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28 May 1980

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 676



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Background of Arab-African Cooperation Examined  
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Apr 80) ..... 1

Policy of Cooperation  
Sub-Saharan View, by Siradiou Diallo  
Real, Imaginary Obstacles, by Habib Boulares

IEMVT Research on Tse-tse Flies, Trypanosomes Reported  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Mar 80) ... 11

Briefs  
Possible OICMA-OCLALAV Merger 15

ANGOLA

Brazilian Influence Seen Dangerous  
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 31 Mar-13 Apr 80) ..... 16

Briefs  
French Textile Training 17

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

EEC Gives Details of Aid to Previous Regime  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Mar 80) ... 18

IMF Credit To Support Economic, Financial Program  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Mar 80) ... 19

Details of 1980 Budget Given  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Mar 80) ... 20

Details on 1980-1981 Economic, Social Recovery Plan  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Apr 80) ... 21

- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]

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CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Briefs		
	French Infrastructure Aid	25
	Repatriation of Soviet Teachers	25
CHAD		
	Goukouni Threatens To Accept Libyan Aid (Goukouni Oueddei Interview; PARIS MATCH, 25 Apr 80).	26
	French Should Continue To Play Humanitarian Role for Present (Editorial; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Apr 80) .....	28
	Pro-Libyan Role Played by Acyl Ahmat Noted (Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Apr 80) .....	31
CONGO		
	State Fishing, Glass Companies Strengthened (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Mar 80) ....	33
Briefs		
	ATC Occupation Training Center	34
	Opango Under House Arrest	34
GABON		
	Bongo Accused of Abetting French Neo-Colonialism (Antonia Blis; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 31 Mar-13 Apr 80) .....	35
	Finance Minister Outlines Future Economic Policies (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Apr 80) ....	38
KENYA		
	EEC Loans Aid Projects Reviewed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Mar 80) ...	41
	Tana River Dredging Equipment Request (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Apr 80) ...	42
LIBERIA		
	Nation Believed To Be Moving Toward Multiparty System (Jos-Blaise Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Apr 80) .....	43

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Coup Seen as Warning to African Governments (Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Apr 80) .....	47
MALI	
Salvation To Be Achieved From Both Inside, Foreign Sources (Sennan Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Apr 80) ....	49
Economist Advocates Measures for New Economic Order (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Apr 80) ...	52
Briefs	
Saudi Arabian Health Assistance	54
Cuban Agricultural Assistance	54
MOZAMBIQUE	
Briefs	
French Credit for Boats, Energy	55
NIGER	
ADB Financing of Sonichar Electricity Project Reviewed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Mar 80) ...	56
SENEGAL	
Council of Ministers Examine 1980-1981 Draft Budget (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Apr 80) ...	58
New Housing Bank Established (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Mar 80) ...	59
New Installation for Dakar-Marine (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Mar 80) ...	61
Briefs	
Truck Gardening Project	63
IDA Credit	63
Army Strength Increase	63
ONCAD Embezzlement	63
SOMALIA	
Siad Barre's Price for U.S. Bases (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Apr 80) .....	64

- c -

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CONTENTS (Continued)

TANZANIA

Development of Forestry Production Discussed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Apr 80) ...	65
FRG Sponsored Irrigation Program (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Apr 80) ...	66
Briefs	
Work on Capital	67
Hydrocarbon Price Increase	67

- d -

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INTFR-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BACKGROUND OF ARAB-AFRICAN COOPERATION EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Apr 80 p 61

Policy of Cooperation

[Text] Three years after the establishment of Arab-African cooperation, that cooperation now constitutes a fundamental concept in the policy of the countries concerned. The first African economic summit of the OAU (Organization of African Unity), which will be held at Lagos on 28, 29 April 1980, will have to examine, among other things, the development of this cooperation. What is its historical, human and political background? At the present time, what is the record of aid from Arab countries to African countries south of the Sahara? How does public opinion in the latter region view that cooperation? These are the questions that these articles are trying to answer.

Sub-Saharan View

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Apr 80 pp 63-65

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] More than ever, Arab-African cooperation is at the center of political reality on the black continent. Since the spectacular splits between almost all of the sub-Saharan capitals and Israel, the Africans have abandoned their position of expectation, as a result of the October 1973 war, if not from atavistic indifference to the struggles and convulsions that are destroying the Arab world. Everything is happening as if the warning shot heard in October 1973 had provoked in them a veritable burst of conscience.

In any case, since then, the slightest event affecting the Mideast--particularly Arab declarations, behavior, and decisions concerning black Africa--is closely followed, commented upon and debated. Often passionately. Some express their satisfaction with "the motivating role which the Arab nations, especially the Palestinians are playing in the struggle against Imperialist domination;" others are reproaching "the arrogance of the 'nouveaux riches' who prefer to put their petrodollars in western banks rather than invest them profitably in Africa."

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Certainly, all sub-Saharanans do not view the Arabs in the same way. Far from it. Slight nuances, if not serious differences, in judgment appear according to geographic location, intellectual level, political and ideological options. But simply, it can be said, that in the Sudan-Sahel region, which extends from Cap Vert to the Horn of Africa, the centuries-old influence of Islam has played an important role in the rapprochement, to say nothing of the understanding, between Africans and Arabs. So much so, that in spite of the wars and conflicts of all sorts that have marked their relations, the former consider the latter as "coreligionists with whom cohabitation is certainly not easy," but toward whom they have no inhibitions. The peoples of central Africa, who have long kept to themselves, view the Arabs, if not with suspicion, at least as "partners with whom they should be on guard." On the other hand, traumatized by the horrible slave trade which devastated all of East Africa today, the people living along the shores of the Indian Ocean still harbor a stubborn resentment toward them.

#### A Common Destiny

However, at the present time, sub-Saharan public opinion generally concurs in the belief that Africans and Arabs share a common destiny. In spite of the distortions and artificial mirages deriving from the oil manna, young people and intellectuals less often consider the Arabs as "false brothers," or, with greater reason, as people from another planet. To make it clear that their situations are identical, many of them are recalling the wounds of colonialism suffered by our peoples in the past, believing that today Africans and Arabs still share the same bitter fruits of exploitation and underdevelopment.

According to the new generation of African historians, like Guinean Thierno Mouctar Bah, assistant professor at the University of Yaounde, and his Cameroonian colleague, Emmanuel Ghoms, a professor at the Ecole Normale Supérieure [College of Education] in the same city, relations between the Moslem world and the Bilad es-Soudan (the Black nations) go back very far in history. Over the centuries, they say, "the wagons of the Garamantes, then the camel caravans braved the immense desert, which, in truth, has never been a barrier. As early as the eighth century, after the conquest of North Africa by the Omniads, Arab merchants have crossed the Sahara, attracted by the gold of the Sudan."

As for the Bilad es-Soudan, continue our two historians, this intensive international trade was also the occasion for transmittal of new technology. In addition to trading commodities, it is important to consider the mobility of men, the spread of customs and the exchange of ideas. Therefore, they say that through the Arabs, the penetration of knowledge and new methods began and accelerated throughout the centuries, affecting different fields of human activity. This is especially true in architecture where the Sudan-Sahelian style, characteristic of the buildings in Timbuktu, Gao or Djenne, in spite of their originality, show a definite Maghrebine influence. It is also true of military technology, where it is an established fact, according to our two academicians, that the nations of the Sudan were dependent on the Moslem world of the North for their equipment, especially for their armor.

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Without denying their contribution to the development of precolonial Africa, some people, like the Senegalese Doudou Gueye, one of the leaders of the former ADR (African Democratic Rally, of which the Ivorian Houphouet-Boigny was president) believe that "today, the Arabs have no model to offer us." Because, they say, they have only money and fanaticism. And Dr Doudou Gueye cites the destabilizing actions, the arrogance and the attempts at corruption being carried on throughout Africa by Colonel Qadhdhafi. Our Senegalese speaker also states that Arab-African relations will never be entirely sound as long as the Arabs refuse to renounce their dream of domination of black Africa.

#### A Common Course

This type of mistrust dates from the era of slavery, notes Prof Owona Joseph, director of the Yaounde Institute of International Relations. In his opinion, the peoples living in different parts of the Sahara, far from having a quarrel to settle today, have, on the contrary, mutual interests to defend and have available a solid foundation for nourishing cooperation. Even more so since "Islam is an integral part of some of black Africa." The only question, he says, is that we sometimes have the impression that the Arabs are too closely linked to the western economic system. It is on such grounds that one wonders whether the well-known "dialogue" aimed at connecting Africa and the Arab world to Europe will not end in a reactivation of the old compact. Because, it is we, the Africans, who, once more, will pay the cost of the operation.

There is no reason to make accusations against the Arabs, says Prof Bibombe Muamba of the faculty of Law at Lubumbashi (Zaire). There are, he says, Westerners who, in order to better pursue their policy of domination, foster the suspicions and prejudices of Africans against Arabs. If this were not the case, everything speaks in favor of a sound and fruitful cooperation between the two populations.

This is also the opinion of the president of the African Development Bank, Mr Goodall Edward Gondwee (Malawi). In his opinion, Arab-African cooperation has already traveled a long and fruitful road. Consequently, it is proper to eliminate all misunderstandings in order to "pursue our common course." Because, he adds, Arabs and Africans have a "common destiny" which far exceeds the alleged give-and-take imagined around the breaking off of African relations with the state of Israel. This cooperation, he concludes, is in the "nature of things."

On the whole, one could state without fear of being contradicted, that the principle of Arab-African cooperation has won the approval of all of sub-Saharan Africa. Certainly, from time to time the suffering related to racism, of which African diplomats and students were the object in some Arab country, is brought up. But similar "flashes" will not alter the tree of cooperation whose roots plunge deeply into hearts and minds everywhere. Didn't the eminent Malien scholar, Hampate Ba say that it is impossible to understand African languages and civilization without calling on Arabic? And that this language is to us, the Africans, what Latin is to Europeans. Undoubtedly, this is a hasty generalization, since the Sudan-Sahel region is not all of Africa.

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This does not prevent the solidarity which is being recreated today, in spite of criticism and obstacles, from being based on principles and a foundation which no one can deny any longer. Not only because from two sides of the Sahara the people fully approve of them, but because they are as sound as they are ancient.

Real, Imaginary Obstacles

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Apr 80 pp 67-71

[Article in Habib Boulares: "Real and Imaginary Obstacles to Sound Cooperation]

[Text] Is Arab-African cooperation limited to the flow of money which could aid in the development of Africa? To hear the critics and the speech-makers, everything is reduced to the level of pennies, a lot of pennies, no doubt, but still, pennies! Is the attitude of black African countries toward Israel political? It is also sometimes presented as a "set-off" of an acquired or desired flow of money. According to some people, the inadequacy and delays of that financial flow could cause a change in attitude.

Oil, which is a source of revenue for some, and a source of annoyance for others, is not left out of the debate, even at J.A., where the editorial board feels that it is impossible to present documentation of Arab-African cooperation without a chapter on oil.

There is only one way to clarify this fairly confused business: open a free and uncomplicated debate by introducing, pell-mell if necessary, anything that seems to be obviously related to the area of Arab-African cooperation, with the actors--all of the Africans and all of the Arabs--being responsible for evaluating the specific importance of each of the factors.

Arab-African cooperation? First of all, the subject appears to be equivocal: which Africans? Which Arabs? The Africa laid out in the atlas is well-known; but are all of its inhabitants aware of belonging to a single unit? How many times have North Africans, citizens of the Maghreb countries, felt themselves to be excluded when listening to black Africans speak of Africa, as if the continent began at the Senegal River and extended to the southern part of the Sahara? This span of burning, but not uninhabited, sands--has it really separated tropical Africa from Mediterranean Africa throughout history--as it is often said? And even if this were the case, what is to be said of the Arab countries located to the east of the Sahara, of the Sudan, mixed and black; of Somalia and Djibouti, members of the Arab League, in spite of their specific character? How can the finest scholars in black Africa give lip service to the fact that the Egyptian civilization of the pharaohs was of negro origin, and reject the Egypt of the present day as being non-African in political discourse?

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This withdrawal of the acceptance of the words Africa and African aggravates and maintains the confusion in peoples' minds. Oddly enough, the more the Arabs soften their criterion of Arabic nationality, by admitting to cultural mixing, as with the Somali, the more questions they raise. Why wouldn't they admit the Comorians and the Chadians under those circumstances? One must agree that this behavior is not easy to understand.

Are black Africans alone responsible for this? Definitely not! The Africans from the Mediterranean, being Arabs or Arabized, consider themselves more Arabic than African, even if the latter dispute over the designation annoys them. In Tunisia, they willingly remember that the name Africa originally meant the region around Carthage, although this affiliation for the name does not imply the establishment of a truly African policy. Perception of an Africa larger than the Arab-Berber region was clearer before colonization. For example, they sing about the bravery of the Tauregs and their attachment to freedom. Abdel Kerim, hero of the Rif, adopted as a war chant a poem beginning with these words: "Hail Africa!".

Today, scarcely anyone but Algeria, among Mediterranean Africans, is developing a policy on the continental scale. Libyan interventionism is too marked by territorial or denominational ambitions to serve as a means of reconciliation. Egypt is too much a prisoner of its fundamental or contingent problems to take up the thread of a cooperation judged ambitious in the time of Nasser. And, at Dakar, we still remember the ambassador from Morocco who expressed his joy to President Senghor at "finding himself for the first time in Africa!"

Restrictions in vocabulary which express the collective unconsciousness do not stop there. Because, although the Maghrebs are not always considered as Africans, they are no longer placed entirely in the same category as Arabs by the black Africans. When a black African leader calls for Afro-Arabian cooperation, the second epithet is applied, in his mind, to the Mideast, scarcely to North Africa.

Finally, anyone who speaks of cooperation between Arabs and Africans finds his words translated as: black Africans and Eastern Arabs. Unless in place of Eastern Arabs is understood: wealthy Arabs; in which case, Libya is automatically understood.

The Golden Calf

Alas! money has stolen some of the richest aspects of true cooperation between black Africans, Arabic Africans and Eastern Arabs. Oversimplifications have definitely identified the Arab with Croesus. However, the reality is far from the myth. Of the 21 independent states making up the Arab League, only 7 are large exporters of oil: Algeria and Libya in Africa; Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Iraq in the Mideast. And, among these fortunate 7, only 4 countries have a surplus of money: Libya, Saudi

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Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates: 17 million citizens are considered to be rich out of more than 149 million Arabs.\* Less than one-tenth of the total.

This figure must be remembered when speaking about Arab money: a golden tree which hides a forest of lead. Is it known that in terms of 1977, the revenue of all Arabs taken together would only distribute \$1,000 per capita, per year, that is, as much as the average Algerian income? It is hardly known that three members of the Arab League number among the poorest countries in the world: Sudan, Mauritania, and Somalia. However, at the time of the establishment of the BADEA (Arab Bank for African Economic Development), all of the members of the league shared in the capital of that institution, including those with the least money; without expecting anything from them, since it was decided that that organization will lend to any Arab country, if it is African and poor. This is not a form of self-sacrifice: the FADES (Arab Economic and Social Development Fund) will lend only to Arabs. This is a means of channeling the flow. Yes, but oil money is cursed. It can only be enjoyed by paying a zakat, the tithing for purification which Islam imposes to make the profits legitimate.

However, the Arabs are not the only oil exporters: Nigeria and Gabon are also members of OPEC. Other countries, without being exporters, produce enough for their own needs. It is true that Africa is importing oil which is becoming more and more expensive; but Africa also exports oil which is becoming more and more expensive.

Why are these problems of development only asked in terms of oil? And why are the problems related to oil only asked in Arab-African terms? In this area too, we see extremely dangerous simplifications of vocabulary: development = money = oil = Arabs!

#### The Past Rewarded

In truth, the question of oil must be put in either a broader or more African context; the non-African Arabs must play an auxiliary role, certainly not inconsiderable, but not determinative. Angola, Algeria, the Congo, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria are all African countries whose exportation of oil represents more than 50 percent of foreign receipts. Tunisia and Egypt, although they are not large-scale producers, export a surplus of crude oil, but also import some because of differences in quality. Burundi, and the Sudan are small-scale producers, but export some refined oil. Kenya, Mozambique and Senegal import crude oil and export petroleum products. Cameroon rightfully expects to become self-sufficient very soon. In all, 20

\*The figures in the atlas of the World Bank show that in 1977 there were in the member countries of the Arab League 149,512,000 inhabitants, including 17,355,000 in the 4 countries with surplus currency. It is necessary to stress again that the figures do not include Arabs who have emigrated to Europe or to America, or nearly 5 million.

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African countries (or more than half of the population, considering Nigeria and Egypt) are either exporters or self-sufficient. This is why it seems questionable to continue to pose the problem of Arab-African cooperation in terms of money coming from oil. If this cooperation is to be successful, it can only be so by being founded on the broadest terms of brotherhood and solidarity.

Cooperation where the field is widened to include the white, mixed and black races, sons of Shem and Ham, will not come of itself. The thread of the past has been broken on many occasions. While today, black historians are trying to reconstruct history--among other sources--from the essential contribution of Arabic manuscripts written by Arabs or Arabized Blacks, this past has already been reconstructed by the facts and the doctrines of colonization; and the distortions are numerous between, on one hand, the image projected by oral tradition, which is an expression of collective memory, and, on the other hand, what is revealed by the analysis of the past through the European mirror. Scientific research is aware of these distortions and is trying to correct them; common practice is ignorant of them, or is often responsible for them, by giving them the force of truth.

To unravel the threads of dangerous mysteries, we must recall that until the 15th century onslaught of the Portuguese and Spanish on the coasts of Africa (starting with Morocco), the continent lived apart from the large area of exchanges whose center was located in the Mediterranean area, and more to the east than to the west. But in its relations with the outside world, Africa was already differentiated according to regions: although the links to western and central Africa with the outside were essentially on land, along the north-south and east-west axes, communications with east Africa were through the ports established along the coast.

In the west and center, that part of Africa that was involved in international life stopped at the edge of the dense forest and only reached the ocean here and there. In the east, it depended on the river axes and on the ports. The impact of these kinds of relations was considerable. The mixing of cultures, but also of men, is much deeper in the west than in the east. Islam is a good illustration of this. The Berbers in the north, Islamized and then Arabized, went to spread the new religion to the west and center of the continent. And the Islamized Blacks took over, not without a mixing of the races which means that even today some of them claim to be of Arabic lineage, which is, of course, difficult to prove. On the other hand, in the east, Islam was made up, throughout the centuries, of an influx of foreigners, who, even when they were established in the interior of the continent, took charge of trade and the bridgeheads. Even in the river valleys (especially the Nile), Islam made progress only to the extent that its spread was assured by the native population.

Colonization totally reversed the situation. Bringing both the European model and Christianity, it became established along the coasts. And this event had profound repercussions on African life. Turning from the coast to the interior,

7

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to the west and to the center, the colonial phenomenon limited the ancient powers, mostly Islamized, to an attitude of conservative retirement that the break with the north, which was weakened and in turn colonized, increased. Access to modern life was increased along the coast, by the European model and by Christianity. But the situation was different in the east.

First of all, the fact that the coast was occupied by Moslem Arabs or Christian Europeans made no difference to the Africans in the interior. In fact, by competing with the Arab merchants, the Europeans offered a possibility for revenge to the Africans in the interior who had reason to hate the sultans of Zanzibar and the princes of the mercantile and slave trading bastions. Aided by the nature of the terrain, it was in the interior of the eastern part of Africa that Europe found its best foundations for economic and human colonization and the establishment of white power coming from the sea was, paradoxically, a return from the interior to the coast. But, everywhere, modernization was, as in the west, synonymous with Europeanization and Christianity.

Traces of this are left. An entire cultural and spiritual heritage has vanished, although there is an immense field for investigation in the Islamic-Arabic contribution to a fantastic intermixing of cultures everywhere on the continent.

#### Africa Is Not for Sale

Culture also means language. There too, there is no lack of topics for friction. At a time when Africa apparently sees herself without inhibition as "francophone" or "anglophone," some black African leaders are annoyed to see the Arab states trying to build mosques and to spread the Arabic language, a language of "access to God" necessary for all Moslems, as Latin was for Christianity. Learning French or English is considered the way to modernity, although Arabic (the official language of the OAU, UNESCO and many other international organizations) fosters mistrust.

But Africa has enormous problems of development, and to grant military, denominational and linguistic aid is a serious error in which Qadhafi's Libya takes great delight. We can, then, understand the irritation of some black African countries which would have the same reaction if the Christian west proposed to limit its aid to the construction of churches and to the teaching of French, English or Portuguese. The process of blackmail for religion, language or even support for Palestine against Israel is much less acceptable when it gives black Africa the impression that it is for sale.

The Arabs should give more attention to African sensitivity. Nasser became famous in black Africa because of his anti-imperialism and not because of his African policy which was aimed at separating Israel from the continent. For ten years, the Arabs have pursued the same goal, adding to it the connection between oil and raw materials. However, it is not with a policy of counterparts that they gain the heart of black Africa. Even by increasing the financial flow. Money does not make happiness, but contributes to it, on condition that it is well-used.

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Having said that, take the Libyan example and apply it to all of the Arab countries dependent on another glaring simplification which keeps the mysteries alive. BADEA does not build mosques and for a long time now, Tunisia has offered valuable technical assistance wherever it could be developed, from Niger to Zaire. It is true that Morocco furnished military aid to Mobutu which was regarded in a bad light by the progressives; but Algeria has also helped so-called revolutionary countries.

In Africa today, there are 49 independent nations, all members of the OAU, among which 9 are also members of the Arab League. To the east of Suez, there are 12 other Arab countries and the Palestinian entity represented by the PLO. To pose the problem of Arab-African cooperation would come back, in all minds, to the establishment and development of the most varied ties among 62 national bodies, waiting for Namibia and Zimbabwe to join them.

This great assembly represents a geographic and historic continuum; and the common denominators all support one another, even if they don't mingle. The most typical example is that of Sudan: a poor country, it is one of the group of the poorest in the world, like Burundi. Black, it is unquestionably rooted in negro cultural values. With an Arabic majority on the cultural level and totally Arabic by political choice, it is part of the Arab League. Although it is Moslem in the center and in the north, it is Christian and animist in the south. A country of desert and swamps, it is also a country of rivers and dense forests. Sudan is a symbol: it puts in proportion everything which should unite the Africans and Arabs and constitutes the basis of their cooperation: culture, languages, development, intercommunity understanding, history.

However, this multisectorial cooperation, to which must be added solidarity toward the outside world, is far from being a success. Too often, we forget that cooperation did not begin with the oil crisis. As early as 1957, ties were established between Ghana and North Africa. It was Tunisia, then Morocco which went to the aid of Lumumba in 1960. It was from the Tunisians and the Algerians that the Angolans found their first physical support in their war of liberation. And, until Nasser's death, the Egyptians were among the most numerous Arabs encountered in black Africa in the field of technical assistance.

Economic and technical cooperation; cooperation in the fight against colonialism, but also ideological cooperation. Before the creation of the OAU, the groups in Casablanca and Monrovia included both black and Arab members. And although Senghor has always had more in common with Bourguiba than with Sekou Toure, it was to Nasser that the Guinean leader extended his hand rather than to Houphouet-Boigny, in 1963 at Addis Ababa.

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An Anticipated Ideal

The 70's have changed everything, upset everything. And in putting money at the center of their concerns, today, the diplomatic corps has replaced elective relationships by forced relationships. However, as soon as we gave up to power and money, Europe again became more in evidence than ever.

Confined to forms of government which they wish to identify with nations on the road to unification, today, the countries of Africa seem to be comfortable with a dependence on their former colonizers, a dependence that they wished to abolish in the 60's.

Never have black and Arabic African countries seemed so dependent along the North-South axes as they are at the present time. And it isn't only the economy which plays the determinative role in these relationships. The weight of acculturation is decidedly much more important than the dreamers of 1960 realized. Alongside of the "francophones," "anglophones," and "lusophones," the North Africans seem to be an exception because of the common denominator of the Arabic language and culture.

An illusion! Qadhdhafi has his uniforms made in Italy, the Maghrebines turn their eyes toward Paris, and London is the turntable for international relations in Sudan. France "holds" her former colonies better than ever; and if Great Britain does not give the same impression, it is because of the difficulties suffered by her economy over the last 20 years. Just the same, it was in London that the protagonists in the Rhodesian drama met.

Frankness

This cultural, political, economic, and even military "presence" of Europe in Africa makes the Arab-African tet-a-tete totally illusory. Whatever they do, in the present state of affairs, Arab-African cooperation will involve a third partner, which is, in truth, an arbiter: it is Europe. We should probably give Valery Giscard d'Estaing his due for having called a spade a spade by proposing (but is it a proposal or a statement?) the organization of an Afro-Arabic-European "dialogue."

A dark and pessimistic conclusion? Let us say, rather, that it is of a nature to reduce the degree of hypocrisy in the relationships and to consider them for what they really are: relations between governments and nations aspiring to an ideal of entente and brotherly cooperation, but not questioning either the colonial heritage, nor the will for power, nor national egotism.

No one can throw stones at his neighbor in this affair. On the other hand, if we approach cooperation with such frankness, we can bet that we will see opening in the face of that cooperation, horizons that are presently hazy, if not closed in.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

IEMVT RESEARCH ON TSE-TSE FLIES, TRYPANOSOMES REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Mar 80 p 734

[Text] In intertropical Africa the most important traditional cattle raising, as we know, is that of the Indian ox, which is always in the Sahel climatic belt. But the disastrous drought during 1970-1973, which resulted in the migration of this bovine breeding from the Sahel region toward the Soudanese zone in the search for new grazing grounds, and the general tendency to cattle breeding development in damp areas, give importance to a blood parasite disease, animal trypanosomiasis, transmitted by dipteran insects (or tse-tse flies), which are also carriers of a similar illness in man, sleeping sickness.

Indian ox breeding in areas infested with dipteran insects is possible, but it depends on chemical-prophylactic and chemical-curative treatments, which are only palliative and can produce resistance to medication. Currently, production of a vaccine will probably involve long term research. Therefore, at this time, it certainly seems that eradication of the diptera insects is still the main weapon in the battle against trypanosomiasis.

Present methods aspire to eliminate the diptera insects directly, generally by selective application of insecticides. This chemical battle has experienced certain progress and continues to be very useful. However, in a damp area its use is restricted due to a too brief dry season (low persistence of benefits), permanent rivers (pollution), the large surfaces to treat (high cost), and disastrous results on nontargeted animal life.

In the face of the new situation created by the need to increase animal production in a damp region, it was appropriate to test new battle methods against diptera insects and the genetic battle or autocide (releasing of diptera insect males sterilized by gamma radiation, which then enter into competition with wild males) could be an acceptable possibility if it were adaptable to conditions in the field.

The technological problems that the operation of the method ran into--mass breeding of tse-tse flies, choosing the stage of insect growth for radiation, the doses of radiation to apply, and evaluation of their results on longevity, competitiveness, the behavior of radiated males, etc.--were the object of

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preliminary studies in the entomology laboratory at the Institute of Cattle Breeding and Veterinary Medicine of Tropical Countries (IEMVT) at Maisons-Alfort during 1965-1972. *Glossina tachinoides* males, raised at Maisons-Alfort and dispatched by air to Chad after radiation were released in 1972-1973 in natural refuges on the Chari and Logone rivers. These releases made it possible to study the behavior of these males and disclosed certain limits to the practical ways of applying the method.

The research accomplished at Maisons-Alfort and in Chad led to the building of a specialized research center in Upper Volta at Bobo-Dioulasso, financed by the French Ministry of Cooperation, with the participation of the Office of Technical Cooperation of the FRG. Three French veterinarians, a German veterinarian, three French technicians and 15 Upper Voltan technicians are permanently assigned there.

The center, built by the IEMVT in 1974, includes, besides offices, a laboratory, animal house and storehouse, an insectarium where 60,000 *glossina palpalis gambiensis* females were raised. This breeding provided a surplus of 3,500 males a week which, after being marked by stains painted on the chest and after radiation with 11,000 rads in an apparatus containing four sources of Cesium 137, were released for 8 months a year in forest enclosures 70 km west of Bobo-Dioulasso sheltering populations of *g. palpalis gambiensis*, the dominant species, and of *g. tachinoides*, which is less numerous.

The main objective was to analyze the effectiveness of the method of evaluating, through regular observations, the capacity for dispersion and the longevity of the radiated males and by studying the dynamics of populations (sex ratio density, ratio of sterile males to wild males, etc.) and the control of fertility in wild females, their effect on the natural population.

Behavioral studies showed excellent adaptation by radiated males in the field. But what seemed chiefly important is that the last observations, effected after the 1979 rainy season, show a demise of the wild population of *g. palpalis gambiensis*. *G. tachinoides* in the same natural refuges remained at its previous level.

The only restriction one sees in the method, outside of its strategic organization for an extensive operation, lies in the uncertainty of being able to apply it to all species of diptera insects, especially to those mainly dispersed in the Soudanese savannas and therefore scarcely accessible to the sterile males, whose effectiveness can be demonstrated only on detached populations of low density.

For this reason, at the Bobo-Dioulasso center at least the IEMVT has operated a study program since 1978 of the biological phenomenon of trypanotolerance. This refers to the fact that certain animal species and races can tolerate a moderate infestation by pathogenic trypanosomes without showing grave clinical symptoms. They are, therefore, fit for working the savannas heavily populated with tse-tse in which no other type of cattle raising would be

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possible. However, trypanotolerance has a limit, and that is specifically the aim of research undertaken, with special financing from the General Delegation for Scientific and Technical Research (DGRST) with the participation of German cooperation, to better understand the biological foundations of the phenomenon to increase its effectiveness.

In a parallel way, the successful experimental results of the autocide battle are on the way to moving into the operational stage, with extension of the insectarium to industrial proportions (600,000 females of the two species: *g. palpalis gambiensis* and *g. tachinoides*).

The French financial effort, shown in the table below, raises our country to the first rank of those that, through better nutrition, aspire to improve the destiny of African peoples.

Contribution financière de la France (1)  
(En 1 000 francs français)

	(2)		(3)			Activités de terrain		(5)	
	Recherche		Formation			TOTAL		TOTAL	
	Mise en œuvre IEMVT	Mise en œuvre IEMVT	Mise en œuvre directe	Mise en œuvre Total	Mise en œuvre IEMVT	Mise en œuvre directe	Mise en œuvre IEMVT	Mise en œuvre Total	
1960 à 1965	2 000	-	-	-	(4)	-	2 000	2 000	
1966	638	-	-	-	-	-	836	836	
1967	1 036	-	-	-	-	-	1 036	1 036	
1968	1 081	-	-	-	-	-	1 081	1 081	
1969	1 320	-	-	-	-	-	1 320	1 320	
1970	1 288	-	-	-	520	-	1 808	1 808	
1971	815	-	-	-	4 000	-	4 615	4 615	
1972	957	-	-	-	-	-	957	957	
1973	1 210	-	-	-	62	-	1 278	1 278	
1974	2 567	-	-	-	-	-	2 567	2 567	
1975	1 681	-	-	-	242	-	1 923	1 923	
1976	2 128	563	412	975	180	412	2 871	3 263	
1977	2 161	-	210	210	-	210	2 161	2 371	
1978	3 235	210	800	1 010	128	800	3 571	4 371	
1979	3 539	107	400	507	80	400	3 726	4 126	
1980	3 111	265	420	685	-	420	3 370	3 796	
TOTAUX	28 771	1 145	2 242	3 387	5 210	2 742	35 126	37 368	

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Key:

- 1. French financial contribution (In 1,000 French francs)
- 2. Research
  - IEMVT operations
- 3. Education
  - IEMVT operations
- 4. Field Activities
  - IEMVT operations
- 5. Total
  - Direct operations
  - IEMVT operations
  - General Total

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

POSSIBLE OICMA-OCLALAV MERGER--N'Fagnanama Kone, Malian rural development minister, and Dr E. K. Andah, Ghanaian agriculture minister, have said that the merger of the International African Migratory Locust Organization (OICMA) and the International Anti-Locust and Anti-Avarian Organization has become an absolute necessity. Dr Andah, who chairs the OICMA board, has asked Kone to contact all member-nations of both organizations in order to arrive at "a final decision on the merger." [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1018]

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ANGOLA

BRAZILIAN INFLUENCE SEEN DANGEROUS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 210, 31 Mar-13 Apr 80 p 15

[Article: "Portugal: The Brazilian Danger"]

[Text] "The Brazilians are more dangerous than the Cubans in Angola," said Bernardo Guedes da Silva, the founder of the defunct A NACAO in an extended interview with O TEMPO last 28 February. A partisan of Realpolitik with respect to the former Portuguese colonies, disapproved of by all the "new conquistadors" and "returnees" in Portugal, this "liberal on the right" is stating an incontestable truth: the Cubans are there only in their role in support of anti-imperialism and not to conduct business with Luanda. And Lisbon, which feels it is in a privileged position to conduct business, feels threatened by the Brazilians, whom it sees as invaders. The interview with Guedes, coming after those with Savimbi and Chipenda, probably did not come about just by chance, since he stated, among other things, that "Portugal has a mission to accomplish with regard to Dr Savimbi. This does not mean supporting him in his revolutionary attempt (sic) in Angola, but, given the specific conditions of history and language, trying instead to reconcile Mr Savimbi and the Angolan government. That would be the right attitude." Especially for Portuguese businessmen, who are overlooking only one thing in this history: the permanent aggression of Pretoria, which wants to maintain its control over Namibia and because of that to destroy the Luanda regime, which supports SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization]. An operation in which for a long time Savimbi has played an important role.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

FRENCH TEXTILE TRAINING--Following the completion of projects in Angola in cooperation with Creusot-Loire Enterprises, the Schaeffer Engineering Company has just entered into an agreement with the Ministry of Industry and Energy of the People's Republic of Angola for the accelerated professional training of textile specialists for existing plants belonging to the Textile Enterprise of Angola, whose main office is in Luanda. There will be 96 students in each of the two training sessions, which will take place at a center designed by Schaeffer Engineering. Schaeffer is also in charge of selecting the candidates for each session. Training will cover all textile activities handled by Angolan plants: spinning, weaving, dying, printing and maintenance. The contract amounts to nearly 9 million francs and will be part of the framework of a French loan agreement signed at the end of last year between the National Bank of Angola and the Bank of Indochina and Suez in Paris. Duration of the contract is 2 years. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 825] 11,464

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

EEC GIVES DETAILS OF AID TO PREVIOUS REGIME

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 629/630

[Text] In reply to a written question from Mr Marshall, a member of the European Parliament, the European Economic Community (EEC) Committee, on 26 February 1980 in Brussels provided details of the aid granted to the imperial regime (dating from 4 December 1977 to 20 September 1979) and reviewed the sum of recent aid to the Central African Republic (CAR).

In 1978, execution of the aid program under the Lome Convention (covering the period 1 April 1976 to 29 February 1980) went forward and commitments were undertaken relating to a total of 16.59 million European units of account. Simultaneously, food aid involving 170 tons of nonfat powdered milk was agreed on.

After the beginning of 1979, when the first news was heard about the 20 January events in Bangui, the Committee, considering the development of the situation in the country, became more insistent that its activities were used solely for the people's benefit, and therefore limited any new commitments under the program, which did not rise between January and September of that year beyond 824,000 European units of account. Other than the program cited, the only new initiatives were a grant of 170 tons of nonfat powdered milk, and a grant of 100,000 European units of account in connection with an operation undertaken by a nongovernmental agency to train agricultural leaders.

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18

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

IMF CREDIT TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL PROGRAM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 629

[Text] In February, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a confirmation agreement dealing with the first credit installment and authorized the Central African Republic to purchase, over a period of 12 months, a maximum amount equivalent to SDR's 4 million to support the government's economic and financial program for 1980.

An IMF communique emphasized that the Central African Republic is facing a very difficult economic and financial situation. Since the beginning of the 70's, the persistent large budget deficit has posed a very serious problem. As a result, there have been major delays in payment of government commitments, and this has served to discourage private investment. The budget imbalance, added to the increasing precariousness of the foreign payments position, likewise prevented the adoption of an adequate program of public investment. These difficulties were further aggravated by factors beyond the control of the authorities, such as the substantial rise in the price of imported gasoline. Thus, the economy as a whole intended to become stagnant, despite the fact that the Central African Republic has a relatively diversified resource base.

The program approved by the government for 1980 has two major targets: to contain the overall balance of payments deficit, and to achieve a reasonably satisfactory economic growth rate, giving priority to expansion of agricultural production both for internal demand and export requirements. The program is also directed at reducing pressures on domestic prices.

The Central African Republic's IMF quota is SDR's 16 million and the amount which the country is supposed to reimburse the Fund, as a result of earlier operations and transactions, is currently SDR's 9.1 million.

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19

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

DETAILS OF 1980 BUDGET GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 630

[Text] The Central African Republic's budget for fiscal year 1980 was completed in January (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS (MTM) of 25 January 1980, p 204). The details follow: Receipts and expenditures each total 26 billion CFA francs. However, the balance is only achieved by virtue of aid funds, and particularly of foreign aid, and recourse to borrowing. In fact, resources proper represent only just over 82 percent of expenditure.

This year again the country is faced with an austerity budget, one which attempts to take into account the goals of the financial realignment plan (See MTM, 15 February 1980 p 389).

Receipts were calculated in quite a realistic manner, particularly in respect to direct taxes (-15.4 percent), the collection of which is always a delicate matter. It is the taxes on foreign trade which bring in the basic portion of ordinary resources.

The administration should nevertheless seek to improve its fiscal returns, and especially it should review the system of customs exemptions in order to conform to the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC).

Expenditure was held down, particularly as regards that for equipment. Only priority investments, in particular for highway construction, received any significant outlay. A special effort was made for the amortization of the country's debts.

Operating expenses represented 85.2 percent of the budget, the major part being set aside for salaries (70.9 percent of operating expenses).

Allowing for salaries paid for equipment allocations, total personnel expenses are 60.6 percent of the budget.

The largest operating allocations are those for national education, 25.5 percent (+15.4 percent in relation to 1978). In contrast, the allocation for the armed forces was reduced by 8 percent.

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20

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

DETAILS ON 1980-1981 ECONOMIC, SOCIAL RECOVERY PLAN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 pp 873, 874

[Text] The Central African Republic economic and social recovery plan for 1980-1981 was solemnly adopted on 27 March in a council of ministers at Bangui. Today it is possible for us to give you the details of that plan, which we had outlined in our number of 28 March 1980, p 755.

The 1976-1980 5-year plan was too ambitious for the means at the state's disposal. Thus, after 3 years of implementation, only 17 percent had been achieved. And it became necessary to abandon the objectives set in 1976 and concentrate on the priorities. In his talk-program of 24 October 1979, President Dacko outlined this recovery plan which must cover the years 1980 and 1981 and lead to the adoption of a new 1982-1986 5-year plan.

Presenting the interim plan, the minister in charge of cooperation, planning and general statistics, Mr Jean-Pierre Le Boudier, started by describing realistically the Central African Republic's economic situation and stressing particularly the agricultural problems.

Since agriculture and breeding employ 80 percent of the active population, they must be the foundation of economic development. Currently the revenue crops are stagnant (coffee) or regressing. Cotton production has decreased by half since 1970. Tobacco, which had advanced strongly during the past few years, is suffering a sort of recession today due to the drop in the price of tobacco cuttings.

The situation of food crops is quite worrisome. Except for paddy rice, whose production progresses normally but which doesn't have a significant place in the Central African diet, most food crops are regressing or developing slower than the increase in population (2.5 percent per year). The result is a continuous decrease in the food intake of Central Africans that affects particularly the inhabitants of the urban centers. In fact, the farmers produce mostly for themselves and market only the surplus.

Mr Le Boudier considers that the bad condition of Central African agriculture is due to six main causes:

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1. The farmers' lack of motivation, mainly in cotton production (discouraging purchasing prices, tax levied at the moment of payment for the harvest, obligation to plant cotton).
2. Misuse of personnel. Though the farming circles are quite numerous, they lack means, are not well educated and are badly spread geographically; centralization is excessive.
3. Irregular supplies of fodder, insecticides and equipment.
4. Marketing difficulties; disorganization of commercial circles, road conditions.
5. Absence of agricultural credit, especially felt by coffee farmers.
6. Absence of a clear structural policy: up to now power has seem to hesitate between vertical structures centered on one product (Adecap for coffee, UCCA [Central African Cotton Union] for cotton) and horizontal structures with a regional character (the Ouham-Pende-Acadop Central African Agency for Development). The result is waste and overlapping efforts.

The situation of breeding is equally critical. Overcrowding and abandonment of control of transhumances has produced a degradation of pastures. For more than 10 years the government has tried to implement a policy of sedentary breeding using trypano-tolerant cattle to promote yoke farming and supply meat. The trypano-tolerant livestock that amounted to 15,000 heads in 1968 is currently less than 10,000. The lack of public influence and conflict with the farmers have discouraged many breeders.

The interim plan will thus stress rural development and roads infrastructures.

The development of revenue crops remains a priority and a special effort will be made in the case of coffee. Concerning food crops the objective is to ensure an increase in production that at least equals the increase in population.

The state's action will be concentrated on the conception, evolution and control of the operations to be undertaken, on agricultural training and education and on regional coordination and the development of statistics.

The production of revenue crops itself will be handled by companies or commercial vertical agencies (Socada, Adecap, Centrapalm [expansions unknown] Fecat [Franco-Central African Tobacco Company]) which will ensure the harvesting of products, supply of equipment, creation of minimum infrastructures, maintenance of roads and processing of products.

The government does not want to get involved with regional development organizations whose result in Africa is often disappointing and which in addition ruin budgets.

The stabilization funds should be recast into one organization to recover financial management.

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The development of breeding will be based on two projects: "development of breeding in the Central African West," financed jointly by the IDA [International Development Association], an affiliate of the World Bank, the FAD and the ADB [African Development Bank]; "development of breeding in the East," an extension of the EDF project in the Bambari region.

Revitalizing trypano-tolerant breeding, promoting breeding and improving marketing circles should also contribute to satisfy the population's needs for meat.

In the field of infrastructures, priority is given to the road network that covers almost 4,000 km, 290 of which are paved.

The plan takes into account some current projects: paving of the Bangui-Bossebele path (146 km) with IDA-ADB-Kuwaiti funds financing, repair of the Bossebele-Garoua-Boulai path (440 km) financed by FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund], EDF-FRG, repaid of highways in the cotton areas (1,700 km) financed by FAC-CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation] and of the Beberati-Carnot-Baoro path (200 km) financed by the FAC. The EDF should also assure reconstruction of 40 art works, and the two heavy recharging units recently delivered by Japan should be moved to the Sibut-Bambari-Bangossou road (550 km). Financing must yet be found to repair the Sibut-Kaga-Bandoro-Chadian border road, and the Bossebele-Bossangoa-Bedaoyo road (345 km), as well as to assure the upkeep of the Nola-Berberati-Gamboula and Bangui-M'Baiki roads. Parallely to foreign aids, the government will see that the road funds are regularly fed (500 million CFA per year) to insure road upkeep.

In addition to the road infrastructure, the plan provides for the lengthening of the Bangui airport's landing strip to receive large air carriers, restructuring of the ACCF [Central African Agency for River Transportation]-Socatraf and modernizing river and harbor equipment, repairing the Bangui telephone network, especially the setting up of provisional assistance service, installation of a land station for satellite communication which has been authorized for two years and whose financing has been arranged, telephone fitting of provincial towns, connection with the Panaftel network and modernization of radio broadcasting infrastructures.

All this projects should contribute to a rapid opening up of the country and an integration of the provinces to the economic development processes.

Education, health and social affairs also have a place in the recovery plan.

Accelerated training of teachers and construction of new classes should permit the reduction of the number of pupils per class. Special effort will be made for technical and professional education as well as for physical education. It is also expected to give the country new sports equipment and to modernize the Boganda stadium in Bangui.

Improvement of health infrastructures will involve mostly rural health centers.

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In all the plan provides for an investment of 45.087 billion CFA as follows (in million CFA):

Agriculture	11,836
Breeding	2,593
River Transportation	2,088
Road Infrastructures	10,095
Air Infrastructures	2,165
Telecommunications and Radio Broadcasting	4,195
Urbanization	2,728
Industry	1,300
Energy	215
Mines	1,230
Education	4,471
Health and social affairs	1,901
Administration	270

13.129 billion CFA have already been obtained from foreign aid. The usual financial backers will be called upon for the balance. These lenders should meet at Bangui next June.

In closing the solemn session of the presentation of the Interim Plan, President Dacko considered that his objectives were ambitious and that it was essential for all the Central African population to mobilize itself in order to assure the country's economic recovery.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

FRENCH INFRASTRUCTURE AID--At the end of February, in Bangui, the Central African Republic signed six conventions with France for financing totaling 1,225 million CFA francs for improvement of the country's river, highway and airline infrastructure facilities. These agreements will finance the new mixed capital venture established to provide river connections, continue repair of the main highway which crosses the west of the country and to improve the international airport installations at Bangui-M'Poko. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 629] 7129

REPATRIATION OF SOVIET TEACHERS--The Central African Republic is faced with grave problems in its schools and universities. The 84 Soviet professors posted to the country (24 at the university) were repatriated to the USSR against the wishes of the Bangui authorities. It has not been possible to find substitutes for them, so that the first-year students in the Science Faculty will have to go to Morocco for study. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Mar 80 p 47] 7129

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CHAD

GOUKOUNI THREATENS TO ACCEPT LIBYAN AID

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 25 Apr 80 p 85

[Interview with Goukouni Oueddei, president of the Republic of Chad, by Jean-Claude Criton--date and place unspecified]

[Text] [Question] What is the situation in Chad now?

[Answer] We have signed a document to insure that the ceasefire will be respected which should have gone into effect on 8 April at 1200 hours. President Eyadema, who came as a mediator, departed in the hope that the Chadians would respect the ceasefire which had been signed. Now since 8 April, fighting continues, for each camp is trying to gain ground over its adversaries. But no one, in my opinion, wants this war to continue for the pleasure of fighting.

[Question] In an earlier document signed by Hissein Habre, there was mention of the presence of French forces as buffer forces. Why did you, and the members of your government, refuse to sign this accord?

[Answer] In effect, in the first document which Hissein Habre had signed, it was a question of the buffer forces being forces composed exclusively of French units. But in conformity with the spirit of the Lagos accord which envisaged the departure of foreign forces from Chad, it is difficult for me to accept French soldiers being responsible for enforcing the ceasefire.

[Question] You were saying several days ago that in this matter there had to be a victor and a vanquished...

[Answer] As far as I am concerned, what I want is for the countries participating in the Lagos Conference which are, it seems to me, guarantors of this accord, to meet and adopt a position with respect either to the transitional government of national unity or with respect to Hissein Habre who is in revolt against this government. Thus, it is for these countries to adopt a clear position to save the Chadian people, who suffer from the ambitions of Hissein Habre, who yesterday was fighting Malloum,

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without respecting the Khartoum Charter which he had signed, and who today is violating the Lagos accord. Thus, to my mind, the African countries that are guarantors of this accord must meet their responsibilities and not remain, so to speak, as spectators while the Chadian factions continue fighting inside the country.

[Question] Are you now appealing to these countries? Have you made it known by other means?

[Answer] No, I clearly said this to President Eyadema as well as to the Secretary General of the OAU. Moreover, if up to now I have not dismissed Hissein Habre, a rebel minister in the government of national unity over which I preside, it is because of the Lagos accord. But I am presently in the process of scrutinizing the correct interpretation of this agreement and if it permits me, I will throw out not only Hissein Habre, but also the minister of finances and the other ministers who support him.

[Question] From the military point of view, the situation is extraordinarily confused. What is your situation?

[Answer] I think it would be very difficult for me to specify for you the points held by such or such a faction, since the positions are changing. Thus, today 11 April a certain position is in the hands of one faction, tomorrow of some other combattant.

[Question] So the ceasefire is not being respected?

[Answer] Without the intervention of pan-African forces, it will be difficult in my opinion to have a ceasefire respected, for each side retaliates against the other.

[Question] How long do you think it will be before this force arrives?

[Answer] It's the OAU that must decide, myself I don't know.

[Question] Today, what is the political situation?

[Answer] We know, and every day we receive information according to which Hissein Habre is being aided by Egypt, Sudan, and other countries. Hissein Habre says that we are pro-Libyan, Kamougue, Acyl, Abba Seid, and I. And certainly, if this help to Hissein Habre continues, I think that we will do what we have refused to do these recent months: we are going to accept the aid that Libya is offering.

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CHAD

FRENCH SHOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY HUMANITARIAN ROLE FOR PRESENT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 843

[Editorial: "Chad: Any Solution Should Go Through the OAU"]

[Text] The fifth cease-fire in Ndjamen was reached on 6 April by the Togolese president, Gen Gnassingbe Eyadema, accompanied by his minister of foreign affairs, Mr Kuma Akakpo, and it has not been respected any better than the preceding ones. Each of the two Chadian belligerents, President Goukouni Oueddei and defense minister Hissein Habre had separately ratified the cease-fire terms, conditional to the acceptance of the other party. According to the terms of the agreement, the cease-fire should start on 8 May at 11 hours GMT throughout Chad. A neutral commission formed by representatives from Cameroon, Liberia, Nigeria and Togo and French observers should determine the two lines of demarcation beyond which the two parties would retreat. The area between those two lines would be considered neutral and placed under the control of joint patrols. Finally, the Togolese president, acting in agreement with the OAU's acting president, would establish the necessary contacts to achieve the fast formation of a panAfrican force to serve as buffer force in Chad.

The initiative of the Togolese president, who according to African sources had received before going to Ndjamen the visit of Mr Martin Kirsch, advisor on African Affairs to the French president, is a sign of the uneasiness of the countries in the region in the face of an aggravating civil war that has already claimed a thousand lives and hundreds of wounded, and of their desire to contain the conflict. The OAU secretary general, Mr Edem Kodjo, also arrived in Ndjamen on 8 April from Monrovia, where he had drawn up a peace plan with Mr William Tolbert. This plan included an appeal to the international community, besides help to Cameroon in facing the influx of Chadian refugees--120,000 according to the Cameroonian press--to abstain from any action that could encourage the belligerents to renew hostilities. A conciliatory mission would be formed to try to reconcile the points of view and would include the chiefs of state of Nigeria, Cameroon, Togo, Sudan and the Congo. Beforehand, the Sudanese president, Marshal Nimeiry would try to obtain a new cease-fire.

28

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What "points of view" is it a matter of reconciling? Apparently not those concerning the constitutional form of the Chadian state, a unitarian state or a North-South federation as was suggested by France? Of all the participants, only Colonel Kamougue, indisputable leader of the South, would not refuse, though strongly reticently, to envision a federal solution if all other alternatives seemed impossible. Mr Amat Acyl, the Chadian minister of foreign affairs, cochairman of the Common Action Front within which he is generally considered as representative of the proLibyan tendency, is violently in favor of a unitarian state. This is also the position of Mr Goukouni Oueddei and Hissain Habre. Why, then, this inexpiable war between the two men whose troops are the only ones who have really confronted Ndjamenas since 21 March after an incident among followers of one and the other within the military police, commonplace but detonating an explosive situation created on 16 March by the attack on troops of the Common Action Front--led by interior minister, Mr Mahamat Abba Said, Arab considered proLibyan--by the partisans of Hissain Habre at Bokoro, 300 km north of Ndjamenas?

The rivalry between the two men is old. Chief of a FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front] army at the time Mrs Claustre was captured, Hissain Habre was replaced at the head of his troops by Goukouni Oueddei, at that time backed up by Libya. Both "toubous" (Teda), tribes that the Arabs classify within the Goranes, they have come from two branches traditionally fighting one another. War was the chosen occupation of these peoples until the French conquest. The implacable struggle for power between Hissain Habre, the westernized Anakaza, and Goukouni Oueddei, son, but not heir, of Derdei, supreme chief of the Teda Tou in whom the religious and civil powers came together, is thus feeding on tradition. Hissain Habre says he is fighting what he calls the "antinational coalition," that is, the alliance of Goukouni Oueddei, Ahmat Acyl, Libyan "Trojan horse" and a third man, Colonel Kamougue, also a sworn enemy of Hissain Habre, who seems to be waiting in retreat for the uncertain result of the struggle among the two rivals. In the eyes of his enemies, Hissain Habre is only an adventurer, a troublemaker, power thirsty and responsible for the rupture of the Lagos agreements.

Chad's minister of Justice, Mr Djoma Golo, partisan of Colonel Kamougue, attending in Paris the conference preparing the next Franco-African summit, said that the followers of Goukouni Oueddei and Hissain Habre seemed ready to battle in Ndjamenas until their adversaries were completely crushed. The fury of the battles seem to justify his statement.

Nevertheless, the respective armed forces of one and the other have only some thousands of men each. They are quite far from representing all the peoples of the North, Islamic also but essentially Arabs outside of Tibesti. Their voice, as that of the peoples of the South, is drowned by the roar of the weapons. One of the objectives of the OAU conciliatory mission should be to let the peoples express themselves.

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Must Chad's fate in fact be necessarily linked to the fate of the two champions favored by the armies in Ndjamená? "A winner who can dominate the country must emerge from these battles" said Goukouni Oueddei on the eve of the implementation of the cease-fire negotiated by General Eyadema, and which, like the four before it, was soon violated. Because they have been the most disorderly, are Goukouni Oueddei and Hissain Habre, who did not want or couldn't apply the Lagos agreements, the most qualified to lead the country when, in addition, they can't even pretend to represent more than some ten thousand Toubous of the North, for want of rallying the Arabs?

If the two rivals remain deaf to the appeals to reason from the OAU, it is essential to establish a sort of health cordon around the country to avoid foreign interventions and so that this conflict, unique in its character in Africa, does not extend beyond its borders, leaving the two forces to exhaust one another.

The French troops which, despite Hissain Habre's allegations to the contrary, have remained strictly neutral, should continue to ensure the humanitarian role which is theirs today until the interAfrican force which was provided for by the Lagos accords is set up. It has not been created up to now for lack of logistic means which the OAU should have furnished. "If there must be a French aid (to Chad) it must be within the framework of the OAU" the secretary general of that organization said. Perhaps the best contribution that France could make to an honorable solution to the Chadian affair would be to furnish the OAU with the means it lacks today to dispatch and maintain in Ndjamená the African troops that would relieve the French troops.

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CHAD

PRO-LIBYAN ROLE PLAYED BY ACYL AHMAT NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Apr 80 p 26

[Article by special correspondent Francois Soudan: "Qadhdhafi's Chadians"]

[Text] With Soviet-made 80-millimeter mortars, Sam-7 ground-to-air missiles used as bazooka shells, flamethrowers, and, naturally, the inevitable Kalashnikov assault rifles which cost \$150 (30,000 CFA francs) each, the 15 guerrilla fighters of Acyl Ahmat in front of me had brought a fearful arsenal with them.

They were heading toward Ndjamen, deserted and devastated, to the barracks of the gendarmerie. A flask of tea, some millet patties, and a bag of dried dates would be enough for them to hold out for 5 days as they faced the warriors of Hisssein Habre. This would give them time to be relieved by another column. Some 500 meters from a strangely calm front we met a patrol of the FAP [People's Armed Forces] of President Oueddei Goukouni. Not a word was exchanged, not a salute between the allies of convenience, the enemies of yesterday and perhaps of tomorrow.

The FAC [Common Action Front], which brings together the men of Acyl Ahmat and those of the pro-Libyan veteran Mahamat Abba Said, forms the smallest group among those confronting each other in Ndjamen. It numbers barely 2,000 fighters. But they are unquestionably the most effective. Organized as shock troops, they enabled Goukouni to resist the initial attacks of Hisssein Habre's forces on 21 and 22 March 1980 (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1006).

Incredulous

Their leader, Acyl Ahmat, is a man of 35 with an Afro hairstyle and a thin mustache hailing from Djedaa 45 km from Ati in central Chad. A deputy from Batha in 1969 under the regime of Ngarta Tombalbaye, Ahmat later "spent" 4 years in Libya and received military training. In 1975 he returned clandestinely to Chad with the mission of supervising the "Arab" guerrillas fighting in central Chad. From that time Acyl Ahmat has been completely devoted to the theses of Col Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi, who seems to hold a fascination for him.

31

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Acyl Ahmat's goal is not to control an area in the interior of Chad but rather to serve as a penetration force, as a spearhead for Tripoli's ambitions. He thus sent his fighters to train in the Libyan Sabha oasis where East German instructors served as cadres. Acyl Ahmat himself set up his command post at the Libyan Palace in Tripoli. In July 1978 Acyl Ahmad persuaded Colonel Qadhdhafi that the hour had come to take Ndjama. Ahmat crossed the border at the head of a well-armed column made up of Libyans and Chadians but, reaching Faya, he clashed with the forces of his ally of today, Oueddei Goukouni. After 3 days of fighting Acyl Ahmat drew back. In October 1978 he tried again but met another setback. He then decided to avoid contact and to infiltrate his men in the direction of central Chad--their region of origin--across the Ennedi desert. The "reconciliation" agreements of November 1979 earned him the portfolio of minister of foreign affairs (with the old Mahamat Abba Said receiving the portfolio of minister of interior) as well as the control of some towns of central Chad--Mongoro and Bokoro.

Supplied with weapons, ammunition, and crates of "Small Green Books" (bilingual French-Arabic edition containing the "thoughts" of Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi) by Libyan parachute drops, Ahmat has allied himself with all those who are fighting Hissein Habre. The leader of the FAN [Northern Armed Forces] is indeed perceived in Tripoli as France's tool and therefore the man to strike down. Acyl Ahmat offered the services of his commandos to the "southerners" of Col Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue and to Oueddei Goukouni whom Acyl Ahmat was fighting only a short while earlier.

Ahmat's men act like cadres but also indulge in indoctrination--or rather, try to do so. I saw under a mango tree in Ndjama an "adviser" of the FAC with a likeness of Qadhdhafi in his hand making a speech before an assembly of cheerful Toubous who were obviously incredulous. Worn out, the speaker ended up by turning around and moving on, dragging behind him his crate of booklets with their plastic covers.

In Chad power does not flow--perhaps not yet--from the end of the Small Green Book.

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CONGO

STATE FISHING, GLASS COMPANIES STRENGTHENED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 632

[Text] Congolese Minister of Industry and Tourism J Itadi was in Pointe-Noire to preside over the administrative council meetings of the Italian-Congolese Shipping and Fishing Company (Sicape) and of the Congo Glass Works (Soverco).

Sicape, in which the government is the majority shareholder, was founded in 1972. For a number of years it has been faced with serious difficulties that have hindered any kind of normal activity. The company appears on the list of "enterprises to be rehabilitated" which was drawn up after last January's Conference on State Enterprise. The Sicape budget for 1980 was 728.6 million CFA francs.

It is planned to undertake this year a tuna-fishing program and to renovate the company's land-based deep-freeze facilities (3 cold storage chambers of 380 cubic meters).

The Soverco budget is 1,117 million CFA francs for 1980. The Soverco plant at Pointe-Noire, built in 1968 by two English companies (Lambot & Co., and Fitzpatrick) has never been operative since it was completed. After the rebuilding work, carried out by Technip, the plant was put in running order in June 1979 with the assistance of Saint Gaudens-Emballages. It has produced 11 million bottles since then.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

ATC OCCUPATION TRAINING CENTER--The ATC's [Trans-Congolese Communication Agency] Center for professional training opened at Brazzaville on 21 March. That center is the result of cooperation among the Congo on the one hand and France and FRG on the other. Four permanent instructors will teach the courses (motors, machining, electricity and brazing). The center will cost 59 million CFA. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 875] 9341

OPANGO UNDER HOUSE ARREST--Last February, the former Congolese chief of state was transferred from Brazzaville to Mokola, a small town south of Pointe-Noire, where he has been placed under house arrest. This measure is a cause of anxiety for his kin, owing to the hostility of the garrison in general, some of who had suffered from his cruelty and abuse. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Mar 80 p 47] 7129

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GABON

BONGO ACCUSED OF ABETTING FRENCH NEO-COLONIALISM

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 210, 31 Mar-13 Apr 80 pp 31,32

[Article by Antonia Blis: "The Renaissance Off To A Bad Start"]

[Excerpts] The Gabonese president invents a slogan every 2 years. "Cooperation with France" is the one he prefers. But it is only a slogan.

After the campaign for "national renovation," which was begun in 1968, when the artificial nature of the Gabonese economic "boom" was becoming apparent, the doctrine of "democratic and concerted progressivism" was launched in 1976. Now, as Mr Bongo is beginning his second 7-year term, and as if the circle were closing, we are entering, it seems, the period of the "renaissance."

There is nothing new to be seen or heard in the message of Mr Bongo. It is announced that "Gabon intends to remain apart from the antagonism of the blocs which is contrary to the legitimate aspirations of the people and to the progress of humanity," in order to make clear at the outset that it is a question of reinforcing the bonds with the "privileged partners," who are in addition to the countries of the UDEAC [Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa] and its close neighbors, "France and the other countries of the European Economic Community, the United States and China." On the domestic level, it will be necessary over the next 2 years, "to bring the administration under control and to renovate it," and to undertake "a permanent coordination between the public powers and the various social partners."

On the economic level, if the completion of the "Trans-Gabon railroad remains a priority, "particular emphasis will have to be placed on agriculture and investments in social welfare;" it will be necessary "to assure that oil is totally used for the diversification of the Gabonese economy," and, finally, "to promote effective and lasting economic development in the country and to outlaw waste and artificial development."

Those are only empty and tired slogans, as if the political machine were merely idling in Gabon; they are only empty promises, impossible to keep,

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when we know, for example, that fraud and artificial development (the extent of which horrified the experts from the International Monetary Fund in 1978) are blemishes which stem from the regime itself. Certainly, the manna from oil (an average of 10 million tons produced each year, 75 percent of the country's income) has permitted the construction of major infrastructures and even of important accomplishments in the social welfare area (Social Security, hospitals, schools).

#### An Eldorado for Sharp Operators

Money is flowing and the poorest Gabonese in this underpopulated country (approximately 700,000 inhabitants) receives crumbs from this windfall. But the post petroleum period (in 10 or 15 years probably) causes the greatest concern. And it is not merely the most extraordinary projects, such as the construction of a paper mill capable of producing 250,000 tons of pulp a year, which has been underway since 1976 because it is so large, which will lay this concern to rest. No more than will the highways or the prestige buildings, which are as useless as they are expensive, built in Libreville and Franceville, the flamboyant showcases of a wild neo-colonialism.

In reality, Gabon is an "Eldorado" particularly for foreign companies and sharp operators of every stripe--particularly the French, who make up the majority--who are engaged in shameless but highly lucrative pillaging and who have enormous influence. The French (there are some 40,000 members of the French colony) are present in force, not only in business, but in the administration, in the ministries, in the army, in the police and even on the staff of the president.

And if a certain tension reigns in Libreville today, if there is a lot of talk today about Gabon in the French press, it is because the secret services and the various French political-business groups are waging a fierce battle for their share of the Gabonese cake--a battle which is intensifying with the approach of the French presidential elections, because, as we know, the "French of Gabon" carry enormous weight in the French elections.

As we can see, the Gabon of Mr Bongo is still nothing other than a French colony, in which the meaning of the words "national dignity" and "independence" are unknown. So much so that the French of Gabon plagiarizing the Paris slogan "We don't have oil, but we have ideas," can say, "No, France does not have oil, but it has Gabon."

So it is not surprising that when President Omar Bongo, a very old "friend of France," should appear as a man with his hands tied, and that his public pronouncements should be so weak, as we saw, once again, last 27 February, when he was invited to appear on "Face the Public," on French television.

#### All the Cliches

The 50-minute debate did not tell us much. Nevertheless, it probably allowed us to form an "edifying" and very unfavorable image of the Gabonese chief of

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state. Thus, we were treated to all the cliches. As if Mr Omar Bongo knew only how to repeat the empty slogans of international reaction, at the risk of displaying an unbelievable disdain for his African countrymen.

But, fortunately, relations between France and Gabon are excellent. There is not the shadow of neocolonialism in these relations, in spite of what the critics say, the agitators of all kinds. No, Mr Bongo is in no way involved in the selection of Mr Robert as French ambassador to Libreville.\* And if the Gabonese regime were the object of an attack, of an attempt to destabilize it, it would call upon France. "There is no shame in saying so," shouts Mr Bongo. Besides, are the French not our betters, since they taught the Africans how to work? Didn't you know that?

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\* A former colonel of the SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service], Maurice Robert has behind him a long "African career." His appointment, due to Journiac, caused much criticism in France.

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GABON

FINANCE MINISTER OUTLINES FUTURE ECONOMIC POLICIES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 pp 816-817

[Text] On 24 March, a ceremony was held in London for the signing of a \$100-million loan agreement between an international banking consortium headed by the BNP (National Bank of Paris) and Citicorp International Bank, Ltd. Jean-Pierre Lemboumba, new Gabonese minister of finance, delivered an address at the ceremony outlining the major aspects of the financial policy which Gabon proposes to follow in the coming years.

These are the main passages from his speech:

Concerning the debt, we intend to follow a selective policy of reducing the government's debt because anticipated oil receipts should, in medium- and short-range terms, enable us to achieve sufficient budget savings to finance most public investments and therefore make limited use of foreign loans. In this connection, one must note that in 1979, budget savings available for the investment budget amounted to 26 billion CFA francs (\$130 million). Such savings will amount to 60 billion CFA francs in 1980 (\$300 million) and should exceed 100 billion CFA francs (\$500 million) by 1981 and 1982.

This selective policy of reducing the government's indebtedness has three aspects: First of all, whenever possible, we shall seek financing linked to projects in the form of export credits and assistance credits. Second, we shall endeavor to gain access to new sources of financing. I am particularly thinking about money markets at fixed national and international rates, although the current evolution of such markets is not very encouraging for a new borrower. Third, we do not expect to make use of money markets with floating rates except to cover balances that we would not be able to finance in another way. This third point responds to the essential need to improve the structure of our debt, which now grants too much importance to this type of credit. Furthermore (...), the current level of interest rates on Eurocurrency can only strengthen this conviction.

Concerning government credit (...), I can see the improvement in conditions obtained by my country over the past 2 years and (...) I shall personally

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try to see that the improvements continue, but I am aware that for us, this implies a better management of our country's resources and economic potential (...). I believe that there is a difference in treatment between the countries in Black Africa and the rest of the world. It is clear that we "pay" a kind of premium compared with countries in North Africa or South America whose risks seem to me to be equally great.

Concerning the budget, the discipline that prevailed over the past 2 years will remain a constant preoccupation. More specifically, we shall make sure that we do not increase the relative weight of the operation expenditures. Our efforts will therefore be directed toward an improvement in the productivity of government employees.

We shall also try to avoid too great an increase in investment expenditures that might cause inflationary phenomena due to the preponderance of public spending in the Gabonese economy. If there is a budget surplus, we would rather reduce taxes, particularly in order to achieve a better distribution of revenue among the Gabonese population.

Regarding inflation, in the face of the price increases being experienced by all countries in varying degrees, we must see that in Gabon, the cost of factors does not increase more rapidly than that of our main competitors. In other words, one of our main economic and financial objectives will be to increase Gabon's competitiveness on the international market.

(...) The close cooperation that has begun between Gabon and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) continues. Negotiations underway with that institution should lead to the definition of a new framework of cooperation between the two parties.

Lemboumba had previously defined the "economic development strategy" of Gabon, referring to the speech-program of President Bongo of 11 March (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 21 March 1980, pp 693-694). The minister said that the strategy would be expressed within the framework of the Three-Year Interim Plan now being drafted "in close cooperation with the IMF."

According to Lemboumba, the economic sectors that will receive priority will be agriculture (food and industrial crops), forestry and mining. Regarding forestry, he said that "the government does not intend to take the place of private initiative, which it will continue to encourage by improving operating conditions. For its part, it will encourage the development of processing industries and will implement an active reforestation policy. Efforts will be made to promote new uses of the resources of Gabonese forests such as the manufacture of paper pulp."

Emphasis will also be placed on mining prospection. Indeed, "geologists have long pointed out the potential interest of the Gabonese subsoil. To date, only a small portion of the national territory has been subjected to systematic research. We therefore intend to step up such research."

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Exemplary Loan

The \$100-million loan granted to Gabon on 24 March was obtained from a consortium of banks whose co-leaders are Citicorp International Bank, Ltd. and the National Bank of Paris (and not only this bank, as indicated in our issue of 28 March 1980, p 725). In the first phase of the country's stabilization plan, the exclusive agent remains Citicorp, as in the case of the two credits granted to Gabon in 1978 and 1979.

Thirty banks from a broad spectrum of countries (European, American, Asian) backed the loan which Gabon willingly limited to \$100 million, even though the success of the operation, linked to the good reputation of Libreville authorities on the money market, would have made much larger credits possible.

In addition to Citicorp and the BNP, seven banks played a leading role in the operation: the French Foreign Trade Bank, Barclays International, Chase Manhattan Ltd., the Chemical Bank, Continental Illinois Ltd., the Dresdner Bank AG and the National Bank of Canada.

The loan will be exclusively used to aid Gabon's development budget. These are the first loans released to an African country since President Carter decided to freeze Iranian assets in American banks. The loan conditions (repayment over 8 years, with a 4-year deferment and a 1.5-percent margin over the London interbank rate) could set an example for bank policy toward Africa in the future.

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KENYA

EEC LOANS AID PROJECTS REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 634

[Text] The European Economic Community (EEC) between 1980 and 1985 will provide Kenya with financial aid amounting to a total of 1,576 million shillings (US\$211 million), pursuant to the terms of an agreement made public on 7 March in Nairobi.

The EEC will place 946 million shillings (US\$127 million) directly at the disposal of the country. Of this, 684 million (US\$92 million) are to take the form of subsidies and 262 million (US\$35 million) will be in low interest rate loans, according to the director general for development of the EEC committee, Klaus Meyer. Further, the European Investment Bank (EIB) envisages aid to the extent of 630 million (US\$85 million) in the form of loans

Meyer, who had just concluded a 3-day mission to Nairobi, added that EEC had also agreed that over the same 5-year period it would contribute between 1,209 and 1,471 million shillings (US\$162 to US\$197 million) in aid to regional projects involving Kenya and its East African neighbors.

The priorities established in conjunction with the Kenyan authorities for use of the aid consist principally of rural area development, energy and mines, education and training, transport and communications, and industrial and commercial promotion.

Mr. Meyer declared that the regional projects are mainly building or improvement of the highway links between Kenya and Somalia, Kenya and Sudan, and Kenya and Ethiopia; modernization of the railway and highway links between the Kenyan port of Mombassa and the Rwanda capital Kigali, via Uganda; and fishing cooperation between Kenya, Madagascar and the Seychelles Islands. He also made it clear that European aid, whether on a collective scale at the EEC level, or bilaterally between the member states, constitutes 60 percent of all the foreign financial assistance to Kenya.

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41

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KENYA

TANA RIVER DREDGING EQUIPMENT REQUEST

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 877

[Text] Kenya's National Irrigation Board (Lenana Road, POB 30372, Nairobi) has launched a call for bids, open till 26 May, concerning the supply of a complete dredging installation for the Tana River within the framework of the Bura irrigation project. Since the contract must be financed by the Netherlands development assistance program, only Dutch manufacturers or those from accredited countries according to the rules governing the provision of goods and services in the framework of the Dutch government's bilateral loans are authorized to take part in the bidding.

The bid requirements can be obtained either at Nairobi, at the above address, or at the Hague at the Ministry of Economic Development, exports department, (Bezuidenhoutseweg 30), or in Cambridge, from Mr MacDonal and Partners (Demeter House, Station Road, Cambridge CBI 2 RS).

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42

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LIBERIA

NATION BELIEVED TO BE MOVING TOWARD MULTIPARTY SYSTEM

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Apr 80 pp 19-21

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "The Revolt of the 'Natives'"]

[Text] The men who, in the night of 11 to 12 April 1980, put an end to more than a century of power of the "free man" does not have the appearance of the rebel officer to which frequent military coups d'etat have accustomed us. When he toppled Ahmed Ben Bella on 19 June 1965 Col Houari Boumediene had a past forged in the ALN [National Liberation Army]. The Colonel with the ascetic looks was then minister of defense. In the Central African Republic Jean-Bedel Bokassa himself was a colonel and chief of staff of the armed forces when he seized power in the night of 31 December 1965. In sum, from Seyni Kountche to Mengistu Haile Mariam, from Sangoule Lamizana to Marien Ngouabi and including Idi Amin Dada, Yakubu Gowon, and Mathieu Kerekou--to mention only these--the military who took over from civilians were known individuals who had "files." Even the young Ghanaian Flight Lt Jerry Rawlings had an official curriculum vitae.

Yet here, for the first time, there emerges from the shadows a man who is completely unknown to such a point that, a week after his coup d'etat, no foreign newspaper had published the photograph of Staff Sgt Samuel K. Doe. Diplomats and newsmen on duty in Monrovia admit that they had never heard mention of him. And with good reason. High-ranking officers are legion in the Liberian army, but then a noncommissioned officer! This individual about whom the only thing known is that he is 28 years old and is a member of the national guard has however gone about his business like a master.

It was 0100 hour GMT and the Liberian capital was in the customary ambiance of the start of a weekend. On the top floor of the Execution Mansion House, official residence of the head of state, soldiers of the national guard were playing the final act of a meticulously staged scenario. When under the direction of Staff Sgt Samuel K. Doe they surrounded the presidential apartments one of the sons of William Tolbert, Adolphus Benedict, just had time to lock himself in a room and try to telephone President Felix Houphouet-Boigny whose godchild he had married. His distress message had reached its

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destination. However, the Ivorian head of state reportedly decided to wait for daybreak to send troops to the rescue of his old friend. He would not have time to do so for William Tolbert was killed on the spot with a bullet in the head. That was the brutal ending of the fairy tale of the "300 families" who were descendants of former black slaves whom U.S. President James Monroe had authorized to cross the Atlantic and go and settle on the West African coast in 1822.

Yet, properly speaking the coup d'etat in Monrovia was not a surprise. At the time of the OAU summit in July 1979 a Liberian worker had told us by way of a warning: "The demonstrations in April 1979 were only a foretaste of what the country runs the risk of experiencing if this system which makes a land of apartheid of Liberia where blacks torture other blacks continues" (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 971). And it is in symbolic fashion that the perpetrators of the coup chose to strike on the anniversary of the incidents of 14 April 1979 which had shaken the Liberian capital.

These events, which left some 70 dead and more than 400 wounded in the city of Monrovia alone, had as their origin a study by the Ministry of Agriculture recommending an increase in the price of rice, a staple of Liberians, which would have risen from Liberian \$22 to \$30 per 50-kilogram bag.

Many arrests were made among the activists of the PAL [Progressive Alliance of Liberia], the opposition movement (not recognized at that time) which had issued the directive for the demonstrations. Subsequently, measures of general amnesty, the increase in wages in the construction sector, and especially the reduction in the price of rice to \$20 a bag helped to calm minds. It is true that President Tolbert had chosen his timing well by announcing these measures on the eve of the OAU summit meeting. The president of the PAL himself, Gabriel Bacchus [Baccus] Matthews, decided to play the game by offering the government "all appropriate assistance in connection with the holding of the OAU summit."

In fact, only a truce dictated by circumstances was involved. Beyond the murmur of consumers, it is the bases of the Liberian state which were being challenged.

Indeed, Liberia was Rhodesia and South Africa combined. For 123 years the oligarchy of American-Liberians (3 percent of the population) exercised undivided authority over the narratives pushed back to the hinterland. This domination impacted on the economy whose structures continue to be of the colonial type. While Liberia is the seventh largest world producer of rubber and the leading African iron ore exporter, the economic sector is controlled by foreigners, namely, Americans. Thus, the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company accounts for 72 percent of the rubber production while LAMCO [Liberian-American Company] exploits the iron mines. The U.S. dollar is the quasi-official currency and 20 percent of the Gross National Product is repatriated each year by the foreign companies (called concessions) on account of interest on loans, dues, and dividends.

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According to a recent study by the World Bank, per capita income is \$164 in the traditional sector, \$784 in the sector of the foreign concessions. Another study by a consultant, Father Aska, gives even more eloquent figures. It transpires that 5 percent of the richest families share 50 percent of the national income.

The dissatisfaction increased in the countryside and then spread to the cities where 40 percent of officials today earn a salary below \$100 a month. In the meantime corruption used to rage at all levels, beginning in high places. The 16th summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (held in July 1979) was to be precisely the occasion for a financial scandal which brought about the dismissal of three members of the government.

All the conditions for a popular explosion were thus joined. What remained was to provoke it, organize it, and lead it. Beginning on 14 April 1979, opposition member Gabriel Bacchus Matthews knew that he had numerous advantages on his side. But his movement had to emerge from semiclandestinity. The establishment of MOJA [Movement for Justice in Africa] had not broken the monopoly of power held by the government party, the True Whig Party, since its creation in 1860. Not until 8 January 1980 did the authorities agree to countenance an opposition party. Matthews' PAL became the PPP [Progressive People's Party]. Two months later came the contest of force. Irritated by the many problems involving his activists, Gabriel Bacchus Matthews ordered an unlimited strike on 6 March 1980 to bring about President William Tolbert's resignation. The following day the PPP organized a peaceful march on the presidential palace whose "tenant" was touring the hinterland. The reaction of the head of state was brutal (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1003). Not only was the PPP outlawed but more than 100 persons were arrested. Among them was Matthews himself. Twenty leaders of the movement saved themselves by flight. Rewards of from \$1,500 to \$2,500 were offered to anyone helping in the arrest of the principal fugitives while the Minister of Justice threatened to put a price on their heads if they did not surrender in short order. A month later it was Tolbert who met his death.

A practicing Christian, a former president of the Universal Baptist Alliance, grand master (like all Liberian presidents) of the local freemason's lodge, did William Tolbert Jr. allow himself to be outflanked on the right by the ultraconservatives of his party? The fact remains that brutal repression only doomed his regime even more. From that point the blowup was inevitable. The fruit had become ripe. All that was left to do was to pluck it. A staff sergeant took it with the blessing of the opposition and with the applause of all the underprivileged.

The toppler of Tolbert justified his action by "the rampant corruption and inability of the government to run the affairs of the Liberian people effectively." At any rate it is clear that the coup d'etat of 12 April 1980 marks the end of the privileges of a minority. It was the revenge of the "natives" who, for the first time, found themselves in a majority in the government. After all, it was only a fair balancing of things.

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The makeup of the government however calls for some interesting comments. First the following: The army does not give the impression of wishing to monopolize power. Only six military men are members of a 19-member government. An unusual fact is that the minister of defense is a civilian. As for the distribution of the portfolios it seems to follow a judicious division evidencing the concern for national unity. Released right from the morrow of the coup d'etat at the same time as all his companions, Gabriel Bacchus Matthews became the minister of foreign affairs while three other members of the PPP joined the government. MOJA received two portfolios assigned to the most prominent personalities of the movement-- Drs Togba Nah Tipoteh (planning and economic affairs) and Henry B. Fanbulleh. The former is the president of MOJA. The latter was in the news about 12 years ago. Ambassador in Tanzania and Kenya, he was arrested on 11 July 1968 on the orders of the late President Tubman. Accused of wanting to favor the promotion of natives, Fanbulleh was sentenced to 20 years in jail. The final indication: Three members of the Tolbert government, natives, were kept in the government of Staff Sergeant Doe. Among them is George Boley. Charged with complicity at the time of the March events, Boley had been arrested at the same time as the members of the PPP.

The coexistence of several factions within the government prompts one to think that Liberia is moving toward the multiparty system. For the time being Matthews' party can rightly claim to be reflecting popular aspirations. His favorite slogan is "In the name of the people the struggle continues" and it has become the watchword with which all official communiques conclude. At least one can already assert that in this country which prides itself on being the first independent state of Africa, nothing will ever be the same as before.

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LIBERIA

COUP SEEN AS WARNING TO AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Apr 80 p 22

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "The Advent of the Judges"]

[Text] Only a few days ago William Tolbert Jr. was still considered as one of the "wise men" of Africa. There is nothing surprising about that on a continent where age is the symbol of all virtues. At 66 years of age the president of Liberia indeed seemed to embody wisdom perfectly, even if his dynamism and physique made him appear younger than he really was. With his white cap perched on the side of his small African "boubou" Tolbert seemed to be a well-worn Liberian, educated and well rooted in his country.

Thus, draped in this personality of an "African wise man" who lacked only a white beard, in March 1978 William Tolbert was able to play the role of "Mister good offices" between Guinea on one hand, Senegal and Ivory Coast on the other; between President Sekou Toure and his brother Ismael who confronted each other in April 1979 in a family quarrel; and lately between enemy brothers whom a merciless struggle for power had caused to clash in Chad.

Incumbent president of the OAU, the former Liberian head of state felt strong and secure from any coup d'etat. It is said that President Seku Toure who, in April 1979, had sent a Guinean military detachment to Monrovia to protect the vacillating regime of his neighbor, warned William Tolbert a few days ago of the imminence of a coup. "I thank you," Tolbert had reportedly answered, "but I don't believe that they (the Liberian military) would dare to take on the incumbent president of the OAU."

This attitude overlooked the thirst for justice, at times vengeance, of the young, the underprivileged, the military, of all the rejects of society who could not care less about what is "sacred." In June 1965 had Houari Boumediene not beaten by only a few days the opening of the Afro-Asian summit meeting in Algiers to topple Ahmed Ben Bella? Had not Gen Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, at that time incumbent president of the OAU, come close to being ousted in 1978 by the Sudanese army? Did not Emperor Haile Selassie

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of Ethiopia, the king of kings, die in confinement in Addis Ababa, the seat of the Organization of African Unity? And did this not happen without any of his peers daring to budge?

In truth nothing is sacrosanct any longer in Africa any more than there are rules and mechanisms to achieve, conserve, or abandon power. Brute force and violence alone take the place of constitutional laws. Myths, fetishes, symbols--everything now belongs to an old order, inexorably doomed, which the waves (military or civilian depending on the occasion) have no difficulty whatever in overcoming. Should one rejoice at it or deplore it? It matters little. The essential thing is to determine that, without a genuine basis, the African states continue to be particularly fragile. The two oldest states of the continent, Ethiopia and Liberia, toppled like houses of cards at the first rifle shot. All the more so those countries which are only 20 years old or so.

Such dreams should give the African leaders cause for reflection in order not only to gauge the vulnerability of their power but so that they may become aware of the need for the necessary changes. As long as they continue to play the ostrich by hiding their heads behind the opaque curtain of the single party system and groups of courtiers, they will overlook the difficult conditions in which, increasingly, their peoples are struggling. By doing this they will aggravate their case while favoring unknowingly the advent of their judges.

Still unknown soldiers yesterday, junior personnel no longer hesitate to attack presidential palaces. This is with the firm intention of putting an end to corruption and correcting social inequalities. It was witnessed last year in Accra. It was just seen on 12 April 1980 in Monrovia. Nothing indicates that they will know what they have to do to achieve their goals. But the fact is that in Africa the paths to power are to a large extent open. All the daring ones can take them provided that they accept their risks and dangers.

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MALI

SALVATION TO BE ACHIEVED FROM BOTH INSIDE, FOREIGN SOURCES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1005, 9 Apr 80 pp 32, 33

[Article by Sennan Andriamirado: "Can Mali Be Saved?"]

[Text] Convoled on 8 April in Bamako, the National Council of the Single Party has little choice. Either to restrict itself to patching up a crumbling state, which would only serve to cover up an explosive situation. Or, by making itself a special congress of the UDPM (Democratic Union of the Malian People), to declare failure. And decide to scuttle. In the first case, a facade of national unity will be applauded, until a new revolt breaks out. In the second case, there will be a call for a general mobilization of Malians to carry out the slogan that President Moussa Traore himself initiated: "The Malian ship of state must not be allowed to sink."

For the Malian crisis is neither governmental nor constitutional. It is primarily economic (J.A. No 1004). So the answer does not lie in refusing to face up to the problem. It is still less one of saving face. It is a matter of saving the state itself.

To identify and recognize the real crisis would be the first service that Malians--leaders, opposition, workers, students, soldiers and peasants--owe to themselves. To accept calling everything into question would be the second. Everything, that is to say first of all that enormous bureaucracy which, for the past 20 years, has taken the place of an economic structure: State companies which have no other function than to provide employment when they do not have the means to pay their employees. There is a plan to encourage investors and private businessmen to provide capital for them. But these plans must be redefined: Numerous operations which are noteworthy only because of their deficits must be buried without hesitation and the totality of these efforts should be concentrated on three or four major enterprises.

This country has enormous agricultural resources. We know that. Its mineral wealth is also well known. But this is only potential wealth because there has always been a shortage of investment. Who can invest? First of all the Malians themselves, those businessmen with a reputation for being aggressive

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and who are directing (or perhaps destroying) the national treasury; the Malians of the diaspora, who are living in neighboring countries and to whom it has never occurred that they might be able to enrich their own country. Let them invest, yes, but also let the state permit them to do so.

Malians are not the only ones responsible; neither for their past or for their future. That they should set up a government of national salvation in order to climb out of their abyss, would be a courageous act of violence on their part. And such a government would still have to have the means to act, to carry out projects, to invest, to produce. Why? Because, actually, if Mali today is the victim of itself, it is also the principal victim of the selfishness which has become the established method for enrichment employed in all well-endowed countries.

Since its beginning, Mali has served as an international showcase of underdevelopment. The universal model of poverty, since, probably, one was needed. International cooperation? It came late. To finance mini-development projects, obligingly paid for with development aid. But nothing came out of it. Granted that this year France has decided to finance investments by suspending budgetary aid (which served to pay government employees). Still, these investments would have to be concretized immediately. Granted that the European Economic Community, that the United States have said they were ready to invest in Mali. But these declarations of intention go back to November 1978. And they are only talking about prefinancing...while waiting for, at the end of 3 years, Malian development projects to be certified viable.

Healing Mali: A Test for Malians and Investors

Mali, today, is sick. Very sick. It is up to Malians, of course, to decide on the cure. But it is also up to international cooperation, to foreign investors to move in that direction.

The material to be exploited exists: The land and water to be tamed in order to create an agricultural system; mineral deposits promising to guarantee in the long run the profitability of the investments and the reimbursement of any loans; a flat country ready to be opened up to all means of communication; unused rivers which could provide transportation for people and goods throughout this vast country of 1,204,000 square km.

But to get out of this chaos, if international cooperation and investments are indispensable to it, Mali must also take the first step, saying clearly where it wants to go. It would be regrettable if the Single Party, which has demonstrated only its impotence, were the only spokesman. It would be regrettable if the leaders were content with a new plebiscite, artificially consecrated by the applause of the official supporters of the party. It would be regrettable if the Mali of today were content with a facade of unity. One might hope that, getting rid of the banners of a fictitious popular support, the present leaders would have the courage to question

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their own position. This is why only the sure values of the present government must remain. This is why a government of national salvation must be opened up to the economic talent that the country has in abundance. It is at that price that Mali can and must be saved. Because its great people deserve a better fate.

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MALI

ECONOMIST ADVOCATES MEASURES FOR NEW ECONOMIC ORDER

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 807

[Text] On 17 March, following the examination by the government and the single Malian party of 3-year plans for the rehabilitation of the 26 Malian state enterprises and companies, General Traore announced a series of measures aimed at "strengthening some of these enterprises and making them viable because they are strategic for our country's economic and social development, opening up the capital of a number of the companies to national or foreign private interests so as to stimulate the sector in which they operate and putting some of them under new management.

"Within the framework of these measures," President Traore added, "we have not discarded the idea of opening up the capital of these companies to the workers in the near future. In other words, we would have self-management, while taking the Malian way of thinking and conditions in our country into account."

The Malian chief of state deplored "the lack of consistency" in carrying out decisions within ministries in charge of the companies and within the companies' national management. He also criticized "the inadequate planning." He asked company officials to manage the firms as "good heads of family" and to have the courage to denounce "untimely interventions by the government" in their business in time.

Finally, the president repeated that state companies and enterprises "are the property of the people but must not become a burden to the people." National and private firms are in debt to the government in the amount of 30 billion Malian francs and the financial effort to be made in order to rehabilitate the government sector and get it back on its feet is an estimated 40 billion Malian francs.

In addition, a Malian economist from the government auditing department, Guimballa Diakite, announced that for Mali, 1980 will be a difficult year. In order to establish a new economic order in the country, he proposed: the coexistence of public, private and joint public and private sectors, the diversification and stimulation of banking, updating the financial

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system and the investment code, reorganization of the rural sector and the organization and establishment of methods in Malian administration.

He further recommended the establishment of an economic and social council that would make specialized circumstantial studies for the legislative and executive branches and the institution of a commission on immigration that would handle the establishment of structures to help Malians living abroad and their reintegration into the life of their country. Diakite also asked for development of the banks of the country's waterways, particularly by the Niger Office on the central delta of the Niger River. Although a million hectares of land are potentially arable, only 60,000 hectares are now being worked.

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MALI

BRIEFS

SAUDI ARABIAN HEALTH ASSISTANCE--On 13 March, Dr N'Golo Traore, Malian minister of health and social affairs, and Saudi Charge d'Affaires Zaki traveled to Bamako, where they laid the cornerstone for a dental health care center whose construction will be financed by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia will also finance construction of other dental care centers in the regions and secondary cities of Mali. Infrastructures included in the plan will cost 1 billion Malian francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 807] 11,464

CUBAN AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE--On the occasion of the official visit which Col Amadou Baba Diarra, assistant secretary general of the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UDPM), made to Cuba from 10 to 16 March, the Cuban Communist Party extended financial aid and made a gift of 50 tractors to the Democratic Union for the purpose of setting up village ton (associations). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 807] 11,464

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

FRENCH CREDIT FOR BOATS, ENERGY--A credit for 600 million francs has been granted by France to Mozambique for the purchase of 15 trawlers in France, the construction in Mozambique of a high-tension 1,400-km line by the Franco Italian CGEE, Alstom and SAE consortium and for the renovation of the Mavazi hydroelectric plant. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French No 512, 5 May 80 p 5]

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55

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NIGER

ADB FINANCING OF SONICHAR ELECTRICITY PROJECT REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 624

[Text] Electricity: 1,175 million CFA franc loan from ADB by terms of an agreement signed in January at Abidjan, the African Development Bank (ADB) granted a loan of 4.35 million account units (approximately 1,175 million CFA francs) to finance the Sonichar project in Niger. The loan, which was approved by the Bank's administrative council on 25 September 1979, is to be reimbursed over a period of 13 years, and allows for a 2-year grace period.

The project is to supply electricity to the uranium mines from a coal-burning thermal central station. The previous electricity supply by generators belonging to the companies began to create difficulties in 1973, when the price of imported fuel rose. Concerned about obtaining other energy sources, the authorities became increasingly interested in the coal deposits at Anou-Araren discovered in the course of uranium prospecting. An agreement was signed in 1977 establishing Sonichar (Niger-Anou-Araren Coal Company) to develop coal deposits for electric power production. In December 1977, the ADB's administrative council approved the granting of 5 million units of account (1.35 billion CFA francs) loan, financed by the resources of the ADB, and a further loan of 5.2 million units of account, financed by the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF). These loans are to cover respectively foreign currency costs of the coal field and the cost of bringing water from the Sonichar complex.

After checking the progress on the project by December 1978, when most of the negotiation was completed and the work was well ahead, it was apparent that, as a combined result of several technical and economic factors, completion of the first stage of the project required supplementary financing of almost 9 billion CFA francs.

This is the 10th operation of the bank in Niger. The African Development Fund (ADF) had granted three loans to Niger for a total of 10.035 million French units of account (almost 2,488.4 million CFA francs), whereas the ADB has made 4 loans to Niger, for a total of 17.85 million Bank units of account (about 4,820 million CFA francs) in all, from its own resources, and two others from those of the NTF.

56

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The total cost of the project is currently up to 216.4 million units of account (60 billion CFA francs). There is thus a deficit of 72.16 million units of account (20 billion CFA francs) to be covered if the project is to be concluded successfully. It is almost half-finished and work should be completed by December 1981.

The first loan granted by the ADB covers the purchase of rails and the first part of the laying of the bed and its ballasting. The second loan is for telecommunications work and for the second portion of laying of the bed and ballasting. The excess over estimate for the part of the project financed by the ADB will be 0.774 billion CFA francs, 2.79 million units of account.

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SENEGAL

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS EXAMINE 1980-1981 DRAFT BUDGET

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 863

[Text] On 1 April the Senegalese council of ministers examined and adopted a finance bill for the 1980-1981 administration which settled on 191.41 billion CFA in receipts and 189.61 billions in expenses.

This bill includes: operating budget: 115. 64422 billion CFA, equipment budget: 20 billion CFA; special treasury accounts: 55.768 billion CFA.

For the expenses, only the figure for special treasury accounts changes, becoming 59.973 billion CFA. Thus there is a surplus of 1.795 billion CFA. This result was obtained by applying austerity measures across the board.

This law shows smaller figures in relationship to the 1979-1980 budget which was passed with some 179.761 billion CFA in resources after corrections. However, in this last figure certain special treasury accounts, those concerning the so-called temporary operations, are not included (accounts of settlement with foreign governments, accounts for monetary operations and accounts of guarantees and endorsements).

The special accounts were summarized in the 1980-1981 budget to show the real expenses acting on Senegal's budget.

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SENEGAL

NEW HOUSING BANK ESTABLISHED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 pp 620-21

[Text] The Senegalese Housing Bank (BHS), the establishment of which was announced here (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 November 1979 p 3016) will become operational as of 17 March 1980.

With capital of 1 billion CFA francs, it will receive a further 1 billion CFA francs annually from the Senegalese government. It will extend loans of 300,000 CFA francs up to 20 million CFA francs, with maturities varying from 15 to 20 years, at a maximum interest rate of 8.5 percent. (Compared with the current average of 13 to 14 percent.)

The Bank will lend to private individuals to build a house for use as main residence, to purchase a lot for building, or alternatively, or to enlarge a home already purchased. The basic condition is the opening at the Bank of a savings account equivalent to a minimum of 10 percent of the building contract's value. The customer must also obtain a sickness-incapacity insurance policy and a fire insurance policy to protect his family.

However, the BHS may also provide financing for private real estate promotion companies "providing such companies undertake to execute building programs which conform to the standards dictated by the Bank, both as regards the levels of monthly rentals and the quality of the homes." The sole condition required is approval of the company by the Senegalese government.

During the first two years of operations the BHS will limit its activity to Cape Verde because of the housing problem in that area. But it will also finance workers communities anywhere in the country.

The BHS staff of approximately 35, chosen from among bank employees, completed 3 months of training in France, mainly at the Credit Foncier, in order to become familiarized with real estate credit management.

Mr Becaye Sene, 41 years old, economic counsellor to the Prime Minister's office, was appointed chairman and director general of BHS. He had been

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administrator of the Central Bank for 5 years, member of the national committee on credit for 10 years, a Governor of the International Monetary Fund, chairman of the administrative council of the Senegalese Banking Union (USB), and administrator of the Senegal National Development Bank (BNDS) as well as several other mixed capital companies, representing state interests.

Oumar Ba, Senegalese minister for urbanism, housing and environment, in an interview dated 28 February said the following about Senegal's housing objectives:

"Our initial objective was planned development of 4,000 housing units by the Office of Moderate Housing (OHLM) and Sicap, to be completed in 4 years. With the establishment of the BHS, these targets were increased and we now expect to have 10,000 units available during the next 4 years. These are our minimum goals. The maximum goal is for 3,000 to 4,000 housing units annually, in accordance with the head of state's instructions.

"Through OHLM," Sene added, "within a month's time, we hope to begin work on 30 housing units at Joal, 30 at Tivaouane, 60 at Louga and 50 at Rufisque. One of the basic directives set by the President is to decentralize the building of housing units in the regions.

"In Dakar, about October, we will begin a program of 1,500 OHLM housing units at Grand-Yoff. The program will be 90 percent social units sold on the installment plan.

"Through Sicap, we are now finishing work on the Sacre-Coeur and Fenetre-Mermoz sites (almost 500 housing units in all). There has been considerable delay at these sites because of difficulties in obtaining loans. In addition to Sacre-Coeur and Fenetre-Mermoz, Sicap intends to start a 1,000 housing unit program before the end of the year."

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60

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SENEGAL

NEW INSTALLATIONS FOR DAKAR-MARINE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 260

[Text] The Naval Construction and Weapons Directorate (DCAN) was transferred on 26 February to the Senegalese state. The transfer, established by the 1974 Franco-Senegalese agreements became effective as of 1 January ulto. and enabled Dakar-Marine, a mixed [private and state] capital company to move from its project stage to the first operational phase.

DCAN--set up in Dakar in 1904--belonged to the French government. It specializes in the repair of navy vessels but for some years now has extended its activities to include civilian clients.

The infrastructure transferred to Senegal includes a dock, 204 meters-long by 34 meters wide, which can handle 25,000 ton-capacity vessels, buildings with an area of 17,500 square meters, equipment estimated to be worth 4 billion CFA francs, and stock estimated at 300 million CFA francs.

Also, negotiations are now underway for the transfer to Senegal of the property of the Naval Construction and Repair Shipyards (ACRN), owned by a French firm.

Dakar-Marine (Company for the Development of Shipyard Infrastructures for the port of Dakar) founded in 1973, being unable to build a 500,000 ton dock, to service supertankers, directed its attention to infrastructures which could handle vessels of up to 60,000 tons displacement.

Work which began on 28 February 1979, will facilitate the installation of infrastructures required for a 240-meter-long, 60,000-ton-capacity floating dock. This work is almost completed and it is anticipated that the dock will be operational by next November. In addition to the floating dock, Dakar-Marine will have a 1,200 ton crane, a 250 meter long pier for repairs afloat, and a service post for ballasting and degasification and workshops.

The Dakar-Marine project will provide employment for 1,250, rather than the 3,000 foreseen initially, and it will cost 16,945 million CFA francs in 1980, rather than the 37 billion CFA francs for 1974.

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Even scaled down in this way, Dakar-Marine remains the major Senegalese industrial project. It will have direct or induced effects on the Senegalese GNP's industry and services sectors, which are 26 percent and 39 percent of the overall, according to the country's official statistics. These figures are significant in an area where for the past 10 years the primary sector has suffered the effects of drought. The project will also contribute to the development of industrial activity at the port of Dakar, which, with more than 10,000 ships a year, is one of the major West African ports. It also has an important fishing pier.

The project was financed almost entirely by the Scandinavian Bank, the Eksportfinans of Norway and the European Union Bank, backed by a French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade (COFACE) guarantee. Norwegian, Danish and French companies will execute the infrastructure and equipment work, begun last April. France, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy will train personnel. The project is to be managed by a mixed company which has not yet been fully established, in which the Senegalese government will have a substantial majority.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

TRUCK GARDENING PROJECT--The truck gardening project in Kirene (former area of BUD-Senegal) is taking advantage of 1.2 billion CFA in EDF financing to install a well and some sheds, set up an access road and purchase appurtenances. Current farming of 120 hectares will grow in 1981 to 180 hectares with the establishment of some new areas. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 863] 9341

IDA CREDIT--The IDA [International Development Association], an affiliate of the World Bank, has approved, according to a bank bulletin of 7 April, a credit to Senegal of \$11 million destined to a project setting up several small and medium sized businesses to help the poor of the countryside: it provides for activities in the fields of food crops farming, apiculture and fishing. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 863] 9341

ARMY STRENGTH INCREASE--On 3 April, in a message to the nation on the occasion of the national Senegalese feast, President Leopold Sedar Senghor said that the manpower of the Senegalese army (10,000 men) will be increased according to a restructuring plan now being developed. This plan, which would bring the manpower to 15,000 men, aims at perfecting the organization of the army and making it more efficient. The army accounts for 13 percent of the Senegalese budget (13.1 billion CFA). It will be increased to 15 percent during the coming year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 864] 9341

ONCAD EMBEZZLEMENT--The embezzlement at the National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development (ONCAD), the central organization of the Senegalese cooperatives, involved a total of 500 million CFA francs. Some 79 agents of ONCAD are in custody following the inquiry, which is still going on at Koalack. The fraud against ONCAD went from grain weighing to electronic recording of the operations. For the time being, the inquiry is focused on the 1978-1979 marketing campaign. The probe of the 1977-1978 activities led to the arrest of 36 cooperative weighers. The Senegalese government recently announced its decision to restructure ONCAD and to reform the whole Senegalese cooperative system. The old system not only gave ONCAD a monopoly to purchase peanuts from the peasants, for loans for the purchase of seed or agricultural materials, and for training of the peasants, but also for the sale of certain foodstuffs bought from the rural population. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 621] 7129

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63

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SOMALIA

SIAD BARRE'S PRICE FOR U.S. BASES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1005, 9 Apr 80 p 29

[Article: "To the Highest Bidder"]

[Text] In an interview with the special correspondent of the HERALD TRIBUNE (dated 29 March), the Somalian president, Siad Barre expressed his disappointment with Washington: "In exchange for the military bases that we have made available to them (since last January) in the port of Berbera, the United States has proposed to us no serious cooperation, either on the economic, diplomatic or military level."

Certainly, an American military presence is ardently desired by Mogadiscio, which hopes to dissuade in that way the "hereditary enemy," Ethiopia, from invading Somalia and proclaiming the creation of a Horn of Africa Federation aligned with Moscow. Somewhat as pro-Soviet Vietnam is trying to unify Indochina under its aegis.... But President Siad Barre also wants to attach a high price to granting access by the American Marines to the base at Berbera, as well as the use of its air space and its territorial waters to counter the "Soviet menace" in the Indian Ocean.

Siad Barre is hoping to obtain simultaneously from the United States: Economic and financial aid of several hundred million dollars, advanced military equipment and diplomatic support for the "just cause" of the Somali of Ogaden in their struggle against "Ethiopian oppression."

In order to do this, Siad Barre has only, for the moment, formulated his requests to Washington in very vague terms. But now that the U.S. Marines have begun to renovate the base in Berbera (constructed in 1975 by the Soviets), now that the United States can no longer pull back...the head of the Somalian state is openly expressing his demands.

He is all the more at ease because, in Baghdad, where he went in mid-March, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is said to have promised him massive financial aid...in case the Marines should be expelled from Somalia.

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64

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TANZANIA

DEVELOPMENT OF FORESTRY PRODUCTION DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 878

[Text] The Austrian company Austroplan, which has been a consultant for the Tanzania Wood Industry Corporation (Twico) since 1978, has just published a voluminous project concerning the development of forestry production in Tanzania.

This study proposes the means for revaluating the production, starting from the fact that most of this output is unhewn wood, exported rough and stressing it would be appropriate to increase the overall value of forestry exports by processing in national factories. The study was carried out by Austrian forestry experts during a 6-month investigation in 1979.

In addition to processing the rough wood domestically, the study recommends using second-rate timber to meet the national woodwork demand; the standardization of production and modernization of existing saw mills; to introduce into the market the less known essences; to promote and intensify afforestation; to encourage the use of wood in architecture; the training of qualified personnel; the creation of a center for treating timber, at the same time mill and institute for training and technological progress.

The study also had the aim of counting the forest areas of Tanzania and their possibilities, mainly for wood veneers, as well as carrying out a market study of Tanzanian timber.

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TANZANIA

FRG SPONSORED IRRIGATION PROGRAM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 878

[Text] The Mombo irrigation project, in the Tanga area has been carried out with West-German cooperation and was officially presented to Tanzanian officials at the beginning of March.

The project costs 4 million shillings and involves four villages: 440 farmers will be able to plant rice on 220 hectares throughout the year thanks to it.

This success, said the FRG ambassador in Tanzania, Mr W. von Eichborn, could serve as model to the irrigation project of 10,000 hectares at Mkomazi, which would permit producing 5,000 or 6,000 tons of rice per year."

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

WORK ON CAPITAL--Dodoma: The demolition of buildings located in the Tambukareli area of Dodoma, future capital of Tanzania, last February, represented the preparatory phase for the execution of work on the center of the new city. This is where the new government buildings are to be erected as well as the commercial and cultural centers and international class hotel and stadium. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 635] 7129

HYDROCARBON PRICE INCREASE--Tanzanian retail prices of hydrocarbons have just been raised. They rose from 14 percent to 37 percent effective 4 March, as a result of successive price increases for crude petroleum sold to the Tanzanian government. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDETERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 635] 7129

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END

67

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