

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010011-5

4

1 OF 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9228

31 July 1980

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 683

FBI FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

For further information on report content
call (703) 351-3165.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9228

31 July 1980

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 683

CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Africans Polled on World Tensions
(Michel Cruzet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Jul 80) 1

Commentary on African Francophone Summit
(Philippe Baleine; PARIS MATCH, 23 May 80) 10

Western Sahara Issue Splits OAU
(Sennen Andriamirado, Abdelaziz Dahmani;
JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Jul 80) 16

Ki-Zerbo Role in CAMES Examined
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 4 Jun 80) 21

Strategy of National Languages Discussed
(Jean Copans; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 May 80) 23

Agriculture in Africa Examined
(J. A. Plus; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Jun 80) 27

Briefs
Alleged MNR Support 41
Senghor Warns of Libya-Mauritania Tie 41

ANGOLA

Alleged French Reluctance To Act Against UNITA, FNLA Elements
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80) 42

Briefs
Reported FRG Support to Units 44
Details on Agricultural Cooperatives 44
1980 Coffee Production Estimates 44

- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BENIN

Nation's Problems in 1980 Discussed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 May 80) 45

1977 Balance of Payments Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 May 80) 49

Details on New Company Given
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 May 80) 51

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Briefs
OCF Replaces UNFCA 52

ETHIOPIA

Briefs
Offensive Planned 53

GHANA

Rawlings' Political Position Remains Strong
(Mohamed Maiga; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 4 Jun 80) 54

GUINEA

Lack of Repression Following Assassination Attempt
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 4 Jun 80) 56

Briefs
Tourists Under Detention 58
Agricultural Agreement With Romania 58

IVORY COAST

Recent Political Changes Examined
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 25 Jun 80) 59

KENYA

West's Failure To Give Needed Aid to Zimbabwe Scored
(Editorial, Hilary Ng'weno; THE WEEKLY REVIEW,
11 Jul 80) 64

Politicians Question Role of Nation's Press
(THE WEEKLY REVIEW, 11 Jul 80) 65

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Oginga Odinga's 'Political Future Full of Possibilities' (THE WEEKLY REVIEW, 11 Jul 80)	67
KANU Life Membership Received Odinga's Views on Luo Politics, Oginga Odinga Interview	
MADAGASCAR	
Paris Weekly Carries Wide-Ranging Interview With Official (Didier Ratsiraka Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun-6 Jul 80)	72
Economic Objectives Discussed (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80)	78
Propaganda Methods Discussed (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80)	84
New Lobster Firm Described (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80)	87
Minister Discusses Future Agricultural Development (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80)	88
MALI	
Briefs Swiss Anti-Desertification Agreement	92
MAURITANIA	
POLISARIO Agreement Signatory Ould Sidi Interview (Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 25 Jun 80)	93
MOZAMBIQUE	
Briefs Reported Calumny in Portuguese Press	97
NIGER	
Possibility of Setting Up Political Organization (Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Jun 80)	98
President Studies Zinder's Problems (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 Jun 80) ..	104

- c -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Briefs		
	FRG Military Material	105
	IDA Credit for Agriculture	105
	French Financing Agreements	105
SENEGAL		
	Data on 1980-1981 Budget Reported (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 Jun 80)	106
Briefs		
	Fuel Price Increased	108
UGANDA		
	Concentration of Authority Reported (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 May 80)	109
	'Democratic' Coup Assessed by Amedee Darga (Amedee Darga; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 May-8 Jun 80)	112
ZIMBABWE		
	Mugabe Spells Out Priorities With UK Journalist (Robert Mugabe Interview; THE TIMES, 1 Jul 80)	116

- d -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFRICANS POLLED ON WORLD TENSIONS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 pp 44-48

[Article by Michel Crouzet: "Africans, What Do You Think About the Tensions in the World?"]

[Text] As we go to press, more than 1500 of you have given us your opinion on the tensions besetting the world today. The answers our surveys keep bringing back to us strengthen the hunch that moved us to undertake them in the first place: in the all-too-frequent absence of freely chosen channels, the peoples of Africa need a forum for voicing their views. Where, for instance, could one reader out of five say openly that no head of state now in power is what he had hoped for?

Is it correct to speak of African peoples as a homogeneous whole? The conflicts which set the continent's states against one another and to which the latest OAS meeting provided further testimony, would seem to indicate that it is not. And yet, in a general way, the points of view you give us on world tensions do converge, whether you come from north or south of the Sahara, and whatever your nationality may be. There are, however, some clear shades of difference to be seen in Cameroon or Morocco, in Tunisia or in Ivory Coast.

All Africans agree on several major questions: they overwhelmingly disapprove, by more than 75 percent, of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the taking of hostages at the American embassy in Tehran (mainly on grounds of principle), and of the execution of the former rulers in Liberia. A considerable majority, more than 60 percent, is against boycotting the Olympic Games and hence in favor of their own countries' athletes taking part. This does not prevent their approving -- quite logically, for that matter, since they deplore the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan -- an OAU position hostile to Moscow (an almost two-thirds majority). On these critical issues

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the solid choices the Africans express give a picture of soundness and consistency. The slight majority (52 percent) supporting economic sanctions against the USSR does not dim that consistency, but actually lends it a touch of prudence: they approve condemnation of the Kremlin for its role in Kabul; they also feel that the Soviets pose the greatest and most hurtful threat of intervention in Africa... This does not prevent their having few illusions over the sanctions taken in Washington, nor their finding (by 55 percent) the Carter operation against Tehran indefensible. As for the role Africa might play in the American-Iranian crisis, they are far from unanimous (51 percent vs. 47).

Asked about the tragedy now being played out in Chad, our readers blame the Chadians themselves (54 percent), Libya (26 percent), and France (only 19 percent of respondents). An overwhelming majority (88 percent) rules out any partition solution; this does not mean, though, that they are mistaking wishes for reality: Chad is, after the Sahara, the place where the risks are highest for multiplication or aggravation of conflict. The polarization of concern over this country certainly explains why 9 percent of our readers attribute a major role in Africa to Gen Eyadema, which nobody did in our 23 January survey. If nationality does not dictate responses, where are these splits coming from? Basically, they are dictated by age and by political preferences -- as they are everywhere. Age? While 71 percent of readers under 25 denounce the taking of hostages at the American embassy in Tehran, that percentage jumps to 88 percent among those over 40; our youngest readers (25 percent of them) see the hand of France at work in Chad, but only 8 percent of their elders do. In Liberia, 28 percent of the young approve the executions of former rulers, while only 10 percent of their parents do. Political preferences? Approval of the Olympics boycott runs to 60 percent among those with rightist leanings, but drops to 20 percent among the leftists. The Tabas intervention gains 71-percent approval on the right, but not on the left (only 32 percent).

Everybody thinks things are going worst in his own country, but 57 percent of readers who are rightists think so, while 66 percent of their brethren on the left do. On the whole, life has not got much better in the interval between our first two surveys this year: taking all ages and political preferences together, our readers see social inequities growing worse (57 percent); while back in January 44 percent said they were optimistic over prospects of change at home and 40 percent saw chances of improvement in countries of their region, those percentages have shrunken today to 41 and 22 percent, respectively.

Does this mean that pessimism has carried the day? That is not quite so certain. From one survey to the next, the general

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

opinion has not changed insofar as conflicts in Africa are concerned, and remains skeptical as to the likelihood of a world war (64 percent think it is remotely or not at all probable, as opposed to 36 percent who feel it is fairly or very likely). Above all, and despite the deterioration of the situation in Chad, only 23 percent of our respondents see these tragic events as the major phenomenon from Africa's viewpoint: 57 percent of them give top rating to the far more hopeful and promising imminence of Zombabwe's independence.

The sample on which these figures were based consisted 21 percent of Ivorians, 14 percent Moroccans, 13 percent Cameroonese, 12 percent Tunisians, 5 percent Senegalese, 3 percent Malians, Mauritanians, and Voltans, and 25 percent Africans of other nationalities.

Political preferences range from 18 percent on the right to 27 percent on the left, with 55 percent of readers citing no ideological commitment. Those under 25 accounted for 27 percent of respondents, those from 26 to 30 for 32 percent, those from 31 to 40 for 29 percent, and those over 40 for 12 percent.

Other profile features (educational level, profession) having no significant impact on responses are not given here.

Special Poll Results

The USSR intervention in Afghanistan and its consequences.

1. Do you approve or disapprove of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan?

Yes	No	No opinion
10 percent	89 percent	1 percent

2. In the wake of Soviet intervention, several countries decided to boycott the Moscow Olympics. Do you approve or disapprove of their decision?

Yes	No
38 percent	62 percent

3. Do you think, personally, that your country should:

Take part in the Moscow games?	Join the boycott?	No opinion
60 percent	39 percent	1 percent

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4. Besides boycotting the Moscow Olympics, the United States has taken economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Are you for or against such economic sanctions?

For them	Against them	No Opinion
52%	47%	1%

5. In your view, what should the OAU do about the Afghanistan conflict?

Side with USSR	Side against USSR	Take no sides	No Opinion
2%	63%	34%	1%

Even on the left, only 17 percent of respondents approved, as compared with 5 percent on the right. The Olympic Games boycott turned opinion around: 26 percent on one side, 60 percent on the other. While 71 percent of our left-leaning readers think that their country should take part in these sports contests (as do 37 percent of our rightist respondents), 57 percent of them agree that the OAU should denounce the USSR. A slightly larger percentage of Camerooneses approved the Soviet intervention (16 percent, as compared with the 10-percent average) and disapproved the Olympics boycott (73 percent as against a 62-percent average). While Moroccans lean toward approval of economic sanctions (66 percent); a slight majority (55 percent) of Camerooneses oppose them. Camerooneses (51 percent of them) want the OAS to take neither side in the conflict, whereas the Ivorians, Tunisians, and Moroccans call for a commitment against the USSR (between 65 and 80 percent of them). Generally speaking, those who approve of Moscow's intervention (10 percent) tend to favor OAU neutrality (73 percent); those who oppose it (89 percent) want the OAU to speak out against it (69 percent).

The Iranian Hostage Situation

6. Do you personally approve or disapprove of the taking of hostages at the American embassy in Tehran?

Approve: 23%	Disapprove: 77%
--------------	-----------------

7. If you do disapprove of the taking of hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, is your attitude governed by:

Principle: 77%	The consequences of hostage-taking: 20%	No answer: 3%
----------------	---	---------------

8. Does the United States intervention in Iran on 24 April in an attempt to free the hostages by force of arms seem to you:

Justified: 44%	Wrong: 55%	No Opinion: 1%
----------------	------------	----------------

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9. Do you believe that Africa has a role to play in the crisis between Iran and the United States?

Yes: 51% No: 47% No Opinion: 2%

Despite a more lenient attitude on the left than on the right, the taking of hostages at the American embassy in Tehran is found to be wrong (by 70 and 89 percent, respectively), yet 38 percent of Tunisians are ready to stand up for it.

Bearing in mind the hostility of the left to the American attempt to free the hostages, it is worth noting that of every 100 readers who deplore their detention, almost half (46 percent) do not believe, even so, that Carter had the right to mount a military operation (that percentage rises to 81 for Tunisians). As for possible African action to help resolve the crisis, it is interesting to note that older readers think more of the idea than do the young: 60 percent of readers over 40, and 45 percent of those under 26.... Sometimes, apparently, optimism tends to bloom as we grow older!

Recent Event of Greatest Import to Africa

10. Among the following recent events in Africa, which seems to you to be most important to the continent as a whole?

Stepped-up fighting in Chad.....	23%
The coup d'etat in Monrovia.....	10%
Zimbabwe's independence.....	57%
The OAU economic summit meeting.....	4%
Miscellaneous answers.....	5%

Zimbabwe's independence leads by a large margin, but readers from south of the Sahara give it more weight than those from the north (61 percent to 48). The same holds true for the coup d'etat in Monrovia, which was cited by 18 percent of Ivorian readers, 13 percent of Cameroonese, and only 4 percent of Tunisians. Readers with leftist proclivities are more sensitive to Zimbabwe's independence than are their fellows on the right (67 percent as against 56 percent), but the ranking of choices is similar.

The Crisis in Chad

11. In your view, which among all those responsible for the crisis in Chad is most to blame?

The Chadians themselves:	54%
Libya.....	26%
France.....	19%
No opinion.....	1%

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

12. In your view, what will it take to restore peace in Chad?

- Reconstitution of a strong and unified government.. 60%
- Partition..... 3%
- Constitution of a federal state..... 28%
- Withdrawal of Gukuni Weddeye and Hissein Habre..... 5%
- Miscellaneous replies..... 4%

Sentiment is most heated over the civil war north of the Sahara (30 percent as against 20 percent). In the north, Libya is the clear target for blame, with 60 percent of readers fingering it as behind the whole thing. Readers in Cameroon are more prone to see France's hand in it (28 percent), while Moroccan readers are least so (8 percent).

In general, if you lean toward the left you will blame France (29 percent), and if you lean to the right you will blame Libya (34 percent): but all agree that the first stone should be thrown at the Chadians themselves (62 percent south of the Sahara, 44 percent north of it), and that Chad must remain united.

Executions of former rulers in Liberia

13. Do you approve or disapprove of the executions of leaders of the old regime in Liberia?
Approve: 22% Disapprove: 76% No Opinion: 1%

United in disapproval were 82 percent of rightist readers and 72 percent of leftists; we find that, when all shades of political opinion are lumped together, only 69 percent of Ivorians go along with that view.

Likelihood of a World War

14. Do you think that, given the present international situation, a world war is:

- Very likely..... 9%
- Fairly likely..... 27%
- Not very likely..... 45%
- Highly unlikely..... 19%

If we break down the replies of those who think a world war is very likely or fairly likely on the one hand, and on the other those who think it not very likely or highly unlikely, we find that about two thirds of respondents fall into the latter camp. Here, though, right-wing readers are most pessimistic: 45 percent of them sense that a general conflict is fairly likely, as opposed to 33 percent of respondents on the left.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Social Inequities

15. As of right now, are social inequities in your country tending:

To increase.....	57%
To decline.....	18%
To stay the same.....	24%
No opinion.....	1%

The Ivorians are the most unhappy: 65 percent of them feel that social inequities are on the rise. At the other end of the scale, only the Tunisians feel the same.

On the right wing, though, 54 percent, like the left wing's 60 percent, agree that social inequity is on the rise.

What Country Poses the Greatest Threat of Intervention?

16. Which of the non-African powers poses the greatest and most harmful threat to the entire continent?

East Germany.....	1%
China.....	1%
Cuba.....	13%
The United States.....	12%
France.....	22%
Great Britain... ..	0%
The Soviet Union.....	47%
Miscellaneous.....	4%

While the Soviet Union got most votes, with rightists putting it on top of the list by 66 percent, and leftists citing it by 39 percent, just ahead of France's 36 percent, the right wing put the finger on France only after Cuba (11 percent and 17 percent, respectively).

Cameroon is most sensitive to the French threat (38 percent), while 26 percent of Tunisians are afraid of the Americans and Moroccans fear the Soviet danger (57 percent). The Cameroonese are less frightened by the Soviet Union than are most Africans (37 percent).

The Role and Popularity of Heads of State

17. As of now, which African head of state, in your opinion, is playing the most important role in Africa (aside from your personal sympathies)?

	Current Survey	23 Jan 1980
Julius Nyerere.....	14%	12%
Leopold Sedar Senghor.....	13%	9%

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

	Now	January 1980
Gnassingbe Eyadema	9%	--%
Felix Houphouet-Boigny.....	8%	11%
Anwar Sadat.....	8%	10%
Mu'ammur Qadhafi.....	6%	8%
Shehu Shagari.....	5%	5%
Robert Mugabe.....	3%	--%
Hassan II	3%	8%
Others.....	8%	18%
None.....	23%	19%

And which African head of state is closest to what you would like to see?

Leopold Sedar Senghor.....	12%	11%
Julius Nyerere.....	12%	10%
Felix Houphouet-Boigny.....	11%	11%
Hassan II.....	6%	8%
Robert Mugabe.....	6%	--%
Ahmadou Ahidjo.....	5%	4%
Habib Bourguiba.....	4%	--%
Seyni Kountche.....	4%	--%
Anwar Sadat.....	3%	4%
Others.....	15%	24%
None.....	22%	23%

Respondents agree that Leopold Sedar Senghor is playing a more important role today than he was in January, as is Gnassingbe Eyadema, while Hassan II's star is seen as setting. Robert Mugabe, Habib Bourguiba, and Senyi Kountche are still seeded, and there are no major changes elsewhere.

Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Sedar Senghor have more of a following on the right than on the left (22 to 6 percent for the rightist, 19 to 6 percent for the left); and Julius Nyerere has more backers on the left than on the right (20 against 3 percent).

The left registers the most "negative" votes (24 percent of those responding like no head of state, as opposed to 14 percent of right-wing respondents).

How Are Things Going?

19. As of right now, would you say things are getting better or getting worse?

In your own country		
Getting better.....	41%	44%
Getting worse.....	57%	54%
No opinion.....	2%	2%

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

	Now	January 1980
In countries in your region?		
Getting better.....	22%	40%
Getting worse.....	71%	55%
No opinion.....	7%	5%

Worse than in January. But, while things are getting no better at home, the same trend can be seen in neighboring countries.

Of our readers, 71 percent think things are going badly elsewhere, and 57 percent think they are bad at home too. When we did our January survey, the corresponding percentages were 55 and 54. On the left as well as on the right, this means that, when all is said and done, and even though there is little grounds for rejoicing, the situation at home is no worse....

Risk of Conflicts or Wars in Africa

20. Do you believe that, as of right now, the risk of multiplication or aggravation of conflict or war in Africa are:

Very great.....	34%	27%
Quite high.....	47%	53%
Fairly low.....	13%	15%
Very slight.....	5%	4%
No opinion.....	1%	1%

Specifically, which conflicts do you have in mind? (Note: Since multiple replies were given, the total is in excess of 100%.)

Sahara.....	41%	55%
Chad.....	39%	9%
Horn of Africa.....	11%	18%
Southern Africa.....	12%	39%
Egypt-Libya.....	7%	--%
Namibia.....	5%	--%
Uganda.....	5%	--%
Tunisia.....	5%	--%

The general view has not changed since January: 81 percent see the risk as very great or quite high. The "Very high" replies rose, however, from 27 percent to 34. We find no significant difference from right to left. The left sees more possible conflict in South Africa and the Western Sahara than the right does (15% to 7% -- and 43% to 35%). In Morocco and Tunisia, readers also see higher risks in that region (63 and 53 percent).

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

6182
CSO: 4400

9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

COMMENTARY ON AFRICAN FRANCOPHONE SUMMIT

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 23 May 80 pp 58-59

[Article by Philippe Baleine: "Africa Has Achieved Little Success"]

[Text] Grandfather Zig would really be amazed if he had attended the French-African summit in Nice! Grandfather Zig has been dead nearly 20 years. But France has not forgotten him. Grandfather Zig* was the one who, to the sound of Corporal Mamadou's battered trumpet, with a handful of sharpshooters, conquered Senegal, the Sudan, Mauritania, Niger, Guinea, Ivory Coast and a few other bits of land that I cannot remember. He was the one that went up the Congo in a dugout canoe under a hail of poisoned arrows, using the butt of his Lebel to beat time to the paddlers' war chant, on the way to plant the tricolor flag on an adobe fort. It was Grandfather Zig who with a bit of bread handled with good nature, helped the nice blacks along in fatherly fashion toward civilization.

Balm to Grandfather Zig's Soul

So it was understandably not without a pang that he learned in his Cancaal retreat of the independence of all those states in Africa over which his gigantic protecting shadow was once spread, and that he died disconsolate.

But in the empire builders' paradise, Grandfather Zig must have gotten his smile back again now.

So there they all were in Nice: the presidents of the French-speaking states that have emerged from our former colonies, to discuss economic problems with our president. Also they want to urge him strongly to let the French troops stay on in Tabad. And even--as the Chadian representative said--to send cadre to Africa in greater numbers, and even--yes, indeed!--some colonists.

*In his recent book, "The Conquest of Zanzibar" (Gallimard), Jean Cau tells the heroic epic of Grandfather Zig.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"You decolonized too soon!" Such words are real balm to Grandfather Zig's soul. That probably causes him to refrain from ironic cursing as he observes the solemn troop of presidents gathered around the green baize at the Nice prefecture.

There is Leopold Senghor, president of Senegal and president of the OAU (as replacement for Mr Tolbert, recently murdered). His country is deep in economic difficulties. Famine threatens in the North and in the South; in Ziguichor rebellious schoolboys are being fired on. Here in his blue robe is President Traore of Mali, the former Sudan [as published], a vast land of savannahs, which after 20 years of the socialist experiment, is bankrupt. And Traore has to tame his rebellious students too. That little man, between two giants from the Sahel, is Omar Bongo, president of Gabon, who, despite the oil bonanza, had to call in foreigners to sort out his finances. And here are the presidents of Niger, Upper Volta, Guinea, all of them countries in which poverty and the single party system hold sway together. And Mr Dacko, let us not overlook Mr Dacko, who has seated himself on Bokassa's throne. But he is not emperor, not yet. That leopard-skin cap, wildly bobbing about over there, belongs to Mobutu, president of Zaire, still irked because it had not been possible to accommodate all of his entourage at the Negresco. He had come with an impressive delegation of 20 people. He wants to leave the hotel...Not very polite from a guest of France, which moreover saved his regime by sending his paratroops to Kolwezi.

Not in attendance, the minister of foreign affairs of Liberia, the honorable Cecil Dennis. His excuse: he was shot last week. Houphouet-Boigny is not here either. He has an excuse, too: the pope's visit. But it is hinted that he is sulking at Giscard because the latter made so bold as to ask him if he had a successor in mind! Oh, I was forgetting, Houphouet has a bone to pick with Lt Oulai Zoumana, who was arrested in Abidjan on 28 April for attempting a military coup d'etat.

In a while all these presidents will be meeting again at the great closing banquet at the Negresco Hotel, to celebrate their having stayed in power for another year.

Ndjamena Sinks Into Total Disaster

A dining room full of floral designs and gilding, a sumptuous menu, champagne of the best vintages. The president of Niger muses that the cost of his meal is almost equal to half the annual income of a peasant in his country....

For the moment, he is less afraid of his people than of the POLISARIO in the West, the Libyans in the North, the Chadians in the East, and the Cubans all over.

No wonder a few strong French battalions would be gladly welcomed here and there, as more reliable in the long run than the national armies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The removal of French troops from Chad, for that reason, cast a chill. People are wondering. Did the French Government just want to get its troops back? (They were not going far. Just to Cameroon, nearby). Because they tended to favor this or that faction? Or has it decided to let the strongest one win? That is exactly what scared the whole of Africa. Especially the Africa of the blacks, the southern one. Those Africans, animistic peasants, have lived for centuries under the domination of the (very tanned) white islamized nomads of the North. At independence, aware of the danger, France handed power over to the blacks. Now the nomads are getting their revenge. They know their business. They have never done anything else for thousands of years but wage war. The nucleus of the POLISARIO, for example, is men of the Reguib whose specialty was the Rezzou. The pilots of Mermoz Aerospace at St-Ex feared nothing so much as falling into their hands. And you should just see the fun the child-soldiers of Goukouni and Hissein Habre have! And what arms! The most sophisticated equipment from West and East. Armed and fed by all the great powers, easily finding recruits among the jobless delinquent youth, these medieval bands can confront each other for a long time. On our continent, that was called the Hundred Years' War. The city of Ndjamenas has now sunk into total disaster. No hospitals any more, no public services, no water, no telecommunications, soon no more electricity. All the windscreens on all the cars are smashed. All the body work has bullet-holes in it. Meantime, in the southern part of Chad, belonging to the Saras, Christian blacks, peace and prosperity prevail. People are planting and harvesting. Colonists are colonizing, and roads are even being rebuilt. Yes, black Africa is less afraid at the moment of the Cubans and the Russians than of the Arab wave coming from the North, remote controlled by Algeria and Libya.

Poor Cubans, anyway, going through one disaster after another. In Angola, whole columns are mysteriously disappearing in the brush. In the very expeditionary forces there are squabbles between (tanned) whites and blacks. The Cubans have failed to regain control of the economy, completely paralyzed by the departure of the 500,000 Portuguese "colonists."

The East Germans have had to be called in. Prussians among the Angolans! You can imagine how beloved they are. Their big problem: finding a cook who will not try to poison them.

In Ethiopia, the disaster is even more gigantic. Despite the billion dollars that the Russians have donated over the past year, the country is on the brink of the greatest catastrophe in African history. Over 2 million Ethiopians are threatened with total famine. The drought is getting the blame! But let us say instead socialism plus war--the scandalous war against Moslem Eritrea. It is at a standstill anyway, because the Cubans, at the behest of Algeria, have decided not to take part in it any more.

Third World Affliction: Graft

An even more total failure of the Cubans and Russians in Guinea and Mali, which are dismissing their achievement-crowned experts: delivery of snow-ploughs to Guinea and ploughs with 60-centimeter ploughshares to Mali, which

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

have permanently sterilized the fragile ground, whose topsoil layer does not exceed 10 centimeters. In general, the Russians are disliked because of their annoying habit of sending machinery and agricultural equipment as aid. But the black states of the region want money, francs and dollars, and that is all. To pay their plethora of civil servants, and keep their overpopulated cities going.

The present organization of the former French black states has been described often enough for a mere reminder to be sufficient: 15 governments installed in palaces, 150 ministers with Mercedes, chauffeurs, and private houses with swimming pools, a few thousand cabinet members with [Peugeot] 604s, thousands of parliamentarians who earn as much in a year as an African peasant does in a lifetime, and countless embassies all over the world. As for the civil service, on a par ever since independence with the wages of French civil servants (with the colonial supplement!), it has doubled in numbers and has a standard of living 10 to 15 times better than that of the poor wretch in the brush. As they cannot pay for their Mercedes fast enough, the insatiable civil servants have made an institution of that plague of the Third World, graft. Graft in the final analysis is an illegal tax levied by the rich in power on the poor, whose rights they cash in on.

Of course every African government has a draconian anti-graft program. From time to time someone who has really gone too far gets shot. From time to time a party of strong-minded, pure young officers overturns the extortive government, and then, once in power, the good apostles yield to temptation in their turn. And people become resigned. Nehru tried to explain why: "Shouting from the housetops that everybody is corrupt only creates a climate conducive to corruption. Anyone who feels that he is immersed in that atmosphere tends to become corrupt himself. So the man in the street tells himself, if everybody is corrupt, why not me, too."

All the urban classes, including the tradespeople, who make their living on what the civil servants spend, subsist increasingly on subsidies from abroad. It is standard procedure in some countries to wait for the arrival of funds from France to pay the civil servants. If the funds are late, watch out for a coup d'etat! The peasants in the interior have not been supplying the cities for a long time now. They have caught on! Overwhelmed by taxes, with their products being bought at ridiculously low prices, despised because they work with their hands, they have resorted to a subsistence economy. Matters might stabilize at this level. Unfortunately, Africa is very rapidly being taken over by desert encroachment, as a result of deforestation and brush fires, and the peasants, driven out of their little millet fields by the sand, are flocking to the towns, where huge shanty-towns are being created, whose means of subsisting are a perfect mystery. But why are Africans burning their savannahs when their flocks are tragically short of fodder? Answer: Africans are unfamiliar with the use of fodder. In addition, they are unfamiliar with the use of the cart, indispensable for harvesting hay. And then, they are unfamiliar with the pitchfork. And what else? Ah yes, I was forgetting, they are not at all used to working. There now, the great sacrilege has been committed. Quick, let us take refuge behind the figures. In the whole forest

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

region, where the way of life is hunting and gathering, supplemented by a little field of tubers, a man works an average of 20 hours a week: a little hunting, a little fishing, a little hut-repairing. A woman gathers berries and hoes the ground in the little field. As she also takes care of the children and the cooking, she works more than the man.

"You Decolonized Too Soon"

In the savannah region, the problem of the man's work has been solved by polygamy. The goal of every proper man is to own four wives. Two to cultivate the bit of land, one to take the surplus harvest to market, and one to keep house and spin and sew in addition. The man builds the house (once and for all), hunts (there is no game any more, but it makes a pleasant ramble), takes the stumps out of the field (once and for all), and sets fires everywhere he can.

So it can be seen that the social climate is not very conducive to peasant labor, and that in Africa people are a long way from the French earth-grubber's 3,000 hours of work a year. Hence the very real threat of famine hanging over sub-Saharan Africa.

Generally speaking, in the new African societies, altruism based upon the idea of mutual service, which was very much alive in the little rural communities of the past, has almost died out entirely in the big cities. Civic feeling can hardly be created in the artificial nation-states, since they are conglomerates of hostile ethnics.

As a result, peasants and their poverty are the least of the concerns of the city-dwelling middle-classes in the new black states. And what is expected of France, Europe, and the wealthy world in general is good, new, ready money, to support the consumer habits of the privileged and to pay the enormous oil bill, another lion-sized tax levied by the Arab aristocracy and middle-class on the poor people of the Third World.

Here then are our troops, to back up weak tyrants or single-party presidents for whom little military chiefs are on the lookout. There are our francs, to keep our clients.

Africa made a bad start, and so did we with it. And contrary to what may be thought, the Russians and the Cubans are in no better a position. (Solzhenitsyn prompts us not to forget that in the Kremlin there is a party opposed to costly colonial undertakings). Are there any other solutions for France and Europe to apply in black Africa? A three-way discussion? Certainly, but the far-sighted Arabs prefer to place their money in America or Switzerland.

There is indeed Ivory Coast, the showcase of West Africa. But the French stayed on there in large numbers after independence. There are even more than 60,000 of them there today. They "provide leadership." And Houphouet-Boigny has welcomed with open arms capital from everywhere.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Ivory Coast is a magnificent example of successful neo-colonial enterprise. (My goodness! How can anyone dare say such things!)

The other example is Kenya. Need it be said that the English stayed on there? Just as in Rhodesia, where Mugabe is said to have been advised by the Russians to keep his whites (The Russians probably want Rhodesia, since they want the world, but a Rhodesia in working order). Far from us be the idea that Africans are constitutionally incapable of managing their resources. But in any case it was, we recall, Mr Kamougue (vice president of Chad) who called out "You decolonized too soon!" And it was in Bamako, capital of socialist Mali, that (progressive) students were heard in the streets shouting "French army, come and drive out our rotten leaders as you did Bokassa!"

Grandfather was quite overcome by it.

His task is still immense. And the youth of Africa must be helped, because we have debts toward them that can never be barred (100 million Africans are missing at the roll-call because of the ravages of the slave trade that only came to an end in the last century). They must be helped not to collapse under the burden of outrageous increases in oil costs. They must be helped to install the new energies, solar and biomass, in their countries. They must be helped to discover fresh resources under their land. From this point of view, Africa is the world's future.

And if, after all, we could agree among ourselves as whites--the Russians are whites, you know--to resume for at least a little while, the work (which was badly performed, incidentally, be it admitted) interrupted by decolonization in a Third World that we abandoned after destroying its traditional structures?

There will be 5 billion of them by the year 2000. And only 1 billion of us, you know.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 by Cogedipresse S.A.

12149
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE SPLITS OAU

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Jul 80 pp 18-20

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado and Abdelaziz Dahmani: "The OAU: Victim of the Sahara"]

[Text] Officially, what is called the "Western Sahara question" does not appear on the agenda for the OAU conference of chiefs of state and governments (Freetown, Sierra Leone, 1-4 July 1980). Because the African ministers responsible for making preparations for this session--the 17th-- wanted to hold to the decision made at the 13th summit (Port-Louis, Mauritius, July 1976) which set this subject aside for a special session of the OAU.

In reality, it was a way of getting around it. The OAU ministerial conference has always evaded thorny questions so that it can announce: such and such a matter is not listed on the summit's agenda but the chiefs of state are free to discuss it. In the matter at hand, the Freetown summit is not going to be able to ignore the Western Sahara case. But it is a fact that, in its 17 years of existence, the OAU has not experienced conflicts so serious that they threatened to cause it to fly into pieces.

The reason for this anticipated crisis is: the candidacy of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) to occupy the 51st seat in the OAU. Led by Algeria and Madagascar, at least 23 member states of the organization are determined to support this candidacy against the opposition of Morocco which denies the SADR any kind of existence.

Even worse, the Sherifian kingdom has announced that it would withdraw from the OAU if the Saharan state were to be admitted. The organization, supposed to be weighing in for the whole of Africa on the international scene, would on the contrary become obliterated, a victim of disagreements among its members. For the withdrawal of Morocco could be followed by that of its friends: Gabon, perhaps Equatorial Guinea, and Zaire, all three having particularly close ties with Rabat, without mentioning Senegal, whose kind regards for Morocco as well as hostility for the Polisario are known. On the face of it, the battle is

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

located on legal ground. From the point of view of the charter, what conditions require such an admission to membership to be made? In the eyes of public international law, what criteria permit one to determine whether or not the SADR is a state?

According to the Law

The OAU Charter is explicit. Admission is granted by a simple majority of member states that is to say 26 would be needed. A tally which is not out of reach for the SADR: already recognized by 23 African states, it can certainly gather up three additional supporters at the last minute. And all the more easily because it falls to the secretary general, and he may do it outside any meeting context, to consult with each member state and make a formal accounting of the votes.

We still have to answer another legal question: does the SADR bring together all the attributes of a state? According to international law, three basic conditions are required on this score: one people, one institutional structure and one territory.

Population is already the subject of controversies. Morocco maintains that the former Spanish Sahara--the area claimed by the SADR--does not include the whole Saharan population; there are Mauritanian or Moroccan Saharans, and ethnic identity by itself (even supposing that there is one in this case) is not a sufficient basis to constitute a people. Not without justification, Rabat therefore denies that there is any coherent whole involved in the notion of a Saharan people. As long as we confine the counting to the former Spanish colony, it barely tops 70,000.

To this the POLISARIO retorts--and justly so--70,000 inhabitants make up a population just fine; the Seychelles, a member of the OAU, barely includes more than 60,000 citizens.

Second criterion: institutional structure. It's easy for the POLISARIO to advance the notion, in this regard, that the proclamation of the SADR is in itself equivalent to creating a state. And even if we don't yet know exactly who, the POLISARIO Front's secretary general or its prime minister, is the chief of state, this is a matter for internal jurisdiction.

Fruitless Controversy

There remains territory, the third criterion to take into account. Morocco proclaims pope-like to the world, "urbi et orbi," that it militarily and administratively controls the territory claimed by the POLISARIO. The latter, without denying that fact, maintains that this "territorial control" is in reality only occupation of the colonial variety. In other words, Morocco has done nothing but take Spain's place--the colonial power.

The legal controversy would therefore be a fruitless one if it were to be initiated among the OAU chiefs of state. Proponents and opponents

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of the POLISARIO have just as many arguments either for the accreditation of or to attack the "de jure" existence of a Saharan state. The verbal rows which are customary for the OAU would hardly be sufficient to either decide between or to convince the various protagonists.

Because, it is know, and it is asserted, going beyond the matter of the SADR's formal admission to the OAU, that the question of the Western Sahara is more political than legal. Any reference to any notion of legal right has since 1975 turned out to be mere quibbling.

For the supporters of the POLISARIO, the principle laid down by the founders of the OAU, no more and no less, must be applied: the inviolability of inherited colonial borders. According to this principle, on the day after the withdrawal of Spain, the former Spanish Sahara was to be considered an independent state and only needed to be proclaimed as such.

The Morocccans, laying siege to the territory, were therefore transformed into new colonizers, and it was in fact the duty of the Saharans, who in earlier days had had to fight Spain, to fight Morocco. To their advantage, the supporters of the SADR bring an argument to bear along these lines: another occupier--Mauritania, who had divided up the Western Sahara with Morocco--tiring of warfare, "got off the hook" in 1979 and renounced its claims. This is proof, it is maintained, of an embryonic "decolonization."

By liberation, the POLISARIO has therefore meant above all territorial liberation. Hence its strategy which at the beginning consisted of attempting to occupy the territory. To which however, the Moroccans responded with another tactic: controlling strategic points in order to let the Saharan guerrillas "gallivant" around the desert. The Ouhoud mobile unit of the FAR (Royal Moroccan Armed Forces) has prevented the POLISARIO from settling down in any one area of the Western Sahara. The result had led to an abnormal politico-military situation. The POLISARIO, not in complete control of any site in the territory it claims, has set up in the cliffs of Warkziz, in undisputed Moroccan territory. In time this position has become an awkward one: the Warkziz did not so much as give any territory to the SADR. Otherwise things have changed: the Moroccan army has retaken control of the Warkziz range, although it hasn't completely "cleaned it out." A good reason for the desert guerrillas to have wanted, on the eve of the OAU meeting, to strike a decisive blow. Coming from Mauritania--which has been transformed willy-nilly into a sanctuary--they attacked the Moroccan troops at Guelta Zemmour. To demonstrate that on "their territory" they can attack anywhere anytime.

What's Really Going On Under the Surface

However, these military actions are not enough to convince their opponents that the SADR controls any territory whatsoever. For Morocco and its

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

friends, even the principle of the inviolability of borders inherited from the colonial past does not apply. Priding itself on its existence as a state before colonial times, Morocco can justifiably draw the conclusion that it is the colonial process which broke up its territory. Even better, it is in a position to show that Spain, the administering power, ceded to it the territorial zones under colonial government coming under the administration of the Western Sahara.

There again, the arguments of the one group and the other are not unfounded. So, supporters and opponents of the SADR have deployed any and all methods of diplomatic warfare. And it is on this plane that the POLISARIO has undoubtedly scored points against Morocco. The SADR, recognized by about 40 states, can pride itself on having some sort of international existence. But one must still be aware, on the other hand, of under what conditions and by which states the SADR has been recognized.

"Hundred Years' War"

Of the 23 African countries which support it, 13 are in eastern or southern Africa, that is to say from the area and the furthest away from the combat zone and the least informed about what is really going on in this "affair." This strong black African contingent compensates to some extent for the indifference of Arab countries. Undoubtedly because the latter, whether African or Middle Eastern, know the "case history" better. And they know, because of having participated in the Arab League summit on 29 October 1974 in Rabat, that on that day the late Algerian President Houari Boumedienne had given his support to the agreement between Morocco and Mauritania to divide up what was still Spanish Sahara. Since then Algeria has changed and has become the champion of Western Sahara's independence. But only four of the 22 members of the Arab League have recognized the SADR.

As one can see, the Sahara question is not as simple as one might want to make it out. As the political debate heightens, so do the emotional overtones which characterize it. In Morocco, for example, the reconquest which materialized out of the Green March of November 1975 served as a cementing force for unity. From one end of the political spectrum to the other, reference is made to the "holy cause" and people declare themselves ready for a "100 years' war."

This being the case, the question which must be asked is: is not the Sahara question only a facade for a struggle between the Maghribian states for influence? Is not Moroccan "expansionism" the counterpart of Algeria's and/or Libya's "hegemonism" aiming at rebuilding and controlling the Greater Maghreb? And, in this case, should the OAU, as an organization of continental scope, bear the brunt of this conflict between medium-sized powers separated by the Saharans?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

No battle here can even be won, and all Africans are being asked to take a stand. The war could last 100 years, as the Moroccans say, but no victor will emerge. The legal debate is hopeless because everyone is right and everyone is wrong.

Is there still a struggle of principle when all is said and done? No, not even that. The self-determination of the Saharan people which is heralded by certain African leaders is not a goal for the POLISARIO when it can proclaim: "The Saharan people has already achieved self-determination via the struggle it carries on against Moroccan expansionism." Which makes empty of any meaning the OAU's desire to have the Saharans consulted to choose their destiny.

Those Who Will Bear the Burden

This is proof, if any were still needed, that what people are happy to say in OAU conferences on the Sahara question does not always reflect what is really at stake. The least that one can say is that the case seems a vague one for those among the member states whose leaders would be ready to listen to something other than their fiery speeches for this or that cause. The POLISARIO'S refusal of a referendum on self-determination is not clear to its friends who have fought for that cause. Algeria's reserved posture which even seems to have frozen its diplomatic initiatives on behalf of the SADR is suspect: perhaps it only reflects hesitation on the part of the current leaders to take up a cumbersome inheritance left by President Boumedienne. Finally, the sudden activism of the Moroccans in diplomatic matters is worrying.

And amid this lack of certainty, what is the OAU going to do? Get bogged down. Because the debate about admitting the SADR does not serve its interests. The OAU was conceived to solve problems. It now risks being transformed into a battleground. Because of a case in which national ambitions are opposed. It is not far-fetched to say that: if Algeria and Morocco were to become reconciled, the Saharans would bear the burden. At best, be being federated with Mauritania.

The OAU would also bear a burden; it would have lost its energy debating a matter that was exclusively sub-regional. The leading lights on all sides will bear the brunt of this affair: for having supported a cause which was not their own.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

9631
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

KI-ZERBO ROLE IN CAMES EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 4 Jun 80 p 37

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "The Ki-Zerbo Affair"]

[Text] Power is so personalized in Africa that to a greater extent than elsewhere, any institution is confused with the official heading it, as shown by the Ki-Zerbo affair. The eminent Upper Voltan professor who for 17 years headed a discreet but vital inter-African organization, CAMES (African and Malagasy Council on Higher Education), has paid the price for this conception of power. He has been removed from his post as secretary general without any explanation or indemnification by the French-speaking ministers of education meeting in April in Kigali (Rwanda). Since that time, CAMES has been leaderless. Its activities are paralyzed and its personnel (about a dozen persons in all and for all purposes) without pay. The very existence of the organization is at stake.

Plurality of Offices

What has happened? CAMES, to which 15 nations in French-speaking Africa belong, receives, studies and records the work of teachers in higher education. If need be, it confers diplomas corresponding to their aptitudes. It was in 1964 that Pr Joseph Ki-Zerbo, *agregé* in history from a French university, conceived the idea for the organization and operated it totally without pay until 1967 when, at the proposal of the then Senegalese minister of education, Ahmadou-Mahtar M'Bow, currently general director of UNESCO, compensation was awarded to him. Later, when he was elected deputy to the Upper Voltan National Assembly, Pr Ki-Zerbo combined those duties with the post of secretary general of CAMES, without requesting any special salary for the latter activity.

However, the Upper Voltan Constitution adopted at the end of 1977 prohibits any plurality of offices. Although elected deputy in the April 1978 legislative elections, Pr Ki-Zerbo had to resign his term in order to continue to head CAMES. Now he is driven out of that post as if he were dishonest, as if there were an attempt to humiliate him and discourage him from ever wanting to be involved with an institution he created through his own initiative, not to say with his own hands.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Party Affair

What is the reason behind all this? First of all, the government in Ouagadougou looked askance upon the possibilities of an opening and contact which CAMES offered to the leader of one of the most important opposition parties. Pr Joseph Ki-Zerbo was one of the main candidates to run against President Sangoule Lamizana in the May 1978 presidential elections. Today he heads the FPV (Upper Voltan Progressive Front), one of the two opposition parties recognized in Upper Volta.

Under such conditions, one can understand why in Kigali, the Upper Voltan minister of education refused to nominate Pr Joseph Ki-Zerbo for the post of secretary general of CAMES, preferring a young assistant from the University of Ouagadougou, Simeon Kabre, who is a member of a party associated with the government majority. Certain ministers, particularly Kader Fall (Senegal), opposed that "wildcat" candidacy and CAMES is now without any director.

But beyond this "political-politicking" maneuver of the Upper Voltan Government, something more can be seen. Indeed, in Paris, certain cooperation circles were not enthusiastic about the proposals and above all, the objectives which Pr Ki-Zerbo set for CAMES. The latter did not conceal the fact that for him, it was inadmissible that 20 years after our countries' accession to independence, Africans should still be forced to obtain their *agregation* in France, that it should be a foreign country which decides upon the number and careers of African professors. "Did you know," he asked us 2 months ago, "that until 1978, the aptitude list of university professors in French-speaking Africa was drawn up in Paris?" It was by means of a letter from the French minister for universities that an African assistant learned whether or not he was included on the aptitude list. It was French professors who received and judged the works of African professors.

Stubbornness

It was not until 1978 that Joseph Ki-Zerbo managed to do away with this outdated practice. Is it not his obstinacy, the persistent struggle he waged against a certain French Malthusianism, for which the eminent Upper Voltan historian is paying today? The scarcely veiled attacks to which he was subjected in Kigali on the part of Mrs Alice Saunier Seite, French minister for universities, speak eloquently on this subject.

The whole question comes down to knowing whether, once again confusing the man with the institution, African leaders will allow CAMES to be buried and, in humiliating its founder, humiliate themselves by going back in time 20 years.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

11,464
CSO: 4400

22

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

STRATEGY OF NATIONAL LANGUAGES DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 May 80 pp 70-72

[Article by Jean Copans: "Can Linguistics Untangle Languages?"]

[Text] "An event without precedent took place today: The president delivered a speech in Swahili. This event truly marks the beginning of a new era in the country's history with respect to language, national development and the administration of governmental affairs.... Today, we took the liberty of speaking our own language. We shall get to the heart of any discussion with confidence because we shall no longer have any doubts about the meaning of our words or about being correctly understood by others...."

The date was 10 December 1962. Speaking before the Tanzanian Parliament in Dar es-Salaam, Julius Nyerere had just delivered the keynote address for the Day of the Republic and it was poet and writer Sheikh Amri Abedi, minister of community development and culture, who proudly derived the lessons from it. The fact is that any consistent cultural and linguistic policy begins there, with that apparently simple act so difficult to put into practice: speaking one's language officially, using it in all public activities. Naturally, we have seen that the problem is not so simple after all,¹ and the domination of Swahili, one of the 100 languages of Tanzania, is only possible because of a long history and the profound Bantu alliance between most of these languages.²

Having said this much, the political determination to change the ratio of linguistic forces makes it possible to pose the problems concretely. And this determination, within the context of dominant neocolonialism, is far from being obvious, to say the least. But speaking one's language, one's languages, in daily life, as all Africans do, is one thing. Using them in official or public reports, in the political, economic and cultural realms, is another, for independently of this political choice, and even, one might say, of this choice of civilization, one must understand the mechanisms for extending the functions of local languages. Above all, we must know how we speak, how we can enrich the African languages with new social customs, new functions (the transmission of written knowledge, mastery of technology and the drafting of new political and economic concepts).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It is therefore necessary to describe and analyze the African languages. This scientific detour is indispensable, for putting national languages in the driver's seat is also and quite frequently moving from the oral to the written, from the word to phonetic transcription and a standardized spelling. Naturally, the usefulness of knowing how to read is sometimes deceiving because learning to read in one's language or in an African language in no way implies that one is reading "useful" texts, texts that eliminate the isolation of the grass-roots citizen.

Confusing Picture

Can one know the African languages scientifically? The situation is a very complex one, on the one hand, because of their multiplicity and their dialectal subdivisions, and on the other hand, because of the variety of effects to which they have fallen victim over the past century: fairly substantial, destructive contacts with colonial languages, shifts and migrations of populations leading to unheard-of phenomena of multilingualism (sections of the large cities), the outright disappearance of languages in the tumult of social domination and change. The linguistic picture is therefore increasingly confused. Traditional purity gives way to mixtures, all kinds of borrowings, semantic neglect. Ways of life and social and technical milieus are changed; new linguistic needs emerge. In short, Black Africa is at the forefront of linguistic innovation that is both spontaneous and constant.

However, the linguistic theories and methods that are available are scarcely adapted to these contexts. Aided by the timidity of educational or informational strategies, the scientific, functional ideology of Western linguistics remains preponderant.³ Naturally, there are not enough persons doing research in linguistics or linguistic experts. What is even more serious -- as is the case in the rest of the African humanities -- those doing research in linguistics are always by and large from the West.⁴

If there is one field in which for reasons of methodology and social efficiency, the Africanization of research workers is urgent, it is definitely linguistics. Furthermore, research underway is generally ill adapted to needs and there is reason to think that one of the difficulties encountered by nations having opted for a policy of national languages stems from the inadequacy of the scientific instrument.

We actually encounter two types of linguistics: 1) a basic type, aimed at reconstituting the functioning of languages, without taking dominations, the dynamics of bilingualism or social cleavages into account. The language of adults is not necessarily that of the young people, meaning that the linguist often works with informers who "know," who are therefore older, while literacy programs and school enrollment plans are addressed to the young. 2) applied linguistics, which works more pragmatically and prepares studies on the current situation of languages. However, very often (at any rate, this is obvious in French-speaking countries), this type of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

linguistics is aimed at a better knowledge of local languages in order to adopt the teaching of foreign languages (that is, the teaching of the so-called "national" or official language). It has been noticed that one could not teach French to a Wolof or a Serer from Senegal, a Baoule from the Ivory Coast or a Beti from Cameroon in the same fashion. In this case, the scientific knowledge of the African language turns against the Africans because it in fact further alienates them linguistically.

The most serious danger stems from the gap between linguists and those who speak the languages. Specialists have a passive relation with their informers. Nothing predisposes linguists (especially if they are foreigners) to working with the people in a collective and democratic way. The development of lexicons, texts, literacy methods, the linguistic Africanization of school programs, written and audio-visual media and the development of a new local culture in the truly national languages cannot take place in a vacuum and be prepared in the offices and laboratories of a few hundred specialists. Of course, not everyone is or could be a linguist, but it is true that everyone has an idea about and means to product these new instruments.

Burden

Like the economic development projects that are generally "parachuted in," if not imposed on the people, literacy and school enrollment programs are often proposed as a governmental decision within a debatable framework (Western-type schooling) and an ineffective context (sporadic, experimental operations).

Insofar as these initial indispensable operations, which literacy training, school attendance and professional training are, do not lead to wider use at the political, economic, cultural and informational levels, they lose some of their effectiveness and they are not renewed. The shift from mass literacy to functional literacy expresses this strategic change insofar as mass literacy can only succeed when there is mass journalistic, technical or cultural literature. If there is nothing to read or nothing interesting to read, then why subject oneself to that which is perceived as a burden since, until further orders, it is literacy training (that is, schooling) in the foreign national language that pays off?

The strategy of national languages can therefore be nothing but overall and it implies the development of new scientific research in languages and even a rejection of certain dominant theories. Linguistic mixtures today are numerous (between African languages, between African and Western languages) and spontaneous linguistic creation among the people is continuous. Now then, on the practical level, the translation of linguistic analysis has always led to a reconstitution of the internal logic of languages and therefore, to an implicit respect of its rules.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Everyone also knows that there is the correct spoken language and the language as the people speak it, that social groups and classes express themselves differently with respect to vocabulary and syntax. Traditional aristocrats do not speak exactly the same language as their peasants and a dock worker or a minister will not speak their maternal tongue in the same way. Consequently, the technocratic drafting of literacy programs or schooling in the national language risks favoring the way of speech of dominant groups because the linguist tends to reject the more popular or bastardized (transformed) versions of the language. Science is therefore neither neutral nor innocent.

Africanizing research workers and increasing their numbers are not enough. It is essential to transform the very mentality of the specialized linguist, who acts as if he alone knew how others should talk.

It is not possible to assure the masses of a mastery of their maternal or vernacular tongues by using the same means that ensured dissemination of the so-called "national" languages. Having said this much, the experiments underway, whether scattered or national, teach us about the possibilities of this linguistic revolution, which is cultural in the strongest sense of the word.

FOOTNOTES

1. See AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 211.
2. English would be introduced into primary schools in 1950, only to disappear some 10 years later. From this standpoint, Tanzania has escaped "bad" school habits.
3. It is not possible to retrace the panorama of linguistic theories, but the current debate in this discipline has a great deal to do with the orientation of research in the field in Africa. In opposition to the structural-functionalist theories that have prevailed for 40 to 50 years are the generalist or transformational theory of N. Chomsky (the well-known anti-imperialist American intellectual) and the Soviet and American sociolinguistic approaches. The French and British traditions (colonial mother countries) are mainly based on the former, while the American research workers, more recent but very numerous, refer more to the other two orientations. This situation (even if healthy scientifically speaking) certainly complicates the development of a unified African Africanist linguistic method.
4. At the applied linguistics centers in Dakar, Abidjan or Yaounde, the research workers are mainly French or Belgian and the technicians nationals, a division of work that says a great deal about colonial traditions.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

11,464

CSO: 4400

26

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AGRICULTURE IN AFRICA EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 80 pp 63-70

[Article by J. A. Plus: "The African Continent: the Dossiers of Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow"]

[Text] Let us ask the "man in the street" if he thinks that Africa is a continent with an agricultural calling. It is a good bet that he will answer in the negative. In fact, during the year the media published information on emergency food assistance to this African country or on the risks of famine in some other country. The authorities of most African countries outdo themselves in asking rich countries for help every year and in evoking the specter of famine in order to evoke the understanding of well nourished Western countries.

In 1980, after the countries of the Sahel, which announced a shortage of about 800,000 tons of cereal for this year, it was Tanzania's turn to sound the alarm of an unprecedented shortage with respect to its corn harvest, the basic food of the population. Other countries, like those of the Maghreb, continue to import ever-larger quantities of foodstuffs each year. The three countries of North Africa import about 30 percent of their cereal needs.

In reading these figures, one might think that Africa is largely destitute. But, however disheartening the reality is, there is too great a tendency to forget that the black continent is also one of the foremost of world exporters of agricultural products: coffee, cocoa, hevea, palm oil, cotton, peanuts, sugar cane in southern Sahara; citrus fruit, grapes, olive oil in the north. The agricultural wealth of Africa no longer has to be demonstrated. It not only has long given proof of this--and the colonial powers that had carried out immense exploitations everywhere had not been mistaken--but this could definitely be increased tenfold--provided one begins to attend to this.

It is moreover enough to see to what point new crops can quickly adapt. Is wheat a particularly Mediterranean crop? It now grows on the Adamaoua

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

plateau in the Cameroon. "European" vegetables and fruit, like carrots, potatoes, or . . . strawberries, unknown to Africans until recently, are cultivated everywhere in the vicinity of big cities where truck farmers easily find a clientele of expatriates or westernized nationals. The most varied agricultural products are sold on Western markets and, in walking about, no one would realize that he is at the same time in what some call "the starving continent."

To carry the paradox further, one could even say that, except for the really desert areas, there are practically no countries that are completely ill-favored from the point of view of agriculture. Even the Sahelian countries, from Senegal to Niger and Haute-Volta, examples of the poorest of the poor, all have a Sudanese area that is quite well irrigated and are perfectly capable of nourishing their population well. But that is not the case. The causes of chronic food shortage in Africa have now been identified: numerous studies in the past 5 years have pinpointed political blockages, economic errors, and inadequacy of agricultural techniques.

Trumps

This past March, a report submitted to the European Development and Cooperation Commission, which held its second session on hunger in the world, drew up a list of errors committed in the agriculture of developing countries. They sometimes caused a loss of 20 years to African agriculture. They could be corrected before it is too late if there existed, from one end to the other of the continent, a real political willingness to develop agricultural production in accordance with the needs of the domestic market without, however, completely abandoning the export crops that provide the currency that is indispensable for growth. They must not in any case cause one to forget that Africa possesses undeniable trumps and that it is not inevitably doomed to malnutrition and to poverty. A self-sufficient Africa, that at the same time is an exporter of agricultural products? This is not impossible, provided the necessary means are made available to it.

Priority of Priorities

The international division of labor, instituted in the 19th century by a West in full expansion, assigned the role of supplier of raw materials-- mineral and agricultural--to Africa, forgetting in the meantime that Africans also needed to eat. The industrial countries' need to find sources of sure and not very expensive supplies explains in great part the present character of African agriculture.

Imbalance

While certain countries--still too exceptional--like the Ivory Coast, have considerably strengthened their potential in this domain, others, on the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ther hand, yielding to the ease of mining exploitation, have completely neglected the agricultural sector to the point of becoming importers of foodstuffs--peanuts or palm oil, for example--which they formerly exported in considerable quantities. This is the case with Zaire and Nigeria. Still others, such as Niger, for years have been appropriating increasing amounts of resources to food production and can hope to attain self-sufficiency in food in a foreseeable future.

On the whole, however, the continent's production is not very satisfactory. According to the FAO, the production of foodstuffs has increased only 1.5 percent a year from 1970 to 1978; that is, much more slowly than the population, the rate of demographic increase almost everywhere being about 3 percent a year. That means that food availability per inhabitant has decreased in recent years. Several countries have even seen their overall agricultural production decrease during that period. This is the case with Angola and Mozambique, which have not yet surmounted the aftermath of the war of independence; with Uganda, for reasons that one knows; but also with Mauritania, Ghana, and Gambia.

But the African population not only is increasing: its structure is changing with a rapidity that alters customs and requires an effort to meet evolving needs.

Abidjan: 30,000 inhabitants in 1945; 1.5 million today; 3 million at the end of the century. No country is escaping this giddy urban increase. The population of cities is increasing approximately twice as rapidly as that of the country as a whole. In 1985, 36 percent of the population of Africa and of the Middle East will live in cities, compared with 25 percent in 1970. This massive exodus to big cities, that one is just about beginning to attempt to control, creates enormous needs for foodstuffs which the rural world, quite unprepared for this evolution, is at the moment incapable of satisfying.

If this trend continues, African food imports, which already amount to \$7 billion a year, will double between now and the year 2,000. Algeria already allots some 20 percent of its oil receipts to the purchase of foodstuffs, chiefly from Canada and the United States. Senegal now spends a portion of its meager currency reserves to import approximately 300,000 tons of rice a year; its overall cereal shortage this year amounted to 300,000 tons. The Sudan which, in the opinion of numerous experts, could become the "granary of the Arab world, at the end of 1979 signed a contract for the purchase of \$100 million of wheat from the United States during the next 5 years.

These examples, which one could multiply, are enough to show the imbalance of most of the African countries, in spite of their repeated willingness to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

accord "the priority of priorities" to agriculture in general and to self-sufficiency in food in particular.

The Exception of Sugar

A study of the situation--region by region--shows that the shortage does not necessarily correspond to the arid or climatically disadvantaged areas, but is due essentially to economic factors.

. In Northern Africa there is a cereal shortage of approximately 10 million tons. Leguminous crops, the basis of nourishment in several regions, is also inadequate. Only sugar production has increased in notable proportions. There will still be a definite shortage in the region in 1990: the rate of cereal self-sufficiency will amount to only 85 percent; the same for meat, while dairy production will satisfy only 72 percent of the needs.

. The rice shortage in the Sahelian countries amounts to 500,000 tons a year and the production of millet and sorghum, which are nevertheless the principal cereals cultivated in the region, is also inadequate. The Sahel imports 300,000 tons of millet a year. During the past 10 years the production of leguminous crops went from a surplus to a shortage. Only the production of meat shows an overall surplus. In 1990, the Sahel would probably have to import 800,000 tons of cereal, especially wheat and millet, while it probably would achieve self-sufficiency in rice and corn. The production of meat will continue to show a surplus, but it will still be necessary to import milk in great quantity.

. In western Africa, while the production of leguminous crops and of root plants is sufficient to satisfy domestic requirements, the wheat shortage, which probably would amount to 800,000 tons, has tripled compared with the 1964-1965 period. Rice importations exceed 400,000 tons a year, which represents an increase of 50 percent compared with the level recorded 10 years ago. In 1990, this region will continue to import almost all of its wheat needs and an important portion of its rice, while the millet and sorghum production should satisfy its needs. A slight shortage in root plants will also be felt.

The Great Mass

. In central Africa, the degree of self-sufficiency in recent years for all foodstuffs has decreased, except for leguminous crops, oil seeds, and sugar. The cereal shortage will still be very considerable in 1990, since local production will be able to satisfy only 60 percent of the needs. Contrary to other regions of the continent, central Africa is still unsuitable for the development of considerable cattle breeding. It will continue to be deficient in meat, milk, and even fish.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

. Finally, for eastern and southern Africa as a whole, the degree of self-sufficiency is higher and more stable than elsewhere. But, as everywhere, importations of wheat and of rice continue to increase, amounting respectively to 700,000 and 400,000 tons a year.

The production of meat has increased in recent years to the point of providing a considerable surplus, but a shortage will again be felt, beginning with 1985, in milk, meat, and fish. The cereal shortage will not be solved, in spite of a surplus production of corn and millet. But root plants and leguminous crops will satisfy requirements.

Still, these estimates for the 1990 outlook are optimistic. At a meeting in Arusha in September 1978, on the occasion of the 10th regional FAO conference, the African ministers of agriculture in fact declined at that time to make estimates based on projections of present trends, believing that one would arrive at an "unacceptable" situation. They thus started from an "optimistic" viewpoint, based on general economic expansion and on the institution of a series of measures to raise food production very much above the present tendentious line. But the evolution of the situation since the 1978 conference calls for more circumspection.

In observing the structure of the shortage one notes in any case the importance of the urban demand, since the cities are the chief consumers of rice and of wheat. As much as the demand, itself, national production does not succeed in keeping up with the change in food habits, and the city-country hiatus is continuing to increase. Will one soon see a modern and highly profitable type of agriculture capture the best land and devote itself exclusively to the satisfaction of the needs of the city dwellers, while the mass of peasants will continue to cultivate traditional cereals and tubercles with more or less improved techniques?

New Outlets

This will be a quite likely pattern and moreover is beginning to exist in some countries, thanks to the countries' development of big agro-industrial areas. Modernization in any case has long developed so-called commercial crops. In spite of the regular deterioration of trade terms, hardly offset by the sharp and ephemeral price increases that were applied to sugar in 1975 or coffee in 1976-1977, in the case of a great number of countries the development of these crops is often the only means of supporting the public treasury and of obtaining currency. Again it is necessary to differentiate between stagnant crops, or those in decline, and those that have developed at a rapid rate during the past 20 years.

In North Africa, for example, the areas devoted to vineyards have been reduced by about half since independence, causing a significant decrease

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in exportations, to the extent also that the French market ceased to receive Maghreb wines on preferential terms. At the same time that this decrease in production occurred, the three countries of the Maghreb have actively searched for new outlets: thus, in a few years, black Africa has become an important buyer of North Africa's wines (of 500,000 hectares of exportation, Tunisia has been selling 110,000 hectoliters a year for some years), as have the socialist countries, in particular the USSR, for which Algeria converts a portion of its production into brandy.

It would be difficult for the production of other export crops to increase much in a near-at-hand future, the world market being currently incapable of absorbing big surpluses. Thus the Tunisian production of olive oil, after being greatly developed since independence, will not exceed 200,000 tons a year, since Tunisia is able to export hardly more than 100,000 tons a year. The same for Moroccan and Tunisian citrus fruit. The European markets that absorb a great portion of the exports are not infinitely extensible, and these two countries already now have great difficulty in exporting some 700,000 tons a year.

In the southern part of the Sahara, peanuts have caused the greatest frustrations in recent years because of drought, but especially because of severe competition from the oil seeds that are being cultivated all over the place, especially in the industrial countries. Senegal, the second world producer after India, is the first to suffer from this situation.

The "Palm Tree Plan"

Considered as a whole, Africa has not increased its production of big tropical crops in a spectacular manner, except for a limited number of products. One notes instead important changes in the distribution of these crops among various countries. Whereas poor management of the agricultural patrimony, or a hazardous economic policy, has occasioned dramatic drops in a certain number of countries, during this time others have acquired a leading position for some crops.

For coffee, whereas Ugandan, Zairian, and central African production has declined, that of other countries, like Rwanda and Burundi--which produce excellent quality arabic--have been maintained at a creditable level, while others have made a big effort in this domain: Tanzania, whose production went from 27,000 tons in 1961 to 50,000 tons in 1978; Cameroon and the Ivory Coast, which respectively produce 90,000 tons and 330,000 tons of coffee a year.

The Ivory Coast has also succeeded in becoming the first world producer of cocoa, with a harvest of 320,000 tons in 1979 and which should amount to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

480,000 tons in 1985. It has thus supplanted Ghana, which has long occupied first world place, but whose production has greatly decreased in recent years, in spite of a slight increase in recent seasons.

Thanks to the implementation in 1960 of a gigantic "palm tree plan," the Ivory Coast has also become the first African producer of palm oil, with an estimated production of 200,000 tons in 1980. Other countries are also developing the cultivation of oil-producing palm trees; the world demand for palm oil is ever-increasing. This is the case with Cameroon and, to a lesser degree, Gabon, which probably will soon produce 15,000 tons of oil a year, thanks to the planting of 5,000 hectares of palm groves.

Good Intentions...

There seems to be a good future in Africa for other oleaginous products. Some countries in fact are proposing to join the competition for soybean production. The project is already very advanced in the Ivory Coast. Export prospects seem promising and Europe, desirous of diversifying its supplies, is actively encouraging the development of this crop in Africa. But the undertaking is not without risk. In addition to its being a question of a new exportation crop in countries with an already extroverted economy, the United States--which possesses a quasi-monopoly of the world production--could at pleasure cause a drop in prices in order to "break" eventual competitors. In addition, new processes for the feeding of livestock in industrial countries would doubtless cause the end of the "soybean era," to the detriment of producer countries. But, for the moment, it seems that the decision has been made to develop speculations according to outside demand.

In recent years Africa has also been accorded the role of supplier of tropical fruit and of out of season truck gardening products destined for Europe. Pineapple and avocados from the Ivory Coast; pimento and green beans from Kenya, Senegal, and Haute-Volta; mangoes from Mali, etc. supply a considerable exportation stream to European markets. But this type of speculation encounters great difficulties because of the instability of markets. For example, the Ivory Coast encounters big problems in exporting its production of fresh pineapple, which moreover has gone from 240,000 tons in 1975 to 150,000 tons in 1980. Production costs have increased in spite of the low price for these foodstuffs paid to the producer. The very great increase in the price of air freight poses enormous problems.

Among the industrial crops that have been developed in recent years, let us finally cite tea in eastern Africa (chiefly Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi) and cotton in western and central Africa, if one excepts the decline in this crop in Nigeria; with an annual harvest of about 175,000 tons of cottonseed, Chad has become the third African producer, behind Egypt and the Sudan; and French-speaking countries as a whole, from Cameroon to Mali, have seen their production develop considerably.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In spite of low remuneration for their products on the world market, African countries on the whole are big exporters of agricultural raw material and increasingly important importers of foodstuffs. However, the time has not yet come for them to harvest the fruit of such a constancy in the outward direction of their crops. International negotiations with respect to the price of basic products always clash with the generosity of consumer countries and the 5th UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] session, held in Manila in May 1979, resulted in a series of failures. No provision was made in behalf of vegetable oil and oil seeds. A new international agreement, which became effective in January 1980, was made only for olive oil. The discussions did not lead to any new agreement on coffee. Negotiations with respect to cocoa, which have been going on since the beginning of 1979, ended in failure at the time of the London conference this past March.

Therefore the prospects for African agriculture are not very optimistic. However, significant attempts are beginning to be made here and there to correct the situation. In the trade sector, one witnesses attempts at regrouping the exporter countries, while in the realm of food, almost all of the African countries are currently concentrating on strategies for the development of food production. Implementation is now necessary. In spite of statements of principle, they are not always carried out.

Unequal Development

The agro-industrial complex: that today is one of the key words of development in Africa. Most countries have desk drawers full of attractive plans, and the countries are on the look out for foreign financing--public or private. There is a logical reason: on the spot processing of agricultural raw materials in fact makes it possible to realize an added value to that of the raw materials, to create jobs for an ever-increasing working population, to contribute to the exploitation of private regions, that is, of resources.

Processing

One should, however, differentiate between several types of agro-industries, which have not been developed to the same degree by all countries: industries that deal with the first stage of agriculture on the one hand, those that process agricultural products on the other hand and, finally, those which deal with local or imported products that are intended for domestic demand.

The general degree of industrialization and the existence of a considerable domestic market moreover condition agro-industrial development: the Maghreb, Egypt, or Nigeria are much more advanced in this regard than the Sahelian

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

countries or most of the central African countries. Other countries, such as Kenya or the Ivory Coast, have embarked on an ambitious policy of industrialization, where the processing of agricultural products occupies a choice place.

In the manufacture of items for the production of agriculture Africa on the whole is a continent that is not very advanced. The still very embryonic use of fertilizers, the small amount of agricultural mechanization have not created demands that would make it profitable to establish such industries. Yet, a potential demand does exist: African consumption of mineral fertilizers (NPK) went from 700,000 tons in 1960 to 1.8 million tons in 1970, and will amount to 3.5 million in 1980-1981. But it is still a question of negligible quantities. Judge for yourself: whereas the developed countries consume 59 kg of fertilizer units a year per inhabitant, Angola consumes only 4.5 kg, and Haute-Volta 0.1 kg! The only countries that possess a strong fertilizer industry are the continent's big producers of phosphate, that moreover export a good portion of their production; this is the case with Morocco and Tunisia. Other countries, like Algeria, have developed a domestic fertilizer production. In the Ivory Coast, the SIVENG (Ivorian Fertilizer Company), located in Vridi, produces 25,000 tons of various types of fertilizer a year from imported raw materials, and envisages bringing its manufacturing capacity of fertilizer compounds to 120,000 tons a year. Senegal and Cameroon also possess their own fertilizer factories. There are plans elsewhere, but their implementation is slow in materializing.

There is a similar weakness with respect to agricultural mechanization: out of more than 15 million tractors in service in the world in 1977, only 120,000 were in service in Africa (excluding South Africa) and only 30,000 in tropical Africa, that is, 0.2 percent of the world total. The Maghreb agriculture, characterized by the long-time presence of great colonial domains, is more mechanized, and it is not surprising that Algeria is in the forefront in this sector: the country in fact manufactures a portion of the farm machines needed for its agriculture and has gone far beyond the mere assembly stage, since there is an 80 percent degree of integration of its factories. Because of its considerable needs, it still remains one of the biggest importers of agricultural materials and of separate parts in the Third World: in 1979, its imports amounted to 1 billion FF (50 billion CFA [African Financial Community] F).

In tropical Africa, industrialization focused essentially on the manufacture of small equipment intended to improve peasant farming: ploughs, multi-cultivators, seeders, harrows, carts, etc.

For the rest, African dependence is still very great and all the more pre-occupying since the price of equipment and of production items is increasing

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

at a much more rapid rate than that of raw materials. The price of phosphated and nitrogenous fertilizers increased 10 percent in 1978 and that of potash 20 percent. This increase continued in 1979.

As one might expect, the most developed agro-industrial sector is that of the important processing of agricultural products intended for exportation.

The Food Industry

The oil mill sector is one of the most important of agro-industrial activities from the north to the south of the continent: olive oil, peanut oil, palm oil, copra oil are processed everywhere on the spot before being exported. It has also given rise to a series of subsidiary industries, for both exportation and the domestic market, in particular the manufacture of various kinds of fat and the installation of soap factories.

Textile plants also are at the basis of numerous industrial units: cotton gins and cotton oil mills, but also textile complexes and the processing of jute and of sisal, chiefly in eastern Africa.

Coffee and cocoa are also decorticated on the spot before being exported, although in this domain processing is not very advanced; a negligible portion of African coffee is roasted at the places of production and the capability for trituration of cocoa is still very slight: that of the Ivory Coast does not exceed 70,000 tons a year, with a total production that soon will amount to 400,000 tons a year. The diversification of domestic demand has nevertheless made possible the creation of more sophisticated industries: chocolate factories, factories for soluble coffee are multiplying across the continent.

As in the case of textiles, the food industry is one of the sectors where implantation is relatively easy in the developing countries: local productions have often favored development of the already long-standing canning industry in North Africa. This sector is particularly developed in Morocco and in Tunisia, countries which, once the domestic demand is satisfied, are big exporters of flour and of canned fish, fruit, vegetables, and jams.

Industrial Breeding

However, outlets are not always assured: in Morocco, the processing factories for fruit juices, which consume a portion of the agronomic production, cannot operate at full speed because of difficulties in selling the production. The world market, dominated by very big producers, like the United States, Israel, South Africa, or Spain, in fact leaves very little room for newcomers. The situation is the same for tropical countries; the Ivory Coast encounters great difficulties in exporting its production of canned

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

pineapple: the SALCI agro-industrial complex regularly produces less than its 55-ton capacity of preserves and 8 million cans of juice a year. That is why satisfaction of the domestic market is an increasingly surer base. Long after the Maghreb, almost all of the countries in south Sahara embarked on the processing of tomato paste. Three factories were installed in Senegal. The Ivory Coast has just put the Sinematiali agro-industrial complex into operation; it manufactures products obtained from 1,800 hectares of irrigated land: 3,000 tons a year of canned local vegetables (grubo and eggplant) and 1,000 tons of mango preserves and of mangoes in syrup.

Finally, the processing of cereals gives rise to a series of industrial activities. While traditional cereals, like millet and sorghum, are still processed through artisan means--even though some countries like Senegal have succeeded in converting them into bread--increasing wheat requirements have resulted in an increase of flour mills for domestic production in North Africa and importations into black Africa. In the French-speaking countries, trade and processing are still to a great degree in the hands of foreign interests. Who has not seen in Dakar, Abidjan, Douala, or Brazzaville the immense Grands Moulins silos that dominate the port? Setting aside the processing of flour, in recent years biscuit factories, factories for pastas (macaroni, noodles, spaghetti, etc.), couscous, etc. have been installed everywhere; these products are being increasingly consumed by urban populations.

Rice factories on the other hand, which have been increasing in the African south Sahara for about 10 years, operate on the basis of a local production that is ever-increasing, rice being in a fair way almost everywhere to deposing traditional cereals and tubercles as the basic food of urban populations.

The demand for the latter has also caused a spectacular development in small livestock breeding in the proximity of big agglomerations in the most advanced industrial countries and also in a dairy industry that is still quite inadequate in comparison to needs.

In this context, the breeding of poultry and of porcine animals (except in Moslem countries) makes it possible to rapidly respond to increased requirements in countries where cattle breeding is inadequate: in Tunisia, the STIL company several years ago embarked on the processing of milk and dairy products, on the production of eggs and of chickens for the provisioning of urban markets. In the Ivory Coast, the SIPRA company will produce at the rate of 1 million eggs a week and 20,000 tons of food a year. In Kenya, where family poultry raising covers only 25 percent of its needs, a poultry industry has developed in the vicinity of Nairobi, Mombasa, and in the tourist areas (Indian Ocean coasts). Morocco is in the process of implementing an ambitious dairy project, intended to make it self-sufficient in this

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

domain. Finally, with respect to cattle breeding, several countries have embarked on an industrial-type breeding, thanks to the processing of livestock food from agricultural by-products.

Change of Direction

Thus an industrial-type of agriculture is in the process of emerging in Africa. Concentrated around some cities, it has only slightly penetrated the rural world, which continues to live according to the rhythms of agricultural seasons and the traditional techniques that have scarcely improved at all. Nevertheless, the desire of countries for agro-industry is not abating and some large-scale realizations are now relieving light industries. The most striking example is that of sugar production. A substitution industry for some countries like Morocco, whose production now amounts to 600,000 tons a year, it now ranks as an exporter industry for a good number of countries that have had sugar complexes for about 10 years (up to that time, the sugar industry had been concentrated in a very small number of countries). Others, like Haute-Volta, Cameroon, or Gabon, several years ago installed one or two complexes, making it possible to largely satisfy their domestic needs. Still others have resolutely embarked on a policy of sugar expansion. Five other countries will become big exporters of sugar between 1982 and 1985: the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Sudan, Cameroon, and Swaziland. The possibilities for the creation of regional markets being extremely limited, the new product will support the predominant trend of a north-south trade.

As in the case of other activities, the agro-industrial sector is still developing in great part in accordance with the needs, or supposed needs, of industrial countries. Evolution toward other priorities is very slow and a change of direction will not occur tomorrow.

Obstacles and Perspectives

The increase in agricultural production in Africa is not only tied in with the increase in cultivated areas or with yields, but also with the protection of crops and harvests. The decrease in yields, owing to crop predators such as insects, like the formidable locust, birds, or rats, and to plant diseases, have often caused catastrophic losses that annihilate years of effort. In some countries, losses due to the enemies of crops can amount to 40 percent of total production. For a long time, a series of phytosanitary measures have been taken in numerous countries. But often the lack of continuity of action and the impossibility on the part of peasants to buy the necessary quantities of pesticides have prevented counteractions from being truly effective.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The use of pesticides nevertheless has greatly increased in Africa, in spite of a 10 percent increase in price in 1979. In order to surmount the obstacle of price, especially for the plants that are big consumers of chemical products, like cotton, one now tries to utilize techniques of integrated counteraction, with a consequent reduction in cost to farmers, while at the same time limiting the harmful effects of the uncontrolled use of chemical products. Another big obstacle to self-sufficiency with respect to food: that connected with the stockpiling of harvests--the losses due to poor conditions of stockpiling being also very considerable. Several countries, like Senegal or the Sudan, have started to build silos in cities, while at the same time they are trying to improve traditional techniques of village stockpiling. Systematic measures in this regard, especially when harvests are good and provide considerable surpluses, can make it possible to save 10 to 20 percent of the crops. In these domains, as well as in others, there are existent techniques. In order to put them into concrete form, willingness is needed at the level of those in charge and necessary means are needed at the level of peasants.

The Utilization of Land in Africa

Utilization of Land	Millions of hectares	Percentage of the total
Arable land actually cultivated	214	7 percent
Pastures	822	27 percent
Forests	635	21 percent
Fallow land and other utilization	1,360	45 percent
Total	3,031	100 percent

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Increase in Agricultural Investments in Some African Countries

A certain number of African countries have increased their agricultural investments after the world food crisis at the beginning of the 70's. But a reading of the following table shows that the effort has not always been adequate. If the trend is encouraging with respect to some countries, the part of agriculture in the total investment continues to decrease in other countries, even though confronted with serious difficulties regarding supplies.

Country	1971-1973 and 1974-1976 evolution		Percentage of Agricultural investments of total investment		Percentage of agricultural PIB of total PIB in 1976
	Current price	1970 price	1971-73	1974-76	
Algeria	68	39	7	5	8
Kenya	60	11	9	10	14
Tunisia	66	27	15	12	17
Mauritius	362	88	10	11	26
Egypt	57	23	13	8	27
Tanzania	356	181	16	25	37
Zambia	- 41	- 59	21	11	38
Ethiopia	- 7	- 27	8	8	46
Burundi	80	25	24	2	58
Malawi	48	10	23	30	60

The countries are classified according to the part of agriculture in the total PIB, in increasing order.

Source: World Bank statistics. The countries chosen are those for which the greatest amount of statistics are available.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

8255
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ALLEGED MNR SUPPORT--The opposition to President Samora Machel of Mozambique are said to be still supplied from the southeast of Zimbabwe by the South Africans. With the complicity of white officers of the army of Prime Minister R. Mugabe. [Text] [JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1013 4 Jun 80 p 40] 8956

SENGHOR WARNS OF LIBYA-MAURITANIA TIE--Senghor, very concerned about the re-organization of the Mauritanian army by the Libyans, has alerted Giscard: "Their first target is likely to be Dakar and Senegal. Be prepared to have the Jaguar aircraft intervene." [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 11 Jul 80 p 71]

CSO: 4400

41

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

ALLEGED FRENCH RELUCTANCE TO ACT AGAINST UNITA, FNLA ELEMENTS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 216, 23 Jun 80 p 37

[Article: "FNLA Death Squads in Paris"]

[Text] In spite of the many economic agreements concluded between Paris and Luanda (especially with respect to oil), certain French special services seem determined to do everything they can to create and entertain a state of crisis between the two countries. Neither the pressing requests made by the Angolan ambassador to Paris, Mr Luis d'Almeida, at the French Foreign Office and at the Elysees Palace, nor the official warnings of the head of Angolan diplomacy, Mr Paulo Jorge, appear to have succeeded in convincing French official circles that they should take the necessary steps to end the dangerous activities of agents from puppet movements, UNITA and FLNA [Angolan National Liberation Front], whose leaders are known to have entertained close relations with the CIA, the SDECE [External Intelligence and Counterespionage Service], the former Portuguese PIDE [Police for the Control of Foreigners and the Defense of the State] and the South African Boss [expansion unknown].

For several months, the French Ministry of the Interior, using legal quibbles, has been asking the Paris Prefecture of Police to open a special service to handle the requests of so-called Angolan political refugees who, in fact, are only FNLA, UNITA and FLEC hit men and secret agents. Thus, Roberto Holden has been able to move to Neuilly, to a villa belonging to the French secret services and located near the Angolan ambassador's residence. Although he is protected by scores of French policemen, Holden kept saying he needed more bodyguards. And thus several members of the evil Death Squad which he had formed in Kinshasa to attempt to the life of MPLA leaders and sympathizers have arrived in Paris. Armed with submachine guns and sight-telescope rifles, these hit men are headed by Cocoderiou and Tetelaoudo whose victim list is especially long. These two individuals have been positively identified by Angolan diplomats and their friends in Paris.

Under the cover of the "political refugee" status, French police authorities are protecting these common criminals, these hired assassins. Certain diplomatic circles in the French capital have reason to wonder whether this is not an operation intended to aggravate--if not create--a serious crisis in

42

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Franco-Angolan relations. The crucial question, however, remains that of knowing what French or foreign power, or political or economic circles would have an interest in disrupting the development of relations between Paris and Luanda. The close connection existing between Roberto Holden and his friends at the CIA might provide a possible answer.

In fact, in Parisian diplomatic circles it is not a secret that France's overture toward Luanda has created a definite malaise in Washington.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

9294
CSO:4400

:

-

-

▪

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

BRIEFS

REPORTED FRG SUPPORT TO UNITS--It was the German Christian Democratic Party which, of the Western parties, decided to give the greatest military and financial assistance to the Angolan puppet, Savimbi. Well informed diplomatic sources in Bonn affirm that, on instructions from the Bavarian leader, Strauss, large loans were made to Savimbi. A campaign is said to be underway among certain German industrial companies to contribute to this UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] fund. It has further been confirmed that the president of Zaire, Mobutu, has himself encouraged German political and financial circles to aid Savimbi in every possible way. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 214 26 May-8Jun 80 p 15] 8956

DETAILS ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES--Luanda has announced that Angola now has 3,500 farmers' associations and 296 production cooperatives representing respectively 417,851 and 50,811 people. The associations consist of cores of 20 families who devote 3 days each week to work in collective fields. In cooperatives, which are the result of the evolution of associations, or of the transformation of small and medium-size colonial farms, the farmers also own the production means (or rent agricultural equipment, etc.) in common, and share the profits according to the amount and quality of the work they provide. The existence of these numerous associations leads to anticipate a significant increase in agricultural production and a progressive modernization of the working methods used in the Angolan country. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 216, 23 Jun 80 p 35] 9294

1980 COFFEE PRODUCTION ESTIMATES--The People's Republic of Angola anticipates the exportation, this year, of 48,000 tons of coffee, which will represent an amount of 160 million dollars (approximately 5 billion kwanzas), the head of the Department of Foreign Marketing of the National Coffee Enterprise (ENCAFE), Jaime de Oliveira, announced. It is estimated that coffee production this year will be double that of 1979 and will exceed that of 1978 by 25 percent. Angolan coffee is exported for two thirds to socialist European countries (East Germany and the Soviet Union) and Algeria; the remaining third is bought by traditional importers (the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal). [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 216, 23 Jun 80 p 34] 9294

CSO: 4400

44

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BENIN

NATION'S PROBLEMS IN 1980 DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1190

[Article: "Benin Facing Problems in 1980"]

[Text] The observer traveling through Benin from north to south and from east to west will notice mainly two things as the present dry season nears its end:

- Political stability has made possible certain economic developments: Onigbolo cement factory, now under construction (investments: 25 to 30 billion CFA francs); Save sugar manufacturing complex (45 to 50 billion CFA francs); Bohicon multipurpose oil mill (2 to 3 billion CFA francs); Bohicon corn mill (1 to 2 billion CFA francs).

The extension of the Parakou railroad to Niamey is also being contemplated: approximately 100 billion CFA francs. Financial backers will soon meet to discuss the Mono dam.

- Petty police annoyances have ceased altogether. From the few police road blocks, one realizes that safety officers are more worried about public transportation or private truck drivers than about controlling the identity of a few tourists.

These observations are a legitimate source of pride for a regime which, at the start, was not expected to last over a year considering the uncertainties which surrounded its creation, the blunders and regrettable incidents which occurred along the way, and the improvisations which characterize the decisions made by the country's high officials. Thus, the struggle against witchcraft (in a country where the near totality of the population goes to the voodoo convent, to a protestant or catholic church, or to the mosk) has been a failure. The campaign to encourage production, poorly designed and poorly organized, has been abandoned. The campaign for national construction has been a flop.

The country has thus to face tremendous problems. An essentially agricultural country, it is striving to prevent an exaggerated extroversion of its economy: self-sufficient food production, use of local raw materials

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in the burgeoning industries: corn-processing, table oils, soap-making... Parallel to these efforts, the drought--added to the disorganization of agricultural trading channels and to the lack of technical cadres--has contributed to reduce production in all sectors:

- In spite of the incentives provided during the 1979-1980 campaign, cotton production will hardly reach again 20,000 tons.
- Oil palms have not yet recovered from the past years' drought. Some mills (Ahozon, Gbada) have even been closed.
- Peanuts and coffee are stagnating. The incentives now offered, if they are continued, will bear fruit only in a few years.

Food crops were likely to cover Benin's requirements and even allow for some exportations. In President Kerekou's words: "The demagogic measures taken by some revolutionary agitators of all tendencies," have consisted in putting institutions incapable of flexibility in control of trading channels: suspicious Beninese farmers have chosen to keep their corn and sorghum or to sell it secretly to their usual dealers rather than to sell it dirt cheap to state organizations.

These observations have enabled financial experts to gather some significant figures:

Palm cabbages (in tons)			
	Production	Difference	Variation
1976/1977	41,425	- 8,360	-16.8%
1977/1978	11,818	-29,607	-71.5%

The evolution for the four products exported is as follows. The products involved are palm cabbages, cottonseed, tobacco and peanuts:

	1974/1975	1975/1976	1976/1977	1977/1978
Production	83,703	77,177	67,289	28,633
Index value	100	92	80	34

The rate of growth of the primary sector anticipated by the World Bank for the period 1978-1986 was between 3 and 4 percent, in actual value, against 1.6 percent actually achieved during the 1972-1978 period.

The strong growth anticipated, 13 percent for the 1977-1978 period, did not occur; all agricultural productions dropped by nearly two thirds.

However, the tertiary sector of private trade is doing well. Import trade is brisk and, as a result, the trade balance shows a considerable deficit: between 35 and 40 percent.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This sector is under the indirect control of a political aristocracy from the North and a bourgeoisie of tradesmen from the South. This phenomenon explains the speculation and the large bank credits granted to the trade sector. To gain control over it, the state has created approximately 130 companies, among which national and provincial trading companies. However, the functioning of these institutions has been corrupted by the bureaucracy: private trade has continued to develop at the expense of state trade, which seems quite normal in a society where commercial acumen is developed in the individual at an early age.

This sector is growing so well that state employees will desert their jobs or resign to devote themselves to it. After making visits to the Cotonou market where he met state employees engaged in trading during office hours, the minister of labor decided something had to be done. The government shared his view and, last 23 April, a long communique was published in which the following were denounced:

- carelessness in administrative management and work;
- increasing incompetence due to a lack of taste for work, and especially for work well done;
- lateness at work due to laziness and thoughtlessness;
- increasing total or partial absenteeism due to a lack of control by immediate supervisors and to the employees' sheer lack of discipline; and especially delays in carrying out the tasks assigned, and the mediocre quality of the work performed, the employees being more concerned about their private and extraprofessional interests.

This communique provides a startling summary of "the disease which undermines dangerously our administrations, our public and semi-public enterprises.

The government reacts, penalizes, reorganizes structures. Thus, a few people are dismissed at each meeting of the Council of Ministers. The head of the state has even created a Ministry for the Inspection of Companies. A minister for propaganda is supposed to "increase the awareness of cadres and the masses." But nothing helps.

The true problem of this country is that it has always been--and continues to be--secretly run by political aristocrats from the North and bourgeois tradesmen from the South, military and intellectual idealists and opportunists. Under these conditions, the pendular motion consists in getting into the good graces of both social groups so as to be in the clear.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From time to time, President Kerekou will denounce this type of behavior. But they retrieve him right away; as a result there is an authority crisis, some companies being managed contrary to common sense and those responsible still retaining their positions.

Under such circumstances, beautiful speeches no longer help. The People's Republic of Benin has all it takes to succeed. Now, after eight years in power, President Kerekou must again convene the cadres, including those of his own party, to draw a balance--which, besides, is not all negative--and a new program--speech is required to mobilize the new energies. The economy of a country is not something which one can improvise.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

9294
CSO:4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BENIN

1977 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1209

[Article: "1977 Foreign Balance of Payments"]

[Text] BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States] has recently analyzed the foreign balance of payments of Benin for the year 1977, which has been approved by the Balance of Payments Committee on 30 January 1980, at the same time as the 1976 balance.

The main elements of the 1975, 1976 and 1977 balances of payments can be summarized as follows (in million CFA francs):

	1975		1976		1977	
	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit
Goods and services	-	25,834	-	24,014	-	31,013
Transfers without counter- parts	14,396	-	11,408	-	20,472	-
Foreign assets and monetary gold	-	10,951	-	6,918	-	9,475
Foreign liabilities	17,599	-	11,472	-	13,078	-
Special drawing rights (SDR) allocations	-	93	50	-	89	-
Total net transactions	31,995	36,878	22,930	30,932	33,639	40,488
Net errors and omissions	4,883	-	8,002	-	6,849	-
Total	36,878	36,878	30,932	30,932	40,488	40,488

For each year, the negative balance of the item Goods and Services indicates the deficit of the Beninese foreign trade; imports are far in excess of exports. Under the same Services item, travel and transportation for 1977 show a surplus of 213 million CFA francs, while foreign capital disinvestments show a total outflow of 740 million CFA francs.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Transfers without counterparts include the repatriation of the savings of Beninese workers working abroad (positive balance: 5.7 billion CFA francs for 1977) and foreign assistance grants (13.8 billion CFA francs).

Foreign assets and liabilities include international loans obtained by Benin and, conversely, the annual instalments in repayment of the debt, and the deduction resulting from the trade imbalance.

As for short and long-term private capital investments, foreign participation into local enterprises in 1977 resulted in a surplus of 4.1 billion CFA francs.

For each of the three years considered, the equilibrium of the balance of payment has been ensured by entering, as a credit, a large amount for net errors and omissions.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

9294
CSO:4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BENIN

DETAILS ON NEW COMPANY GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1209

[Article: "SABLI: Publication of By-Laws"]

[Text] On 5 June 1977, in Tripoli, SABLI [Agro-Animal Benino-Arab Libyan Company] was created; this is an industrial and commercial company with mixed public capital, having the legal status of a corporation and enjoying financial autonomy. The by-laws of the company have just been published (in EHUZU, the Cotonou daily, 7 May 1980).

SABLI, which has its headquarters in Cotonou, has for its object the cultivation of lands, the realization and management of agricultural projects, the realization of projects to develop livestock-raising resources (especially the development of poultry farming, the creation and operation of ranches and feedlots, the production of cattle feed), industrialization, and the marketing and exportation of agricultural products.

The registered capital of the company has been set at 2 million dollars, divided into 1,000 actions of 2,000 dollars each. The participation of the parties is as follows: 49 percent to Libya, 51 percent to Benin.

The shares taken up by each of the parties will be paid for in full, in cash and in convertible currency, 25 percent at the time of creation of the company, and 75 percent when called up by the board.

SABLI is headed by two organizations: a general assembly comprising nine members (four from Libya, including the chairmand of the board, and five from Benin, including the general manager) and a board of six members (three from Benin, including the general manager, and three from Libya, including the chairman of the board). The company has been created for a period of 25 years, and is renewable.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

9294
CSO:4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

OCF REPLACES UNFCA--The Organization of Central African Women (OCF) was created last May to replace the National Union of Central African Women (UNFCA), dissolved after the fall of Bokassa who had changed it into a political organization affiliated to the only political party, the MESAN. The OCF is apolitical, it is not affiliated to any party, and its purpose is to educate the Central African woman and promote her emancipation. Mrs Ruth Rolland, who is in charge of the armed forces' social service, has been elected OCF chairwoman. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1570] 9294

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ETHIOPIA

BRIEFS

OFFENSIVE PLANNED--The Ethiopian government of Col Mengistu is getting ready to launch a new offensive against the nationalist movements in Eritrea. It recently received large shipments of Soviet arms, notably 30 Mi-24 combat helicopters, similar to those used by the Red Army in Afghanistan. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1018 9 Jul 80 p 41]

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GHANA

RAWLINGS' POLITICAL POSITION REMAINS STRONG

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1013,4 Jun 80 p 41

[Article by Mohamed Maiga: "When Will Zorro Return?"]

[Excerpts] Two attempts at a putsch in 2 months; a tense political climate and a catastrophic economic situation. Almost 9 months after the installation of the civilian government, Ghanians are asking questions about the future.

A troublemaker to some, a last recourse to others (see JA No 1007), the hero of the coup d'etat of 4 June 1979 has caused a lot of talk. Periodically, the government tends to discredit him by accusing him of tribalism or even of having covered up the corruption of certain members of the AFRC [Armed Forces Revolutionary Council]. Each time his answer has prevailed: Rawlings' press conferences fill the hall and no one places his sincerity in doubt. To neutralize him, the government is said to have proposed to him, in vain, a "golden" exile in Great Britain. Another attraction: a seat in the Council of State (consulting), but Rawlings will not hear of it. Only if it were going to deal with agricultural questions. A prospect which causes fear because the team of President Limann suspects the former captain of wanting to draw closer to the peasants in order to create a "part of the masses."

Lethargy

For the moment, Jerry Rawlings is safe from attack: his men, who have remained in the army, would be ready to act and the constitution of the Third Republic forbids "interfering with" former members of the AFRC. He still heads therefore the Fourth of June Movement (not officially) which watches over the spirit and the accomplishments of the revolution.

What is more, between the old guard of the People's National Party (PNP, in power) which has remained faithful to the first president of Ghana, the late Kwame Nkrumah, headed by Imoru Egala, the right wing headed by the president of the party, the very wealthy Nana Okutwer Bekoe and finally the intellectual and trade union left, Limann does not know whom to listen to. Even less since, 1 year after the Rawlings coup d'etat which gave him back the power, the civilian team has not kept its promises.

54

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Ghana is threatened with real famine, even though it is one of the African states most well endowed by nature. The inflation rate is close to 100 percent per year while wages remain frozen. Foreign investments are not being made, as investors wait for a return to stability. Because of a lack of replacement parts, factories are running at 20 percent of capacity. And, finally, cacao production (65 percent of export income) has stagnated at around 250,000 tons (500,000 tons in 1963). In 1980, it will just barely cover oil imports (\$400 million), while the budget deficit is worsening. The national currency, the cedi, (officially, 1 C equals 190 CFA francs), having lost about 300 percent of its real value in 3 years, 50,000 tons of cacao have secretly found their way to the Ivory Coast and to Togo, where the CFA franc is more profitable.

Reconversion

One year after the "purification" putsch by the young officers and enlisted men, the young Ghanaian democracy is once again in danger of being submerged by corruption and "shady deals." Two plagues which had motivated the Rawlings coup d'etat. But it is true today that Jerry Rawlings is no longer in the army.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

8956
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GUINEA

LACK OF REPRESSION FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1013 4 Jun 80 p 31

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Guinea-Liberia: Each Has Its Own Big Brother"]

[Text] During his brief visit to Conakry, on 23 May, Chief Sergeant Samuel Doe was given a talking to by President Sekou Toure. It was the first excursion for the new master of Liberia. It was the first lesson in political morality to be given in a long time by the Guinean chief of state: "Assure your fellow citizens," he told his young visitor, "the enjoyment of the rights of man. Be honest and sincere with those whom you govern and try to lead the Liberian people rapidly to the socio-economic prosperity they need."

It was enough to reassure Samuel Doe, a little out of favor with Africa since his coup d'etat of 12 April. So much so that, in the good old African tradition, Sekou Toure, the beneficiary of age and reason, is now his "Big Brother."

One is tempted to believe it was only a mean joke when one remembers that this was the same Sekou Toure who, in March 1979, had sent his troops to help the late William Tolbert put down the "rice riots" (JA Nos 1007 and 1012), which had been organized and supported by the opposition at that time. The Liberian president owed his survival in power only to his bloody repression: 70 dead, more than 400 wounded.

Since then, Doe has replaced Tolbert (assassinated) and has had executed 13 of his former associates (JA No 1011). A sordid accounting would show that, as far as the rights of man are concerned, Doe has been worse than Tolbert. What is worse, Doe has killed fewer--far fewer--than the person giving him lessons, Sekou Toure, after 20 years of terror.

This sudden zeal for moderation on the part of the Guinean president is all the more a welcome surprise since, after the attack in which he was almost killed on 14 May (JA No 1012), a new wave of repression had been feared. He had had arrested about 100 people, among whom were some of his close associates, such as former minister Toumani, even relatives,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

like General Lansana Diane. But he freed them afterwards, following their interrogation. And he had just ordered these releases and had counseled moderation to the last contingent of his faithful, when he received Samuel Doe in Conakry. Why this sudden turnabout?

Actually, Sekou Toure himself received lessons in prudence and moderation from his own "Big Brothers." Fearing an immoderate reaction on his part, Felix Houphuet-Boigny, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Valery Giscard D'Estaing and Gnassingbe Eyadema had sent messages to him, if not messengers, to tell him in substance: "Do not yield to the temptation of repression, you will only be helping your adversaries. Be magnanimous." Did Sekou Toure need such advice? Probably, in the opinion of anyone who knows his past. But he probably also profited from the lessons of this past and has understood that his adversaries have always needed to see him use repression. So they could fight it. And that is perhaps the best lesson that Sekou Toure ought to learn from the determination of his mortal enemies.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

8956
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GUINEA

BRIEFS

TOURISTS UNDER DETENTION--Diabate Arafan, a Guinean holding French citizenship and Christian Faure, a Frenchman, are being detained in Conakry for "not having entered Guinea directly through Conakry." This is at least the explanation provided the mother of one of the tourists. Having left the Charles-de-Gaulle airport on 3 June, they had gone first to Dakar, then on to Guinea via Labe. Following their arrival in Mamou, they were arrested and transferred to Conakry. Their families have no news of them. According to his relatives, Diabate Arafan, a worker in a Lyon hospital, married and the father of two children, had never been involved in politics. He was not known as an opponent of the Sekou Toure regime and had gone to Guinea to visit his parents. His friend Faure, a geography student, was accompanying him simply out of curiosity. Despite the demarches undertaken by the consul of France in Guinea and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Conakry does not seem ready to free the prisoners. The Quai d'Orsay and the respective families are wondering about the incident, especially since both prisoners held valid visas and Faure's mother had given the Guinean Embassy in Paris a written itinerary for the young men's trip. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1018 9 Jul 80 p 29]

AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH ROMANIA--Guinea and Romania will implement an agro-industrial project aimed at the development of 2,500 hectares of fodder corn for poultry raising. The project, which will be based in Kindia, is the result of the agreement signed on 20 June between Guinean Minister of Agriculture, Water and Forests Alafe Kourouma and a Romanian delegation visiting Guinea. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul 80 p 1682]

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IVORY COAST

RECENT POLITICAL CHANGES EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Jun 80 pp 30-32

[Article by Siradiou Diallo, special correspondent in Abidjan: "Cultural Revolution?"]

[Text] For months many bets were being made in the affluent drawing rooms of Cocody and the smoke-filled bars of Treichville. And the rating of such and such a big shot of the regime would climb or tumble on the succession stock market depending on the gestures and whims of the "Old Man" [President Felix Houphouet-Boigny].

President Houphouet-Boigny has put an abrupt halt to all these speculations. The political and economic measures that he announced before the National Council (which includes the representatives of all the active forces of the nation), summoned on 12 June 1980 at the presidential palace in Abidjan, have indeed caught short the entire Ivorian political class. After receiving a veritable crushing blow in this respect this class is now thinking less about the minor game of primacy and succession at the head of the state than salvaging its own position: All those at the top of the top--that is how the average Ivorians refer to the members of the ruling class--are worried and wondering about their future.

Scalpel Incision

Members of the [party's] politbureau, deputies, state company directors and heads of ministerial departments--all those whom the Ivory Coast has by way of big shots, of "bosses," "chiefs" (whether genuine ones or those who claim to be so)--are trembling. With the changes announced by Houphouet-Boigny, who is going to keep his position and therefore his privileges and distinctions? Who will return to being a simple citizen, fading back into anonymity and the wanness of the streets of Treichville and Koumassi? These are the questions which, since 12 June 1980, have been obsessing the minds and haunting the sleep of the golden class, of the human locomotives of the opulent Ivory Coast. This is a concern which recalls that of the Chinese cadres at the start of the Cultural Revolution when Mao Tse-tung proclaimed: "Fire on the general staff!"

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In the economic realm a generalist of the ilk of Felix Houphouet-Boigny (he is a physician by training) has not hesitated to borrow the surgeon's scalpel to operate on and amputate all the gangrenous portions of the patient's body. Aware of the serious threats which the international crisis is imposing on the economies of the Third World, the "Old Man" plans to take measures to protect his "dear Ivory Coast." To be sure, the latter continues to evidence a brilliant record in the field of development, especially in the agricultural realm where, from being fourth among cocoa-producing countries in the world, the Ivory Coast ranked first in 1979 while continuing to be second in the export of palm oil and third in the production of coffee. This is in addition to the fact that the Ivory Coast is also the leading African producer of pineapples and bananas.

But this export agriculture is seriously handicapped by the worsening trend in the terms of trade (the obstinate refusal of cocoa-importing countries to commit themselves to guarantee a floor for prices paid to producers is a case in point). Furthermore, the young Ivorian industry comes up increasingly against the protectionism of the European markets. More serious, the level of indebtedness now stands very close to the ceiling considered acceptable for a well-run country--a level corresponding to 20 percent of export revenues.

Thus, moving ahead of the recommendations of the international experts the "Old Man" has deemed it prudent to himself relinquish a series of industrial or infrastructural projects included in the development plan now being implemented. That is the case of the sugar complexes whose number has thus been reduced from 10 to six (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1013); the paper pulp mill planned in the San Pedro region; the second airport of Port Bouet; the radio broadcasting center; and others.

Not satisfied with postponing these projects despite the fact that President Houphouet-Boigny likes some of them very much, the head of state has made a genuine clean sweep. First in state companies by putting an end to the legal mess represented by their bylaws and by alining the compensation of their employees with that of officials in the general public administration. Also, by proceeding to a thorough reform of their structures. Thus, while some of these companies are amending their bylaws, being converted from state companies to ordinary government establishments or those with an industrial and commercial character, others are purely and simply being scrapped. Among those doomed are some especially well-known companies such as the AVB [Bandama Valley Development Authority], ARSO [Southwest Region Development Authority], SONAFI [National Financing Company], SODERIZ [Rice Cultivation Development Company], and others. In all, of the former 36 state companies only seven are escaping the knife. The best known of these are Air Ivoire [Ivorian Airline], Palm Industrie [Palm Oil Industrial Company], PETROCI [Ivorian Petroleum Company], SITRAM [Ivorian Marine Transport Company], and SODESUCRE [Company for the Development of Sugar Cane Plantations and the Industrialization and Marketing of Sugar].

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The severity of the sentence is explained, it is said in authorized circles, not only by the fact that some of these units no longer have a "raison d'etre" or no longer meet the needs of the moment but especially by the fact that their management cannot be trusted.

Indeed, it is mentioned, most of these state companies had not been established to meet the country's development needs but first and foremost to provide jobs for "buddies" and to secure a following. Thus, it is not surprising that uncontrolled management should have led to increasingly more onerous deficits for the state budget. This is true to such an extent that by lancing the sore the head of state undoubtedly expects to improve the administration of this sensitive sector of the Ivorian economy. He also hopes to put an end to some anomalies which had led to veritable bailiwicks whose lords had become all the more arrogant as they believed themselves to be irremovable.

Open Elections

It is especially in the political realm that the measures announced on 12 June 1980 could lead to far-reaching disruptions in established privileges. The decision of the "Old Man" to "place the democratic train back on its rails" breaks in a manner that is as abrupt as it is explosive with quarter-of-a-century-old practices and methods. Indeed, so far the dishes of the electoral cuisine had been planned, prepared, and entirely served by the high priests of the single party's politbureau, the PDCI [Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast].

At any election no matter which, the heads of this church would draw up, here as nearly everywhere in Africa, the complete slate of candidates at the rate of one for each electoral district. On the day of the voting they would experience no problem in having their designees ratified by a voting public which was becoming more and more blase and indifferent. These practices of superficial unanimity with their famous winners polling 99.99 percent of the votes which do not fool the electorate any more than the elected officials used to be the good old days of the "African democracy" of the 1960's. With time it became more and more evident that this policy of the ostrich did not solve any political problem but, contrariwise, that it constituted an encouragement to disorder and favored the more or less bloody intrusion of the colonels--not to say sergeants--on the political scene.

To remedy this state of affairs African leaders are striving more and more to find a system taking into account both the imperatives of national unity and respect for the popular will. Accordingly, without renouncing the single party principle, Tanzania, Kenya, Tunisia, and Zaire have allowed various candidates, designated with the blessing of the government, to challenge each other within the same electoral district. Because of this, well-known personalities witnessed resounding defeats at the time of the 1979 legislative elections in Kenya and Tunisia.

The democratic game which the Ivory Coast is getting ready to inaugurate is more original and much more daring than all the experiments tried elsewhere in Africa, at least within a single party structure. Indeed, the head of state spoke clearly in his speech of 12 June 1980. Henceforth in any election, whether what is involved is to designate within the PDCI the general secretaries of subsections, villages, or districts or to elect deputies or mayors, no more lists will be sponsored by the party's politbureau. Even better, said politbureau shall not either designate official candidates nor even supervise the elections. Any Ivorian citizen will be able to seek any political position without having to go through the party. "Our people," Houphouet-Boigny declared, "have reached their majority and must prove their political maturity by making good choices." This means that a grand premier is involved in Africa. Hence the gratification of the "good" Ivorian people in the face of the discomfiture of the regime's mandarins.

Battle Plans

The system will soon be tried since, with the party's congress slated to be organized in the second half of September 1980, elections will be held beginning in July 1980 in order to renew the leaders of the various party organs. Then, municipal and legislative elections are scheduled. All these elections will be supervised by prefects and subprefects, it being understood that it is absolutely prohibited for them, at the risk of their jobs, to support any given candidate. However, the fact remains that all those elected will be the choices of the PDCI. For in the mind of the "Old Man" all Ivorians are members of the party and, therefore, all those elected will be so in the name of the PDCI.

The election campaign is already under way. Prospective candidates have, without delay, started to make contact with the body of voters, whereas elected officials, formerly parachuted and elected by voters who, at times, did not know the candidates, now hesitate to participate in the forthcoming contests. In contrast, young cadres who have so far remained on the sidelines of these activities are getting ready to join the electoral fray.

Everywhere, in the residential districts of Abidjan as well as in the cities and villages of the hinterland, it is possible to witness a lot of stir. Meetings and conferences continue late into the night. The intentions of some are probed, the prospects of others weighed, and battle plans drawn up. Will such a dignitary be returned to the National Assembly or to his position as mayor? Another, it is rumored, is seeking an electoral district. Such or such a brilliant technocrat who for years had failed to return to his village suddenly hurries back to seek the goodwill of his people. Yet, Houphouet-Boigny stated, "I have constantly urged young cadres to build their bases in their villages and to return to them as often as possible..."

New Lease

Alas, the advice was taken only by some. Needless to say, these will not have any trouble in future to win the votes of their fellow-citizens. As

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

for the others, more numerous, they are biting their fingernails today. At any rate, what is sure to everyone is that of the 120 deputies now making up the National Assembly fewer than half will be re-elected.

This gives some idea of the scope of the changes that are in the offering. Suddenly one no longer hears talk of the succession to the "Old Man" who thus has earned for himself a new 5-year lease--in all tranquility.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

2662
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

KENYA

WEST'S FAILURE TO GIVE NEEDED AID TO ZIMBABWE SCORED

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 11 Jul 80 p 1

[Editorial by Hilary Ng'weno: "A Letter From the Publisher"]

[Text] THE western nations should be ashamed of themselves. When Zimbabwe nationalists were negotiating with the British government and the then rebel regime of Mr. Ian Smith, the western nations, led by the United States, especially in the heyday of the then American secretary of state, Dr. Henry Kissinger, dangled the promise of one billion dollars in aid for the reconstruction of Zimbabwe if the nationalists would agree to an orderly transfer of power, and if there were expropriation of white properties. The money was in fact intended to buy out white Zimbabweans who would choose to leave the country to Africans. As it turned out, things have gone better than even Kissinger ever dreamed they would, but now western nations are playing Scrooge. The Americans came up with the miserable sum of \$20 million in aid to the new country, and from all indications there is nothing which the government of Mr. Robert Mugabe can expect from Washington in the near future. The British, despite their economically straightened condition, did better; they have so far come up with \$173 million. The French recently agreed to give between \$50 and 70 million. The Germans have not been heard from. Altogether Zimbabwe has received in real cash or pledges less than one fourth of what the country needs for reconstruction during the next three or four years. One begins to wonder about either the moral fibre of western nations or their foresight in global political issues. Are we to conclude that the one billion dollars promised by Kissinger were a figment of his imagination, or was that money to be used only for easing the trauma white people in Zimbabwe were likely to be subjected to because of the coming of majority rule? If the latter is true, then it would not be surprising if the frustrations which the government of Mugabe is beginning to feel in its attempt to reconstruct the country after years of civil war translate themselves into the kinds of political violence and instability which would ultimately force out most of the whites. Kissinger and his western colleagues were so anxious to help.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 by Stellascope Ltd.

CSO: 4420

64

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

KENYA

POLITICIANS QUESTION ROLE OF NATION'S PRESS

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 11 Jul 80 p 4

[Text]

THE press in Kenya continues to be under scrutiny, mainly arising out of the current shortages of maize meal and other foodstuffs. As politicians try to apportion blame for the shortages, a battle appears to be shaping up between the country's newspapers and politicians, with the banner of the press side being carried by *The Standard* and its new executive chairman and former *Daily Nation* editor in chief, Mr. George Githii. In an aside about *The Standard's* coverage of the maize shortage last week, the vice president and minister for finance, Mr. Mwai Kibaki, asked his fellow parliamentarians not to be obsessed about what they read in newspapers for, in Kibaki's views, newspaper editors are only doing their master's bidding. "There is nothing special about becoming an editor or chairman of a newspaper", the vice president said. There was an immediate rejoinder from *The Standard* which in an editorial comment said there was nothing special about becoming a vice president either. Strong words in a country which is not used to verbal battles between the press and vice presidents.

But what gave newspapers food for thought was the seeming campaign

which *The Standard* was conducting on behalf of the new minister for constitutional and home affairs, and former attorney-general, Mr. Charles Njonjo, while at the same time crossing swords with Kibaki and the minister for culture and social affairs, Mr. Jeremiah Nyagah, whom *The Standard* has blamed for most of the shortages of maize meal in the country. (Nyagah was Kenya's minister for agriculture during period in which the shortages started). The support for Njonjo may not come as a surprise to *Standard* readers for Githii was one of the election campaign managers for Njonjo when he stood for the Kikuyu by-election in April to fill the seat left vacant by Mr. Amos Ng'ang'a, but it has a few people wondering where the battle of words in the press is going to end. One thing which seems clear is that President Daniel arap Moi is not taking very kindly to the high profile which is being given to the maize shortage issue in the press. Moi has reportedly sent word to his ministers and assistant ministers that they should lay off the maize shortage issue, and indeed the same message is being sent out by many politicians who feel that the issue could become explosive if it were to get out of hand. The Nairobi branch of the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ruling party. Kanu, last week called upon politicians, especially members of parliament, to desist from making political capital out of the maize-meal shortage. Whether they will, remains to be seen, and whether others will let the issue alone is also in doubt.

Last week when the University Staff Union was given a licence by the government to conduct a demonstration against the apartheid regime in South Africa, some of the placards which the academics carried through the streets of Nairobi decried the shortage of maize meal in the country. Until the current crop of maize is harvested, which is in another month or so, and the stores are filled with maize meal again, food shortages will provide great temptation to disgruntled people to make political hay, and in covering their activities the press will be in for further criticism.

The scrutiny which the press is receiving at the moment is not all bad, however. In parliament this week as front bench members were warning the press against concentrating on issues of corruption and malpractices in the country, many back-benchers took the view that the press should not be shackled in its investigative reporting. "The press works as a watchdog for the public. The work it is doing is vital if we are to survive. The press is acting in good faith", said Mr. Mohamed Sheikh Ali MP for Mandera West.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 by Stellascope Ltd.

CSO: 4420

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

KENYA

ODINGA ODINGA'S 'POLITICAL FUTURE FULL OF POSSIBILITIES'

KANU Life Membership Received

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 11 Jul 80 pp 5-6

[Text]

NINE months ago Mr. Odinga Odinga was *persona non grata* with Kenya's ruling party, Kanu. Odinga had taken the momentous step of suing Kanu's secretary general, Mr. Robert Matano, for calling him and former Kenya Peoples Union members who had been released from political detention security risks. Matano had made the remarks as one of his many reasons for withholding Kanu's election sponsorship from Odinga and his colleagues. President Daniel arap Moi later used the court suit as a pretext for barring Odinga and his colleagues from standing in last year's general election. The president was concerned, he did not see how Odinga could sue Kanu — President Moi made no distinction between Kanu as a party and Matano as an individual — while at the same time he was seeking Kanu's sponsorship in the elections.

Those days and their bitterness are now gone. President Moi appointed Odinga to the chairmanship of the Cotton Seed and Lint Marketing Board last December. He has since appointed to various parastatal boards many of the ex-KPU colleagues of Odinga who had joined the former vice president in the abortive court action against Matano. Recently, the president told Kenyans

that from now on there would be no ex-KPU people on the one hand and the rest of Kenyans on the other, and true to his word, a fortnight ago, without any fan-fare, the president signed Odinga's Kanu life-membership certificate. With the granting of that certificate, Odinga's return to the Kanu fold is now complete, and many observers think that the way is now clear for the former vice president, if he so wishes to embark on the political come back which he has been seeking without any success ever since he was released from political detention in 1974.

The issue of life membership in the ruling party has been a sore one for Odinga. In 1974, Odinga was barred from standing for the general elections because, as Matano's colleague in the party's national executive, the organising secretary, Mr. Nathan Munoko, then put it, Odinga had not received clearance from the president, the late Mr. Jomo Kenyatta. Party clearance, which could come only from the president, was a hurdle which in 1974 all former political detainees had to surmount before they could secure party sponsorship for running for any elective post in the country. Clearance was a sign that a former dissident was no longer of the same political

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

complexion which brought him to grief in the first place. Though Odinga had been out of detention for the mandatory three years required by the party's new constitution, he lacked clearance, and so he had to wait until 1979.

In 1979, however, a new kind of hurdle had to be surmounted. Every ~~would-be~~ candidate needed to possess a valid Kanu life membership certificate in addition to a clearance certificate. Odinga thought he had a valid life membership certificate. The party didn't think much of his certificate; Matano claimed it had been issued by unauthorised persons and in the wrong place (Nyeri instead of Siaya where Odinga comes from). Odinga then tried to get a new valid life membership by sending a banker's cheque for the shs.1,000 life membership fee to the party headquarters together with his life membership application fee. He never heard from the ruling party -- not until two weeks ago, when, according to Mr. Luke Obok, who is currently acting as Odinga's publicity manager, the former vice president received his certificate duly signed by the president. Other ex-KPU leaders who had also applied for Kanu life membership certificates have reportedly also got their certificates or are likely to get them in the near future.

Though no fanfare has accompanied the issuing of the Kanu life membership certificate to Odinga, it represents the closing of the final chapter on the KPU story: a story which has had its share of political and human drama and one which for ten years was punctuated with bitterness and divisive incidents among the Luo people. The closing of the KPU affair opens a new chapter on politics in Luoland, and ultimately in the whole country. Already, moves for rapprochement, (See THE WEEKLY REVIEW, June 27, 1980) are underway amongst erstwhile political enemies. Mr. William Odongo Omamo, who had been associated in the past with

anti-Odinga elements in Luo politics, recently decided to drop a High Court petition against the election of Mr. Hezekiah Ougo, an Odinga supporter, who defeated Omamo in Bondo during the general elections of 1974 and 1979. Omamo gave as his reason for dropping the petition his desire to work within the new spirit of unity in Luoland. With the defeat of the former minister for cooperative development, Mr. Mathews Ogutu, in last month's by-election in Ugenya, the last of the former anti-Odinga forces among Luo parliamentarians has been removed from effective political leadership and this in itself is going to make a major difference to the nature of politics in Nyanza. Without the old division among Luo leaders along pro and anti-Odinga lines, the temperature of politics in Nyanza has come down dramatically. Odinga, in particular, no longer feels compelled to prove that he had grassroots support among the Luo, something he has been saying ever since he first went to parliament a quarter of a century ago.

The defeat of Omamo, Ogutu and former minister for power and communications, Mr. Isaac Omolo Okero, has proved Odinga's point, but the former vice president seems to be reacting to the political misfortunes of his erstwhile opponents with characteristic magnanimity. Interestingly enough, though the way is now more or less clear for him to embark on his long-sought after political comeback, Odinga at the moment, is concentrating on proving to any doubting Thomases that President Moi did not make any mistake in appointing him chairman of the cotton parastatal. He is doing very little politicking and a lot of promotion of cotton production among cotton growers. But for Odinga and for the country in general, there is no escaping the reality that the former vice president remains

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

first and foremost a politician. Sooner or later, observers feel, Odinga will begin to make his way back into full-time politics, first at the district level probably by making a bid for the chairmanship of the Siaya branch of the ruling party when the elections are held. The branch chairman is currently Okero, and the secretary is Ogutu, both of whom are likely to give way to new faces in a new Kanu election in the district. After regularising his leadership within the Siaya Kanu branch, Odinga should be in a position to attempt a parliamentary come-back during the next general election due to be held by the end of 1984. Some reports, in fact, have it that Odinga may not have to wait that long. Ougo, it has been suggested, may be planning to step down from parliament in favour of Odinga, but this report has been denied by Ougo and Odinga himself has gone on record, through Obok, as saying that he has not heard of any such plan and that he is unhappy that people are propagating such rumours.

Politics is nevertheless the art of the possible, and right now Odinga's political future is full of possibilities. Those possibilities rest on the solid support which he appears to be enjoying among Luo leaders. Odinga is aware that getting fully back into the Kanu fold is not a matter concerning him only; it concerns a whole community, and these past few months no leader has been more energetic in drumming up support for President Moi among the Luo people than Odinga. Given the former vice president's well known political stubbornness, Odinga's new relationship with the powers that be is something which is bound to leave a lasting impression on the politics of the country.

Odinga's Views on Luo Politics

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 11 Jul 80 pp 6, 7

[Interview with Oginga Odinga, chairman of Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board, this week--place not specified]

[Text]

The chairman of Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board, Mr. Oginga Odinga was this week interviewed by The Weekly Review on his views concerning Luo politics.

Q: IT has been reported in a roundabout way by the former minister for co-operative development, Mr. Mathews Ogutu, that you were involved in a campaign against him which led to his defeat by Mr. James Orengo in Ugenya in the recent by-election. What part, if any, did you play in the Ugenya by-election campaigns?

A: What I can say without hesitation is this: I did not support Ogutu because

he has never supported me. But beyond that I would state that it is unfair on Ugenya people to start looking for a scape-goat once they, in their collective wisdom, have made their choice. You see the greatest mistake many would-be political leaders make is to underrate the intelligence of those who elect them. They assume the "boss" attitude the very moment elections are over and in many instances they discover too late

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

that the electorate are more intelligent than they originally imagined. When they then get into serious trouble they start looking for imaginary enemies from outside their areas instead of being honest to themselves to admit their errors and start making amends in good time. The truth about Ugenya, and for that matter any other constituency in Kenya as I know it from my long experience, is that the electors are intelligent enough to know what to expect from those whom they elect. If they find the person they elect wanting they take remedial action without delay. That, in my opinion, is what Ugenya people have just done. In the final analysis it is a question of knowing what the people want of you and acting accordingly.

Q: Since you were presented with your Kanu party life membership papers there have been rumours that you may soon be getting back into active politics. Are you considering such a move, and if so, how soon might this be?

A: Normally, I do not go by rumours or speculations. I only go by facts. However it all depends on what you mean by "active politics." I, myself consider that I have always been, and still am, in active politics. It does not mean that if there are one or two obstacles in a politician's way then he ceases to be in active politics. Once a politician one is always a politician. Any changes which occurs is only a change of roles and I am always prepared to play any role assigned to me by the people of Kenya through his excellency the President.

Q: During the Kanu national elections in October 1978, you were barred from contesting the post of national chairman of the party. Now that you are a life member of the party, do you intend to contest a national post in the party when the next elections are called?

A: As I have already said, any new role that I play now or in future entirely depends on what the people want me to do. I rejoined Kanu immediately after my release from detention in 1971. If the party members decide to ask me to serve them in any capacity I shall not let them down. I am always at the service of the people.

Q: There have been a series of recent developments in Luo politics aimed at promoting greater unity among Luo leaders and patching up the political divisions that have characterised the politics of Luoland for the past ten years. How do you view these developments and what is your role in the new political set up?

A: This is a very very healthy development. It is in line with the efforts I made in the forties to bring unity to our people. I travelled all over East Africa as "Ker" (boss) of Luo Union to get the community together and make them understand the need to co-operate with other communities in Kenya. Their response was very encouraging and a great deal was achieved. The experience I gained during this period helped us in the organisation of Kanu and the whole Kenya nation to stand united to fight for independence.

In these changed circumstances the Luo community should now take the opportunity to solidify its unity by strengthening the Luo Union under the leadership of Mzee Paul Mbuya. Mr. Oselu Nyalik should get in touch with Mzee Paul Mbuya and have the case now pending in court withdrawn to allow for a meeting of members of the union to be called. This should elect able officials who can promote

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

development with special emphasis on Ramogi Institute of Advanced Technology.

On the question of how I fit into the new set up, you know that His Excellency the President has appointed me Chairman of Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board. This is a very important responsibility and I intend to devote my energies to it. The work covers nearly the whole country and it involves extensive travel. You have recently read of my tours. My second role is to support the President's efforts to end *magendo*, corruption and nepotism. Great harm has been done by these evils, including the creation of the current food shortage. I also support fully the steps being taken by President Moi to bring about universal education to the Kenya people starting with 7 years universal free education and to promote general development in the country.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 by Stellascope Ltd.

CS0: 4420

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

PARIS WEEKLY CARRIES WIDE-RANGING INTERVIEW WITH OFFICIAL

LD041241 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun-6 Jul 80 (Supplement)
pp VII-XIV

[Exclusive interview with Madagascan President Didier Ratsiraka by
Simon Malley in Madagascar; date of interview not specified]

[Excerpt] [Question] What is your reaction to all imperialism's attempts
to create hotbeds of tension in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin
America? What do you think about Iran and Afghanistan?

Didier Ratsiraka: We hailed the Iranian revolution because the Iranian
shah's overthrow was a major event for us and for all exploited and
oppressed countries. Iran is standing up to the United States. We can
only condemn the U.S. aggression since the question of the U.S. Embassy
detainees is merely a pretext for destabilizing Iran, overthrowing the
Ayatollah Khomeyni and ensuring that Iranian oil goes to the Americans
again.

If there is a war or full-scale conflict in the Gulf, if the Strait of
Hormuz is blockaded, the whole Western, Japanese and Third-World economies
will be in difficulties. However, the United States will not suffer too
much because it has its own oil, oil stocks and South American and
Indonesian oil.

How could we accept this U.S. aggression against Iran, these aircraft,
helicopters, this naval air armada and these aircraft carriers...which
are endangering world peace? Moreover it is these facts which explain
the Europeans' reservations about U.S. policy.

You ask me what I think of events in Afghanistan? People really do have
short memories. How can you condemn the Soviet Union when the inter-
national community and the United Nations never condemned U.S. aggressions
in Vietnam and Kampuchea, Sihanouk's overthrow and the arrival of
David Dacko in Central Africa to replace Bokassa? Ali Soilih was
assassinated in the Comoro Islands and replaced by Ahmed Abdallah with the
help of Bob Denard's mercenaries. Nobody said anything about that. There
was no "special" security council meeting or UN General Assembly meeting.
Yes, double standards certainly are applied.

72

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Nonetheless we felt we had to abstain in the UN General Assembly vote on the Afghan affair in order to show our independence. Madagascan policy is drawn up here, decided by us, and no power dictates our policy to us. We also wanted to stress that the Soviet Union had good reasons to respond to the appeal made by Babrak Karmal's government, especially since its aid had already been requested by Presidents Taraki and Amin.

However, let us move beyond the current aspects of the international political situation and face facts. The USSR is encircled. From Norway to the United States and Japan, it is surrounded by a series of military bases, Pershing and other missiles, not to mention the nuclear submarines based on Scotland and elsewhere. Could the USSR remain inactive, passive in the face of this encirclement? Just look at Washington's reaction to the possible installation of missiles in Cuba: No, Moscow could not remain passive toward this encirclement....

[Question] Do you fear an international conflict? What is the state of your relations with Washington, Moscow, Paris and so forth? What do you think of relations between the great powers in what some sections of the press now describe as a "world crisis?"

Didier Ratsiraka: I do not believe in the possibility of a world conflagration. Conflicts waged using other powers as intermediaries will probably continue. Of course the Third World countries could influence the outcome of this crisis since it is they who supply the basic raw materials. I often say to my Arab friends: Stop storming against Isarel! If the Arab countries had not supplied their oil to the Westerners and in some cases even directly to Israel, the Israeli aggressions and wars launched against Arab countries would never have been possible and the Palestinian people would not be experiencing their present martyrdom.

If the Third World countries, which produce and sell uranium, oil, cobalt, coal, phosphates, iron and so forth, displayed solidarity toward each other, the risks of war and the violation of their territorial integrity and sovereignty would be difficult if not impossible.

As for our relations with the United States, we are perfectly prepared to examine any new candidate for ambassador put forward by Washington. The dispute between us and Washington stems from the fact that Washington proposed an ambassador whose previous career embarrassed us. The Americans said that they were annoyed by our refusal to agree and did not feel obliged to put forward another candidate. Therefore, our diplomatic relations are limited to the level of charge d'affaires, although our trade relations are continuing normally. However, we do not oppose another candidate being put forward for ambassador. Let them suggest somebody.

[Question] What about the Soviet Union? The Western press frequently mentions an alleged Soviet request to use the Diego-Suarez Base....

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Didier Ratsiraka: Our relations with the Soviet Union are very good. Some countries have nothing good to say about Madagascar. Moreover that is a good sign since it confirms that we are following the correct policy. As far as I know the Soviets have never asked for naval and air facilities at Diego-Suarez because they know me well and know how Madagascan foreign policy is defined. I do not know whether some sections of the Western press are just trying to draw me out. The truth is that Moscow has never asked me for a base at Diego-Suarez and President Brezhnev and I have never discussed the matter.

Nonetheless, the Soviets are going to supply us with the MIG-21 aircraft we have ordered to replace those we loaned to North Korea. This is a trade deal. We have sent several dozen trainee pilots for training in the Soviet Union. To put these aircraft into service we need sophisticated infrastructures in our airports, suitable runways and special electronic equipment.

[Question] What about relations with France? Do you think the atmosphere has improved since your last visit to Paris and the successive visits to Antanarivo by numerous French delegations? Are relations making progress? Some people mention the Elysee's special position in Chad, the Middle East and so forth.

Didier Ratsiraka: Politics is the art of the possible.... I think for instance, that after Madagascar's victory at the United Nations, in the OAU and the nonaligned movement on the subject of the Madagascan islands occupied by France, we must await official French reactions. I think that in this rather troubled period prior to the [French] presidential election campaign, no immediate reaction can be expected, although I personally think that if President Giscard d'Estaing were to admit the justice of the stance adopted by the international institutions it could help him in the elections. Indeed it would be a point in his favor at a time when he is talking of a fundamental change in France's relations with Africa, of a dialogue and so forth. I do not want to interfere in French domestic politics and it is up to President Giscard d'Estaing to decide whether returning these islands to Madagascar would improve his image among African opinion. For our part we are awaiting his decision.

As regards the other questions, I wonder about the extent and efficacy of the French lobby's action against Madagascar. Various official Franco-Madagascan commissions meet regularly. Some have achieved specific results. I will not say that France is interfering in internal Madagascan affairs at the present time. Within the framework of these joint commissions France respects our priorities and the ultimate results will depend on the balance of forces between the anti-Madagascan lobby and the French businessmen who want new business.

[Question] You played a major role in attempts to reconcile Somalia and Ethiopia.... What is the present position on these attempts?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

bring pressure to bear on Morocco to force it to negotiate, the right to self-determination will inevitably result in independence. Once it has gained its independence the SDAR will choose the path most suited to it: joining forces with Morocco, Algeria or Mauritania; independence pure and simple, or Maghrebian federation or confederation.

[Question] What progress has been made by the summit conference of Indian Ocean progressive parties? You have had many meetings and discussions but the impression given is that things are stagnating....

Didier Ratsiraka: It is not a question of vacillation. We must make sure that any conference aimed at making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace produces positive, specific results. I think that, in the present obsessional context with the Indian Ocean being militarized to an excessive extent, it would be necessary to go beyond the framework of the region's progressive parties. That is why I am proposing an international conference to be held in Madagascar this year or next year, not only among Indian Ocean countries but attended by the great and medium powers.

I have just learned that Europe, which has many interests in this region since its oil passes round the Cape of Good Hope and the Mozambique channel, intends to send a large fleet to protect its oil route.

Consequently, the U.S., Soviet and French ships now in the ocean will be joined by other war fleets which will patrol the region, thereby increasing the tension and hence the risks of a conflagration. It would be the Indian Ocean countries which would suffer from such a conflagration. In my opinion the Indian Ocean problem must not be handled solely by the great powers. It is necessary for those involved, above all we Indian Ocean countries, to take part, as I have often said.

Worries are expressed about the security of oil supplies. It is not the ships transporting this oil which worry us, but I say: In that case why not decide on some sort of international guarantee under the terms of which the oil supplies for West Europe, the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan would never be attacked. At the same time there would no longer be any need for all these fleets to be present. It is time that international opinion was warned of the danger posed by the presence of all these fleets. We have been talking about the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace for 10 years, but nothing has been done. It is time to act quickly to prevent the whole situation from exploding.

[Question] Which countries would you like to attend this conference?

Didier Ratsiraka: I suggest that our capital be the location for this conference and I think that all Indian Ocean littoral states should be invited, especially the Indian subcontinent--including India and Sri Lanka. In addition Australia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Gulf States, the European Nine, the United States, the USSR and Japan should attend.... If we really want to settle the question of the security of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Didier Ratsiraka: Even if there is only a 1-percent chance of success these efforts ought to be continued. All the present problems could be solved if all foreign interference ceased. Somalia could make a gesture. Unfortunately, however, its economic potential is such that it is dependent on some countries, which shall be nameless, which are complicating and paralyzing its action.

President Siad Barre told me that he stands to gain nothing from a war with Ethiopia and I believe him. Mengistu asked me whether I loved my country. When I said "yes," he asked me whether I was popular in Madagascar. I said that I thought so. Well, he explained, if one of your neighbors were to ask you to give up part of your territory as a token of cooperation and friendship would you do so? I replied "no."

[Question] Mengistu was referring to the Ogaden in this case, despite the fact that he refuses to implement his plan for giving the provinces internal autonomy. But what about Eritrea? He cannot say that Eritrea is an integral part of Ethiopia in view of the autonomy status recognized by the United Nations before Eritrea was annexed by Haile Selassie.... If Mengistu really wants peace on his borders is it not possible to find a solution to satisfy all sides?

Didier Ratsiraka: The Eritrean affair is of course in a state of deadlock. As you know, I proposed a federal or confederal solution in the interests of both sides. However, the Eritreans, whom I have received here and plan to receive again, reply: Once bitten, twice shy. "We were federated," they say, "and subsequently annexed. Now we say: independence first and then a federation or confederation. It is Haile Selassie who created this deadlock and it is still having far-reaching effects."

[Question] What about Palestine and Polisario?

Didier Ratsiraka: I have never thought that the Camp David agreements would settle the Palestinian question. I find it difficult to understand the Israelis. Before the state was founded Jews, Muslims and Christians lived in peace. The eviction of the Palestinians alone caused the problem. If my memory serves me well the Torah (Jewish Holy Book) repeatedly stresses that foreigners, in other words gentiles, must not be ill-treated.

What are they doing to the Palestinians? They ill-treat them, evict them from their homes, kill them, massacre them. The Torah preaches equality among races, but the Zionists regard themselves as a superior race. It is paradoxical to see a people who have suffered in the way we all know they have behaving so cruelly and unjustly toward another people....

As for the Saharan people's liberation war, the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR] is now gaining ground on all fronts both diplomatic and military. In this case the great powers' role is decisive: if they

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

oil routes let us sign an international pact, a code of conduct, and Diego Garcia with its 20,000 men will no longer have any reason to exist. We are sitting on a powder keg which might explode at any time.... [Ratsiraka ends] (Our interview continued for a long time and other subjects were discussed to which we will return at a later date. As he saw me out the head of state smiled for the first time during our long hours of discussion--Simon Malley note)

[Ratsiraka continues] We have talked a great deal about the nonaligned movement. However, there is one thing that I would like to say: nonalignment is not a movement of uncommitted countries. Quite the reverse, the movement is involved in a struggle, a world struggle. Attempts have been made to deviate it but they have failed. Imperialism wants us to return to the fold and change our spots. Its weapon is essentially economic. If we free ourselves from that yoke we will have removed the most important obstacle on the road to winning our sovereignty and true national independence.

The nonaligned movement does not depend on individuals. Some people say that Tito's death will be a severe blow to the movement. I do not believe that. The movement is not dependent on individuals. Nehru, Al-Nasir, Sukarno, Nkrumah and Modibo Keita are dead.... That has not prevented the movement from making progress. However valuable those men were, and they really were, the movement will continue its irresistible march toward alinement with the anti-imperialist, anticolonialist and anti-Zionist camp....

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun 80 pp XXXIV-XXXVI

[Article: "Economy: How to Manage One's Own Affairs"]

[Text] Mr Justin Rarivoson, minister of economy of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, has discussed with us the vast problems which pertain to his department.

"When I entered the ministry," he told us, "I found an empty office. No files. What I received from my predecessor was above all a practice of letting things go, blocked investments, no credit, and an administrative system reduced to nothing. We needed 6 months to one year to begin to see things clearly."

Among other difficulties, the abandonment of the franc payments zone (a correct decision) did not make things easy. Local factories, the property of Europeans, were operating only slowly. One could even say that their purpose had been to function badly. As to coffee, it was not Madagascar which sold it but rather a company in Marseilles, which negotiated its sale in terms of world prices and its own interests.

"Thus," Mr Rarivoson emphasizes, "the most positive achievement was the return to internal and external credibility.

"We now feel, to some extent, an infatuation for our projects. Even if one considers that we do not always have the means to carry out our ambitions."

It is therefore necessary to take into account, on the one hand, the potential which exists on the island and, on the other hand, the general situation. The general situation was hardly satisfactory. In 4 years the petroleum bill was multiplied by three. There was a drought and stagnation in the sale of products that brought in foreign exchange. Cloves were following a capricious cycle of 4 years.

"Perhaps we wished to go too quickly?" the Minister asked himself. "This was a risk that had to be run. It was worth the trouble, and we are going to continue, because the game is worth the candle."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Presently, the annual rate of growth is 16 percent in current francs and 9 percent in constant francs. Certainly, it should be stated once again, the beginning was difficult. For 1 or 2 years it was necessary to run from one pressing emergency to another. But the errors were more often caused by haste than by poor judgment. Superficially, people might have the idea that Madagascar was spinning its wheels. And Mr Rarivoson recalls a remark often repeated by President Didier Ratsiraka: "We don't explain enough what has been done, although there are many answers to give, in reality."

In fact, the Ministry of Economy controls many things. And notably in the field of commerce and industry. It keeps an eye on 50 percent of the agreements with foreign countries, particularly with regard to commercial and bilateral agreements. It supervises more than 50 percent of the national companies.

"Today," the minister says, "we control more than 90 percent of our exports and 60 percent of our imports. We are trying to keep in our hands everything which is strategic. Our people are known abroad."

So, what about concrete? The cement plants, for example. There are four of them: one at Antsirabe, two at Majunga, and one at Tulear. "We could have gone faster," says the Minister, "in using petroleum for energy. We have preferred to wait two years to be certain of our coal. This is now a reality." The problem which came up was knowing whether it was better to have one big unit or several small units spread out across the country. The answer has been in favor of the latter proposition, given the present state of means of transport.

The steel plant? "There again," says Mr Rarivoson, "well-intentioned people have accused us of being dreamers or comedians." However, the plant will be built in the region of Moramanga, near a mineral deposit with a high ferrous content, which can be exploited by open strip mining. That is to say, also within range of the electrical energy provided by the Andekaleka dam. There also, one might have been tempted to save two years by using expensive energy. That would have been an error. Andekaleka will make it possible to use an advanced process, a steel plant operating on the basis of electrical reduction, due to begin in the last 6 months of 1982, at which time the turbines of the hydroelectric power plant will begin to function.

And in the same region nickel ore has been discovered. The reserves of coal so far identified are in the vicinity of half a billion tons, which even makes it possible to consider exporting it. Regarding hydroelectric power, only 0.8 percent of the potential has been put to use so far. There are deposits of heavy oil and possibilities for finding natural gas.

There remains petroleum. "We are beginning," says the Minister, "the drilling stage. If the average success in the world is one in ten, the prospects in our country are estimated by the experts at one in four. Regarding sandstone and bituminous schist, their exploitation requires further study." He adds, "I can only count as probable what is 20 to 40 percent sure."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Regarding national companies, there are good ones and, of course, those which are less good. One source of reassurance is that they are making profits, which have permitted further investment. Their greatest achievement is still that they have made a mark for themselves. The people in them have learned to manage them by themselves, thus confirming the political will to independence and self-sufficiency. The Solima Company, for example, functions today with personnel entirely from Madagascar (although it had, at the beginning, 57 expatriate technicians). It is operating in a difficult international context, without assistance from any multinational firm. It needs to resolve all problems itself. And meanwhile it is functioning, and the company is continuing to invest. The Minister emphasizes, "No developing company has thought, like us, of developing technology in a way suitable to its needs. And we say, however, that we are only at one stage, the objective being to produce our equipment goods and our production goods ourselves."

We ask, "But Mr Minister, aren't you also President of the IMI (Madagascar Institute of Innovation)?"

Then Mr Rarivoson becomes animated. He says, without hiding his satisfaction, "It is here that we have made the whole world laugh. Perhaps 995 out of 1,000 people. We have been attacked as being dominated by tabus, and our suggestions seem to be so original that people are not used to them."

The IMI is an institute bringing together young and enthusiastic researchers, which is destined to adapt existing technology to the economic problems of Madagascar.

Some examples: the wooden airplane "which has made many people laugh." Of course, it is not a matter of a soapbox but rather the use of plywood and epoxy resins. An aircraft provided with motors driving a propeller and which can land on a few hundred meters of turf. It will not fly at Mach 2 or 3 but at 250 km/hour. The estimates show that it is, nevertheless, the least expensive means of flight which, considering the extent of the country and of the road infrastructure, would make it possible to reach thousands of isolated villages and in particular to collect products which today are difficult to transport. However, even the aviators didn't believe in it. It was necessary to show them that aircraft like this fly in America. The production of this airplane is possible in Madagascar.

The project of developing a small, cheap petroleum stove, without a wick or a burner, has brought out "a general laugh." However, it has been found that the pioneers in the American West warmed themselves by burning petroleum poured over porous rocks. It is this principle which has been adapted and white, at little cost, would take care of many families.

Should we recall an air cushion vehicle conceived on the basis of a suggestion of President Ratsiraka, a vehicle with a glass fiber body, an original type of house "which provoked hilarity among the Deputies" but which exists in Algeria and whose principle has been adopted for the construction of the regional university center at Fianarantsoa?

80

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Minister continued, "A year from now we are going to choose a certain center to make of it a technological village. This will be an experiment. We foresee establishing there a pond for the raising of carp according to a scientific method, of arranging for heating with bio-gas, of teaching people to build carts, of encouraging them to consume something other than rice, such as other products which they will be able to raise. It will be a matter especially of changing the life of the women who presently spend eight to nine hours per day on subsidiary and unwelcome tasks like drawing water or collecting firewood. We will see the reaction and the response of the farmers...."

The IMI, as such, does not invest anything. Thanks to its correspondents, it collects everything which exists, throughout the world. It selects and adapts them to the conditions of Madagascar. Moreover, as of now, a computer is in the course of storing all existing techniques in the world, past or present. And it is already the computer which has reassembled the facts on the raising of carp. It is in Colombia that the model of a certain kind of windmill has been found. And it is the Dutch who have furnished free of charge the plans for another windmill capable of producing the current to provide electricity for a city.

The minister concluded, "It will be another achievement to be able to prove that we can build a new society and manage our own affairs in the best way."

Those Who Make Trouble: Adopting Techniques Which Suit the Economy Of The Country

The Minister had spoken of them, saying that they make everyone laugh. They themselves considered rather that they made trouble. They made trouble for the government. They made enemies among the venerable institutions and also among those who understood the threat, and who no longer laugh.

In going to visit the IMI, which is set up at present in an old brickworks, we could have believed that we were in the cave of a magician. But in all that we saw there was no gadget. Nothing but concrete.

This windmill which was working before us, pumping water from the river which it was discharging in great gushes into a basin, of what was it made? Of two times nothing.

The sails on the arms of the windmill, recalling on a small scale, Greek windmills? Bamboo poles radiating out from an axis to which strips of cotton made in the country were attached. All of this attached to the top of used telephone poles. The means of transmission? A long and solid bamboo pole. The structure of a pump in very simple form, which even local foundries could cast if they were provided with the mold. And that was all. A simple lever made it possible to turn the whole apparatus into the wind, and it was extremely strong; human strength was unable to stop it from moving. What did it cost? The most expensive parts were the two rubber tubes, one set in the river and the other discharging the water, our hosts told us. Tomorrow it

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

will be possible to install thousands of them in the countryside, either to drain the fields or to irrigate them. The energy cost: nothing. An insignificant overall cost. Maintenance: within the reach of everyone.

We turn away. There is the house. The whole structure rests on four cast forms of concrete, called stools, because in effect they have the form of a seat. A standard mold, unique in form, makes it possible to cast them as many times as necessary. All the rest, prefabricated in domestic wood, is set in, by the hands of one man, into housings and yokes set out in advance. The interior has surfaces and arrangements which lead one to think of "up to the minute" city residents. It took a month to complete.

And there is the red car. A chassis made of folded sheet metal. A body made of cast glass wool, cut with a saw, which one adjusts with a brush. Any present motor can be mounted in it, including an alcohol-powered motor. Two axles which engage without a clutch. In test runs observers have been stunned into silence as the IMI vehicle passed the "Land Rovers" and "Toyota" vehicles around the side.

The surface effects vehicle, which was being rebuilt under the same roof, astonished everyone, we were told, at the time of its trials in the bay of Diego Suarez and on the Pangalanes canal. This vehicle, operating on a cushion of air, would make it possible to serve flooded areas which neither boats nor aircraft nor trucks could reach.

That is what we saw. But they spoke to us of the airplane, which is being built somewhere, and whose components will be made of domestic plywood. A single-engine aircraft, at first. Then, later on, a four-engined aircraft which could land on the grass and reach the small towns well before the roads are built.

How Much Steel Wasted!

On the whole, the innovation does not consist so much of the things which had been shown to us. The new development is the idea that one can find another path of development than that chosen and imposed by the Western countries. Instead of losing one's breath by seeking to copy and catch up with the industrialized countries on their own terrain, there are a thousand other ways of development. Thus, the vehicle, the house which we have seen, could be built by small teams of workers, in small shops, without the use of production lines like tentacles, imposed elsewhere by the multinational firms, which the developing countries do not need. It is a matter of putting the men of the country to work, with technology using the resources of the country. How much steel has been wasted, for example, when certain domestic woods can replace it advantageously!

The young people who received us wish, they said, to be copied, although they consider that such procedures, relevant to Madagascar, will not necessarily be so in another country. Each one must find his own way. But the way exists.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Credits of the Fifth European Development Fund [FED]

On 12 April 1980 an agreement was signed at Antananarivo between the Government of Madagascar and the European Economic Community (EEC). It defined the credits assigned to Madagascar by the European Commission for the application of the Lome II Convention and in the framework of the Fifth European Development Fund (FED).

In terms of the aid available, the budget of the Fifth FED provides for a maximum of 23,625.8 million Madagascar Francs (whereas for the Fourth FED the total aid amounted to 19,200 million Madagascar Francs).

In addition to these resources provided for the financing of national development projects there are other funds available which are not in the program and aid from the European Investment Bank (BEI). It is calculated that the total amount of credit available under the Fifth FED for Madagascar could reach or even exceed 30 billion Madagascar Francs. These funds will be distributed as follows: 45 percent for rural development, 12 percent for infrastructure, 10 percent for road projects, 7 percent for industrial and commercial development, 5 percent for health, 5 percent for scholarships and training programs, 4 percent for education, and 5 percent in reserve.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

5170
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

PROPAGANDA METHODS DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun 80 pp XXX-XXXII

[Article: "The Fight for Ideas"]

[Text] Implicit in the revolutionary struggle is the entire people's awareness of its principles and requirements. The popular government has at its disposal many means to that end.

There is no revolutionary combat without ideological struggle. This is especially true for a country like Madagascar, whose intellectual milieu were trained in the French school and in which the great mass of the inhabitants, mostly rural, until 1975 could have only a confused notion of the ideas of socialism. No one endures a century of colonization and neocolonialism without feeling prejudice.

The new government, invested through popular suffrage, had to wage a battle on the ideological front. The responsibility for this is incumbent upon the ministry of Information, Ideologic Orientation and Institutional Relations, under Georges Ruphin.

What is involved is widely disseminating information by utilizing the available media; motivating mass action; logistic support for the revolutionary struggle; and publicizing the activities of the various institutions. Finally, it is a matter of better coordination of every action within a framework more in conformity with the charter of the social revolution. The means: radio and television, the Office of Ideological and Economic Orientation of Collectives (DAIEC), the press and publications, the movies. For the printed press, the government has at its disposal the daily AFRIKA in the Malagasy language, circulation 7,000; a quarterly journal RENOUVEAU; the weekly VAO VAO and the monthly FOKONOLONA. The Taratra Press Agency (ANTA) enjoys autonomous management; and the Malagasy Cinema Office.

Television has not yet had the hoped-for impact because of the delay in installing transmitting equipment. Also because of the high cost of receiving sets, which must be imported. However, radio waves are in service along the Tananarive-Tulear axis. They are to be open along Tananarive-Fianarantsoa,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

while other projects are planned to serve the southwest coast. For the immediate future, taking the realities into account, there is more emphasis being placed on collective listening, as has been done in Antsiranana, where citizens gathered in one location were following a broadcast on a set that had been placed in a common hall.

Radio is much more effective, since its broadcasts reach 70 percent of the territory and transistor sets have become the thing to have. National programs are designed with a precise objective--to inform and educate cadres and the masses in terms of the forward progress of the revolution and socialism.

Foreign news of socialist countries must be brought to the cadres. They must be urged to realize the government's socialist options. Is the step accepted by all? There is no way to affirm this, but the minister and his associates emphasize that radio broadcasts are often the subject for discussion or meetings and this encourages them to persevere, even though their contribution is not immediately assimilated by everyone. At the same time, many broadcasts are devoted to that purely Malagasy reality, the decentralized collectives, to the socialist form they have taken on since 1975 and to the idea of democratic centralism.

For the masses the radio programs present simple broadcasts at selected hours (especially at the hour when the farmers have returned from the fields and rice paddies). To awaken the people to the economy, management, cooperation, health measures; to enable the various ministries to tell of their respective activities; to bring government closer to the villagers and city-dwellers--these are the objectives of the broadcasts.

In the field, the leaders responsible for the ideologic and economic administration of the cooperatives (DAIEC) are conducting a more in-depth action for the benefit of elected representatives, cadres, leaders, civil servants or cooperative managers.

In the Field

Teams of cadres are moving up to the firaisampokontany level and dedicating themselves first to a socio-economic study of the region. On the basis of this work they are working out a theme according to which discussion will be entered into with the cadres concerned. Imperative emphasis is being put on the practical conclusions to be drawn from the debate: building a road; opening a market; creating a cooperative; piping in water; schools, etc. These debates are also being broadcast over the radio.

The DAIEC proposes to complete the ideologic and economic training of the operational leaders of all the firaisampokontany by the first quarter of 1981 at the latest. It stipulates that 32 courses be organized for managers and storekeepers and 32 for members of management committees. At the same time the DAIEC, hoping to raise the level of its own agents, is providing for three training courses per faritany, in their own areas, for all field agents. Simultaneously, correspondence courses will be proposed in support of the objectives gained and to allow new ideas to be heard.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It is an enormous task, and to compensate for the lack of cadres the ministry has had to appeal for young single people fulfilling their national service. When sent into the villages these young boys and girls, city-dwellers for the most part, have discovered a country many of them knew nothing about. To be understood by the farmers they have eaten with them, slept on the ground, walked barefoot. In return, the farmers have acknowledged that these intellectuals were not like they used to be. They have understood that something new was going on and have paid attention to the information given them.

Training, then, is being carried on on three levels: at the bottom by training brigades in the faritany and at the top at the National Institute for Ideological Fokonolona Training (INFFI). The teachers here are from the universities and hold at least the DUEL (university certificate in letters), but many have degrees or a master's. In this way, by uniting theory to practice, the cadres of public services and the state are trained.

Thus, is a profound flowering of efforts, the ideas of the revolution and socialism are being propagated at all levels, deep in the provinces. They are coming to populations who may be expecting them, but who have had no concrete notion of what they are.

For his part the minister believes that the revolution is following its road because the people are mobilized. The rural masses that five or six years ago were still passive are being set in motion and harnessed to production tasks. If production has not increased, it is above all because of natural phenomena. But new land has been cultivated. The people are aware that the revolutionary government's efforts are offering them the chance to emerge from under-development.

Many have seen that more has been done since 1975 than in the first 15 years of independence. Also, attempts to destabilize, conspiracies, sabotage have not shaken the popular masses. Shortages have not brought troubles, as was formerly the case; at the university the irresponsible strikes of old can no longer be renewed because of the students' political consciousness, nor has anyone been able to lead the civil servants into a protest movement incompatible with the country's potential. Political explanations are listened to and understood. And when the economic situation brings about results the people have counted on...

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

8946
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

NEW LOBSTER FIRM DESCRIBED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun 80 p XXXII

[Article: "Lobsters for France"]

[Text] Live lobsters, fished from the Fort Dauphin reservoirs, specially packed and shipped in the afternoon by Air Madagascar Boeing 747 from Tananarive, are being sold the next morning in the Rungis markets that feed Paris.

This is the little-known activity of a young Malagasy firm, the Lobsters of the South (LANSU). It is a socialist company founded in May 1979, whose capital (50,000,000 Malagasy francs) is 84 percent covered by the state, other socialist firms and fishing cooperatives. The firm is directed by a management committee, with a president (Rakoto Endor), an agricultural engineer who is an adviser to the president of the Republic.)

The activity deals with the marketing of Madagascar's lobsters: live, frozen raw, frozen cooked or lobster tails. The products are purchased from the fishing cooperatives to which LANSU has furnished assistance, fishing equipment, individual fish tanks. The present installations consist of six-ton reservoirs at Fort Dauphin and three 15-ton cold chambers.

The first fiscal year having shown a positive balance, the objectives for the 1980 season are: 80 tons of collection--60 to be exported--to bring in foreign currency the equivalent of 150,000,000 Malagasy francs. The longer-term goal is to obtain an annual collection of 200 tons--150 for export--and to put into service 12 new collection points and install relay reservoirs in the capital. At the same time an attempt will be made to increase the authorized share of the fishing cooperatives in the company's capital.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

8946
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

MINISTER DISCUSSES FUTURE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun 80 pp XXX-XXXII

[Article: "Accepting the Challenge of the Year 2000"]

[Text] The Malagasy territory will have to provide the country's supplies and procure a currency supply. But between now and the end of the century profound reforms will have to be accomplished if the peasant world is to make progress.

If you ask Simon Pierre, the Malagasy minister of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform, about his main preoccupations, he speaks first of grain production, especially the problems of rice culture. Moreover, rice is the subject of permanent discussion in Madagascar.

What is the situation? Since 1976, motivated by the new popular government, rice-growing areas have increased, going from 100,000 to 1,200,000 hectares. The average yield is 1.9 tons per hectare, but in some areas that are well fenced and well irrigated, as in Antsiranana Province (Diego Suarez), it reaches 3.5 tons and even as high as 7.5 tons per hectare.

However, the demand cannot help but grow, because the Malagasy is a big eater of rice, while the population is increasing at an accelerated pace. The difficulties stem on the one hand from the fertilizer problem: prices have more than doubled, and in this matter the island has received scarcely any aid from the FAO. At the same time a deterioration of seed is seen, which causes a production loss capable of reaching 40 percent. The average losses, taking into account those resulting from conditions of harvest and transportation, reached nearly 500,000 tons for the 1978-1979 season. The government had to import 150,000 to 160,000 tons of rice to provide for the period between harvests.

But if we take into account that 500,000 tons of paddy produce 390,000 tons of shelled rice, we see that an appreciable reduction in losses would make possible almost total elimination of the current shortage.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (IN TONS)

Products	1975	1976	1977	1978 (Drought)	1979
Rice	1,972,100	2,042,500	2,154,130	1,913,540	2,250,000
Coffee	83,560	78,930	68,380	78,200	81,070
Vanilla	7,300	3,955	3,900	4,800	3,585
Cloves	4,500	12,930	13,555	12,800	18,000
Pepper	2,950	4,860	2,965	2,500	2,450
Sugar cane	1,267,178	1,267,178	1,280,725	1,374,930	1,431,570
Peanuts	41,790	54,795	46,580	34,015	43,455
Cocoa	1,380	1,557	1,202	1,250	1,375
Source: Rural Development and Agrarian Reform Ministry					

However, reality raises other problems. If we evaluate the present rate of demographic development, we would have to anticipate that in the year 2000, 1,000,000 additional hectares would have to be put under cultivation. If things continue to go in that direction, it would become difficult to solve the question.

Efforts are therefore being made in several directions.

First, the expansion of cultivated areas. In a single season 48,000 hectares of rice fields, plus 8,000 hectares that were rehabilitated thanks to micro-hydraulic projects and 4,500 hectares due to an African Development Bank (BAD) plan. On the other hand, research is in progress, some with the collaboration of the FAO in particular, into production of hybrids that would provide high-yield seed.

Finally, an effort to restructure the ministry and strengthen the staff is about to be applied. It involves bringing technicians closer to the peasants. The heads of services will be decentralized and will have to reside in the fivondrona (departments). Socialist companies that are going to manage and rent modern agricultural equipment are raising many hopes. Their bases will be established in the fivondrona and their services will benefit the state as well as third parties.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

However, whatever efforts are deployed it will be necessary to persuade the people to change ancestral habits. It will have to be explained that no one is obliged to live on rice alone, but that other food products grown on the island may be substituted for it.

That will be a long term task, one that cannot be regulated by decrees, but rather by a lengthy effort to convince, with the help of schools and women's organizations.

Return to Robusta

The minister in any case says he is optimistic and mentions the building of a 15,000-ton silo at the port of Tamatave, which is capable of solving the problems of importation as well as exportation, when the time comes for that.

Another crop that is a producer of foreign currency, vanilla, has fallen victim to the international economic situation. Around 1976, the main customers being Americans, the system was blocked by a sharp fall in prices and even a halt in orders. The country found itself with the inventory of several harvests and the farmers, discouraged, finally uprooted the plants in order to grow rice. In recent years however, thanks especially to the World Bank and the agricultural missions under the army, production is on the ascendant. The army is also participating in a coffee operation intended to increase production, which has climbed appreciably in the last two years.

This coffee crop now calls for renovating the plantations, many of the plants having reached the extreme age of 25 years. Also, the consequences are being suffered today of errors committed in 1971, when hybrids were planted whose male and female flowers appeared not to have bloomed at the same time. And since the coffee did not produce for the first five years... However, production is on the increase, thanks to the return to robusta, whose vegetation is well controlled.

The sugar cane harvest for its part has experienced a regular increase. In 1981 a new 20,000-ton-per-year unit will go into production at Morondava, with the assistance of the Chinese.

In the last few years cotton has also suffered the trials of the drought, added to the continual increase in the price of phytosanitary products. The yield is increasing from .8 tons to 1.5 tons to the hectare, but in irrigated soil it may reach 2.5 tons; this is especially the case in the north, where there are flood crops.

Finally, livestock raising is an omnipresent phenomenon in Madagascar, where the zebu plays a part in traditional farming. The herd is evaluated at 10,121,000 head, but the practice is especially extensive. One of the problems to be surmounted is the significant calf mortality; it has been reduced to 20 to 30 percent, but it had been 50 percent. The growth rate is slow-- .6 percent per year-- , whereas the rate of consumption exceeds 3 percent.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Efforts are being carried on, therefore, in two directions: improvements in sources and stocks. Cuban veterinarians have come to Madagascar to contribute their cooperation. Attempts have also been made--with some success--to cross the zebu with dairy or meat stocks, with Frisians for example. In any case it is necessary to guide and improve the work of the livestock raisers and to extend the cooperative system. However, Madagascar exports meat--to the EEC in particular--for a quota of 20,000 tons per year. There are two modern slaughterhouses in Tananarive and Mahajanga, with ad hoc refrigerated transportation equipment. Fianarantsoa also has two, less up-to-date, slaughterhouses and a cannery.

The tasks for tomorrow are enormous and are aimed at profound reforms and the devising of new structures. New and unexpected problems have had to be confronted. Everything had to be discovered and mastered. Thus, following the nationalization of vast colonial lands in Mananjary, former agricultural workers found themselves owners. They had to go from a monthly wage (ridiculously low, of course) to the ups and downs of selling prices, or even to be initiated into banking problems. And without being able to depend on the immediate assistance of skilled instructors. "In 1975," Mr Pierre told us, "you could count on the fingers of one hand those who had some idea of cooperativism or socialization of agriculture."

Economic studies also had to be made for each type of management; a school specializing in agricultural cooperatives had to be organized; a graduate training school had to be set up (Final Honors in higher education) for instructors in state firms.

The goal to be attained is the development of state properties surrounded by and integrated with agricultural cooperatives. Agro-industry will be a focus of development and a technical and logistic support for the cooperatives. At the same time it will constitute an outlet for processing the cooperatives' production. The state firm, Sakay, in the Tananarive faritany, which raises 30,000 pigs, is already operating on this principle.

There are various projects currently under study with the help of the Yugoslavs, the Germans, the Italians or the Koreans. The goal of all of them is to process livestock products into food products on the premises.

"Those are our problems," Simon Pierre concluded. "We are proposing solutions and we are hopeful. We recognize our difficulties, but we are confident that the future will solve them. In five years, on the tenth anniversary of the revolution, after slow but perceptible progress, it will be seen whether we were right. But we are optimistic."

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

8946
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MALI

BRIEFS

SWISS ANTI-DESERTIFICATION AGREEMENT--The Malian ambassador in Berne, Mohamed Moulaye Haidara, signed an agreement with Switzerland on 24 June for a forestry project in Mali which the Swiss Federal Council had approved last April. The project is aimed at protecting the development of forests in a vast area of the southern region of Mali within the framework of the fight against increasing desertification, as well as at satisfying the country's energy needs. The Confederation is financing the implementation of the forestry program for a total of 20 million Swiss francs (approximately 50 million French francs) for a 5-year period. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul 80 p 1682]

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAURITANIA

POLISARIO AGREEMENT SIGNATORY OULD SIDI INTERVIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Jun 80 pp 38-39

[Exclusive interview with Col Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi, former deputy chairman of the CMSN and signatory of the agreement with the POLISARIO, by Abdelaziz Dahmani; Paris, early June 1980]

[Text] The AMD [Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania] was established in Paris on 22 May 1980 and in several African capitals. Who are its promoters and its members? Politicians with various backgrounds but also officers. Their goal? To check the cascade of coups d'etat witnessed by Mauritania since the toppling of Mokhtar Ould Daddah on 10 July 1978 and to return government to the civilians.

Right after the AMD's creation one of the most senior officers of the Mauritanian army, Col Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi, who arrived from Dakar where he had gone by crossing the Senegal River clandestinely (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1013), joined the Alliance. On the same day, incidentally, among other "deserters," the Mauritanian ambassador in Kuwait, Mohamed Abderrahman Ould Amine, went to Paris. The defection of Colonel Ould Sidi did not occur without having some impact in Nouakchott where the press and radio were advised to exercise discretion on this score. Furthermore, on 30 May 1980 the Council of Ministers, at the conclusion of lively discussions, decided to restrict travel abroad (especially to France, Morocco, and Senegal) to a minimum, even the trips of officials among whom it was not known with certainty which could be considered "reliable."

The point is that Colonel Ould Sidi is not just anybody. In the name of Mauritania he signed in Algiers (on 5 August 1979) the peace agreement with the POLISARIO, the framework of the new regime's policy. First deputy chairman of the Military Committee for National Safety [CMSN] established as a result of the coup d'etat of 10 July 1978, Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi had been expected to succeed Col Ahmed Ould Bousseif (who died accidentally late in May 1979) in the presidency.

To tell the truth, Colonel Ould Sidi had not played any part in the ouster of Mokhtar Ould Daddah. The initiative of his army buddies had even surprised

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Ould Sidi as the latter, donning his native boubou [flowing robe] in place of his uniform, had accompanied a young relative to the airport [on that day]. After being under house arrest like everybody else for 3 hours, that very evening Ould Sidi was appointed, willy nilly, as the regime's Number 2 man with the mission of going and explaining to French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing the underlying reasons for the coup.

Born in Mederdra, this son of the emir of the Trarza region is 41 years old today. He studied at the French military academies of Saint-Maixent and Saint Cyr Coetquidan beginning in 1960. Back in Mauritania he became a unit commander and then a prefect, notably in Bir Moghrein (in northern Mauritania), governor of a region, deputy chief of staff, and commander of the interservice school in Atar. Today he has broken with the junta in power in Nouakchott "because," he explained, "it is necessary to prevent the Mauritanian nation from being destroyed by the irresponsible individuals who are ruling it today."

I met Col Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi in a small Paris hotel in early June 1980 in the company of Mohamed Ould Jiddou, coordinator of the AMD, and Colonel Kader, former Mauritanian air force commander in chief. Granting us an exclusive interview, Colonel Ould Sidi told us the circumstances in which the famous agreement between Mauritania and the POLISARIO was signed.

Question: You signed the Algiers agreement. How did the negotiations leading to it take place?

Answer: I had earlier traveled to Algeria on two occasions, on 30 June and then on 17 July [1979], to discuss matters not with the POLISARIO but with the Algerian Government. I had talks with Col Kasdi Mesbah; Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, minister counselor to the Algerian President; and Mohamed Seddik Ben Yahia, minister of foreign affairs. Our goal was to bring to its senses a POLISARIO which had become too greedy. But the Algerians, despite their perfect courtesy, were too demanding. They wanted to settle for nothing less than a turning around of alliances, our recognition of the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] before the 16th summit meeting of the OAU scheduled to be held in Monrovia in July 1979, the almost immediate evacuation of the portion of the [Western] Sahara occupied by Mauritania, and our denunciation of the Madrid agreements of 14 November 1975. Accordingly, we were unable to reach an understanding with the Algerians.

Immediately upon my return to Nouakchott I gave an account of the failure of our negotiations to the prime minister, Khouna Ould Haidalla, who was leaving for Monrovia (17 to 20 July 1979) at that moment. On his return he submitted to the CMSN the draft of an agreement with the POLISARIO that he had negotiated in the Liberian capital with Algeria and the POLISARIO. I was again designated to go to Algiers and put this agreement into final form. I was accompanied by Lt Col Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, chief of staff. I was not empowered to ask the POLISARIO for the release of our prisoners who numbered in the hundreds.

Question: Some Mauritians have characterized this agreement as "capitulation," have they not?

Answer: I am a military man. I obey. However, I have the feeling that this agreement obviates another war for Mauritania since the threat of same has never been lifted. It is true that we had more cards in hand to negotiate a better agreement.

Question: There has been a lot of talk of secret clauses...

Answer: There is one secret provision which reads: "Within 7 months Mauritania pledges to leave definitively that portion of the Sahara under Mauritanian administration and to transfer it directly to the POLISARIO." The POLISARIO first sought immediate restitution. Then there was talk of a 3-month deadline. We asked for a year, hoping that "something" would happen in the meantime. Finally, we agreed on 7 months. The bargaining was tough.

Question: Would this "something" not be the occupation of the Tiris el-Gharbia region [of the Western Sahara] by Morocco?

Answer: No, but rather a better framework for peace, a more general framework for which the search is now frustrating many foreign ministries.

Question: Was this return of territory slated to occur after a popular referendum?

Answer: No, without any consultation whatever. The clause was to remain secret up to the end.

Question: Why were these agreements signed in Algiers and not elsewhere--say, in Tripoli?

Answer: We did not have the choice of location. The POLISARIO wanted the Libyans to be present at the signing, but we refused. The presence of the Algerians can be explained since the signing took place in their country.

Question: It has been said that Mauritania managed to keep La Guera, a small port necessary for the security of Nouadhibou but which did not fall within Mauritania's 1960 [post-independence] borders.

Answer: The agreement stipulated that Mauritania does not have and will never have any claims on the Sahara. What remained was to situate La Guera geographically and to conclude...

Question: It seems that Ahmed Baba Miske played a discreet role in the conclusion of the agreement.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Answer: I know that Miske sided with Khouna Ould Haidalla in Monrovia. The day that we left for Algiers via Paris, Miske tried to get in touch with me from Dakar. He was in Paris too. We avoided each other. In Algiers, Algerian protocol ended up by mandating our meeting. Ahmed Baba Miske was in the room at the time of the signature of the agreement. To my astonishment the head of the POLISARIO delegation told me: "He is no longer sailing in the same boat with us; address yourself to the Algerians."

Question: Is there room in the region for two Saharan countries considering that Mauritania is also a Saharan country?

Answer: I don't think so.

Question: As things are going it is the government in the north, the SDAR, which threatens to impose itself.

Answer: Or that of the south which will "gobble up" the other. Or they could "gobble up" each other leaving two corpses behind.

Question: There is a lot of talk of fickle policy on the part of present-day Mauritania.

Answer: Mauritania has become a thing which is sold to the highest bidder, which is repossessed before the sales are completed in order to try to resell it to others. Mauritania has become a stake. It is the stake of embassies and foreign ministries.

Question: How are the "buyers" behaving?

Answer: They no longer understand. They have become reticent because of "the devaluation of the merchandise" offered to them.

Question: Had the CMSN been involved in the bargaining relating to the release of Mokhtar Ould Daddah?

Answer: Several days after his release in early October 1979, members of the CMSN still believed that [former] president Mokhtar Ould Daddah was being held in Oualata. You can see what kind of trust prevailed among the military officers.

Question: Why do you wish today to see the removal of those officers who are still in power?

Answer: Their major defect is their impatience to which should be added their total unfamiliarity with economic matters, education, and other serious problems.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

2662
CSO: 4400

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

REPORTED CALUMNY IN PORTUGUESE PRESS--Portuguese right-wing newspapers are leading an endless campaign of calumny against the young African states who used to be Portuguese colonies. Even when their tone is friendly and understanding, the poison hidden underneath their flattering articles is easy to detect. For instance, the Lisbon weekly TEMPO writes that the head of the Portuguese government would be happy to visit Mozambique if President Samora Machel were to invite him. According to TEMPO, the Mozambican head of state has shown real interest in a rapprochement with Portugal, inasmuch as, according to certain circles--well-informed circles of course--the "fall" (sic) of Marcelino dos Santos has relieved him of a man "who enjoyed Moscow's confidence." The Lisbon weekly added that the Mozambican ambassador to Portugal might be replaced by Joaquim Chissano (the present minister of foreign relations!), "a politician who is a friend of Portugal." Deception at an elementary level. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 216, 23 Jun 80, p 34] 9294

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGER

POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 80 pp 24-27

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "A Country Visited by Hope"]

[Excerpts] As if it had escaped the economic crisis which has stricken all of Africa and is shaking the existing governments, Niger is one of the two or three countries which are still investing in development. While agriculture is not in better shape than elsewhere in Africa, the sub-soil is fulfilling its promises: Today the manna of uranium is showering over the Niger desert. Work places are continually opening, not only--of course--in the uranium-producing areas, but also in the cities.

An island of prosperity within an ocean of desert? Niger and the Nigeriens do not concur because uranium does not go to their heads. In any case, economic security has promoted political serenity. Colonel Kountche's government--without doubt the only African military regime which has not been accused of dictatorship--has even taken the risk, 2 months ago, of releasing the most illustrious of its prisoners, beginning with former President Hamani Diori. This would give proof, if such were needed, that Niger considers its future sufficiently secure not to fear its past.

Expresident Hamani Diori has, indeed, recovered his freedom 6 years, to the day, after falling from power. (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1007).

State Secrets

Three days after the seizure of power by the CMS (Supreme Military Council), the expresident was housed in Zindar (1,200 km east of Niamey) in a comfortable administrative villa located in a residential neighborhood. He remained there only 6 weeks. Because of frequent mob gatherings in front of his home, and particularly for fear of a kidnaping, Col Seyni Kountche, Diori's victorious adversary, thought it prudent to remove him.

Six weeks later, Diori exchanged his large comfortable dwelling for a modest two-room apartment in the Zinder military camp. It is there that we

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

interviewed him on 15 June, 1976 (see JEUNE AFRIQUE Nos 807, 808) and were assured that he was being "treated with all the consideration due to his rank.

Nevertheless, in spite of this good treatment, our host was the victim of creeping old age. Suffering from inaction, like all retired people, he divided his time between listening to the radio, taking walks and conversing with his companion in detention--at the time, Mr Harou Kouka, exminister of public works.

Unfortunately Mr Diiori, who has a passion for books and newspapers, can devote only a small amount of time to reading because of a cataract. "My right eye has only about three-tenths vision, as against six-tenths 2 years ago," he confided. "At that rate, I will soon be blind."

We still had present in our mind this poignant conversation when, in the afternoon of 6 April last, hardly 10 days before the announcement of his predecessor's liberation we met President Kountche on the terrace of his residence, two steps away from headquarters. "And your illustrious prisoners?" we asked (referring to Diiori Hanani and Djibo Bakary). "They are well." "When do you expect to free them?" "You will not know the date. You will learn it when they are free." "It would be too bad if one of them happened to die in your prisons." "Don't worry. None of them will die in prison." "In other words, their liberation is forthcoming soon?" "I don't know." "State secret?" "Of course." "You are too secretive; that isn't always good." "That's the way it is. You can't trust journalists. They're like the plague, dangerous people..."

On the Banks of the Niger River

Astonishing man, Kountche! While he was speaking in this mysterious tone, he knew all measures had been taken for the liberation of his famous prisoners, that the villa in which the expresident would take up residence had already been chosen. Since he does not have a personal home "worthy of his rank," Diiori has been housed in the former official residence of Mr Boubou Hama, president of the National Assembly and No 2 man in the old regime. It is a spacious villa, fronting onto a terrace overlooking the Niger river. Since the coup d'etat of April 1974, it was used only for official receptions of the minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr Diiori has since been living the life of an ordinary retired person, dividing his time between rest and conversations with members of his family, from whom he had long been separated.

For the moment, the latter are the only ones authorized to freely visit the former resident of the Zinder military camp. Anyone else must request an authorization to see him. Such was the case of his Parisian ophtalmologist, Dr Pierre Victor who rushed to Naimey as soon as his client's liberation was announced. He told us that he had found Dr Diiori "in perfect physical condition." He added, however, that "he should be operated on as soon as

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

possible, for otherwise he risks losing his sight completely." Yes, but how, since the Niamey hospital is not equipped for such a delicate operation? The specialist told us, furthermore, that he was seeking a solution to the problem. In other words, he is trying to persuade the authorities to allow the expresident to go to France for treatment. This will be difficult, but not impossible.

In any case, the Niamey authorities should not leave matters half-way. Having taken the first step, they should go to the end and liberate him totally, allowing him to move about without interference and even travel abroad, if necessary, for his health. Expresident of Mauritania Mokhtar Ould Daddah, for instance, liberated in October 1979 (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 980), has since taken up residence in Paris, and has even found the opportunity, recently, to make the pilgrimage to Mecca (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1010).

In any case, President Seyni has nothing to fear from Diouri Hamani. After the terrible ordeal that he has endured, he is thinking more of recovering his health and peace of mind than of getting even, let alone fighting his way back into power.

The same holds true of Mr Djibo Bakari, freed at the same time as Diouri. By the ironies of history, the leader of the Sawaba party was, for decades, the expresident's toughest adversary--so much so that Diouri's victory in the Gaullist referendum of 1958 had forced him into exile. This exile, spent between Accra and Conakry, lasted at least 15 years, Mr Djibo Bakari returning to Niamey only after the fall of his illustrious cousin. However, less than a year after his triumphant return, the Sawaba leader was compromised in a plot. Arrested in August 1975, at the same time as Commander Sani Souda Sido--then No 2 man in the military regime--Djibo Bakari was detained, until his liberation, in the military camp of Nguigni, on the shores of Lake Chad.

Retreat or Conversion

Other personalities of the old regime were freed at the same time as these two brother-enemies. A majority of them had already been liberated in waves. Thus, the former president of the National Assembly, Boubou Hana, was set free in July 1977 because of the--in the words of the communique from the Supreme Military Council--"advanced age of the interested party," and his "contribution to the cultural flowering of Africa, as a historian, researcher and writer." Such were the cases also of former minister Leopold Kaziende and Harou Kouda, and of Colonel Seyni Kountche's predecessor in the post of army chief of staff, Colonel Bala Arabe. All these men now lead peaceful lives, far from political turpitude, dividing their time between their families and businesses, which now reoccupy their attention.

However, not all former comrades will answer the roll-call of those who have recovered their freedom. The logic of those in power being often beyond

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the grasp of simple folk, some underlings are still cooling their heels in prison. It is true that they are now only a small number. Is that a reason to be indifferent to their lot? Certainly not. These men are: former Minister Aboubacar Moussa (brother of former president Diori) and Ibrahima Issa; former secretary general of the presidency of the republic, Mr Mai Tourare Gadjo; and former chief of the party militia, Mr Abdou Go.

On the other hand, there are some who will never again see the sky of liberty. They died in prison, not by summary execution or as a consequence of ill treatment, as happens elsewhere, but simply of natural causes. Indeed, in spite of attentive care, two political personalities at least have suffered that fate: former commander Sani Souda Sido, dead in 1978 at the military camp of Agadez as a result of an epileptic seizure, and former finance minister Mouddour Zakara, about whom President Kountche has said to me: "I will always reproach myself for having let him die in prison."

Chambers and Antech mbers

The fact is, however, that, as the chief of state affirmed in his speech of 14 April, "essentially all the political personnel of the former regime have been liberated." Niger can now devote its energies and its power to development: such is the leitmotif of the leadership. Trump cards are not lacking, with the enormous wealth of the soil and sub-soil. The importance of uranium in the economy is sufficiently well known for us not to dwell upon it, short of recalling that royalties derive from it represent one-third of the State budget. And new projects are expected to be undertaken soon.

This rapid extension of uranium exploitation is not without its problems. Since supplies are, in any case, limited, the question is whether the unbridled exploitation characteristic of foreign concessionary companies does not risk exhausting the supply. In the case of uranium, as in others, is it not the policy of developed countries to economize their own resources by stimulating the poor countries to accelerate the exploitation of theirs? In that case, it is clear that if a country like Niger lets it happen, it will face a bleak future. Once uranium supplies have been exhausted, the question of development will risk becoming as problematic as ever. Furthermore, the country will have lost much of its attraction for foreign investors.

For today Niger is being particularly courted. Business men, bankers and experts, attache-cases stuffed with stupendous projects, jostle each other at the airport and in the ministerial antechambers of Niamey. Hotels in the capital display signs saying "Full." Visitors had better reserve rooms at least a month in advance. The upshot of it is that the government is obliged to press for the construction of new hotels, such as the Caweye, an international luxury establishment with 250 rooms and a prestigious conference center, which will open late in 1981.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Pressures

Other infrastructures are taking shape: ministries, administrative and educational buildings, youth and cultural centers. With its work areas dominated by the high silhouettes of cranes, the capital has taken on a new look. The by-products of the uranium industry are visible everywhere, in the form of glass or concrete, or of great projects. One such project is the Kandadji dam in the [Niger] River, with an estimated profit of 80 billion CFA francs (1.6 billion French francs), another is the Parakou (Benin)-Niamey railroad, which will open up the country, at a cost of 130 billion CFA francs (2.6 billion French francs).

The by-products of the uranium industry cannot alone finance these undertakings. The authorities are therefore obliged to solicit the aid of foreign money-lenders. The latter require some arm-twisting and sometimes do not hesitate to exercise, if not outright blackmail, at least pressures. Such was the case in the matter of the free sale of uranium, which--it will be remembered--caused great commotion abroad recently. Certain powers have done (and are still doing) everything to prevent Niger from selling it to Libya or Pakistan. "We are pictured as 'irresponsible'," says President Kountche. "As for us," he adds, "uranium is a merchandise like any other. We sell it to any client who, while accepting our prices, fulfills the sales conditions fixed by the international commission in Vienna."

In Broad Daylight

In this matter Nigerien authorities do not hide anything. Twelve-ton trucks loaded with blue barrels, each containing 50 kilos of the famous mineral, regularly leave the humming beehive of Arlit for the small airport of Agadez, where Libyan military planes accept delivery. Never never, so we have been told, has a truck disappeared in the desert. In any case, no paved road joins Agadez to Libya.

As for the uranium destined for Pakistan, it goes by sea from the Benin port of Cotonou, end of the line for trucks coming from Arlit. Once only a Pakistani plane came to load at the Niamey airport. And, so that nobody could say that the transaction was going on in secret, the authorities insisted upon having the loading done in broad daylight, right in front of the hanger where cargo planes load fruit and vegetables destined for Europe! During the nearly ten years that this chain-pump of special vehicles has been linking Arlit with Cotonou (2,000 kilometers across the pebbly desert and the lightly tree-covered savanna), there have been only three accidents--none of them grave. Some trucks turned over without any radiation. Under those circumstances, Colonel Kountche and his collaborators are surprised that some circles abroad should express disapproval of these "quite regular transactions" between Niamey on the one hand and Tripoli and Islamabad on the other--precisely like those with various Western capitals.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Currently, authorities are mobilized above all for the establishment of new and original institutions, such as the Development Society. Lacking a political party capable of leading and mobilizing the population, this society, organized in cells from the smallest villages to the various urban neighborhoods, will serve as a structure for welcoming and orienting the general Nigerien population. Colonel Kountche compares it to "a pyramid at each level of which the popular will expresses itself, proceeding from the bottom to the top, and where successive levels of management are organized." With bases in the youth movement--whose ramifications are spread throughout the country--as well as among the rural cooperatives, this new institution is called upon to symbolize the representation of villages at different levels of the national life.

Taking the First Step

A commission in charge of setting up the Development Society was solemnly installed on 17 March, 1980, in Niamey, by the chief of state in person--an indication of his interest in the project. Is it not intended to serve as a springboard for the political party which is the secret dream of the military? Absolutely not! say some of them, with a look of false indignation. "It is not envisaged...for the moment," reply others, more purdent."

The fact is that, 6 years after the Army's assumption of authority, Niger needs a political organization capable of serving as a driving belt, if nothing else, between the power structure and the people. We are "not in a hurry to create a political party," says President Kountche. Perhaps, but the option is not excluded

At present, when the door has been partially opened to the principal former leaders, when conditions seem fulfilled for the realization of unity and national reconciliation, when the economic situation appears satisfactory, it is not impossible that Nigerien leaders will resolve to take the first step in the establishment of a political organization. Details of the process hardly matter, nor the etiquette, the objectives, nor the methods. The fact itself will show that a page has been turned in the life of modern Niger. Everyone will rejoice, particularly the Nigiens, who have been feeling like political orphans for the last 6 years.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980

9347
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGER

PRESIDENT STUDIES ZINDER'S PROBLEMS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1565

[Article: "President Kountche Has Studied the Problems of the Zinder Department"]

[Text] The president of the Republic of Niger, Col Seyni Kountche, has visited the department of Zinder at the beginning of June. He especially wanted to visit the site of the Galmi project which has been started with the cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany. This is a 500 hectare project for the cultivation of sorghum during the rainy season, and of onions during the off-season.

Two dams had been planned; however, the program had to be modified because of inflation. The first dam will be built, and the first 230 hectares equipped, at a cost of 2 billion CFA francs. The second dam, at Konni, will have a capacity of 35 million cubic meters.

The economic development of Zinder is compromised by the low level of the underground water supplying the town. Measures will be taken at the end of the year to increase the pumping capacity until a comprehensive survey makes it possible to find a rational solution.

For the head of state, the first problem which the populations have to face is the dramatic water-supply situation. In this respect, he said, we are completing discussions on the financing of a 1,000-well program now under construction in the Liptako department which has the same geological structure as the Damergou or Koutou departments. It is a question of sinking deep wells. The same situation exists in the Maradi department.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

9294
CSO:4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGER

BRIEFS

FRG MILITARY MATERIAL--On 16 June, the ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Niamey, Mr Harald Ganns, has delivered a large shipment of transportation and telecommunication equipment to the Nigerien armed forces; among others, this shipment included 30 motorcycles, 5 cars (including 2 all-purpose vehicles), 10 dump-trucks, and telecommunication equipment with spare parts. The ambassador recalled that the FRG was also providing assistance to the Nigerien armed forces in the fields of engineering and aviation. This equipment will be used "for humanitarian and peaceful purposes, and to benefit the people," e.e. for road construction, food distribution and road traffic control. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1565] 9294

IDA CREDIT FOR AGRICULTURE-- The International Development Association (IDA), a subsidiary of the World Bank, has just granted Niger a 20 million dollars credit to be used for an agricultural development project intended to increase crop production and stock farming. Some 80,000 farmer families should benefit from the project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1565] 9294

FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENTS--On 14 June, 7 agreements between France and Niger, involving a total amount of 36.75 million French francs, i.e. 1,828.5 million CFA francs, have been signed in Niamey. Four agreements deal with the extension of the telecommunications and television network (1 billion CFA francs), the second instalment of the Tahoua-Tsernaoua road construction work (495 million CFA francs), the integrated development project for the Dosso department (132 million CFA francs), and solar pumping stations (100 million CFA francs). The 3 remaining agreements deal with the assistance to be given by the French Textile Development Company to the Nigerien Credit and Cooperation Union (61.5 million CFA francs), the financing of the feasibility study for the extension of the Parakou (Benin) railroad to Niamey (10 million CFA francs), and the financing of a survey concerning a bridge on the Fantouka River (30 million CFA francs). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1565] 9294

CSO: 4400

105

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

DATA ON 1980-1981 BUDGET REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 20 Jun 80 pp 1560, 1561

[Article: "The Budget for 1980-1981 Has Been Approved"]

[Excerpts] On 11 June, the Senegalese National Assembly has approved Senegal's proposed budget for the fiscal year from 1 July 1980 to 30 June 1981. We have reported on the major points of the budget in our 13 June issue (page 1500). However, the figures finally approved differ somewhat from those we indicated. Therefore, Senegal's 1980-1981 budget is now as follows:

- Expenditures: 191.6 billion CFA francs, against 190.7 billion for the previous fiscal year.
- Receipts: 193.4 billion CFA francs, against 172.2 billion for the previous fiscal year.
- Therefore, the budget shows an estimated surplus of nearly 1.8 billion CFA francs, against 1.5 billion in 1979-1980.

Welfare: 265.7 Billion CFA Francs For the 1981 Budget

On 7 June, the Senegalese National Assembly has discussed and approved the budget submitted by the Ministry of Welfare, which shows a reduction of 12 percent compared to the current budget, and amounts to 265.7 million CFA francs for the coming fiscal year. Credits amounting to 120 million CFA francs will be allocated for the construction of 7 regional psychiatric treatment centers.

Sea Fisheries: Action of the State Secretary

The budget of Senegal's State Secretariat for Sea Fisheries for the fiscal year 1980-1981 will amount to 226.8 million CFA francs. During its discussion in the National Assembly, deputies raised the questions of territorial waters, poaching by foreign ships, the distribution of outboard motors, refrigerating lines, the case of fishermen exploited aboard foreign ships, the liberalization of shrimp prices, and the problems arising in connection with the liquidation of SOSAP [expansion unknown].

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Mr Robert Sagne, secretary of state for sea fisheries, stressed especially the effort made in favor of small-scale fishing which accounts for 80 percent of the catch, i.e. 300,000 tons. He also mentioned the question of the retrocession of refrigeration lines, for which a temporary solution has been found. The refrigerators have been placed temporarily under the management of the municipalities, until private companies take some initiative. The question of the maritime border with Guinee-Bissau is still pending, the minister indicated. Finally, under a new decree, shrimp fishing will be regulated more strictly.

Railroad: New Rolling Stock

On the occasion of the vote, in the Senegalese National Assembly, of the budget of the Ministry of Equipment--amounting to 3.25 billion CFA francs for 1980-1981, against 4 billion last year--Mr Adrien Senghor, minister in charge, stated that the Senegalese Railroad Company would acquire 15 locomotives, 6 rail-cars, 11 light railway motor tractors, and 200 railroad cars. A personnel training program geared to equipment maintenance will also be provided.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

9294
CSO:4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

BRIEFS

FUEL PRICE INCREASED--An increase of 5 CFA francs on fuel prices has been decided in Senegal on 10 June. This new increase, the 4th since December, raises the price of premium gasoline to 170 CFA francs, that of regular gasoline to 160 CFA francs, and that of gas oil to 108 CAF francs. In less than 6 months, fuel prices have increased by 30 CFA francs. Before the recent crude oil price increases decided by OPEC countries, Senegal's 1980 oil bill was estimated at 50 billion CFA francs, against 5 billion CFA francs in 1973. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1561] 9294

CSO: 4400

108

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UGANDA

CONCENTRATION OF AUTHORITY REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANNEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1189

[Unsigned article: "Strong Concentration of Authority in Uganda"]

[Text] The power structure in Uganda after the power play which removed former president Godfrey Binaisa has been spelled out in a 13-point document put forward on 18 May by the military commission of the National Liberation Front.

This complicated structure includes the military commission, a cabinet made up of 37 ministers and deputy ministers, a presidential commission, and a national consultative council.

The military commission has assumed the real power. Originally made up of six members--Paulo Muwanga, former interior minister, then minister of labor in the Binaisa government; Yoweri Museweni, former minister of regional cooperation, who abandoned the former president to join the junta; Major General Tito Okello, commander in chief of the Tanzanian army; Brigadier General David Ojok, chief of staff; and Colonels Zeddi Maruru and William Omaria--it has been augmented by two government ministers, M. R. Bitamazire and Dr M. Apiliga, as well as three special assistants: Yona Kanyomozi, former minister of cooperatives and marketing who will be in charge of economic affairs, Chris Rwakasisi to run political affairs, and Sheika Ali Omar Senyonge diplomatic affairs.

The military commission is presided over by Mr Paulo Muwanga who is proving to be the new regime's "strongman." The commission has reserved the right to "give direction to the cabinet in all political matters."

To make sure of its own continuity, the military commission has decided that its authority "is not to be questioned before any court of law" and that no legal action is to be initiated against it concerning the manner in which it seized power. It decreed as well that no Ugandan who served in an official capacity during the 8 years of Idi Amin Dada's dictatorship is to be elected to an important position without its approval. However, this last provision does not apply to the 6 original members of the military commission. The reason for this exception is obvious.

109

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Mr Paulo Muwanga, who was in the foreign service, had been appointed Uganda's ambassador in several countries--notably in Paris--by Idi Amin Dada, who he did not break with until 1975. And as for Colonel Zeddi Maruru, he stayed in the army after Idi Amin's coup before going into exile.

The cabinet (whose make-up can be found under the heading "Uganda") is to be in actual fact controlled by the military commission since it will be chaired by Mr Paulo Muwanga, and its role will be merely an implementing one.

The national consultative council will do nothing from now on except draw up legislation. To become effective legislation must be approved by the presidential committee which is supposed to include 3 members, most likely two judges and a medical doctor. If the members of the presidential committee cannot agree on submitted legislation, the military commission will take its place.

These new institutions were approved by Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere with whom Mr Paulo Muwanga, accompanied by Mr Museweni, General Ojok and Colonel Maruru, met in Arusha on 16 May. Since there are 10,000 men from the Tanzanian army present on Ugandan territory, the coup would hardly have been crowned with success if Mr Nyerere had decided to oppose it. He has chosen to abandon President Binaisa to his fate, and make sure he is unharmed, since Binaisa is guarded by Tanzanian troops, and to recognize the new regime while imposing a certain number of conditions on the Ugandan junta: there must not be any executions, public order must be reestablished and legislative and presidential elections are to take place before the end of the year and under the supervision of a Commonwealth commission.

Kampala's new authorities have officially announced that elections will be held at the previously anticipated time, in other words in December or perhaps even at an earlier time. However, they have not yet made contact with the Commonwealth secretariat, and in regard to the latter it is not certain that they would agree to take responsibility for "free and fair" elections like they did recently in Zimbabwe. Observers in London point out that the Commonwealth could not possibly take on this responsibility without a certain number of assurances having been made beforehand. In particular, the army would have to be subordinated to civilian authority, according to the requirements of democracy. In the second place, there would have to be put forward candidacies for the office of chief of state other than Milton Obote's which were likely to be viable ones. We do not know, in fact, if Messrs Yussuf Lule and Godfrey [Binaisa] will be permitted to run for president and under what conditions. On the other hand, we are forced to confirm that the overthrow of President Binaisa, and the make-up of the military commission as well as the cabinet which Mr Milton Obote's partisans dominate, that all this favors to a considerable extent Obote's return to power and the same for his

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

party, the Uganda People's Congress. The Democratic Party is, in reality, only meagerly represented in the new cabinet by the new finance minister, Mr Lawrence Nebolu.

This new government is the third since the fall of Idi Amin Dada. Will it be able to restore public order and put the country's economy back on its feet, tasks at which President Binaisa and his government and unquestionably failed? The former president's opponents formed an opportunistic alliance in order to overthrow him. In reality the Uganda People's Party and the Democratic Party have in common only their determined opposition to holding elections under the umbrella of a single party: the National Liberation Front. Within the military commission itself Messrs Paulo Muwanga and Yoweri Museveni are political enemies of long standing and the latter is far from being partial to former president Obote.

What policies the new authorities intend to follow, preoccupied as they have been up to now mainly with consolidating their power, remain largely unknown except regarding foreign relations. The new minister of foreign affairs, Mr Alimadi, while receiving foreign diplomats on 19 May for the first time since the coup, assured them that the country's foreign policy remained unchanged. The new regime will remain "loyal" to Tanzania and will endeavor to develop good relations with all neighboring states.

The latter are following the development of this crisis with a certain anxiety. As soon as the coup was announced, the Sudanese chief of state Gaafar Nimeiri interceded with President Nyerere of Tanzania and President arap Moi of Kenya to ask them to use their "good judgment" to bring peace back to Uganda. The three presidents in fact met at Mombasa last month in the company of ex-president Binaisa to examine the situation in Uganda, to which they had promised aid and assistance.

For his part, President Nyerere, who obviously desires to have on his northern border a stable government from which he certainly intends to get reimbursed for the cost of the war waged by Tanzania to overthrow Idi Amin Dada, had as early as 13 May sent his foreign minister to see the Kenyan president. The latter had expressed his serious fears regarding the future of Uganda, judging it probably that the country would remain unstable after the coup.

As for the United States and Great Britain, to whom President Binaisa had appealed to come to his aid in personal letters addressed to President Carter and Mrs Thatcher, they have held back to wait and see. They undoubtedly feel that it is a matter which must be handled by Africans themselves and that the Organisation of African Unity, which President Nyerere had strenuously criticized for its inaction at the time of the invasion of the Kagera bend area by Amin Dada's army, would be the best qualified institution to offer to mediate if peace in the region came to be threatened.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

9631
CSO: 4400

111

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UGANDA

'DEMOCRATIC' COUP ASSESSED BY AMEDEE DARGA

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 May-8 Jun pp 26-27

[Article by Amedee Darga: "A 'Democratic' Coup"]

[Text] Barely 48 hours elapsed between the time of Ugandan President's Binaisa's decision to dismiss General Ojok, the army's chief of staff and a supporter of ex-president Obote, and the bloodless coup which occurred during the night of 11-12 May. Binaisa, who the military had tried to win over, was relieved of his duties as chief of state and president of the FNLO [Ugandan National Liberation Front], the party in power, and he was replaced by a "presidential commission" charged with making preparations for the December legislative and presidential elections in which all the political parties are supposed to participate. This decision cancelled out the one announced ten days beforehand which prohibited these parties from taking part in the elections and compelled candidates to run under the FNLO umbrella alone. Binaisa, especially fearful of the party of ex-president Obote who still enjoys a certain amount of popularity and army support, tried via this measure and by dismissing General Ojok to eliminate his most dangerous political adversary.

"This is not a military coup, because the commission which has been set up is a political body; and this is not a UPC [Uganda People's Congress] coup either," stated Mr Musoweni of the Fronasa faction, one of the five people who participated in Binaisa's overthrow. It is confirmed, moreover, that on 27 May in Kampala ex-president Milton Obote, in exile in Tanzania for 9 years, will as anticipated chair the party congress of the UPC, which is considered to be the most progressive group in the country. It is expected that the political program which is to emerge from the congress will pay particular attention to the country's economic recovery since it is near to catastrophe.

112

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In the course of his 11-month rule, Binaisa did not tackle any of the serious problems which affect Uganda. The presidential commission, which has accused that regime of corruption as well, has settled on guaranteeing law and order, and on ensuring emergency supplies of basic necessities for the markets, as its priority.

Nearly a year after the overthrow of Amin Dada, Uganda offered the world a picture of muddled stability.

What was reassuring was first of all that the FNLO regime had attempted to avoid the pitfalls of tribal rivalries, that it had managed to achieve a certain reduction in armed robberies and banditry and above all had managed to institute the beginning of a democratic life, so essential for these people who have known 8 years of censorship, terror and dictatorship.

However, as one noticed that the FNLO had already dumped its first president Yussuf Lule and that the second one, Godfrey Binaisa, had almost fallen during the week of 15 February; and noticed the musical chairs of ministers dismissed from their positions or who changed ministries, from Youvezi Museweni, first minister of defense, to the case of Paulo Muwanga, first removed from the Ministry of the Interior, then installed in the Minister of Labor's seat; there emerged an impression of fragile stability.

For those who know the dangers that tribal feeling have made for in this country, for those who had recently observed the abyss into which Amin plunged this country by destroying the economy, the basic infrastructure (water, telephone connections, etc.) and above all the moral standards of the population which for years lived with looting and the black market, weren't the odds completely against the FNLO in wanting to rebuild Uganda while maintaining unity and learnings toward democracy and promising general elections under universal suffrage for 1981?

The economic situation was such that it was not necessary to do an extensive analysis of it but simply to list the facts. In this country, cut off as it is from sea lanes, the large Entebbe airport was slowly starting up service again. Readjustments were being made; bus transportation was being organized to link Entebbe with Kampala. Government officials were being asked to relinquish the hotels they had had to occupy for lack of other accommodation, in order to fix them and open them up to tourists, investors, businessmen and other visitors. By using water systems originating in Tanzania, the water distribution service in Kampala and the other cities was being set up again, as well as telephone communications.

The government was also actively engaged in restoring the main roads which had been devastated by tanks and shells and in importing buses to re-establish connections between major cities.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

But, while particular attention was being paid to restoring the basic infrastructure to working order and to reestablishing a greater measure of safety in the country, the two biggest problems which remained were, on the one hand, the disastrous state of agriculture and the absence of industries, and, on the other hand, the lack of basic foodstuffs.

Coffee, tea and sugar production had fallen almost to 20% of what they had been before 1971.

And assistance furnished mainly by Tanzania, which is already having difficulties, itself, and then by France, the United States, and Great Britain, is only a drop in the bucket.

Two Courses

There were two clashing courses of action regarding the country's industrialization. The first, supported by President Binaisa and certain ministers who had personal interests at stake in it, was to favor accepting massive investment from multinationals. The second one, supported by nationalists and progressives, was to encourage investments by the Ugandan middle class and even by certain Ugandans of Asian origin, all this in order to assert a kind of national independence.

But the biggest day-to-day problem was still the shortage of basic products like rice, flour, butter, milk, etc. For a certain amount of time, the damaged shops had not been suitable for setting up trade. But efforts made with an eye to revitalizing commerce were particularly undermined by the black market ("magendo") and smuggling, which made it so that nearly 50% of certain commodities sometimes went to Zaire or Rwanda. The "magendo" is a destabilizing practice which affects not only basic commodities but also coffee production (Rwanda last year exported more coffee than it produced!) and foreign exchange reserves—at a time when the dollar goes for 7.3 shillings, the black market will peg it at between 20 and 40 shillings!

The FNLO, set up a few months before Idi Amin's regime was overthrown, was the product of a united front strategy of the Ugandan leftist elements that were particularly active then in Dar es-Salaam.

In spite of the numerous conflicts and contradictions that inevitably ran through this front, which was made up of no less than 5 parties, the leftist elements not belonging to any grouping had succeeded in making two principles accepted within the front and in the country at large: maintain unity at any price, and, above all, resolve political differences by democratic debate. The Moshi conference, prepared for on the basis of a committee set up in November-December 1978, succeeded in getting together the main parties and progressive individuals not belonging to any party on a program conveying these two basic principles and reaffirming the struggle for political, economic, military, diplomatic and cultural independence vis-a-vis imperialist forces.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Within the National Consultative Council (NCC), which was the interim national assembly, the 127 members were distributed in the following way:

- The UPC (Milton Obote's party). About 25 members; head men: Paulo Muwanga and L. Kirunda;
- The DP [Democratic Party]. About 20 members, divided between an "old guard" led by Semogerere and Adimola and a progressive faction with Okulu and Olum;
- The Fronasa. About 12 members, with Youvezi Museveni, former minister of defense, the strongman;
- The SUM (Save Uganda Movement). About 10 members; strongmen: P'Osok and Ejalu;
- The KY ("Kabaka Yekka")--an old party. About 10 members; strongman: San Sebagereka, who was a minister under Yusuf Lule.

The other members do not officially belong to any party; certain ones have sympathies for parties which have been set up, and the others are leftists such as Dan Nabudere, minister of culture and community development.

President Binaisa did not belong to any of the aforementioned parties. In the struggles between the front's different factions, it is independent leftists, - who were responsible for the united front's constitution - men like Omwony Ojok or Professor Yashpal Tandon, the only Asian on the NCC, and who was one of the prime movers of the Moshi conference - who often played the decisive role.

This leftist element explained that, for them, none of the parties would be capable by itself to govern Uganda without clashing with the other ones, which would bring in a resurgence of tribalism and would end in dictatorship.

During the debates over the constitution for a new Ugandan army, this element succeeded in stressing the fact that this army, whose nucleus is the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) led by Colonel Tito Okelo, is to be a detribalized and politicized army, that is to say aware of its role as defender of the people's interests, and not an instrument of repression.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

9631
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZIMBABWE

MUGABE SPELLS OUT PRIORITIES WITH UK JOURNALIST

[LD011341 London THE TIMES (Europa Supplement) in English 1 Jul 80
pp (Roman) I, IV]

[Interview with Zimbabwe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe by Nicholas Ashford;
no date or location indicated]

[Text] Question: You have said that you did not carry out the struggle in Zimbabwe to maintain the status quo here. In the short time you have been in office how far have you been able to change the status quo, and to what extent have your actions perhaps been constrained by the political and economic situation that you inherited on coming to power?

Answer: Changing the status quo in terms of the political and economic objectives we espouse cannot be achieved overnight. We have done quite a lot so far, but of course we have definite priorities which guide us.

One is the achievement of total peace and a state of security in the country. It is only in the context of peace that we can attend to the social and economic problems that confronts us. We have done our best to achieve peace. It is possible now for people to move around although there are a few dissidents still at large. The process of integrating our forces, although slow, is taking place.

Now we are beginning gradually to attend to other problems that impede the achievement of our social and economic goals--the task of resettling our people, of reconstructing our economy, of bringing education and health services to the people. All this is going on in gradual steps.

There is also the need to attend to the immediate demand for increased wages in the private sector as well as in the public service. We have established minimum wage scales which we believe are a good start. We are going to appoint a commission soon to inquire into the totality of conditions in the private sector so that we can come up with satisfactory recommendations on wage scales.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Then, in terms of the country's international status I think we have achieved quite a lot. There was hardly any international relationship between this country and the outside world. We have completely changed that, and now we are friends with almost everybody. We are the darling of the world at the moment.

Question: In formulating your present policies how conscious are you of trying to avoid taking actions that might provoke a white exodus? How important is it to retain white skills in Zimbabwe?

Answer: I think it is very important. It is a very crucial matter. We are worried that already so many are leaving. We cannot do without these people with definite abilities and skills, and so we must try to retain those skills. I believe the best way to develop future African skills is to base them on existing skills. Those who have them should become tutors for the future generation.

Question: Why are they leaving?

Answer: For various reasons. There are those who have never accepted the fact that we won the election and who believe our political persuasions will not enable them to stay. Then there are those who leave as a result of fear--fear that we are going to act against them, perhaps in a physical sense, but I think more in the sense that our policy will be to replace whites with blacks. Then others are afraid that their acquired benefits will vanish.

Question: Are these fears justified?

Answer: No, I certainly do not think they are justified to the extent that these people believe. We do not intend to act against anybody in physical terms; we are pledged to a policy of peace and reconciliation. The constitution prevents us from enacting retroactive legislation and we do not desire to do that; we are pledged to the principle of forgiveness.

In terms of the fear of replacement, we are carrying out a policy of African advancement but, that does not mean we are going to make the public service or any other service totally black. We cannot do that. True, the blacks are in the majority but what we need is a kind of balance. If we carry out African advancement to the extent that we feel to be satisfactory then the future process will be one of recruiting on the basis of merit.

Question: You have said on a number of occasions that your ultimate goal is the establishment of a socialist state in Zimbabwe, but one could hardly describe your present policies as socialist. Does this mean you have modified your aim?

Answer: No we have not. We are going to work towards the establishment of a socialist society, but we have taken into cognizance the reality of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the capitalist system here. You do not destroy an infrastructure that is in being in order to realize your socialist aims. In fact you can do so by building on the structure that is there.

And what is socialism about anyway? It is about bringing benefits to people in a definite way, using definite modalities. Our view is that we can proceed to work on socialist principles at the present moment. In any case there are quite a number of things which are already socialist; education and health are already state-controlled. We are going to have collective agriculture. This is not going to be by way of imposition; we are going to educate the people into accepting the system. You do not begin by imposing the system, you start by creating a consciousness among the people.

Question: Will there eventually have to be some state participation in sectors like mining or industry?

Answer: State participation? There will be that. I am glad that most of the multinational and foreign companies which want to invest in the country are suggesting state participation. Where we can, we will participate, of course, but where we feel the field should be left entirely to private enterprise we will do so. I think that in commerce and industry generally the field is better left to private enterprise. But in the crucial areas like mining and certain sectors of the infrastructural system like hydro-electric schemes and vast irrigation schemes the need for the state to participate exists and in my opinion should be emphasized.

But the state need not participate as a state-directly. It can establish a statutory body, which is what you already find in the airways, the grain marketing authority and the electric supply commission. These already exist.

Question: Where are you going to get the money to pay for the reforms you wish to carry out in areas like land resettlement, education and health?

Answer: We have tried begging, and grants have not been all that forthcoming in spite of the honeymoon many people are enjoying with us. The British have given us 75N pounds, the Americans about \$35M, the Germans DM50M, and there are smaller sums from other countries. That is all by way of grants, but I do not think we are going to receive such large sums in the future. We want loans and we are busy getting loans for various projects.

Question: Why do you think the flow of foreign aid has been rather disappointing?

Answer: I suppose it is because there is a state of economic recession throughout Europe. The economic situation in Britain and the United States is not encouraging. Nor are the politics of the moment either, with electioneering taking place in the United States. I suppose, too, that after

people have had a look at our infrastructure they think we do not deserve much help. That is the disadvantage we get from our level of development.

Question: What role do you see for foreign investment, and do you think that foreign investors are holding back until they see the true colors of your government?

Answer: Certainly not. Contrary to what some circles in Europe are suggesting, we are actually taking our time in examining which foreign investors can be of greatest benefit to us.

Question: You are not envisaging any changes in the regulations concerning foreign investment?

Answer: No, except that we will expect some of them to propose joint ventures with the government, or else we will propose joint ventures. They are free to come, but we would prefer it if the enterprises became localized and a greater number of their shares became owned locally.

Question: Zimbabwe's foreign policy is one of non-alignment. How do you see Zimbabwe's relations developing with the West, particularly with the European community?

Answer: On that basis of non-alignment, but we want to be associated with the EEC under the Lome Convention. We are in the process of finalizing arrangements for our entry as an associate member.

Question: What about Zimbabwe's relations with the Eastern block, particularly the Soviet Union? Zanu's ties with the Soviet Union have never been particularly close?

Answer: Well, not because of Zanu but because the Soviet Union chose it that way. They had their own preferences. We are not responsible for the cool relationship that exists. If they want to be more friendly than they have been in the past then we are ready.

Question: The news broadcasts on the Zimbabwe radio always describe South Africa as "racist" and "apartheid" South Africa. Yet your country is likely to have to import up to 200,000 tons of maize from that country next year. Can you define your attitude towards South Africa?

Answer: Our position is clear: A political relationship with South Africa is out of the question. We cannot have any political relationship with them for obvious reasons. We feel revulsion at their system of apartheid. What we have reversed here is what they are still practicing there. But on economic ties, the relationship which we found in existence will continue to exist because the reality is that our economy, both historically and geographically, has tended to depend more and more on South Africa's economy. This has to be recognized although in Lusaka (at a meeting in April between

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

nine black Southern African countries) we committed ourselves to the interdependence of our economies in this region and the lessening of dependence on South Africa.

Question: What scope is there for Zimbabwe to lessen its economic dependence on South Africa in the foreseeable future?

Answer: Well it depends on the pace in the development of relations and communications between us and the rest of the African countries of this region. We also produce lots of goods here which we can sell to countries in this region. Then there is Zambia which wants to use the ports in Mozambique; Zaire too.

Question: Have you had any contact with white South African leaders?

Answer: No, but we are prepared to sponsor a meeting here between South Africa and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) on the question of Namibia.

Question: Do you think that a negotiable solution can be achieved in Namibia on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435?

Answer: I think so. I think the parameters are there, the principles have been spelt out and some basic requirements demanded by South Africa seem to have been met. It appears that SWAPO is forthcoming--perhaps more forthcoming than South Africa--on the question of a conference to work out the manner of implementing the United Nations resolution on Namibia.

Question: Many people, particularly in the European community, believe that Zimbabwe will sooner or later become a one-party state like most other countries in Africa. Is this going to happen and is it desirable?

Answer: You already had a one-party state here in the past, not because the constitution decreed it but because that was the reality. I myself am not against a one-party state as long as it results from the decision of the people, but at the moment I do not see that being the political trend. We have a constitution that accepts a multi-party system: under it we had a landslide victory.

CSO: 4420

END

120

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY