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ABRATOV'S NEW BOOK ON WASHINGTON'S POLICIES

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18 July 1980

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 14/80)

Arbatov's New Book on Washington's Policies



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USSR REPORT

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ARBATOV'S NEW BOOK ON WASHINGTON'S POLICIES

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[Book by A.G. Arbatov: "Security in the Nuclear Age and Washington Policies"]

[Excerpts] In this monograph the Americanist A. G. Arbatov analyzes the foreign policy of the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Especial attention is devoted to Washington's policies in the field of nuclear missile weapons. The author examines the question of how and with what purpose American militaristic forces are intensifying the arms race. At the same time, in far-sighted circles in the country there is a tendency toward negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms and on spreading detente to the military sphere. All of this reflects a very sharp struggle in the United States ruling circles on the issues of foreign policy and security during the nuclear age.

The book is designed for propagandists, lecturers, and everyone who is interested in the important problems of the present day.

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From the Author

Security is a concept which is as ancient as civilization itself. In seeking it states have from time immemorial relied upon territorial seizures and superiority in military strength. And this inevitably threatened the security of other countries and gave rise to devastating wars.

The 20th century has compelled us to take a new look at many truths which seemed unshakable for thousands of years, and this applies in full measure to the concept of security. History's greatest social revolution and the growth of the might and influence of real socialism have created the possibility of a fundamentally new way of ensuring security. Defining it, V. I. Lenin said even before the birth of the first socialist state: "The end of wars, peace among peoples, and a halt to plundering and violence -- this is our goal...."¹ The development of the scientific and technological revolution and the creation of weapons of unlimited destructive power and range have made a shift to this path a vital necessity.

But it was not in the summer of 1945 when an atomic tornado swept away Hiroshima and Nagasaki that the realities of the nuclear age were recognized in all of their terrifying dimensions in the United States of America. It was only in the beginning of the 1960s that America was once and for all deprived of the inaccessibility to which it had become so accustomed and which was ensured by the two oceans that separated it from the remaining world. The shock which overtook the United States as a result of this was aggravated by the fact that after World War II it had tried to make the basis of its relations with other countries an overwhelming nuclear superiority and an unprecedented military and political expansion overseas.

In this book which is being offered for the reader's consideration there is an examination of the difficult path which has been covered

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by the United States from the time of its awareness of the realities of the atomic age to its adaptation to them. In fact, this path is far from completed today, since the American ruling circles have not yet given up their attempts to solve new problems with obsolete methods, although they have taken on the form of increasingly perfected and powerful weapons and increasingly sophisticated strategic ideas. However, these efforts have again and again been demonstrating their bankruptcy and, at the same time, causing damage to the security of the entire world, including the United States.

For the essence of security and the ways of strengthening it have undergone a fundamental change under today's conditions when tremendous stores of means of destruction which are capable of putting an end to our civilization have been piled up in the world, when rapid technological progress is continually giving birth to increasingly terrible types of weapons which can shake the military balance, and when in many areas of the world centers of conflict which threaten to put these arsenals of global destruction into action have been preserved and are ripening. The entire experience of the nuclear age suggests a fundamentally different approach to the problem of ensuring security. It has been at the basis of the policies of the Soviet Union which have already produced positive results contributing to a relaxation of tensions. "...We are not seeking to achieve military superiority over the West," the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev has emphasized, "for we do not need it. We need only reliable security. And there is no doubt that there will be more security for both sides if the arms race is harnessed, military preparations are curtailed, and the international political climate is improved."²

In the West, and above all in Washington, an understanding of this difficult and untraditional truth is making a way for itself with great difficulty, with halts and even with reversals, especially when it is a matter of concrete steps to limit armaments which affect the interests and programs of the military-industrial complex. It is these questions which are at the center of the attention of the present book which covers an important and quite long period of United States history. Of course, the author was interested only in those aspects of it which are directly connected with his topic. He was able to find support here in the work of Soviet scholars in which there are detailed analyses of the history of American domestic and foreign policy, of the mechanism of the formation of the country's political course, and of the levers by which the military-industrial complex influences this course. I am speaking above all about the works of G. A. Arbatov, O. N. Bykov, A. A. Gromyko, V. V. Zhurkin, V. S. Zorin, E. A. Ivanyan, N. N. Inozemtsev, A. A. Kokoshin, Yu. M. Mel'nikov, N. A. Mil'shtein, B. D. Pyadyshev, G. A. Trofimenko, N. N. Yakovlev, and others.

In the present book the reader will find a detailed examination of many American weapons programs and of the strategic conceptions connected with them, since Washington's political approaches to the realities of

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the nuclear age are reflected especially palpably in them and it is in the struggle around them that a new attitude toward the problem of security is making its way among the American public and a section of the country's ruling circles. Under present-day conditions even certain issues which in the past seemed purely military ones are becoming major problems of Soviet-American relations and important factors in the international situation. They merit the careful attention of all who are interested in international relations in which the great task today is practical steps toward disarmament. And this task, as L. I. Brezhnev has said, is facing not only governments: "No one has a right to stand aloof from this matter. It cannot be expected that it will be possible to turn the course of events around from armament to disarmament without the energetic actions of international public opinion and of the broadest political forces."³

Chapter V: Mutual Security, Parity and the Dynamics of Armaments

In a speech on Capitol Hill the United States Secretary of State depicted the chief problem of American foreign policy in the 1970s as follows: "If we pursue the goal of peace, regardless of any other task (of foreign policy), our remaining interests may suffer damage and, perhaps, be completely lost. But if unbridled competition leads to a nuclear conflict these interests, like everything else, will perish in an inevitable catastrophe....The greatest task of our time consists in reconciling the reality of competition with the necessity of coexistence."¹

By virtue of immutable historical laws a return to the "cold war" in its, so to speak, "classical" form has become very difficult if not impossible, attractive as it may be for dogmatists with its simplicity and constancy of foreign policy goals and interests. The preponderant "nuclear superiority" of the United States and its absolute hegemony in the capitalist world have retreated irretrievably into the past; and the myth of a monolithic international "communist conspiracy" has revealed its complete bankruptcy. An overall military equilibrium between the USSR and the United States on the level of strategic weapons and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the sphere of conventional armed forces has become the distinguishing feature of the new stage of international relations. The dilemma of the West's ruling circles has consisted in whether to restrict the dynamic movement of the military equilibrium with ever broader agreements between the opposing sides on the basis of genuine equality and an equal security, or to attempt to make use of the rapid development of death-dealing technology in order to obtain one-sided military and political advantages in the formulation of ever more sophisticated strategic conceptions.

The choice of what path to follow on this very important issue will to a large degree determine what the world will be like in the 1980s and even the 1990s. Will it be a world of good neighborly coexistence and

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cooperation, or will it turn into an arena of fierce competition and confrontation in new fields and dangerous forms. To an enormous extent this depends upon the policy of the Soviet Union and the United States. The USSR's line on these questions which was once again confirmed in the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1976 consists in strengthening detente in those areas where the objective conditions have developed for this, and in spreading it to new areas of bilateral and multilateral relations. In the Summary Report of the CC CPSU to the 25th Congress it was unambiguously emphasized: "In its foreign policy the Soviet Union intends to patiently and consistently seek ever new ways to develop peaceful mutually advantageous cooperation between states with different social systems and paths to disarmament. We shall steadily increase our efforts in the struggle for a durable peace."²

As for American policy, it has been formulated in a stubborn domestic struggle and has frequently shown contradictoriness and a lack of consistency. Since the middle of the 1970s circles which have put an intense emphasis on Soviet-American differences and have advocated a sharpening of the rivalry have become more active in the United States. As a result of the fundamentally new realities this course is not capable of yielding the desired fruits, but it can seriously hamper the development of detente and even undermine it in certain areas where the first positive steps have already been taken. The limitation of strategic weapons has remained the decisive issue in Soviet-American relations. It is not surprising, therefore, that since the mid-1970s it has been precisely around it that there has been in the United States the most stubborn struggle to determine the choice of a way to ensure "national security" at a new and exceptionally important and complex historical stage.

1. On the Road to Security and Equality: Vladivostok, November 1974.

The reorientation of Washington's strategic course and its acceleration of the development of new nuclear weapons in the mid-1970s gave rise to sharp criticism from realistic circles in the United States. Heated disputes about this broke out on the Capitol. "Doctor Schlesinger is waving the alarm flag," Senator Kennedy said. "His point of view neglects to see the essence of the problem which will face the United States in the immediate future....Nowhere in the world today are there military threats to our security with which our existing and planned military might could not cope...We are much more threatened by the Administration's inability to manage the economy than by any imaginary shortcomings in our military strength."³ Many American public and political figures and authoritative foreign policy specialists came out against the policy of speeding up the arms race. A discussion of Schlesinger's strategic initiatives unfolded on the pages of such central American newspapers as THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON POST, and THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. Influential public organizations joined the debates: The Association for Weapons Control, the Federation

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of American Scientists, and the Center for Defense Information. Examining the strategic conceptions proposed by the Pentagon, G. Skowell emphasized: "To make the waging of a nuclear war easier does not mean to strengthen restraint. It leads to increased risks that the nightmare of nuclear destruction will become a reality."⁴

However, certain circles in the United States thought differently. Despite the valid criticism of a number of public figures and scientists and journalists, Schlesinger's conceptions and the weapons programs connected with them made a way for themselves into Washington's state policy. Moreover, after several years of being under a "siege," the military-industrial complex and its conservative political echelons began to unify their ranks and prepare a counter-offensive along a broad front. The coalition of militarists was strengthened by its alliance with Schlesinger in the Department of Defense and Senator Jackson in Congress. The main direction of their work was a continuation of the mass brain-washing of public opinion through the tested method of frightening it with the "military threat" of the Soviet Union. Juggling statistics and strategic forecasts, the Secretary of Defense did not miss an occasion to portray gloomy pictures of the future "nuclear superiority" of the USSR as a result of its allegedly "forced" missile programs. In support of these pessimistic prophecies a widely advertised study under the name of "An Evaluation of the Global Balance of Power" was performed by the Strategic Center of Georgetown University. It was asserted in it, in particular: "...The growing nuclear forces of the Soviet Union are capable of acquiring an obvious degree of superiority in the eyes of the political leaders of the entire world. This appearance of superior force will increase Soviet influence and prestige to the detriment of the United States."⁵

On the Capitol Senator Jackson showered criticism upon the 1972 Temporary Agreement because it allegedly gave the USSR "major advantages in the number of land- and sea-based strategic missiles." He did not mention here that as early as 1970 the United States had begun a rapid increase in the number of its nuclear warheads by means of deploying missiles with detachable nose cones, and he also passed over the existence in the United States of a large fleet of strategic aviation and of its forward-based nuclear weapons near Soviet territory. Especial emphasis was put on the issue of the so-called Soviet "superiority in the throw weight" of ballistic missiles. According to Schlesinger's and Jackson's arguments, it turned out that the "superiority of many times over" of Soviet missiles in the weight of their nose cones would lead to the USSR's "superiority" in the number and power of its nuclear missiles after the deployment of its warheads of the "MIRV" type. In addition, of course, there was silence about the fact that the United States itself was creating heavy liquid-fuel

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missiles in the early 1960s ("The Titan"). It had restricted the deployment of the latter by no means out of good motives, but because in recent years the Pentagon, as has already been shown, regarded other paths of military and technical development to be more effective and undertook the reorganization of the structure of America's nuclear triad on the basis of its ideas of strategic expediency. However, this did not at all embarrass the American prophets who had taken it upon themselves to frighten the public with the "Soviet threat." Some of the supporters of increasing American military might like Senator S. Nunn were unsparing in their assertions regarding an increase in the size of the armed forces of the socialist countries that was allegedly taking place in Central Europe. Others, like Retired Admiral E. Zumwalt, became noisy about an alleged increase in the "threat" from the Soviet Navy.

Senator McIntyre, a recognized specialist on the problems of armaments, rightly noted in this regard: "When the Pentagon plays for big stakes it publishes testimony with an abundance of fears and exaggerations but with a shortage of truthfulness and objectivity."⁶ And the stakes of the military-industrial complex in the middle 1970s were indeed big. They included a planned new round of the arms race, a weakening of the anti-militarist opposition within the United States, and the future fate of the relaxation of tensions itself.

Other channels were also used to stir up anti-Soviet feelings in the West. The new Arab-Israeli war which broke out in the Near East in October 1973 and the subsequent repeated increase in petroleum prices which plunged capitalism into an energy crisis (aggravating the general economic crisis) were placed entirely at the service of the anti-Soviet campaign. And here American Zionist circles united in a single front with conservatives and with the military-industrial complex. They just about accused the Soviet Union of "instigating" the armed conflict and the petroleum embargo, and incriminated the USSR with "violating" the spirit of the "Principles of Relations" which had been signed in May 1972 at the Moscow Summit Meeting.

Serious damage was caused to detente by the campaign which was begun in the United States regarding so-called "violations of human rights" in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The anti-Soviet forces pursued the goal of using the weakening of tensions, the expansion of contacts between peoples, and the growing exchange of information for subversive activities against socialism and an unceremonious intervention in the internal affairs of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. The movement by American Zionist Circles, reactionary trade union leaders, and the press influenced many liberal politicians, which weakened their position in favor of detente and placed them in a very ambiguous position regarding Soviet-American relations. On the Capitol the "human rights" campaign was led by none other than Senator

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Jackson. Through the efforts of Jackson and his supporters both Houses of Congress adopted in December 1974 trade legislation in which the granting to the Soviet Union of "most favored nation status" and trade credits was qualified by conditions which concerned the USSR's emigration laws. As a consequence of such an unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and the absolute unacceptability of the American conditions the agreements on the development of trade and economic cooperation which had been concluded in 1972 did not come into force.

Domestic events in the United States also had an effect upon the process of detente. In the summer of 1974 the Watergate Affair reached its culmination. President Nixon's closest associates, Haldeman, Erlichman, Mitchell, and others, were sentenced by a court to prison. Vice President Agnew went into retirement. The leader of the Republican minority in the House of Representatives, Congressman Gerald Ford, was appointed to replace him. In Congress the movement to impeach the President was growing. After Nixon's participation in concealing illegal actions had become obvious, a judicial commission of the House of Representatives, on 27-30 July 1974 in the three stages established by procedure, passed a resolution to bring an impeachment action. Faced with his inevitable removal from office, Richard Nixon decided to abandon the Presidency. On 8 August 1974, in his last appearance on national television, he announced his retirement. "I no longer have a sufficiently strong political base in Congress," he said. "I would have preferred to remain to the end, regardless of the personal sufferings this would cause me....But, in taking a different step, I hope to speed up the process of the healing of wounds."⁷

On 9 August President Richard Nixon went into retirement. Gerald Ford became the next President of the United States.

Great damage to detente was a serious side effect of Watergate. On the one hand, from the end of 1973 to the middle of 1974 the leadership of the Administration was practically paralyzed in the foreign policy sphere. In the process of losing the remnants of his authority and influence within the country, President Nixon was to an increasing degree incapable of carrying out further steps in the field of detente and weapons limitation. The Watergate scandal consumed more and more of the attention and energy of the liberal circles in the United States, distracting them from the problems of foreign policy and the arms race. Although Secretary of Defense Schlesinger who took some drastic strategic measures publicly called upon the opposition for a debate on military policy, the reply to this challenge was insufficiently decisive. To a large extent on account of Watergate the individual centers of opposition to the counter-offensive of militarism in the United States did not turn, as in preceding years, into a united front of opposition.

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The opponents of detente in the United States, of course, did not fail to make use of the domestic political situation to cast a shadow on the successes of Soviet-American relations and the improvement of the international climate. Stubborn efforts began to be made to convince the public that for the sake of its own popularity which was connected with expanding detente the Administration had allegedly permitted the Soviet Union to acquire one-sided political and military advantages. For example, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense W. Natter asserted in his sensational study "Kissinger's Grand Design": "Secretary Kissinger is glorifying agreements against which Professor Kissinger would have taken an energetic stand. I am talking about such landmarks of detente as the ratification of the status quo in Berlin, the recognition of East Germany, and the legitimization of the existing political regime in Eastern Europe. SALT-I is proclaimed an enormous success in limiting nuclear weapons, although it permits a substantial expansion of the Soviet arsenal....Such diplomacy," Natter concluded, "has created too much one-sided detente and has resulted in a super relaxation of tensions in the United States and throughout the West."⁸

Soon after President Nixon's departure from the political scene which concluded the scandalous sensations of Watergate a new exacerbation of the domestic struggle around the issues connected with the Soviet-American relations and a limitation of weapons began in the United States. Conservative and militaristic circles made efforts to use the change of the head of state for a sharp turn in Washington's policy in the direction of sharpening confrontation and increasing military rivalry. In their turn, the opponents of this line attempted to achieve decisive progress in the development of Soviet-American relations which had been constrained during President Nixon's final period by domestic events. The chief clash between these currents occurred around the future policy of the United States in the field of strategic weapons, particularly the issues of SALT.

During his 25 years in the House of Representatives the new President of the United States had recommended himself as a supporter of very conservative political views. In domestic policy Ford was firmly opposed to federal monies for social security, but during his membership in the Appropriations Committee he invariably supported military budgets and the development of new weapons systems. With regard to the Soviet Union, Ford adhered in a traditional way to a very hard line -- "No concessions, no deals." In Washington there were few people who regarded Ford as a person of outstanding qualities, but he had gotten the reputation of being an experienced master of Capitol procedures and inter-party combinations.

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After becoming President of the United States, Ford refrained from new appointments to key offices in the military and political apparatus. Only the post of White House Chief of Staff was taken by the United States Ambassador to NATO Donald Rumsfeld who replaced General Haig who was appointed Commander in Chief of NATO. Kissinger's position, despite his authority and popularity in the United States, had become much more difficult in 1974. His appointment to the post of Secretary of State which in itself strengthened Kissinger's influence burdened him with current matters to the detriment of issues of paramount importance. An especially large amount of his time and energy was swallowed up at the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974 by his so-called "shuttle diplomacy" which was expressed in separate actions by Washington in the Near East, and this at the very moment when a critical stage in Soviet-American relations and in the entire policy of detente and arms limitation had come!

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger began to confidently pursue his own line in the field of strategic weapons. Schlesinger's first press conference in January 1974 at which a change in America's military conceptions was announced caught the State Department by surprise. It had not been informed in advance of the content of the Secretary of Defense's strategic ideas. (In the White House Schlesinger's speech was approved by General Haig over the head of the Secretary of State who was at the same time the President's Assistant for National Security.) When the State Department learned of the Pentagon leader's initiative a special meeting was arranged with the Secretary of Defense whose essence was a protest against the strategy of "counter-force." However, Schlesinger had no thought of yielding. A conversation followed as a result of which differences of a technical nature between the two departments were revealed.⁹ However, they were not made public. Apparently, in order to avoid weakening the already shaky positions of the Ford Administration.

At the same time, no doubts remained that Schlesinger had performed a profound and purposeful undermining action on the policy of detente and a limitation of the military rivalry of the two powers which had gradually been taking shape in past years. With his strategic conceptions and, what is even more important, his weapons programs the Secretary of Defense had narrowed the prospects for achieving an agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons between the USSR and the United States. In this way, hopes diminished for an expansion of detente and for the development of Soviet-American relations which were connected above all with progress at the SALT negotiations in Geneva.

As for the new President, at that time he showed an interest in making progress at the Soviet-American negotiations. Having gotten into the White House unexpectedly, Ford decided to become a candidate in the 1976 presidential elections. This meant that he had to gain prestige

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and popularity in the United States during his remaining two years in office. What could be better for this purpose than the rapid achievement of a new agreement on a limitation of offensive weapons which had not moved from dead center during President Nixon's last period in office? Despite the anti-Soviet campaign of the military-industrial complex, the Zionists, and the reactionaries, there remained in the United States extensive feelings in favor of detente and limitation of the arms race.

But the most important role in making progress at the SALT negotiations was played by the continuing nuclear missile equilibrium between the USSR and the United States, the Soviet Union's constructive policy, and the objective interests of both powers in another agreement in this field. After 1972, at the second stage of the SALT negotiations, the American side raised the question of establishing "equal ceilings" on the strategic forces of the two powers. It is completely natural that the USSR raised the question of taking account of the American forward-based weapons in these ceilings. It acted in accordance with its official statement at the time of the conclusion of the 1972 agreement that this question would have to be returned to when a long-term agreement was prepared. For a period of two years it was not possible to reach an agreement in Geneva, although certain partial and preliminary steps were taken toward concluding it. In particular, even before President Ford had come to power, in June 1973 at a summit meeting in Washington it was decided that a permanent agreement would be signed in 1974 and would include both quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic offensive weapons -- on the basis of the principle of equal security for the sides and of the impermissibility of either one of them obtaining one-sided advantages.¹⁰ At the Moscow meeting between the Soviet and American leadership in July 1974 it was agreed that the new treaty would "cover the period until 1985 and concern both quantitative and qualitative limitations."¹¹

Desiring to promote progress in the Soviet-American negotiations, the leadership of the USSR took an important step in the direction of the position of the American side. As the member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko later recalled, during the course of the negotiations in the fall of 1974 "in the interests of achieving an agreement we did not propose as a mandatory condition the inclusion in the agreement of a point concerning the elimination of American forward-based nuclear weapons."¹² The Soviet Union's major political decision was aimed at facilitating the current round of negotiations by postponing the question of American advance-based weapons to the future. This made it possible for a new agreement to be reached between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of offensive strategic weapons systems.

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On 23-24 November 1974 there was a meeting between the General Secretary of the CC CPSU L. I. Brezhnev and the President of the United States G. R. Ford in the environs of Vladivostok. At the center of the Soviet Primor'ye the leaders of both powers confirmed their determination to continue to develop their relations in the direction which had been set during previous years by the treaties and agreements concluded among them. First of all, this concerned the agreements on preventing a nuclear war and limiting strategic weapons which, as was noted in the Soviet-American communique, were a "good beginning to the process of creating guarantees against the appearance of a nuclear conflict and of war in general."¹³

In order to make further progress along this path an agreement was reached at the Summit Meeting in Vladivostok that the new agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons should include "the appropriate points of the Temporary Agreement of 26 May 1972" and "cover the period from October 1977 to 31 December 1985." Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement was supposed to include a number of important limitations. In particular, both sides would have the right to possess a total of 2400 launchers for land and sea-based ballistic missiles and also of strategic bombers. In addition, both sides could have no more than 1320 launchers for land and sea ballistic missiles equipped with detachable nose cones and individually targeted warheads. It was planned that the working out of the legal details and formulation and the conclusion of the new agreement would take place before the end of 1975. Not later than 1980-1981 it was planned to continue negotiations on a further limitation and reduction of strategic weapons for the period after 1985.¹⁴

The Vladivostok Agreement was a very important step toward a limitation of the arms race. It established clear and equal long-term limits on the number of strategic weapons carriers in the USSR and the United States, including long-range bombers, for the first time. Limits were also placed for the first time on the deployment of detachable nose cones, which was an initial step toward limiting the qualitative arms race. Finally, the agreement on equal ceilings could serve as the point of departure for lowering them, as it also could for new qualitative limitations at a subsequent stage of the negotiations. Taking note of the positive role of the Vladivostok Agreement L. I. Brezhnev said in the Summary Report of the CC CPSU to the 25th CPSU Congress: "It is clear that an agreement on this important issue would be of very great importance for the further development of relations between the USSR and the United States, for strengthening mutual trust, and for strengthening world peace."¹⁵

For his part, President Ford of the United States stated at a press conference: "I believe that the agreement that was concluded at the first stage of the negotiations on a limitation of strategic weapons

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was a step forward. If we succeed in concluding a second agreement on a mutual basis, it will also be constructive within the framework of detente."¹⁶ In this connection, Secretary of State Kissinger observed: "The negotiations on restraining the strategic arms race and detente are in our common interests. We are not doing any favors here for the Soviet Union. This follows with necessity from the circumstances of the present period. In seeking to prevent a nuclear war we are not doing anyone any favors."¹⁷

The Vladivostok Agreement was met with approval by a substantial part of America's public and ruling circles. In January 1975 a majority of the Senate adopted Resolution No. 20 which had been put forward by Senators Kennedy, Mathius, and Mondale in support of the Soviet-American agreement in Vladivostok. In February of the same year the House of Representatives adopted the almost identical resolution No. 160 which had been proposed by 15 congressmen, including those like Bing, Zabalocki, Findley, Schroeder, Leggett, and others. Speaking in support of the Vladivostok Agreement, Bing stated: "The importance of the agreement is completely obvious....The Vladivostok Agreement is a positive step toward slowing down the strategic weapons race. We support the efforts of the Administration to turn the agreement in principle which has been reached into a concrete treaty limiting the amount of strategic delivery systems and individually targeted warheads which the United States and USSR are permitted to have."¹⁸

But the opponents of the limitation of nuclear missile rivalry in the United States did not retreat from their positions. On the contrary, they carried out a broad offensive against the Vladivostok Agreement, trying to hinder the conclusion of a long-term agreement and to open the way for a continuation of an increase in armaments. Some of them like the expert from the Hudson Institute D. Brennan who has repeatedly been mentioned above, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense P. Nitze and the former Secretary of Defense M. Laird carried out a frontal attack on the principles of Vladivostok. They asserted that the agreement allegedly gave the Soviet Union one-sided advantages in "heavy missiles," missile throw weight, and the amount of powerful warheads of the "MIRV" type. The president of the Rand Corporation, G. Rowan (whom we remember as one of the chief inspirers of the "nuclear superiority" strategy in the Pentagon in the early 1960s) called openly upon Congress to refuse the support an agreement based on the Vladivostok principles.¹⁹

Others chose a more sly tactic. For example, Senator Jackson, camouflaging himself with the slogan of lowering the Vladivostok ceilings which had been put forward by some sincere supporters of the agreement in the United States, called for a lowering of the maximum on strategic carriers from 2400 to 1760. Within this framework, according to his plan, both sides would be permitted to have no more than 800 inter-continental ballistic missiles, 560 BRBL (submarine missiles), and 400

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aircraft. In fact, under the plausible pretext of a radical reduction in weapons, Jackson was trying to ensure one-sided advantages for the United States. By virtue of the unequal structure of the strategic forces of the two states, the above-measures would have a much greater effect upon the Soviet Union than on the United States. "Jackson's proposal was a diplomatic maneuver that was completely unacceptable to the Soviets," the American scholar A. Cox noted. "But due to the complexity of the nuclear numbers game many supporters of detente were deceived and decided that this was a good idea."²⁰

Finally, many representatives and allies of the military-industrial complex, especially those who occupied important posts in the Administration, began a kind of flank-action by-pass of Vladivostok. While supporting the agreement in words, they tried to create difficulties for turning it into a Treaty. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated with complete loyalty at first glance: "...We have to strive to establish control over weapons, but we must also preserve an equilibrium in our military might with the Soviet Union."²¹ However, under the pretext of "maintaining an equilibrium" allegedly within the Vladivostok framework he demanded an increase in military appropriations and the speeding up of strategic weapons programs. Schlesinger announced for example, that it had been planned to commission ten projected "Trident" submarines not instead of a corresponding number of "Polaris" missile carriers (as should have been the case in keeping with the 1972 Temporary Agreement), but in addition to them.²² Beyond this number of carriers, it was also planned to deploy substantial numbers of new "B-1" bombers.

The Pentagon's budget request for strategic weapons programs in the 1976 fiscal year and for a three-month carry-over* came to 9.8 billion dollars -- almost 2.5 billion dollars larger than the strategic section of the previous military budget. From a formal legal point of view, most of America's military programs did not violate the principles agreed upon in Vladivostok. But, in essence, these long-term arms race plans went contrary to the spirit and purposes of Vladivostok. Their task was to acquire one-sided strategic advantages in spite of the principles of equality and equal security which had been proclaimed in November 1974. These programs threatened to emasculate the meaning of the limitations which had been formulated and to destabilize the general strategic situation.

*The additional funds were included in connection with the movement in 1975 of the beginning of the fiscal year from July to October, which in fact made possible a "free" addition of one-quarter of the annual appropriations to the 1976 fiscal year.

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2. The Onslaught of Militarism in the United States in 1975-1976 and the Political Zigzags of the Ford Administration.

In 1975-1976 the struggle within the United States between the supporters and opponents of the arms race again entered an unprecedentedly acute phase comparable perhaps to the debates of 1969-1970. True, during that period the anti-militarist opposition was on the offensive and pushed back the military-industrial complex along the entire front. Now, however, the reverse process was occurring: By making use of domestic and foreign political conditions and of certain objective difficulties which had been encountered on the path to detente, militarism made a fierce attempt to get back its lost positions.

In Congress the liberal wing under the leadership of such figures as Senators Kennedy, Mondale, Mathias, McIntyre, Muskie, McGovern, Symington, Humphrey, and Brooke entered into an intense struggle with the conservative wing led by Jackson, Buckley, Thurmond, Stennis, Goldwater, and Hruska. To a definite extent their struggle amounted in practical terms to pulling over to their side twenty-five to fifty senators who occupied centrist positions and did not have firm opinions on political military issues. After the successful passage of resolutions by the Senate and House of Representatives in support of Vladivostok in January and February of 1975, Senator McIntyre proposed in May of the same year an amendment to the military budget for the 1976 fiscal year which provided for the removal of appropriations for the development and testing of detachable nose cone systems of the "MaRV" type. It was blocked by a small majority, to a large extent as the result of an anti-communist campaign regarding the final collapse of the puppet regimes in Indochina. However, a resolution by Humphrey was adopted which called in a less categorical form for a postponement of tests of "MaRV" type warheads until there were "convincing reasons" for this. (A similar resolution, however, was killed in the house of representatives.)

In the summer of 1975 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives condemned at its hearings the Pentagon's "counter-force" programs. But in the Senate a McGovern amendment on halting the development of the "B-1" system did not pass, in the same way that a Kennedy amendment to reject the production of an additional number of intercontinental "Minuteman-3" missiles failed to pass. Nor was support given to Kennedy's amendment on disassembling a missile defense complex which remained in the United States in the area of the Grand-Forks (North Dakota) Air Force Base. On the other hand, a resolution on a "freeze" on all construction, with the exception of radar construction, was adopted. Finally, in the fall the Capitol nevertheless reduced the 1976 military budget by a total of a whole 10 billion dollars.²³ At

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the same time, Congress had been unable to discredit and reject the strategic conceptions of "equality in essence" and "selective nuclear strikes" which to a large extent the Pentagon's financial requests in the field of increasing nuclear missile forces were based. For this reason, matters were limited to a slowing down of a number of weapons programs and to a redistribution of appropriations among other weapons systems.

Outside of the Capitol the debates involved wide circles of the public and gave rise to a polarization of it such as had not occurred since the days of Vietnam. The sharp controversy surrounding the problems of a military balance and of a new SALT agreement on the basis of Vladivostok called forth in the United States a clear demarcation of two groups of numerous public and political organizations comprised of former officials, retired military people, scientists, and public figures. They held seminars, published articles and pamphlets, sent letters to Congress and to the government, and made financial contributions to the election campaigns of politicians. They made use of their connections with officials, Washington politicians, and the press as sources of information and channels for exercising influence on government policy.

Organizations like the "Council for a Liveable World," "Citizens' Organization for a Just Peace," "International Peace and Law and Order," "Center for the Study of National Security," "Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions," "Association for Arms Control," and the "Federation of American Scientists" occupied a leading place among the organizations which came out for arms limitations by means of Soviet-American agreements and against new United States military programs. In their political work these organizations based themselves upon a whole network of scientific centers like Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford, the Center for Defense Information, and the Brookings Institute which worked on military-political and military-economic problems. These groups were joined by large sectors of the business world which were not directly connected with military orders, had suffered losses from the swollen defense budget and inflation, and were interested in trade and economic cooperation with the socialist countries.

On the other side of the political struggle were such conservative, chauvinist, and pro-militarist public organizations as the "American Legion," the "Veterans of Foreign Wars," the "American Council for Security," the "American Institute for the Study of Public Policy," and the "Coalition for a Democratic Majority." These groups were given scientific research support by the Center for Strategic Studies of Georgetown University (the main rival of the Brookings Institute in Washington), and also the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the

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Institute for Defense Analysis, and Chicago University. Of course, these forces received a large amount of financial support from military business, reactionary trade union leaders from the AFL-CIO and a substantial number of Zionist organizations. "It was obvious that these forces represented millions of votes," A. Cox writes. "They made up a pressure group to increase military expenditures which at first glance seemed to be preponderant."²⁴

The point of view of these circles was expressed in perhaps its most concentrated form in the July 1974 and July 1975 reports "For an Adequate Defense": "If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the myth of detente, reduce our military might, and allow the erosion of our alliances (abroad), we may suffer irreparable defeats which will pose a threat to the preservation of democracy in America...The best diplomatic signal that the United States can give to the outside world," the reports concluded, "would be a sharp increase in our defense programs beyond the requests recently made by Secretary Schlesinger in Congress."²⁵ Replying to these militaristic appeals, Senator Kennedy expressed the essence of the position of realistic American circles: "Neither of the sides possesses superiority, and at the same time neither yields to the other. This is the lesson which finally has to be learned by our military leaders...who are still chasing after the chimera of building real superiority, although this fruitless search provokes new and more dangerous rounds of the arms race."²⁶

But it was not only the great intensity of the struggle in Congress and among the American public and scientific circles which distinguished the period that followed immediately after the Vladivostok Agreement. What was even a more rare and eloquent testimony to the intense conflict in the United States was that a deep split took place within the Ford Administration itself. Beginning with early 1975 the center of the domestic contradictions was occupied by two leading government officials in the field of American "national security" policy: the Secretary of State and President's National Security Advisor Kissinger and his former Harvard classmate, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. The political differences and rivalry for influence within the government which had begun between them as early as January 1974 had now developed into open disagreements on the principle issues of "national security." During the course of their stubborn struggle each of them tried to influence government policy through their own administrative sphere. The Secretary of State directed his efforts toward the most rapid conclusion of a long-term agreement on the Vladivostok basis. The Secretary of Defense set himself the goal of giving the new agreement such terms as would emasculate its restrictive effect for American military programs, but would unjustifiably tie down the other side. In essence, this was a provocational plan, since a refusal by the Soviet Union to sign such an

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unequal treaty would also be to the liking of the military-industrial complex. In such an event it counted on pushing the United States into another round of an accelerated arms race without any limitations whatever.

The opponents of SALT became active in two basic directions. First, official representatives of the Pentagon and their allies in Congress and in the scientific and business world and press began an intensive campaign in favor of a new strategic weapons system -- winged air-, sea-, and land-based missiles. Beginning with 1975 winged missiles were at the center of the attention of the American public and ruling circles as being almost the "only hope" for American defense. Expressing the point of view of the united group of the adherents of the new system, G. Rowan asserted in mid-1975: "The winged missile embodies a fundamental technology which will lead to a revolution in military capacities and doctrines."²⁷ Schlesinger, Carey, the Pentagon generals and admirals, Jackson, Nitze, Brennan, and many others expressed themselves in the same spirit. They gave all manner of praise to the combat effectiveness, economicalness, universality, and other strategic "virtues" of this type of weapon. At the same time, pressure was increasing from the military-industrial complex against the limitation on winged missiles in the future Soviet-American agreement. And it was pointed out here that due to their small size and other technical characteristics, it would be impossible to control the number and range of winged missiles by means of national space observation equipment. (The military "establishment" did not even wish to hear about a prohibition against this weapon.)

Meanwhile, the character of this type of weapon did not make it possible to agree to its unlimited and uncontrolled deployment. "In Vladivostok this issue did not exist," USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko later pointed out. "No green light was given there to winged missiles."²⁸ However, the Pentagon and its advocates performed stunts of juridical casuistry and demanded the deployment of these systems without any limitations, in no way bothered by their obvious negative consequences for strategic stability and the SALT negotiations.

The second direction of the campaign by the opponents of a SALT agreement was some propropaganda sensationalism about a new Soviet weapons system -- the jet bomber which had been named in the West "Backfire." The General Secretary of the CC CPSU L. I. Brezhnev at a meeting with President Ford, and also the Soviet representatives at the Geneva negotiations provided the American side with unambiguous explanations to the effect that the "Backfire" was not an intercontinental bomber, but a medium-range aircraft. Thus, it was not subject to limitation on the same level as strategic weapons systems.

However, despite this, in the United States beginning with 1975 fabrications were stubbornly spread about the "capability" of this airplane to

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reach American territory by means of fueling in the air and to make a landing on its return flight in Cuba or in other countries of Latin America. Under pressure from militarist opposition, the American side began in the SALT negotiations to absolutely arbitrarily tie a limitation on winged missiles to a limitation on the deployment of the "Backfire" bombers. Meanwhile, the only thing that they had in common was the fact that, as in the case of the campaign in favor of the winged missile, the sensation surrounding the "Backfire" system had a dual goal. On the one hand, there was a plan to obtain the right to deploy strategic winged missiles "in exchange" for giving the Soviet Union "permission" to create medium-range airplanes intended for completely different defense tasks. Or, in the contrary case, in accordance with the plans of the most aggressive circles, it was planned to "overload" the agreement with irrelevant demands which for understandable reasons would not be acceptable to the USSR and, in general, wreck the agreement on the Vladivostok basis.*

The provocative line of the military-industrial complex which was aimed at torpedoing or emasculating the Vladivostok Agreement was supplemented by continuing to whip up an extensive campaign about a mythical "Soviet threat" and by inciting anti-Soviet feelings in the United States. This included, in particular, the spreading of unsubstantiated rumors concerning alleged "violations" of the terms of the 1972 Temporary Agreement by the Soviet Union. The instigator of these fabrications was the former Secretary of Defense Laird who in June 1975 published an article in the READERS DIGEST which carried the plain title of "The Russians are Deceiving Us." Laird's accusations were enthusiastically seized upon by anti-Soviet circles in the United States.²⁹ True, the Administration leadership made a public refutation of these irresponsible inventions. But the provocative fabrications did not cease, especially since Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and his protege the Director of the CIA Colby confirmed Laird's "facts" at a secret report to the Senate, and Jackson immediately organized a "leak" of this information the press.³⁰

Finally, the opponents of detente in the United States also made use in their interests of foreign political events. After the collapse of the puppet regime in Saigon in the spring of 1975 which gave rise in the United States to indignation among the reactionary forces about the "inaction" of the government, a sensation was created regarding the construction of an imaginary Soviet Naval Base on the coast of Somali which was allegedly intended to provide rear-echelon support for USSR

*The inclusion of the "Backfire" airplanes in the Vladivostok ceiling of 2400 would demand a one-sided reduction by the Soviet Union of its strategic weapons system.

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war ships in the Indian Ocean. In fact, the "threat" by the Soviet Union to the petroleum sea route from the Persian Gulf was needed by the Pentagon as a pretext for continuing to build the very large United States Naval Base on the island of Diego-Garcia. American naval headquarters calculated that this base would help with the deployment of an aircraft carrier strike unit in the Indian Ocean, and also in supporting the battle watch of the future "Trident" missile submarines.

In this situation it was becoming more and more difficult to find a diplomatic compromise on the Vladivostok basis. Ideas which arose in the State Department regarding a solution of disputed issues in Geneva were immediately blocked by Schlesinger in the Pentagon and Jackson on the Capitol. The anti-Soviet campaign in the United States and the pressure by the military complex for increasing armaments placed ever new obstacles in the way of detente and the Soviet-American negotiations. The challenge by those circles in the United States which were pushing Washington toward a harder foreign policy was becoming increasingly open and stubborn. "The entire process (of detente) could be threatened," Kissinger observed, "if it begins to be perceived as something due to us. As the "cold war" is effaced from our memories, detente begins to look so natural that it seems quite safe to make ever increasing demands upon it. The temptation to combine detente with increased pressure upon the Soviet Union will grow. This kind of attitude will lead to horrible results. We ourselves would never allow this from Moscow. Moscow will not allow it from us. In the end, we will again come to the "cold war"..."³² he warned. To those people in the United States who, like Schlesinger, publicly kept talking about the "danger of lagging behind" the USSR in nuclear weapons, and in their closed circle of friends defended the idea of American superiority, the Secretary of State addressed the eternal question of the nuclear age: "What, in the name of God, is strategic superiority? What does it mean? What can you get from it politically, militarily, and diplomatically?"³³

With regard to the campaign about Soviet "superiority in the throw weight" of ballistic missiles and the "threat" to the survival of the American "Minutemen" missiles, the Secretary of State provided a reminder that it was the United States which was the initiator of the creation of destabilizing strategic weapons.³⁴ Now, through the efforts of the Pentagon, the cost of past mistakes could be a further undermining of a military equilibrium and of the process of the limitation of strategic weapons. Fears appeared that in the future the same would occur with cruise missiles. True, at first the Secretary of State himself supported them as an "exchange card" in the negotiations with the Soviet Union. But with time the military-industrial complex began to demand their creation under all circumstances and would not agree to any terms for the limitation of the new weapons system in a Soviet-American agreement.

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"I could never imagine that the Pentagon would fall so much in love with cruise missiles," the Secretary of State said.³⁵ (Unfortunately, a relatively short time would pass and Kissinger, now as a private person, having either changed his views, or adapting himself to American domestic political positions, will join the campaign about the "Soviet threat," and would begin to accuse the USSR of allegedly making attempts to "violate the world balance of power." (In this way, Kissinger will not only cast doubt upon many of his sensible statements in the past, but will inflict damage on the cause of detente with which his reputation as an American government official was connected.)

At the end of 1975 the disagreements in the Administration reached such proportions that they became more intolerable for the President. Schlesinger no longer found it necessary to even publicly conceal his opinion that the military budget for the 1977 fiscal year (117 billion dollars) would be insufficiently large for his military program. Ford could no longer tolerate his lack of control over the Secretary of Defense who permitted himself, in the words of A. Cox, "to make military statements in Congress which flung a challenge at the basic issues of the foreign policy which was being conducted by the President and his Secretary of State."³⁶ In the meantime, the presidential election year was drawing closer and Ford had decided to become a candidate. The open split in the government on the chief problem of "national security" was in fact paralyzing the Administration's ability to carry out a purposeful policy. All of the President's appeals to Congress to give bipartisan support to the Administration's policy were in vain; on the Capitol sharp contradictions also held sway. All of this was undermining the President's domestic positions and threatening his hopes for success in November 1976.

Finally, the President decided that the hour for decisive action had come. On 1-2 November 1975 he carried out a thorough shake-up of the key posts in his Administration. He fired Schlesinger and replaced him with the Chief of Staff of the White House, the former United States Ambassador to NATO Donald Rumsfeld. He removed Colby from the post of the Director of the CIA, replacing him with George Bush, the former United States Representative to the U.N. In order to balance these decisions and moderate the indignation of right-wing circles, Ford announced that his moderate Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller would not be reelected along with him in 1976. Finally, the President deprived Kissinger of his former post of Assistant for National Security, keeping him as Secretary of State. Kissinger's deputy Brent Scowfort was appointed to the post of Assistant to the President. Speaking on television, Ford explained these shuffles by the necessity to have his "own team" in the Administration, and not those officials who had come to him from Nixon. Schlesinger left the Pentagon as a hero of militarist

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circles in the halo of a martyr who had suffered for the military-industrial complex. In a farewell talk he said to journalists: "Henry (Kissinger) shows firmness with everybody but the Russians."³⁷ Anti-communists in the Capital and the right-wing press bemoaned the loss of the Secretary of Defense and bitterly criticized the President.

The year 1976 came -- the Republican Administration's last year in power. It began with the appearance of a ray of hope in the SALT negotiations during a visit by Kissinger to the Soviet Union in January. The essence of the compromise which was discussed in Moscow consisted of the fact that bombers carrying strategic winged missiles were equated to ballistic missiles with detachable nose cones and, in this way, included in the ceiling for missiles equipped with an RGCh (expansion unknown) system (1320). At the same time, the deployment of sea- and land-based winged missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers was prohibited. After returning to Washington, the Secretary of State announced to reporters that "90 percent" of the controversial questions in the new SALT treaty had been resolved.³⁸

But a final decision was not made. Negative features were becoming increasingly obvious in Kissinger's approach to Soviet-American relations. President Ford's position was changing palpably and rapidly against a new weapons limitation agreement. This transformation was explained by the aggregate influence of domestic political factors and of events on the world arena. With the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld came out sharply against the compromise which was still being defended in the State Department. While Rumsfeld was not on the level of his predecessor in the Pentagon command with respect to strategic theory, he clearly did not wish to be behind him in adherence to a "hard line" in relation to the Soviet Union. The new Secretary of Defense willingly followed the lead of the generals surrounding him. At the same time, as Ford's appointee and loyal protege he had greater access to the President than Schlesinger. For its part, the military-industrial complex rejected the compromise which had been proposed at the SALT negotiations, not willing to cut itself off from the possibility of deploying long-range sea- and land-based winged missiles. The latter, apart from everything else, was connected with strengthening American advance-based weapons and its nuclear guarantees in NATO. In addition, the dissatisfaction of the militarists was also explained by the fact that the inclusion of any kind of significant number of airplanes with winged missiles in the ceilings on missiles with detachable nose cones would require, as the "Trident" submarines were commissioned, a reduction of a corresponding number of existing ballistic missiles with RGCh.*

* The ceiling of 1320 missiles with "MIRV" warheads was supposed to include: 550 "Minuteman-3" intercontinental ballistic missiles, 496 "Poseidon" missile submarines, and 240 "Trident" missile submarines, that is a total of 1286 units. Thus, if missiles with RGCh were not eliminated, it would be possible to have only 34 airplanes with cruise missiles within the limits of this level.

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The attitudes of the Generals had become for the President an issue of increased importance in the domestic situation of 1976. In the spring the election campaign went into full swing. In his struggle for reelection President Ford had first to obtain his nomination as a candidate from the Republic Party. His chief opponent at this stage was Governor Ronald Reagan of California -- a dyed-in-the-wool reactionary and a long-time and consistent proponent of "absolute nuclear superiority" for the United States. Reagan, as was to be expected, chose as his election tactic attacks on the Ford government from the right, criticizing it for ignoring "national security" and for making "insufficient efforts" to increase the country's military might. "Ronald Reagan characterized detente as a spineless policy toward the Russians," an American scholar wrote. "He cited President Ford's position on detente as still another example of his indecisiveness and unclear thinking."³⁹ Anti-Soviet groups decided to make full use of the election campaign during which the political leadership becomes especially sensitive to the directions in which domestic winds are blowing. Despite Schlesinger's departure from the Pentagon, the opponents of a new agreement between the USSR and the United States and the supporters of increasing armaments who were led by Senators Jackson and Moynihan continued to strengthen their domestic political positions.

But events in Africa where in 1975 the collapse of some bastions of colonialism was entering its final stage gave rise to a special rage in anti-Soviet circles. Portugal's colonial empire had fallen apart, but the new liberated states of Africa immediately found themselves faced with a new danger. At the end of 1975 an immediate threat hung over Angola whose independence had been encroached upon by schismatics from the national liberation movement who were supported by assistance from the West and China and also the racist government of the South African Republic. After forces from the South African Republic had entered Angolan territory from the south, while armed detachments of schismatics had moved on Luanda from the east and the north, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other socialist countries, faithful to their proletarian internationalist duty, provided Angola with comprehensive assistance and support.

In stubborn battles the Angolan patriots inflicted crushing defeats upon the enemy forces. Displaying wisdom and not wishing a repetition of "Vietnam" in Africa, the American Congress refused to support the neocolonialists in Angola. At the end of December 1974 a majority vote in the Senate ordered a halt to military supplies to the anti-popular forces of Holden Roberto. The defeat of the racist units and of the contingents of mercenaries and schismatics of all colors in the tropical jungles was enthusiastically welcomed by the progressive anti-imperialist forces of the world. But the Angolan events became a pretext for an unprecedented anti-Soviet hysteria in the West. In the

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United States it led to an even greater consolidation of the opponents of negotiations with the USSR and to the unification of the supporters of a hardening of foreign policy and an increase in military might.

It was in this situation that Kissinger decided to pay tribute to the anti-Soviet feelings which had swept over the United States and to demonstrate his "firmness" with respect to the Soviet Union. In a speech in San Francisco on 3 February 1976 to the members of the California Council on World Problems he stated, shamelessly distorting the true meaning of the USSR's disinterested aid to the national liberation movement: "If one of the great powers decisively changes the balance of power in a local conflict by means of military intervention and does not encounter resistance, this creates a sinister precedent, even if the intervention takes place in a remote area."⁴⁰ With righteous anger Kissinger decided to place the responsibility for the "loss" of Angola on the Capitol. Well, perhaps the Secretary of State did succeed in deflecting accusations from the right against himself. But he had to pay for this with a considerable weakening of his foreign policy positions and arguments in favor of a Soviet-American SALT treaty on the basis of Vladivostok.

Thus, in the beginning of 1976 united pressure by right-wing Republicans and conservatives in the Capitol and by reactionary public groups and the military-industrial complex forced the Administration to "freeze" the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union. Ford was afraid that in the situation which had developed Congress would refuse to ratify the treaty and this would undermine his hopes to make use of the set of circumstances which had brought him to the White House and to remain there for an additional four years -- this time as a national elected representative of the people. And he rejected the compromise which had been recommended by Kissinger, for the first time going against the position of his Secretary of State on a chief issue of "national security." Instead of this, the United States proposed signing the treaty on the Vladivostok basis, but postponing the limitation on winged missiles until the future, which again brought the negotiations into a blind alley. And this position by the American government meant the loss of a whole year of precious time which was so necessary in order for steps on weapons limitation to be able to keep up with the intensive development of the technology of nuclear destruction.

The facts show that in 1976 there was a real possibility of making substantial progress along this path. It was a result of the objective position of the strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States and the genuine long-term security interests of the two greatest powers. It was provided by the constructive policy of the Soviet Union which found a new confirmation and development in the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1976. The Congress

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formulated a Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation and for the Freedom and Independence of Peoples. The Summary Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU expressed the determination of the party and of the entire Soviet people "to do everything possible for the completion of preparations for a new agreement between the USSR and the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons." "To do everything necessary to deepen the relaxation of international tensions and to embody it in concrete forms of mutually advantageous cooperation between states."⁴¹

Pointing to the necessity for concluding a new SALT treaty on the basis of Vladivostok, L. I. Brezhnev made additional proposals to the United States not to stop solely with a limitation of existing types of nuclear missile weapons. "We believed it possible to go further," the General Secretary of the CCPSU said, observing that in the past these initiatives had already been put forward by the Soviet side during the course of the negotiations. "Concretely, we proposed agreeing on a prohibition against the creation of new and even more destructive weapons systems, particularly new submarines of the "Trident" type with ballistic missiles and the new B-1 type strategic bombers in the United States and analogous systems in the USSR. Unfortunately, these proposals were not accepted by the American side.

"However, they remain in effect."⁴²

The government of the United States did not respond to the USSR's constructive initiatives. The President not only would not decide to sign a new SALT agreement, but under pressure from the right he began energetically to demonstrate his concern for ensuring the "defense capacity" of the United States and to show in every way his "firmness" toward the Soviet Union and readiness to stand up for American "global interests." Finally, in his polemical ardor Ford even stated that in the future he would refrain altogether from the use of the word "detente," and would speak instead of "peace on the basis of strength."⁴³

This kind of rhetoric at Washington's highest government level did not, of course, help Soviet-American mutual understanding. But even worse was the fact that the statements were backed up by real political and military measures which went counter to the spirit of detente, of the negotiations, and cooperation. The budget proposed by the Pentagon for the 1977 fiscal year exceeded the appropriations of the previous year by 14 billion dollars and reached the record figure of 110 billion dollars. Despite Schlesinger's departure, his military programs continued to develop at rapid rates in keeping with the planned schedule. More than 2 billion dollars were allocated for the construction of the fifth and sixth "Trident" atomic missile submarines. The development and production of the first models of the "B-1" bomber was

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appropriated 500 million dollars, the "M-X" program received 70 million dollars, winged missiles -- 190 million dollars, and programs to increase the effectiveness of ballistic missiles and increase their accuracy and power received 200 million dollars.⁴⁴ In his budget report of February 1976 Rumsfeld repeated almost word for word the strategic conceptions, arguments, and validations for military programs which had been put forward previously by Schlesinger.

On 5 March 1976 the first flight tests of an experimental model of a winged missile of the "ALSM" type carried by a "B-52" bomber were carried out at the White Sands Testing Grounds (New Mexico). Before the year was over, models of this system were tested six times at distances of from 130 to 370 kilometers. Soon after, on 28 March 1976, tests were begun at White Sands and over the Pacific Ocean of experimental winged missiles of the "Tomahawk" type from the Navy "A-6 Intruder" interceptor-bomber, including for a distance of more than 1,000 kilometers and involving the use of the "PERKOM" guidance system. The development of new dangerous weapons had crossed another boundary line and had come another step closer to being deployed in the strategic arsenal of the United States.⁴⁵ In the spring, making an election speech in the city of Cincinnati, the President made a public promise to develop the "B-1" bomber, despite serious doubts about its strategic usefulness, the enormous cost of a new system, and serious technical difficulties. But these circumstances did not trouble the President. The interests of the election campaign were higher than anything else, and near Cincinnati were plants of the General Electric Corporation which produced new jet engines for the new bomber. In addition to the aerospace monopolies and the local trade unions interested in military orders, Ford also hoped to lure over to his side the numerous Reagan supporters among the politicians of the southern states.

The shift by Washington to a harder policy could also be felt in other areas of foreign policy. Under the leadership of the United States NATO representatives stymied the negotiations in Vienna on a mutual reduction of armed forces and weapons in central Europe. The achievement of progress in this field was not regarded as a more pressing task in Western capitals. Pressure within the United States under the leadership of Senator Mansfield for a unilateral withdrawal of American divisions from the European continent was replaced by a campaign led by Senator Nunn to strengthen America's military presence on the other side of the Atlantic. The West European members of NATO, in their turn, now favored a greater coordination of military policy by the participants in the block and agreed to a more even division of defense expenditures and an annual increase in military budgets. This was supposed to provide financial support for their collective programs to increase their forces and modernize their weapons -- on the pretext

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of "counteracting" a mythical increase in the "threat" from the Warsaw Pact and, first of all, the Soviet Union.⁴⁶

The situation in the Near and Middle East also changed. In order to compensate for its collapsed hopes of making its influence felt in Angola, the United States put diplomatic pressure upon Cairo in order to rupture its cooperation with the USSR. In the spring of 1976 President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, having been tempted by promises of economic and military aid from the West and by a promise of American mediation in settling the conflict with Israel, committed an unprincipled and short-sighted political act. He broke off a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, erasing the many years of support by the USSR with unsubstantiated claims and slanders. From that moment on, with the encouragement of Washington, Sadat openly took the path of making separate deals with Tel Aviv, of undermining Arab unity, and of torpedoing the Geneva Conference on a just peace in the Middle East. In the neighborhood of this area, in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, the United States was attempting to strengthen its influence by seeking support in the right-wing monarchist regimes of Saudi Arabia and Iran, and it supplied them with an enormous quantity of modern weapons worth many billions of "petroleum dollars." Washington gave especial encouragement to the hegemonist pretensions in the region of the reactionary Shah's government of Iran and to its police actions against the national liberation movement in the Arab world and its pro-Israeli foreign policy.

In order to review America's "military needs" at the new stage and, consequently, its planned weapons programs, and also its approach to the SALT negotiations in Geneva, in August the White House sanctioned the organization of an independent committee for the study of military problems at the highest level -- the so-called "Group B." It was provided with secret information and the right to dispute the positions of government intelligence agencies. "The main quality which was required for membership in Group B," a journalist wrote, "was a pessimistic view of the Soviet Union's intentions."⁴⁷ The group was headed by figures whose reputation in this respect was beyond any doubts: Richard Pipes -- the well-known "Sovietologist" from Harvard, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, the former director of the Pentagon's intelligence agency, and again the same Paul Nitze.

As was to be expected, the conclusions of the study by "Group B" portrayed frightening pictures of the USSR's military "superiority" on all weapons levels and almost in all of the strategic areas of the world. An information "leak" about the conclusions of "Group B" was immediately arranged for the press; this was the work of Maj. Gen. George Keegan, the former intelligence chief of the Air Force. For many years he had come out against the estimates of American intelligence,

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accusing it of "playing down the Soviet threat." The information "leak" about the "Group B" study served as yet another pretext for an anti-Soviet campaign which was begun by Jackson and his supporters in Congress, and also by the press and right-wing political circles. This campaign placed an even deeper anti-Soviet tone on the domestic political polemics of the United States just at the time of the elections. The conclusions of "Group B" were also reflected in the long-term measures of the Ford Administration. In November 1976 a decision was made to accept the "P-1" for service, and it was planned to equip it with winged missiles.

The military budget for the 1978 fiscal year -- the last budget which was made up under the Republicans -- provided for another substantial increase in military appropriations and reached 123 billion dollars.⁴⁸ These enormous sums included monies to increase the effectiveness of ballistic missiles, speed up the development of winged missiles, for full-scale design work on the "M-X" system, for the development of a design of the "Trident 2" sea missile, the series production and deployment of the "B-1" bombers, and the construction of the seventh "Trident" missile submarine (their total number according to the plan was broadened to 16). Appropriations were also made for expansion and modernization American land forces and tactical aviation and to strengthen the United States Seventh Army in the FRG. Major programs were stipulated for an expansion of the Navy (the construction of 140 ships and submarines during the following five years) and for the construction of a gigantic new aircraft carrier and an atomic-power driven missile cruiser. It was planned to reequip the Navy with tactical winged missiles of the "Harpoon" type, and later also with "Tomahawk" missiles, to develop anti-submarine defense, and so forth. Under the heading of appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission, there were secret funds for the creation of a new inhuman type of weapon of mass destruction -- neutron warheads with increased radiation.⁴⁹

But Washington's measures "under the curtain" of the Republic Administration which were undertaken under pressure from militarist groups within the country did not bring President Ford his desired victory in the November 1976 elections. A number of American specialists believed that one of the reasons for his defeat consisted precisely in the fact that he wanted too much to remain in the presidency, devoted an excessive amount of attention to changeable domestic political conditions, and tried to please all influential groups and, first of all, the noisiest anti-Soviet circles and the demagogic champions of strengthening America's "defense capacity." For the sake of this Ford was ready to waive the fundamental issues of national security, progress in detente, and weapons limitations. Later, when the dust of the election battles had settled, doubts on this account began to be

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expressed even by the leaders of the President's election campaign: Perhaps, it had not been worthwhile to follow the lead of Reagan, Jackson, and Nitse and to squander President Ford's political reputation in tactical maneuvers? Would it not have been wiser to take a principled line, to sign the SALT agreement, and to defend it to the end? Perhaps this would have been just the thing to strengthen the President's authority, to demonstrate his ability to firmly defend his policy, regardless of domestic political trends and costs, and would have ensured him the victory in the elections?

But what sense is there in belated regrets! The political zigzags of the Ford Administration did not lead to its success in November 1976, but prevented a very important step from being taken in restraining the arms race in the face of dangerous tendencies in the development of nuclear missile potentials. Leaving after eight years in office, the Republic government left behind a very contradictory heritage in the field of foreign policy. The relaxation of tensions had entered a period of serious trials and progress in Soviet-American relations had slowed down greatly compared with the beginning of the 1970s. The new agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons "hung in the air." The tremendous potentials for destruction continued to weigh on the world, threatening a catastrophic devastation, and the next generation of death-dealing strategic equipment born in the depths of the military-industrial complex was approaching. Tendencies toward strengthening the armed forces of NATO began to prevail over the endeavor by the North Atlantic partners to lessen the burden of the arms race and lower the level of military confrontation in central Europe. Within the capitalist states and, above all in the United States, the pressure of the anti-militarist opposition definitely gave way to the onslaught of the adherents of increasing military might and of a policy "from the position of strength."

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to see only negative tendencies in the second half of the 1970s. During the preceding years the relaxation of tensions had become a reality of international relations which sprung from the objective interests of states with different social systems in peaceful coexistence and the prevention of a thermo-nuclear war. The positive changes were so deep that they began to be perceived as something given and were less noticeable than the various new complications in the international situation or the changes in the domestic political climate in the United States. The Soviet specialist O. N. Bykov has rightly observed in this connection that "the development of American foreign policy in 1976 showed that the complicating influence of the domestic political situation was to a great extent compensated for by the influence of the entire international situation whose chief feature remained the relaxation of tension and a deepening of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems."⁵⁰

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In the field of strategic weapons, although there had been a postponement of the long-term agreement, the soil on which this agreement could be reached had been preserved. The Soviet-American agreements of 1972-1974 had substantially decreased the vagueness and dynamism of the nuclear balance and had limited a number of dangerous directions of the arms race. In and of themselves, the negotiations between the USSR and the United States on these issues of paramount importance had become an important stabilizing factor in Soviet-American relations. Despite all of the difficulties which had been encountered in them, the SALT negotiations had turned into a very large sphere of common interests between the two great powers and an already well-worn and promising path for solving the most difficult problems of security in the nuclear age.

Within the United States, although the militarists stubbornly attempted to win back their lost positions, the situation remained far from their ideal. The doctrine of "nuclear superiority" had lost its attractiveness in the eyes of the broad public and of a definite section of the ruling circles. The principle of "strategic equilibrium" with the Soviet Union became officially recognized. In the minds of most Americans the SALT agreements had in the past few years turned into a legitimate and preferable way to ensure "national security." It is significant that even those domestic groups which in fact were trying to obtain one-sided military advantages for the United States were now compelled to publicly justify their requests by the needs of "parity" or "essential equality." The military-industrial complex was coming up against the necessity of taking account of the restrictive measures which had been agreed upon or discussed at the Soviet-American negotiations. Henceforth, it had to reconcile itself with the loss of its monopoly over the determination of policy in the sphere of development and deployment of weapons. Under the pressure of Congress and of public opinion, some programs were slowed down, others were postponed, and certain others were completely eliminated.

As was later emphasized by L. I. Brezhnev, in contrast to the late 1960s, "detente today is not a theory, not a slogan, and not a well-intentioned wish. It has to its credit quite a few good deeds which are entirely concrete and palpable. In Europe it has been at the basis of relationships between states and has embraced various aspects of their life. And despite all kinds of fluctuating conditions, Soviet-American relations now have a new look, one which is more favorable for the cause of peace."⁵¹ The enormous responsibility of the moment was explained by the fact that as a result of the successes of detente during the first half of the 1970s broad possibilities were opening up for further progress in the negotiations, for a limitation of military rivalry, and for the strengthening of universal security. On the other hand, this path was being threatened with blockage by large obstacles

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in the form of the arms race, the activization of aggressive imperialist circles, and an exacerbation of international conflicts and contradictions. And this responsibility would have to be taken upon itself by the new Administration which came to power in the United States in 1976.

3. The Difficult Road to Salt-II

"The lessons of the past which have been learned by us can become a basis for a fundamental improvement of the prospects for peace in the world and for the successful solution of international problems."⁵² This wish was expressed in May 1975 in Tokyo by a guest from the United States. The Governor from the state of Georgia, James Carter. Probably not many people could have foreseen at the time that less than two years later he would be given the opportunity to demonstrate his understanding of the lessons of history and to make his own contribution to international relations from the President's office in the White House.

On 20 January 1977 the 39th President of the United States, James E. Carter, took a solemn oath and a Democratic Administration came into power. This occurred under circumstances which were very unusual for the history of America after World War II: despite the difficulties of the situation in the world and within the United States, the main parties of America's ruling class replaced one another at the helm of state for the first time when American troops were not conducting military operations abroad and when there was no acute international crisis involving direct opposition between the leading nuclear powers. A long series of major political agreements between states with different social systems and a number of important agreements on restraining the arms race which had been reached in the first half of the 1970s made up a solid base for a further strengthening of world security and for the expansion of mutually advantageous international cooperation. And the chief task here was the conclusion of a long-term treaty between the USSR and the United States limiting strategic offensive weapons, and progress in other directions of military detente.

It has to be said that the speeches made by Jimmy Carter during the election campaign contained quite a few statements and proposals on the problems of military detente. He set himself the final goal of "reducing nuclear weapons to zero," while in the more immediate future his goal was to achieve "radical reductions" in strategic weapons at the SALT negotiations, to bring about a complete halt to nuclear tests, and to effectively put a stop to the spread of nuclear arms. The Democratic Party's candidate also committed himself to strive to lower the level of conventional forces and weapons and of military and weapons trade, promised to withdraw American forces from South Korea and to conclude an agreement on holding back the militarization of the Indian

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Ocean, and announced his intention to reduce American military expenditures by 5 billion dollars.⁵³

However, the Democratic Administration's practical politics during Carter's first two years in the White House not only left most of the President's election commitments in this field unfulfilled, but in many cases even led to complications in the international situation and created additional difficulties for detente and limiting the arms race, including in the chief sphere -- at the Soviet-American SALT negotiations. Moreover, the Carter government's line in these negotiations were influenced more tangibly than ever before by the domestic political situation in the United States. On the other hand, Washington's policy in the SALT area was experiencing an extensive influence from the review of American foreign policy which was taking place and was being worked out in direct connection with the leadership's decisions regarding nuclear missile programs.

Even before the formal acceptance of its authority by the Democratic government, the military-industrial complex and American anti-Soviet circles began an offensive against the policy of detente, attempting not to lose the initiative which had been seized by them during the election campaign and attempting from the very beginning of the new administration's work to create the kind of domestic political situation in the United States in which the achievement of Soviet-American agreements would become even more difficult, if not impossible. The opponents of detente were at first disturbed by some of Carter's election statements and by the composition of the new government which had enlisted certain figures who were well-known from their public statements for their support of SALT. They included, in particular, Secretary of State C. Vance, the Director of the Armaments Control and Disarmament Agency P. Warnke (concerning whose approval by Congress the militarists gave the Administration its first battle), and to a certain extent even the Secretary of Defense H. Brown, who had taken direct part in the SALT negotiations in 1969-1972.

The so-called "Committee on the Existing Danger" which was formed in November 1976 and was made up of almost 200 representatives of pro-militarist and reactionary public organizations became the most important base of support and coordinating center of the campaign against detente. The "Committee's" executive director P. Campbell was a confidant of Senators Jackson and Moynihan, and its other outstanding activists included the already mentioned P. Nitse, D. Packard, D. Rusk, W. Rostow, and J. Connolly.⁵⁴ This organization, as its very name testifies, was created with the direct purpose of inciting hysteria about the growth of an imaginary "Soviet threat" and of putting pressure on American leaders in favor of whipping up the arms race and rejecting agreements with the Soviet Union. The "Committee" and supporters also

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made use in their own interests of the crisis of confidence in the American Executive Branch after Vietnam and Watergate which was expressed in an offensive by the Capitol, the press, and diverse domestic pressure groups on the prerogatives of the White House with regard to the problems of the economy and of foreign and military policy. In the end, the opponents of detente succeeded in creating in Congress a serious and belligerent opposition to a new SALT treaty.

At the same time, despite the importance of the influence of the domestic situation on the Administration's course in the field of strategic weapons, a large role was played in the first two years of Carter's presidency by the approach of the political leadership itself to the foreign policy of the United States in which the attitude of American ruling circles as a whole to the events on the international arena and to the interests and tasks of the United States abroad during the late 1970s was reflected. And, incidentally, it was precisely these views which made it possible for the campaign by anti-Soviet groups to become such an influential factor in Washington's foreign policy. The leitmotiv of the mood of the American ruling class was a serious anxiety in the face of a further change in the global balance of power in favor of socialism and to the detriment of the imperialist policy of "from a position of strength" and of an aggressive intervention in the affairs of other peoples. The acute economic and social and political problems of capitalism and the powerful upsurge of the national liberation movement which swept over many countries of the Near and Middle East and of Africa and Latin America caused great disturbance among the ruling circles of the West. One after another reactionary regimes which had recently represented a faithful bulwark for the United States were collapsing.

The Carter Administration set itself the task of mobilizing the West's resources in order to consolidate imperialism's international positions in the economic, political, military, and ideological spheres, and also to ensure more advantageous conditions for itself in the negotiations with the socialist commonwealth and with developing countries. As followed from the official statements from the President and his Assistant for National Security Z. Brzezinski, as a result of the re-evaluation of Washington's foreign policy priorities, relations between the United States and its imperialist partners -- the countries of Western Europe and Japan -- were put in first place. Relations with the developing countries whose raw materials and resources were playing an increasing role in the economy of capitalism were allotted second place. And relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the relaxation of tensions were only in third place. In addition, the "human rights" campaign in accordance with which the American leadership appropriated the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, proclaiming with messianic ardor --

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"America's ideals are the ideals of all of mankind" -- was elevated to the rank of government policy.⁵⁵

In and of itself this kind of approach to the foreign policy priorities of the United States did not promote progress in political and military detente because, above all, the main problem of contemporary international relations -- the prevention of a nuclear war -- was moved to the background. In addition, in practice the fulfillment of the tasks which had been named top-priority ones frequently was planned to the detriment of the interests of the USSR and the other socialist countries. For example, with regard to the unification of the West which had encountered great difficulties in the coordination of the economic policies of the imperialist countries Washington began to put increasing emphasis on strengthening NATO's military potential. At the London (1977) and Washington (1978) meetings of the leaders of the countries of the North Atlantic Bloc, the United States and its partners adopted a commitment to increase real military expenditures by 3 percent annually, and long-term (ten to fifteen years) collective programs were worked out for increasing and modernizing NATO's armed forces at a total cost of 80 to 90 billion dollars. This course, of course, worsened the prospects of the negotiations in Vienna on reducing the military confrontation in Western Europe and since it was being conducted under the cover of a mass campaign concerning a growth of the "Soviet threat" it was having a negative effect upon the European as well as upon the international political climate as a whole.

With respect to the developing countries, America's policy, along with economic pressure, included an intensification of the opposition to the national liberation movement by political and military methods and attempts to undermine the influence of the Soviet Union which was based on disinterested aid to progressive forces. In the Near East, after having rejected an all-embracing and just peace settlement by means of the Geneva mechanism, Washington took the route of imposing a separate Israeli-Egyptian deal. In Rhodesia and Namibia, the United States provided comprehensive assistance to the treacherous conspiracy of the comprador elite of the black majority and the white racists. Contrary to Carter's election commitments, the diplomatic maneuvers were accompanied by a sharp increase in military supplies for Iran, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, South Korea, and other countries. Meanwhile, the arms trade was combined with direct military pressure (an example -- the shifting of an aircraft carrier unit during the revolution in Iran in the fall of 1978), by the threat to land forces on the oil fields of the Persian Gulf, and by the transportation of French and Belgian parachutists for the purpose of military intervention in Zaire province of Shaba (May 1978). And all of this was also done, of course, to the accompaniment of heightened official rhetoric regarding "Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Third World."

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Nor were Soviet-American relations helped by the attempts of the Democratic Administration to play the "China card" and to use the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China for pressure on the Soviet Union, and by its encouragement of aggressive hegemonistic pretensions of the Peking leadership which came to power after Mao Tse Tung's death. The widely advertised development of economic relations between the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the Chinese People's Republic was accompanied by plans by America's allies, with Washington's approval, to deliver weapons to China. The development of such a course which was covered up by considerations of "detente in Asia" and of simple "commerce" in fact posed a threat to the relaxation of tensions in general and to the negotiations to restrain military rivalries.

After the new Administration's coming to power the shift by the United States to harder positions also revealed itself directly in Soviet-American relations. It was expressed in an unceremonious intervention by the American leadership in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union under the pretext of defending so-called "human rights" in the USSR, by a ban on a number of trade deals, and by loud accusations against the Soviet Union for an "excessive growth" of its military potential and for its assistance to the national liberation movement. Despite constructive proposals by the Soviet side, through the fault of Washington a blind alley was reached in the negotiations on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, on limiting military activities in the Indian Ocean, and on limiting weapons trade. Returning to the politics of "coupling," President Carter stated in June 1978 that the Soviet Union's support of Ethiopia in defending it against direct foreign aggression would make reaching an agreement in the SALT negotiations difficult. This line reached its apogee in the speech by the President of the United States in Annapolis in the summer of 1978 where he declared: "The Soviet Union may choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is equally prepared for both."⁵⁶ This statement, however, should have been addressed to the United States itself. The Soviet Union had long ago and irrevocably made its choice in favor of detente, but, as can be seen, the American leadership, despite Carter's election declarations, had not yet learned the lessons of history sufficiently well. It would have to learn from its own mistakes and failures.

And this manifested itself in its most concentrated form in Washington's military policies which were connected in the closest way with the Democratic Administration's course at the SALT negotiations. The review of United States military policy which had been begun by the new government was expressed first of all in an increased emphasis on general purpose American armed forces. Recommendations regarding this were contained in the well-known document "PRN-10" which was prepared on

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instructions from Carter by an interdepartmental group as an analytical base for reevaluating American strategic tasks and plans. Especial emphasis was put on increasing the combat capacity of American forces deployed on the European continent and of those designated for transfer there from the United States, on improving air and sea transportation, and on training an expeditionary corps consisting of army and infantry divisions for intervention in other areas of the world, above all, in the Persian Gulf. This tendency had already revealed itself in the amendments to the military budget for the 1978 fiscal year which were proposed by the administration in early 1977 and according to which a certain reduction in appropriations for strategic programs and the Navy was accompanied by an increase in monies for the American Infantry and Air Force in Western Europe. In his first budget report in February 1978 the Secretary of Defense H. Brown emphasized: "Despite the fact that we have to devote attention to our nuclear forces -- both strategic and tactical, -- it is now generally recognized that the conventional forces of the United States and its allies merit at least the same, and at the present moment, in my opinion, even greater efforts."⁵⁷

At the same time, the Pentagon was taking measures to change not only the balance of conventional forces but also of tactical nuclear forces in favor of NATO. This was connected with published plans for creating and siting in Western Europe a new barbarian type of weapon of mass destruction -- neutron bombs with intense penetrating radiation specifically designed for the more effective destruction of human beings. These plans, as is known, met with such wide indignation and opposition from world public opinion that they were to a certain extent reviewed and postponed by Washington.

In the field of strategic nuclear weapons the new Administration began a definite reorganization of its predecessor's policies. The plans for the forced renewal of all three components of the nuclear missile triad which had been adopted in the last years of the Ford Administration came up against serious financial and technical difficulties despite the fact that, contrary to Carter's election commitments, the Pentagon's budget was continually increasing (on the basis of the request for the 1979 fiscal year it had reached the record level of 126 billion dollars). Because of economic and technical complications the "Trident" program continued to lag behind schedule, although large financial injections were given to it. Substantial problems also arose with the program for the development of mobile "M-X" intercontinental ballistic missiles, especially with the method of basing them, as a result of which the schedule for deploying the new system was postponed from 1983 to 1986. Finally, in June 1977 a decision was made to temporarily stop the production and deployment of the new "B-1" bombers in connection with the enormous cost and insufficient strategic expediency of this system.⁵⁸

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The Democratic Administration attempted to compensate for the forced delaying and cancellation of certain programs with an acceleration of other strategic programs which were supposed to increase the "suitability" and effectiveness of the American nuclear potential. In particular, it was decided to begin to install new "counter-force" "MK-12A" nosecones with more powerful and accurate warheads of the "MIRV" type on the "Minuteman-3" missiles in October 1977, and not in 1978 as had originally been planned.⁵⁹ In January 1977 the Department of Defense approved the acceleration of the development of the cruise missiles of the "ALSM" type for the "B-52" heavy bombers, and there was a substantial increase in the appropriations for this program. Full-scale tests of the sea-based cruise missile of the "Tomahawk" type also began in February 1977. On 20 June of that year, off the coast of California, this missile was launched for the first time from a submerged submarine.⁶⁰ The forced development of still another variant of an airborne cruise missile and a mobile land-based winged missile of the "ALSM" type began on the basis of the "Tomahawk" system. On 18 January 1977 the new "Trident-1" ballistic missile which was designed as equipment for the strategic submarines of the 1980s was launched for the first time from the testing grounds on Cape Canaveral. There was a continuation of the programs to increase the accuracy of land and underground ballistic missiles, of research to create a new missile-carrying airplane, of the development of the next generation of cruise missiles ("ASALM"), the improvement of guidance and control for the strategic forces, and the creation of anti-satellite space systems.⁶¹

Thus, contrary to the statements of certain Western specialists, the strategic arms race in the United States did not slow down, but continued at rapid rates, while in a number of dangerous directions it even accelerated. This course by the military-industrial complex was officially justified through an increased emphasis on the conceptions of "guaranteed destruction" and "equality in essence," although the idea of "strategic flexibility" was also confirmed by the Secretary of Defense H. Brown. "As one of the aspects of this flexibility," he stated, "we have to have the capacity to inflict controlled counterblows against a wide range of targets, including the enemy's tactical nuclear and conventional forces, his communications systems, his defense industry installations, and highly protected targets -- from take-off strips to nuclear warhead warehouses, and from command bunkers to intercontinental ballistic missile launching shafts."⁶²

But first the American approach to the SALT negotiations was subjected to an even more radical reevaluation. As early as his election campaign Carter had criticized the 1974 Vladivostok agreement because it allegedly had placed "too few" restrictions on the strategic arsenals of the two powers. After having become established in Washington, the Democratic Administration undertook a frank revision of the Vladivostok principles.

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And although in words this step was justified by considerations having to do with "more radical" reductions in strategic weapons and the strengthening of the "stability" of the nuclear balance, in reality the new American leadership had made an attempt to better tailor the SALT agreement to American military programs and plans, without regard to the legitimate defense interests of the Soviet Union and to the agreed upon principles of equality and equal security of both sides.

At the end of March 1977, during the course of a visit to the USSR by the United States Secretary of State C. Vance, the American side put forward a new plan for a so-called "all-embracing" SALT agreement.⁶³ In accordance with it, the total number of strategic weapons carriers would be reduced to 1800 to 2,000 units, while the number of ballistic missiles with detachable nose cones would be reduced to 1100 to 1200 intercontinental ballistic missiles and BRPL [submarine missiles]. But no consideration at all was given to American advance-based nuclear weapons whose role and proportion in the military balance of power would have undergone a substantial increase with such a reduction in the overall levels of strategic nuclear weapons carriers. In addition, the United States demanded that the number of Soviet missiles which, in that country were called "too heavy" or "overly effective," be cut in half. At the same time, no limitations were provided on the scope of the deployment of American winged missiles whose number could reach many thousands. Finally, it was planned that a review be made of the right of both sides to modernize their missile forces in such a way that the Soviet Union would be in a worse position, while most of the United States' military programs such as "Trident" and the "MK-12A" could continue unimpeded (with the exception of the "M-X" system which had been held up at an early development stage and which it was planned to cancel).

In addition to this "all embracing proposal," Vance put forward an alternative "narrow proposal." In accordance with it, it was proposed to conclude a SALT treaty on the basis of the Vladivostok agreement and to leave out cruise missiles and the Soviet bomber called the "Backfire." For this "concession" to the Soviet Union which permitted it to have outside of the framework of the agreement medium-range airplanes which in general were unrelated to the subject of the negotiations, the United States tried to stipulate for itself the right to an unlimited increase in its strategic weapons (which is what, in essence, the winged missiles being developed in the United States were) along a new channel, possibly an even broader one.

It is completely obvious that the plans for a SALT treaty which were presented by the American leadership in March 1977 were unacceptable for the USSR. In this connection, the member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union A. A. Gromyko

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stated at a press conference: "The United States representative, Mr. Vance, has characterized his proposals about which I spoke above as the basis for a broad and all-embracing agreement. However, after an objective examination of these proposals it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that they pursue the goal of one-sided advantages for the United States to the detriment of the Soviet Union and its security and the security of our allies and friends. The Soviet Union will never be able to accept this."⁶⁴

After Secretary of State Vance's unsuccessful visit the American leadership took another step which was harmful for the negotiations: It publicly revealed the essence of its SALT proposals and accused the USSR of a "lack of desire to reach an agreement." Subsequently, this created the possibility for attacks on the negotiations by the opponents of SALT who created a fuss about the waiving of any of America's deliberately unacceptable proposals which had been made in March 1977, stigmatizing it as a "capitulation to the Russians," or as a one-sided "concession." It is characteristic that even some American specialists noted the unrealistic nature of the Carter Administration's position in early 1977. Thus, the authoritative specialist and former National Security Assistant to President Kennedy M. Bundy noted: "The Carter Administration...has become convinced from its own experience that it is one thing to believe in radical reductions and quite another thing to compel the Soviet Union to agree to them on terms which Americans like. The radical American proposals in March 1977 which were categorically rejected by the Soviets and rapidly and wisely removed (by the United States) should serve as a reminder of the great distance between hopes and reality."⁶⁵

The change in Washington's position in the field of SALT and the Democratic Administration's return to reality had already begun in mid 1977; however, the path to a new treaty occupied around two more years and demanded great efforts from both sides. In addition, the evolution of the American leadership's approach to a limitation of strategic weapons occurred not only under the influence of the lessons of March 1977, but also under the influence of the general situation on the world arena and of the problems and difficulties which were encountered by the Carter government's foreign policy.

Without mentioning the continuing deepening of energy, trade, and currency difficulties, in the relations between the United States and its imperialist partners, the Democratic Administration's line aimed at a hardening of policy with regard to the USSR and its "human rights" campaign and economic sanctions not only did not encounter unanimous support in Western Europe but gave rise to serious concern in the FRG, France, and other states and impelled them to conduct a more independent policy in the field of a relaxation of tensions with the socialist commonwealth. The question of siting neutron weapons in Europe gave

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rise to substantial disagreements among the North Atlantic allies and a wish to place the responsibility upon one another for this act which had elicited active resistance from world public opinion.

In the Near East the Camp David deal did not lead to a settlement of the crisis on the terms set by the United States, Israel, and Egypt; it was condemned by the vast majority of states in that region, and Cairo found itself in isolation in the Arab world. Despite Washington's efforts, the national liberation movement in the south of Africa was growing wider. In the beginning of 1979, as a result of a revolution in Iran, the chief bulwark of American influence in the Persian Gulf zone collapsed; a popular revolution against the dictatorship seized Nicaragua. Once again imperialism saw the collapse of its plan to establish its dominion in strategically important areas of the developing countries by means of cultivating anti-popular, pro-western regimes, supplying them with weapons arsenals, and constructing regional pacts to suppress the national liberation movement. In February 1979 aggression against Vietnam which was begun by China with the connivance of the West created the threat of a global crisis. It demonstrated very clearly that the playing of the "China card" by the United States was turned by Peking into the playing of an "American card" and that the encouragement of the great power hegemonistic pretensions of the Peking leadership could lead to dangerous, unforeseen, and uncontrollable international consequences.

Finally the "human rights" campaign which was undertaken by the United States government was discredited along many lines. Its falsity was revealed in attacks upon the USSR, and its hypocrisy was shown up in the light of the trampling upon human rights in the United States itself and also in connection with Washington's pragmatic support of dictatorships in Nicaragua and South Korea, the right-wing monarchist regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the racist governments of South Africa and Rhodesia, and in the "forgiving of the sins" of the repressive military bureaucratic system of China and of Pol Pot Cambodia. Permeated by double standards, Washington's moralism encountered a firm rebuff from the socialist countries and did not find the absolute support which was expected from America's capitalist partners. In the United States the government's campaign in defense of "human rights" was not able to become a base for bipartisan support for its policy from the Capitol. The contradictions between the legislative and executive branches continued on very important issues of the economy and of foreign and military policy. Moreover, within the Administration itself there was substantial disagreement which, in particular, showed up publicly between Secretary of State Vance and the President's advisor for Soviet-American relations Brzezinski.

Under these conditions, as was emphasized by the Candidate Member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU and Secretary of the CC CPSU B. N. Ponomarev,

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"while giving a firm reply to the intrigues of the enemies of detente and resolutely rejecting all attempts at intervention in our internal affairs, the CC CPSU and the Communist Parties of the fraternal socialist states have conducted patient political work in defense of what has already been achieved during the course of detente and for its further development...In addition," he emphasized, "the opponents of detente are rebuffed in forms and actions which lead not to an exacerbation but to an alleviation of tensions."⁶⁶ The purposefulness of the Soviet Union's policy was the chief factor which ensured the stabilization and further progress of Soviet-American relations during this difficult period. Beginning approximately with the second half of 1978, S. Hoffman observes, "to all appearances the Administration (Carter) was dealing sufficiently well with its confusion to put SALT at the top of its priorities and conduct the negotiations in a calmer atmosphere."⁶⁷

But the negotiations between the USSR and the United States continued to be an exceptionally difficult process. For what was involved was a limitation of weapons which comprised the heart of the military potentials of the two states and the very basis of their defense capacity and the discussions revolved around extremely difficult and delicate technical military questions which concerned a wide range of security problems for the two powers and their allies. In addition, it was necessary to find an acceptable balance for the interests of the sides whose ideas concerning the concrete content of the principle of equality and equal security were substantially different. "It seems that it is nice and easy to say -- the principle of equality and equal security," A. A. Gromyko later explained. "It would seem that no one will object against this principle. But it is another matter when negotiations are being conducted and, moreover, on an exceptionally important issue -- it is here that difficulties arise, and even great difficulties. To the one side it seems that it is adhering to the principle of equality and equal security; but the other thinks that it is acting this way, and not the first side. And yet there is only one truth."⁶⁸ However, since both sides had the determination and the will to bring the negotiations to a conclusion, a mutually acceptable compromise on the highly difficult problems was found, and a new treaty was prepared for signing at the end of June 1979.

In Vienna, the capital of Austria, on 15-18 July 1979 a meeting took place between the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev and the President of the United States J. E. Carter. It was marked by the conclusion of a series of agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons between the USSR and the United States which, as a whole, was given the name SALT-II. Four documents were signed in Vienna: A Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons, a protocol for it, a joint Statement on the principles and basic

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directions of subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons, and also the document "Agreed Upon Statements and General Understandings in Connection with the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons."

The essence of the Treaty⁶⁹ amounted, above all, to the establishment of equal quantitative ceilings on the strategic nuclear forces of the two powers. In accordance with them, when the Treaty came into effect, each of the sides would be obliged to limit its intercontinental and BRPL launchers, heavy bombers,* and also air-based ballistic missiles of the "Air-Land" class (BRVZ) to a total not exceeding 2400 units.

Both sides would commit themselves to limit these types of strategic offensive weapons beginning 1 January 1981 to a total of no more than 2,250 and would begin to eliminate those weapons which on that date were above this level. In addition, within the limits of this total amount an overall level of 1,320 units was established for launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles and BRPL and DRVZ with individually targeted detachable nose cones, and also for heavy bombers equipped with winged missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers. Within this level a ceiling of 1200 units was agreed upon for launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles and BRPL and also for DRVZ equipped with the RGCh system; Moreover, launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles with multi-warhead nose cones were not to exceed 820 units. Finally, both sides would commit themselves not to create any additional fixed intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and not to relocate them into other areas.

The Treaty also contains a large number of qualitative limitations on strategic weapons, including the following commitments: not to re-equip the launchers for the light intercontinental ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles of the old types which were deployed in 1964 into new heavy type intercontinental ballistic missile launchers; not to increase the amount of underground launchers by more than 32 percent; not to create new intercontinental ballistic missiles of heavy types which exceed the existing heavy ones in launching weight and throw weight; and not to increase the number of warheads on existing intercontinental ballistic missiles. The following is also prohibited: to test and deploy new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, with the exception of one new type of light intercontinental ballistic missile for each side with a number of warheads not exceeding ten; to create new BRPL with more than 14 warheads; to create BRVZ with more than

*For the USSR this included the "Tupolev-95" and "Myasishchev" bombers, and for the United States -- the "B-52" and "B-1" bombers.

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10 warheads; to deploy cruise missiles on heavy bombers in excess of 28 on each bomber.**

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Treaty the sides commit themselves not to bypass its regulations through any other state or by any other means. The Treaty is to come into effect on the day when ratification documents are exchanged and will remain in effect until 31 December 1985; the verification of the observance of it is provided by national control equipment.

In addition to the long-term Treaty a protocol to it with an effective period until 31 December 1981 was signed. It also contains such additional qualitative limitations on strategic weapons as the commitment by both sides not to deploy mobile light intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and not to carry out missile flight tests from them; not to deploy winged missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers on sea- and land-based launchers, not to test such missiles with an RGCh system, and not to test and deploy DRVZ.⁷⁰

In the joint Statement of the two powers a group of problems is mapped out for discussion at the following, third stage of the negotiations on a limitation of strategic weapons. First of all, the task is set of reaching an agreement on a substantial reduction of the numbers of strategic offensive weapons and on further qualitative restrictions on nuclear missile weapons, including restrictions on their modernization and on the creation of new types of weapons, and also on the solution of problems which were included in the protocol in the context of the negotiations on the conclusion of a SALT-III treaty.⁷¹

The documents were signed in Vienna are of great and multi-leveled importance. First of all, as a further development of the 1972 Temporary Agreement, the SALT-II equal overall limitations cover not only sea- and land-based ballistic missile launchers, but also heavy

**The additional qualitative limitations provided for the USSR and the United States to renounce: the delivery to areas where intercontinental ballistic missile launchers are deployed of ballistic missiles in excess of normal needs and the creation of equipment for the rapid re-loading of launchers; and the reequipping of land ballistic missile launchers of a different type into intercontinental ballistic missile launchers. Both sides accept a commitment not to conduct tests of cruise missiles and DRVZ from airplanes which are not heavy bombers, and not to create launchers for ballistic and cruise missiles in the oceans and seas, and certain other types; not to create mobile launchers for heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles and also heavy BRPL and DRVZ types, and not to conduct tests and deploy air-based cruise missiles with detachable nose cones.

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bombers including those equipped with winged missiles, and also establish limits for ballistic missiles equipped with detachable nose cones. In addition, strategic stability is consolidated in SALT-II on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security for the sides through a kind of codification of nuclear missile parity with a certain lowering of the level of military equilibrium.

Strategic stability is also strengthened in another way -- by means of limiting a number of directions of the arms race which could increase the capacity to destroy various components of strategic forces and increase the threat of a nuclear war, especially in a crisis situation. A large role is played here by certain limitations on the modernization of nuclear missile arsenals and the creation of new weapons systems and by limits on increasing the number of nuclear warheads and deploying winged missiles. Finally, the SALT-II Treaty greatly reduces vagueness both with respect to the existing and to the future state of the nuclear missile balance and thereby makes it possible to approach the problems of military planning for many years in the future with greater confidence and rationality, and it reduces to a certain extent additional stimuli to the arms race.

In a broad political sense the results of the Vienna Summit Meeting marked substantial progress in the development of Soviet-American relations and in an improvement of the entire international climate. The new treaty between the USSR and the United States on the central issue of military detente can serve as an important stimulus to progress on other fronts of the struggle for disarmament. We are speaking, above all, about the conclusion of a treaty on a universal and complete halt to nuclear tests, on the prohibition of certain other types of weapons of mass destruction, and on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

The SALT-II agreements are, of course, a complex balance of compromises and, therefore, of the interests of both sides. As has been written by the Marshal of the Soviet Union, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense N. V. Ogarkov, himself a past direct participant in the SALT negotiations, the Vienna Treaty "not only erects definite barriers to a further quantitative increase and qualitative improvement of a number of the most destructive strategic weapons, but also lays the basis for decreasing them...The Treaty...has a balanced character and accords equally with the interests of both the USSR and the United States."⁷² In keeping with this, along with limitations on certain directions of Soviet armaments, the SALT-II Treaty tangibly affects a number of American military programs. For example, there are important restrictions on the possible scale of the deployment of air-based cruise missiles, since a limit of

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1,320 units is established for ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and for heavy bombers with winged missiles, while the number of the latter may not exceed the product of 28 times the number of these airplanes. The ceiling of 1,200 ballistic missiles equipped with the RGCh system requires a slowing down in the construction of "Trident" missile submarines compared to the previously projected rates, or, should the case be different, the removal of a corresponding number of existing "Poseidon" and "Minuteman-III" missiles from the arsenal. The terms of the protocol slow down the development of new mobile land-based ballistic missiles and postpone the date for the deployment of sea- and land-based winged missiles. As the United States Secretary of Defense has stated, thanks to SALT-II it is planned to spend 2 to 3 billion dollars less every year than would have been spent in the absence of the Treaty over a period of a number of subsequent years.⁷³

The signing of the SALT-II Treaty at the Vienna Summit Meeting was met with approval by world public opinion and by all of the progressive peace-loving forces of mankind. It found full support in the Soviet Union and in the fraternal socialist countries. Expressing the unanimous opinion of the Soviet people, the Politburo of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers noted in the decree "On the Results of the Meeting Between the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev and the President of the United States J. Carter": "The full implementation of the document signed in Vienna ... would be a new stage in restraining the nuclear arms race and would open the way to an important reduction of armaments and to the realization of our highest goal: a complete halt to the production and the elimination of stocks of nuclear weapons."⁷⁴

In the United States of America the conclusion of the Vienna agreement signified the entrance into a new and unprecedentedly acute stage of the domestic struggle around Washington's policy in the field of strategic weapons and United States foreign policy as a whole. Most of the American public and the realistically minded representatives of the ruling circles of the United States (as of the countries of Western Europe and Japan) came out in favor of ratification of the SALT-II Treaty and of continued negotiations to limit the strategic arms race. But the opponents of the new agreement also activated their efforts in order to foil the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate (for which 34 votes -- one-third of the Senate plus one -- would be enough), or to "sew on to it" amendments disturbing to the balanced character of SALT-II. The hearings of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee which went on during the summer and fall of 1979 and then a general Senate debate became the central arena for the stormy debates concerning the ratification of SALT-II. Outside of the Capitol, an intense struggle

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between the supporters and opponents of the Vienna Treaty unfolded in the American press and involved numerous public organizations and broad political circles.

The opposition's attacks on the new SALT Treaty were organized in several directions. First of all, it was said that the Soviet-American agreement allegedly grant "one-sided advantages" to the USSR, in particular with regard to heavy type intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that they allegedly made it possible for the Soviet Union to acquire in the early 1980s the potential for a "disarming strike" against American land-based intercontinental missiles.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, and this was pointed out by the defenders of the SALT-II, the concrete terms of the agreement reflect the objective characteristics of the nuclear missile arsenals of the two powers. Moreover, these characteristics are carefully balanced in the new agreement in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security for the sides. In the 1960s and 1970s the United States deliberately made a choice in favor of maintaining extensive sea-based missile forces and a large fleet of heavy bombers, put the emphasis of deployment of detachable warheads on most of its submarine missiles, and made plans to equip its long-range aviation with winged missiles. Even from the point of view of elementary logic it is quite natural that in the ceilings on strategic carriers and launchers with RGCh which are equal for the two powers disproportions in favor of one side in certain components of its nuclear forces have to be compensated by disproportions in other aspects which favor the opposite side.

As for the statements about the future increased vulnerability of American land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, even without considering the question of the actual validity of such a forecast, an artificial isolation of only one element of America's strategic triad from the overall picture of the military balance is completely unjustified. Since only 26 percent of the nuclear warheads in America's strategic arsenal is concentrated on silo-based missiles, even the most pessimistic calculations of an increase in vulnerability do not allow one to speak of the vulnerability of the majority of its nuclear missile potential.⁷⁶ In this connection, commenting upon the totally theoretical character of the problem of the vulnerability of American "Minuteman" forces, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of the ACDA [U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] has emphasized. "Since it was assumed that the potential vulnerability of our land missiles would take place over a period of many years, we have distributed our strategic forces approximately equally among land, submarine, and air carriers and we are continuing to modernize each component of the triad....Thanks to SALT the maintenance of a stable strategic balance will be less difficult, less expensive, and less risky."⁷⁷

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The opponents of the Vienna Treaty also attempted to prove that by consolidating Soviet-American strategic parity at lower levels the new SALT agreements would undermine America's nuclear guarantees in NATO and allegedly weaken the security of America's allies. In refuting these inventions, realistic-minded leaders pointed out that the treaty between the USSR and the United States takes full account of the interests of both powers' allies. It is completely obvious that SALT-II strengthens the security of America's partners and also of all other countries, since it limits the arms race in the field of the most destructive weapons of destruction, promotes progress in military detente in a central sphere, and decreases the threat of global war. Of considerable importance in this respect was the active support for the SALT-II Treaty by the governments of France, the FRG, Great Britain, Japan, and other states which in effect removed the ground from the various insinuations by the opposition within the United States.

In addition to their attempts to cast slurs upon the essential positive significance of the Vienna agreements, the enemies of detente also resorted to the tactic of dragging out the SALT-II debates in order to postpone its ratification as long as possible on the eve of the 1980 presidential elections. They hoped to create a domestic political atmosphere during the election campaign which would be unfavorable for the approval of the Soviet-American agreement. Toward this end, for example, a sensation was created concerning the appearance of a mythical Soviet military unit in Cuba, and use was also made of the American-Iranian crisis.

Another direction of the struggle around the SALT-II Treaty was represented by the campaign of a very influential conservative group and of powerful echelons of the military-industrial complex which condemned the Democratic government for canceling the "B-1" bomber, slowing down the "M-X" program, disturbing the construction schedule for the "Trident" submarines, and for allegedly "tailoring" American military programs in advance to fit the SALT-II conditions and not showing firmness in foreign policy as a whole. The activities of the militarist circles who, as it were, held the ratification of the Vienna Treaty as a "hostage" consisted in pressure on the American leadership in the direction of increasing the arms race throughout its entire range and of a general hardening of American foreign policy in Soviet-American relations. It has to be said that this campaign had its effect; under its influence the Administration began to tie the ratification of SALT-II more and more closely to the "maintenance of power," an increase in military appropriations and the continuation and acceleration of a number of weapons programs. In the summer of 1979 the United States government made a final decision concerning the deployment beginning with 1986 of around 200 mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles of the "M-X" type, each of which is to carry 10

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nuclear warheads of increased accuracy and power and be moved by a transporter at the launching complexes between a large number of protected shelters. Parallel to this, the development of the "Trident-2" sea-based "counterforce" missile was accelerated; it may enter the American arsenal in the second half of the 1980s. The first of 12 "Poseidon" submarines reoutfitted with "Trident-1" missiles went to sea in October 1979, and in April the lead missile submarine of the "Trident" class, named the "Ohio" which will enter combat duty in the Navy in 1981 was put into the water. A year later it is planned to deploy winged missiles on the first "B-52" bomber squadron.⁷⁸

At the same time, the emphasis on the conception of massive "counter-blows" was strengthened in official American nuclear strategy. Speaking at Senate hearings, Secretary of Defense Brown stated: "A potential for guaranteed destruction is essential for restraint, but it is inadequate as a strategic doctrine or a criterion of the combat capacity of our forces. Although I doubt very much that a nuclear war, should one begin, can be limited..." the Secretary said, "effective restraint demands the creation of a sufficiently large and flexible potential so as to be able to inflict selective blows against a number of military and other targets and, after that, keep a substantial reserve of nuclear might for a considerable time."⁷⁹ In this way they gradually began to form a new strategic conception in Washington which in Brown's budget reports for the 1979 and 1980 fiscal years was formulated, in particular, as a strategy of "opposition" or "escalating domination." In accordance with it, the United States had to preserve a superior nuclear potential even after all imaginable scenarios for an exchange of "counter-blows."⁸⁰

This conception takes American strategic policy still another large step away from the actual conditions of reality and from the true interests of American security. At the same time, it provides broad opportunities to the military-industrial complex for validating another round of an increase and renewal of the strategic nuclear arsenal in the 1980s. It is clear that to a large extent the Administration's measures in the field of strategic weapons are a concession to the militarists. At the same time, it has to be seen that this policy by Washington is aimed at obtaining one-sided strategic advantages during the coming decade which, in particular, are designed to be used for putting additional pressure on the USSR during possible future SALT-III negotiations in order to achieve for the United States more advantageous conditions in the quantitative reduction and qualitative limitation of strategic weapons. As has already repeatedly happened in the past, attempts by the United States to change the military balance in its favor do not yield their sought-after fruits; however, the creation of new "trumps" in the form of weapons programs around which as they develop interested circles of the military-industrial complex unite

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can whip up the nuclear missile race and make the attainment of an agreement on SALT in the future more difficult.

In this connection, the question of siting American long-ranged winged missiles and "Pershing-II" ballistic missiles in Western Europe has become another dangerous aspect of United States and NATO policy. In words these plans were camouflaged by considerations connected with the "modernization" of American advance-based nuclear weapons, and it was said that given the parity on the higher strategic level which has been fixed by the terms of SALT-II, it is allegedly necessary to "neutralize" the imaginary Soviet "superiority" on the level of medium-range nuclear weapons or of so-called "Euro-strategic" weapons. Meanwhile, the indisputable fact that during the last ten years the Soviet Union has not increased its medium-range nuclear weapon carriers by a single missile or a single airplane and, on the contrary, their number has decreased as has the power of the BRSD nuclear warheads was completely ignored.⁸¹

In fact, the siting in Western Europe of American winged missiles and "Pershing-II" ballistic missiles has the goal of changing the overall military equilibrium on the European continent in favor of NATO.

In spite of a constructive proposal by the socialist countries to decrease the number of the USSR's medium-range nuclear weapons if new medium-range nuclear missiles are not sited in Western Europe, it was decided at the Brussels session of NATO (December 1979) to deploy beginning with 1983 around 600 American cruise missiles and "Pershing-II" systems in Great Britain, the FRG, and Italy. This, of course, will not give NATO military superiority: the socialist countries will, of course, take all of the necessary steps to strengthen their defense capacities. However, this kind of development of events is capable of intensifying the military confrontation in Europe and seriously exacerbate tensions in the relations between the USSR and the United States.

The noisy campaign in the United States aimed at worsening Soviet-American relations and undermining SALT reached an unprecedented scope in early 1980 in connection with the introduction into Afghanistan, at the request of the Afghan government, of Soviet military contingents to assist that country in repelling aggression from without. The shock wave from an explosion of anti-Soviet hysteria deprived the Carter Administration of its political equilibrium which was expressed in an irresponsible decision by the White House to postpone the ratification by the Senate of the SALT-II Treaty and in measures to "freeze" bilateral negotiations and cooperation between the USSR and the United States on a number of important issues. Another zigzag by Washington -- and a very dangerous one for peace -- in the direction of putting pressure on the USSR in the spirit of the "cold war" and the blocking by it of international efforts to reduce military dangers has produced

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a very clear impression of the unreliability of the United States as a partner in inter-state relations in the light of the ability of the American leadership to violate its international commitments under the influence of emotional outbursts or of considerations of a narrowly understood immediate advantage.

The steps which were undertaken by Washington in early 1980 are equivalent to a serious miscalculation. They may strike like a boomerang against the long-term interests first of all of the United States itself. For these interests require stability in Soviet-American relations, a return to a business-like and equal dialogue between the USSR and the United States, and the renewal of efforts to solve the cardinal problems of detente and of restraining the arms race, including the coming into effect of the SALT-II Treaty. Despite all of the difficulties which have been caused by the strengthening of militarist and extremist tendencies of the ruling circles of the United States and of a number of other imperialist states, the policy of detente is making a way for itself. This policy has deep roots. It is supported by powerful forces which favor peace and disarmament, and this policy has every chance of remaining the leading tendency in the international relations of the present-day world.

Conclusion

The past three and a half decades of the nuclear age, especially the experience of the policies of the United States of America in the sphere of strategic weapons in the 1960s and 1970s have convincingly demonstrated the unsuitability of traditional approaches to the fundamental problem of the present-day -- the ensuring of security in the nuclear age. In the past it was believed that superior military might was the most reliable guarantee of security. Today it is becoming increasingly obvious that in and of itself even an enormous weapons arsenal is not capable of guaranteeing national security, while an endeavor to achieve military superiority weakens it by instigating an arms race and exacerbating political tensions. In the past the arms race was looked upon as an inevitable evil, the consequence of international contradictions. Now it is completely clear that the military rivalry which has been fanned by the imperialist powers has turned into a very important cause of the worsening of relations between states and into a serious source of the threat of war. Previously it frequently seemed that a limitation on armaments and international agreements on these questions contained risks for security. Now it is being recognized more and more widely that a much greater risk is connected with the continuation of an unrestrained increase in weapons of destruction and with the lack of desire or inability to put them under control.

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The international treaties to limit the arms race in the 1960s and 1970s and, above all, the Soviet-American SALT-I agreement and others proved the possibility and reality of a fundamentally new way of ensuring security in the face of the changed world balance of power and the new situation on the world arena and within the capitalist countries. At the same time, it is obvious that the problem of ensuring security during the nuclear age remains an acute one and its solution still requires a long and difficult struggle and the overcoming of many serious obstacles. For the events of the last two decades have also shown the vitality of the previous, obsolete approaches to these problems which, it would seem, have already repeatedly revealed their bankruptcy. And the reasons for this, of course, are not simply in the power of traditions. They are in the very class nature of imperialist politics which place their wager on force and on the use of or threat to use military might to achieve goals on the international arena. These reasons are also in the gigantic mechanism which turns the wheels of the arms race that has formed in the capitalist countries and in the military-industrial complexes whose very existence is inseparably bound up with preparations for wars, with the creation of increasingly barbaric weapons, and with the pursuit of an aggressive policy abroad.

The debates on the ratification of SALT-II in the United States provided still another vivid illustration of the continuing acute struggle in the West about the choice of a way to ensure security during the nuclear age. The broad public and most of the realistic-minded representatives of American ruling circles favored the ratification of the Vienna agreements and a movement to SALT-III negotiations. On the other hand, Washington has taken measures to increase military appropriations and to accelerate a number of strategic programs which are designed both to encourage the militarists within the country and to obtain one-sided military advantages in the 1980s and "trump cards" in future SALT negotiations.

Such steps, as has already occurred in the past, are capable of whipping up the arms race, and creating additional difficulties in the next stage of the negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons. It is clear that neither the security of the United States itself nor that of other countries will win from this. The lessons of history and the realities of the nuclear age dictate another approach to ensuring security which is being consistently defended by the Soviet Union, supported by the peace-loving forces of the entire world, and finding a response among the far-sighted government leaders of the West.

Contrary to the arguments of those people in the United States who assert that the goals of USSR policy in the field of national security and strategic armaments are allegedly unclear or, even worse, envisage the achievement of "military superiority," the positions of the Soviet Union are entirely clear and have been repeatedly explained in the official statements of the leaders of the CPSU and Soviet government. First of all, the security of both the USSR and the United States

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requires stability in the existing military equilibrium and the consolidation through international agreements which take account of the structural and technical characteristics of the military potentials of states and of the differences in their geographical positions. "The Soviet Union is effectively taking care of its defense, but it is not seeking and will not seek military superiority over the other side," L. I. Brezhnev has said in this connection. "We do not wish to disturb the approximate equilibrium of military forces which has now developed, for example, between the East and the West in Central Europe, or between the USSR and the United States. But in exchange we demand that nobody else should try to disturb it in his favor."¹

As for plans to use nuclear missile forces, in replying to the arguments of certain Western theoreticians who keep asserting that the USSR is seeking a "first strike" ability and call upon the United States to acquire the potential for a nuclear "counter-blow" (be it in the form of "massive" or "selective" or "forestalling" or "reply" nuclear attacks), the Soviet Union unambiguously states that it has been and remains an opponent of such conceptions. Its strategic doctrine has a thoroughly defensive character, and its armed forces in this respect serve the goals of stability and are designed for restraining a potential aggressor. "Our efforts are directed," L. I. Brezhnev has emphasized, "at seeing to it that things do not get as far as a first or a second blow and that there be no nuclear war at all. Our approach to these questions may be formulated as follows: the defense potential of the Soviet Union has to be sufficient to prevent anyone from risking disturbing our peaceful life."²

The measures in the field of limiting strategic weapons, in their turn, help to strengthen the restraints on a nuclear war on lower levels of military opposition and with lesser economic expenditures.

However, the USSR's policy is not limited solely to the tasks of preserving strategic stability on the basis of military parity and of deterring war on the unsteady ground of "a balance of terror." For tremendous potentials for destruction continue to hang over the world, rapid scientific and technological progress is continuously giving birth to ever more sophisticated weapons, and international crises threaten to put the machinery of global destruction into action. For this reason the Soviet Union is consistently struggling for the limitation and halting of the arms race, for a reduction of armaments, for a just and peaceful settlement of international conflicts, and for an improvement of the world political atmosphere. "Of course, the maintenance of the equilibrium which has developed is not a goal in itself," L. I. Brezhnev has said about this. "We are in favor of beginning to bend the arms race curve downwards and of gradually lowering the level of military opposition. We want to substantially reduce and then to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war -- the most terrible danger for mankind."³

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There is no more difficult task. But in the nuclear age there is no other way of attaining a genuinely reliable security for the USSR, for the United States, and for all of the countries of the world, a security which, in the final analysis, amounts to ensuring the most basic and the most sacred right of every individual -- the right to life.

FOOTNOTES

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CONCLUSION

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