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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

INSOLVENCY OF AFRICAN NATIONS REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Mar 80 pp 42-45

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] A century ago, Africa lost its soul. With the emergence of the colonial system following the partition stipulated at the Berlin European Conference (1885), Africa bowed under the yoke of foreign domination, yielding to constraints and force. However, 20 years ago, there was the dawn of independence and all hopes for freedom seemed licit. Concealing a fabulous treasury of raw materials, such as copper, zinc, lead, tin, phosphates, bauxite, manganese, uranium, gold and diamonds, would the continent not emerge from the darkness of the colonial regime with invaluable trump cards to promote its own industrialization? And, consequently be able to hasten its own development? Not only was this to become the general belief, but optimism became the rule throughout the area.

Costly Fanaticisms

Euphoria was replaced by disenchantment. Long after losing their souls, the Africans are now about to lose what is most dear and precious to them: their joie de vivre. Admittedly the champagne still flows abundantly in the opulent salons of Abidjan or Yaounde. In Kinshasa, as in Nairobi, the nightclubs swarm with people seven nights out of seven. In Cairo as in Dakar, one frequently hears great, resounding bursts of laughter from groups lolling on cafe terraces or walking along the streets. Henceforth, everywhere, traffic jams constitute an integral part of the urban scene.

Yet, behind this facade, a sober reality is hidden. Of the 50 members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), barely 10 have a healthy economy. The state of the other 40 is truly alarming, further complicated by penury of essential goods, grave violations of human rights and an appreciable population increase. With the exception of the petroleum exporting countries, the economies are in a bad way, if not actually on the brink of bankruptcy.

Some were--and for that matter still are--battered by cruel civil wars, born of fanaticisms as infantile as they are costly: Somalia, Angola,

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Chad, Zaire, Mauritania, and Morocco. Others suffer the inconvenience of the sinister practice of demagogery and intolerance by their leaders: Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Conakry, Uganda and the Central African Republic. The policy of the sword consists in liquidating anyone suspected of having notoriety, wealth or education, and this has led to the massive exodus of vital forces. Moreover, it has plunged the countries, little by little, into economic and social chaos. But, in general, economic stagnation, not to say recession of the growth rate and collapse of the production apparatus, is now commonplace.

Food Deficit

This is particularly true in connection with food where, at the present time, almost all the countries of Africa are facing a dramatic situation. To be sure, the desertification of the Sahel countries, where rainfall shortages recur often over several consecutive years, explains in part the drop in agricultural output. But only in part, because a food deficit is also rampant in Central African countries where the rainfall is both regular and abundant.

In his address to Congress on 12 February, Bob Bergland, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, pointed out that food production continues to decline in Africa and that its level per capita is now "Considerably lower than it was 15 years ago." He also added that, "Without help from the United States, together with donations from other sources, the unfortunate inhabitants of these countries will suffer a great deal more."

Begging for Alms

The provision of basic necessities in the way of food for the major African population centers at the present time has created a real headache for the governments involved. At Kinshasa as in Brazzaville, in Accra as in Conakry, one frequently finds offices and work sites totally deserted in full day. The employees spend the better part of their time looking for some rice, milk and manioc, needed daily for their families. When they are found on the black market, the price is beyond their reach.

In most of the capitals, consumer prices increased four and five times between 1976 and 1980. In Kolwezi (Zaire), a Kawoto mine worker remembers a period when his daily income was easily enough to enable him to buy his beer ration for a whole month. Now, he says, he must spend the equivalent of 10 days' work to purchase the same amount of beer. So, he acknowledges with a slightly embarrassed air, "I've given up drinking beer!" And that, given the custom of the region, is absolutely the worst possible fate.

Private individuals are not the only ones to suffer the effects of the rapid decline in purchasing power. The countries themselves appear doomed to succumb to poverty. Some have ended up discreetly requesting aid from the former colonial power in order to maintain their operational budget.

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The truth is that increasingly, one encounters cases of countries where the civil servants go days, sometimes a month or two, without being paid. Heads of state who, just a short while ago, raged against colonialism and imperialism, describing them as satanic, no longer hesitate to hold out the beggar's bowl for aims from the directors of multinational corporations. They are looking for additional funds to pay their civil servants and to provide food for their fellow citizens. For reasons of economy, the governments of Bamako (Mali) and Ouagadougou (upper Volta) decided to deprive civil servants of their service vehicles. Lacking the necessary resources, the leaders of three countries (Benin, Congo and Guinea-Conakry), designated by the OAU to constitute an intervention force in Chad, have requested logistical aid from France whose troops they are supposed to relieve at N'Djamena. Moreover, they reportedly made secret representations to President Giscard d'Estaing, seeking to dissuade him from withdrawing his detachment based in Chad.

Budget Deficit

In a number of countries, highway repair programs have been abandoned. Nor are the existing highway networks being maintained any longer. Everywhere, budget allocations for hospital and school equipment have been reduced. In Mauritania, the state expenditure for material has been cut down by 50 percent in the 1980 budget and the budget itself is 7.5 percent smaller than that for 1979.

All the growth rates are in a free-fall. Over its 100-year history, Liberia has never recorded a budgetary deficit equal to that recorded now: 140.8 million dollars (as against 224.9 million dollars of receipts). Per capita national income dropped 10 percent in 4 years, whereas consumer prices rose 16 percent in 1979 alone.

According to experts, the Ivory Coast which has taken the prize, since its independence, for economic growth, in 1979 would register a mere 2 to 3 percent growth rate, as compared to 12 percent in 1976. After 4 years of recession, wealthy Gabon itself expects a return of investments only by means of a very rigid austerity policy.

Foreign Debt

The constant rise in the cost of manufactured goods, together with the progressive decline in the price of most raw materials, and higher energy pricing, laid bare the inadequacy of the economic structures inherited from the colonial system. The nonpetroleum producing countries are all more or less on the brink of bankruptcy. At the rate prices are soaring, one African expert told us, "the countries able to pay their petroleum bills will indeed be rare in 5 years."

Right now, Senegal is directing 25 percent of its budgetary revenue to buying petroleum. Despite the Akosombo dam, which provides sufficient

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electricity to meet its needs, Ghana will have to use almost 50 percent of the value of its 1980 imports for petroleum. The lack of adequate energy supplies means that the people of Bamako and Conakry, day and night, suffer prolonged power cut-offs every day, which disorganizes all the business of these capitals. The Europeans periodically evoke the possibility of gas rationing, an African leader told us. In Africa, he went on to say, "This decision figures among the categorical imperatives to which most of our responsible leaders will soon have to bow, unless they benefit from the understanding attitude of their foreign creditors." Nowadays, there are very few countries that do not show a deficit in their balance of payments. Even the Ivory Coast, which has never had a deficit since its independence, showed only a very small surplus in 1978.

Nor can the results be expected to differ much in 1979. Although the tonnage of exports rises regularly, the mining and agricultural raw materials exported are progressively less able to cover the cost of imports. As a result, the magnitude of the foreign debt becomes truly disquietening. With the exception of Cameroon, Niger, Upper Volta and Benin, which their leaders administer paternalistically, between 1976 and 1980, most of the African nations were fairly severely reprimanded by the international financial institutions.

A good deal has been said about the affairs of Egypt, Zaire, Zambia and Ghana in this connection. Yet Senegal, Togo, the Congo, Tanzania, Morocco and Madagascar have not been able, either, to escape the vigilant watchdogs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Even the petroleum producing nations, such as Algeria, Nigeria and Gabon, are not immune to the contagion; while prosperous countries, such as Kenya and the Ivory Coast, are compelled to postpone--in not purely and simply abandon--ambitious equipment projects planned during better times. Thus, the Ivory Coast has only recently indefinitely dropped its plans, dating from some time back, to build an enormous radio center, as well as a costly project to provide ultra-modern equipment for nationwide radio and television coverage. The same thing applies to the construction of the large international airport, designed to replace the existing facility at Port-Bouet, near Abidjan, where the clearing and excavation work had already been started. At COFACE (French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade), a very well-informed businessman told us, "Fewer than 10 African countries today are regarded as being really solvent. All the others are more or less in the red."

Treasuries in Difficulty

Consequently, one observes a very well-defined decline of investments in all sectors, the slowdown of economic growth, a sharp increase in bankruptcies and a generalized stagnation of business activity. One sign of the times is the fact that SCOA (West African Trading Company) established on the continent since the dawn of colonization, in 1979 for the first time ever recorded a deficit and thereupon closed a number of its branch

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offices. LAMCO (Liberian-American-Swedish Minerals Company), the principal iron ore extraction enterprise in Liberia, showed a deficit of more than 26 million dollars for 1979 and plans the dismissal of 700 workers.

Similarly, for the first time since its establishment in 1963, the income statement of Air Afrique shows a deficit. The African Development Bank's (ADB's) managers did not hide their concern over the failure of a number of its members to pay their quotas. The OAU itself is not unlikely to suffer the after-effects of the predicament of these countries. Some disaster victims, such as the Chad and Equatorial Guinea, did not hesitate to ask for exemption from payment of their share. Others (and they are quite numerous) without owning up to their treasury problems, acknowledge that they are unable to honor their commitments. All of this recently led the Secretary-General of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, to send his kindest regards to all the member-countries. Thus it is that, after businesses, administrations and countries themselves, some Pan-African organizations as prestigious as Air Africa, the ADB and the OAU, run the risk, if not of dying from anemia, of at least being seriously paralyzed.

Somber Clouds

All this is tantamount to suggesting that 20 years after their independence, the feast of African nations is over, and the bright sun of bygone days is now replaced by dark clouds. The situation is all the more serious in that the leaders insist on hiding the tragedy from their fellow citizens. And they do it so well that with a very few exceptions, Africans continue to believe that the problem is one of regimes or personalities.

The truth is that Africa is now faced with a problem of survival, both at the level of states threatened with collapse and of citizens whose human dignity has been assailed. Fortunately, at a time when petroleum sets the tempo for the lives of nations and the destiny of all peoples, Africa proves to have some. However, between its discovery and exploitation, a great deal of time may elapse. Time which, for Africa, may seem like an eternity. And which, for that reason may prove fatal to Africa.

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OAU SECRETARY GENERAL EXPLAINS ECONOMIC POLICY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Apr 80 pp 23-24

[Statement by OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo to Professor Mahdi Elmandjira: "The Last Chance"]

[Text] OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo explains to Professor Mahdi Elmandjira why Africa has waited 20 years before thinking about its economic future.

For the first time an OAU summit devoted exclusively to Africa's economic problems will be held in Lagos (Nigeria) on 28 and 29 April 1980. This decision was taken in July 1979 when the chiefs of state held a conference in Monrovia.

Twenty years after independence, the African leaders stated at that time that "Africa had remained the least advanced region in the world" and "that the time had come to give serious consideration to the problems of the socioeconomic transformation of the states (OAU members)".

In Addis Ababa in May 1973, the 10th summit of the organization had already adopted an "African resolution for cooperation, development and economic independence," which had paved the way for a "resolution pledging assistance for African economic development," formulated in Monrovia in July 1979. The object of the Lagos summit is specifically to "translate into action" this last declaration which goes beyond the one of 1973 and involves rather radical reorientation of the type of development followed by almost all the African states since their independence.

Reorientation

The most serious problem is that of Africa's fragmentation into 50 states, of which more than 40 have a population of less than 20 million. In fact, there are only three African states (Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia) which reach or exceed the world's average population of the UN member states, which is 30 million. This balkanization of the continent dooms any endogenous development from the outset and plays a double role. First, the absence

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of a "critical mass" and an economy of scale forces the great majority of the African states to maintain very strong ties with the old mother countries. Secondly, these same ties are an obstacle to any real integration on a regional and continental level.

Moreover, with 25 countries whose income is equal or inferior to \$300 per capita, where 80 percent are illiterate, 60 percent underfed or poorly nourished, suffering from a 75 percent deficiency in a constantly diminishing diet, and 30 percent are unemployed or underemployed, which have the highest mortality rate in the world (20/1,000), 0.6 percent of the world's industrial production, and investments in research and development lower than 1 percent of the GNP, Africa has all the chances to remain the planet's sick continent for many years to come, unless there is a fundamental change in its course. This change can only happen with more intensive inter-African cooperation, since no African country, with the exception of four or five, has the slightest chance of truly developing outside of a much broader economic and political cohesion. This is not a question of Pan-African sentimentalism, but of absolute necessity.

The sovereign powers' games and childish diseases and their obsession to command admiration from abroad, in total contrast with reality, become signs of selfishness and irresponsibility when one refuses to forget them in order to permit hundreds of millions of human beings to accede to a minimum of well-being.

Minimum of Well-Being

There is enough change in the wind in the African political weather to make it possible in Lagos to look for some of the heavy clouds to scatter, which would permit Africa to attain this needed turning-point.

The number of chiefs of state who will take the time to attend this first continental economic meeting will be a test in itself of their genuine interest in dealing with the most vital questions for the future of their country. If, on the contrary, the flow of words at the Lagos meeting prevails over the economic obligations, the African chiefs of state, consciously or unconsciously, will have contributed to making the conjunction of economic underdevelopment and political instability more explosive.

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REALISM OF OAU ECONOMIC SUMMIT PRAISED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1073

[Editorial: "Realism At Last"]

[Text] For the first time in their history, all the African nations, with the exception of Liberia and South Africa, met under the aegis of the OAU to examine problems of economic development.

Seventeen years after the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, which to date has devoted most of its activity to the achievement of political objectives, Africa took an unbiased look at its economic progress. Despite the sum of possibilities and achievements, the result is alarming and OAU Secretary General Kodjo exclaimed that Africa is "confronting the problems of its very survival."

This cry of alarm is scarcely exaggerated despite its dramatization which was probably intended. Too often in these columns we have exposed Africa's anguishing problems of galloping population growth, inadequate food production, unemployment, accelerated urbanization, indebtedness, the consequences of increasing oil costs not compensated for by aid from producer countries, the deterioration in terms of trade and the ill effects of internal and external inflation, for it to be necessary to repeat Edem Kodjo's demonstration.

From his overall evaluation of failure, we have retained only a few significant figures: Africa has 18 out of the 25 poorest countries in the world. The mortality rate (19 percent) is the highest and life expectancy the shortest (47 compared with a world average of 55 years). The yield of the main types of agricultural production: wheat, corn, rice, peanuts, millet and sorghum has steadily dropped since the early 1960's, with the exception of cotton, while world yields have increased. In 1970, the cost of food imports made up 15 percent of the gross national product. Africa's share of world production is almost insignificant: around .9 percent. In 1970, industrial production made up only 11.5 percent of Africa's GNP. Systems of education are poorly adapted and result in a waste of human resources and "an opposition between education, culture and employment." Intra-African trade has dropped almost continuously since 1970.

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In view of this gloomy picture, it is paradoxical to note the wealth of the African Continent, particularly with respect to mineral and energy resources (1.3 percent of world coal reserves, 27 to 40 percent of the world's hydro-electric power potential).

A March 1980 UNDP document sums up Africa's economic situation perfectly:

"The past 20 years of the postcolonial period of political independence did not bring the radical economic transformation that had been anticipated.... Despite vast natural resources and the praiseworthy efforts of its governments and peoples, Africa can show no noteworthy growth rate or satisfactory index of general well-being. Its economy remains essentially underdeveloped."

For several years, political leaders and economic and social planning experts have obvious tried to analyze the causes of such a situation and to find ways of doing something about it. Several debates between Africans, particularly the Monrovia Colloquium in February 1979, actually preceded the Lagos Economic Summit Meeting.

The latter derives its importance and significance as much from the African leaders' examination of their conscience and their new approach to development problems as it does from the resolutions adopted.

The basic question underlying all these discussions is in fact this: What type of development does Africa need? The answer to this question has had light shed upon it by the evaluation of errors that must not be repeated.

The secretary general of the OAU noted, in fact, that the development policy of the new nations following their accession to independence continued to be oriented toward the former colonial countries, that the African economies still depend to a great extent on those of the industrialized world and that there has been a prevailing tendency to wait for solutions to come from the outside, to imitate the Western pattern of development and to import technology. In short, Africa has to date practiced "a strategy of extroversion. Africa's development has been organized "toward the outside and for the outside with respect to both concepts and products," notes Edem Kodjo. "With regard to concepts, it is time for Africa to draft an appropriate economic development theory in keeping with its individual needs, its own genius, its own authenticity," he adds.

This dependency of African economies on the outside world, this "vertical" development from the south to the north and vice versa which has neglected "horizontal" development -- that is, coordination and the complementary nature of African economies among themselves -- are these things simply a legacy of colonization? Without denying the importance of the effects of colonization, the secretary general of the OAU rejects the facileness of this excuse and is not contradicted by the heads of state and government. Twenty years have passed since independence has been gained and yet, on the whole, Africa has made no great effort to throw off the yoke.

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After the diagnosis comes the search for therapy. Here again, the spirit in which African political leaders at the highest level have proceeded is significant: One must henceforth examine development problems with the "seriousness" merited by the concern for improving the welfare of the African peoples as much as by political problems. It is time to consider possible choices realistically, abandoning the distorting prism of ideologies. Africa must no longer expect an improvement in its fate only from the progress of the industrialized world, its aid and the burdensome acquisition of Western technology that is often poorly adapted to its own needs. Before relying on others, Africa needs to rely on itself.

If, in the future, this new language is translated into concrete decisions, Africa will truly undertake what the Nigerian president has called "the second phase in the struggle for freedom" -- that is, the struggle for economic independence.

For the time being, the Lagos Summit Meeting has established the terms and proposed long-term objectives. Over the next 10 years, Africa will try to strengthen existing regional economic communities -- that is, essentially ECOWAS in West Africa -- and to stimulate the setting up of similar groups in Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. . . . Wherever their establishment would be too difficult, as in North Africa, sectorial integration on a continental level would be sought.

The regional approach seemed preferable, because it is more realistic, to the more ambitious and overall solution proposed at the outset by the Guinean president -- that is, the establishment of an economic community of the entire African Continent. The latter remains the objective for the year 2000 and a preliminary charter is to be presented to the chiefs of state at the next economic summit meeting of the OAU, in principle, in 2 or 3 years. On the other hand, the secretary general of the OAU received a mandate to continue studies and steps needed to bring about an African Common Energy Market by 1990.

The essential thing is that Africa is determined, over the next two decades, to strengthen its integration in the agricultural and food domains, which have recognized priority, and in the industrial, energy, transport and communications sectors, especially since it is resolved to rely above on on its own efforts and to choose its own paths to the future.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

NIGER FOREIGN POLICY STRESSES NIGERIAN, LIBYAN COOPERATION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 May 80 p 41

[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "Between Two Too Powerful Neighbors"]

[Text] A Necessary But Difficult Cooperation Between Libya and Nigeria.

They had not been invited. They came anyway. By plane, from the north, and in a procession of 504 blacks, from the south, Libyans and Nigerians landed in Niamey on 13 April. Panic in the protocol service. One had not anticipated housing and feeding the prefect of Sebha (Libya) and above all not 49 Nigerians who had thought it a good idea to invite themselves to the celebration of the 6th anniversary of the army's taking power.

"Our proximity is difficult," acknowledges a high Nigerian official, "this surprise visit is proof of that, but we have to bear with it."

That is why Niger, a realist, is striving to develop with its two powerful neighbors--Nigeria and Libya--the best possible cooperation. Of course, with its 5 million people and its budget of 72 billion francs CRA (African Financial Community), it is a little bit like Cinderella in the presence of its partners. But, as President Kountche states, "Just because Niger is one of the poorest countries does not mean we should not be respected as a sovereign state." And to make itself respected by Libya is already a feat, as much as there is between the two countries a border dispute. "The present border," states Daouda Diallo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, "does not satisfy either Niger or Libya, and a joint commission has been created to find a solution to this problem."

Another delicate matter is that of the Nigerian uranium sold to Pakistan (150 tons in 1978) and to Libya (300 tons in 1979). This issue was "deflated" at the 23d session of the AIEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in New Delhi (December 1979) where it was conclusively proven that Niger certainly sold uranium twice, in an entirely official way, to Libya. But if Niamey informed the AIEA about this sale, Tripoli did not think it wise to point out its purchase to the agency...

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With Nigeria, on the other hand, relations have never been as involved. Niger, landlocked, sends a large part of its freight from the ports of its neighbors. After having bought its petroleum in Algeria (at a high price and through Benin), then in Libya, it turned this year toward Nigeria, which should deliver to Niger 400,000 tons.

Regarding mining, Nigeria, at the request of Niger, has taken a 16 percent share in the company that is supposed to work the uranium beds in Techili. In agricultural development an agreement was signed on 12 April in Niamey by the Nigerian secretary general of the joint Niger-Nigeria commission, Gabriel Sam Akunwafor, with the FAO (Western Armed Forces) to put into operation the Komadougou-Yobe basin.

Destabilization

Certainly, right now, Niger along side Nigeria as well as Libya looks like a beggar. One is sometimes obliged at Niamey to accept unequal contracts, lacking the power to negotiate as equals, and watchfulness has to be exercised. On 15 April President Kountche asked his countrymen "to open their eyes wide" in view of "destabilizing activities to which small countries with unstable and uncertain borders are subjected." It is difficult to refrain from looking toward the north and thinking that two powerful neighbors, at last, are better than one....

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MILITARY, FINANCIAL AID REVIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 May 80 p 17

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "France-Africa: Weapons and Money!"]

[Text] What evil curse has struck the so-called French-African meetings? In April 1977, at the Dakar (Senegal) summit conference, one participant, Zaire, was shaken by the first war in Shaba. In May 1978, it was the second war in Shaba. In May 1979, the Kigali (Rwanda) summit meeting was sullied by the Bokassa scandal. On 8-10 May 1980, the meeting in Nice will have taken place against the background of war: the Chadian tragedy and the bloody events in Liberia. This time, however, no one will have lied. The official communique emphasizes economic cooperation between France and Africa and for once, the chiefs of state are right: Economic cooperation is more than ever the order of the day.

Since the beginning of the year, phenomena of "destabilization" for economic reasons have increased in number. Senegal, Mali and Zaire have experienced (and are still experiencing) disturbances in which the students are actually only the ones to reveal the economic malaise. Africans have found only two paradises: money and weapons.

Money? One has to have it. African chiefs of state meeting in Nice were coming from the Lagos summit meeting (see page 22) "exclusively devoted to the economy." They had their records: Africa is an economic disaster and international cooperation has been scandalously inadequate. France was prepared. The 1980 budget of the Ministry of Cooperation amounts to 4.3 billion French francs (over 200 billion CFA francs), or 23 percent more than in 1979. What is more, France had put together a dossier on the energy crisis in Africa. According to the study, the cost of imported oil doubled in under 2 years and OPEC aid to 12 nations on the continent (nonproducers) represented only 40 percent of their oil imports.

This reference to oil served as a diversion because France is not in a good position. Giscard d'Estaing's promises since 1975 on the establishment of an International Solidarity Fund for Africa have not been kept: The ACDA (Concerted Action for the Development of Africa), set up at the

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end of 1979, only provides for "concertation" between developed countries to coordinate their aid. No funds!

On the other hand, lacking money, France's friends will have arms and the consolidation of "military cooperation." Officially, the famous Defense Pact was not on the agenda. But, by virtue of the bilateral agreements, the 7,700 soldiers stationed in Africa (except for those from Reunion) are ready to fly to the aid of any chief of state in difficulty. Paris will continue to equip the armies of its "satellites," which, according to French sources, are demanding more and more sophisticated war equipment and consequently, it is more and more costly. The French gun merchants have even decided to "extend credit" to their African customers, but by being paid by the Paris government, which confirms the thought of French socialist Lionel Jospin: "Africa is at one and the same time coveted and forgotten and the great powers have difficulty allowing it to become a subject of history."

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PROBLEMS OF FRANCOPHONE MOVEMENT REVIEWED

Francophone Movement's Problems Examined

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14 Apr 80 pp 66-67

[Article by Elie Ramaro: "The Institutional Francophone Movement in Crisis"]

[Text] Half-paralyzed by the trench warfare that France and Canada are waging, the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT), which in Paris recently abandoned the principle of collegiality, is suffering a serious crisis of identity.

Brawling over the naming of the secretary general and his six statutory assistants, more and more closed sessions so as to spare the members of the 30 delegations and the observers from the more vigorous duelling between the French and Canadian ministers, the Western sponsors of an institution of which they are at the same time the principal financiers: the six conference of the Agency of cultural and technical cooperation (ACCT), in Lome last December, and the extraordinary session just held in Paris at the end of March have lived up to the reputation for confusion and futility held by this No 1 institution of the Francophone movement.

The daily humor prevailing in Togo further enriched these championships of sterile jabbering: "Oh, papa, oh, mamma, let me go see the well-beloved Guide, E-ya-de-ma!" was sung at the top of their voices, to an accompaniment of bongos and dancing, by "animation" brigades composed of several hundred young Togolese in multicolored uniforms, sent to punctuate all the heavy moments of the mid-December conference. But this riot of behavior and slogans proved at least--to the point of caricature--how the ACCT, known as "Agecoop" in those parts, is received in the capitals of most West African countries and in Quebec--the only ones that incarnate the "popular Francophone movement" which certain creators of the agency, founded in Niamey, Niger, in 1969, dreamed of.

"Soft" Cooperation

It is true that by the fact of its having been expanded (see lists at end), the institution appears to be better able to defend itself against the accu-

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sation of being only an instrument or "submarine" of French neocolonial policy as manifested particularly in Africa, and it is also true that the agency's aid programs--totaling 60 million French francs, not including the "special budgets"--deserve better than the image the ACCT gives itself when it meets in conference. Although they do not always escape the reproach of "sprinkling" readily leveled at them by countries that do "heavy" or "linked" cooperation, such as France, they constitute a formula for "soft cooperation" that is appreciated by its African or Asiatic users for its flexibility, its variety, and at the same time its relative political, if not cultural, neutrality.

Thanks to the Agency, in fact, 1,200 professionals have been able to take management training courses at the International School of Bordeaux, which has been operating for some 10 years. The linguists of the ACCT, anxious to escape the ambient cultural imperialism, have taken up defense of the national languages, particularly in Africa: lexicons, atlases, collections of oral tradition, design of transcription systems and learning methods are beginning to restore respectability to some of the principal languages spoken on the continent. The same is the case for the Creole languages of the Caribbean or of the Indian Ocean.

The ACCT has also oriented itself toward development of education, with an interesting educational-television experiment in the Wolof language in Senegal and a policy of harmonized productions involving a dozen television systems or educational-television centers throughout the world. The agency is also doing a lot for the emergence of an independent African cinema: it has helped some film-makers known throughout the world today, such as Sembene Ousmane and Med Hondo, to produce and distribute their films, and finances several Third World film festivals which are not without controversy. Without it, the folklore troupes and the artisans of the poor countries, as well as the young writers of books and radio plays, would never have had the opportunity to present themselves to a public.

Under the impulse of the African countries and Canada, the agency has also gone into development action: the "green Sahel" operation; the Bamako hotel-training school; the creation of a special fund that makes it possible to carry out 200 study or action missions in the neediest countries each year; "horizontal cooperation" experiments opening the way to a "South-South" dialog, etc. It would be a shame for so creative an institution--no matter what its management difficulties¹--to founder in a powerlessness to which its principal "godfathers" would like to reduce it today if they cannot have exclusive leadership of the political "Francophone movement" to which they aspire. It was in order to ward off this pressing danger that the extra-

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1. The agency's accountants and auditors do not fail, on the occasion of each statutory conference, to point out numerous irregularities in management. The latest crop includes, for example, nonapplication of personnel regulations, commitment to expenditures without confirmation of loans, use of budget surpluses, thefts of cash and materials, etc.

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ordinary meeting concluded on 27 March formally declared that it wanted to "give a new impulse (to the ACCT by providing it with) even more effective structures." The most tangible result of this was the elimination of the collegiality of the general secretariat, already greatly reduced, in 1978, by the secretary general, the Nigerien Dan Dicko.

Member State: Belgium, Benin, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Comores, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Dominica, France, Gabon, Haiti, Upper Volta, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritius, Monaco, Niger, New Hebrides, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Chad, Togo, Tunisia, Vietnam, Zaire.

Associated States: Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Mauritania.

Participating Governments: New Brunswick, Quebec.

ACCT Official, Dicko, Interviewed

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14 Apr 80 pp 67-68

[Interview by Elie Ramaro with Dankoulodo Dan Dicko, secretary general of the ACCT; date and place not given]

[Text] "One cannot do cultural things only. Everything has to go forward together." Thus said the Nigerien Dankoulodo Dan Dicko, present secretary general of the ACCT (Agecoop), who at the extraordinary conference in Paris on 27 March was reelected to his position and relieved of assistants from whom he had withdrawn a part of their functions in 1978. "The big-brother type of Francophone movement is dead," he adds--but with the limits implied by the "patronage" of Agecoop by France and Canada, who would dearly like to make it an instrument of cultural neocolonialism, if not the all-purpose of neocolonialism pure and simple.

[Question] Is there really a difference between the type of cooperation practiced by your agency and that which is done in a bilateral way, by countries with a "dominating" tendency, such as France, for example?

[Answer] We are actually complementary. I call this a sensitizing, catalytic type of cooperation. We are helping in the pooling of means, in development of awareness on the part of those involved that one project or another is within the capacity of the population itself.

[Question] Is this what is meant by "horizontal cooperation"?

[Answer] Here is an example. In the matter of scientific research, we have set up a network of exchanges which first involved Senegal and the Congo. It then snowballed and stimulated Mali; and it was Mali that provided the experts to set up something similar in Haiti. This is a case of action by a "soft method," between two countries that have comparable levels of infrastructure, without risks of imbalances.

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[Question] And in the case of educational television?

[Answer] There had been some experiments in Niger and in the Ivory Coast within the framework of French cooperation. The first one has closed down for good; the second one reaches many young people, but it uses enormous facilities to do so, and at a cost beyond the reach of many poor countries. Nevertheless, with the help of the Senegalese authorities the Agency has found an original approach: light and well-suited equipment, reduced budget in line with the country's capacity, local personnel, experimentation phases following one another in a prudent sequence. This works. And Djibouti's educational television is presently starting up thanks to cooperation from Dakar's educational TV.

[Question] Your last general conference, in Lome, gave an example of disorder, confusion, procedural battles dominated by the confrontation between France and Canada, your principal backers, and all this in a riot of personality cult. And in addition, you had to meet in an extraordinary conference at the end of March, less than 4 months later, to settle the differences left hanging at Lome. This is a crisis, isn't it?

[Answer] You are hard. But it is true, there is a problem about amending texts adopted 10 years ago, to serve as a charter for this Agency at the time of its creation. You know that at its beginning the states of socialist tendency considered the ACCT a disguised reconstitution of the French colonial empire--on the cultural level, in any case. But I believe that since 1974--the year when I took on responsibility as secretary general--we have shown by our actions themselves that we were not an instrument of cultural imperialism.

I had 20 member countries; today there are 33. A certain adaptation of the texts is needed to follow this dynamic development. We started out with a collegial system, but it has been proved within the agency that this makes it too difficult to take decisions. In such a system, there is a tendency for everyone to bring his own views of cooperation into the running of the agency. Canada insists on social or economic development; France, on training; Belgium, on culture in the strict sense; for our part, we have stressed the notion of overall development.

[Question] You the Africans?

[Answer] Yes, we the Africans. One cannot do cultural things only. Everything has to go forward together. But this continues to collide with habits; whence divisions in the management that have impeded the agency's work--that is, its programs.

[Question] Then was Lome, with all its expenses, a conference for nothing?

[Answer] If it had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent it. It made it possible to pose the problem. I regret the impassioned character that it took on. I admit that discussion of the programs went down the drain, although this is what interests our peoples.

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But since November, new operations have started up in Vietnam, in Chad, in Guinea-Bissau. As for cult of personality, as you say, it is not up to me to judge this: we all accept one another as we are. And we are often very different.

[Question] What unites you, then? The language?

[Answer] Yes, and it is tremendous. It is a cement, a joint, a convergence, even a way of feeling. And it does not belong only to France. In this, the agency has a supplementary role to play which is not quantifiable: a task of sensitizing and liaison among the Francophone delegations on the stage of world diplomacy, especially on the occasion of conferences of the United Nations family, such as UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] and a good many others.

[Question] For you, then, are the conditions that presided over the agency's formation, this politicization of the Francophone movement, this emphasis on the "moderate" countries as well-behaved spokesmen for a culture coming from somewhere else--is this forgotten?

[Answer] It is no longer a big-brother type of Francophone movement. Ten years later, the Congo is still there; Vietnam and Laos have stayed with us; Mauritania and Morocco are beginning to work with the agency. Socialist and Portuguese-speaking Guinea-Bissau too.

[Question] But why Algeria's rejection and Madagascar's exit a few years ago?

[Answer] At the beginning, the Algerians sometimes "poop-speakers"! But we are not losing hope of rapprochement with them. The same with the Malagasies, who quit the Agency mainly, I think, because they considered their participation too expensive for the services received. In any case, I hope that the way of expansion will continue to be followed, and that this will give a boost to horizontal cooperation between developing countries.

[Question] Do your personnel, the experts that you use, have a different "profile" from those of the national cooperation systems?

[Answer] Our structure is quite small--some 100 agents--and everything is known. Our policy is in line with our means; and contrary to what is sometimes said in the press or elsewhere, our operating expenses are lower than those of many international organizations or of our agents' home governments.

As for the experts, we have had only two complaints about them, out of several hundred missions organized since 1974. The characteristic thing about them is that they do not feel they are sent by one particular country or another. They are animated by an internationalist spirit. Often, the Agency does not even see them: we have an idea, we put people in contact, we participate in the financing of the missions and then we receive the reports. But their circuit is horizontal.

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Thus, for example, we asked Upper Volta, which is very advanced in the area of the rural press, to make someone available to Rwanda; in the same way, a coconut-plantation expert from the Ivory Coast went directly to the Seychelles with the savoir-faire of his country's people. In a different vein, we have an educational cooperation program in the Comores, which began in 1976; there are still some 50 Belgian, Canadian, Senegalese, Beninese, Upper Voltan, Tunisian teachers and doctors there--and this has never posed the least problem.

[Question] Nevertheless, all these programs are often eclipsed, in the debates of your institutional bodies, by the Franco-Canadian confrontation, which seems far-removed from them.

[Answer] I know that these debates have left a bitter taste, and that they have been viewed as political opposition between the agency's funders and its users. I do not believe it is really that. France and Canada are fated to remain in the agency, for various reasons. The Africans too, without whom the organization would be nothing. Cooperation means not only the selling of products. There is also an affective side that humanizes our agency, perhaps because of its cultural vocation. The ACCT is not the Commonwealth: it is an entirely voluntary matter.

[Question] But what do the African countries, for example, bring to this cooperation; isn't it once again a one-way matter?

[Answer] There are presently some attempts--North-South dialog, trilogy, etc --to rid the relations between rich and poor countries of their natural cynicism. Africa has the means to climb up the ladder with its raw materials, at least when it has them. And then, doubtlessly, the humanist side comes increasingly from the South, whereas the North--partly because of the race to technology and the consumer society--has somewhat lost sight of these values. On the cultural level, we are helping the cinema, plays, African musical groups, which are finding popular audiences, to "rise" toward Europe.

[Question] Is your mission to defend the French language as such?

[Answer] Inasmuch as it is used by most of our member countries on a daily basis, yes. But it is not the property of one country, nor is it an elitist creation. Thus we defend the right to difference, to specific heritages. If dialects derived from French--such as the Creole tongues of the Caribbean, of the Indian Ocean or the Pacific, for example, or what is sometimes called "African French" in its different regional variants--make it possible to retain a broad Francophone system, they are entitled to all our attention and to our help. But in the face of the English language, which has progressed so fast, we should not be afraid of "Francophonizing" to the maximum: we have got certain English-speaking countries of Africa to specify French as a second language. We have also launched French-language programs on island obtaining independence that belong to the Anglo-Saxon cultural area, such as Dominica (in the Antilles) and the New Hebrides (in the Pacific). The problem is that one sometimes has the feeling of defending the

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French language more than the French do themselves! One sees French scientists publishing regularly in English, or using that language in conferences; and nowhere in Africa does one hear a broadcast like that of "English by Radio," which the BBC broadcasts everywhere.

[Question] But as for the African national languages, what is there place in all this?

[Answer] We have a department directed specially toward study of the national languages, collection of oral traditions, the writing of dictionaries and indexes. This is right in the agency's charter, and--with the exception of some French associations wedded to the past, and a few individuals-- no one dreams of going back to that. Even so, the road is a long one: I cannot do a course in organic chemistry in Hausa, which is my language, but which I do not manage to write. And even if I did manage to, my theoretical public would be limited to the Hausa cultural area, which would not take me very far.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

KENYAN-RWANDAN CONFERENCE--A mixed Rwandan-Kenyan conference was held starting on 21 April at Kigali. This meeting, which was attended by experts from both countries, tried to improve cooperation between Rwanda and Kenya in the fields of transportation, trade, telecommunications, cultural exchanges, agriculture, and animal husbandry, as well as justice and immigration. The participants also examined a draft of an agreement pertaining to Rwandan-Kenyan cooperation in secondary and university education. Rwanda assigned great importance to this conference because Kenya is its first trade partner in Africa; 80 percent of Rwandan imports transit through the port of Mombasa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1052] 5058

KENYAN, RWANDAN, TANZANIAN EXPERTS---Experts from Rwanda, Kenya, and Tanzania met at Kigali at the end of April for the sixth time in order to try to create a pyrethrum industry in the three countries. We note that pyrethrum cultivation declined in 1979 in Rwanda where the villagers had often replaced this cash crop with food crops. Rwanda's pyrethrin output came to 38 tons in 1979 as against 46 tons during the year before that. Because of the shortage on the international market, prices were as high as \$50 per kilogram in 1979, as against \$30 in 1978. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1052] 5058

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

OFFSHORE OIL EXPLORATION LOAN--The American Export-Import Bank has decided to grant a loan of \$96.9 million for an offshore petroleum exploitation project in Angola. The loan, granted at an interest rate of 8.25 percent to the SONANGOL and Cabinda Gulf Oil companies, will make it possible to increase the petroleum output by 26.4 million barrels and the propane output by 14.9 million barrels between 1981 and 1988. These two companies will purchase equipment and services connected with the project from the United States for \$114 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1056] 5058

SWEDISH ASSISTANCE CONTINUED--Sweden will participate in Angola's economic development to the tune of almost F30 million over the next 2 years under the terms of an agreement which has just been signed between the two countries at Luanda. This aid will be used primarily in the field of health and for the development of the fishing industry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1056] 5058

FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE--Angolan exports amounted to \$684 million in 1973 against \$474 million in imports [as published], presenting a positive balance of \$210 million. In 1974, a positive balance of \$550 million was registered, with \$1,114 million in exports against \$564 million in imports. For the first 2 years during which full estimates can be computed, the situation is the following: in 1977, exports amounted to \$910 million and imports to \$681 million, with a positive balance of \$229 million. In 1978, exports rose to \$1,100 million and imports to \$750 million, with a positive balance of \$350 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 May 80 p 1169]

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BENIN

REPORT DETAILS COTONOU PORT TRAFFIC

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 p 928

[Text] Traffic in the autonomous port of Cotonou in 1979 revealed the following features:

	Number	Tonnage Figures	
		Net	Gross
Tankers	192	1,935,567	3,143,332
Freighters	430	1,866,980	3,133,716
Trawlers	182	33,805	65,467
Miscellaneous Vessels	11	6,733	9,670
Total	805	3,843,085	6,352,185

In the breakdown by vessel flags, Greece headed the list with 183 vessels and 292,445 tons net and 452,586 tons gross. It is followed by France with 92 vessels and 497,546 tons net as well as 870,445 tons gross. Great Britain is in third place with 89 vessels and 698,474 tons net and 1,172,326 tons gross. The USSR sent 53 vessels to this port with 306,210 tons net and 569,716 tons gross. Benin sent 14 vessels with 13,524 tons net and 21,777 tons gross.

The year 1979 enabled the autonomous port of Cotonou to achieve a figure of a little more than 1.5 million tons, which is less than in 1978 when the figure was close to 1.8 million tons. On the other hand, figures for 1980 are growing constantly because both Niger and Benin made big investments requiring heavy imports. Moreover, in order to diversify its access to the sea, Mali could step up the shipment of certain equipment through Cotonou. In any case, the two projects for the extension of the port of Cotonou and the port's productivity will make it possible to handle an ever-growing traffic volume by making the infrastructure facilities more profitable.

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1979 General Goods Traffic (in Tons)

	Imports	Exports	Total
Hydrocarbons	789,836		789,836
(including transloading)	627,747		
Miscellaneous goods	651,241	61,176	712,417
Total	1,441,077	61,176	1,502,253

Breakdown of Main Import Items, 1978 and 1979 (in Tons)

	1979	1978
Hydrocarbons	789,836	309,304
Solid bulk goods	314,384	274,003
Construction materials	49,527	36,231
Cereals and similar products	79,790	124,815
Food products	70,037	111,678
Lubricants and bituminous products	10,018	8,227
Fertilizer, insecticides	11,735	12,479
Equipment	21,873	23,823
Vehicles and parts	9,834	11,585
Miscellaneous	84,043	93,874
Total	1,441,077	1,006,019

Breakdown of Main Export Items, 1978 and 1979 (in Tons)

	1979	1978
Vegetable oils	12,719	4,271
Oil crops	17,351	11,443
Products	15,646	18,589
Textile fibers	4,476	7,481
Food products (corn)		3,435
Equipment	789	186
Vehicles and parts	1,012	486
Miscellaneous	9,165	3,826
Total	61,151	49,717

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

SHIPYARD FINANCING--Within the framework of the first Lome convention, the BEI (European Investment Bank) granted a loan of 3.5 million accounting units (1 ECU equals approximately F5.8) for the construction of a repair facility for big ocean-going fishing vessels in the Bay of Mindelo, the principal port in the Cape Verde island group. This operation took the form of a conditional loan which was granted at an interest rate of 2 percent for a term of up to 25 years; the loan was extended to the Republic of Cape Verde to help it in putting together the amount of in-house funding necessary to finance these infrastructure facilities. The BAD (African Development Bank) likewise participates in the financing of this project for which the BEI had already, in February 1979, granted a conditional loan of 80,000 accounting units earmarked for the financing of the feasibility study. Maritime and fishing activities as we know are the major factors capable of promoting the economic development of Cape Verde which is at the center of one of the world's busiest fishing zones; it is expected that this repair yard, which could become operational at the end of 1982, will provide something like 700 jobs and an annual net foreign exchange gain of something like 3.5 million accounting units, corresponding to close to 80 percent of the earnings from the export of goods and services in 1978. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1037] 5058

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CHAD

CIVIL CONFLICT IN CHAD ANALYZED

Goukouni Between Camps

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 p 6

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Goukouni Between Sadat and Qadhdhafi"]

[Text] From the start of the nth Chadian civil war France had promised to remain neutral. President Valery Giscard d'Estaing confirmed it in Paris on 3 April 1980 to Edem Kodjo, secretary general of the Organization of African Unity. The thing is that the French were (and are still) persuaded that their potential adversary, Libya, would not intervene directly in the conflict. There were two reasons for this certainty.

The first is that the northern part of Chad bordering on Libya is controlled by the FAP [People's Armed Forces] of President Oueddei Goukouni, whose troops--viscerally anti-Libyan--could have cut into shreds any column which Col Mu'ammur Qadhdhafi might have had the imprudence or impudence to send to intervene. The second reason is the major one: diplomats from the French Foreign Ministry assert in private that his surveillance of Libya's border with Egypt demands too much of Qadhdhafi's attention to enable him to afford committing a portion of his forces to a Chadian adventure.

For Anwar al-Sadat and Mu'ammur Qadhdhafi, who have reciprocally promised to eliminate each other, have really decided to cross swords (see the analysis of Abdelaziz Barouhi on page 18 of this issue). And they have begun their war using Chadians as their surrogates. Despite respective denials it is indeed Egypt which is arming the FAN [Northern Armed Forces] of Hissein Habre and is training them in camps located around Kutum in Sudan. And it is indeed Libya which has established an airlift to Moundou in southern Chad to supply the commandos of the FAC [Common Action Front] of Acyl Ahmat and the FAT [Chadian Armed Forces] of Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue (see the report of Francois Soudan on page 22 of this issue [translated below]).

Between the two camps stands a single individual, President Oueddei Goukouni, theoretical head of a splintered state. Alone today because if he benefits

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from the support of Acyl Ahmat and Wadal Kamougue against his former ally, Hissein Habre, it is because they fear the ambitions of the latter and he has become the man to strike down. Alone tomorrow because, violently opposed to Libyan control, Goukouni knows that should he win against Habre he would owe this victory (at least in part) to the pro-Libyans.

And tomorrow, with or without Hissein Habre, the fire still threatens to envelop Chad because Goukouni will be asked to "pay his debt." This is a gesture of gratitude to Libya which Goukouni could not decide to make without definitively tainting his only major strength--his intransigent nationalism. It is a quality which will make him the new man to strike down.

Prospects for Continued Carnage

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 pp 22-23

[Article by special correspondent Francois Soudan: "Down to the Last Chadian"]

[Text] The dogs are fat in Ndjamen. The one which came to rub himself against my leg at the edge of a shell hole had a greyish-yellow coat, the color of this desert sand which gives its tinge to the earth and the sky but glistens with amber-colored brilliance. If they could talk, these dogs which at one time used to be starving would place the beginning of their prosperity in February 1979 when 4 days of fighting between the troops of former President Felix Malloum and those of his prime minister at the time, a Toubou with eyes like embers named Hissein Habre, played havoc with the native markets. That was the time of the first battle of Ndjamen.

The carnage started all over again 3 weeks ago and Hissein Habre, a godsend to the dogs which do not distinguish at all between a corpse and a stall of squashed fruit, is still in the game. The dogs are fat because men die: there were 1,500 killed and 3,500 wounded in 20 days of fighting.

When the incident which was to put a match to the powderkeg broke out at dawn on Friday, 21 March 1980, four armies were in the contest in Chad. Each of these has its warlord, each was gorged with weapons.

Sadat Trail

First the FAN, identified by the blue ribbons which they fasten to their shoulder-straps. These Toubou warriors hailing from the north are under the orders of the most famous, the most intelligent, and the most ambitious of the Chadian leaders: Hissein Habre (38 years old). A former student at the School of Political Science in Paris, a former deputy prefect (and later adversary) of Ngarta Tombalbaye, a former guerrilla fighter who joined ex-President Felix Malloum in 1978, he has been minister of defense since the establishment of a government of unity (November 1979). Habre has put on a lot of weight but has lost none of his charisma and his consuming will

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to govern. Diabolically clever, he has managed to win the sympathy of the Moslem petty bourgeoisie of Ndjamenas and of its spiritual leader, Imam Ibrahim Moussa. Hissein Habre controls all the African neighborhoods of Ndjamenas. His command post, not far from Felix Eboué High School, is a villa with bougainvilleas, surrounded by disciplined men, regularly paid, and especially well trained.

The virulent anti-Qadhdhafism of Hissein Habre--who reproaches the Libyans for occupying the border strip of Aouzou in northern Chad--has earned him France's sympathies. Some of Habre's cadres were trained at the noncommissioned officers' school in Montpellier at a time when he was Felix Malloum's second-in-command and some of Habre's weapons are French. But this same anti-Qadhdhafism has especially earned him the solid alliances of Egypt and Sudan. Since early 1979 mortars, trucks, and ammunition from Cairo have been reaching Ndjamenas via Khartoum by crossing the towns of eastern and central Chad controlled by Habre, namely, Abeche, Oum Hadjer, and Ati. This "Sadat trail" brings only weapons, not (or not yet) advisers. But everyone knows that the FAN have training camps in western Sudan.

The second army, this one wearing white ribbons is the FAP of Oueddei Goukouni. Numbering as many men as the FAN (10,000, of whom 3,000 are in Ndjamenas), the FAP are also made up of Toubou warriors. But this army has not been given traditional training, has few cadres and therefore little discipline. The son of the "derdei," the spiritual head of the Toubous, President Goukouni (33 years old) is a timid ascetic, the exact opposite of Habre. His troops have no experience in urban guerrilla fighting.

Is Goukouni pro-Libyan? No, even though it is rumored that his entourage of young fighters has been provided by the services of Tripoli. But, Qadhdhafi has agreed only to provide Goukouni with arms, the balance being made up of French supplies seized from Gen Felix Malloum's forces at the time of the "southern offensive" in February-May 1978. In Ndjamenas Goukouni, who controls the entire northern part of the country, is not rooted at all in the underprivileged districts. His troops control the European part of the city and the environs of the air base where some 1,100 French paratroopers are stationed, troops who have maintained strict neutrality.

Lion of the Saras

The third armed group are the FAT of Col Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, the "southerner." His 5,000 men are based in the densely populated cotton-growing southwestern region. Their leader is the former head of the gendarmerie driven out of Ndjamenas by Habre in February 1979. This rotund officer, wearing an American tunic, Soviet camouflage dungarees, the beret of a French paratrooper and having the traditional fly-swatter in hand, calls himself "the lion of the Saras" (Chadians of the south). He has a violent hatred for Hissein Habre. Having fallen back to his fief of Moundou he has been receiving, starting in April 1979, massive Libyan aid brought in by an airlift flown by Antonov-22 aircraft. His radio station--Radio Moundou--violently charges France with supporting Hissein Habre. The fact remains that

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Kamougue's troops have a training and a motivation which are far from doing justice to the caliber of their equipment...or that of their adversaries.

It is not training which the commandos of the fourth armed force of Chad is lacking, that of the FAC of Acyl Ahmat. These are reportedly responsible for the assassination of the Sudanese consul in Ndjamena at the end of March 1980. Few in number (barely 2,000 men) but terribly efficient, the FAC forces are the most pro-Libyan of all. They were trained in Libya (more particularly, in Sebha Oasis) by East German instructors, according to some sources. Their arms and uniforms come from Tripoli and many have the "little green book" of Mu'ammur Qadhafi in their pockets. Barely ensconced in Chad (they control a few zones in central Chad around Mongo) and infiltrated in the direction of Ndjamena across the Ennedi desert, they proposed a few months ago to Goukouni and Kamougue a "tactical alliance" against their common enemy, Hissein Habre.

Indeed, everything began badly for the "derdei's" son. Because of some pretty Chadian girls, a banal argument broke out around 0200 hours in the morning on 21 March 1980 at Ndjamena's military police headquarters between the FAN and the FAP. This headquarters is the Chadian tangle in miniature: 300 men belonging to the 11 national political factions have been brought together to form the core of the new police force. This was a genuine powderkeg. Abruptly Habre, who for some weeks had been feeling increasingly threatened by the Goukouni-Kamougue-Ahmat alliance, decided to put an end to the situation.

Habre's attack was launched at 0800 hours in the morning against the European districts. His goals were to seize Goukouni's command post along the Shari River and the gendarmerie camps north of the city, then to encircle the FAP and destroy them. For a few hours Habre thought that he had been successful: Goukouni's men were on the run. But Ahmat's forces, holding a second line, hung on. For a week on the border of the neighborhoods abandoned by the 650 French citizens who lived there and while the Chadian civilians were crossing the Shari River by fording it or by pirogue toward Kousseri in Cameroon where they soon totaled 100,000, the carnage continued with cold steel. The front became stabilized. Habre seems to have lost, all the more so as one of Kamougue's columns from Bousso approached Ndjamena on a forced march with 400 Ahmat commandos acting as cadres to attack Habre from the rear.

Burned Flesh

Habre then launched a second offensive in the downtown section around the cathedral and Saint Martin basin. The FAP were turned back a second time, losing 300 men in 3 days. An Habre group advanced to the Air district, 200 meters from the airport.

Hissein Habre was relieved. Yet, everything was to change at dawn on Thursday, 3 April 1980, as the second bloody week in Ndjamena was coming to a close. The setting was the gendarmerie's central building which was

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evacuated at 0600 hours in the morning by the 550 terrorized Congolese troops of the OAU's "neutral force." Habre's FAN immediately secured the empty premises. But at 1500 hours, thanks to a masterly counterattack effected from the neighboring rooftops, Ahmat's commandos retrieved the site. Mopped up with flamethrowers and grenades in a frightful stench of burned flesh, the FAN fell back for the first time.

The front line of 21 March was practically re-established as was firing from stationary positions. Only suicide commandos from both sides clashed. I saw 20 meters in front of me on the Rue des Quarantes two men fighting each other tooth and nail.

A Single Victor

On the afternoon of Saturday, 5 April 1980, when calm was becoming general, an airplane landed at Ndjamenas airport. On board was Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema who had come to try a desperate mediation effort in the name of African fraternity. Dressed in impeccable garb, surrounded by 30 admirably gotten-up officials, Eyadema held talks for 3 days with dust-covered guerrilla fighters, at times stained with blood. Eyadema was even seen crossing the Shari River in a pirogue, deafened by explosions and blinded by smoke, to talk with Hissein Habre who was waiting for him, adopting the posture of a head of state.

But the ceasefire which President Eyadema managed to impose on Monday, 7 April, did not last more than 4 hours. "One victor should emerge from the fighting, a single one," Goukouni asserted, emerging from his reserve on Saturday, 5 April. Down to the last Chadian? An old man in immaculate native wear who had taken refuge in Kousseri looked from the other side of the Shari River at immense black columns rising from Ndjamenas. "In a few days it will be 80 years ago that the father of all of us, Sultan Rabah, died here, killed by the French, on the day of my birth. He should come back. He alone could still save Chad."

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CHAD

NEUTRALITY OF FRANCE IN CRISIS SAID TO BE OPEN TO DOUBT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr-11 May 80 p 41

[Article by Maryam Sysle "The French Threat--Paris Talks Too Much About Non intervention: Who Can Believe it When the French Are Sending Fresh Troops to Ndjamenah?"]

[Text] Each passing day swells the list of dead and wounded at Ndjamenah where the combatants continued, after 3 weeks of fighting, in carrying on a war of attrition whose result none dared predict. And the failure of the fifth attempt at a cease-fire, on 7 April, following the visit of the Togolese chief of state, General Eyadema, gave adequate evidence that the time is past for bastard solutions.

To be sure, on the 21st day of the Ndjamenah war, Hissein Habre and his Armed Forces of the North (FAN) appeared more isolated than ever. On 10 April the Chadian armed forces under Col Abdelkader Wadel Kamogue, which up to that time had contented themselves with pounding at the FAN positions from a distance, around Chagoua Bridge, their targets being in the African sections in the southern part of town, went on the offensive as if to show that at the decisive moment they were ready to give battle seriously. Hissein Habre's troops, thus caught in a pincers between the People's Armed Forces (FAP) of Goukouni Oueddei, president of the Transitional Government of National Union (GUNT) in the north of the town, by the commandos of the Front of Common Action (FAC) of Messrs Acyl Ahmat and Mahamat Abba Seid (respectively foreign minister and minister of the interior) at the northeast, and finally in the south by the Kamoueguist forces.

On the political level President Goukouni could count on the support of nine of the 11 factions within the GUNT. On 11 April the People's Liberation Movement of Chad (whose soldiers are based in the Lake Chad region) announced his "firm support" to the president of the GUNT in the legitimate struggle being waged to protect the Lagos agreements. Up to now only Mr Hadjero Senoussi's fundamental FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front] had taken a position favoring Hissein Habre. At the same time progressive voices began to be heard on the outside. Thus it was that the Steadfastness Front conference that just met at Tripoli with the Libyan, Algerian, Syrian and South Yemeni Heads of State, announced its intention of supporting the president of the GUNT.

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In this conjuncture the ins and outs of the new war of Ndjamená appeared with more and more clarity, and it was no longer possible to stick with the facile and misleading cliché of the "war of the chiefs," and still less with the explanation of conflicts between the north and the south, or between Muslims and Christians. Breaking his silence, the president of the GUNT indicated at a press conference held at his residence on 6 April that Hissein Habre--whom he had characterized as a "rebel minister"--had attempted a coup in violation of the Lagos Agreements of last 21 August, a coup prepared long ago with attacks against FAC positions in the center of the country.

Consequently, he said, Hissein Habre from now on represents a handicap to national reconciliation. And a cease-fire under these conditions would constitute "a lame solution that would lead to another confrontation tomorrow." As a counter-proposal, the president of the GUNT declared himself in favor of a new Lagos conference and the establishment of a neutral force.

In order for these plans to succeed this time around, the positions must be clarified and one must not go around trying to glue the pieces together so the situation can deteriorate further and allow the adversary to gather and consolidate his forces.

Finally and above all, it would be naive to believe that the Chadians are to be allowed to settle their problems amongst themselves. Already the press campaigns carried on about the "Libyan threat"--a threat that the foreign correspondents in Ndjamená call a "mirage"--show for what alternative it is desired to prepare international public opinion. For the threat of direct foreign intervention, which at any moment risks overturning the Chadian chess-board, very definitely exists. It is already present at Ndjamená, symbolized by the French military base (where 1,100 soldiers are officially stationed, but probably in fact many more) established near the airport, on the north flank of Goukouni Oueddei's FAP.

Of course the French Government loudly proclaims that it intends to remain neutral. The minister of cooperation repeated once again on 10 April before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly that "he does not envisage the hypothesis according to which France could be brought to intervene in the conflict." However, on the other hand, "Paris will seize every opportunity to encourage the restoration of the unity and integrity of Chad."

Irritation Increases

The experience and recent history of Chad right up to the most recent events have sufficiently demonstrated what is hidden by this type of promise and statement. Moreover, Mr Robert Galley himself does not appear at all sure of what he is saying, since he adds: all that is anticipated "of course, are the necessary means of defense." Defense of whom? Against whom? It is no longer possible to invoke the pretext of protecting the expatriates, since they have all left, except for those who expressed the wish to remain, at their own risk and peril.

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It would be a question, then, of "protecting" the French Expeditionary Corps, which the Lagos Agreements of 21 August, 8 months ago, called for immediate removal. Now a state of irritation reigns at the French military base, the commander in chief of which has let it be known according to REUTER's, that his men would use their weapons if they are attacked. "If French soldiers are killed in bombardments, France will immediately send substantial reinforcements," a high-ranking French officer even said. "We will not allow our men to be killed and do nothing about it."

When one realizes that fighting is going on all around the base, it is understood that a negligible incident, a simple provocation would be enough for the shooting to start. Besides, fresh troops continue to be sent to Chad, naturally without this piece of news being shouted from the housetops. That tells one what to think of France's "strict neutrality. The French are in fact holding themselves in readiness to move into action, should the situation become too critical for Mr Hissein Habre whose troops are incidentally being supplied in arms and ammunition by Egypt, via the Sudan.

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CHAD

FRENCH PARATROOPERS WITHDRAW

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 May 80 p 32

[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Real Reasons for the Withdrawal of the French"]

[Text] Giscard: "We Are Evacuating If You Fight Qadhdhafi." Goukouni: "Granted, But I Am Dismissing Habre." Agreement Concluded.

With the withdrawal of 1,100 French soldiers, paratroopers and engineering specialists, the Chadian drama lost on Monday, 28 April, one of its main actors. Energetic protagonist or reserved, nursing or bombing, but present for more than 10 years, the French troops are going away.

"Protection mission accomplished," states of the official communique. What protection? That of the French civilians? There are no longer any or hardly any in Ndjamenas since 21 March. That of the Chadian civilians? Bazooka shells continued ripping up the African neighborhoods. "Protection," then of the French interests in Chad? But one verified, mid-April in Paris, that a unit of 500 Libyans armed to the teeth was descending on Ndjamenas, and that it was going to "be certainly necessary to defend oneself if one was attacked." In fact, the French retreat is the result of 20 days of bargaining.

Paris, Thursday, 3 April, preparatory meeting for the Franco-African summit, which is to take place on 8 and 9 May in Nice. Very clearly the French declare their position: they want to withdraw from Chad. A military intervention would have repercussions on domestic politics, the OAU would turn up its nose, and then not one of the principal parties appealed to them officially.

Qadhdhafi's Bed

The "moderate" representatives of French-speaking Africa are surprised, then worried. France, which successively supported to the limit Tombalbaye, Malloum and Habre, is evidently preparing to turn around to Goukouni. But would not this old guerrilla be in the process of getting ready Qadhdhafi's

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bed in Ndjamena? "If you leave Chad while the crazy man of Tripoli is coming in here, we will consider this a desertion of post," cried out, that Thursday, 3 April, an African diplomat in the corridors of the International Conference Center on Avenue Kleber in Paris. The curt answer from Jean-Philippe Ricalens, cabinet director for the French Minister of Cooperation: "Everyone is encouraging us to stay in Chad. But no one is meeting his responsibilities. The result: it is France that is taking all the blows. This can not last any longer."

Fortunately, "by chance" Ricalens will inform us, the secretary general of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, is in Paris at the same time. He sees Giscard and then certain African delegates and explains to them that the departure of the French troops is perhaps the only chance for resolving the crisis.

Supervised Freedom

Kodjo's idea: to place Chad under the guardianship of the UN and the OAU. But the French in charge are not unanimous. Certain of them--especially at the Ministry of Defense and among the soldiers stationed at Ndjamena--are urging direct intervention along side Habre. "The only one," they say, "who is not corrupted by Qadhafi." Moreover, when it is learned at Ndjamena that Giscard's new adviser for African affairs, Martin Kirsch, is supposed to come to negotiate with Goukouni the withdrawal of French troops, one obligingly spreads the rumor that a Libyan unit is descending on Ndjamena. But it is only a matter of some commandos of Acyl Ahmat--pro-Libyan indeed--moreover. One hopes that this bogeyman will force Paris to recant its decision. But Martin Kirsch arrives hurriedly on Monday, 21 April, in Ndjamena. He strikes his fist on the mess table, "scolds" the officers and goes off to bargain with Goukouni. As far as one can determine: Kirsch to Goukouni in short: "We are withdrawing all aid to Habre and we are evacuating the base if you get involved in fighting Qadhafi." Answer: "Granted, but let me first dismiss Habre as Minister of Defense. This will be clearer for everyone." Agreement concluded: on Friday, 25 April, Habre and two of his deputies, Mahamat Saleh and Hadjero Senoussi, are stripped of their responsibilities. Two days later, on Sunday, the 27th, Paris announces the withdrawal of its troops. But the French paratroopers have not gone very far away. France, everyone knows, has a base in Bouar, in the northwest of the Central African Republic. From there she can keep Chad under supervised freedom.

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CHAD

BRIEFS

FRENCH BACKING FOR HABRE--Hissein Habre is the only statesman among the Chadian leaders. This is what French diplomats continue to assert at the very time when it is held, at the French foreign ministry and the French President's office, that France does not have any "favorites" in Chad. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 p 24] 2662

FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD LIBYANS--Only the Libyans are still expected. Chad's President Oueddei Goukouni has reportedly called on them for help in a message made public by Radio Tripoli. But what are the chances of seeing Libyan columns cross the 3,000 km [sic--read, 1,300 km] which separate the border from Ndjama? Slim. If, however, Col Mu'ammarr Qadhafi decided to launch into this adventure, the 1,100 French paratroopers in Chad could very easily relinquish their prudent neutrality to which the French President has confined them since the beginning of this deadly struggle and emerge from the camp near the airport where they are entrenched. Some 18 months ago [French] Jaguar planes dropped napalm and pulverized an entire Libyan column which had imprudently advanced into the desert south of Tibesti. [Text] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 5-11 Apr 80 p 93] 2662

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CONGO

BRIEFS

FRENCH GIFT FOR BRAZZAVILLE--France approved a grant of 3 billion CFA francs for the Congo to spruce up Brazzaville on the occasion of the capital's 100th anniversary. The latter will thus be able to welcome President Valery Giscard d'Estaing with dignity when he pays his official visit to that city in October 1980. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 p 24] 2662

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ETHIOPIA

ERITREAN WAR SITUATION DESCRIBED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 4 May 80 pp 75, 77, 79

[Text] As the war in Eritrea, which began in 1961 as a rebellion against Emperor Haile Selassie, nears its 20th anniversary, there are glimpses of a possible solution. All indications are that Moscow is now taking the first steps so that Africa's longest war can one day draw to a close.

Ethiopian policy, determined monolithically by the DERG [Armed Forces Coordinating Committee] and under the leadership of Colonel Mengistu, threw itself into Moscow's arms, thus breaking an almost 25-year tradition of pro-American leanings. Eritrean independence fighters, whose largest and most powerful armed wing, the EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front], calls itself Marxist-Leninist, were forced to battle an army outfitted with Soviet weapons and trained by Cubans. Even though the DERG also claims that its policy is Marxist-Leninist, as far as the EPLF is concerned, it is a continuation of the policy of the deposed emperor against whom the Eritreans took up arms two decades ago. After a military disaster in early 1980, the DERG spoke of the possibility of seeking a negotiated settlement.

"The DERG talks about negotiating, but always after a military defeat. It is trying to gain time to prepare its next offensive," says Mohamad Ramadan Nur, the secretary general of the EPLF. CAMBIO 16's Juan Gomez Puiggros spoke with Ramadan Nur in Khartoum and made a 3-week tour of the zone controlled by the EPLF.

The EPLF would agree to negotiate, according to its secretary general, only on the basis of its territory's self-determination. "Moreover, the USSR is making a serious mistake regarding the Eritrean question," he adds.

In fact, however, the USSR seems to have understood that it is unlikely that either of the two rivals can win the Eritrean War, and the notion that the two sides are doomed to negotiate has been gaining strength. The DERG, furthermore, is in a difficult position:

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Ethiopia is in total economic chaos, fueled by the war's financial drain. Successive military defeats have created serious political tensions. Although the Addis Ababa hardliners still control the machinery of power, the symptoms are becoming increasingly unmistakable that an opposition faction in favor of hastening an end to the war is consolidating within this machinery. Although no one is optimistic about such a hastening, Moscow has initiated very cordial contacts with the ELF [Eritrean Liberation Front], the group that headed up the first 10 years of the war. The ELF's Islamism presents Moscow with a favorable opportunity in the complicated chess game in the so-called "arc of the crisis."

Meanwhile, the war continues to wreak havoc. All of the efforts of the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA), the organization that centralizes international aid to the Eritrean refugees and war-wounded in Sudan, are insufficient. With funds from the International Red Cross, the ERA can meet only 25 percent of its real needs. Sudan has taken in 200,000 Eritrean refugees (in addition, there are almost 1 million exiles throughout the world), but the Sudanese Government itself and the UN, which have only 5 officials in Khartoum who are specifically in charge of aid work, also have to shelter another 200,000 refugees from Oman, Libya and Uganda. The Sudanese Government, which is neutral and a would-be negotiator in the conflict, allows Eritrean convoys performing humanitarian tasks to pass relatively freely though an eastern corridor in its territory.

Solomona, A School

The Solomona refugee camp lies almost 300 kilometers south of Port Sudan and only 12 kilometers from the border. Two-thirds of the road between Port Sudan and Solomona is a bare desert in which the route is marked only by the tracks of truck tires in the sand. All other indications are hidden by the very fine, almost dust-like sand that is wind-blown into ever-moving dunes. Because of the semifederal organization in this area of the Sudanese desert, Eritrean convoys have to ask each feudal lord in each town that they pass through for a permit reauthorizing their circulation permit issued by the central government. On the other side of the feudal border, the last stretch of the road to Solomona is through the interior, in territory occupied by the Hashaira tribe, which is regarded as a group of bandits and traffickers who smuggle goods between Saudi Arabia and Sudan. Their main source of income is illegal sales of tobacco, which is in short supply throughout the country. In one of the world's poorest areas a package of mild British cigarets costs \$3 dollars. Those expensive cigarets and the enormous flocks of camels, up to 150 in single file, are like ghosts watching over the mysterious solitude of the desert.

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The Solomona camp is located in a mountainous zone covered with dwarf trees and vegetation that seems reluctant to turn green. It usually rains from 5 to 10 minutes every evening on this moist summit of the desert. There are 12,000 refugees in the camp, which consists of tents spread over an area of several kilometers. On the day before the visit by this paper's correspondent, Askalu, the woman who runs the camp, suffered an attack of malaria, which is endemic in the area. The refugee population, she relates, is composed mainly of civilians, orphans of combatants and handicapped combatants. A revolutionary school gives classes to some 3,000 children between the ages of 7 and 14. One-fourth of the 100 teachers are women. On fields laid out by the students themselves, they engage in sports like anywhere else in the world. The revolutionary school also takes in Sudanese children from the area and tries to alleviate the enormous nutritional problems of its infant population. Medical aid and political instruction are the main tasks of this precarious school life. Yhemani, a 13-year old boy who is a member of Red Flowers, an organization of pioneers, is interested in Spain's political system. He mentions that his parents died in 1978, at the time of the major EPLF retreat. His brother was one of the soldiers wounded at the battle of Nafka, which was fought in January, and he is looking forward to his 14th birthday so that he can enter a training camp, although if the war continues, he will not be allowed into combat until age 18.

Clinics in Containers

There are two hospitals, one for civilians and one for combatants. Infant mortality, 200 per 1,000, is the major plague at Solomona. Malaria, malnutrition and tuberculosis also wreak havoc. The daily meal at the camp is a ration of lentils and rice with a piece of moist, sour bread made from sorghum flour. Meat is eaten twice a month.

Travel from Solomona to Eritrea, which means another descent into the desert, must take place at night to avoid the reconnaissance flights by Soviet Migs. At the last Sudanese post before the border a nomad about 50 years old came up to CAMBIO 16's special envoy, thinking that because he was white, he might also be a doctor. His wife, who was not even 20, had just aborted and was lying on a dirty straw mattress, burning with fever and being eaten alive by flies. The nomad did not understand of what use the profession of newsman could be; he thought it was useless to have someone relate what he saw. It was impossible to take his wife in the jeep that was trying to get to Eritrea in the dark. The EPLF men gave him a pass so that the sick woman could be taken by truck to the Central Hospital. Returning to the war front, this correspondent found out that the woman had recovered.

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The face of disease, contrasted with the efforts of all those who were trying to overcome it as if it were another enemy of war, again appeared at the EPLF Central Hospital in Awale, a rugged, mountainous zone sticking out of the desert. The hospital has just received a fabulous booty: \$200,000 in medical equipment and materials captured from the Ethiopian military hospital at Keren, where an EPLF unit had recently staged an attack. The Red Cross is the main supplier of this medical center, where all kinds of operations, except brain and heart surgery, can be performed. Mobile clinics, improvised from the containers that a Belgian solidarity committee used to send food and medicine, attempt to care for the sick throughout the occupied zone. The risk is great, because whenever the Ethiopians have discovered one of these clinics, they have executed all its personnel. The staff at these clinics is given speeded up instruction regarding war wounds and regional diseases.

Twenty year old Kaflom is one of those convalescing at Awale. Wounded by a bullet on the Algena front in January, he has a broken thigh-bone. He believes that in the long run Ethiopian soldiers will eventually realize that they are being forced to fight for an unjust cause, that Ethiopians and Eritreans are brothers and that the DERG is a foreign element and cause.

Shirefon is an Ethiopian soldier; he is also at the hospital. He is from Wollo, one of the most impoverished regions of Ethiopia. He did not expect to be treated so well at the hospital. He is given the same care as any Eritrean soldier. He says that they enlisted him into the army by telling him that the Arabs had invaded northern Ethiopia. Before the war he worked as a bricklayer in Addis Ababa. He says that he knows that if he returns to Ethiopia, he could be regarded as a deserter and executed. He has heard that this has happened. That is why he wants to leave for another country, his hope being that his family will receive some news, even if from afar, that despite his current hospitalization he is well. Shirefon, somewhat saturated with Marxist instruction, believes that Fidel Castro and Karl Marx are the same person. He recalls that there were Russians, but no Cubans in his combat unit. "I saw at least 10 of them; they were always behind the soldiers, next to the commanders."

Harity is a 19-year old girl who was wounded at the battle of Nafka when the EPLF tried to attack the Ethiopian general headquarters. After the battle, her companions had to carry her on their shoulders for 7 kilometers. There are 575 patients at the hospital, and there is supposedly enough room and medical facilities for 300 more. There are always enough lentils for the wounded, who are also served tea three times a day. The little milk that arrives in sporadic shipments is given to those suffering from anemia.

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Another nighttime trip along the rugged slopes that run parallel to the coastal strip controlled by the Ethiopians takes us to the Central Rear Guard Base. The base tents are spread out around a 5-kilometer axis and are perfectly camouflaged. The serious problem entailed in keeping 4,000 prisoners there is alleviated through a policy of gradually releasing them once they have undergone a period of political instruction. Since 1974, more than 3,000 people have been given their forced release. The 200 Ethiopian deserters housed at the camp graphically illustrate the wounds of this endless war.

Abderraman Aafoghi, a 38-year old man from the southern region of Kaffa, relates that the DERG took away his small coffee plantation and turned it into a cooperative. Another deserter beside him comments that the DERG gave him lands, but as soon as he became a landowner, he was sent to the front. A police lieutenant recalls that he fought in Ogaden with Cubans and South Yemenis and that he served as an interpreter for the Russians during the Eritrean War after the DERG had sent him to Bulgaria and Hungary to study.

The officers who have deserted often discuss the possibility of a movement within the army. A captain points out that one out of every six men in the Ethiopian Army is a police informer. The brutal Prussian attitude of the officers, moreover, whether they are loyal to the current Addis Ababa establishment or not, completely rules out any attempt at independent thought.

One deserter, who did not reveal his name because he still hopes to return to his home in the Tigray region, tells how despite his 52 years (there is no age limit on draftees into the Ethiopian Army), they came looking for him one night to force him to enlist in the "Glorious Peasant Militia" that was going to fight the Arab invaders from the north. He resisted, saying that he was too old to fight in a war and that his wife and children could not survive without his help. The recruiting soldiers took him away as a prisoner. He was in jail for 3 months. Later, he received a month and a half of military instruction on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. The instructors were Cuban. Then Eritrea; then, desertion; then and now, fear.

The Northern Front

The so-called northern front is located in the Algena area, along a mountainous, 40-kilometer long strip. Over the last 3 years of the war, the Ethiopians, situated 10 kilometers from the Eritrean trenches and with an enormous plain at their backs, have lost more than 10,000 men. The front is an impregnable stronghold.

"The enormous plain could become a gigantic tomb for the Ethiopians if they try to attack us again," says Salef Suliman, a military chief.

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"To us the plain is dangerous terrain, and we do not intend to occupy it." But the EPLF's military strategy is not limited to repelling disorderly attacks by an enemy who is unfamiliar with the terrain. It also makes guerrilla raids. In both cases it uses as little ammunition as possible, because it is in short supply. "We have excellent artillerymen," Salef Suliman says, "the kind that hit their target every time they fire."

Leregherghis Gherensie, a 19-year old girl, lives the normal life of a soldier at war, just like the other combatants, who are imbued with the idea of political camaraderie without discrimination because of sex. She does not think that the conflict can be resolved politically.

Mendragtu is the only married man in Gherensie's unit. His wife is a doctor at a mobile clinic. He knows that he will not be able to see her until he gets an official pass. They have crossed each other's paths occasionally at her clinic, merely saluting each other like disciplined soldiers.

This correspondent was able to attend a triple wedding at the front base, celebrated amid a tomb-like silence before a representative of the EPLF Central Committee, who asked whether the bride and groom were contracting matrimony of their own free will. After they said yes, all kinds of weapons were fired into the air in a frenzied squandering of ammunition. Then came feverish dancing to music played over a powerful loudspeaker. The brief truce was kept wet by sua, a sour local beer made with sorghum and water.

The Holy City of the EPLF

Before the war broke out, Nafka was a city of almost 20,000 inhabitants. Bombings by the Ethiopian Air Force caused people to flee towards the mountains or to seek out refugee camps. Last December and January, Nafka was the scene of one of the fiercest battles of the war. The Ethiopians deployed 25,000 men, 63 tanks, four batteries of B-21 rockets and 6 batteries of 120-millimeter guns. They made intensive use of their air force; some planes chalked up as many as 50 runs a day. Opposing them were just 7,000 Eritreans, 3 tanks, ten 120-millimeter guns and light mortars.

The Ethiopians initiated the attack, for which certain success was predicted. On the second day of combat the Eritreans counterattacked. After 4 weeks they had killed 4,000 of their attackers and captured an unbelievable booty of 102 Soviet trucks, 11 tanks and a great many guns. Eritrean losses "were not extensive." The EPLF never gives precise figures, this being part of its morale-related strategy. The most innocuous weapon of all in this strategy is

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tombau, a tobacco that when chewed provides extra energy and eliminates drowsiness. With nothing other than tombau, 600 men were able to endure a 2-day march during the battle of Nafka, which ended with the would-be executioners fleeing towards Afabet.

The status of vanquished executioners is causing perceptible demoralization among Ethiopian troops. Despite the gradual strengthening of the Eritreans' independence mystique, their chances of a definitive victory are practically nonexistent. All of this means that Moscow's already carefully assessed notion that negotiation is the only solution will have to be imposed sooner or later.

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ETHIOPIA

BRIEFS

NORWEGIAN AID--The Norwegian organization Redd Barna ("Save the Children") on 21 April granted emergency aid in the amount of 500,000 crowns (\$100,000) to Ethiopia for the fight against the consequences of the drought. A representative from the organization is shortly to go there to supervise the distribution of this aid. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1052] 5058

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GABON

BRIEFS

MINERAL PRODUCTION STATISTICS--The Gabonese Ministry of Mining has just submitted an activity report for national mining operations in 1979. Last year was marked by a definite reduction in manganese mineral sales which had been declining seriously for the past 2 years. Uranium output continued to grow in keeping with forecasts. On the other hand, petroleum production revealed another drop (7 percent) compared to the preceding year but the worthwhile results achieved through exploration over the past 2 years should make it possible to stop this decline rather quickly, according to the Ministry of Mining. Exports of manganese mineral reached a record figure of 2,304,656 tons for an output of 2,300,094 tons. COMILOG (Ogooue Mining Company) took a preponderant part on the natural dioxide market with an output of 98,167 tons (60 percent). The increase in sales in this mineral category is 7.5 percent compared to 1978. But while the exported metallurgical mineral tonnages are going up, the price did not follow the same trend and remained on a level very much lower than prior to the crisis. As anticipated in its exploitation development program, COMUF (Franceville Uranium Mining Company) in 1979 produced 1,100 tons of uranium metal contained in 1,488 tons of concentrate. Work has begun on the construction of new mineral treatment installations which should make it possible to reach a figure of 1,500 tons of uranium metal in 1982. The work should be finished by December 1981. Exports of uranium concentrate came to 1,438 tons, containing 1,060 tons of uranium metal. The uranium metal tonnage sold by COMUF throughout the year came to 1,251.8 tons. The crude petroleum output came to 9,798,570 tons. The two refineries, SOGARA (Gabonese Refining Company) and COGEM processed 1,241,000 tons of crude, in other words, 28 percent less than in 1978. Exports came to 8,461,270 tons or 4 percent less than in 1978. The International Diamond Exchange in Libreville, throughout the year, exported 25,193.5 carats of diamonds, according to the Ministry of Mining report. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1046] 5058

ESTIMATED OIL SEARCH COST--A project in drilling for oil off the coast of Gabon which has just been announced by an international consortium operated by Burmah Oil (MTM 18 April 1980, page 933), could cost 15 million pounds during the first two years, it is estimated in London oil circles quoted by AFP. Burmah had already secured participation in Gabonese oil production at the time of the signing of an agreement with the Libreville government in 1978. Since then the company has performed several soundings off the coast of Gabon. While the drillings undertaken last year by British Petroleum in the same region did not meet with much success, optimism nevertheless remains high with Burmah concerning the possibility of discovering oil. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 p 988] 9498

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GHANA

OIL OUTPUT DOWN, CONSUMPTION DECREASE REGISTERED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1042

[Text] The director of the department of geological studies of Ghana, Mr G. O. Kesse, revealed in April that the local petroleum output had dropped from 3,000 down to 2,000 barrels per day with only one company-- Agri-Petco International Inc., of the United States--working the deposits at Saltpond. The company furthermore is facing technical difficulties. Mr Kesse noted that the drilling work on the four new wells, which were to be added to the six now being worked, has not yet been started. He also added that the petroleum taken out at Saltpond, according to the agreement with the United States, was to be shipped to that country in order to be refined there. He likewise expressed the hope that this agreement would be revised to Ghana's advantage.

Roughly at the same time, Professor George Benneh, minister of land, natural resources, fuel, and energy, announced a decline in foreign purchases of crude from 1.1 million tons per year down to 1 million tons only. This measure had been predictable and the minister, on several occasions, after the chief of state himself, had expressed his worry about the increase in Ghana's petroleum bill (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Dec 79, p 3466; 4 Jan and 18 Jan 80, pp 27 and 144).

Mr Benneh welcomed the 20-percent drop in fuel consumption following the restriction measures that were instituted and asked the population to continue to display its sense of civic responsibility. He praised the contribution made by the distributing companies, especially Mobil, Shell, Ghana Oil, and Texaco; he announced that a bill would soon be introduced into parliament, creating an energy commission for the purpose of drafting a long-term savings policy. He had already recommended that the government adopt the proposal submitted by the ministry of transport and communications aimed at the standardization of vehicles and he asked that the use of bicycles, scooters, and motorcycles in place of vehicles.

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GHANA

BRIEFS

IDA AGRICULTURAL CREDIT--The IDA (International Development Association), a branch of the World Bank, on 24 April approved a \$29.5 million loan for the Farmers' Services Company of Ghana, a government company which helps the country's agriculture operators. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1042] 5058

RENEWED USSR COOPERATION VIEWED--The director of the Soviet cultural center in Ghana, Mr Anatoli S. Kuzmenko, in opening a regional bureau of the Ghanaian-Soviet Friendship Society for the Haute Region at Navrongo in April, announced that his country was once again seriously contemplating the resumption of the 13 projects which had been started in the country and which it had abandoned after the military coup d'etat in 1966 which ousted Dr Nkrumah. The society's president, Dr A. B. Adda, welcomed the intentions of the USSR and in turn announced that he would soon lead a delegation to Moscow in order to conclude a 2-year bilateral cooperation agreement there. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1042] 5058

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

KONKOURS DAM FINANCING REVIEWED--The project for the Konkoure dams, which in April 1979 was designated as "top priority" among the big projects in Guinea, by President Ahmed Sekou Toure, was the subject of a meeting on 29 and 30 April in Paris. This meeting was attended especially by Mr N'Famara Keita, Guinean minister of energy and of Konkoure, and Mr Nfaly Sangare, minister-delegate to the EEC, secretary of state in charge of international cooperation, Mr Marcel Cros, and the ambassadors of Guinea and France, West Germany, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. The meeting made it possible to finalize the financing for the project. The project for the dam on the Konkoure is already quite old. The record had been closed on the French side following the country's independence in 1958. Guinea then in vain tried to get the USSR and Italy to resume working on the project. Finally, starting in March 1979, EDF (French Electric Power Corporation) was given a contract to study the project. This contract had a price tag of F25 million on it and its financing was assured partly through a gift from the French government while the rest was supplied equally by guaranteed commercial loans and a loan from the Central Economic Cooperation Fund. The electric power furnished by the two dams (650 Megawatts) should make it possible to complete the project for the exploitation of bauxite (Ayekoye) by an Arab-Guinean company with a production target of 150,000 tons of aluminum. Libya and Saudi Arabia are supposed to contribute, respectively, \$58 million and \$100 million as the first installments toward the completion of the Konkoure project (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 June 1979). For the Ayekoye project, these two countries as well as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Iraq will be associated with Guinea in exploiting a bauxite deposit of 500 million tons in the Northwest. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1038] 5058

DELEGATION IN CHINA--A trade delegation of the Guinean Government, led by the Minister of Commerce, Mr Diao Balde, arrived in Beijing to negotiate with the Chinese minister of foreign trade the signing of the annual Sino-Guinean trade protocol for 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 p 925] 9516

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PROSPECTS FOR FLEET DEVELOPMENT--Norwegian shipowner Torvald Klaveness of Oslo and the Navis Corporation, a company registered in the Bahamas and which operates on behalf of the American company US Steel are getting together to create a Liberian-registered company, the West African Bulk Shipping, whose purpose will be to participate actively in maritime traffic with the west coast of Africa. Their goal would be to secure the transporting of 5 million tons of bauxite per year departing from the Guinean port of Kamsar for destinations in Europe, North America, and the Caribbean. West African Bulk Shipping is presently negotiating on acquisition of a 50 percent capital share in the Guinemar company which was set up last year between the Guinean Government and Klaveness. West African Bulk Shipping was thus simultaneously operating for Guinemar and on its own account in the search for cargo for its return voyages. One of the objectives of the new partnership between Guinemar and the new Liberian company would be to give Guinea a maritime fleet, which it presently lacks. Guinea could lay claim to aid anticipated for developing countries, whereas Navis and Klaveness would bring their experience. A ship is presently under construction in the Danish shipyard Burmeister et Wain. Orders for five to ten ships could ultimately follow. The tonnage envisioned for these ships would not exceed 60,000. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 p 925] 9516

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

FADEA LOAN--The FADEA (Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development) granted a loan of 12 million dirhams (\$3.2 million, approximately) to the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. This loan is intended to finance the opening of a road and an industrial project and will be spread over 3 years. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1037] 5058

BRAZILIAN LIVESTOCK COOPERATION STUDIED--Great possibilities for cooperation exist between Guinea-Bissau and Brazil regarding the development of animal husbandry involving hogs and poultry raising, according to a delegation from the Brazilian Agriculture Ministry visiting Bissau in order to evaluate cooperation between the two countries. The Brazilian delegation was made up of two veterinarians, Mr Humberto Mancebo de Araujo and Mr Hamilton Ricardo Farias. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1037] 5058

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IVORY COAST

FOREIGN DEBT FIGURES GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 pp 925-926

[Text] The CAA (Autonomous Sinking Fund) of the Ivory Coast recently published its management report on the Ivorian public debt for the year 1978.

Looking at indebtedness, the year 1978 marked a pause: the signatures on foreign loans were reduced from 442,8 billion CFA [African Financial Community] in 1977 to 182.8 billions, in other words, a drop of 58.70 percent.

In 1978, the debt servicing volume (debt managed by CAA and debt not managed but guaranteed by the government) represented 14.70 percent of the value of exports, as against 11.12 percent in 1977.

Following government decisions, the CAA became the only negotiating partner for money lenders and the exclusive representative of the Ivorian government and public companies in the matter of loans.

Here is the development of the foreign public debt of Ivory Coast since the end of 1975 (in millions of CFA):

	End 1975	End 1976	End 1977	End 1978
Debt outstanding	215,019	281,866	435,047	601,813
Liabilities	111,820	236,662	492,228	366,800
Total	326,839	518,528	927,275	968,613

Overall, the public foreign debt went up 4.5 percent in 1978, against an increase of 78.8 percent in 1977. At the end of 1978, the debt managed by the CAA came to 600.5 billion CFA (including 355.2 billions in liabilities and 245.3 billions in commitments) as against 563.5 billions at the end of 1977.

During the year, the drawings totalled 236.3 billion CFA (202.3 billions in 1977) and the servicing of interest and annual installments required

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93.7 billions (71.4 billions in 1977).

Concerning the debt managed by the CAA, the liabilities and commitments given in dollars came to 50.97 percent (60 percent in 1977), those expressed in French francs came to 22.27 percent (19.5 percent in 1977), and those contracted in Swiss francs accounted for 13.46 percent (7.9 percent in 1977); the other foreign exchange currencies were involved in small percentages, such as Deutschemarks (4.65 percent); Canadian dollars (1.41 percent); lire (1.31 percent); yens (1.10 [illegible in photostat] percent); florins (1.01 percent); special drawing rights (0.98 percent); Belgian francs (0.52 percent); Danish, Swedish and Norwegian crowns, Kuwaiti dinars and accounting units of the EEC and the African Development Bank.

Looking at the debt not managed by the CAA (debt outstanding and foreign loan commitments obtained by public companies and mixed-management companies as well as private outfits, backed up by the government, the dollar accounted for 38.50 percent (44.1 percent in 1977), the French franc accounted for 17.48 percent (13.9 percent in 1977), the Belgian franc, 9.34 percent (9.3 percent in 1977), followed by Deutschemark with 7.53 percent, the florin with 5.84 percent, the Norwegian crown with 4.04 percent, and then the Swiss franc (2.14 percent), the lira (1.68 percent), the Pound Sterling (1.40 percent), the Austrian schilling and the EEC accounting unit.

The total volume of obligatory loans of the CAA, placed on the French and Ivorian financial markets, comes to 8.1 billion CFA; the loans of the Central Economic Cooperation Fund total 5.6 billion; loans obtained from KfW [Reconstruction Credit Institution, Loan Bank] account for 9.3 billions; loans granted by the World Bank come to 32.2 billions, and loans taken out with private French and international financing outfits add up to 119.5 billion CFA.

The Fund furthermore took over the consolidated loans for an equivalent of 115.7 billion CFA (loans from EEC, from Eximbank, in Eurodollars and from various private financing organizations), while government loans accounted for 24.9 billions in the CAA; the payment of delayed-payment agreements going to public works and civil engineering companies amounted to 4.8 billions.

During 1978, the Ivorian government provided backing for 55.9 billion CFA in loans taken out abroad by public companies and mixed-management companies, private outfits and multinational organizations (including 15.2 billions in favor of Ciments de l'Afrique de l'Ouest).

The foreign debt backed up by the government totalled 368.1 billion CFA as of 31 December 1978 (debt outstanding and commitments). The principal

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beneficiaries were the Society for the Development of Sugar Cane Plantations, Industrial Processing and Sugar Sales (132 billions), the Housing Management and Financing Company (47.1 billions), Ciments de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (32.9 billions), the Monopoly of the Abidjan-Niger Railroad (21.3 billions), the Ivorian Industrial Development Bank (16.9 billions), the Society for the Development of Oil Palms (15.3 billions), Air-Afrique (12.1 billions), the Ivory Coast Electric Power Corporation (11 billions), the Council of the Entente (8.5 billions), the Ivorian Industrialized Construction Development Company (6.9 billions), the National Agricultural Development Bank (6.1 billions), the National Water Power Fund (6.1 billions), the Post and Telecommunications Office (4.2 billions), the Ivorian Real Estate Construction and Management Company (3.9 billions), International Telecommunications of Ivory Coast (3.6 billions), the Coffee Industrial Union (3.5 billions), the Ivory Coast Credit Company (3.3 billions), the Multinational Company of Bitumens (3.2 billions), the Agricultural Products Processing Plant (3.1 billions), the Government Company for the Production of Fruits and Vegetables (2.6 billions), the Abidjan Transportation Company (2.5 billions), the Ivorian Cotton Company (2.5 billions), the Ivorian Transportation Company (2.5 billions), the Real Estate Promotion Company (2.4 billions), the National Petroleum Operations Company in Ivory Coast (2.3 billions), and, in smaller amounts, the National Savings and Loan Bank, the Ivorian Maritime Transport Company, the National Civil Engineering Company, the Finance Company of Ivory Coast, miscellaneous coffee hulling and processing companies, the African Hevea Plantation Society, the Hotel and Tourist Society of the Bay of Banco, the Ivorian Grated Coconut Company, the Ivorian Fishing and Outfitting Company, the Real Estate Company of the Lagoon, the Ivorian Refining Company, the Ivorian Fertilizer Company, the Society for the Industrial Development of Construction, the Society of Hotels of the African Riviera, and the Textile Industry Union of Ivory Coast.

Ivorian indebtedness heavily contributed to the development of the country. Most of the money was used for financing infrastructure facilities, such as the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro, dams and hydroelectric power plants at Kossou, Taabo, and Buyo, highway programs, expansion and modernization of telecommunications, repairs on the Abidjan-Niger railroad, housing, urban development, sanitation, and agricultural development, including coffee, cocoa, cotton, rice, rubber plants and palm plantations, with industrial processing of by-products. Besides, the commitment of Ivory Coast to the financing of the cement plants at Tabligbo, belonging to the West African Cement Company, a multinational outfit, was particularly significant.

The CAA has been getting the benefit of tax revenues allocated to it, such as 49.7 billion CFA for the fiscal year we are looking at now, plus contributions from the Agricultural Product Stabilization and Price Supports Fund, to cover operations carried out by that agency to the tune of 9.6 billion CFA during the fiscal year.

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Independently of its role in managing the public debt, the Fund is getting deposits of public funds, especially the funds available to the Stabilization Fund and the surpluses from the treasuries of the Mixed Management Companies. As of 30 September 1978, all of these deposits came to 94.2 billion CFA, an increase of 14 percent compared to the end of September 1977.

Out of these funds, the CAA, operating as a development bank, introduced loans exceeding 51 billion CFA (as against 28 billions during the preceding fiscal year) into the economic circuit through the public enterprises; this aid mainly benefitted the SODEPALM [Company for the Development and Exploitation of Oil Palm] and the Abidjan Transport Company.

Moreover, the National Sanitation Fund and the National Water Power Fund, managed by the CAA, during the fiscal year made investments amounting to 3.2 billion and 16.5 billion CFA, respectively.

The president of the CAA is Mr Abdoulaye Kone, minister of economy, finances, and planning, with Mr Leon Naka taking the job of general manager.

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LIBERIA

ISOLATION ON AFRICAN SCENE, INTERNAL HARDENING NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 May 80 p 26

[Article: "Liberia: The Big Whitewash"]

[Text] Isolation on the African scene; hardening within. This is the picture presented by the Liberia of the sergeants 1 month after the military putsch.

This isolation (temporary) was made clear on 27 April when the Liberian Minister for Foreign Affairs was refused entry at the Lagos airport. Gabriel Bacchus Matthews was supposed to participate in the Nigerian capital in the OAU economic summit. He was refused entry because officially, due to his rank, he could not preside over a meeting of heads of state, since Liberia is the functioning president of the OAU. Indeed, the death of Ex-President William Tolbert on 12 April and the hasty execution 10 days later of 13 ministers of the fallen government had offended. And no African state, except for Libya, had then recognized the government of Quartermaster-Sergeant Samuel Doe.

Domestically, the PRC (Military Council for People's Redemption of 15 members) is increasingly taking the lead in the government. The executions on 22 April sanctified a defeat of the civilians who, in opposition to the soldiers, had preached moderation. Since 25 April the PRC has been the country's legislative and executive body. First measures: annulment of the constitution, declaration of martial law, threats against the foreign press.

Finally, a people's court, depending on the PRC alone and appointed by it, is replacing the military court. And, from 26 April a list of 138 persons (including the executed criminals of 22 April) was made public. All are accused of "high treason, unbridled corruption and abuse of power." Among them are directors of companies, including Americans and Englishmen and Madame Neh Dukuly-Tolbert, Liberian Ambassador to Paris.

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LIBERIA

NATION'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 pp 1019, 1020

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "After the coup d'Etat of Monrovia"]

[Text] One might ask oneself why the neighboring governments of Liberia, ready to express their solidarity for Mr William Tolbert in 1979, quite apart from any ideological consideration, allowed themselves to be taken by surprise in 1980 by the coup d'etat, in spite of the growing agitation maintained in the country for several months. The same question might be addressed to the United States who, in the tradition of political, religious, and monetary sponsorship exerted over tropical Africa's oldest republic, had increased contacts with it for a year, including exchange of official visits, creation, on the initiative of President Carter, of a special commission charged with the development of American-Liberian relations, and even certain moves designed to get Monrovia interested--as a supplement to the Camp David policy--in a diplomatic rapprochement by the liberal countries of Africa toward Israel.

The answer probably is that it is easier for friends to help heal a disease rather than prevent it. One might undoubtedly say that Liberia, delayed in terms of its development by a historical evolution different from that of the other states in the region, found itself faced, by virtue of that fact, with a certain delay as compared to those other countries, with the need for tackling the problem of decolonization (to the extent that the descendants of the Negro-American pioneers of the 19th century can be likened to the white settlers). But this kind of interpretation is better suited for explaining events rather than detecting their premises. The responsible officials in the Liberian government in any case were bound to have only an imperfect perception of that. In spite of certain shadowy areas, the economic situation was far from catastrophic. The new political formations--to whose actions one must attribute the recent social conflicts--were not at all mysterious. They even seemed open toward negotiation and Mr Tolbert had on several occasions tried to get negotiations started with them. It was entirely unforeseeable that the coup should come after all and that these formations did not tactically contribute to the overthrow of the authorities except by playing a diversionary role of which they were not necessarily aware.

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Origin and Development of Social Agitation

The uprisings of April 1979, which ended with 80 dead, several hundred wounded, and considerable damage, had in fact been caused by the untimely decision made by agriculture minister Mrs Florence Chenoweth to raise the price of a bag of rice from 22 to 30 dollars; this cereal constitutes the basic food item for the workers in the ports, in industry, and in the mines. The scarcity of the product had done less to inspire this initiative than the more or less artificial idea of holding down the flight of the people from the countryside and slowing down the urban concentrations by dissuading the job applicants from leaving their family plantations.

Liberia does not yet have self-sufficiency in food but it would be wrong to believe that the government was indifferent to the problem. On the contrary, between 1973 and 1978 it had made very effective efforts for agriculture in general and for rice cultivation in particular because, during that period of time, rice harvests grew 15 percent. Of course, that was at the expense of cassava but this partial substitution of one product for another was precisely in keeping with the conversion of a portion of the active population to wage workers.

Although the measure was rapidly cancelled and although the price for a bag of rice was reduced below the level in March, it did produce a very unfavorable echo among the workers in the iron mines who were already hard-hit by inflation (17 percent in 1979) and personnel layoffs following the world steel crisis and the deficit registered by the three major mineral extraction companies, that is, Lamco (Liberian-American-Swedish Minerals Company), operated by the Swedish Grangesberg group; the Bong Mining Company, with German and Italian participation; and the National Iron Ore Company, based on American capital. The strikes that broke out in August in the basin of the Nimba Mountains and the violence accompanying them were a direct consequence of that. These were strikes which served as a trial run for the leaders of the PAL (Progressive Alliance of Liberia), the initial cell of the PPP (Progressive People's Party), and, very sketchily, the Moja (Movement for Justice in Africa).

The paradox is that none of these organizations really sprang from the autochthonous and "colonized" majority of the population but rather consisted of American-Liberian students and management personnel. It has not yet been established that their leaders--most of whom by the way were in prison on 12 April--took an effective part in the preparation of the coup d'etat, even though four PPP ministers and two ministers from Moja turned up on the government list drawn up on 14 April by Sergeant-Major Samuel K. Doe who is a real native.

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The Action of the New Parties

The PAL, founded in New York in 1975 by Mr Bacchus Matthews, a former foreign office employee, with a small group of students or technicians taking training courses, had progressively returned its members to Liberia starting in 1976. It was at that time tolerated and President Tolbert did not rule out the idea of admitting it--side by side with the very governmental True Whig Party--to the list of approved formations, provided it could justify its figure of 300 members. But the administration believed that it could provide an alibi for its own mistakes by designating it as an organization of mutineers in April 1979 which had the immediate effect of increasing its following.

Right after the uprising, posters showing portraits [passage apparently missing in photostat]--numerous operations of equipment supply are currently the subject of guarantee requests from COFACE [French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade].

But above all new prospects were opened up for French initiatives by virtue of the 1979 agreement. The local references of Dragages, which had built two big bridges over the Mesurado and Saint-Paul rivers, in particular enabled the company, for a figure of F30 million, to get a contract for the expansion and restoration of the port of Greenville. The same company submitted offers for the three big modernization and expansion programs for the port of Monrovia, with F160 million, in which financing from the Central Fund could participate, both in terms of capital and for the opening of export loans. The Central Fund could also intervene, in conjunction with the European Investment Bank, the Liberian government, and Kuwait, in building a palm oil refinery for an amount of 12 million dollars, to be erected on the Buto plantation. It is studying the possibility of helping in the development of coconut plantations in the littoral zone, based on a study by SODEPALM [Company for the Development and Exploitation of Oil Palms]. A basic agreement was worked out for the construction of a small rolling mill (F60 million) and the supply of pre-fabricated boats (30 million). The completion of two water treatment units by a French company, with a price tag of F50 million, has also been mentioned.

In addition to their intrinsic significance, these projects would seem to assure France's position in a country which often served as a bridgehead for international competition in Africa and where, moreover, problems of reimbursement and payment have never come up until now.

If the authorities in power today should embark upon a profound transformation of the financial mechanisms involved in production, then the completion of these projects obviously could only be delayed. Beyond that, this could result in serious uncertainties--even though they may be temporary--in the supply of Western Europe with iron mineral and the

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supply of the United States with rubber. The consequences of a nationalization of the crypto-Liberian shipping industry are even more difficult to fathom. But above all it is rather difficult to figure out what the economic survival of a country could be if its investors, its suppliers, its customers, and its currency are abruptly challenged.

Sergeant Samuel Doe in this respect was quick--between two blasts--to come up with the usual statements of appeasement, noting that the Council of Redemption was quickly to pass into the hands of the "civilians." What we know about the sociological origin of the liberals, whom he brought to power, as well as their declared objectives, would make them look rather like what, in Anglo-Saxon countries, is called radicals, rather than Marxists-Leninists. One might think that it would seem more important to them to let the Liberian population, which so far has been largely excluded, share in the profits of the big agricultural and industrial establishments, rather than stopping their operations and thus adding to the misery of wage workers in a situation of underdevelopment in the traditional sector.

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LIBERIA

NEW REGIME MUST END U.S. ECONOMIC DOMINATION

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr-11 May 80 pp 26, 27

[Article by Fode Amadou: "The Test"]

[Text] In sweeping away the repressive old regime, the present rulers open up new outlooks for the country. Will they go so far as to attack the real masters--the United States--for the time being still there?

Life has once again become normal in Monrovia and in all the cities of Liberia 2 weeks after the coup that overthrew President Willian Tolbert's regime. The airports and seaports of the country have been reopened, and the little street stands and a number of shops selling general merchandise were taken over by the population by assault. The population applauded the decision by the new Council of Ministers to freeze the prices of merchandise sold in the country, both imported and of local manufacture, to double the minimum wage in the civil service and to raise soldiers' monthly pay from \$100 to \$250.

The release of several hundred individuals imprisoned for minor offenses and of 86 militants from opposition parties, as well as the arrest of hundreds of government officials, dignitaries and politicians accused of corruption, embezzlement and conversion of public property to their own use under the Tubman and Tolbert regimes, were interpreted as the first evident manifestation of the current regime's concern, in the words of the new head of state, to "put to use every means aimed at reducing the cost of living, especially in the domains of food, health, education, transportation and housing."

While the investigations were going on the new governmental and military authorities maintained a state of alert in order to be prepared for any new attempt at rebellion within certain military units. But neither the attempted insurrection that broke out among certain groups of soliders of the Presidential Guard in Bong County northeast of the capital--rapidly extinguished--nor the death by ambush of the chief of artillery of the new regime, Maj Isaac Jurwah, shook the sessions of the National Council of People's Redemption made up of the principal organizers of the coup. This latter group constitutes in effect a military junta of six sergeants, nine corporals and one private first class, presided over by a sergeant-major: Samuel K. Doe, who proclaimed himself chief of state and president of the Council of People's Redemption.

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Opposition, several of whom had been arrested and imprisoned awaiting trial, after having been accused of responsibility for the popular revolts of 14 April 1979 and 7 March of this year. Among them is Gabriel Bacchus Matthews, president of the Progressive Party of the People (PPP), who was given the post of foreign minister, and Togba Nah Tipoteh, president of the Movement of Justice for Africa (MOJA), one of the most brilliant economists of the country, who has become the new minister of the plan and economic affairs.

The Afro-American "Families"

It is perhaps premature to make serious predictions on the real political and economic options that the new Liberian regime will pursue. There are serious differences within the government, both political and socioeconomic in nature. They divide the two principal parties that participate in the government. Though some consider the MOJA more "radical" than the PPP by reason of its members and supporters among the workers, peasants and students, and the fact that its positions have a leftist ideological basis, the PPP leaders reject this distinction by specifying that their party follows an "African Socialist" policy and that MOJA's refusal to join in the mass action of 7 March of this year was a serious political "error," even though it without any doubt precipitated the coup.

That is why the diplomatic observers of progressive and Socialist persuasion at Monrovia prefer to follow with justified prudence the evolution of the new regime's policy before speaking out. All the time recognizing that whatever the orientations of the junta may be, the overthrow of the unpopular, repressive and neo-colonial Tolbert regime is an important step achieved along the path of liberation and emancipation of the Liberian people, who for 111 years have been subject to the yoke of some dozen Afro-American families. With that said, some points deserve to be emphasized:

1. Two days after the coup the new junta turned to the American military advisers to help maintain public order and to set up an "security force capable of dealing with uprisings or public demonstrations difficult to control." Thus it was that Colonel Robert Gosny, the American military adviser and the new Liberian Defense Minister Samuel Pearson perfected a precise plan for internal security measures.
2. The new regime did not terminate the duties of the American Military Mission, which had been attached to its own Defense Ministry for a long time. This Mission, made up of six high-ranking officers, has its office in the Defense building and performs the duty of supplying "all assistance and advice" to the Liberian Government.
3. Most of the Liberian officers were trained in the United States. Sergeant-Major Doe and most of the other members of the National Council of Redemption were trained by U.S. Army Special Forces instructors invited over by former President Tolbert.

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These facts do not fail to furnish substance to the rumor that the unit of U.S. Army Special Forces might have "encouraged" the overthrow of the Tolbert regime to make way for a more "liberal" governing team, to prevent a popular revolt that could end by seizure of power by genuine revolutionaries. By reaffirming their desire "to continue to maintain their treaties and their historic relations with the Liberian Government and people," the United States was in fact responding to the address by new Chief of State Samuel K. Doe, who declared on last 14 April that he was making "an appeal to friendly foreign investors to pursue and develop their ties with Liberia, which intends to respect private property..."

However that may be, the statements of the chief of the military junta (age 28) hardly contain any surprises. Needing as he does to consolidate the bases of his own authority, he surely seeks to avoid any statement of position which could arouse and mobilize the might of the United States against him. He is aware that the United States has substantial economic interests in Liberia. Since 1947 the Firestone Company has been running the largest individually owned rubber plantation, and Bethlehem Steel owns 25 percent of the stock and operates the largest African iron ore exporters, eleventh largest in the world. A state within a State, Firestone has been unremittingly one of the strongest bastions of American economic power in West Africa for the past 35 years.

To allow this American economic domination to consolidate itself and develop, to fail to take the measures called for to assure Liberia's authentic control of its natural resources, is that not a perpetuation of the neo-colonial status, poverty, exploitation, suffering and hunger of an entire people? This is the crucial test which the new regime must deal with and resolve if it is to win national confidence and popularity.

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MADAGASCAR

MAHAJANGA FARITANY ECONOMY DESCRIBED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1053

[Text] The recent regular meeting of the People's Council of the Mahajanga faritany [higher level of new administrative pyramid] provided an opportunity for Executive Committee chairman Rajaofera to supply details on the economic activities of the faritany, in particular, on the operation of the port of Mahajanga (formerly Majunga). Documenting his report with figures, he emphasized the solutions adopted in order to make port activities profitable.

Concerning loans from the BTM [National Bank for Rural Development], Rajaofera emphasized that peasants were somewhat reticent about paying back loans. He noted that the situation has forced the BTM to suspend loans to some fokontany [village district]. Nevertheless, measures have been taken to put an end to these irregularities.

Concerning production, the following figures are for the 1979 season: rice, 144,540 tons from an area of 25,795 hectares; peanuts, 2,757 tons from an area of 3,035 hectares; manioc, 51,460 tons from an area of 12,025 hectares; and corn, 7,360 tons from an area of 6,855 hectares. Chairman Rajaofera emphasized that experiments concerning rice growing on tanety [translation unknown] enterprises in Andriamena were very conclusive.

In the field of education, the faritany have some 1,492 basic education schools with 146,859 students, representing 59.6 percent of school-age children. The faritany also have 68 basic secondary schools, 17 of which were opened this year, 6 lycees and 2 professional schools.

The 1980 budget of the Mahajanga faritany totals 539.1 million Malagasy francs, a 163-percent increase over that of the previous fiscal year, essentially due to tax receipts and credits from the National Economic Development Fund. A large portion of this sum will be devoted to investments, aid to decentralized collectives and improving communications.

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

SECREN TO MANUFACTURE PUMPS--In 1979, SECREN (Naval Construction and Repair Company), in Antsiranana (formerly Diego-Suarez), had a total turnover of 2 billion Malagasy francs, compared with 1.4 billion in 1978. Shipbuilding continues to account for most of its activities (60 percent in 1979, with the order of four LCT's for the Malagasy Government), but the company is now diversifying its activities and has just gone into pump manufacturing with the aid of North Korea which, within the framework of a cooperation agreement signed in Pyongyang in 1979, sent a team of technicians to Antsiranana in April 1979. SECREN is therefore now able to supply different types of pumps: propeller, self-priming, one-stage, double-action and centrifugal pumps adapted to local conditions for industrial and agricultural uses. It recently presented a demonstration of these various models on Dorodosy Lake, 10 kilometers south of Antananarivo. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1053] 11,464

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MALAWI

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH TAIWAN--Mr Sun Yun Suan, prime minister of Formosa, recently made an official visit to Malawi. This trip resulted in the signing of a new cooperation agreement between the two countries. The Formosans are participating in various agricultural development projects in the country, such as rice cultivation, irrigation, vegetables, and agricultural training. Taiwan is sending about 50 technical agricultural cooperation agents to Malawi. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 p 992] 5058

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MALI

ECONOMIC FUTURE REPORTEDLY IN DOUBT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 211, 14 Apr 80 p 39

[Text] Last February a new series of price increases in certain products and services arrived, affecting hydrocarbons (25 percent on top of an identical increase last November), flour (18.34 percent), water and electricity (30 percent), and urban transport (40 percent).

And this is only to speak of the official prices. As the state does not control the market, the real prices are much higher most of the time. For example, in the urban transport sector--in private hands--prices reach double, even triple those which the state establishes. It is the same with grains, unobtainable in the state-owned stores, and for which one must pay 315 Malian Fr. on the parallel market, compared to the official price of 175.

This succession of increases comes at a time when living conditions for the population have already been profoundly impacted by the drain of higher social costs, difficulties with supply, and delays in payment of wages, though only to the degree that was absolutely necessary. In mid-February, workers in every category had not yet collected their January wages. And many of them have seen nothing in three months.

It is this situation which provoked the strike of secondary schoolteachers in the capital. The Treasury therefore had to get advances on its accounts with certain companies in order to meet its obligations, but this expedient proved to be insufficient. In fact, the state finds itself unable to pay all its wages at the same time.

It is necessary to understand this well: the public coffers are empty, and the state is on the verge of bankruptcy. Certainly, most developing countries are familiar with problems; but, to these general causes must be added here particular causes, especially the incoherent management of a political class of which the least that one can say is that it has not been motivated for essentially a dozen years by a high sensitivity to the national interest. For the only ones to escape the general misery are the privileged ones in power and the bourgeois comprador class which competes against itself in speculation while evading the taxes.

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The food situation is just as gloomy for the overwhelming majority. Mali is, of all the countries of the Sahel, the one which anticipated the biggest grain deficit: some 257,000 tons, which it hopes will be supplied by international aid. For the state cannot finance imports of this scale. The population will continue thus to endure the rule of the speculators. Moreover, it has no choice: in the state stores, the allotted rations are barely enough to survive; according to the region, they range from 800 g to 3.5 kg of grain per person per month.

This situation could get even worse in the months ahead. In fact, the recovery plan proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)--whose director general recently visited Bamako--is based on reduction of public expenses, an increase in consumer prices, and increased fiscal pressure. Now we have already witnessed such an increase in social costs that workers of every kind are no longer prepared to meet the vital problems of daily sustenance, transport costs, health expenses, rents...

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MALI

CENTRAL BANK PUBLISHES ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL STATISTICS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 pp 978, 979

[Text] The Central Bank of Mali recently published its quarterly bulletin (March 1980) of economic and financial statistics.

As of 31 December 1979 the bills and coins in circulation represented 76.9 billion Malian francs, compared to 63.3 billion one year previously.

As of the same date, end of December 1979, the Central Bank found itself owing, in the way of foreign liabilities, the exchange value of 114.9 billion Malian francs (plus 5.3 billion from the end of December 1978) as opposed to 2.9 billion Malian francs in counterpart credit in currency and 15 billion Malian francs on deposit with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The whole of deposits (on sight and at maturity) in the banking system amounted to 53 billion francs as of 31 December 1979 (plus 0.8 billion from the end of December 1978).

Likewise at the end of December 1979 the volume of economy credit amounted to 152.3 billion Malian francs compared to 133.1 billion a year previously; seasonal credits for state production enterprises were recorded at 91.5 billion (plus 14.2 billion).

The general budget for 1980 was set at 71.3 billion Malian francs with 11.8 billion in income from foreign assistance, compared to 62.8 billion for the 1979 budget (including 5.6 billion in foreign assistance).

During the year 1979 Mali's imports totaled 111.1 billion Malian francs (including 23 billion in supplies of petroleum products) compared to 105 billion in 1978 (including 17 billion in supplies of petroleum products) and 78 billion in 1978.

In 1979 Malian exports amounted to 47.1 billion Malian francs (including 27.8 billion in cotton fiber, seed and oil-cakes) compared to 42.5 billion in 1978 (including 25.8 billion for the cotton line).

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Thanks to a contribution of the exchange value of 42 billion Malian francs in foreign public grants and loans, the balance of payments of the year 1979 presents a surplus of 10.1 billion Malian francs, compared to a surplus of 10.5 billion entered in the accounts in 1978 (with 42.7 billion in foreign assistance).

The marketing projections of the agricultural production from the 1979-1980 campaign cover 144,500 tons of seed cotton (plus 17,800 tons from the previous campaign, 52,000 tons of peanuts (plus 14,700 tons) and 80,400 tons of rice (plus 17,700 tons). All producers' purchase prices were recorded at the beginning of the campaign. Consequently agricultural income will represent 15.9 billion Malian francs for cotton (plus 4.4 billion) and 3.2 billion for peanuts (plus 1 billion).

The general consumer price index for the food groups stood at 562.7 at the end of October 1979, compared to 491.6 at the end of October 1979 [sic] (on a basis of 100 determined in 1962-1963), indexes recorded in consumer cooperatives; prices on the open market being considerably higher (from 20 to 25%).

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MOZAMBIQUE

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEPENDENT ON PORT, RAILROAD RECEIPTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 p 997

[Text] Three series of immediate problems to resolve to enable the railways of Mozambique to insure railway services to the inland countries.

President Samora Machel's surprise visit to the railway-harbor complex of Maputo in mid-January, Mr Mugabe's victory in the Rhodesian elections 27-29 February and the independence of Zimbabwe which was a result of it, matched with the reopening of the border with Mozambique, the summit meeting in Lusaka, at the beginning of April, of the chiefs of state of Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola, Botswana and Zambia which accented this geographic area's need for access to the Indian Ocean and led to the creation of a transportation and communications committee for southern Africa, all these events highlight the importance of the railway and harbor system of Mozambique.

When can traffic get back to normal, a traffic which used to make possible the flow of three-fourths of the foreign trade of the former Rhodesia and a part of those of Zambia and Zaire? To this question Mr Ernest Kadungure, Zimbabswean minister of transportation and energy who just went to Mozambique to look into the problem, has replied: "Soon."

But at just about the same time the FINANCIAL TIMES showed greater reservations, and indicated that the resumption of traffic probably could not come about before the end of the year because the damage caused before the independence of Zimbabwe by the attacks of the Salisbury forces against the line ending in Maputo are turning out to be greater than had been thought heretofore, and because repairs will last at least until November. As for the tracks that terminate in Beira, they cannot insure any more than 1,000 tons a day both ways because of lack of qualifications with respect to personnel and lack of maintenance with respect to equipment. We shall take a more detailed look at the problems relating to each of these two lines.

On the Maputo line which crosses the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border at Chicualacuala, 60 kilometers of tracks must be replaced on the Zimbabwe

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side and 80 kilometers must be checked on the Mozambique side at the rail level as well as at the level of the crossties and fasteners. But an alternate solution exists; it consists of having goods travel by South African Railways via Komati Poort, and from there to Maputo. Komati Poort is very well equipped for bulk shipments (sugar or steel). The disadvantage of this method is that it increases the dependence of Zimbabwe (as well as Zaire and Zambia) on South Africa. Moreover the Komati Poort line is very congested during the months following the harvest of corn and other agricultural products of the Transvaal.

On the other line (Umtali-Beira) the principal problem to be solved is that of manpower. In 1975 at the time of independence, nearly 7,500 railway employees, the majority of them Portuguese, left Mozambique and were replaced by 300 managers from Eastern Europe who made an effort to train Mozambicans. Not fast enough and in too small a number. For that reason, and even though exchanges of viewpoints between the leaders of Salisbury and Maputo brought about a decision to run one train a day in each direction between Umtali and Beira, the only traffic up to now covers the coal from Wankie, which adds strength to the coal of Mozambique to enable steam locomotives to keep moving. Copper from Zambia and Zaire, tobacco from Zimbabwe on the way down, imported goods for these three countries and neighboring Malawi on the way up, still are not circulating.

An additional problem affects the resumption of traffic on one line as well as on the other. In 1976 when Mozambique had decided to participate in the sanctions against Rhodesia, Maputo had seized nearly 3,000 cars of all kinds, including some passenger cars, two diesel locomotives and three steam belonging to Rhodesia Railways. This equipment is utilized by the Mozambique railways. A political decision must be taken to put an end to this seizure. But the replacement cost of this material, for Mozambique or for the new government of Zimbabwe, would have to be on the order of \$80 million.

Such are the immediate problems which the authorities of Maputo are facing. In the longer term, if Mozambique wants to improve its balance of payments (we emphasized in our issue number 1796 of 11 April, page 885, the fact that transit is one of the three "invisible collections" making it possible to support the state budget), it will have to develop its railways and ports, a project which implies the widening and deepening of the access channels in Maputo and Beira.

A study concerning Beira was done by the British company, Bertlin Partners, the FINANCIAL TIMES points out. A feasibility study in greater depth, costing \$2 million, could be undertaken and financed by the EEC. This question was supposed to be taken up in the discussion which Mr Cheysson had with the Mozambique leaders during his recent stop in Maputo. The total cost of the Beira project would stand somewhere between \$120 and \$150 million.

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Aviation. Chartering of a Boeing 707. The Mozambique Deta airways company has secured a second Boeing within the framework of a new subcontracting deal worked out with the British Company, British Midlands Airways (BMA). The contract is evaluated at 5.5 million pounds (\$11 million). The BMA had already chartered a first Boeing 707 which insures regular service from the departure point of Maputo for Deta's account. The British company likewise provides the airship crews and maintenance personnel.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

WAREHOUSES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS--Following a study by the directorate of domestic trade in the province of Sofala, according to which 10 district warehouses of a total capacity of 3,800 tons must be built, Mozambican authorities have decided to build a warehouse in Chimbabava for the storage of 1,000 tons of agricultural products, and a second one, also in Chimbabava, but smaller in size. A total of 8 warehouses will be distributed thus: 3 in Gorongosa, 2 in Chimba, 1 in Caia, 1 in Cheringoma and 1 in Buzi. Except for one of the warehouses in Gorongosa which will have a capacity of 500 tons, the others will all have a capacity varying from 100 to 200 tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 May 80 p 1169]

SWEDISH AIR ASSISTANCE--The Swedish domestic airline LINJEFLYG will soon sign a contract with Mozambique in the amount of approximately 10 million kronor (10 million French francs), financed through the development assistance granted to Mozambique by Sweden. The Swedish assistance to Mozambique for 1980-1981 will amount to 180 million kronor. This makes Mozambique the second-highest beneficiary of Swedish development assistance in Africa after Tanzania. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 May 80 p 1169]

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NIGER

RELEASE OF DJIBO BAKARY COMMENDED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr-11 May 80 p 27

[Article by Antonia Blis, "Djibo Bakary Free At Last!--Release of the eminent patriot starts new hopes at Niamey"]

[Text] President Seyni Kountche's decision to free the leader of the Sawaba, Djibo Bakary, was well received by African and Third World public opinion generally. There is great satisfaction with the gesture the Niger chief of state has just performed for one of the greatest African patriots, one of the best of those who dedicated their lives to the struggle for national liberation and the fight against the colonial and neocolonial ascendancy in Africa.

It was on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the overthrow of the neocolonial regime of Hamani Diori, 15 April 1974, that President Seyni Kountche announced the release of "the main body of the former political personnel;" he made sure to emphasize that these measures were decided "freely, without pressure of any sort, out of humanitarian concern," by the Supreme Military Council. Wishing "to establish in depth an atmosphere of peace and detente between all Niger," President Kountche is adopting a new tone which could no doubt open up particularly encouraging possibilities in support of the independent and nonaligned policy of Niger and the creation of a political force made up of all the patriotic and progressive Niger citizens. A political force one must hope will make a clear and precise distinction between the reaction the Hamani Diori clique stands for--most of the elements of which have also been set free--and the integral left of which Djibo Bakary has always been the symbol.

Moreover, the Niger president seems perfectly aware of the problems that exist in his country. It is necessary, he says, to clean up an atmosphere characterized by influence-peddling within the government and the malaise of holding responsibility that afflicts the higher cadres. This is doubtless the price that must be paid to fight the battle of the "Niger of tomorrow" effectively.

There should be unalloyed rejoicing at the freeing of Djibo Bakary, whose incarceration for 4 years and 9 months had deeply disappointed everyone in Niger and throughout all Africa who had welcomed the overthrow of the

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unpopular regime of Hamani Diori by the young officer Seyni Kountche and the declarations of intent by the new rulers as an announcement of changes in depth. In Guinea-Conakry, where he had been in exile for many years, Djibo Bakary told us a few days after the overthrow of Diori that he had confidence in the new regime and that he was quite prepared to work with it without any hesitation: "I rush," so he told us, "to get back to my country, my people. And I hope that after 14 years of neocolonial government Niger will at last breathe the air of freedom and genuine political and economic independence so that our national resources will be exploited in the interests of our people..."

At the time President Ahmed Sekou Toure, his comrades of the Guinean Democratic Party (PDG) and all the political and personal friends of Djibo Bakary had counseled him to go back home and place himself at the disposal of the new government. Several individuals assured him, on the basis of information gathered at Niamey, that he would have nothing to worry about.

Lying Accusations

The leader of the Sawaba did in fact return home, and his modest residence was immediately invaded by a crowd of old Niger comrades and patriots who knew that the name of Djibo was intimately linked with the history of Niger's anti-colonial struggle. Everyone was pleased with the attitude of the new Chief of State, who had pledged himself to work for "national reconciliation." Unfortunately a conspiracy, hatched by a colonial agent, Colombany, who had already played a decisive role in the victory of "yes" in General de Gaulle's 1958 referendum, ended some months following Djibo Bakary's return on 2 August 1975 in the arrest of a number of militants and sympathizers of the Sawaba Party. Djibo was even accused of participating in a plot against the government, when all the world knew there was nothing to it and that he had been the victim of French neocolonialist plotters who lived in Niamey.

A founder of the Democratic Union of Niger, then of the Sawaba Party, which campaigned for the "no" in the De Gaulle referendum (the only African party with the Guinean Democratic Party), Djibo had to leave the post of President of the Council of the Niger Government which he had held since 1957, yielding it to Hamani Diori, following fraudulent elections that gave victory to the advocates of "yes". It is well known that as soon as he took over the Hamani Diori regime organized a regular witch hunt--sometimes going as far as assassination--against the opposition; and it is known how this permanent repression led to the exile of the militants of the Sawaba Party who survived this man-hunt.

The overthrow of the Hamani Diori regime on 15 April 1974 was to open a fresh page in the history of Niger. And the freeing of Djibo Bakary gives rise to new hopes. We rejoice in it.

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RWANDA

REPORT ON LARGE VOLUME OF INTERNATIONAL AID

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1052

[Text] In its report for FY 1979, submitted on 23 April to the general stockholder's meeting, the Belgian-Zairian Bank (Belgolaise) reviewed the economy of Rwanda.

Because of the difficult transportation situation, Air Rwanda in 1979 purchased one Boeing 707 aircraft which greatly contributed to handling certain essential imports.

The reopening of the Mombasa road across the Eastern part of Uganda toward Kenya brought about an improvement; but, although the new Ugandan authorities took steps to release the Rwandan trucks which had been held up at the time of hostilities with Tanzania, traffic is being restored only gradually.

Export estimates for 1979 include 35,000 tons of coffee (including 9,500 tons from the earlier harvest), 4,100 tons of tea as well as 1,945 tons of cassiterite, to which we can add 775 tons of tungsten.

On 24 April and 19 June 1979, USAID decided to grant Rwanda two loans in the amounts of \$5.2 million and \$8.75 million, respectively.

The first loan is earmarked for a second development and financing program for industry to be implemented through the enterprise of the Rwanda Development Bank, with an estimated total cost of \$15 million, of which 40 percent will be financed by the above-mentioned bank. The main objective of these projects is the utilization of local resources and the substitution of imported products with local food products. The projects within the framework of the first program had added up to \$30 million and were concentrated on the light as well as coffee and tea processing industries.

The second loan covers the second phase of the development of agriculture and animal husbandry at Mutara in the Northeastern part of Rwanda. This project, whose cost has been estimated at \$11.5 million, will include collective livestock ranches and small farms.

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On the other hand, the Special Fund of the OPEC on 28 August 1979 granted a loan of \$4.5 million to the Republic of Rwanda for the improvement of its balance of payments.

At the end of the activities of the Mixed Belgian-Rwandan Commission in October 1979 at Kigali, a cooperation agreement was concluded, covering about a hundred projects, over a period of 5 years. The financing program over a period of 5 years of Belgian cooperation in this development effort involves an amount of 6 billion FB [Belgian Francs].

Among the most important objectives we find scientific research in the field of agricultural food production.

Belgium will take over the complete development of several rural areas covering about 350,000 inhabitants in order to promote food and industrial product crops, animal husbandry, the fight against erosion, as well as the development of cooperatives.

In the industrial sector, efforts will be concentrated especially on the production of methane in Lake Kivu with the possible collaboration of the Belgian private sector, as well as the construction of a tea processing factory.

Looking at transportation, the Kanombe (Kigali) airport will be enlarged so that it will be able to accommodate big aircraft.

The Republic of Rwanda will also benefit from financial intervention by the FRG whose amount had been fixed at 3,718,000,000 Rwanda francs for 1979-1980 under the terms of the meeting of the mixed German-Rwanda mission in November 1979 (\$1 = 92.84 Rwanda francs). Among the most important projects we have the Kigali-Ruhengeri road and the Ruhengeri-Gisenyi high-voltage power line.

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SOMALIA

EXTENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, NEED FOR ARMY ANALYZED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 pp 911-913

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Has Somalia Chosen Sides?"]

[Text] The Democratic Republic of Somalia has constantly benefitted from a current of sympathy within the countries of Western Europe, despite its past political positions, a current which historical factors make understandable in the case of Italy, but which also existed within the EEC and even in France at a time when the Djibouti affair was making Franco-Somali relations especially difficult. The isolation of which it has unceasingly complained since fighting in the Ogaden broke out in June 1977 seems surprising.

This sympathy finds its origins in the quality of its elite, the courage with which it has carried itself into operations as ambitious as the sedentarization of the nomads--undertaken thanks to Soviet trucks and /Antonovs/ following the droughts of 1973-1975--the results of which have been skillfully exhibited to foreigners. The Italian-Moorish elegance of Mogadiscio's decor has contributed to it. The irredentism it supports in the border provinces of neighboring states itself meets with some understanding on the part of observers; the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of a united Somalia riding the four winds, is appealing at first glance, even if it is not matched by any common historical tradition of a unitary solution.

Somalia's mistake is doubtless to have believed that this benevolence of principle, allied to the satisfaction of seeing it break off its alliance with the USSR, would extend to [the Western countries] supporting it in an armed action, at the risk of jeopardizing the political stability not only of the geographic region but to all African states; and the latter are much more attached than the old colonizers ever were to the notion of the sanctity of the colonial boundaries. The reluctance of the Western powers to follow Somalia onto this ground was matched by the realization--already made by Moscow--that because of its demography and its real or potential resources, Ethiopia is the big player in this part of the world. Created by Great Britain at the end of World War II, "pan-Somalism" was only of interest to chancelleries to the degree that it was opposed to France's sovereignty over Djibouti and to the regional supremacy of an Ethiopian empire in full decay.

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Once Djibouti was independent and the Ethiopian empire, however colonial its nature, was "pumped up" through the efforts of the USSR and Cuba, the putrid growths which disturbed its borders were transformed suddenly into a simple eczema, certainly an irritant, but no more justifying a third-party intervention than a difference between Switzerland and France over the Jurassian cantons.

Such an assessment is obviously as extreme as that of the aggressive capacities of Somalia which had preceded it. Witness the continuing insecurity in the Ogaden and the reappearance of the guerrillas in southern Ethiopia, not to speak of the international repercussions of the refugee problem--today 1.5 million people in a state of 3.3 million inhabitants, and whose support requires annual gifts from the United States, Saudi Arabia, the EEC, Italy and France valued at \$90 million. But it must be said that a certain laxity in interpretation of events has been supported by the position of the Somali Government.

Whatever justification it may make, this government cannot really deny its initiating role in the 1977 war. As early as February of that year the French services knew that it was preparing an offensive against the railroad line between Diredawa and the TFAI [expansion unknown] border. In these circumstances, the daily denunciation, by Somali press and leaders, of the imminence of a general attack of Ethiopian air and ground forces aimed at Mogadiscio in order to cut the nation in two, arouses more a droll skepticism than concern, even if the charge is not baseless altogether.

A certain way of re-writing history, in maintaining, for example, that the ex-ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Somalia to Paris "had played a great personal role in the peaceful settlement of the Djibouti affair"--which is exact in one sense, but not necessarily in the sense we are invited to believe--has a comparable effect. If only for the sake of the credibility of Somali diplomacy, it would be preferable for Somalia to adopt the silent attitude of the player who has gambled and lost and who prepares his revenge with his teeth clenched. This was the attitude of General Siyad Barre at the OAU summit in Monrovia, where it was generally accepted. His collaborators, unfortunately, have not always shown the same discretion.

What is the Cause of Somali Isolation?

It is appropriate to inquire into the true nature of this isolation, or claimed isolation, against which the authorities in Mogadiscio have reacted with extraordinary diplomatic activity, since, with the exception of the states of the Eastern Bloc, all the states in the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian sub-continent, the Arab peninsula, the Middle East, North Africa, and even some in western Europe, received during 1979 a visit by General Siyad Barre or one of his principal ministers.

The favorable posture (\$8 million) of its balance of payments, while its balance of trade is chronically nearly \$140 million in deficit, indicates

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in any case that foreign financial assistance, amounting to 80 percent of total revenue, has not been lacking, and that the assistance was provided on sufficiently advantageous terms to maintain annual debt service at a reasonable level (7 percent of export earnings, for a total of \$360 U.S.), while the external assets of the Central Bank are estimated, at the end of 1979, at \$150 million. If the 1979 rate of inflation remains high, about 19 percent, and the /per capita/ GNP very weak (\$110), the incentive to foreign aid, born of the second factor, being thwarted by the effects of the first, the total 1979-1981 Development Plan (\$900 million), calculated by extrapolating up to the present the previous support, is itself also indicative of the variety and abundance of the financial support available to the country.

Imports from Primary Countries [of origin]

	Value (millions of Somali shillings)	
	1973	1979
Italy	212.1	459.6
China	126.3	50.7
Great Britain	32.5	146.8
United States	16.5	38.6
FRG	35.4	159.7
Others	215.0	663.5
TOTAL	637.8	1518.9

One observes a certain acceleration in the pace of international and multi-lateral financial interventions, whether by the World Bank group (IBRD-IDA) which has sponsored huge agricultural management projects and efforts to ameliorate livestock conditions in the Hargeisha region, or by the European Economic Community, the chief financial sponsor of the Bardera dam over the Juba river and the irrigated perimeters downstream, for a total of \$3 billion, while in the framework of the 4th FED [expansion unknown] its activity was in excess of 63 million European counting units. Jointly with the Islamic Development Bank and OPEC, the African Development Fund participates in a project valued at 12.5 million counting units for the evacuation of used water from the capital. The UNDP, finally, subsidizes various educational and agricultural operations.

The bilateral aid effort is on no smaller a scale, with Peoples China in first place, having in 1978, thanks to the work of 1,200 Chinese engineers and foremen supervising 2,500 Somali workers, completed the Burao-Belet Wayn section of 970 km of the 2,524-km railway line intended to connect the agricultural regions of the south to the pastoral zones of the north. China is also present, financially and technically, in several agricultural projects, municipal services (drilling and water supply), sanitary infrastructure, and in the creation of small industries.

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The Arab oil states, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf Emirates, have assisted, since 1976, in the most varied fields: the road from Berbera to Burao, agriculture, schools, urban electrification, etc., for a total of \$300 million. Iraq, where the Baathist regime has itself put some distance between itself and Moscow, is in this respect following with interest the evolution of the Democratic Republic of Somalia and has financed, along with the Mogadiscio refinery, with a capacity of 500,000 t, roads and various agricultural experiments, representing an outlay of around \$15 million per year.

A certain decline of Western assistance, apart from food assistance, was observable starting in 1970. It picked up again, starting in 1977. Italy to this day remains the most important [source], giving to Somalia 20 percent of its Third World aid, supporting numerous technical advisers there and assuming an especially significant role in the fields of health, education, and culture, quite apart from the budget-balancing subsidy which after an interruption of several years it once again grants to the state. The Federal Republic of Germany weighs in with around 83 million Somali shillings* worth of donated goods (vehicles, agricultural tools, radio materials) and training projects (agriculture and police). Great Britain brings limited cultural and social assistance to Somalia, but on the other hand has agreed to substantial bank loans for completion of the sugar refineries at Djelib, near Kisimaio.

The United States, finally, tends to increase each year the total of its assistance, which in 1979 reached \$26.2 million, of which \$10 million was for food, and will exceed \$34.5 million in 1980. The negotiations which continue between Washington and Mogadiscio could carry the figure to \$100 million in 1981, not counting allowances and provisions of a kind not difficult to imagine, if, as everything leads us to think, they should result in an accord.

Franco-Somali Economic Relations

French assistance in Somali has suffered from historic handicaps on which it is useless to dwell for many years, this country not relying on the services of Rue Monsieur and having remained besides rather a stranger to French industry. Beyond French participation in FED, nevertheless, our assistance has provided for the placement of two experts in Sidam (the Somali ENA [National School of Administration]), one a specialist in statistical mathematics and the other in administration, while a surgeon, a radiologist, and a pneumo-physiologist work with foreign and Somali doctors in Mogadiscio's hospital, which was also brought into being by the FED and finally put into operation after many delays. More recently, France has furnished Somalia two experts in date-palm cultivation.

A second stage of French cooperative assistance was reached with the locating in Somalia of Sogreah, [expansion/translation unknown], to which was

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entrusted the study and bookkeeping of operations of the part of Mogadiscio, which was also realized with European financing, through an Italian firm. With this foot in the door, Sogreah was able to obtain a new contract in the agricultural and pastoral management projects in Hargeisha cited above, and it is in line to be given others relating to harbor infrastructure and fishing. Some French firms, Sofremer, Satec and Aquaservices are also studying the possibility of activities in this field.

The establishment of the Central Bank for Economic Cooperation in Mogadiscio in 1978 marks a third stage. The CBEC is involved, presently, in the realization of the Berbera cement plant, for which two French projects are in competition, an additional study having been asked of Lafarge S.A. In the Bardera affair, the CBEC envisages an investment of \$2.6 million in agricultural management in the Bajaba valley, and perhaps in the dam itself. A meeting on this subject is scheduled in Brussels in June. Finally, an agreement should soon be signed by the Minister of Planning and the Central Bank for creation of a 1,000-hectare cotton experimental project at Balad. Subsequent phases of this project, North Korean in origin, may involve feasibility studies, extensions, and improvements in the Chebeli valley.

In other sectors, we must note the offer made by Thomson-CSF for establishing a television network in Mogadiscio, and above all the mining survey made by the Bureau of Geological and Mining Research (BGMR). Its efforts in the field of hydro-geology have been the object of a French grant of 1 million French francs, disbursement of which coincided with the visit of Mr Olivier Stirn on 21 October 1979, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the revolution.

This visit thus officially sealed the definitive reconciliation between France and the Democratic Republic of Somalia, and the development of a new basis for the relations between the two countries. In 1979, French exports to Somalia represented a value of 31 million French francs, compared to 15 million in Somali imports to France, this latter figure being an increase of 11 million from 1978. Another aspect of this "new ball game" could be participation of the Somali Government at the upcoming Franco-African conferences.

The tangle of Somali preoccupations

The involvement of the western and Arab states and China in the Democratic Republic of Somalia has largely compensated for the effects of the break with the USSR and the socialist bloc--it being recalled in this connection that General Siad Barre still claims allegiance to socialism, but to a socialism which he describes these days more willingly as national than scientific. Russian activities in the economic sector were moreover limited to fish and meat canning, the massive personnel aid--nearly 3,000 people--spread over the Somali services obviously having a more political and ideological than technical character.

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It is thus on the military plane that the divorce from Moscow appears to have had the heaviest consequences, both with respect to its still-bloody quarrel with Ethiopia and to internal political equilibrium.

The reverses suffered in the Ogaden have not in any way tempered Somalia's demands for that province, where it is, after all, difficult to imagine that the latest initiative of the guerrillas has not in some way received Somali support. In a statement in March 1979, responding to a joint communique from Kenya and Ethiopia which was ambiguous in tone, mentioning the possibility of peace subject to the payment of reparations, General Siad Barre stated in the most categorical way that, as the Ogaden is a non-autonomous territory peopled by Somalis, to renounce it would be equivalent to recognizing its unjust conquest by Ethiopia; any demand for reparations, on the other hand, would constitute a "veritable defiance of international law." At that moment there is little chance that position will change. Let us add that for either of the parties to express a willingness to resolve peacefully the dispute would run the risk of appearing to their respective arms purveyors to be entirely too lukewarm to justify the assurance of "outlays" for this secondary theater of operations.

Somalia thus cannot hope to receive modern weapons unless it appears determined to use them. This willingness is readily apparent from the fact that an operational army is not only indispensable to the liberation of the Ogaden, it is the essential condition for survival of the regime. It is, in reality, the regime itself. The "centurion politics" practiced by the Russians can have a sway which in the West has perhaps been insufficiently appreciated over the population of a country as terribly deprived of natural resources as Somalia. The French colonial tradition was acquainted with the "sharpshooter's trade" which thanks to the levies exacted by the families, gave life to the southern provinces of Chad and part of Upper Volta. At Djibouti's independence, it was to a solution of this kind that the leaders of the new state quite naturally looked, at least in the short run, to get through that critical period separating them from a still hypothetical economic development. This state of mind explains why they not only accepted, but asked for the coexistence on their territory of a French expeditionary force and a national army, which they would gladly have reinforced, had they only the means, with civilian detachments. The systematization of the process by the USSR results in something much different from guaranteeing a source of revenue. To a young generation without hope, in which the tribal warrior traditions remain strong, it brings the exaltation of the tank commander or the MiG pilot. Once savored, it is difficult to trade it in for the pale charms of pastoral life in the desert.

The Soviet military advisers probably did not foresee, when creating the Somali army from nothing, that the logic of the system would condemn its leaders--except those with a suicidal tendency--to protect its viability at all costs against their old instructors. Equipped entirely with Russian material, this only survives thanks to its Egyptian allies who provision

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it with isolated Soviet pieces, with which they are abundantly supplied. But it is a precarious expedient, which pulls Mogadiscio excessively into a network of alliances whose center is in Washington.

If General Siad Barre wants to maintain the unitary ideal he has established for his people and thus escape a coup more or less comouflaged, like the previous one, under tribal rivalries--Mijertein against Marehar--but supported, in reality, by those who regret the high degree of military perfection obtained thanks to the Russian alliance or, on the contrary, by those who believe that revenge must be sought with still more determination, then there hardly remains anything for him to do but to move imperceptibly from the Russian alliance to the American alliance. The new constitution, adopted by referendum in August 1979, and the elections organized in December to present to the world a democratic facade both prepare for and accompany this movement. They have, in fact, the same significance as the old dictatorial structures, in an Africa which, not content to settle their internal disputes with the machine-guns of the Whites, also insist on doing it with the words of the Whites, in order to arrive, in short, at the constant solutions which necessity imposes.

It is improbable that we will see, for all that, American "bases" arising in Somalia and especially in Berbera. The term is obsolete, and the former Soviet allies already declined. There will simply be more war vessels in the ports and airplanes on more fields. The silhouette of the tanks will change along with that of the instructors. It would be in vain to deplore a transformation which the nature of the regime, on the one hand, and the reshuffling of alliances resulting from the coup in Kabul, on the other, made inevitable. Instructed by the experience of their predecessors, it is moreover probable that the new allies will take care that the equipment entrusted to the Somali army is not utilized in fighting which diverges from their own [aims].

This transformation, however, poses two problems. One can ask, first of all, whether it will stop at the borders of the Democratic Republic of Somalia, whose leaders could decide, notwithstanding the shrewdness they have evidenced to date, that the material advantages they could gain outweigh the assurances of peace provided by a clever, but fragile, combination balance between two ethnic groups, two states, and two blocs.

One can ask, then, about the chances for success of the regional conference proposed by France, with the unwavering support of General Siad Barre, to attempt to reach a peaceful settlement in the "Horn of Africa," while the Ogaden and even Eritrea, for which men continue to die, risk becoming no more than stage-props and alibis in the settling of accounts between the superpowers.

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UGANDA

BRIEFS

BRITISH AID--Under the terms of an agreement signed in Kampala on 18 April, Great Britain has pledged this year to supply Uganda with 4 million Pounds in credit, plus 1 million Pounds in aid under the heading of technical assistance. The 4-million Pound loan is to be used in purchasing British goods and services especially for the renewal of the cotton industry, road construction, preventive measures in animal health, drinking water pipelines, and waste water evacuation. Last year, the total volume of aid given by Great Britain to Uganda came only to about 2 million Pounds. This year's increase was decided upon during the meeting, in Paris, last November, by the consultative group of the World Bank (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 16 Nov 79 p 3221). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 p 1050] 5058

FRENCH AID--France is to give Uganda financial assistance in an amount of F122 million, the Ugandan finance minister announced on 25 April. The agreement, signed in Paris this month, consists of a long-term loan, with a period of grace of 10 years, as well as commercial loans guaranteed by the French government. This loan will be used especially for the purchase of capital goods intended for the Ugandan Railroad Company as well as the importing of equipment, trucks, and ambulances for the ministry of health. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 p 1050] 5058

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

MINING, PETROLEUM--The Belgian-Zairian Bank (Belgolaise) held its general meeting on 23 April 1980. In its report, the board of directors indicated that the business volume handled by the bank, particularly in the area of trade relations with Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda, remained at a high level in 1979. This report reviewed the evolution of Zaire's economy over the past year. In 1979, the GECAMINES [General Quarries and Mines Company] came to 336,000 tons of copper (391,300 tons in 1978) and 13,700 tons of cobalt (13,100 tons in 1978), whose output was maintained because of its high sales price at 1.62 million FR [Belgian Francs] per ton after 1 February 1979. The general copper price performance was good in 1979. While the maximum reached in 1978 for this metal had been 46,450 FB per ton as of 13 December, its price went up to 68,710 FB on 2 October 1979 and the average price for the year went up quite considerably (58,187 FB as against 42,865). The shipment of the output and the transportation of supplies continued to pose serious problems. Following the disturbances caused by the events of May 1978, GECAMINES during FY 1979 concentrated its efforts primarily on the restoration of its equipment, the reconstitution of its stocks, and the resumption of the expansion of its installations in the Kolwezi group. It furthermore made a major effort to increase its manpower in order to return its output to the previous level as quickly as possible. The output of crude petroleum in Zaire's maritime zone came to something like 7.6 million barrels in 1979, a rather definite increase compared to the 1978 output which was 6 million barrels, a rather marked drop compared to 1977. Looking at the railroad and highway transportation infrastructure, the contract for the construction of the suspension bridge over the Zaire near Matadi was completed by a consortium of six Japanese companies. The cost of the construction work, whose financing was provided through the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan, will come to something like 5 billion FB and it will take about 5 years to finish the job. In 1979, Belgolaise recorded a profit of 216.8 million FB to which we can add a carry-over of 40.2 million from the preceding fiscal year. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 pp 988-989] 5058

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BRITISH AID--Great Britain in March gave Zaire a loan of 2 million Pounds Sterling to aid that country's manufacturing industry. This aid is a part of the international effort aimed at reviving the Zairian economy. It will be used in purchasing, from Great Britain, spare parts and raw materials needed by the Zairian branches of British firms, particularly in the transportation and textile industries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 p 989] 5058

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ZIMBABWE

OUTLOOK FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH ENCOURAGING

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1107

[Text] The AGEFI special correspondent in Zimbabwe recently echoed the satisfaction of business circles in Salisbury that welcome the conciliatory statements made by Robert Mugabe to the effect that "it would appear that a lesson has been learned from the disastrous experience of Samora Machel in Mozambique."

Our colleague notes that the Salisbury Stock Market and the banks have already evaluated the new situation and for the first time in 2 years, are recommending investments in local stock. There are in fact many companies which anticipate substantial increases (as high as 25 percent) in their profits for the fiscal year ending March-April 1980.

In an interview granted to AGEFI, David Young, Zimbabwe's secretary of state for finance, confirmed the optimism of business circles. Young believes that in order to repair damage caused to the economic structure, it is necessary to invest in agriculture (the sector hardest hit by guerrilla warfare) between 50 and 75 million Zimbabwe dollars, 25 percent of which could be found locally (1 Zimbabwe dollar = about .65 French franc).

Economic growth should reach 4 percent in 1980 and 8 percent in 1981. Among the urgent problems is rapid restoration of the rail line going to Maputo via Malvernia. Next, it will be necessary, Young said, to repair the irrigation system and the water supply indispensable to any increase in agricultural production.

Minister of Agriculture Dennis Norman stated that agricultural production (17 percent of the GNP) should double over the next 15 years in order to follow the population curve. But, he added, it would be possible to reach the objective in 5 years if adequate financial means were available. Production will rise 4 percent in 1980. Coffee has made the most remarkable progress and leads the list of products promising great expansion.

AGEFI nevertheless remarks: "It is likely that any future expansion will have to reckon with a scarcity of skilled labor. In fact, it is expected

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that 10 to 15 percent of the Whites in the 25-30-year-old age group will emigrate. Although the prime minister's policy is currently favorable to Whites, one wonders what will be left of it in 3 to 5 years when his power will be consolidated and the economy sufficiently developed.

In this connection, it must be pointed out that Mugabe's government initiated a broad survey on the country's labor needs on 1 May (Labor Day for the first time in the former Rhodesia).

E. Tekere, minister of labor planning and development, also stated that his ministry intended to set up training programs for the "so-called semi-skilled workers" as soon as possible. There are also plans to expand the capacity of the Salisbury Polytechnic School and the Bulawayo Technical School. A commercial school is reportedly to be set up in Gevelo and the private sector will reportedly supply the financial means to build a technical school in Que Que in 1980.

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ZIMBABWE

BRIEFS

NKOMO'S ATTACK--The discernible climate of tension that has existed for 2 months between Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Minister of Interior Joshua Nkomo, his former ally in the Patriotic Front, is beginning to look more and more like a confrontation. Deeply disturbed over the small place given them within the new government, the most "hard-line" -- and the most pro-Soviet -- leaders from the ZAPU (Nkomo's party) no longer conceal their opposition to Mugabe, whom they accuse of "following a rightist policy" and "extending his hand to the former colonists rather than to the people." Mugabe's friends say that they are "frankly worried": Some 3,000 guerrilla fighters from the ZIPRA -- the armed branch of the ZAPU -- are still in Zambia and 1,000 of them are reportedly preparing to infiltrate western Zimbabwe, as during the hottest moments of the war against Ian Smith. At the beginning of May, several searches at different ZAPU headquarters led to the discovery of large stocks of arms. In Salisbury, where alarmist rumors spread rapidly, there is no longer any hesitation in speaking about a possible pro-Nkomo coup. This is certainly an unlikely possibility, but it does express the crisis atmosphere, especially since the last Mugabe-Nkomo meeting on Friday, 2 May, ended in complete failure and since more strike movements, undoubtedly headed by ZAPU militants, broke out the following day in the main southern sugar mills. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 May 80 p 35] 11,464

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