capital will be provided by Guinea Bissau and 30 percent by Brazilian funds. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS In French 27 Jun 80 p 1625] 6857

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KENYA

MAIZE SHORTAGE HAVING EFFECT ON POLITICAL SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1752

[Text] The current maize shortage in Kenya gave rise early in July to lively polemics in Nairobi.

The daily STANDARD in fact asserted on 2 July that the situation was tied in with ill-considered exports. According to the newspaper the then minister of Agriculture, M. J. Nyagah, in 1978 and 1979 authorized maize exports in 17 lots, for a total of 179,770 tons. The most important operations took place between February and July 1979. These sales, which cost Kenyan taxpayers 12,650,000 shillings in export subsidies, resulted--taking into account the domestic needs and the meager 1979 harvest--in wiping out the national reserves of maize, which consisted of 5,800,000 sacks at the end of 1978, after the record 1977-1978 harvest.

The STANDARD went on to say that Kenyan maize exports were sent to West Africa, the Middle East, Japan, Venezuela and Zaire. Some shipments bore no mention of their destination!

On the other hand, the newspaper recalls, the same minister abolished the GMR (guaranteed minimum returns) system that encouraged farmers to grow maize; consequently, the STANDARD says, Kenyan production of that cereal diminished by 40 percent, while the minister went on believing that Kenya had an abundant supply of maize and put the seasonal credit scheme into operation, but too late.

Nairobi's daily, in an article by M. G. Githii, the president of its publishing company, also challenges Mr Nyagah and Kenya's Finance Minister, M.M. Kibaki. He recalls that last 17 June one might read in his columns that the maize shortage was not entirely explained by monopoly. In conclusion he states that the situation has not improved and that long lines are still to be seen in front of the shops that sell maize, the basic food of the Kenyan population.

On the other hand, on the same day Charles Njonjo, minister of the Interior and Constitutional Affairs and one of Kenya's most visible politicians, was taken to task in the Parliament for saying that important people had been

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compromised in the maize monopoly scandal and that considerable smuggling of cornmeal to Uganda was going on. He stated in particular, "Let me say that when morality rules in this Chamber there will be no more maize shortage in this country."

Those words had all the more of an echo because the day before the vice minister of Transportation and Communications, Nahashon Njuno, had stated in Parliament that "corruption had become cancerous" in Kenya and that "if the country was going down the drain, it was the fault of some money-lovers."

The vice minister of Economic Development, John Keen, stated in his turn the next day that the country had lost 1,000,000,000 Kenyan shillings (1 Kenyan shilling = 0.56 French francs) as a result of misappropriation of funds and deficits in the accounts of the para-government corporations--for example, the Kenya Meat Commission, whose 15,000,000-Kenyan shilling deficit was explained in that way. He added that it was after maize exports that had brought some persons 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 shillings that the government today had to import that cereal at great cost to feed the population, and he suggested that the monopolizers be arrested and brought to justice, that they are comparable to economic saboteurs. The vice minister of Culture and Social Services, S. K. Meto, said they "should be hanged" because "people were dying in Turkana as a result of the food shortage."

Confronting the commotion caused by this group of revelations, Finance Minister Kibaki on 3 July warned the members of Parliament against placing "exaggerated confidence" in the press. Mr Nyagah, who is now minister of Culture, stated for his part that he would not resign, and demanded from the journalists more "concrete facts" than they had produced so far. In return, the Kenya Union of Journalists (KUJ) solicited Mr Njonjo's protection against the dangers that could be brought about by freedom of the press, which is guaranteed by the constitution.

Also on 3 July the minister of state for the Presidency, Nicholas Biwott, acknowledged in a parliamentary debate that the maize shortage had become a "national problem," caused by people who "were only patriots toward themselves", and asked the journalists be "patriots" and do "constructive work in favor of the people," adding, for the benefit of the newspapers, "If they crush the nation, they themselves will also be crushed."

As we see, the maize shortage is having political consequences to the extent that it stresses the corruption in the ruling classes, and to which Charles Njonjo, the former minister of Justice who was criticized by some for his hostile positions on Africanization for a pittance and his devotion to values defended by Western countries, seemed to support the moralization campaign undertaken in the press and aimed at men like Vice President and Minister of Finance, Mr Kibaki.

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LIBERIA

BRIEFS

IRON ORE EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN--Pakistan will import from Liberia 1,700,000 tons of iron ore for the Karachi steel mills which are currently under construction, according to the terms of a contract signed on 2 July between the two countries. Deliveries of iron ore from the Mount Nimba (Western Liberia) deposits will begin in November. Of course Liberia will be just one of many suppliers to the Karachi steel mills which, built with Soviet aid, will go into service in 1981. They will also receive iron ore from Brazil, India, Canada and Australia. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1744] 8946

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MALI

BRIEFS

MALIAN-LIBYAN COOPERATION PROTOCOL--On 16 June, Ali Abdessalam el Triki, secretary for foreign affairs of the Libyan Jamahiriya, and Alioune Blondin Beye, Malian minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, signed a protocol of cooperation in economy and information. The protocol also includes plans for agreements on culture, trade and manpower. The next meeting of the joint Libyan-Malian commission will take place in Bamako. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1625] 6857

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NIGER

THREE FINANCING AGREEMENTS SIGNED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1743

[Text] Robert Galley, the French Cooperation Minister, while visiting Niger from 2 to 5 July, signed on 5 July, with Nigerian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Hamid Algabit, three financing agreements for the sum of 1,200,000,000 CFA francs (20,400,000 French francs).

The first agreement (20,000,000 CFA francs) concerns the Acacia albida project for fighting desertification in the Dosso department. The second, for 100,000,000 CFA francs, is for financing the College of Agronomy and the third (900,000,000 CFA francs) for financing the second television section.

In a statement to the press Mr Galley said that his talks with President Kountche dealt chiefly with the dam project at Kandadji on the Niger, the development of telecommunications and television in Niger and French assistance in the domaine of higher education.

As for the Kandadji dam, the French minister emphasized that neither France nor the European Community is in a position to finance this project, which requires international cooperation. Mr Galley added that a conference is to be held soon, probably next January, to discuss the financing structures.

In addition, a mixed Franco-Nigerian company (Nigerian PTT [Postal Telephone and Telegraph] and France Cable and Radio) will be created to manage the international connections. Mr Galley emphasized that the development of television in Niger was due to a considerable financial effort on France's part, and he added that in two years Niger will be endowed with a very modern telecommunications and television system (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS for 4 July, p 1685, on this subject).

Lastly, Mr Galley stated that President Kountche desired increased French assistance in the field of higher education, especially in medical training.

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NIGER

BRIEFS

MAJOR ARRESTED IN NIAMEY--Niger Maj Boulama Manga, former minister and member of the Supreme Military Council, was arrested on 17 June in Niamey. Not for plotting but for outright insubordination. Returning from a long training course in France, he had refused to take up his new post as prefect at Tahoua. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 41] 8143

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REUNION

EFFORTS TO SEEK AUTONOMY REPORTED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 7 Jul 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Dorothee Durban: "Sovereignty on the Agenda"]

[Text] Pretoria, June 1980--The fiery reality of South Africa does not completely mask other subjects of interest that may capture the observer's attention. Certain circles in the South African capital see the country as an advance sentry of the "free world"--which will come as no surprise--, but they also see it as the eventual recourse against the undertakings of all national movements doing the same thing far from the shores of the Cape of Good Hope.

So they are talking here, without much mystery, of a South African lobby to be installed on the island of Reunion. Such a lobby would maintain close ties with Pretoria and would prepare bases for a commando network like that of the OAS in the Algerian war. This network, supported by South Africa, is ready to face a potential success on the part of the island's autonomist forces.

The lobby's center would be at St. Denis for the present; circles thoroughly familiar with municipal political life would not be strangers there.

The basic reasoning of the ultras is as follows: all conditions have been met for the island to go on to independence. The economic situation is steadily deteriorating; unemployment is increasing and urging toward revolt; the accession to independence in recent years of neighboring territories, such as the islands of Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Madagascar serve as encouragement to follow the same path.

The ultras think moreover that nothing will happen before the 1981 French presidential election, the government and Giscard d'Estaing having too much need of the Reunion votes. Dropping the island would in any case have a deplorable effect on the electorate of the right. But the ultras believe that once the elections are over things might develop in a different direction. In fact Paris seems very determined at present to prevent too-radical changes by all means, including the military. But the French capital might, in the grip of necessity, change its attitude; careful, in fact, to give itself a

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more progressive image vis-a-vis the third world countries, the oil producing countries and the socialist countries, French diplomacy might agree to "relinquishments of sovereignty"--to use the hallowed expression--, which would put a definite end to the island's status. It is believed in the Pretoria circles alluded to above, that this scenario might be presented within three years after the French presidential election. The alarm bell has already rung in St. Denis and according to the same sources of information collected in South African banking circles, flights of capital (principally to France) have already been observed; while the bonds grow stronger between the Reunion lobby and those in Pretoria who would be completely disposed to favor colonialist reaction on the island. Moreover they say the CIA, which has a great interest in the NATO submarine (Omega) guidance station installed in Reunion, would be following these projects very closely and with an eye as benevolent as it is comprehensive.

To ask that question is to wonder whether Reunion is headed for total independence and detachment from the French body. Put this way, the problem seems to us to be a false problem. But a brief examination of the positions will make it possible to give an account of the place occupied by the idea of autonomy.

The Socialist Party, which garnered 10 percent of the votes in the presidential election, was at one time autonomist (it had signed the Morne-Rouge agreement with the communists). It has returned to "more classic" options. Like the parties of the right it has again become "departmentalist," that is to say it does not challenge Reunion's status as a French department. It believes, however, that some adjustments are required that are no different from those it advocates for the other regions of metropolitan France.

The big autonomist force--and it has been so for a long time--is the Reunionese Communist Party (PCR). Its influence over the island's poorest strata is considerable. The powerful CGTR (General Confederation of Labor of Reunion) and the Youth Movement (FJAR) [Autonomist Youth Front of Reunion], influenced by the PCR, have attitudes on the subject of autonomy that are very close to those of the communists.

What difference does the PCR see between autonomy and independence? It must be said first of all is not a priori against the idea of independence, but that this makes sense only within the framework of an historic reality that, at least for the moment, does not exist in Reunion. In a recent statement (TEMOIGNAGE, 3 June 1980) refers first of all to the preamble to the Morne-Rouge Convention, which was signed in August 1971 between the PCR and the Communist Parties of Guyana, Guadeloupe and Martinique, as well as other progressive forces. The preamble says: "The peoples of the four territories of Reunion, Guadeloupe, Guyana and Martinique are, by virtue of their geographic framework, their historic development, their ethnic components, their cultures, their economic interests, national entities whose reality is variously felt in the consciousness of the peoples. Consequently, no one can dispose of them through any legal artifice. These peoples themselves will determine their destiny, democratically and in total sovereignty. Consequently too, no one

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can put forward the claim, at the time of decolonization, that the field of the power to decide to recognize these peoples is limited. But at a precise moment in their history, in the atmosphere of imperialism in which they are living in the economic context that the colonial power imposed on them, these peoples may decide to demand /only a part of those powers/" [in italics] (underlined by the author). The PCR concludes its statement in these words: "Yes, we could have demanded independence or anything else; yes, it is the most absolute right of our people; but at the historic stage we are in, autonomy such as we are demanding in the Morne-Rouge Convention corresponds to our people's profound aspiration, because it alone is likely to bring solutions to the colonial situation our country is experiencing."

## An Expanding Movement

It must be added to that that certain political organizations having no great electoral weight but having a real impact on public opinion are also "autonomist" in the sense expressed by the PCR. This is the case with the Leftist Radical Movement (MRG) directed by Joseph Varondin. It is also the case with religious groups like those that gather around TEMOIGNAGE CHRETIEN DE LA REUNION. The leader of this group, for example, Father Rene Payet, attacks members of Parliament who go to confer in Paris instead of understanding "that the battle is to be conducted elsewhere and for other things, on the terrain, with our people, for its autonomy" (TEMOIGNAGE CHRETIEN DE LA REUNION, 15 June 1980).

This autonomy watchword seems all the more realistic in that it finds, in attenuated form (and by way of backfire against the impact of the communist positions) an echo even in circles that are traditionally extremely far removed from anticolonialism. A number of local leaders of commerce and industry, impressed by the sincerity and strength of the CGTR and the PCR, go so far as to demand for the Reunionese economic and political initiative powers (especially where relations with the neighbors are concerned) which, although nothing is said about it, are by nature strictly "autonomist." This movement comes together more clearly in the activity of a group that denies it is a political party and moreover does not run a candidate for elections, the Committee for Progress, whose secretary general is Paul Hoarau. This committee, which conducts discussion groups on the island, benefits from the support of the bishop of Reunion, whom no one goes so far as to label "red."

Monsignor Aubry, a disciple of the "Creolie," proposes "a Reunionese model located not necessarily outside of a French national framework, as some are claiming, but a model that should enable us to produce the most things right here for food self-sufficiency" (interview in LE QUOTIDIEN DE LA REUNION, 5 June 1980). Monsignor Aubry in March of this year led an inter-island meeting of bishops, participants in which were the highest-level representatives of the Catholic Church of Reunion, Mauritius, the Seychelles, the Comores and Rodriguez Island. This "mini-council of the Indian Ocean" adopted a long and more politically interesting text, analyzing the difficult economic situation that is overwhelming people, emphasizing that "some wish for developments that others dread" and noting that "the legitimate desire of various population

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groups and communities /to affirm their cultural identity/ [in italics] (underlined in the text), to maintain and develop their traditional values, is not always understood."

Responding to an accusatory commentary in JOURNAL DE L'ILE DE LA REUNION, a journal of the right, Monsignor Aubry stated, "The hierarchy must not neglect the political problem, but we do not have to apply pressure; it is not for us to turn against a status as a French department, nor /to preclude any choice other than French departmentalism/" [in italics] (underlined by the author).

In various publications the Committee for Progress put forward ideas very close to those of the bishop. In fact, it "lays down as a principle that Reunion's political development must be controlled first of all and mainly by the Reunionese themselves, whatever the outcome of that development" (November 1978). It "aims at making the Reunionese collectively aware, which is likely to bring about their unity as a people." In a general way, it recommends regional ententes (Mauritius, the Comores, the Seychelles) on the economic and political levels. Some think they find in this an underlying desire to go to a more or less independent entity of various Indian Ocean territories.

Be that as it may, the question of autonomy is obviously a problem with profound implications. The autonomist demand, originally presented by the communists alone, has acquired a growing audience through the years. In one form or another it has become the more or less clear desire of a majority.

None of this is without contradictions or afterthoughts. In a territory in which a revolutionary party, the PCR, enjoys so much influence, it may be tempting to cut the ground out from under its feet and find generally conservative solutions to the inevitable questions. They are problems of the relationship of internal forces, which are obviously not independent of the surrounding world. Some have understood this thoroughly--those who are seeking already in South African fascism the impossible recourse against the movement of history.

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RWANDA

RADICAL CHANGE NEEDED TO AVERT DEBACLE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 9 Jun 80 pp 32-33

[Article by Antonia Blis]

[Text] Is the Rwandan system gangrenous to the point of being threatened by collapse at the slightest shock? That is the question being asked in Kigali by those who aspire to a healthy change and those who are desperately holding on to their privileges. In any event, everything is happening as if panic had taken hold of the bureaucratic and buying [compradore] middle class; and events which have occurred during the last few weeks-- when certain personalities in the public eye, including Major Lisinde, director general of public relations in the president's cabinet, and Donat Murego, legal adviser in the ministry of justice, were arrested--bear witness to the existence of a process of decomposition which the present government may not be able to stop.<sup>1</sup>

For some time, President Habyarimana had not ceased denouncing and condemning corruption, diversion of public funds, banditry, fraud, etc. Following his lead, other voices had been raised to echo the same thoughts. Last April, the governor of the National Bank made public a letter denouncing the misdeeds committed by certain personalities. However, well before that, one voice with weight had made itself heard, namely that of the Catholic bishopric which, in a pastoral letter signed by the archbishop of Kigali, the archbishop-bishop of Kabgayi and the bishops of Butare, Kibungo Ruhengeri and Nyundo for the first time in 20 years had drawn up a serious indictment against the enrichment of those in power, the corrupt and the corrupters, the speculators and profiteers, and denounced certain social problems such as unemployment which strikes youth, or the inhuman conditions prevailing in overpopulated prisons into which "criminals" are thrown.

This position-taking on the part of a Catholic church about which we could say that it has been governing the country for three-quarters of a century-- the archbishop of Kigali is a member of the politburo of the government party, the National Revolutionary Development Movement (MRND) just as in the colonial period the bishops were ex officio members of the Belgian council of government--is revelatory of an explosive situation.

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"...One cannot fail to be profoundly disturbed when he observes the abuses engaged in by certain holders of power..." the pastoral letter of the Rwandan bishopric emphasizes. It also offers a reminder that power is not given for the purpose of "self-service and the quickest possible personal enrichment...."

"We must point out, for example, the detestable custom of the bribe which, unfortunately, tends to be generalized. A bribe is becoming necessary to obtain an official paper, to put one's child in school, to get a job and many other things.... However, there are still other abuses. How can one keep from wondering when he sees someone, in the space of very short time, become the owner of several houses and several trucks?"

"How can one remain indifferent when he sees the privations suffered by the little people to pay their taxes often turning to the personal profit of those who divert public funds and whose diverting of funds has been formally denounced by the chief of state?"

"A young man who, being without arable land and having looked for work in vain in the city, is arrested for having stolen 100 francs to buy something to eat. But are we going to permit freedom of movement to a man who diverts up to thousands of francs because he boasts of having connections?"

"There are courts," it will be said. "Go to the courts." In principle, that is so! The court is the recourse of anyone who has been the victim of injustice. But what happens to this recourse when some of those whose job it is to provide redress for the violated rights says 'yes' or 'no' on the basis of the sum of money they are given?

"...If the situation is to be redressed before it is too late, it is not enough to denounce the abuses: they must be eradicated...."

In an earlier paragraph dealing with the "agonizing problem of youth," this pastoral letter, which is a veritable cry of alarm, stated: "There has been much criticism of today's youth; they are reproached for not wanting to live on the hill<sup>2</sup> and going to the city to live as bandits. Of course, it is the duty of all Rwandans, including the young people, to apply themselves to obeying the directives of the authorities with a view to improving agriculture and livestock raising. What is more, the arable lands required for such improvements must be available. Has not the second five-year development plan revealed this scarcity of land as one of the principal concerns of the moment? The sight of hundreds and hundreds of youths standing in front of a newly-opened workshop in the hope of finding work there when the number hired can only amount to a handful, cannot leave us indifferent.... What is to be done to prevent all these young people, gnawed by hunger, from resorting to banditry? How are these young people going to be able to think about establishing a home?"

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"We are not unaware of the very good intentions of the authorities and dare to implore them to make the employment of youth their priority of priorities. The authorities have spoken of many jobs in which the hands of the young people, 'this primary wealth of the country,' would take the place of machines wherever possible. Let the technicians of the respective departments coordinate their decisions to begin such projects as may be conducive to giving hope to our youth...."

Finally, the pastoral letter brings up the problem of the conditions of detention, among others. While stating that "it is all too obvious that society must protect itself against bandits and murderers who, alas, are becoming more and more numerous and are so gravely tarnishing the friendly image of our country," the bishopric comments: "For all that, a prisoner continues to be a man. He retains the right to a modicum of human dignity. Prisons should be places of social reeducation and rehabilitation. Although it is necessary to punish people, there can be no question of leading them to the point of despair...."

After having cited as positive elements the amnesty decreed by the chief of state on the occasion of his investiture to the supreme magistracy on 8 January 1979 and the actions taken by the authorities "to humanize the living conditions of prisoners," the bishops' document nonetheless goes on to say: "However, can we endure in silence the anomaly that accused persons are being kept in prison for months and months without a trial?"

#### The Only Solution

This problem of banditry and juvenile delinquency is also the subject of a very instructive polemic which appears in the Catholic magazine, DIALOG, published in Kigali. It must be said that this phenomenon which is nothing more than the most spectacular manifestation of more serious problems gnawing away at Rwandan society is becoming an increasing cause for concern despite the brutal and at times bloody measures taken in an effort to eradicate it. (Thus in 1974, 20 young men charged with banditry and murder were executed; at the same time the army had organized systematic roundups of young people without proper papers who were sent to "reeducation centers." However, two years later the situation became even more aggravated and new "cleanups," as useless as the first ones, were undertaken.)

In its number 77, the magazine, DIALOG, published an article by one of its readers, Emmanuel Bahigiki, who, in response to two previous articles which had appeared on this subject under the questioning headline: "Is Kigali A Thieves Paradise?" puts the problem in its true perspective. Rwanda is a paradise for thieves, he says in substance; however, the real thieves are not the juvenile delinquents denounced with such fanfare. The real thieves are the "very great number of diverters of public funds in Rwanda"; they are "the merchants who in a few years have accumulated millions of francs"; etc. Denouncing the problem at its source, Emmanuel Bahigiki demonstrates

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that if we want to clean up the situation, it is the entire system which has to be thrown out.

"Since the beginning of colonization," he writes, "Rwanda has been engaged in the capitalist system, a system based on the exploitation of the great masses of the people by a handful of privileged persons. This system is based on feudalism, and its spirit is obscurantist. The current authorities have the sad objective (although at times they deny it) of wanting to consolidate the national middle class (the country's bigwigs); i.e., to permit the middle class to accumulate as much wealth as possible in the hope that it will be very dynamic and will 'develop' Rwanda. Since this middle class does not have sufficient capital and know-how, an appeal is made to foreign capitalists who do nothing more than reinforce the dependence of the national economy.... However, encouragement is also given to members of our middle class by all kinds of credits, tax exemptions, tolerance of corruption, etc.

"Wealth, therefore, accumulates in the hands of a small majority, while the great majority of the population becomes increasingly impoverished.... Thus you will see food-producing fields abandoned, in a country where food shortages are omnipresent, while everyone is urged to grow coffee, tea and pyrethrum.<sup>3</sup> You will also observe that fine and very expensive houses are springing up everywhere to meet the tastes of foreigners and wealth nationals, while the mass of workers has no hope of getting housing one day.... These members of the middle class allow themselves every great luxury of the consumer society (automobiles, alcoholic beverages, expensive clothing, gadgets of all kinds), while the fundamental needs are far from being satisfied. In 1973, for example (and nothing has changed since then), Rwanda imported alcoholic beverages and tobacco worth 168.9 francs and 70.1 million francs worth of goods under the heading of 'health and hygiene'....

"At the end of the chain, you will find the class of those who have been left out of the divvying up process; the other group is the one for which it is said that Rwanda is a paradise."

In conclusion, Emmanuel Bahigiki says: it is, therefore, now time: "to call into question the capitalist pathway which has been followed by Rwanda up to now and of which banditry is nothing more than a byproduct."

As one can well imagine, the Rwandan Catholic church does not at all share this opinion. And in a rebuttal to the Emmanuel Bahigiki article, Father Massion, the author of an earlier article which was challenged by the latter, waves the red flag of communism, taking as his witness Solzhenitsyn or the "notebooks of Samizdat."

This entire debate which is taking place in Rwanda is nonetheless particularly eloquent; and rumors about an attempted coup d'etat fomented on ethnic based by reactionary elements which have been circulating in recent months

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clearly demonstrate that a radical reordering is required if the country is to be saved from a debacle.

FOOTNOTES

1. Following these arrests some of which involve speculation and diversion of funds and other subversive actions, a judicial investigation was initiated.
2. In Rwanda, like Burundi a mountainous country, the hill is the basic district.
3. A plant with rich insecticidal properties.

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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AIRPORT LOAN GRANTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Jun 80 p 1634

[Excerpts] A loan amounting to one million units of account (UC)--or approximately 280.74 million CFA francs--was granted to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe by the African Development Bank (ADB) to finance implementation studies for the expansion of the international airport of Sao Tome, the capital of the island by that name. Reimbursement of the loan which carries with it a 5-year grace period, will be spread over the next 25 years.

The runway of the present airport is only 1,933 meters long. It can only handle short-range planes like the Boeing 737 or Lockheed F 28 types. The location lends itself to further development.

As part of its aid to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, the Portuguese government recently completed a full study pertaining to the first phase of the runway lengthening by 210 meters. Work to that effect will begin sometime this year. The planned financing will therefore make it possible to extend the total length of the runway to 2,443 meters.

Total cost of the project is estimated at 1.225 million UC, one million to cover costs in foreign currency and the remainder--or 225,000 UC--to cover costs in local currency. This loan will therefore help finance the totality of the costs in foreign currency or 81.6 percent of the total cost of the project. The government of Sao Tome and Principe will assume the remainder of the costs.

Studies are scheduled to begin in January 1981 and be completed by December of that same year.

This is the second intervention of the banking group to Sao Tome and Principe. A first loan from ADF (African Development Fund) amounting to 8 million units of account was granted in 1978. It was allocated to the cocoa plantations reclamation project.

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SENEGAL

SFI PARTICIPATION IN BANK REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1739

[Text] The International Financial Company (SFI) has invested \$475,000 in the authorized capital of the Housing Bank of Senegal (BHS), a Senegalese institution specializing in financing housing for the modest-income classes, as revealed on 1 July in a communique from the company. In investing in this largely privately-owned bank the SFI joins some 75 other shareholders from the private or public sector, among them nearly all of the country's financial institutions. The SFI investment represents about 8.6 percent of the authorized capital of the BHS, the entire amount being \$5,500,000. The BHS was founded recently with technical assistance from the SFI and the World Bank, with which the SFI is affiliated. The SFI investment is intended for the extension of a plan for improving structures and services in Senegal; this project is also receiving aid from the World Bank. Housing being inadequate in Senegal, the BHS is expected to increase new housing and make housing more accessible to more of the population, and at the same time develop volume and improve conditions for domestic savings. By mobilizing institutional savings through the issuing of long-term bonds and by issuing bonds to the public, the BHS will contribute toward developing the financial market. The BHS' resources, formed by its authorized capital augmented by a start-up subsidy from the Senegalese government, will be supplemented by funds from savings deposits, by the placing of bonds, by loans, by the rediscount facilities of the central bank, as well as by the income from certain taxes on housing. The BHS' operations will increase the activity of the housing sector, which will stimulate the local construction industry, encourage the development of small and medium-sized firms connected with that sector, and it will contribute toward creating new jobs.

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SENEGAL

## BRIEFS

DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS CLOSED--The list of the 22 Senegalese diplomatic missions whose closing "for reasons of budgetary austerity" was announced last 4 July was published on 5 July: in Africa, the embassies of Senegal in Mali, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, Niger, Ghana, Zaire and the Comores; in Europe, embassies in Romania, Bulgaria, Portugal and Austria, as well as Senegal's legations to UNESCO in Paris, the FAO in Rome and UNO organizations in Geneva, and Senegal's Information Bureau in Paris; in Asia, embassies in Lebanon, Syria and India; in America, the Senegalese consulate in Rio de Janeiro and the legation to the OACI [expansion unknown] in Montreal. The Lebanon embassy has been closed since 30 June. Senegalese interests there are being handled by two honorary consuls, one at Beirut, the other at Jounieh, 20 km north of the capital. The Damascus embassy has also been closed since early in July. The embassy in Austria has been closed since 2 July. However, Mademba Sy, Senegal's first ambassador to Austria, will continue to represent his country at the UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) and the AIEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Finally, the closing of these 22 diplomatic missions, which represent half of Senegal's mission abroad, is to provide a saving of 2,000,000,000 CFA francs, the Foreign Affairs minister said. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1739] 8946

BIAO-SENEGAL ESTABLISHED--Established in Senegal since 1853, the BIAO (International Bank for West Africa), a French bank with capital of 161,280,000 French francs whose company headquarters, as is well known, are in Paris, has put all of its seven agencies and offices in Senegal into a company under Senegalese law with capital of 2,000,000,000 CFA francs, which has taken the company name BIAO-Senegal and which was officially founded on 28 June 1980. Xavier Althuser, formerly regional manager in Senegal, was appointed managing director of the new bank. This transformation of the BIAO in Senegal is part of the process of affiliating all of the BIAO's African and European network. We recall that the principal shareholders are the BNP [National Bank of Paris] and the CCF [French Railway Company] through the agency of the France-Africa Financial Company, as well as the Union of Swiss Banks, the Bank of Brazil and the Inter-African Bank Company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1739] 8946

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SAUDI ECONOMIC AID--Saudi Arabia is going to grant to Senegal "very important financial commitments, the total amount to be determined later," the Dakar daily LE SOLEIL has indicated. The Saudian authorities made these commitments during the visit of the Senegalese chief of state to Riyadh at the end of June. Senegal, which because of the drought, inflation and increased oil prices is going through a financial crisis, had decided to appeal to "friendly countries" for the necessary 30,000,000,000 CFA francs to redress the credit situation in the economy. At the same time the Senegalese government will utilize to its advantage the specific and contractual mechanisms (loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). Finally, we recall that STABEX [expansion unknown] intervened previously in Senegal's favor by advancing 5,200,000,000 CFA francs for 1980 losses of export income (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 July, p 1681). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1739] 8946

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SIERRA LEONE

BRIEFS

NEW DIRECTOR OF 'DAILY MAIL'--Jonathon Modupeh Johnson, who was for 22 years a printer in the Sierra Leone national printing plant, has just been appointed managing director of the local daily, the DAILY MAIL, replacing Samba Kamara, who is returning to the ministry of Information and Broadcasting as information director. It should be noted that the DAILY MAIL's has gone up from five to ten cents, in line with the country's other newspapers. [Text]  
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1744] 8946

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SOMALIA

BRIEFS

FINANCING OF BARDERA DAM--Construction of the large dam being considered for Bardera, in Somalia, would cost the enormous amount of 500 million dollars, covering only the absolute necessary minimum work, namely, the dam itself, the access road to Baidoa, the power station and an electric power transmission line to the town of Chisimaio. At the time we went to press, results of a money lenders' meeting scheduled for 25 June were expected. This meeting was organized to search for an additional 200 million dollars still needed after the present leading participants made known their eventual financial contributions: 100 million dollars from the Saudi Funds; 30 million from Italy; 25 million from France (CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation]); 45 million from Germany; and 70 million from the fifth EDF, to which should be added a contribution of approximately 30 million from the Somali government for the access road. Cost of the project could even be higher if, as it was considered for a while, an electric power transmission line to Mogadiscio was added to the facilities currently planned. This would cost an additional 120 million dollars. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1639] 6857

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

IDA LOANS--Tanzania will use an IDA (International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank) credit of \$10,000,000 to realize a project to aid the Tanzania Rural Development Bank in developing its accessibility for the country's small farmers. On the other hand another IDA credit of \$30,000,000 granted to Tanzania will aid in financing a petroleum exploration project to be developed in the Songo-Songo Island region. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1754] 8946

GOLD MINES REEXPLOITED--The Tanzanian secretary of state for Water, Energy and Minerals, Maokala Tojolo, stated on 4 July in Parliament that Tanzania had a plan to reexploit the gold mines in the country, as a result of the rise in the price of that metal on the world market. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1754] 8946

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ZAIRE

NATION FACES CRUCIAL FOREIGN DEBT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1217

[Editorial: "Foreign Debt, Zaire's Crucial Problem"]

[Text] In April, Zaire made an initial repayment to commercial banks of \$58 million out of a total of \$434 million of its readjusted debt. Yet this gesture, if one is to believe a special correspondent of the FINANCIAL TIMES IN Kinshasa, was received with a certain amount of skepticism by western economists, Zaire's foreign debt having been, for the past 5 years, such a major concern of the banks and governments that do business with it.

According to a report prepared for the Bank of Zaire by/Lazard Brothers, Kuhn Loeb Brothers, and S.G. Warburg/[in italics], the Zairian foreign debt reached 3.65 billion dollars by 30 June 1979; since then it has risen to about 4 billion dollars. In 1980, the debt represents 26 percent of the value of exports, without taking into account the outstanding debt estimated at about \$1.1 billion. The total amount of the public and private debt, which represented 32 percent of the gross domestic product in 1972, today would reach 100 percent (we can note that in 1978 the World Bank estimated Zaire's gross national product at \$5.5 billion).

In 1975, Zaire began to negotiate the readjustment of the debt because of its deteriorating economy following a drop in copper stocks and the after-effects of Zairianization. The two "Shaba wars", in 1977 and 1978, added another disruptive element by leading to a slowdown in copper production. However, negotiations concerning the debt were started in June 1976, with members of the "Paris Club" representing the creditors of the Zairian Government. The negotiations continued in 1977, with no results. At the same time, negotiations were also taking place with private banks, but they also failed.

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It was only in 1979 that an agreement was drafted for the bank debt, anticipating a significant reduction for repayment in 1980, relatively low repayments of yearly installments from 1981 to 1984, and the payment of the rest between 1985 and 1990. This agreement was officially signed on last 23 April (see MTM of 2 May 1980 p 1048). The \$58 million repaid at the end of April by the Bank of Zaire represents back interest and 10 percent of the principal owed.

As for the national debt, negotiations with the "Paris Club" resulted in an agreement, in December 1979, for the repayment of an important part of the debt: \$1.3 billion, including the arrears, and with due dates falling between 1 July 1979 and 31 December 1980. The payment is between 10 and 30 percent of the amount due, the rest of the debt to be repaid in 10 years, with a 4-year grace period.

But we must remember that this agreement includes a condition that requires the achievement of economic stability for the 18-month period extending from July 1979 to December 1980, a program on which is also dependent the aid from the International Monetary Fund.

Will Zaire be able to face up to its obligations towards the banks and the Paris Club? That is the question asked by the FINANCIAL TIMES, emphasizing that the service rate for the debt would be twice as high in 1980 as in the previous years. The agreements represent between \$440 and \$470 million, or 23 percent of the exports, but without the readjusted agreement they would have amounted to 540 million. Many observers in Kinshasa find that few things have changed to prove that the government would reach its objectives. The future will tell, but in any case it is certain that Zaire will be unable to overcome its difficulties without a new, strictly orthodox financial policy, and a strict economic policy.

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