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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 677



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFRICAN MILITARY REGIMES EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Mar 80 pp 24-29

[Article by Hamza Kaidi]

[Text] One can do anything with a bayonet except sit on it. Some of the military who rule here have learned this from experience. Many of their colleagues have learned it at their own expense. Some of those who remain have come to terms with the civilians. Or again, in turn, they have become "legal politicians."

Why are the military attracted by political power? Should they retain it? Or, under certain circumstances, is military power a compulsory route toward democracy? Hamza Kaidi carried out a long inquiry into this subject and we will place before you his analysis--the first of its kind--of military power in Africa.

Military Power in Africa

In 1978, we ascertained that in Africa, countries governed by civilians were becoming islands in a sea of khaki (See JEUNE AFRIQUE No 916); in fact, military governments ruled in 22 nations. The year 1979 saw, without regrets, the addition of one more military regime: in Equatorial Guinea the dictator Macias Nguema was overthrown by Col Theodoro Obiang Nguema. However, that same year, four soldier-presidents surrendered power to civilians, namely in Uganda, Central African Republic, Nigeria, and Ghana.

Two of these departures were forced: it was even necessary to have recourse to foreign "aid" to oust "Marshal" Amin Dada and "Emperor" Bokassa. In contrast, Gen Olusegun Obasanjo handed the power over to civilians in Nigeria, without really being constrained to do so and Jerry Rawlings, the Ghanaian captain who snatched power from the military to hand it over to civilians acted, above all, in response to the economic deterioration. Could one then refer to the ebb of the "khaki tide"? These cases are

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too isolated to justify such a claim. Yet an analysis of the conditions in which the "militarization" of the continent took place would appear to be instructive.

From the dark barracks to the radiant halls of power is but a step. In Africa, that step has been taken at least 50 times in the past 20 years or so. Some infantry companies, backed by one or two squadrons of gendarmes, a few tanks, or, lacking these, some light armored cars, and the show is over within just a few hours. Once the main strategic points are occupied and the presidential palace surrounded, those responsible for the "Putsch" have only to nab the head of state and the major dignitaries of the regime before going to the radio station to read a proclamation addressed to the people they "have just saved." "War is too serious an affair to be entrusted to the military," Georges Clemenceau once said. Sixty years later, it would seem that a goodly number of African military men have retorted that the exercise of political power is too serious a thing to be left to the civilians.

To what can one ascribe the progressive militarization of African governments and the attraction which political power exerts over the army? To tell the truth, the phenomenon is neither specifically African nor Latin American, as some would have us believe....

Like many of their ancient colonists, when they gained independence, the African countries took precautions to keep "the army out of politics and politics out of the army," according to the expression made famous by Gen H. T. Alexander, first British commander of the Ghanaian army. On the average, however, after 3 years this principle was questioned anew in many countries. That was the case in Togo in 1963 and in Algeria in 1965.

If foreign power, and above all the former mother countries were not strangers to a number of coups d'etat, it would be false to claim that this was always the case. Inner considerations often served as a motive for the Putschs. At the outset, because they were too young, or were serving in the colonial armies, most of the African officers, who had played no role within the nationalist movements were barred from the political contests. They were a class apart, living according to different standards from those of the society which surrounded them. Feeling closer to the technicians than to the politicians, they were imbued with an "apolitical" professional mystique. Yet, paradoxically, these officers were often led into the arena of power by the very disgust they felt for politics: by virtue of their duties, they had actually long been mute witnesses to the irresponsibility of the governing groups. If the main function of any army is the protection of the national territory against any eventual foreign aggression, its secondary function, in the eyes of the military themselves, is the protection of the government against internal threats. The first of these duties is readily accomplished in Africa, even by the most modest armies, not by reason of their own power

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but because of their neighbors' weakness. Thus the protection of the government has become the African military's prime task and they express toward society as a whole the same concern for order as they evidence daily in the army. They impute the responsibility for the wrongs of that society to the "politicians," and choose as precious allies the technocrats whose power is limited precisely by those same politicians.

A Warm Welcome

Thus, governments that believe they can monopolize the destiny of a country by having themselves "elected" by 99 percent (or more) of the ballots and by rejecting all of the avenues for recourse and protest, do no more than open the doorway to "militarization." The delays and hesitations of the powers-that-be vis-a-vis the difficulties confronting the State thus take on, from the military man's standpoint, the form of a danger which must immediately be eliminated. Who other than the army, the sole organized force, could save the country from "chaos"?

The ascent of the military to power is often welcomed. Since the civilian government had previously eliminated the different currents of opinion and made the various pressure groups (trade unions, mass organizations, etc.) toe the line, few are those who are ready to sacrifice themselves for it. Therefore, the coup d'etat involves only a minimum of violence, since it encounters little resistance. Modibo Keita in Mali and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, experienced this. Generally, the military begin the take over of power with strong criticism of their predecessors. They promise the establishment of commissions of inquiry which will make the former leaders accountable; but they rarely go beyond statements of intention.

Law of Silence

It is often noticed that those who share a part of the responsibility for the situation created by the previous regime in fact represent forces to be treated considerately. Thus, resounding trials and acts of vengeance which might strike at random are avoided, because it is a time for reconciliation and national unity.

Often, "the law of silence" is chosen. The most visible leaders of the former regime are placed in "protective custody" for more or less long periods. A consolidated regime will soon free them. In contrast, a regime less sure of itself and its foundations will let them rot in prison, until such a time as they die or are forgotten.

Contrary to what is generally thought, governments made up solely of military men are both rare and short-lived. The military are quick to realize that one can do everything with bayonets except sit on them. Therefore they seek an alliance with the civil servants and the technocrats, who are as concerned as themselves with matters of hierarchy and discipline. Together they constitute what might well be described as a military-administrative regime.

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Established in order to regenerate the society it rules, this regime seeks to avoid the internal divisions which weakened its predecessor. It tends to reject ideologies, except in the field of foreign policy, in order to preserve the nation's cohesion. Civilian and military groups do their utmost to ensure that, in fact, their organization is apolitical, despite the progressive or moderate coloring of the regime, generally aimed at foreign consumption.

The political party (or parties), the assembly, the constitution, everything that symbolized the earlier power structure, are therefore dissolved or abrogated during the hours immediately following the take-over by the army. The military then try to establish other movements or revive older ones. However, such attempts are almost always condemned to failure. At worst, they adopt the previous situation as an example. A true emanation of the state, the new parties or trade unions remain dependent on the State. Conceived solely to spread its directives and slogans, they cannot undertake the mobilization of the masses which is theoretically assigned to them.

For the military-administrative regimes, and those responsible for them, development is no longer a "political" affair. It is regulated "in the interests of all" by technicians, planners, economists, etc., who seek to apply scientific solutions to all manner of problems. However, more often than not, the lack of experience will make itself felt. Wishing to progress too quickly, wanting to apply too literally those plans conceived for other nations, those in authority do not take into account any human or material resistance entailed by such an upheaval. Generous notions and theoretically perfect projects prove to be inefficient when put into practice.

A Strengthened Bourgeoisie

In the majority of the military-administrative states, with some differences in detail, a public sector is established. It is directed by the bureaucracy but at the same time it serves to strengthen the propertied classes.

The state apparatus in fact rests on a new petty bourgeoisie, and the greater the economic functions of the state, the more power will be concentrated in the hands of that petty bourgeoisie. Although it does not possess the means of production, it does command enormous power over the utilization of resources. An ideological profession of faith then becomes essential to justify its activities: the state will then proclaim itself socialist and it will engender its own "apparatchiki."

The sine qua non for survival of any bureaucratic-military regime is the degree of autonomy of the masses. These represent a threat to the state bureaucracy founded on corporatist and centralist principles. In the army as well as in the bureaucracy, the only good decisions are those taken at the top of the pyramid. They must be implemented without the slightest discussion. The "success" of the enterprise depends on that. The military

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motto, to the effect that "there are no bad orders, there are only orders badly carried out," can be seen in full measure here. The one who executes the orders is always to blame. One can therefore smile at the so-called attempts at decentralization or establishment of a dialogue with the base, announced by certain bureaucratic or military regimes.

However, it would be absurd to place the same labels on all the African military regimes. The best example of democracy in Africa was given by a military man: Gen Sangoule Lamizana of Upper Volta. In contrast, certain civilian regimes have made great use of terror and repression. The most murderous dictatorship in Africa was undoubtedly that of a civilian: Macias Nguema of Equatorial Africa.

The fact is that a number of Third World countries with civilian governments must ask themselves a fundamental question in connection with their own future: "How can our military be prevented from taking over power?" In the developed countries, considerable thought was given to this, as was done by Moshe Amin in "The Evolution of the Place and of the Role of the African Public Forces." He wrote, "The complexity and diversity of the army corps constituted a restraining force for the initiatives of a number of officers." The different corps (armored, navy, air force) are a mutually counter-balancing factor.

Limited Confidence

In Africa, this differentiation has little value. The predominance of the infantry, the essential part of the armed forces, renders the principle inapplicable. Civilians therefore sought to counter the virtual power of the army by creating paramilitary units (militias, gendarmerie, police) which they often strengthened at its expense, believing they thus had an antidote against coups d'etat. That was the case in the Ivory Coast, in Gabon, in the Central African Republic, in Liberia, in Sierra Leone, in Mali and in Tanzania. There is something even more remarkable: it often happens that the paramilitary forces of certain countries with a military regime resulting from a coup d'etat (of which Zaire is an example), are more important than the army itself.

Could the confidence of the soldier-presidents in their own armed forces be limited? Actually, these paramilitary forces, regarded as the essential instrument for prevention and for action against army intervention, end up by constituting a threat to the established regimes. Therefore, certain civilian governments have gone back on earlier decisions of their own. A case in point is the Ivory Coast which from 1963 undertook to reduce its army from 5,000 to 3,000 men, after the discovery of conspiracies in which some military were involved.

The Ivory Coast army was broken up. The public forces were separated from the Army proper, into which they had previously been integrated. The civilian service was detached from the army and the gendarmerie's function

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was enhanced. In 1968, the army of the Ivory Coast thus had 3,400 men while the public forces numbered 5,800 men. (These unofficial figures come from a cross-check of information published in the press.) A short time later, however, the tendency was reversed, and in 1979, the army of the Ivory Coast had 4,950 men while the paramilitary numbered 3,000.

Gabon shows similar trends. After an attempted military Putsch failed in 1964, thanks to the intervention of the French troops, President Leon M'Ba strengthened the public forces to the detriment of the army. While the Gabonese army had 300 men and the public forces 1,200 in 1965, 3 years later, numbers stood at 450 and 1,750 respectively. But beginning in February 1969, the army's prestige shot up. By virtue of a ministerial reshuffling (three officers were appointed to the Cabinet), the army was "co-opted into power." This measure was designed to counter-balance the opposition forces, whether civilian or military, to which President Bongo addressed this warning: "All the sorcerer's apprentices, all the politicians left on the shelf, who always believed they would ultimately reach power (...), well, to all of them, I say that they are wasting their time because I have made the army in my own image, and as such, it is my prerogative, as commander-in-chief of the army, minister of National Defense and senior officer in the highest ranks of the army, to issue the orders to the military. What is more, the military know it."

In fact, the numerical gap between the army and the public forces in Gabon has narrowed. Now the former stands at 1,300 men and the latter at 1,000. Moreover, the Gabonese government can also count on 500 French soldiers still stationed at Libreville, as well as on some Moroccan policemen to watch over...the President's security.

Settlement of Accounts

Nonetheless, the "experience" to which the Central Africans have been subjected shows that the strengthening of the public forces does not always constitute an efficient way to ferry coups d'etat. In view of the growing army influence, President David Dacko sought to neutralize it as early as 1961. He detached the gendarmerie from the Ministry of Defense and put it under the Ministry of Interior. In January 1962, the Central African guard, which had become the republican guard, was also put under the Interior Ministry and placed under the command of a gendarmerie officer. In September 1963, an internal security brigade was created and placed under the direct orders of the president of the republic.

In 1965, the Central African paramilitary forces were estimated at 1,600 men whereas the army had only 500. However, it was that small army unit that on the night of 31 December 1965 to 1 January 1966 went into action under the command of its Chief of Staff, Col Jean-Bedel Bokassa. The revolt took on the appearance of a settlement of accounts between the chiefs of the different factions. Gendarmerie commander Izamo was charged with involvement in "a conspiracy fostered by China," and was promptly executed.

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The body of the director of the state internal security brigade, Mr Mounoubai, was "found" at the end of January at a site some kilometers away from Bangui.

It has been proved true that those responsible for carrying out a Putsch can take advantage of the element of surprise to defeat loyalist troops which may be numerically or materially greater. A few resolute men are enough to capture the head of state and close members of his staff.

Only in certain cases has it been possible to reverse the situation, thanks to foreign intervention. This occurred when President M'Ba of Gabon was saved by the French paratroops and General Nimeyri, of Sudan, was unable to recover power in 1971 until the Egyptian troops intervened on his behalf.

Finally, what political role can our officers play, whether or not they are in power? In countries where an apolitical attitude is regarded as treason, to deprive the best organized force of the exercise of this right--merely because mentors from the West have decreed it--seems to be the height of political short-sightedness. That civilians should believe that they can hold the army for a long time away from the centers of decision is tolerable. But that military men should believe that they can brush aside their old colleagues from the political arena is downright foolish. Because this rule was ignored, more than one soldier-president has been tossed out by the same army that placed him on the seat of power. That is why, in Mali, the military are henceforth members of the party. According to the officers, it is because they are "militants in uniform." According to the civilians, it is because they are involved in all the decisions (good and bad), and can no longer plead their non-responsibility to perpetrate a coup d'etat.

Whatever the nature of the established regime, the army can contribute greatly to economic and social development. Participation of the army's corps of engineering in the construction of national infrastructures--as has been done since time immemorial--is essential in every country with a limited budget.

No Cure

Certain countries have gone even further and placed their armies in the production sector. The National Directorate of Cooperatives (DNC) of the Algerian army rivals the greatest industrial enterprises in the country. Employing more than 20,000 civilian and military workers, it operates in numerous production sectors (including public works, construction, carpentry, ready-made garments and several other industries). Finally, thanks to conscription, young people who missed schooling can acquire knowledge that will be of use once they return to their homes. They learn to read and write and they get some discipline and training which the schools often

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fail to provide. Rotation of the forces, however, must be quite rapid in order to increase the number of beneficiaries.

There are thus definite advantages to be derived from the army. But the question remains: is there any defense against Putschs? Even if some therapies were to prove efficient, there would be no absolute cure for the evil. As long as tyrants exist, others will be preparing to overthrow them. And then they, in turn, will rule as tyrants.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ALGERIAN LOAN TO TANZANIA--On 26 March, the Algerian and Tanzanian ministers of finance, M'hamed Yala and Amir Jamal, signed an agreement in Dar-es-Salaam according to which Algeria will loan Tanzania 160 million Tanzanian shillings (80 million French francs) at a rate of 3.5 percent. The loan will be used to finance various development projects in Tanzania. It is considered by Algeria to be an example of its action on behalf of poorer countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 820] 11,464

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

TRIAL OF BOKASSA ACCOMPLICES POSSIBLE THREAT FOR REGIME

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-27 Apr 80 p 40

[Article by Maryam Sysle: "Bangui-Sur-Seine"]

[Text] David Dacko can relax: France is standing by. However, there is this notorious trial. . . And it is here that the new regime feels the ground cracking under it.

Six months after he seized power in Bangui, on 20 September 1979, traveling on a French army Transall, David Dacko can count on Paris' "exceptional support." This was already known, but President Giscard d'Estaing deemed it proper to publicly assure him of the fact in the course of his "working state visit" to Paris, last 24, 25, and 26 March. In terms of security as well, David Dacko can relax: The French paratroopers who were sent to Bangui to overthrow Bokassa, who was already fleeing, will remain there as long as . . . there is no Central African army.

As to the state treasury, it is being systematically filled. It is, therefore, no question of any discontent on the part of officials. According to official figures, French aid reached 68 million French francs for the last quarter of 1979, and 10 million for the first two months of 1980. Finally, Le Boudier, Central African minister of cooperation, who accompanied his boss on his trip, submitted to his interlocutors an economic and social plan--drafted by the French themselves--the financing of which will total 900 million French francs (or 45 billion CFA francs).

Nearly one-half (21 billion CFA francs) will be spent to improve the transportation and communications infrastructures; 15 billion will be used to develop food and industrial crops (coffee, cotton). Dacko who, in addition to Prime Minister Barre, met with French industrialists and bankers, is relying on Paris to help him draw foreign capital into Central Africa. It goes without saying that the chances that his wishes will be met are substantial, the more so since Bangui has accepted a very strict austerity plan drafted jointly with the International Monetary Fund and the French prime minister.

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Foundations and Legitimacy

Within the framework of this close "cooperation," some companies, nationalized under the Bokassa regime, will be taken back by French or international groups. Finally, the industrialists are already interested in the development of the Central African uranium deposits, assessed at 8,000 tons. A meeting of investors could be held in Bangui as early as June. David Dacko, therefore, has all the necessary reasons to be satisfied. The Central African republic will not be abandoned to its fate. Yet. . .

Yet, not everything is for the best within the new system. Certainly, following the advice of his friends, Bokassa's successor is doing everything possible to try to gain a certain legitimacy and lay his foundations. A party, the Central African Democratic Union (UDC) was hastily created and held its constituent congress between 10 and 17 March. Reorganization of administrative institutions, economic decentralization, and agricultural development constitute the party's "program," within which "trends are not accepted, for this is not possible in Africa," but which is, nevertheless, again according to David Dacko, an organization of "a liberal spirit, with multiple trends, and a broad opening." . . . Actually, the UDC is pursuing the single objective of preparing the holding of a constitutional referendum and a presidential election (planned for 1981), for which a single candidate will be nominated. This, it is assumed, will insure the continuity of the puppet system.

Meanwhile, David Dacko is watching. There are detentions here and there, and deportations. Since November Ange Patasse, the former prime minister and president of the Liberation Movement of the Central African People (MLPC) has been detained in the Ngaragba prison, near Bangui, under the pretext of having committed "common law crimes," and a number of his close assistants have been sent away from the capital.

More recently, the public salvation government detained and deported two national officials of the Oubangi patriotic front (FPO) headed by Dr Abel Goumba. They were Manuel Majeot, an official and a technician of the radio and television system, and Cyriaque Bomba. Despite all such precautions, the ground is cracking under the footsteps of David Dacko and his confederates who are caught in a dangerous contradiction: to make believe the dismantling of the Bokassa system without affecting too much the structure inherited from the emperor for life.

It is thus that, pressured by public opinion (which was voiced, specifically, in the course of the 22 September 1979 demonstrations), and having done everything possible to delay it, Dacko and his accomplices were forced to accept the starting of a series of trials of Bokassa's accomplices by the Bangui criminal court.

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In the course of its first session, at the end of last February, the court had sentenced to death six collaborators of the ex-emperor, the sentence to be considered by the supreme court. The criminal court was scheduled to undertake soon the trial of one of Bokassa's sisters and of Mrs Domitien, former prime minister. Initially, it was believed that this would be a parroting of a trial, restricted to a few scapegoats. Yet, as a reader writes us, "the trials are the results of popular pressure," and "the strictest indictments" resulting from the sessions of the criminal court, "were welcomed with euphoria." Above all, a process had been launched which, unless one watches out, risks the crushing of at least a few heads of the team currently in power.

The Trap

It is thus that in the course of the trials a number of ministers have been involved: Henri Maidou, currently vice president of the republic and prime minister at the time of the massacres of school children; General Bozize, current minister delegate to the presidency, in charge of defense, who accompanied David Dacko in his Paris trip; and Alphonse Koyamba, former minister of finance and current vice prime minister. On the request of the chief investigative justice of the high instance court of Bangui, Justice Minister Francois Gueret, had submitted to the Council of Ministers a report dated 19 January 1980, signed by him, in which the charges against these high officials of the regime were stipulated most specifically, particularly in terms of repression and misappropriation of funds. The Council of Ministers had also been "requested to authorize, by decree, the auditing of the members of the government."

Curiously enough, six days before his departure for Paris, David Dacko relieved Francois Gueret from his position as minister of justice. This, in Dacko's thinking, was, unquestionably, a means for suppressing the matter. However, the Central African magistrates objected vigorously. And, despite the "exceptional support" given by Paris, it will definitely be quite difficult to stop a trial which seems to undermine, slowly but surely perhaps, a system which has borrowed excessively from its predecessor and from which it borrowed a certain number of its members.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FRENCH POLITICAL SUPPORT, FINANCIAL AID NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 815

[Excerpt] On 25 March, President Giscard d'Estaing received David Dacko at the Elysee Palace and told him: "You can count on exceptional backing from our country."

The French chief of state also referred to "the overthrow of a regime that had become brutal and contemptuous" thanks to French military intervention. An official communique issued 27 March states that Dacko paid "homage to the action of France and that of the president of the republic, which made it possible to reestablish a humane and liberal republic and embark upon the path of rebuilding democratic institutions."

It is a path politically difficult to take at a time when the Central African chief of state has dismissed his minister of justice, Francois Gueret, because, according to some sources, the investigations he wanted to make within the current government concerning complicity with Bokassa were considered too dangerous, questioning personages such as Henri Maidou, now vice president, who was prime minister until the empire was overthrown.

Other difficulties are economic and financial in origin. As AFP recently recalled, the "change in regime has undoubtedly not yet convinced investors, who are little inclined to trust a government in power for scarcely six months."

The exceptional backing promised by Giscard d'Estaing was to make it possible to solve precisely these difficulties, thanks to public intervention and also by means of the effect such intervention might have on a private sector reassured about the future of the Central African Republic.

There is plenty of good will in the French parapublic sector to come to the aid of the government in Bangui. In particular, one might cite the actions which could be undertaken on behalf of cotton by the CFDT (French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers), which is already active in Central Africa and which could set as its objective doubling the country's cotton production in 2 years. The oil company Total would also intervene to ensure a regular supply of oil to the Central African Republic.

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During his stay in Paris, President Dacko met with Francois Giscard d'Estaing, president of the BFCE (French Foreign Trade Bank). The meeting he granted to a representative of the BIAO (International Bank for West Africa) also shows that international aid is expected to solve one of the most serious problems of the Central African Republic: its foreign debt, on the order of 70 billion CFA francs (nearly three times its annual budget), which prevents it from gaining access to foreign credit.

The Central African delegation accompanying the chief of state, who had reason to be content with his visit to France because of contacts made, it is said, with business circles as well as with government officials, seems to have tried to avoid the French press, making it rather difficult to appraise the results of the trip.

This discretion is undoubtedly explained by the discontent caused in Bangui by the attitude of the foreign press, which has never fallen in line with the official line of French policy since the coup d'etat of 21 September. Newsmen have often given very pessimistic information about the situation in the Central African Republic. Furthermore, a press campaign underway for several months in Paris was aimed at the president of the French Republic as well as certain members of his family, who because of their very posts had business relations with Bangui over the years.

French Aid Program

A communique from the Elysee Palace dated 29 March emphasizes that the financial assistance already given in the sector of transportation will be continued and further states that French aid to the Central African Republic will particularly concern the relaunching of agricultural production (cotton, coffee, food crops), development of mining research, the construction of an earth communications station and the normalization of postal relations.

Among the other domains in which France will be active is the granting of scholarships to Central African students in 1980, modernization of the hospital center and expansion of the Bangui telephone network. The number of technical assistants and high-level personnel in education, training and management will be increased.

The communique also stated that through international organizations, France will back development projects that might receive international support, particularly the project to relaunch cotton production.

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CHAD

LIBYAN, FRENCH ROLE IN CHADIAN CRISIS NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Apr 80 p 19

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "Chad: The Death of a Country"]

[Text] Seven months after its conclusion, the Lagos agreement between the eleven Chadian factions is dead. Nor is it any surprise, for the Molotov cocktail prepared in the Nigerian capital in August 1979 had to explode some day.

In order for this not to be so, the different protagonists would all have had to demonstrate the political will to remain aloof from the influence of foreign countries under which the needs of the fight for power placed them, but this condition was not fulfilled. The thirst for power finally won out over the concern for preserving the fragile equilibrium of a territorial entity that was now a nation in name only. In short, the formation in November 1979 of a pseudo government of national union did not succeed in masking the sad evidence: Chad -- one still has to call it that -- is still living over a bed of hot coals.

Traumatized by a civil war which since February 1979 has been grafted onto an imbroglio that had lasted over 12 years, have the Chadian politicians ever realized that they were no longer the real masters of the game? The real strategists, those responsible for the current situation, are in Paris and Tripoli.

It is France which, on the pretext of opposing the expansionist aims of Libya, put Hissein Habre into the action, a man considered to be a pure, hard-line nationalist. For its part, Libya justifies its intervention in Chad by its desire to fight French imperialism. Actually, each of the two countries exploits the situation for its own good: Libya, in order to satisfy its ambition of extending Islam into Black Africa; and France, in order to maintain its control over a strategic region, without forgetting the prospect of working the substantial resources of the Chadian subsoil. And as the old adage advises that one should "divide and conquer," the method used by both sides has always been to pit the Muslim north against the Christian or animist south.

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Nor is the federalist formula once recommended by France viable. Indeed, what good would it do to have a northern, desert, nomadic nation without the south, the "useful Chad" that is a reservoir of men and economic potential? A federal state would be so unbalanced that in the long run, one part of the country would finally absorb the other. Because Hissein Habre and Abdelkader Wadal Kamougue are deeply marked by their origins, Chad's interest lay in having these two diehard enemies fade into the background behind a third man who would be more level-headed and better able to serve as a catalyst.

This role seemed to fit Goukouni Oueddei. By attacking him, Habre nullified the bargaining that from Benghazi to Lagos and including Kano had established the premises of national reconciliation. Powerless, Africa now witnesses the death of a country whose fate may set a dangerous precedent for the rest of the continent.

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CHAD

NATION WILL EMERGE FROM CRISIS 'MORE VULNERABLE THAN EVER'

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-27 Apr 80 pp 32-35

[Article by Ginette Cot: "The Chad Has Exploded"]

[Text] A new stage in the battle for economic-strategic stakes in a country which France tends to consider its private preserve.

After 15 days of fratricidal and particularly deadly fighting in Ndjamea, left by one-half of its population, nothing at this beginning of April, led to hope for even the slightest possibility to calm down. It was in vain that a number of cease-fires, never effectively applied, had been proclaimed by the leaders of the two main warring forces, the Armed Forces of the North (FAN) of Hissein Habre, minister of defense of the Provisional Government of National Union (GUNT), and the People's Armed Forces of Goukouni Queddei, president of the GUNT.

It was equally in vain that appeals for the cease-fire and for the opening of new negotiations had multiplied, sent by the various African capitals, the OAU, and the United Nations. It was as though the dynamics of a war, latent for months, despite the laborious 21 August 1979 Lagos agreements, had definitively taken the upper hand. It was as though the crisis of unprecedented violence, which had seized once again a country already quite weakened and hurt in the torment, was unable, this time, to find a denouement in a precarious bastard solution, but in the decisive victory of one or the other camp. Actually, if one may say so, all restraints had been lifted from the freedom of action of the fighters. The some 800 Europeans had been evacuated. The French Embassy had been moved to a French military camp located near the air field, where 1,100 soldiers are still officially stationed. The other foreign diplomats, the Americans being the first, had left the country.

On 30 March the 550 Congolese soldiers, the only elements of the Neutral Inter-African Force (NIF) ever to reach Ndjamea, who were billed in the gendarmerie building near the airport without being able to undertake their mission, had also begun to return to Brazzaville. Finally,

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as we know, in the first 15 days of the war, the civilian population in the capital had escaped the horrors by crossing the Chari at a daily rate of 8,000 to 10,000 people, seeking refuge in Cameroon. At the beginning of April the small Cameroonian settlement of Kousseri was already sheltering some 100,000 refugees.

As of that point, everything seemed organized in Ndjamená for total war, for the decisive test.

But how was this point reached? A step to peace and reconciliation seemed to have been taken with the GUNT 11 November 1979 Constitution, the result of difficult and long negotiations. Providing, that is, that one could question the viability of this heterogeneous team of 22 members recently divided by profound differences and even if one doubted the willingness of some among them to sacrifice personal ambitions to national interest and safeguard Chad's integrity.

Actually, during the initial weeks and despite the meager possibilities (the state treasury was empty, and the administration broken up following the departure of the southern officials as a result of the first civil war of February 1979), the team seemed to have become operational. A 200-men military police unit--which was to become the embryo of the national army, as stipulated in the Lagos agreements--had been raised. The government met regularly, and everything possible had been done to minimize the importance of incidents which broke out here and there in a city crowded with armed men.

Tension and Blocking

At the beginning of the year, however, while negotiations for the withdrawal of the French intervention force were being initiated under the guidance of Goukouni Oueddei, the tension rose suddenly: The fact was that the process had been blocked, the GUNT had become paralyzed, and the situation which prevailed on the eve of the Lagos agreements had remained dangerously static. Today the responsibility of the minister of defense of the GUNT appears crushing. Hisssein Habre had refused to withdraw his forces from the capital and the key militarization of Ndjamená, which was a sine qua non condition for the normalization of the situation, whose deadline was 5 February, had been postponed sine die.

Furthermore, the use of an inter-African neutral force, which was to consist of Congolese, Benin, and Guinean troops, and was to help the GUNT in its task, met with the fierce opposition of the minister of defense. To justify his refusal, Hisssein Habre questioned the neutrality of this force, going so far as to claim that the Congolese contingent consisted of Cubans, and that this would also be the case of the contingent of the Benin troops, awaited in vain, and trained, according to

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him, by Soviets and Cubans. Finally, waving the Qadhdhafi scarecrow, he accused his partners of favoring Tripoli's penetration, and was ready to demand the closing down of the Libyan Embassy in Ndjamen. Minister of Defense Hissein Habre was thus multiplying the consequences of favorable statements concerning the keeping of French forces in Chad.

The Council of Ministers had not met since 9 February and, because of a lack of understanding of the tendencies concerning a clear problem, the general policy statement of the GUNT which was to be issued at the beginning of December had not gone beyond the plan stage. By mid-March, the radio station of Mondou, the stronghold of the Chadian Armed Forces, commanded by Colonel Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, vice president of the GUNT, announced that an extraordinary meeting was to be held in the Sahr by the political cadres of the southern part of the country.

New Steps

"Predictably," stated Mondou Radio, "those attending the conference will proclaim failure. In effect, the GUNT has still not been able effectively to demilitarize the capital and prisoners of war (2,000, held mainly in the northern and eastern parts of the country) have not as yet been released, even though the Lagos agreements stipulated their release 15 days following the formation of a Transitional National Union Government. Furthermore, the neutral force is still not operational." Under those conditions, Radio Mondou pointed out, it is not excluded that the Sahr meeting may provide the opportunity for a "new step toward the GUNT asking for the implementation of the Lagos agreements on which the south is basing its hope for establishing peace and security in the country."

However, matters developed quickly. On 16 March Hissein Habre's FAN troops mounted an offensive against elements of the Joint Action Front (FAC) headed by Mahamat Abba Seid, GUNT minister of the interior, in Bokoro (300 kilometers east of Ndjamen), and then in Mongo, in the Guera. Denouncing the assaults against his forces in the central and eastern parts of the country as "a line equipped and supported, financially and logistically, by a big power well established in the country--France in this occurrence," Mahamat Abba Seid announced that the FAC would withdraw from the GUNT if president Goukouni Oueddei would not assume his responsibility to the nation and to international public opinion on the implementation of the Lagos agreements which were being systematically violated.

Having hesitated a long time to use his authority as president of the GUNT, concerned with the preservation of a peace and consensus which were becoming ever more precarious and illusory, Goukouni Oueddei was summoned to action from all sides. A test of strength had become inevitable. The spark which was to trigger a general fire was provided

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on 20 March, with the outbreak of incidents at the military police station, involving elements of Hissein Habre's FAN and Goukouni Oueddei's FAP. The second civil war of Ndjamen, with its aftermath of pain and death, had broken out. At the beginning of April there were casualties by the hundreds (1,000 at least), and the number of wounded, many of whom were to die unless attended, due to inadequate medical facilities, in horrible conditions, was estimated into the thousands (at least 2,000).

Despite the complexity and the shifts in the Chadian puzzle, from the very beginning, a rather clear cleavage had become apparent. The isolated Hissein Habre saw that, in addition to Goukouni Oueddei's FAP, two or three other groups possessing armed forces were turning against him: Colonel Kamougue's FAT, deployed on the southern bank of the Chari, a few kilometers away from the Chagoua Bridge, which commands the southern entrance to the capital, i.e., the African districts where Hissein Habre's forces are concentrated; and the FAC commanded by Mahamat Abba Seid and Acyl Ahmat, whose forces were marching toward the capital from the east. "For us," said Djona Golo, a spokesman for vice president Kamougue, minister of justice, speaking to a French newspaper, "the problem is simple. Hissein Habre has seceded from the legal government of the Chad, based on the Lagos agreements accepted by the 11 Chadian groups. For this reason, we shall defend to the end the authority and legitimacy of the state."

In turn, and in his own way, Hissein Habre shed a rough light on the traumatic events which, once again, are bleeding white the live forces of the Chad. "This war is not a war between two men," he stated. "It is a political battle between nationalist and countryless regressive forces, the allies of Libya, remote-controlled by Libya, the Goukouni-Kamougue-Acyl Ahmat coalition." Knowing that Hissein Habre was launched in orbit by France, in August 1978, imposed on General Malloum as prime minister, and knowing that his forces (following the withdrawal of Goukouni Oueddei's FROLINAT, the ex-jailer of Mrs Claustre, in September 1977) were rebuilt and supplied by that same power, one can understand, naturally, the significance of this cruel war. The Libyan scarecrow was brandished one more time only for the sake of confusing the events and making international public opinion accept the "arbitration" of France.

Therefore, even though the situation on the battlefield had not changed in the least after 15 days of fighting (the FAT and FAN had equal force: 3,000 men on each side, while the FAT and the FAC had not as yet been truly committed to battle), the attention focused on the French military base located on the northern flank of the FAT positions, holding the European district.

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Indeed, following a work meeting, chaired by Giscard d'Estaing in the Elysee Palace, the French government had announced, on 25 March, that the French intervention force would never intervene in the course of these confrontations. It was specified that its sole mission was "to insure the safety of the Europeans and to proceed with their evacuation" (which has already been done). However, the Elysee Palace added, "The French forces remain available to make an eventual contribution to the specific request of the Chadian authorities to engage in any action whose exclusive purpose would be to insure the implementation of the cease-fire." This was a rather vague formula (which Chadian authority's request would be answered, and what type of actions would be carried out?), leaving any possibility open.

Indeed, it is equally clear that France has fallen into a particularly explosive trap which it greatly contributed to building itself, and from which it would have great trouble extricating itself. Yet, it is no less evident that Mr Giscard d'Estaing's government does not intend to abandon the "fruits" of 20 years of presence in the Chad and of permanent interferences in the affairs of that country.

The manner in which the French forces directly intervened in Ndjamena in February 1979, to give a hand to Hissein Habre's army, hurled against the FAT, commanded by General Malloum and Colonel Kamougue, has not been forgotten. Yet, at that time as well, their sole official mission was to "help to maintain the cease-fire." . . .

At the beginning of April, while the French intervention force seemed to maintain a rather doubtful state of expectation, the material, financial, and logistic aid which gave Hissein Habre's forces clear superiority in terms of organization and equipment were being constantly denounced by all in the Chad, undoubtedly it was not a question of a tactical attitude, awaiting a decisive change in the ratio of forces. The Elysee Palace puppets, such as Omar Bongo, were already calling upon France to assume its "responsibilities," as though all that they waited for were African green lights to act if need be.

Actually, the stakes of this murderous war imposed upon the Chadians are considerable. For France it is a question of securing its seizure of the mining resources (uranium and petroleum) of that country, cleverly presented as poor and lacking in resources. It was also a question of preserving and strengthening French presence in this area of major strategic importance, in the heart of Africa which the Elysee Palace is considering, ever more openly, as its private preserve.

Weakened and maimed by this new blood-letting, whatever the outcome of the current crisis, the Chad will come out of it even more vulnerable. That is, unless an unpredictable change occurs in the situation and unless a solid front is organized by all Chadian currents who truly wish

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to bring back peace into their country and safeguard its integrity and independence, without which it would become the easy prey of imperialism.

Therefore, if we must say it, it is all of independent Africa that is affected by the dramatic events shaking up Chad.

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CHAD

SECESSIONISM SAID TO BE AT ITS HEIGHT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 80 p 31

[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Demons of Secession"]

[Text] The north is eating itself up while the south is organizing." Briefly, a young cadre of Cotonchad Textile Company sums up in this sentence the factual division which has characterized from the beginning, over one month ago, of the second Ndjama battle: "The Toubous (of the north) spent their lives fighting. This goes on from generation to generation. How could you build anything with them!" He admits being one of the founders of the Southern United Front, which demands the autonomy of the southern provinces. He does not yet speak of independence but, obviously, this word is burning his lips.

Naturally, the secessionist current he represents is still in the minority. However, it is no longer quite marginal. Last 22 March, the representatives--most of them moderate personalities--of the four southern provinces: Mayo Kebbi, Tandjile, Logone, and Middle Chari held a congress in Sahr. Their demand was autonomous management. Since then, by the force of events, they have obtained far more. Nothing works in Ndjama anymore: roads have been cut off, the airport has been closed down, and telecommunications have been suspended. Therefore, it became necessary for "the south to organize." Moundou became the substitute capital, with its radio station, a permanent council which acts as the government, its landing strip, and its armed forces.

The French Interests

The armed forces? They consist of about 5,000 men, commanded by Col Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue: "The lion of the Saras," as he likes to be called. Some 40 years old, with a small belly, Kamougue is a former student at the colonial military school in Brazzaville. A great lover of American convertibles, he was the chief of the gendarmerie, and in charge of Chadian diplomacy at the time of Felix Malloum. Only 15

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months ago he was very pro-French. Expelled from the government in August of 1978, he had not forgiven the forces of General Forest for having supported secretly the new prime minister at the time, Hissein Habre, and were against President Malloum in February 1979. Folding back in the south, he has since engaged in strong flirtation with Libya, going so far as to officer his troops with "Qadhdhafist" commandos of Acyl Ahmat (see J.A., no 1007). Staffed by a team of young intellectuals, "Radio Moundou" Hissein Habre the "false Mao" or the "real Pinochet," and compares the action of the French army in Chad "to that of the OAS in Algeria."

Should we conclude, therefore, that Kamougue, the uncontested chief of the south, has become Qadhdhaffi's creature? No, at least not yet. The economic presence of French companies is vital to the south: The French Company for the Development of Textiles (CFDT), for example, operates the 22 plants of the Cotontchad and the spinning enterprises of the Chad Textile Company. Yet cotton, the virtually single crop of the south, is the support of some 600,000 planters and accounts for 75 percent of the country's total exports.

Regardless of his statements, Kamougue also appears to have retained his close relations with the French Ministry of Cooperation. It is whispered that this dates from the time when he was the "protege" of Major Gourvenec, head of the intelligence services of General Malloum and close to the "Rue Monsieur." Finally, the alliance with Qadhdhaffi of a person who stated in 1977 that "we shall never yield to the imperialism of Libyan petrodollars," is too much "against nature" not to be circumstantial. Hence, unquestionably, Kamougue's timid military interventions since the opening of Ndjamená battle: advance elements of his army are satisfied, for the time being, with shelling Habre's positions with rockets.

Naturally, the "wisdom" and "good will" shown by President Goukouni are willingly acknowledged. Yet, it is being said, "what is taking place in Ndjamená is a settlement of accounts among northerners. This is none of our concern. Our problem is to eliminate Habre without supporting Goukouni." Regularly invoked for over one year, the secessionist demons have never been so pressing.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

REFINERY OVERHAUL AGREEMENT--According to the terms of an agreement signed in February 1980, the Congolese Ministry of Energy and Mining has entrusted a project to the French company Technip for the overhaul and industrial startup of the Pointe-Noire refinery. Built between 1973 and 1978 by the Sybetra-Voest-Alpine-Sercobe partnership, the refinery has never gone into operation and is the subject of litigation before the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris as the result of a suit brought by the Congolese Government. The refinery has a processing capacity of 1 million tons of crude oil a year. In the Congo, Technip has already participated in the overhaul of the SOVERCO (Congo Glass Company) plant in Pointe-Noire. This plant was built in 1968 by two English companies (Lambot and Company and Fitzpatrick) but could never be put into operation. After an overhaul by Technip, the plant commenced operations in June 1979 with the technical assistance of Saint-Gobain-Packing. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 817] 11,464

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GABON

BRIEFS

SOUTH KOREA IN URANIUM RESEARCH--An agreement on exploration and eventual exploitation of uranium in Gabon has just been signed in Libreville. This was announced by the General Nuclear Materials Company (COGEMA), an affiliate of the French Atomic Energy Commissariat (CEA). This agreement groups the Gabonese state, the South Korean Electric Company and the French company. The exploration zone covered in this agreement extends for approximately 5,600 square kms and is located between the cities of Lastoursville and Mounana, in the central region of Gabon. The COGEMA is in charge of the mining operations. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Mar 80 p 756]

INCREASE IN GNP--According to estimates from the general directorate of the Gabonese economy, Gabon's gross national product (PIB) for 1979 was 598 billion francs CFA, against 539 billion for the preceding year. This constitutes an 11 percent increase, compared with a 21 percent drop in 1978 in relation to 1977. The 1979 increase is essentially related to the increase in oil production. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Mar 80 p 756]

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

MILITARY DELEGATION TO GDR--A Guinean military delegation led by Gen Lansana Diane, minister of defense, made an official visit to the German Democratic Republic from 6 to 13 March. General Diane and the members of his delegation were received by Erich Honecker, leader of the Communist Party and of the East German state as well as by Gen Heinz Hoffman, minister of defense, who had visited Conakry himself in May 1978. The Guinean delegation also visited many units and training centers of the East German National People's Army. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Mar 80 p 745]

INCREASED COOPERATION WITH UK--The 7-member Guinean delegation led by Mamady Kaba, ministry of industry, signed a draft agreement in London on 24 March. This draft agreement is related to a new schedule for long-term payments by Guinea to the Export Credits Guarantee Department of Great Britain. The two sides agreed on the search for an acceptable solution, either on the basis of the 1976 agreement which required repayment for the 6.25 million English pounds until 1991 at a 6.5 rate of interest, or on the basis of a new agreement. Moreover, Mamady Kaba declared on 17 March that Guinea, which had broken off diplomatic relations with Britain in 1965 because of the Rhodesian problem, now wishes to initiate a close cooperation with this country. He added that British firms would be welcome to participate in the exploitation of the rich Guinean mineral resources. During the past 6 months, two important British trade delegations visited Guinea, the first led by Michael Young of AMEY ROADSTONE and the other from the British Consultancy Bureau. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Mar 80 p 746]

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LIBERIA

ALMOST NOTHING KNOWN ABOUT NEW REGIME'S PROGRAM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 pp 907-908

[Report: "The End of the American Dream"]

[Text] On 14 April, Dr William R. Tolbert, a Baptist minister and Mason president, paid with his life the brutal yet not unpredictable advent of an event which, even though unprecedented in Liberia, is quite common in Africa: a military coup d'etat.

In a republic which dates from 1847, whose constitution is modeled on that of the United States, where the American dollar has parity value, and where ties with America in the political class even include the drawl of the rural south, in addition to the stereotypes regarding freedom, democracy, and religion, it is a "sin" which had undoubtedly had to be considered twice before committing a military coup d'etat. The paternal shadows of Washington and Monroe (who gave his name to Monrovia, founded in 1822 by freed black slaves returned to their "homeland") must be shuddering.

However, the American dream was short. Liberia, with its 1.6 million population, was practically controlled by a minority of a few tens of thousands of descendants of the American blacks, holding the majority of political and administrative positions. At the turn of the century the exploitation of the Africans by these unique colonizers was shameless: Slavery was still extant. The main local ethnic groups, Kpelle (over 200,000), the Bassa (170,000), the Wai, and the Kru, who were related to the populations of the neighboring countries, lived separately, while the Liberian American concentrated in the cities or their farms. According to Maurice Delafosse, at that time French vice consul in Monrovia, the announcement of the seizure of Samory in 1898 gave hope to the natives that "the French were going to sweep off Liberia," i.e., put an end to the seizure of the country by the "Americans."

Between 1943 and 1971 President Tubman was the first to try to react against this situation through his "open door" policy. Following his election, he promised to develop the entire country. In 1945, the seventh constitutional amendment made possible, for the first time, a

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parliamentary representation of the people of the interior. In 1947 (the eighth amendment) all Liberian citizens without discrimination, other than the one based on the ownership of the house, were given the right to vote. In 1963 the internal "provinces" were made "counties" on the American model, and the unification of the nation took the path of expanding the dominant culture.

President Tolbert, the appointed successor of his predecessor, pursued this policy even further. The injustice of the fact that it was he who fell victim of the error piled up from 1822 to 1943, and even later, prove, nevertheless, the impatience of subjects who were unwilling to merely gather the crumbs dropping from the tables of their masters.

Breaking with well established traditions, indeed, Tolbert wanted to draw closer to the rest of Africa. He exchanged his jacket for a white uniform like that of his neighbor Seko Toure. While emphasis was put on the "African nature" of the Liberians, for the first time a vice president not of American origin was elected: Bennie Warner who, ironically, was in the United States, attending a meeting of Methodist bishops, at the time of the coup d'etat. The peak of this policy was the election of the Liberian president to the chairmanship of the OAU, for one year, at the Monrovia Summit, held last July. Shortly before that, Tolbert had again displayed, on two separate occasions, his desire for an opening to French-speaking countries, paying in March 1979, a state visit to Paris and, subsequently, at the time of the disturbances whose anniversary coincided with the coup d'etat, receiving military aid from Guinea. Liberia was to attend, as an observer, as it did last year in Kigali, the forthcoming "Franco-African Summit" in Nice.

The mistake of the system, which brought about its overthrow, was that it merely retained the appearances of the American ideal while promoting national reconciliation. The students returning from the United States were even more sensitive than the rest of the population to the disparity between the government's words and actions. That is what led them to launch a movement hostile to the system and which led to the coup d'etat.

Like the United States, Liberia considered itself a democracy. In reality, however, ever since 1878 the power had been monopolized by a single party, the True Whig Party, whose obsolete name reflected its stagnation. All politicians were Masons. This was not open to everyone merely by virtue of initiation costs.* Following the troubles of 1879, an opposition party succeeded in gaining recognition, the Progressive People's Party (PPP), whose president was Gabriel Bacchus Matthews.

* About \$2,000 according to THE FINANCIAL TIMES, while World Bank statistics show a median per capita income of \$470.

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However, the party was banned last 29 March. Of late a nonrecognized group, the MOJA (Movement for Justice in Africa) seemed to be facing a worse future in the hands of the authorities who had strengthened their control over political life after the failure of demonstrations demanding President Tolbert's resignation.

Let us emphasize the popular joy at the announcement of a successful coup d'etat. The bulk of the population had reasons other than those of the students for being dissatisfied with the system.

The disturbances of April 1979 had been caused by the food situation in Monrovia: There was a shortage of rice. Imports increased despite a policy of promoting the cultivation of food crops supported by the chief of state. A stagnant annual production of 250,000 tons of rice could not meet the needs of a growing urban population (Monrovia grew from a population of 40,000 in 1950 to 170,000 in 1975. Following the announcement of a governmental plan to increase the price of rice, the people of the capital rose answering the call of the PAL (Progressive Alliance of Liberia), the ancestor of the PPL. The stores had been looted (causing a damage of \$40 million), and the army, helped by Guinean forces, put down the mutiny, leaving some 100 people dead.

Liberia wanted to be a single nation on the American model. However, corruption was rampant, political speeches notwithstanding. Both presidents Tubman and Tolbert had promised to fight it while reveling in it. The murdered president had substantial private interests. A brilliant political future seemed promised to his family along with an extended control of the state, in the order of things, even though shared with a few other families. According to the MOJA, 3.4 percent of the population still account for 60.4 percent of the national revenue.

Despite certain achievements, the country was stagnant. The scarcity of foodstuffs and high prices had already become a Monrovia characteristic by the turn of the century, and one of the initial effects of American black colonization was the disruption of domestic food production.

In the area Liberia remains the state which has invested the least efforts in education, as 80 percent of the population remains illiterate. The control which the Firestone Company has on Hevea plantations remains the same, while 35 percent of the national labor force is employed in Hevea growing. The opening of public jobs to a larger number of local people, on the initiative of President Tolbert, had as its corollary increased corruption. In 1972 indebtedness had already reached a substantial level (interest accounted for \$19 million on a commercial revenue of \$60 million in 1977). It increased with the cost of organizing the OAU summit meeting in Monrovia (estimated at \$100 million).

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The necessary conclusion is that the army merely followed a path borrowed elsewhere. Unquestionably, it considered that the gap between the governing and the governed was too wide to be filled legally. It set itself a "redemption" mission and has let the civilians, i.e., the old opposition, play a large role in the new government.

However, the blood-shedding nature of the coup d'etat is undeniable. This is no accident, it appears, but the hateful and brutal manifestation of a deep resentment.

This is not to say that Liberia, the loyal ally of the United States and "moderate" countries, is about to change camps. Virtually nothing is known of the program of the new system. The originators of the coup d'etat answered with violence the violence which was practiced by the previous government.

In 1979 there were massacres, torture in the jails, and a price put on the heads of the opposition, according to Amnesty International. What the civilian opposition essentially wanted and what the people in the country who could express themselves wished was respect for the democratic ideal proclaimed by the Liberian Americans who, in fact, were violating it. The model of a small class had become popular.

Sometimes, a coup d'etat seems the only recourse against legal tyranny, when institutions have been rigged for its benefit by a small privileged class which intends to keep for itself most of the national wealth.

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LIBERIA

POSSIBILITY THAT DOE MAY SEEK U.S. SUPPORT NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 80 p 30

[Article by Mohamed Maiga: "An Obstacle Course for the Chief Sergeant"]

[Text] Three weeks after his putsch, the consolidation of the new system is the objective which Chief Sergeant Samuel Doe has set himself. Starting with 18 April, he had three soldiers and one civilian shot for looting. Televised live, these executions took place on the beach of Monrovia, in the presence of the chief of state and the minister of defense, Lt Col Samuel Pearson. "This will serve as an example," stated Chief Sergeant Doe, adding that there would be no more a "mini-Far West" Liberia where holdups and attacks were frequent. Having blocked, two days previously, an attempted counter coup d'etat, Samuel Doe pledged to be firm toward all "trouble makers." For the time being, however, he has shown great moderation toward the losers, the 91 Tolbert collaborators whose trial opened on 17 April in a military court of justice.

Concerned with the presence of "Ivory Coast forces massed at the border," Samuel Doe had informed of this, two days after seizing the power, the United States charge d'affaires in Monrovia. In turn, the diplomat had gotten in touch with the American mission in Abidjan which obtained both the denial and the assurances given by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. It is believed that the American diplomats as well might have tempered the zeal of the Guinean Ahmed Sekou Toure. The latter was threatening military intervention should the Tolbert family be endangered, on the basis of a secret military pact he had concluded with the deceased ex-president. For the time being, however, the Guinean president merely asked for one minute of silence to honor the memory of his (ex-) protege. This was in the course of the keeping of the National Revolutionary Council (CNR), held mid-April in Conakry.

Does this mean that the new Liberian regime has taken its first steps with Washington's help? The day following his putsch Samuel Doe expressed his desire to strengthen the ties between the two countries. It is equally true that American military experts posted in Monrovia

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took part in the reestablishment of the public order as early as 12 April. Washington holds substantial trump cards in Liberia. The 5,000 soldiers of the Liberian army (known as the national guard) and their officers have been trained by American instructors. Military equipment comes exclusively from the United States. For the past three years American military aid has been rising steadily: \$6 million in 1977, \$6.2 million in 1978, and \$6.5 million in 1979.

Political Influence

Will Washington exert a political influence as well on the domestic policies of the new Liberia? There are those who do not exclude it, predicting outbreaks within the new leadership dominated by two rival currents: the Progressive People's Party (PPP) of foreign affairs minister Bacchus Matthews, and the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) of plan minister Dr Togba Na Tipoteh. Both claim to be "on the left," but the second has shown greater ideological coherence and less "spontaneity" than the former. The MOJA, in addition to the support of the intelligentsia, has, above all, the support of the African peasant population from which Dr Na Tipoteh comes. The PPP, headed by people of "American" origin, such as Matthews, rely essentially on the unemployed in the slums, and proclaims an "African socialism," close to the American black ideology of the Black Panthers. It remains to be seen whether, between the two "lefts"--one American and the other African--the young Samuel Doe will be able to keep an equal distance between the two without Uncle Sam's support.

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MALI

STUDENT REVOLT IS ONLY TIP OF ICEBERG

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1004, 2 Apr 80 pp 35, 36, 37, 39

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Mali! Revolt and Repression"]

[Excerpts] Engulfed in turmoil, Mali, an African state, is on the verge of collapse because of the 5-month old confrontation between students and government.

The Malian crisis, however, is much worse. The malaise among students is real enough, as it has always been. However, it is only the visible part of a profound disruption. An official study published in October 1979 went to the root of the problem: the Malian educational system "is only aimed at being a conduit for higher education." Thus, it increases the number of students "admitted to universities." After that, it is a matter of luck: either unemployment, or the civil service, since the state is practically the sole employer in Mali, since there is no productive activity in Mali outside the state enterprises. Agriculture? It is made up of a multitude of rural development operations (ODR) which, through lack of means if not because of conceptual errors, have been agonizing for the last 15 years. International assistance? It took 20 years for international lenders to discover that the exploitation of a million hectares of irrigable land along the Niger River could save the entire Sahel region from famine. France, the World Bank, the EEC and the U.S. only declared themselves ready to invest in the country in November 1978. The Soviet Union? A colony of 3,000 Russians have been living in a ghetto in Kalana for 15 years, involved in the exploitation of a gold mine, while Malians never even saw an ounce of it. The oil-producing countries? They are financing the construction of mosques and at times grant a "budgetary aid" to pay civil servants. The foreign investors? A high official of a French oil company stated to us some months ago: "We shall exploit Malian oil resources. The price of crude is now high enough for the rapid amortization of investments." And, finally, what about private Malian investors? They are rich (sometimes very rich), but they are "in business," (sometimes illegal traffic), or they have established themselves in the Ivory Coast, Senegal or Kenya. Thus, only the state is left. It provides unbounded support to moribund companies created 20 years ago. Since November 1968, when the military

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overthrew the socialist regime of the late Modibo Keita, no one has ever dared attack the state enterprises, which remain the "people's gains." But the gains of the people are a heavy burden. These enterprises register a daily loss of 150 million FM (75 million CFA). Since most of them are practically bankrupt, they cannot honor their fiscal obligations. As for private individuals, they either pay no income taxes because they have no salaries, or else, being rich businessmen, they can bribe civil servants--whose remuneration is almost non-existent--in order to declare less and thus pay less.

The state continues to function because a state is needed. The 1980 budget (77,811 billion FM, less than 40 billion F CFA) has not provided one single franc or investments. Salaries alone require 55,143 billion. But these are only theoretical numbers: no receipts, no credits, therefore no salaries, no grants. This is the Malian inferno exploding today through youth revolts. How did Mali reach this low point? In truth, the country is the victim both of past ineptitude and recent inertia, brutally thrust into the limelight because of the international financial crisis. Who is responsible for this state of affairs? Errors have been piling up in the 20 years since independence. It is Modibo Keita who decided, in 1960, to entrust the economy to the state, in the name of socialism. When the military overthrew Keita in November 1968, they promised a series of changes. They made speeches, but nothing else. Within the ruling junta, young officers maneuvered to stay in power and plotted against each other more than they worried about financial management. In 10 years, the military allowed the economic situation--which they had already inherited in a lamentable state--to rot still more. Moussa Traore was unable, despite his governmental reforms, to save Mali from disaster. He created a party which is supposed to give him a popular foundation. And what happened to him is similar to what happened to many other chiefs of state: the party has resounding slogans but no ideas, and especially those needed to give new impetus to the economy.

Profound Frustrations

The many competent people among the intelligentsia are not blameless either. Having welcomed the 1968 coup d'etat, they quickly lost their illusions, retreating into the strict observance of time schedules, and even into genuine, loyal opposition. Many a high official regrets today he did not take the party in hand.

The opposition? Contrary to appearances, it does not exist, at least in the sense that it never was considered an alternative, and also because it is constituted by minuscule, isolated and divided groups.

It would be unjust, however, to impute the responsibility for the present Malian disaster solely to the Malians. If state enterprises cannot meet their operating expenses, it is also because the cost of spare parts, fuel, electricity and maintenance of old equipment is 5 or 10 times higher than 10 years ago.

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Thus, the student revolt has been left far behind. It only revealed a generalized failure. As long as no one will admit that the Malian malaise is economic before it is political, all the revolts, all the coups d'etat, all the changes in government will only be a temporary outlet for deep frustrations.

The Adventure

Under present circumstances, only a government of national salvation could put order in the chaos and re-plaster the walls of a crumbling state. The solution for Malians should be that, whether belonging to the party or not, in a last effort at dignity, they succeed in persuading themselves that it is no longer a question of who should govern, but how to preserve Mali's very existence. Only then would they be able to mobilize themselves. This people, whose national consciousness is doubtless one of the most solid in Africa, has the ability to rebound. But they cannot act alone. At the point they have reached, with only their pride left, they must receive assistance from abroad for everything, for the rebuilding of their economy through the influx of capital and an end to the territorial isolation of their massive country.

As long as Malians remain convinced that their isolation leaves them outside the international economy, they will be obsessed by the ever-present ghost: an opening to the sea. Every adventure then becomes possible, and this could endanger the regional balance in this part of Western Africa. Mali is one of only two African countries (Guinea is the other) whose constitution anticipates renouncing its sovereignty in the name of African unity. Attempts at federation failed in the early years of independence, but Malians never gave up the idea of a federation, in an attempt, among other reasons, to gain access to the sea.

Another obsession deriving from the first and which finds its source in the collective remembrance of past glories: Malians today have inherited imperial pride from the ancient empires of Ouagadou, Manding or the Songhai, to the point that--it is no secret--certain of its neighbors suspect Mali of still dreaming about domination. One must admit that these suspicions do have a foundation in fact, when one refers to recent history. This is unfortunately true; the proof resides in the fact that in January 1975, at the time of his visit to Mali and at the request of other chiefs of state in the region, French President Giscard d'Estaing insisted on receiving assurances from Malian leaders that they did not harbor velleities of hegemonism. This is reason enough why it is vitally important for the entire sub-region that Mali receive support in fighting chaos. Moreover, it is dangerous to let Mali seek renewed breath alone: it could well, then, look for it farther--and elsewhere.

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MALI

BRIEFS

BRITISH TRAINING--Mali had asked London to cede to it 2 HS 748 transport planes. Arguing that the transaction could only be effected on a "commercial basis," the British Government nevertheless agreed to immediately provide training for a Malian specialist in the maintenance of these planes. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1011, 21 May 80 p 46]

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NIGER

SONICHAR MONEY LENDERS' MEETING

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 811

[Text] The meeting of backers of the Niger Coal Company in Anou Araren (SONICHAR) came to a close on 21 March following deliberations that lasted 2 days. The meeting was to decide on the financing of the second phase of work for the startup of mining and the construction of a thermic power-plant which would produce 100 million kilowatt-hours annually starting in 1983.

The cost of the second phase is an estimated 24 billion CFA francs, with the portion of funds supplied by the Niger Government amounting to 8 billion. The remaining 16 billion will be the subject of long-term financing.

The African Development Bank, the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (France), the National Bank of Paris, two American banks (City Bank and the Chase Bank), the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Kuwaiti Fund and OPEC all participated in the meeting.

The company's purpose is to work a coal deposit near Agadez, estimated to contain over 6 million tons, and to set up a thermic powerplant capable of producing 100 million kilowatt-hours annually starting in 1983.

According to Minister of Planning Mahamane, the total cost of the SONICHAR project is now an estimated 64 billion CFA francs, including 40 billion for the first phase of work. The cost of the first phase was covered by the 11.7 billion CFA francs in capital and 28.3 billion francs in a long-term loan.

Over the next 20 years, the SONICHAR thermal powerplant should enable Niger to save 150 billion CFA francs (1979 value).

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SENEGAL

1980 EXPECTED TO PRESENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 pp 963-965

[Text] While the Senegalese economy revived somewhat during the first few months of 1979--thanks to the favorable course of the 1978-1979 harvest--it was confirmed early in the second quarter of 1980 that the current year will doubtless be difficult for Senegal.

The office of the president and the office of the prime minister are perfectly aware of this, and last 19 September Mr Abdou Diouf, the prime minister, had already presented to the National Assembly a plan of recovery and correction. The known results of the peanut harvest of 1979-1980 were, however, unfortunately poor and threaten to make an already worrisome financial situation worse, while at the same time some social tension has been observed recently.

Will the recovery plan of Mr Abdou Diouf enable Senegal to overcome its present difficulties? It is not impossible, for Senegal has some trumps, as we emphasized in a previous article published on 5 October entitled "On the Eve of the Counting of the Offers of Diama, A New Dimension for Senegal." Among these trump cards are especially the great OMVS [Senegal River Development Organization] and the completion of Dakar-Marine. But the benefits of the harnessing of the Senegal River will come only over the intermediate term, while the industrial installations of Dakar-Marine, whatever their economic interest, will be insufficient, when they are operational at the end of 1980 or in early 1981, to reactivate the economy and refloat Senegalese public finance.

In the meantime, in March, the saleable harvest of peanuts was about 400,000 tons, and it is estimated that the total harvest will not exceed 450,000 tons, a figure from which one must deduct about 130,000 to 140,000 tons of seed, leaving a saleable balance of 300,000 tons. The 1977-1978 harvests yielded 442,000 and 782,000 tons, respectively, not counting seed.

While agricultural receipts will decline, the petroleum bill will increase greatly, and is estimated for 1980 at 46/47 billion CFA francs, compared with 25/26 billion in 1979. This rise threatens to aggravate the deficit in the balance of trade, which last year was 50 billion CFA francs.

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This is why a mission of the IMF visited Dakar from 17 February to 6 March, and its diagnosis will doubtless affect the financial policy of the Senegalese Government. The share of SDR's to Senegal would be raised from 42 to 63 million, however.

At this point it is permissible--in the interests of Senegal itself--to ask what are the deep causes of the "Senegalese disease", which reminds one, to some extent, of the "French disease", the clinical analysis of which was the subject of a well-known work.

The Burden of the Feudal Groups

Never have the two feudal groups which dominate Senegalese life--that of the great marabouts and that of the government party--been so powerful. No social or political decision at whatever level, has a chance of being applied if it does not have the support of the great marabouts. The Family Code, promulgated in 1972, has remained a dead letter on many points, because it went against certain Koranic or traditional rules. Prosecutions loudly proclaimed against the perpetrators of embezzlements and frauds, peter out when a particularly well-protected "talibe" is found to be compromised. Muridism is strengthening its position and is increasingly gaining the appearance of a religious nationalism. In the face of this competition the Tidjans have restored, since May 1979, a unity which had been compromised since 1957 by problems of succession. Muslim intellectual circles are uneasy over certain displays fanaticism as well as over the growing influence of Arab countries which strive to convince the masses that Islam is inseparable from Arabism.

For their own part, certain responsible party leaders tend too much to act like "feudal lords" when they feel protected by higher echelons which need their services as grand electors. The information media are almost entirely at the service of the socialist party, and the opposition is at the moment too divided to worry those in power. The Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) comprises mainly malcontents who did not get the advantages they hoped for when they were in the Socialist Party (PS). The Senegalese Republican Movement (MRS), officially recognized early in 1979, presents a resolutely conservative program which could enjoy the support of Muslim religious circles, but for the moment it makes little noise. The left is still divided, despite appeals for union, and is recruited mainly from the intellectual circles.

Malcontents are nevertheless numerous in the country. While the student and school pupils' strikes and demonstrations often have very concrete motivations (absenteeism of the teachers, poor living conditions in the dormitories the resources of which are often embezzled, etc.), they increasingly reveal the worry of the young scholars in the face of an uncertain future. Unemployed people with university degrees are not rare. And one may wonder what jobs the 350,000 pupils and 15,000 students of 1980 will have when they enter active life?

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President Senghor is not unaware of these realities, and this is without doubt what is making him delay his departure. But his constant concern of imposing his image as a great writer and the priority often given to foreign policy problems doubtless do not permit him to search actively for solutions to economic and financial problems.

He is nevertheless increasingly pushing to the forefront his prime minister and boasts of his statesmanlike qualities. As designated crown prince, Mr Abdou Diouf indeed has the abilities and will necessary to take charge of the country. He will be able to do so if he relies on the young cadres not yet spoiled by the exercise of power and concerned for the common good. But he will have to have a completely free hand and the "pontiffs" of the party will have to refrain from raising obstacles to his actions.

It is sometimes said in "well-informed" circles of the capital that President Senghor will announce his departure during the visit which Valery Giscard d'Estaing proposes to make this year to Senegal. If true, 1980 will be a turning point in the history of the country.

Short-Term Results of the Stabilization Plan

On the economic side, as we have indicated, 1979 ended as a difficult year, despite a good beginning. It was opened, on 1 February, with the presentation of the short-term stabilization plan worked up by the government and, 11 months later, the prime minister gave the results of this plan to the National Assembly.

The first part was the tax reform, promulgated on 1 June. For imports, customs duties were standardized at 5 percent. Customs duty was eliminated or reduced to 10 percent for all imports enhancing the development of local industries, the ordinary rate being set at 35 percent. On the other hand duties of 45 percent and even 70 percent are levied on all luxury products and those which compete with local production. The common value added tax was set at 18.5 percent and raised to 50 percent for luxury products. The tax on performance of services was standardized at 15 percent, with a reduced rate of 5 percent for activities of social application and at 12.5 percent for tourism. The tax on exports is applied only to phosphates and peanut products.

Operating expenses, with a ceiling of 99 billion CFA francs, actually amounted to 99.8 billion. Receipts reached 107 billion and their slight surplus made it possible to apply 11 billion to investments, instead of the 9 billion planned.

As we have already indicated, the deficit in the balance of trade in 1979 exceeded 50 billion CFA francs due to the bad peanut harvest of 1978-1979, the 20 percent drop in world prices, and the increase of the price of petroleum, average consumption of which is 800,000 tons per year. The bill rose to 25 billion CFA francs in 1979, and, we have stressed, it will be more

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than 45 billion in 1980. And starting a short time ago, the Senegalese have been paying 165 CFA francs (3.30 French francs) per liter of super, and 155 CFA francs (3.10 French francs) per liter of regular gasoline.

As a result, the current balance of payments was negative at the end of 1979, amounting to 33.7 billion CFA francs, and also at the end of 1979 debt service stood at 15 percent of the value of exports and 19 percent of that of tax receipts.

Unfortunately the new sources of energy are not yet ready to provide relief. The Diama dam, the first stone of which was laid on 12 December 1979, is mainly destined to reclaim the lands of the delta of the Senegal River, by preventing the rise of the saline water. And while the first stone of the Manantali dam, on the upper Senegal, should in principle be laid before the end of 1980, the completion of the hydroelectric plant has been put off for lack of financing.

Senegal is participating actively in research in the field of solar energy. A solar pump, operating on photovoltaic cells, was inaugurated last 19 September at Aere-Lao, but that is still only a very burdensome pilot operation.

Natural difficulties are added to the difficulties of foreign origin, for nature did not come to the rescue of the government. The saleable peanut crop in 1980 will probably be only 300,000 tons. This deficit is due to lack of rain, to a reduction of the cultivated area (1,096,000 hectares compared with 1,157,000 hectares in 1978), and to the quality and quantity of seed distributed (127,300 tons instead of 147,800 tons in 1978). Cotton production, which really began only in 1963, had reached 45,000 tons in 1976-1977, with a yield of more than 1000 kilograms per hectare. The 1978-1979 crop was 33,800 tons, with a yield of 700 kilogram per hectare. There is a good chance that this drop will accelerate: in 5 years the cost of production rose by 77 percent (mainly because of insecticides), while the purchase price for cotton (49 CFA francs a kilogram) exceeds only by 7.50 CFA francs that of peanuts (instead of 12.05 in 1963-1964).

The harvest of millet and sorghum is estimated at 500,000 tons, that of rice (paddy) at 120,000 tons. The food deficit therefore is reaching at least 225,000 tons, which must be distributed to 3 million uprooted peasants, and saving the cattle will require the sum of 4 billion CFA francs, 3 billion of which is expected from international aid. A program of protection of seed stocks and products in course of processing, deteriorated by the late rains of the last two years, is estimated to cost 3,352 million CFA francs.

The government is once again struggling against brush fires, and 1970 was a year of reforestation, thanks to vigorous propaganda ("one child, one tree", "one woman, one tree"...). Three million trees have been planted, but the continuation of the program will cost 7 billion CFA francs.

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"A Society Which Cheats..." Said the Prime Minister

The activities of the 27 public establishments and the 75 mixed ownership companies represent 40 percent of the GDP and these organizations employ more than 25,000 people. But those whose management is satisfactory are rare. On 27 September 1979, the chief of state called a meeting of responsible officials to denounce the evils afflicting this public and quasi-public sector: disorder in bookkeeping, fantasy management, waste of assets, excessive personnel, excessively high salaries, and interference by politicians notables. While accepting willy-nilly these criticisms, the responsible officials noted that one could add others: flight of high level managers into the private sector, sluggishness of administration in allocation of credits or settlement of bills, and instability of directors. All this explains the present tendency of the state to rely more on private initiative.

Several public organizations are particularly criticized. ONCAD [National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development] has become an excessively heavy organization (4,767 agents, 2.5 billion CFA francs in salaries, and a turnover of 100 billion), and therefore often inefficient and very difficult to control. In a statement last 7 December, the minister of rural development admitted that "up to now ONCAD had served as a repository of political patronage..." Since 10 October the office has had a new director-general in the person of Mr Abdourahmane Toure, who proved himself by re-establishing order in SIEDEC [Senegalese Company for the Importation, Distribution, and Exploitation of the Cinema] in three years. Mr Saliou Sarr, ex-president-director general of ONCAD, has found another job as head of the new COSENAM [Senegalese Marine Shipbuilding Company] created with a capital of 1 billion CFA francs, of which the state holds 84 percent.

BUD-Senegal, which exported early vegetables to Europe, was placed in liquidation of 3 September 1979, putting 3,000 people out of work. It was the victim of quite bad management: a good part of the means of production were said to have been used on the personal estates of certain officials.

President Senghor himself denounced the misuse of the organizations which are in principle supposed to promote housing: SICAP [Cape Verde Real Estate Company], and OHLM [Office of Low-Cost Rental Housing]. The rise in the prices of construction materials does not entirely explain the fact that the cost of housing has risen 150 percent in 10 years. The establishment in Dakar of many inter-African organizations, especially the headquarters of the Central Bank of West African States, caused frenzied speculation in rental properties. SICAP and OHLM have not escaped this trend: their latest completions are almost solely villas and apartments the luxury or medium type which Senegalese officials get allocated to themselves, in order to sublet them to international officials at profits of 50 to 100 percent.

In his speech program of 19 December 1979 to the National Assembly, the prime minister stigmatized the ills of Senegalese society which are the causes of

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poor management and increasingly numerous embezzlements (of which there have been some in ONCAD, the Social Security, Rural Development, the Post Office, etc.): laziness, love of pleasure, laxity, and waste are the most visible manifestations of a society which cheats and proceeds in a happy-go-lucky way." In three years 47 high officials have appeared before the court of budgetary discipline, 49 were punished, and there were 48 cases of abuse of trust in the private sector. Also on 5 December the National Assembly extended to the latter sector the law which increases the penalties for those guilty of embezzlement.

The Plan for Recovery and Taxation

In his program speech, Mr Abdou Diouf gave the broad outlines of a recovery plan which should accelerate growth within 5 years: continuation and maintenance of financial improvement, revival of investments in which the proportion of public saving will have to rise from 15 to 25 percent by 1985 by the reduction of the rate of growth of the operating budget (12.5 percent for receipts and 10 percent for expenses).

A policy of truth in pricing and redistribution of income should make it possible to increase private saving: at the beginning of 1980 the purchase of prices of cotton and peanuts were raised, the salaries of administration were raised (by 4 percent to 34 percent), and the interoccupational guaranteed minimum wage as well (25 percent). On 1 July the index point will be raised by 7 percent.

The government is going to strive to reduce the deficit in the balance of trade by limiting the volume of imports (that of 1980 must not exceed that of 1977), by raising from 5 to 10 percent the customs duty on all imported products, and by encouraging exports.

Confirming and explaining the directives of the prime minister, the Minister of Finance, Mr Ousmane Seck, gave a very realistic review of the economic and financial situation of his country on 19 March in Paris, before the members of the CIAN [International Committee for Black Africa, the former AIAT], and the informational letter of CIAN, dated March 1980, contains it.

Mr Ousmane Seck mentioned the three basic guidelines of the activity of the government:

- 1) Priority for better job mobility so as to remedy the extremely serious inconveniences caused by the impossibility of dismissals. The survival of certain enterprises which can no longer bear certain personnel costs is at stake.
- 2) In the field of prices, a new policy of truth in pricing, especially through a reduction of subsidies. Liberalization of prices and elimination of the system of blocking should make possible margins which provide more incentive.

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3) Overhaul of taxation, which is considered relatively severe compared with that practiced by other countries of black Africa, in the hope of creating more incentive to foreign investment.

According to the statements of Mr Ousmane Seck to CIAN, a note concerning taxation was submitted to President Senghor on 24 March 1980. It confirmed that the tax burden is very heavy in Senegal, the direct tax being paid by a small number of people, actually by salaried personnel in the modern sector who represent less than 4 percent of the active population, a percentage which in practice should be reduced to 1 percent, for in the enterprises only 20 percent of the salaried workers pay the general tax on income, because of their family burdens especially.

The note affirms, on the other hand, that the Senegalese tax system has not been an incentive to investment by private parties. It stresses that the Senegalese citizen is either too poor to invest or he has an income so heavily taxed that investment is either impossible or unattractive.

The study submitted to the chief of state is not only critical, for it advances suggestions for more tax incentives, and the minister of the economy and finance has already asked his services to study modifications of the Investment Code and to make concrete proposals which could be included in the next finance law.

Along with this, and in the framework of the austerity budget, expenses for matériel will be considerably reduced, as well as Treasury subsidies to the quasi-public sector, and taxation will be revised so as to penalize imports which are not indispensable to the national economy. Finally, the special accounts of the Treasury must be rebalanced, and the large deficit of the Autonomous Amortization Fund will be covered by an increase in the value added tax.

In conclusion, while in Senegal as elsewhere the financial difficulties are temporary: rising cost of energy, inflation (largely imported) and also drought, a phenomenon alas peculiar to the Sahel countries, one cannot be unaware that to the financial difficulties are added sociological burdens which are the principal cause of the "Senegalese disease" like others, in France for example, which have been feeding the "French disease" for a long time.

So this advantage of the existence, very old in Senegal, of a bourgeoisie with a cultural level similar to the same social class in Europe, risks being neutralized if the behavior of Senegalese social elite continues to be too egocentric, if the bourgeoisie forgets the poverty of the peasant masses, if it does not reduce its prestige expenses, if it does not invest enough of its capital and intellectual resources in Senegal, and if it does not support the economic plan in the most literal meaning of the word "support".

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SENEGAL

FRENCH TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 p 965

[Text]

In millions of French francs	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total
Bilateral aid.....	294	394	384	470	536	600	2078
Including:							
FAC (Aid and Co- operation Fund)							
Subsidies.....	62.5	66	74	63	93	90	448.5
Technical Assis- tance.....	87					145	

French technical assistance has stabilized in numbers and reached 1574 persons on 1 October 1979, divided as follows: general administration--47; Ministry of Justice--14; financial services--26; agricultural services--43; Public works, equipment--57; post and telecommunications--5; health--86; miscellaneous--11; primary education--33, general secondary education--620; technical instruction--239; professional training--88; higher education--305.

The planned cost of technical assistance for 1980 is 160 million French francs.

In 1979 the Aid and Cooperation Fund contributed 50 million French francs, mainly in the following operations: the Diama dam (first effect of the triangular cooperation entrusted to Henry Jean-Baptiste); Dakar-Marine (all of the installations of the naval shipyard were transferred to Senegal on 1 January 1980; 36 French technicians remain assigned to it and 15 million francs are envisaged for the personnel training plan); The Delta Harnessing and Exploitation Company; forest development; study of the iron deposit of eastern Senegal; University (70 million francs over four years).

The aid has affected primarily (in millions of French francs): education--24; grants for study and courses abroad (650)--16; scientific research--32; food aid--3; various equipment--50.

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Loans of the Central Economic Cooperation Fund in 1979 amounted to 160 million French francs.

French investments, with a total of 260 million French francs, represented 45 percent of the total in 1979.

There were 18,200 French citizens in Senegal, of whom a little less than 6,000 were children of school age. A French school has been operating for them for 2 years.

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SENEGAL

NEW FUEL, ELECTRIC POWER PRICE INCREASES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 806

[Text] On 26 March, the price of fuel rose 3 francs in Senegal. As a result, a liter of super gasoline has now gone from 162 to 165 CFA francs, the price of regular gas has increased from 152 to 155 CFA francs, and finally, diesel fuel has risen from 100 to 103 CFA francs.

The last fuel price increases came on 26 February. In mid January, other increases had already occurred, bringing about a general increase in mass transportation rates.

Ousmane Seck, Senegalese minister of state for finance and economic affairs, explained that the increase in the cost of living in general and in the price of fuel in particular can mainly be explained by the higher cost of oil. Seck said that the oil bill would exceed 40 billion CFA francs, more than 50 percent over last year's figure.

Finally, the minister said that in order to pay for its oil, Senegal will have to spend a sum equivalent to over 40 percent of its export receipts, when 2 years ago, only 23 percent of these receipts covered oil purchases.

Furthermore, since January, SENELEC [presumably Senegalese Electric Company] has raised rates twice. The overall increase is an average of 6.5 percent. It is expected that there will soon be a third increase on the order of 8 percent.

SENELEC has in fact had to face different increases. At the beginning of January, increased wages meant an additional charge of 400 million CFA francs and 300 million for equipment. The minister of industrial development had granted a 4-percent rate hike.

In mid January, another increase was made necessary because of the higher cost of oil products. In 1979, SENELEC used some 189,000 tons of heavy fuel and 4,300 tons of diesel fuel. For 1980, it estimates it will need 192,000 tons of heavy fuel and 8,400 tons of diesel fuel. Due to the price increases, the additional charges will be an estimated 828 million

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CFA francs. A new request was submitted to the minister, who will accept the recovery of only 400 million out of 828 million. This caused an increase in rates on the order of 2.5 percent, applied at the end of February.

Finally, on 25 February, a new increase in the price of oil products was to bring about additional charges on the order of 644 million CFA francs, added to the 428 million that had not been recovered previously. Consequently, SENELEC introduced a third request for a rate increase, which may be on the order of 8 percent, in order to recover the loss caused by this new charge of 1,073,000,000 CFA francs.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

POLISH FISHING AGREEMENT--The Senegalese-Polish joint fishing commission met in Dakar from 25 to 28 March. The delegation representing Senegal was headed by Robert Sagna, secretary of state for deepsea fishing. Edwin Vichnevsky, undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Trade and Maritime Affairs, headed the Polish delegation. The meeting, during which officials evaluated compliance with the deepsea fishing agreement concluded between Senegal and Poland in 1976 and valid until 1982, was deemed highly positive by both sides. Technical cooperation will be intensified and new emphasis will be placed on fishing training. In the near future, Poland will receive 45 Senegalese trainees. The programs will improve the competency of persons working in the field of fishing. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 805] 11,464

NEW MEASURES AIDING WOMEN--On 23 March, Senegalese Prime Minister Abdou Diouf announced, in his address marking National Women's Weeks, that effective on 1 July, working women will receive their entire wages during their maternity leave. The measure changes the situation of wage-earning women who to date have received only half of their pay during the entire maternity leave. In addition, Mrs Maimouna Kane, secretary of state for human advancement, indicated that her office "has encouraged the establishment in our country of a private company that will provide jobs for 1,500 women and that in only 4 months has paid a minimum of 30,000 francs per month to 630 Senegalese." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 805] 11,464

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SOMALIA

BRIEFS

IMF ASSISTANCE--At the end of February the International Monetary Fund approved an agreement authorizing Somalia to make purchases amounting to a maximum sum equivalent to 11.5 million DTS [SDR] over the next 12 months, in support of the financial program adopted by the government for 1980. The Somali economy is presently confronted with serious difficulties because of the prolonged 1973-1975 drought. As a result, public expenditures have increased rapidly, exports of agricultural products, which represented about 90 percent of the total exports, have diminished, inflationary tendencies have intensified and the balance of payments has been considerably weakened. At the same time, foreign assistance registered a significant decrease and political events aggravated the situation in the region. The government's program for 1980, set up to improve the financial and economic situation, is aimed at slowing inflation and reducing the deficit in foreign payments in the years to come, through the adoption of measures tending to slow the growth of the money in circulation and favoring the increased production of agricultural foodstuffs, thus lessening the need for expensive imports of food. Somalia's contribution to the IMF is 23 million DTS, and the total amount of this country's debt to the IMF for previous operations and transactions amounts presently to 4.9 million DTS. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Mar 80 p 760]

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

HIGHER OIL IMPORT COST--According to Charles Nyirabu, governor of the Bank of Tanzania, the cost of Tanzanian crude oil imports should be some 2.2 billion shillings in 1980 compared with 230.7 million in 1972. Consequently, oil imports should represent 45 percent of the value of all Tanzanian exports in 1980, a year when they should total some 5 billion shillings. In 1972, exports already amounted to 2.27 billion shillings and the oil bill therefore made up only about 10 percent of their value. The governor recalled that Tanzania's trade balance showed a deficit of 1.68 billion shillings in 1977, with imports amounting to 6.19 billion. He added that the deficit increased the following year (5.3 billion, with imports totaling 8.86 billion). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 820] 11,464

COST OF LIVING FIGURES--According to the Bureau of Statistics in Dar es Salaam, the consumer price index in Tanzania increased 13.3 percent between the fourth quarter of 1978 and the corresponding period in 1979, going from 277.6 to 314.4 (base 100 = 1969). Food products increased only 8.3 percent during the same period of time, beverages and tobacco 14.9 percent; and clothing and shoes 23.8 percent. It should be pointed out that certain observers believe that inflation in Tanzania is much higher than these official figures, allegedly amounting to 30 percent annually. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 820] 11,464

CUBAN AID--Mrs T. Siwala, Tanzanian minister of national education, recently thanked Cuban authorities publicly for their aid to Tanzania, particularly in the field of education. The minister said that Cuban aid has made it possible to build three secondary schools and that four more are being completed. There are 29 Cuban doctors working in Tanzania. A center of artificial insemination has been set up in Butiama, near Musoma, by Cuban technical assistants. A delegation headed by A. Gomez Trueba, first deputy chairman of the state committee for economic cooperation in Havana, traveled to Dar es Salaam to join with Tanzanian authorities in examining ways of continuing Cuban aid. On 30 March, the delegation signed an agreement for the sending of 15 Tanzanian teachers to Cuba, where they will receive agricultural training. Havana will also train teachers in the field of fishing and will send fishing experts to Tanzania. The contract of Cuban doctors in Tanzanian hospitals will be renewed for 2 years. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 820] 11,464

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