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West Europe Report

(FOUO 25/80)

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SOVIET-WEST EUROPEAN RELATIONS: CHANGING ATTITUDES, PERSPECTIVES

Paris COMMENTAIRE in French Winter 79-80, Spring 80

[Article by Pierre Hassner, former student of the Advanced Teacher Training School, holder of a degree in philosophy and chief researcher at the Center for International Studies and Research at the National Foundation for Political Science, and author of a number of articles published in France and abroad on problems in political philosophy and international relations: "Prosaic and Powerful--The USSR Viewed From Western Europe"]

[Winter 79-80, pp 520-528]

[Text] One evening in June of 1977, President Giscard d'Estaing welcomed Secretary General Brezhnev with great pomp and ceremony. A number of leaders from the greater cultural and political Paris had been invited, but no outstanding intellectual was present. For at that moment, they were all--from Jean-Paul Sartre to Eugene Ionesco, from Michel Foucault to the "new philosophers"--at the Recamier Theater, where they were giving a counter-reception for Soviet dissidents.

Visibly, the "in" place to be that evening was with Leonid Plyushch (whom Jacques Chirac, when he was prime minister, had accused of abusing French hospitality by attacking his native country) and Andre Amalrik (with whom President Giscard d'Estaing had refused to meet), not the two French politicians and the Soviet dictator.

The Path Covered in 25 Years

To measure the length of the path covered, one must go back to 1952. At that time, the French government arrested Jacques Duclos and his cohorts for plotting, the French Communist Party was promoting the slogan "The French people will never wage war on the Soviet Union," and Jean-Paul Sartre, the author of "Nekrassov" (a satire on Soviet emigres and their reception in the West), was writing in "The Communists and Peace" that "an anticommunist is a dog," and that the truth about the Soviet Union

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should not be publicized too widely for fear of "causing despair in Billancourt." A special issue of LA NEF on the USSR as seen from France was published at the beginning of that great year, 1956, which thanks to the Khrushchev report and the invasion of Hungary, was to be the first to mark the great change in the attitude of French intellectuals. In that issue, Raymond Aron could still write an article entitled "Fascinated By the Soviet Union," in which he stressed that, for French intellectuals, "when the teacher is Russian, words change meaning and slavery becomes liberation."

Today the French seem fascinated by the Soviet Union anew, but less it appears by "the shining future" or "the Medusa head of communism" than by what seems to point to a chink in its armor. For months and months, the two best sellers in politics in Paris were a very serious book which explained to the French public that there was a nationality problem in the USSR, and with a title seeming to foretell the collapse of the empire, and a very keen study in which two French communists traced their discoveries about daily life in Moscow, both the title and the cover of which stressed the contrast between the ideology and the reality in the Soviet Union.

Indeed one must not fall into the typically Parisian trap of viewing the development of intellectual fashions in Paris as representing that of universal history, or even Europe. If the two phenomena--the improvement of relations between the Western European governments and the Soviet Union through detente, and the disillusionment of the revolutionary left wing with the regime following a series of revelations, ranging from those of Khrushchev to those of Solzhenitsyn, are real and striking, it is difficult to distinguish what is French from what is European, what has to do with passing fashion and what is the manifestation of irreversible desacralization.

On the one hand, because of de Gaulle and the diplomatic tradition of "reverse alliance with Russia, France is the country which for reasons of pure realpolitik, has sought the most systematically for 20 years to maintain a privileged place in East-West relations. At the same time, France is the country in which the intellectuals, having gone farthest in their faith in the revolution, have also felt the shock of Solzhenitsyn most keenly, and have shown the most enthusiasm toward the dissidents from the East.

On the other hand, if these two phenomena, belief in detente and the cult of the dissidents, are doubtless already on the wane, they are but one aspect of the two broader and more complex realities which have lost none of their validity--the perception by the Western governments and the conservative forces of the need for a certain accommodation with Moscow, because of the power of the Soviet Union, and its decline as an ideological model.

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Suddenly a certain relatively enduring convergence has developed between the perspective of the governments and that of the left wing, in particular the leftist intellectuals. Thanks to detente, the former see the Soviet Union as all black to an ever lesser extent. Thanks to the Krushchev report, the invasion of Hungary, the Sino-Soviet schism and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the latter has an ever less rosy, or red, view of the Soviet Union. In some cases and to a certain extent, we are even seeing a kind of game of musical chairs of which the episode at the Recamier Theater is a perfect illustration: certain conservative governments and certain business circles have more sympathy for the Soviet Union (in the name of realpolitik, economic interdependence, or the Holy Alliance of the Friends of Order) than some past or present revolutionaries (in the name of their Maoism or, in the case of the French "new philosophers," their late discovery of the misdeeds of totalitarianism).

The Standardization of the Soviet Union

What has happened is a kind of standardization of the Soviet Union. Except for a few extremists on one side or the other, it represents less a terrifying menace or a radiant future than a massive, cumbersome presence, as embarrassing as it is disconcerting.

No one knows very well how to handle it, but no one imagines any longer that it might disappear or change in nature basically in the foreseeable future, either by conversion to democracy or through disintegration.

This convergence on more realistic bases has come about through a kind of differentiation process, which has taken the image of the Soviet Union from the theological stage (in which it represented the devil or the good Lord), through the metaphysical stage (dominated by such abstract notions as detente, convergence, peaceful coexistence, or for the other side, the anti-imperialist struggle) to the positive stage. Henceforth, on the one hand, revolution, communism and the Soviet Union are not necessarily linked together, not only thanks to the demystification of the domestic regime, but also because, from Eritrea to Cambodia, it has become more and more difficult to believe in a world revolutionary process and to identify it with the Soviet policy. On the other hand, where the Soviet reality itself is concerned, there is a consensus, sometimes explicit and sometimes unexpressed, which says that it represents a failure on various levels ranging from economic well-being to the ideological model, but a success on the military level. But it is precisely this minimal consensus on the basis of differentiation which supplies the point of departure for the new debate characteristic of the present phase.

Is the mixture of power and weakness in the Soviet Union reassuring or worrisome? Will it lead it to caution or to adventurism? Should it encourage the West to give priority to military balance or to economic

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interdependence? It is on this that the hawks and the doves, Americans and Europeans, rightists and leftists, begin to clash again.

The USSR Seen From the Right

The image of the USSR has remained relatively stable for the right wing. For example in West Germany, according to a survey, the opinions of the older generation and the more skeptical have changed much less than those of the young, more readily enthusiastic and easily deceived. After all, neither the invasions of Budapest or Prague, nor the books of Solzhenitsyn, nor the Russian intervention in Ethiopia have altered the opinion of the Western conservatives. These events have more nearly comfortably confirmed their views, which proved more correct than they had thought. They enabled them to pursue a struggle against the illusions of the left wing and the dangers of detente--an exercise at which both Franz-Joseph Strauss and Mrs Thatcher excel.

There are, however, three reservations with regard to the persistence of the conservative view. First of all there is the fact that, unlike the fascist extreme right wing, the parties of the center right are the government parties, and their leaders are former, present or future ministers. If these parties are more anti-Soviet, in most cases, in particular when they are members of the opposition, than the governments they produce, they cannot remain isolated from the development of these governments, whose concern with nuclear peace and East-West trade leads to a less Manichean view of the USSR. Finally, perhaps the most interesting aspect of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in the spring of 1978 was his long and cordial talk with Franz-Joseph Strauss.

Secondly, the conservatives, in Europe as well as the United States, share not only a convergence of interests but a continuing flirtation with China. But the very fact of being the allies of one communist power against another probably gives their anti-Sovietism a less ideological and more pragmatic aspect.

Finally, the conservative parties may in certain cases be more hostile toward another power--for example the United States or Germany, than toward the Soviet Union, or to another personality--Giscard d'Estaing--than to Brezhnev.

In the tradition of de Gaulle, the postulated primacy of nations over governments and the importance of Russia as a counterweight to Germany or the United States, leads to avoiding the placement of too much emphasis on the military growth of the USSR or on the expansionist policy out of fear of having to justify Atlantic integration. The result is the paradox of seeing a party such as the RPR [Rally for the Republic], the main stated ambition of which is to save France from the danger of communist totalitarianism, seeking the sympathy of the USSR in the name

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of reasons of state. In addition, it evidences a certain tolerance of the fashion in which the Soviets use the state apparatus against leftist anarchism or the crusades for the rights of man encouraged by American liberalism and moralism.

The USSR Seen From the Left

But it is above all in the left wing that one sees a change and paradoxical attitudes toward the USSR. There the transnational differences among the leftists, the communists and the socialists, national differences within these parties, and ambiguity or a guilty conscience joined together to make the Soviet problem a fascinating example of the more general development of the Western European left wing itself.

The most striking fact is the decline in the influence of the old fellow travelers and the emergence of the New Left. The changes are in part due to the developments and the behavior of the USSR, as well as, paradoxically, to the improvement of the international atmosphere. The first major break between the Western intellectuals and the USSR since the war occurred in 1956 after the invasion of Hungary. As to the decline in the peace movement or the campaigns of the Stockholm protest against the bomb sort (except where the unilateral disarmament movements, generally English, are concerned), it was linked with the relaxation of the cold war and the fear of a preventive war launched by the United States. But the main cause for the emergence of a new autonomous left wing lies perhaps less in a change in the perception of the Soviet Union and its relations with the United States than in the emergence of other cult objects or symbols of revolution.

If we take the case of Sartre, it is clear that for him what changed was less the image of the Soviet Union than his own attitude toward the PCF [French Communist Party] and, in the final analysis, the French workers' class. The chain of equations--"being against the bourgeoisie = being for the oppressed = being for the workers = being for the communists = being for the Soviet Union"--broke down not so much at the beginning or the end as in the middle. First the Chinese and Cuban revolutions, then the "peasant masses on three continents," the "damned of the earth," of whom Fanon made himself the spokesman, and then the young people, after 1968, in particular those who had participated in the "events" in France and more recently in the "movement" in Italy, represented reasons for wanting a change making it possible to wage the struggle against the existing order in the West without identification with the communist parties and the USSR. These new objects of devotion, with their romantic and activist aspect, symbolized by Che Guevara, contrasted sharply with the cautious, rigid, authoritarian and conservative behaviors of the orthodox communist parties and states.

On the basis of this movement, three new trends developed. For one branch of the new left, which was just recently predominant everywhere

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and still is in Italy and the FRG, for example, the concepts of revolution, violent rebellion and more generally overall struggle against imperialism and the reactionaries are retained and even reasserted with a new energy. For one faction of this group, the Maoists, the USSR and the communist parties in the West have joined the ranks of the capitalist enemy. Yet another faction believes that, although they are bureaucratic, authoritarian and "gone bourgeois," the Western parties and to an even greater extent the USSR still play a positive role on the world scene, as supporters of the national liberation movements and the revolutionary causes against the main enemies--capitalism, colonialism, the United States and the multinational companies.

One finds this point of view within the extreme leftist groups themselves, among such Third World supporters as Jean Genet--pro-Arab, pro-Baader-Meinhof and once profascist, as well as Regis Debray, who joins support of the Castro movement with that of Mitterrand. This tendency is also often found within the Italian and French communist parties and above all, perhaps, in the CERES [Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research and Education] and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK).

At the other extreme, a certain number of young intellectuals, in France in particular, have pushed the criticism of past illusions to the point of rejecting even the concepts of revolution, the conquest of power and socialism. For the majority of them, the waning attraction of Maoism, in particular since the end of the cultural revolution and the death of Mao, coincided with the discovery of Solzhenitsyn and the Soviet dissidents, and, in some cases, with the point of view of certain writers who share what one could call roughly the antipsychiatric criticism of society. This has led on the one hand to the generalization of their criticism, which is directed not only at any state, authority, institution or leftist movement whatsoever, and any belief at all in progress and rationality as such, and on the other, to the adoption of the Gulag Archipelago as the archetype of the state and the Soviet dissidents as the models for the only attitude possible for intellectuals--joining in the resistance rising from below. Instead of a model, they have found in the USSR, in the light of the Gulag Archipelago, a countermodel representing the ultimate logic of the West, and in the Soviet dissidents the combination of a new oppressed people and a new heroic and enlightened elite. I am speaking, of course, of the new philosophers. They do not by far have a shared position (some, for example, but not all, are again praising the liberal state and citing the United States as the least evil society because it is the most tolerant of dissidents), but they all have in common this need, born of their past, to find new incarnations of absolute good and evil. This sometimes leads them, through anti-Sovietism or anticommunism, to become the unexpected allies of the established order (as in France) or of violent pseudorevolutionary minorities (as in Italy).

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Finally, the perhaps largest and most interesting but also the least organized faction of the new left is made up of those who, sharing the majority of criticisms directed by the new philosophers at known revolutions, are skeptical about violent movements and conservative institutions, but have not as a result lost all hope of a basic transformation of society.*

For the first time, they have neither a foreign model nor an ideal formula, but their disillusionment with the various Utopias is mixed with a desire for liberation as strong as it was before. Their gaze turns toward less general objectives, linked with the local level, such movements as feminism and ecology, or the establishment of communities. For them, the USSR is neither an ally nor the main enemy: very simply, it no longer holds any interest.

Eurocommunism

If the Western communist parties, Eurocommunist or not, and their socialist or social democratic rivals have anything in common, it is their inability to afford this kind of luxury. They are doomed, if not to judge everything as a function of the USSR, at least to assign it importance--which in a way becomes more complicated and more difficult, for their attitude can no longer be either one of pure acceptance or one of unconditional rejection. The importance they give to the USSR is closely linked both to their ideological and organizational past (since the split in the workers' movement which developed precisely on the problem of the Russian leadership and model) and their political futures as potential government parties on the continent on which the Soviet presence is weighing ever more heavily.

The problem is particularly sensitive for the Eurocommunist parties. First of all, because their base level often has a version of the USSR inherited from past indoctrination, but also because their voters and potential allies make their break with Moscow a condition of access to power for them, and because, finally, the probable conditions of their government experience would make it desirable for them to be both protected against and by the USSR. It is moreover difficult to know what position to adopt to evaluate their vision of the USSR. It is necessary to differentiate at least four levels--the electorate, the militants, the intellectuals and the leaders themselves--as well as four dimensions in the foreign relations of the communist parties (and in particular their relations with the USSR), which influence their perceptions, i.e., the relations among parties, the relations among nations and the alliances both on the domestic and international, European and global, levels.

* See Guillebaud in "The Orphaned Years," Le Seuil, 1978.

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The classic view of the USSR which it would like to see maintained involves, in order of importance, the view of Moscow as the leader of the international communist movement, the ideological model for socialism, the promoter of European security and protector of the forces of peace in the European system and the liberation movements against imperialism on a world scale. Acceptance of this traditional view has waned to varying degrees depending on the party. We will limit ourselves to mention of the three parties which have given birth to the Eurocommunist notion (the Italian, Spanish and French parties) and to stressing both the differences in their attitudes and their development, which makes the very concept of Eurocommunism extremely ambiguous and uncertain, and the common points which, despite everything, distinguish them from the others.

None of these three parties accepts the Soviet claim to leadership of the world communist movement today: They all believe that there should not be a single leader or central authority proclaiming dogma. However, none of them rejects the concept of a world communist movement as such, although the majority speak of a new internationalism which, in the view of the Italians, should not be limited to the communist party, and which they all believe should no longer have pro-Sovietism as the touch-stone. None of the three recognizes the USSR as its socialist model, either: They all say they want to build another kind of socialism, based on the pluralist traditions and social structures of the advanced Western society. But none, as a party, has gone so far as to claim that the USSR is not socialist, although the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] and numerous key intellectuals in the French and Italian communist parties have stopped not far short of this. All have criticized the lack of political democracy in the USSR and Eastern Europe (ranging from the denunciation of individual acts of repression to recognition of the structurally antidemocratic aspect of the regime itself). But none has admitted publicly that economic exploitation has carried out "real socialism" or that the workers' class there has fewer social rights than in the capitalist world.

Similarly, where the relations of the USSR with Eastern Europe are concerned, they all condemn the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but continue to justify the invasion of Hungary. They all admit implicitly, and some explicitly, that the USSR dominates Eastern Europe at the expense of its allies' independence, but none has called the bloc an imperial system. All more or less accept the Western structures (NATO, EEC) which the USSR calls aggressive. But in the discussions or current negotiations on East-West relations in Europe (from the neutron bomb to East-West trade), they generally place the USSR on the side of the angels. In the same way, they criticize the clash of the superpowers in the Third World and encourage the independent development of the formerly colonized peoples. They continue, however, to utilize a class method of analyzing the world revolutionary process and they regard (in any case the PCI [Italian Communist Party] and the PCF do) American imperialism and the

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multinational companies as the main enemy in this struggle for world liberation, and the USSR as a powerful ally in this struggle. In the same way, where China and Kampuchea are concerned, they do not (with the exception of the PCF) necessarily participate in the campaigns to denounce and excommunicate Moscow, but they remain sympathetic to the USSR and Vietnam.

The important thing in connection with these three positions is, if indeed they reflect a common logic--that of differentiation both within the communist movement and in their judgments on the real Soviet situation (that is to say rejection of a clear-cut choice between obedience and a total break, or between imitation and rejection), no one of them is truly consistent or tenable. Their various directions and the stress they place on one element or another bear witness, on the contrary, to a series of unstable compromises in response to contradictory pressures.

The Spanish Communist Party

The party which has moved the farthest away from the USSR is the PCE. The real break occurred after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, although there have been several pseudo-reconciliations since. Santiago Carrillo doubtless regards bonds with the USSR as compromising and its invective has done nothing but given him greater credibility in the eyes of the Spaniards. He has gone so far along this path that without a doubt, of all the Spanish political forces, it is the PCE which has the worst relations with the USSR, much worse than those of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] or the government, for example.

It is difficult to assess to what extent the image of "David against Goliath," to which Carrillo has made very clear reference, is accepted by the Spanish people and the members of the party. Some within the leadership, such as Marcelino Camacho, have voiced more favorable judgments of the USSR, and a large number, among the older veterans above all, while sharing Carrillo's desire for total independence, obviously believe that he goes too far.

Publicly, in any case, there is no split on the leadership level between the bolder intellectuals and the more cautious leaders, for it is Carrillo himself (in his book "Eurocommunism and the State" in particular, which brought down upon him the wrath of Moscow) and his right hand man, Manuel Azcarate, who have most clearly and forcefully dared to criticize both the nature of the Soviet regime and its role in the world. And they are clearly, on almost all subjects, at one extreme of the consensus of which we spoke, to which they are linked solely by the fear of being too isolated from the other Eurocommunist parties. It is they who refuse most explicitly to regard the communist movement as a church and Moscow as Rome. They have termed the Soviet regime a primitive form of socialism based not on the power of the proletariat but on that of a small elite. In connection with the invasions and Soviet oppression in

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Eastern Europe, it is they who have voiced the strongest criticism, the clearest defense of armed resistance and the greatest solidarity with the victims.

In the final analysis their position on the problem of the international role of the USSR (both from the point of view of relations among states--and in particular the European balance--and that of the international class struggle) is to a certain extent closer to that of the Chinese or at least the Yugoslavs than to that of their Eurocommunist comrades. Above all they emphasize the dangers of the two hegemonies and great power politics. On that basis, they place the great powers on the same level. In Western Europe, according to Carrillo, the two superpowers would be hostile toward a victory for the left wing and socialism. Europe must thus be independent, on the military level also, in order to resist their blackmail. On the world level, it should seek an alliance with all the anti-imperialist forces, not to align with the USSR against American imperialism, but to allow the existence of a multipolar world.

The Italian Communist Party

One finds no trace of this boldness and clarity among the Italian communists, although this does not render them less credible. Their deviation from the model and the Soviet vision, precisely because it was slower (it had begun at least by 1956 and was based on experiences as distant in time as the reservations of Togliatti concerning the sectarian bent of the Third International in 1929 or his direct experience of the Stalinist purges), much more discreet and more vulnerable to reversals and changes of direction, may seem more timid, or, in an equally justified way, more authentic and less tactical. While for the PCE (and above all for the PCF), the development of the perception of the USSR might have been superficial or the result of a conflict with Moscow or a tactical need to assert independence, the Italians seem instead to have wanted to avoid or minimize conflicts with the USSR, or anyone else. Their development may have been caused by the same domestic policy considerations, requiring a certain distance from the USSR as a condition of their participation in the political game. But the main key must be sought instead in a third phenomenon found to a much lesser extent in the other countries, to wit the mutual contamination or interpenetration between the PCI (which escaped Stalinization because of fascism) and Italian society. The result for the latter was a certain Marxist cultural hegemony making the right wing culture weaker therein and that of the extreme left wing more Stalinist than, for example, in France. But the effect on the PCI was one of "Westernization" or "Italianization" which seems to have given a whole generation of local administrators, economists, historians and politicians a concept of civic life, of European integration or the economic crisis, which, whatever their abstract attachment to the USSR, seems to belong to a cultural universe other than that of "real socialism" or the "general laws of social development."

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It is obvious that there are on all levels, apart from the old leaders who experienced Stalinism and want to hear no more of it (such as Amendola or Terracini), other men such as Longo and Pajetta, who have doubtless remained more attached to their early education. Among the young leaders, some have a social democratic air, while others seem to evidence a taste for order and control which makes them more similar to the traditional Leninist "apparatchiks." The USSR means practically nothing to the majority of the new young cadres of bourgeois origin who represented the basis for the development of the PCI in the 1960's and 1970's. But this is not the case with a large number of the older members of worker origin who form the nucleus of the party. Among the intellectuals in the PCI, if indeed the majority are profoundly influenced by Western culture and in particular American culture, some are trying to preserve the philosophical basis for a communist identity by retaining a link with such concepts as the "world revolutionary process" or "the hegemony of the workers' class." Finally, even among the electors, the vast majority of whom vote communist for noncommunist reasons and most certainly non-Soviet reasons, a strong minority (30 percent) expressed a more positive view of the USSR, in a survey published by ESPRESSO, than of any Western country. An excellent recent survey made of the communist base in Bologna, shows that if a small faction believes that the leaders do not go far enough in separation from the Soviet Union, and a larger faction agrees with them, they are both surpassed by the number (made up above all, but not solely, of veteran militants and workers) of those who accept Eurocommunism as a tactic, but remain attached to the USSR and even to Stalin.*

What then is the true attitude of the PCI toward the USSR? As the party still functions on the basis of the rules of democratic centralism, the last word falls to Enrico Berlinguer and his faction. But the movement they head is so diverse and the real situation they must take into account so complex, that one never knows whether their hesitation and contradictions mean that they are profiting from this diversity and complexity or whether they are the prisoners thereof, as the address given by Berlinguer at the UNITA festival in September 1979 seemed to suggest. In that speech he appeared to cite the concern to avoid causing despair for millions of workers as the explicit reason for avoiding total rejection of the USSR. Whether the voices of the PCI are well orchestrated or not, the fact is that their shading varies with the speaker, the context and the subject.

* Marzio Barbagli and Freigiorgio Corbetta, "One Tactic and Two Strategies--A Survey of the PCI Base," IL MULINO, 260, November-December 1978.

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Where the relations among communist parties are concerned, the PCI, along with the PCE and the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Romania, have been one of the "autonomous" bodies rejecting the effort made by the USSR and the GDR to impose a common line on the conference of European communist parties held in Berlin in 1976. But since then, with the Hungarian party, it has played more of the role of a mediator, showing that it truly supports the formula "unity in diversity." This effort is also clearly revealed in its very moderate support of Carrillo against the USSR. On the other hand, the PCI is truly trying to promote a new concept of internationalism eliminating the distinction (basic for the Soviets) between the communist parties and their allies.

On the ideological level, the judgment as to the socialist or non-socialist nature of the USSR has become one of the most important themes in the dialogue between the PCI and the noncommunist left. Communist statements have varied, ranging from the very measured comment by Berlinguer in January 1977 on "some antiliberal characteristics" of the societies of the Soviet type, to the regrets expressed by major party theoreticians, sometimes in the editorials of the party newspaper, UNITA, regarding the persistence of a form of Stalinism in the USSR, the structural defects in a system which make repression possible, or again the existence of a socialist economic infrastructure along with the absence of the democratic superstructure which should be one of the foundations of socialism. The PCI asserts that it refuses to answer yes or no to the question of the socialist nature of the USSR, for this would mean a return to the logic of labels and excommunication, but more important than all this, it seems that no one can make abstraction of the historical role of the October revolution and the present international role of the USSR. The leaders of the PCI insist on the need for further research--undertaken in a spirit free of any polemic or apologetic approach--in order to understand the development of the Soviet system since 1917 and its interactions with the general development of the world.

The specialized institutes and the intellectuals in the PCI have moreover in fact done remarkable work along these lines. They organized a seminar on the USSR in January 1978, and on the spring events in Prague in July of 1978. They have written a number of books on Stalinism and the history of the USSR, and finally, not the least of their contributions, they have undertaken a campaign of articles urging the rehabilitation of Bukharin and, more recently, Trotsky.

It is interesting to note that if these undertakings are encouraged by the party leaders, their own statements always lag behind those of the experts. The latter obviously serve the purpose, with pedagogical and exploratory goals in mind, of stating what the leaders think but do not want to state officially. Berlinguer feels that he should take the present and future relations of the PCI with the USSR into account, just as a chief of state would, or almost.

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The relations between the PCI and the USSR have in fact somewhat taken on the aspect of relations between nations. The Italian communists, even more than the Yugoslavs themselves, seem to be putting into practice the formula stated by a Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs: "As Yugoslavs, we need American protection against the Russians. As communists, we need that of the Russians against the Americans." Here again their excessive diplomacy is no help in a proper evaluation of the attitude of the PCI toward the foreign policy of the USSR in the international arena. One thing is clear: They support the Soviet policy to the extent that it is, in their view, a factor in balance and detente, but they are worried, without stating it explicitly, about certain of its militaristic or expansionist aspects. They remember the days of Krushchev fondly and support the so-called doves against the so-called hawks in the Kremlin.

In Europe, they defend Soviet undertakings but at the same time, they support Italian participation in the European community and in NATO, with arguments which suggest that they regard the strengthening of the West as a security measure against interference by this same USSR. They also show their concern with Yugoslavia's independence: A number of Italian communist leaders have made it clear to Western interlocutors that if Yugoslavia were to slip into the Soviet orbit, Italy, and in particular the PCI, might for their part move toward nonalignment. This does not cast a very favorable light on their moral intransigence or the depth of their attachment to the West, but it can be regarded as a message to the latter to alert it to the possible consequences of abandoning Yugoslavia, and in any case, as a sign of mistrust concerning the attitude of the USSR after the disappearance of Tito. Where the Third World is concerned, the PCI seems to speak less of stable balances than of the world revolutionary process promoted by the USSR. Here we see a contradiction with its attitude toward European problems, just as its ecumenical concern in seeking alliances with all progressive or peaceful movements leads it to support the social democratic parties in Europe and the military dictatorships in the Third World. The contradiction is somewhat modified by the fact that the Soviets are also paying court to the Socialist International. Reliable communist sources have criticized the fact that the USSR pursues a logic of confrontation in Africa, but again, the critics, incensed in particular by the Soviet support of Ethiopia against Eritrea, are mollified by the fact that the Soviets themselves seem unwilling to support Colonel Mengistu totally and that the PCI shades its criticisms by pointing to the importance of class criteria in judging Soviet actions.*

In 1978 and 1979, the PCI made an effort to minimize or rise above these contradictions, but in some respects it only aggravated them. On the

* See A. Minucci, "The Reasoning of a Criticism," RINASCITA, No 29, 21 July 1978, pp 1-2.

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theoretical level, the statement by Berlinguer to the party congress to the effect that "it can happen and it does happen that a communist party, a socialist state, finds itself closer to a noncommunist party, popular progressive movement or democratic groups than to another communist party or another socialist state"* represented a decisive step forward in replacing an independent judgment for affiliation with a movement as a criterion of the "new internationalism." On the critical level, the application of this principle has seen fluctuations and hesitations: an open attitude toward China during the tour of Eastern Europe made by Hua Guofeng, to the great displeasure of the USSR; support, at first partial and then more categorical, of the USSR and Vietnam against Kampuchea and China during their armed clashes; a very clear position, at the time of the congress and perhaps under the influence of the Yugoslavs, of condemnation of all intervention by a socialist country in another, placing China and Vietnam on the same level; and a new flirtation with the Chinese later, but without visible protest by the USSR.

Since that time, if the independence of the PCI on this matter has been confirmed (in its defense, against Soviet criticism, of the action of the Italian navy in rescuing Vietnamese refugees, as well), its support of the USSR in matters concerning the military balance in Europe (like nuclear modernization) has been just as much confirmed, the assertion of the socialist nature of the USSR has been clearer, and support of the dissidents in the East, including the Czechoslovaks, has been less clearly expressed, which has moreover given rise to protests in the communist press itself by such pro-Soviet intellectuals as Boffa, Guerra and Procacci.

Whatever the variations may be, one aspect remains constant--the specific style of the PCI, which leads it, even when in fact its position supports that of the USSR, as on nuclear negotiations, to present it in an original and constructive fashion or, as with the Iranian crisis, to maintain a discreet position, if not neutrality, in contact with the violent campaign of the French Communist Party.

[Spring 1980, pp 81-90]

[Text] The Communist and Socialist Parties

Its an ill wind that blows nobody good. Reviewing a text written in July 1978 in September 1979 or February 1980 poses formidable problems, but by the same token, it provides precious information on the very subject which is the meat of the two parts of this article: the attitudes

* UNITA, 4 April 1979

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of the Italian and French communist parties toward the Soviet Union.* If the variations, hesitations and contradictions in the PCI are persisting, the general direction of its development as well as its concern with combining adaptation and continuity are not in doubt. If, like all the "Eurocommunist" parties, it modified its criticisms of the USSR in 1978-79, the invasion of Afghanistan gave it an opportunity to take a further step in its criticisms (which are very clearly consistent now with the nature of its foreign policy), and thereby in the effort to find grounds for understanding with the European left wing as a whole and in particular with the German social democrats. One can simply note that at each stage the resistance of the pro-Soviet base seems to increase, but that the desire of the leaders to override it, paying the prices of pauses and periodic tactical retreats, also seems to be increasingly evident.

It is almost exactly the reverse which seems to be true for the French Communist Party. One does not know which to admire more--its perseverance in its pro-Soviet nature "as Afghanistan in itself finally alters it," or the sharpness of the swings which, at the end of a generation, have led it to reestablish the positions and the stress of the era discussed at the beginning of this article. Condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, followed by approval of its normalization; solidarity with the USSR and Portugal in 1974 and 1975, followed by conversion to Eurocommunism in the autumn of 1975, and the violent Brezhnev-Marchais conflict in 1976 and 1977; beginning of normalized relations with the USSR coinciding with the breakdown of the Union of the Left, but accompanied in an initial stage by an all-out nationalist French communist attitude and the establishment of a certain ideological distance marked by the support of the work "The USSR and Us," and finally the speed-up of reconciliation by the formula of the "overall positive assessment," and then by the campaigns on Vietnam and subsequently the NATO missiles, culminating spectacularly with the approval of the invasion of Afghanistan, the trip made by Marchais to Moscow, and the praise of the conquests of real socialism and the change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism.

Where should the key for these variations, as well as this contancy, be sought?

The French Communist Party

Where the French are concerned, unlike the Italians, the true attitude of the leadership seems much more difficult to establish than does that

* The two parts of this article are the French version of an article published in DAEDALUS (winter 1979). We are publishing this revised version with the kind permission of that publication.

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of the militants. A certain number of surveys seem to reveal a relatively consistent development in the membership, while the public positions adopted by the leadership have often reflected drastic changes.

According to the responses to a questionnaire drafted by L'HUMANITE DIMANCHE in 1973, less than one percent of the individuals surveyed based their definition of socialism on the USSR or the other socialist countries. Only six percent defined it as the collective ownership of the means of production and the replacement or defeat of capitalism.* This does not mean that the communist party voters do not have the slightest feeling of attachment to the USSR: Their view of that country is consistently more favorable than the national average. But the results coincide well with the general trend toward disaffection and tend to approach the average.

This development is not however found everywhere. In 1974, 63 percent of the communists surveyed regarded the Soviet experience as a success in economic development, while 5 percent called it a failure. The national average was 47 percent and 19 percent, respectively. If in 1977 the national percentages had decreased slightly (40 percent and 22 percent), the communist responses, for their part, had not changed. Similarly, concerning the improvement in the standard of living in the USSR, the opinion was hardly more favorable among the communists in 1977 (52 percent for, 16 against) than in 1974 (53 and 15 percent, respectively), while the national average had dropped from 45 (against 20 percent) to 31 percent. On the subject of the sincerity of the USSR concerning detente, the national responses, which were positive in 1974 (49 percent as opposed to 26 percent) had become negative by 1977 (28 percent as opposed to 34 percent), while the communist responses remained positive in 1977 (52 percent as opposed to 16 percent), if indeed they had dropped in comparison to 1974 (70 percent as opposed to 10 percent).

Concerning public freedoms, however, the development of a number of favorable responses by the communists into unfavorable ones was great enough to bring figures close to the national average, which was already negative in 1974 (55 percent thinking that the Soviet experience represented a failure on the level of public and individual freedom) and became still more so in 1977 (61 percent as opposed to 6 percent). Among the communists, 33 percent spoke of success and 23 percent of failure, in 1974, while in 1977, only 17 spoke of success and 39 percent of failure.**

* L'HUMANITE DIMANCHE survey "Socialism is Not Identified with the USSR," LE MONDE, 22 November 1973.

** SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company], "The Soviet Union as Seen by the French," surveys with commentary by A. Dukamel, March 1974 and June 1977.

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The subject of violations of the rights of man is that concerning which the PCF came into conflict most directly with the USSR in 1976 and 1978 (to the point of protesting the trials of Orlov and Shcharanskiy much more speedily and forcefully than the PCI). It would seem natural to assume that the reactions occurred in the following order: French society became ever more aware of the repression in the USSR, and that awareness was communicated to the communist electorate; the leaders were then in turn affected by this change, or adapted to it for tactical reasons; and finally, this led them to clash with the USSR. There is certainly some truth in this description. Whether it be to give the Union of the Left a chance or to wrest first place in this same left wing from the socialists, the PCF urgently needs to improve its classic image where it is most vulnerable. But when it tries to demonstrate its independence of Moscow, it seems much more convincing when speaking of its nationalism than when asserting its love of liberty, although its development in 1979-80 served in the end to cast almost as much doubt on the one as the other.

It is also true that, in connection with the USSR and a suitable attitude toward Stalinism, one finds sincerely voiced and violently contradictory points of view within the PCF, ranging from unconditional support--Jeanette Vermeersch--to the historical explanations and moral condemnations of Jean Elleinstein (whose theses are not very different from those of Carrillo or such Italian experts as G. Boffa) and the oversubtle contorsions of Louis Althusser, who sees in Stalinism the result of an economist and humanist deviation. But it is even more true that the abrupt swings in direction characterizing the recent history of the PCF seem to correspond more nearly to unclear and unforeseeable episodes in the personal battle for power between its leaders and those in the Kremlin than (as in the case of the PCI) the logical progression, although cautious, of a social and ideological development.

The reactions of the French communists to the Krushchev report and the other events in 1956 were in contrast to those of the Italians. Until the death of Maurice Thorez in 1964, the PCF was the firmest opponent of destalinization and the Krushchev policy. Under Waldeck-Rochet, between 1965 and 1969, it began a gradual movement toward the Italian position. But the rise and establishment of control by Georges Marchais led to a return to closer bonds with Moscow.

This development was illustrated by the attitude of the French (still opposed to that of the Italians) at the world conference of communist parties in 1969, by their acceptance of the "normalization of Czechoslovakia" and by their hostile attitude toward such different victims of the USSR as Dubcek, Solzhenitsyn and Carrillo. There were, it is true, at the time of the signing of the joint program and the presidential campaign of 1974, some criticisms of Soviet policy in the realm of freedoms, but this period nonetheless remained that in which, for example, Georges Marchais proclaimed the superiority of Soviet democracy over democracy

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in the West in 1973 (which he began to do again, more or less, in 1978 and 1979, and more strikingly in 1980), while in 1974, the official communist press published books offering an apology for the communist countries, such as for example, "Socialism is Doing Well."*

In 1975 in particular, during the clash on the subject of events in Portugal, the PCF alined itself clearly on the side of Cunhal and Brezhnev against Berlinguer and Carrillo. Even further, the PCF seemed in fact to be tacitly reproaching Moscow for not supporting the Portuguese communists sufficiently. During the preparations for the Berlin conference of European communist parties, the PCF found itself on the side of the Soviets and the East Germans and against the "autonomists" on the subject of a joint document establishing a common strategy. If the Italians wanted this document to insist on detente and avoid any attack on the Americans, the PCF for its part went even farther than the Soviets along the "anti-imperialist" path. Once again the PCF experienced the fear that the Soviets might sacrifice revolutionary progress in the name of detente and the status quo.

Then came the great turnabout of October and November 1975. Since their maximalism did not rally majority support at the conference, the French communists moved from a more centralist position than that of the centralists themselves to one still more "autonomous" than that of the autonomists. From apostles of "proletarian internationalism," they became apostles of the absolute priority of national strategy.** Beginning at that point, it becomes still more difficult to understand their line of conduct with regard to Moscow. On the one hand, they supported the Italians (whom they had criticized two months earlier) and the Spaniards. They adopted the concept of Eurocommunism and seemed to be moving toward acceptance of the European and Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, they set themselves apart from the Italians by serious and open clashes with the Soviets and a more nationalist line. Marchais was not present at either the 25th Congress of the CPSU or the celebration of the anniversary of the revolution, while Berlinguer was welcomed there with deference, and in the same period, Brezhnev did not meet with Marchais during his visit to Paris.

The swing toward nationalism became spectacular at the time of the break-up of the Union of the Left. Beginning in the summer of 1977, the PCF

* M. Jouet, Editions Sociales, 1975.

** See in particular J. F. Revel and B. Lazitch, "The True Life of G. Marchais," and "Quarrel With Brezhnev," in L'EXPRESS, 31 July-6 August 1978, pp 84-93.

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launched a violent antisocialist campaign, which was evidenced on the international level by an even more violent campaign against the Socialist International, West Germany, the European Community and its expansion, the United States and the capitalist world, and which, on the theoretical level, led to a nationalist or autarkic version of the Soviet and East German theory of monopolistic state capitalism. All of this revealed an attitude opposed to that of the PCI and the PCE which, for their part, were basically favorable to Europe and were trying to seduce the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]. These new directions, and in particular the collapse of the Union of the Left, were of a sort to please the USSR, particularly since they were paralleled by an ever clearer normalization of relations with it, the resumption of contacts between the parties and the defense of the "socialist" countries, whose achievements were increasingly said to be "positive over all." The opposition to supranationality and the clear and definitive split between the communists and the socialists or the social democrats were consistent with the Moscow orthodoxy which Eurocommunism threatened. The campaign of the PCF on these points was moreover much more vehement in general than that of Moscow. The frequent praise addressed by the Soviets to Willy Brandt and their courting of the Socialist International brought them closer in fact to the attitude of the PCI. With regard to both West Germany and the social democrats, and perhaps even European integration, the USSR seemed to want to retain space in which to maneuver by avoiding confinement to options which were too rigid and too negative.

In this connection, one can wonder if the spectacular reconciliation in the shadow of the tanks in Kabul does not reflect a swing on the part of the USSR as much as the PCF. It is true it was prior to the invasion that G. Marchais rediscovered the fact that Soviet socialism had eliminated exploitation and oppression, and the communique of the political bureau dated 26 October 1979 represented a step in the direction of the campaign of the Soviets to seduce the social democrats, by referring to the collaboration with them in the struggle for peace and disarmament. But the fact remains that the reconciliation came about precisely coinciding with a revolution under the boot--more boot than revolution, and the pressure from a socialist camp more interested in intimidating than seducing, as if--the only consistent element following the criticisms of Krushchev by Thorez and of Moscow by the PCF likely to accept the status quo out of concern for detente--the only sincere reproach the PCF had ever had to address to the USSR had had to be perhaps too peaceful or too liberal.

In any case, if the PCF had taken a step in the direction of tactical use of the left wing of the social democratic sector by the Soviets, in October, the Moscow communication adopted the view of that faction, so dear to the French, as a tool of imperialism. And this was precisely

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the formula to which the Italian communists pointed as a test,* showing that the USSR had turned its back on peace and detente.

It is indeed the attitude toward Germany--on the international diplomatic level, toward social democracy--on the level of "ideological warfare," or, on the contrary, the search for a third path, and above all, toward the SPD as the intersection of the two, which seems to be the decisive breaking point both for the USSR and for the two great communist parties in Western Europe.

The European Socialists

It is not certain that they are wrong. Perhaps too much attention has been paid to the development of the Western communist parties, and not enough to that of the socialist and social democratic parties, whose future may well be still less predictable and yet have much more import on that of Western Europe. After all, not only in northern Europe, where the Scandinavian social democrats, the British laborites and the German SPD obviously have greater weight than the communist parties in these countries, but everywhere else in addition, with the sole exception of Italy, the future in European-Soviet relations might well be determined by the orientation of such parties as the French PS [Socialist Party], the Spanish PSOE, the PSP [Portuguese Socialist Party] and the Greek PASOK.

Now the majority of these parties, precisely because of the recent nature of their establishment, their change, their spectacular growth or their gaining a strategic position on the political chessboard, are particularly variable and unpredictable in their attitudes on East-West matters. Some, in particular those in the Mediterranean region, have again taken up the ambitions of the "Two-and-a-Half International" founded by the Austrian Marxists in the 20's, desiring to create a bridge between the Second and Third Internationals--between social democracy and bolshevism. One of the aspects of this position involves an attitude of critical sympathy for the Soviet Union, recalling the effort of the Eurocommunists to avoid both unconditional support and total rejection.

Refusal to allow themselves to be assimilated by the social democrats and the ambition to create a bridge between the East and West are parts of the historical tradition of the Italian socialists.

With the spectacular rise of the French socialist party and the apparent prospects for revolutionary transformation in southern Europe in 1975 and 1976, the idea of a bridge between the north and the south and the

* See the interview with Romano Ledda by Joella Kuntz, LE MATIN 26 January 1980.

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concept of ideological and political unity in a "Mediterranean or Latin" socialism--more or less under French hegemony, making a matching pair with the social democratic parties in the north led by the SPD and the British laborites--was the fashion for a while. It was utilized by Francois Mitterrand, but it was above all the CERES which gave it its theoretic and strategic letters patent of nobility.

If it took little time for the Portuguese socialists first and then the Italians, to turn their backs on this idea, the fact was that the domestic policy in their respective countries led them to oppose the communists and to seek the favor of the social democrats in the north. Conversely, it is among these latter, and more precisely within the SPD, that one can see a new trend toward unconditional support of detente and granting priority to a dialogue with the USSR with a view to keeping open the possibility of a reunification of Germany, indeed, in some cases, the international workers movement. More generally, while certain Mediterranean socialists are tending to return toward the center, certain social democrats in the north are seeking (in part to compensate for the moderate policies of the likes of Schmidt and Callaghan) a leftist foreign policy. The question is whether, contrary to the trend in the extraparliamentary New Left, this means a more accomodating policy toward the USSR.

The French Socialist Party

Nowhere are these ambiguities and paradoxes more obvious than in the case of the French Socialist Party. This should surprise no one, for the paradoxical adventure of this party between 1971 and 1978 was based precisely on ambiguity. Its source is to be found in what one could call the paradox of the French left, to wit the fact that it cannot win power either without the communists or with them. The more particular form this paradox takes in the case of the socialists is that, in order for the left to win, the socialists must become visibly stronger than the communists. But to achieve this, and in addition in order not to lose the support of the communists, they must pursue a leftist strategy, that is to say one of unity with the communists, which forces them constantly to give guarantees of leftist stability and to defend themselves against the suspicion that they are preparing to betray their allies and rejoin the center. Precisely because their interests and those of the communists in domestic policy are characterized as much by rivalry as convergence, ideology and foreign policy are the realms in which it is possible for the socialists to show at little cost--at least in the short run--that the PS is closer to the PCF than the centrists. This explains the form the socialist paradox has taken where our subject is concerned: it was precisely in the period when the intellectual prestige of Marxism and the moral and political prestige of the Soviet Union were tending to decline in French public opinion that they were tending to increase in one single sector--that of the socialist party, which itself was rapidly expanding until 1978.

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It is not that the socialist party has become officially Marxist or favorable to the USSR. But it has become first of all more critical of the United States, of the multinational companies and even of European integration and German social democracy in their present forms. In effecting this shift in the name of the struggle against imperialism, and in establishing its domestic policy under the sign of a break with capitalism, it implicitly adopted a view within which, since imperialism is basically linked with capitalism, and the basic split in the world opposes capitalism to socialism, the Soviet Union is on the right side. The criticisms it deserves have to do with important problems, perhaps, but not the central problem, and they are expressed within the same camp. This view is seen again in the answers of the socialist voters in the surveys we mentioned above. Most frequently, in particular in connection with the success of the Soviet Union where the standard of living and worker participation are concerned, the socialists surveyed were closer to the communists than other noncommunists.

Secondly, when the socialists criticize Soviet policy--in particular in connection with such problems as the rights of man or Portugal--they do so with hesitation and much moderation, out of fear of alienating their communist allies, awakening their suspicions or encouraging their attacks upon themselves. This could be noted in particularly striking fashion at the time of the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn.

Thirdly, when the communists attack them, the reaction of the French socialists is often the same as that of the conservative governments. They solicit the support of Moscow (which they regard as more reasonable) to moderate these attacks. In the course of recent years, a certain number of contacts, visits and meetings have linked the French Socialist Party and not only the governments of Eastern Europe, but the party and government of the Soviet Union itself, as well as experts at specialized institutes.

Very often, the terms of their communiques are inspired by Soviet concepts.

On the other hand, in international relations, the French socialists, who favor a vague and indiscriminate concept of disarmament and collective security, can in the present stage find common ground with the Soviet campaign for "military detente." The problem is that, in the ideological realm as well as that of international security, the French socialists are in danger of being content with an approach combining a general vague and sentimental orientation with short-term domestic policy calculations; while the Soviets have more specific ideas about the symbolic means and specific use of these meetings and these communiques.

It is possible, however, that the breakdown of the Union of the Left, coinciding with the emergence of the theme of the rights of man, followed by new military aggression on the part of Moscow, has begun to modify the attitude of the French socialists toward the Soviet Union. The socialist party must reassert its identity, which should lead it to retain its Marxist and more or less revolutionary rhetoric, but also to

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have less fear of displeasing the communists and to seek out more of the themes which might embarrass them. It is true that, at least for Francois Mitterrand, the two immediate priorities (repelling the attack by Michel Rocard and rallying the votes of the communists in the second round of the presidential election) would suggest not too much change in attitude or language with regard to the Soviet Union, and did in any case lead, in 1978 and 1979 to adopting language close to that of its new allies in the CERES. More than ever, tactics dictate.

The Spanish and Greek Socialists

In some of the Mediterranean parties, one finds some of the same contradictions and developments leading to rather varying results. For two of them, the PSOE in Spain and the PASOK in Greece, the problem seems to be serving as the expression of the dominant national climate. In the Spanish case, it is a matter of being on good terms with everyone, and Felipe Gonzales has succeeded in fact in being on better terms both with Moscow and Washington than with Santiago Carrillo. In 1978, he seemed to move toward the West, but not to the point of acceptance of Spanish membership in NATO. It should be noted, moreover, that he justifies his position by pointing to the presumably evil consequences of such membership for Yugoslavia's independence of Moscow.

For Mr Papandreou, the basic attitudes are anti-Americanism and support of the Third World. They lead to an ideological sense of being closer to Moscow, an anti-imperialist force, although national interest considerations (for example if Soviet-Turkish relations were to become too close) might easily also make this feeling anti-Soviet.

The Portuguese and Italian Socialists

For two other parties, the PSP and the PSI [Italian Socialist Party], the development was different. The Portuguese socialists moved in just a few weeks to the direct experience of traditional communist methods, from the usual Mediterranean combination of Marxism, anti-Americanism and support of the Third World to the resolute defense of Western values, the European Community and NATO. The same primacy of domestic policy could however produce a certain return toward the earlier positions which might be revealed by the position of Mario Soares on Africa, in particular Angola, and Nicaragua. If the main threat seems to come less from the communists and the revolutionary captains supported by the Soviet Union than from the right wing supported by the United States, the anti-Soviet attitude of the Portuguese socialists, however authentic it may be, might be partially subject to review.

The case of the Italian socialists illustrates even better, if possible, the way in which attitudes toward the Soviet Union can vary as a function of the vicissitudes of domestic policy. Alone among the large socialist parties of the West, the PSI continued after 1948 to pursue unity of

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action with the communists. This policy led to numerous splits (the most important resulting in the creation of the Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI) headed by G. Saragat), but it led basically to support of the Soviet policy during the cold war, to the point of winning its leader, Pietro Nenni, a Stalin Prize.

After 1956, the Italian socialists began to move away from the communists and toward an understanding with Saragat's PSDI and the Christian democrats. This development was to end in the "socialist reunification" and the formation of "center-left" governments. In foreign policy, the position of the socialist party changed as a result. From then on, it accepted the Western institutions (including NATO), with the proviso that they be only of defensive significance and not go against the ultimate goal of dissolution of the blocs. In the majority of the governments which followed, the socialists were the elements most favorable to detente, just as on the domestic policy level, they began to complain that the communists were now ready to participate in the government and that the country, for its part, was ripe for a "leftist alternative."

However, as soon as the Italian Christian democrats and communists began truly to engage in dialogue, and Italy began in fact to move toward a "historic compromise," the socialists began to feel excluded. And the path that they chose to regain their identity and a role to play involved becoming the harshest critics of the inadequacies of the communist conversion to Western democracy. While the "creeping historical compromise" led the Christian democrats to be less and less critical of the Soviet Union, it led the socialists to be ever more so. Just as they are the most vigorous and polemic critics of the Gramsci tradition and the attachment to him which the PCI continues to reveal, so they rail at the communists for their lack of clarity about the Soviet Union and the inadequacy of their support of the dissidents in the East. And so the socialists have become specialists in the study and the defense of the dissidents (for example in connection with the Venice Biennial devoted to them, and for all practical purposes organized by the Italian socialists, as well as innumerable seminars and symposiums).

These undertakings are a part of the broader project of Secretary General Craxi, which is to "Westernize" the PSI and regain the ground lost on the European level--particularly in relations with the British labor party and to a still greater extent with the SPD, because of the interest shown by these latter in "Eurocommunism." The paradox lies in the fact that at the same time, these impeccably Nordic and Western social democratic parties seem to be more interested in detente than in dissidence, in reassuring the Soviet Union than in attacking it.

The Labor Party

There is nothing new in this for the left wing of the labor party, in which the discovery by the Webbs that the USSR represented the future

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has never been completely forgotten, and to which the most important trade union leader in the country, Jack Jones, could say at the time of the visit paid by Mr Chelepin: "The people should go into the streets to celebrate his visit. Has 1939 been forgotten? Of course, this naive idealism about the USSR has very little practical results.

The Social Democratic Party of Germany

The situation is quite different for the SPD. There are few recent developments in Europe more interesting than the new developments in its Ostpolitik. Indeed, the national interests and domestic policy converge to lead the West German government to strongly desire to pursue detente, and thus to maintain the advantages it has provided for the security of Berlin and communications between the FRG and GDR; to fear, no less intensely, a hardening and a polarization on the international level, which domestically could only serve the opposition CDU [Christian Democratic Union] (above all, Franz-Joseph Strauss); and finally, to be tempted to play the role of mediator or arbiter between the East and the West, which it has already ventured to do in certain circumstances between the United States and the southern left wing.

But there are elements in the development of the SPD on East-West problems which go beyond this general attitude. Let us examine a certain number of isolated facts: The statements by Chancellor Schmidt on the subject of weapons mastery, his criticism of Mr Carter's policy on the rights of man and his publicly expressed resentment with regard to the Americans; the visits paid by Minister Wichniewski to East Berlin and the hope often expressed by the federal government, in particular on the occasion of Mr Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in May of 1978, that he could influence Mr Honecker in the direction of moderation; the statements by Mr Egon against the neutron bomb and those of Mr Herbert Wehner on the defensive nature of the new Soviet medium-range missiles; the statements of the West German leaders minimizing the Soviet danger; the presence of Boris Ponomarev at the spring meeting of the Socialist International and the invitation issued to Willy Brandt, as its president, concerning joint studies and activities to promote disarmament in Europe; and finally the statements of certain young SPD leaders (in particular Karsten Voigt) on the need to overcome the schism in the workers' movement at the same time as that in Europe--thus echoing a scheme ever more frequently voiced by the Italian communists as representing the ultimate meaning of Euro-communism. Doesn't all of this have a logic which stands out from this political chiaroscuro in which ideology and realism, long-term dreams and short-term estimates intermingle without distinction?

Let us be on guard against lapsing into too conspiratorial a view of this ferment, either by reviving, like the German right wing, the mystery ghosts and old debates (like the "Bahr plan" of the 1960's, revealed in the 1970's as proof of the neutralist projects of its author, the communist past of Herbert Wehner and his secret visits to East Berlin),

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or like certain of the French and Poles, by reviving even more anachronistic images (such as that of the new Rapallo, leading to German reunification, with the USSR abandoning the DDR in exchange for the neutralization of the FRG). If the idea of a Rapallo is still present in some German minds, it is in a nostalgic and not very influential right wing group. Franz-Joseph Strauss, who made a point of noting, by his cordial interview with Brezhnev and his visit to Budapest, that he has his own Ostpolitik, is not planning any more than Helmut Schmidt is on a reunification which neither the one nor the other is sure he wants, but which both are certain the USSR could not allow.

It is on another level that the basic ambiguity of the Ostpolitik of the SPD, expressed in such famous slogans as Egon Bahr's "Change through approach" and W. Brandt's "To change the status quo, one must accept it," is to be found. The basic postulate is that to improve the relations of communist regimes with other societies and their own, it is necessary to reassure them and to do that it is necessary to help them stabilize their authority.

What is not clear is whether this increased confidence is supposed to lead the communist elite to lower their guard and to bring about a structural change despite and unbeknownst to them, thus sawing off the branch on which they were sitting, or whether the goal was a real stabilization which would enable them to retain their domination, but also to do without the more pathological measures resulting from their feelings of insecurity. There was no proof, in the former case, that the communist leaders would not see through this maneuver and turn it in their favor, nor, in the second, that their regimes were not structurally unstable, and that conciliatory gestures, whether they be those of the West toward them or their own toward their peoples, could avert the cycle of explosion and repression.

In any case, the experience of the 70's revealed a certain success for the Bahr-Brandt formula. It produced more concrete results, in terms of improvement of the fate of individuals, than any other policy. But it also revealed its fragility and its dangers. In fact, it is highly vulnerable both to general tension and to specific blackmail. It led the leaders of the SPD to be extremely reticent about any change likely to alter the stability of the Soviet regime.

According to the statements collected by Barbara Spinelli,* the West German attitude is the result in large part of the fear of losing

* B. Spinelli, "Fear in Bonn--They Have Seen Brezhnev Reduced to Extremities," LA REPUBBLICA, 29 July 1978. See also the same author's interview with H. Ehmke (26 July 1978) and the Egon Bahr interview in DER SPIEGEL, 11 September 1978.

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Brezhnev and having to deal with harsher successors, but it goes much farther, since it implies a negative retrospective judgment of the spring events in Prague, hesitation with regard to the East German dissidents and even toward the Eurocommunists--not, as in the case of the conservatives, out of fear that they might be the tools of Moscow, but for the very reason that they are of interest to Z. Brzezinski--because they could create problems for the Soviet Union and thus have a destabilizing effect in Eastern Europe.

A certain desire to avoid false hopes or useless frustration is without a doubt a European reaction which is not only natural but healthy, with regard to certain American manifestations of irresponsible exuberance. But this degree of empathy and solicitude about Soviet reactions raises a certain number of objections. It leads the SPD to wager desperately on the existing situation, even though it is visibly very shaky (if only for biological reasons, as is the case with Brezhnev's personal power); to discourage and disappoint the forces which are morally respectable, like the Eastern European dissidents, or historically important, like the development of the Western communists; and indeed even to have recourse to doubletalk, giving the maximum of publicity to their concern about President Carter's blunders and the minimum to their concern about the Soviet military efforts and political expansionism.

In the matter of the NATO missiles as in that of the reaction to Afghanistan, the same motive is to be seen in Chancellor Schmidt: On the one hand a real attachment to the military security guaranteed by the United States and the West in general, which leads him, in real decisions, to choose the Atlantic option, and on the other, language more critical of the United States than of the USSR.

All of this is certain to reassure (some would say pacify) Moscow, and would seem to justify Brzezinski's comment on the "self-Finlandization" of Germany.

As always when "Finlandization" is involved, there is however another side to the matter. Horst Ehmke himself was the politician who coined the term "Sozialdemokratismus" to express the hope of a convergence of the European left wing, from Palme to Dubcek, based on the combination of socialism and freedom, beyond the Iron Curtain and the Wall. This same Willy Brandt demonstrated the explosive effect his popularity could have in East Germany during his trips to Erfurt and Kassen: One of his defenders, Peter Bender, was not wrong in speaking of an "offensive detente." If one considers the interaction of the SPD and the East from this point of view, there is justification for posing the classic question: "Who is Finlandizing whom?"

From the point of view of a Soviet strategist or negotiator, the position emerging from the social democratic left certainly offers great

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advantages, above all since a part of the SPD seems, for the first time in many years, to be allowing its moral pacifism and its political concern with detente to influence its positions on matters of NATO strategy and the negotiations on arms control. But from the perspective of an East German government, a threatening and vengeful West Germany is certainly preferable to a smiling social democratic regime whose embraces involve the greatest risk of all, that of "ideological contamination" or "creeping subversion."

European Priorities and Soviet Priorities

There is not necessarily any conflict between the strategist and the ideologist, but there may be a difference in priorities. These are found in the West because they are linked with the very essence of present era, which one might call a period of "hot peace," to indicate that we have emerged from the era of detente without returning to that of cold war in the classic sense. The military concerns have to do with the resurgence of the Soviet superiority or expansion which characterized the cold war, but which does not eliminate the multiplicity of conflicts of both national and regional interests which flourished during detente.

Also, the period which is beginning should see an increase in conflicts of priorities and allocation of resources between butter and guns, between military effort and negotiation effort, between economic interests having to do with the transfer of technology and a political concern with controlling them, etc., these differences corresponding to different attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

A leftist Europe in which civilian priorities have won out could emerge from an alliance of social democracy with Eurocommunism. This would imply maximal vulnerability for both sides, for it would present for the Soviet Union both ideological dangers and military opportunities. A right wing Europe, such as the Chinese want and such as Mrs Thatcher and in a more ambiguous fashion F. J. Strauss embody, would be united in resistance to the Soviet military threat, giving European defense a real chance for the first time, but it would come up against hostile reactions both from the two great powers and major political and social forces within a number of countries.

Neither of these two Europes is however very likely.

First of all, neither resolves the current problems except in part. According to the formula of Uwe Nerlich,* reestablishing the military

* See H. Holst and V. Nerlich, editors, "Beyond Nuclear Deterrence," New York, 1977.

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balance which has been dangerously tipped in favor of the Soviet Union and integrating the social and political forces of the left are two complementary rather than exclusive aspects of the same political necessity.

Above all, neither of the two policies, nor much less a calculated and flexible combination of them, have much chance of being adopted, because the development of the different countries in Western Europe is likely to be too different to allow a truly concerted policy. The most probable prospect seems to be that of a relatively fragmented Europe, in which different countries or groups of countries will continue to maintain concurrent and contradictory bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. That nation is likely to retain the initiative and to make use both of its increased military weight and intensified campaigns for peace in order to influence the development of the political forces in Western Europe and their attitude toward it.

Then again, these efforts themselves could be paralyzed by the domestic problems of the USSR or by its foreign ventures, which may very possibly themselves cause shock waves. Above all, if they prove to involve such countries as the Balkans which enjoy the dubious privilege of being apart, like Afghanistan, of a zone which is both gray and red, contiguous both territorially and ideologically to the USSR, and of having a decisive symbolic and practical importance not only for the military security of Europe, but for the ideological security of the Soviet empire and the political development of the continent.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

MARKET SATURATION, IMPORTS THREATEN AUTO INDUSTRY

Hamburg STERN in German 10 Apr 80 pp 28-29

[STERN interview with BMW Chief Eberhard von Kuenheim: "The Japanese Do Not Fight With the Same Weapons"]

[Text] STERN: Mr von Kuenheim, the car boom is leveling out, and at the same time more and more low-priced import cars are being pushed onto the market--is there no more future for the German auto industry?

Von Kuenheim: This is certainly not true. In the past 5 years the German auto industry reached the highest economic peak in its entire history.

STERN: That is in the past. Today things are not quite that rosy any more.

Von Kuenheim: After a boom of such duration and intensity, which we never experienced before, it is quite natural for a slump to occur.

STERN: However, a saturation of the market is beginning to be seen in the FRG. Once every household has a car or even two, some day there will only be a need to replace cars.

Von Kuenheim: This will already come about in this decade. Today 23 million passenger cars are in operation here. We will probably reach a 26 or 27 million mark.

STERN: That would mean a ratio of 500 cars per 1,000 inhabitants.

Von Kuenheim: If one assumes that the life of a car is almost 10 years, the replacement requirements can be estimated at about 2.6 million cars per year.

STERN: However, at present about 4 million passenger cars are being manufactured in the FRG per year. It will not be easy to push a surplus and a desirable increase in production onto the export market due to stiff competition, especially from Japan.

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Von Kuenheim: This is a serious problem. The challenge from Japan will bring many things into question that we have become accustomed to in Germany.

STERN: Do you at times experience fears that you could suffer the same fate as the watch/clock manufacturers and the entertainment electronics industry?

Von Kuenheim: In the worst case, which I do not even wish to imagine, even that would apply. We, and not only the automotive industry, are facing the question whether we can defend the FRG as a manufacturing location at all.

STERN: How is that?

Von Kuenheim: We have meanwhile become the country with the highest personnel expenses worldwide, and this is also the country with many of the highest costs. We have the highest telephone charges of all industrialized countries, as well as the highest national air fares. A round trip Hamburg-Munich by air costs almost as much as flying from New York to Los Angeles, almost four times the distance. We have the highest taxi fares, the highest utilities, and the highest energy costs.

STERN: This is why our switchboard operators, pilots, taxi drivers and meter readers are doing quite well.

Von Kuenheim: It is the question of how long this will last. The FRG as a location for industry is jeopardized if we continue like this. The activities of the Japanese, whose productivity in the auto manufacturing industry is 36 percent higher and whose labor costs are 30 percent lower than in the FRG, are a threat to our jobs.

STERN: By saying that, are you not making it too easy on yourself? Your company is presently looking for 500 engineers for the research and development department. Is this not an indication that you have grossly neglected this area up to now?

Von Kuenheim: You are wrong there. We are the first to have electronically controlled engines produced in series. We are the first, for instance, to reduce or stop the feeding of gasoline when going down a hill in thrust operation. We are among the first to have introduced the anti-blocking system, and much more.

STERN: It should concern you, however, that the Japanese just took first place in the latest state inspection statistics which examined the lack of faults in 4-year-old cars.

Von Kuenheim: Testing has its pitfalls. Only those cars are comparable that have received the same treatment over 4 years, and the same maintenance. However, there are vast differences.

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STERN: It is a fact that state inspections showed that 4-year-old cars had more defects than Japanese cars.

Von Kuenheim: Did you ever see the list? The differences are almost marginal.

STERN: However, there are more than marginal differences as far as the prices are concerned. According to the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, Japanese cars are on the average 20 percent cheaper than comparable German cars.

Von Kuenheim: For us this means that we, too, have to increase productivity. We will have to automate to a large degree if we want to survive. Then we will have to apply the same strict laws here as are applicable in Japan.

STERN: You cannot reduce the wages, though.

Von Kuenheim: But we can reduce the wages per unit...

STERN: ...by increased use of robots.

Von Kuenheim: That, too.

STERN: The Japanese, though, will not only be tough competitors on the FRG market, but also on the export markets. How large of an export slump are you estimating the German auto industry will have to swallow in the mid-1980s?

Von Kuenheim: The Japanese will probably produce more cars this year than the United States. You have to take into account that the Americans have an average national market of 10 million units per year. Japanese requirements only amount to about one-third of this figure. The question arises as to how long the world will look on while someone destroys other industrialized nations through its mass production. The Japanese do not fight with the same weapons. They are great masters as far as utilizing all possibilities of the free world market is concerned, and they have great talent in keeping competitors' products away from their own market. In 1979 they exported more than 3 million automobiles, but only imported 60,000.

STERN: Would you go so far as to advise the government to threaten trade barriers in order to make the Japanese give in?

Von Kuenheim: Yes, I would if it were necessary for tactical reasons. However, this would put to question our intentions of maintaining a free world market. Therefore I would not like this idea, and if it were implemented, it should be implemented by the European Community, not only by the FRG. Action would have to come from this group.

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STERN: If we manage without a trade war, including government regulations, how are the chances for German auto exports?

Von Kuenheim: I do not think that we will have a slump in exports. But if our prices become exorbitant, which is already the case in some countries, the purchasers interested in our products may forego buying them and may be forced to purchase cheaper vehicles.

STERN: Is this mere fear of what could happen, or is it already happening?

Von Kuenheim: It is already happening. In the United States our large cars now cost twice as much as Cadillacs. We have customers abroad saying "Your product is exactly what I need, but I cannot afford it any more."

STERN: This all sounds threatening. How do you plan on defending yourself against this development? Does relocating your production abroad make any sense?

Von Kuenheim: We need not speak about BMW. Take VW--they started a new plant in the United States, because they could not handle the situation by exportation alone. Possibly other manufacturers will arrive at similar decisions. Ford or General Motors no longer build plants here. They are meanwhile building them in Spain or Portugal.

STERN: Could a merger of German car factories be the solution?

Von Kuenheim: We are already cooperating to a large degree. Take the antiblocking system which we developed in cooperation with Bosch. It will be applied by Daimler using almost an identical design. This also represents one form of cooperation. Another example: VW had a pressing mill which was not working to full capacity. We were about to build our own pressing mill for sheet metal, but we did not build it. VW has been supplying us with pressed parts for 2 years now. This is economically sensible. The cooperation extends much further than is known to the public.

STERN: Mergers of large auto manufacturers in the FRG, then, are not necessary and therefore not to be expected?

Von Kuenheim: I believe that the cartel law will prevent such action, and besides, we do not plan on acquiring Daimler-Benz or VW.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

UNITED STATES SEEN IN NEED OF FRENCH, ALLIED SUPPORT

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 29 Mar 80 p 98

[Article by Raymond Aron: "America Needs Us"]

[Text] The die seems to be cast: unless there is an unforeseeable accident, in spite of the New York vote, the opposing candidates in the presidential campaign next November should be Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. The holder of the title, as they say in sports parlance, will start off the favorite. The Democratic Party is the majority party in the country; during the last few years, the candidates who represented the extremes, McGovern, on the Democratic left, or Goldwater, on the Republican right; were crushed by a moderate or a centrist. Reagan belongs to the hard-core conservative group of Republicans.

In spite of U.S. public opinion's swing to the right, Reagan needs, in order to win, favors from fortune. From now to November, Carter may be the victim either of some spectacular blunders or indeed of events. A national defeat would ruin the prestige of the President, whom a good many voters consider incompetent, unequal to his obligations.

Why, the Europeans ask, is this great country, rich in scholars and writers, finally obliged to choose between two apparently mediocre men, whom no PDG [President-Director General] of a large company would entrust with the management of a department? Harry Truman, before his arrival at the White House, was also considered to be mediocre; he was transformed by his responsibilities. Neither Eisenhower, nor Kennedy, nor Johnson, nor Nixon was mediocre. The election method has been made more democratic; the number of primaries has increased--which makes even more difficult the task of the presidential candidates. The enhanced role of the primaries gives their chance to politicians, such as Carter or Reagan, who know nothing of Washington, Congress and possibly even the outside world.

Let us add that, among the Republicans in Washington, a number of senators have more of the qualities needed to govern the United States and even to be elected. But the militants agree, it seems, to lose with /their/ [in italics] man.

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Carter--why conceal it--is judged even more severely abroad than at home. Now, without denying his weaknesses or his mistakes, I should like to recall the attenuating circumstances, some particulars of the U.S. and world situation that should impel to modesty the ministers and even the journalists who are so certain of their superiority.

Let us take, for example, the problem of the Near East. The European governments, led by the French president, are proclaiming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and are establishing paraofficial relations with the PLO. Nothing could be easier, since they do not commit themselves either to achieving the evacuation of the territories occupied in 1967 or to guaranteeing the survival of the State of Israel. The Europeans, incapable of their own self-defense, are not capable, a fortiori, of defending Israel. What would Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, Lord Carrington do in the White House? We would like to know the secret they definitely hold to ensure peaceful coexistence between Israel and the PLO, which does not hide its objective: the destruction of the Hebrew state. The Europeans arrogate to themselves cheaply the merit of lucidity, because they are satisfied to talk and to reap marginal benefits, leaving it to the United States to find a solution or to avoid the worst.

Let us take another example: the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan. There again, the French and the Germans have spoken, condemned the occupation of the country by the Soviet Army. But both parties have manifested their firm intention of preserving detente. Although in words they have proclaimed detente to be indivisible, they wished to maintain in Europe a pacified climate and trade exchanges.

So be it! Perhaps the Europeans should conduct themselves as regional powers, as was said by Henry Kissinger. They tend to play the role of spectators, to mark the shots and to attribute to Carter's weakness the Soviet resort to arms. If they looked at the map, they would see without difficulty that through the intermediary of the Baloutchi tribes dispersed between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the Soviets can destabilize three countries and reach the sea of Oman. The Persian Gulf concerns them as much as the United States.

The Europeans do not lack arguments to explain and justify their loss of confidence in the United States. But I wonder if they follow their thought to its logical conclusion. Is it a question of the President or of the United States? Carter definitely gives the feeling of not being in control of his team, of hesitating himself, of wavering between conflicting feelings and advisers. But he inherited an America which for 2 years was reducing its armament efforts while the Soviet Union was overarming. If we suppose that there is an approximate equality at the level of strategic nuclear arms, there is no doubt about the Soviet superiority in classical weapons. The nuclear threat, apart from the protection of U.S. territory, seems less and less dissuasive.

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Thirty years ago, when the Korean war broke out, the United States in 3 years tripled the national defense budget without imposing sacrifices on the population. To increase this same budget by 5 percent, the President has to make cuts here or there in social expenditures. The United States today has neither industrial nor financial surpluses. An increase in armament production would require a transfer of workers and machines, taking them from industry in the civil sector.

Certainly the United States remains potentially the foremost economic and military power--potentially but not actually. During the next few years, the U.S. President, whoever he may be, will try to save the essential. Since 1965, since the dispatch of an expeditionary corps to Vietnam, the United States has lost on all fronts: military force, prestige, moral unity.

Today, for the first time, U.S. public opinion is becoming aware of the Republic's humiliation, ready to answer the appeals of a President who would inspire confidence. The United States, less imperious than humbled, has more need of the support than of the criticism of its allies.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PAUL THOREZ DEBRIEFED ON SOVIET LIFE, ATTITUDES TOWARD WEST

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 7-13 Apr 80 p 44

[Interview with former PCF member Paul Thorez, son of former PCF Secretary General Maurice Thorez, upon return from recent trip to USSR by Alain Chouffan: "Soviet Public Opinion and the Boycott of the Games"]

[Text] The second of the three sons of the former secretary general of the PCF, born in Moscow in 1941, during the war, he has visited the Soviet Union over 20 times. "Anything having to do with that country affects me," he says. A party member from 1965 to 1968, he broke with the PCF following the May 1968 events. Today he lives in Aix-en-Provence where he is writing a book of recollections of the USSR.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: You have just returned from Moscow. What do the Soviets expect of the Olympic games providing that they are not boycotted?

Paul Thorez: Zinoviyev has pointed out that the Carter initiative did not affect in the least the position of the USSR in the world. On the other hand, he mentioned its mobilizing effect domestically. Actually the American blackmail has turned the situation around. Dramatizing the Olympic games, it triggered an integration mechanism which the authorities had been unable or unwilling to use and which, henceforth, will be working in their favor. Until January, with the exception of the authorities and the leaders, few people felt affected by the development of the games which were considered an event for the benefit of foreigners.

The upset of the preparations and the bill to be paid became everyone's concern: It was one year of work or study lost, an unlivable summer, and the predictable worsening of the shortages in the autumn, after the food stocks had been consumed by the tourists. In this respect the

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present difficulties justify all worries. The fact that Pepsi-Cola appeared on the market does not balance, for example, the impossibility for a number of months to find table and household covers and most prime necessity consumer goods. They have been reserved for the new hotels and the Olympic village. The people do not refrain from voicing out loud what they think of it. The threat of boycott has pushed these realities into the background.

Public opinion reacts to insult more energetically than the authorities themselves who, so far, have been quite cautious not to go one better than the public. Henceforth, public opinion is waiting for the opening of the games, with or without the participation of the Americans, as the answer to their presumptuousness.

N. O.: Does the criticism to which the USSR is subjected today affect the average Soviet person?

P. Thorez: As far as the average Russian is concerned, the foreigner does not understand anything about Russia, in any case. His criticisms always seem to be "missing the point." They may be excessive or insufficient but, in any case, useless. They do not really hurt him. This is with the exception of some administrative and scientific cadres and the intelligentsia, those whose minds are clouded by the West. Some of them are part of the establishment and seek consolation by running around the world in the jets of Aeroflot and buying their clothes in Paris; the others established, not so long ago, the nucleus of "democratic" dissidence. Today they are dispersed in exile, whose witness is Sakharov.

For the majority of Russians the temptation of the West does not go beyond imported items which it is nice to acquire occasionally and whose difficult access, perhaps determines their entire value. As to the rest, the essentials, they cultivate with pride, willingness, or resignation, as the case might be, the myth of an identity, of a national destiny of which the rest of the world has no idea. This myth is the most real feature of today's Russia.

N. O.: How do the Soviet people live today and withstand the difficulties and hazards of daily life?

P. Thorez: It is necessary to realize, first of all, that daily life does not consist of difficulties and obstacles, at least not in the eyes of those involved. On the material level, the experience of absolute unhappiness and misery provides the generations familiar with massive repressions and the war with a feeling of relative comfort. This is a feeling which the youngest neither share nor understand. However, those same youngsters find within the system and the social ritual, whose faults seem to them, justifiably, inherent in everything, means for the satisfaction of most of their ambitions.

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In today's USSR one can find everything if the means are there. Shortages have been replaced by inequalities by virtue of the importance of the private sector, legal or illegal, in the distribution of consumer goods. Careerism, corruption, and scrounging are the law, triggering an equalitarian discontent based on the myth of a peasant and patriarchal Russia, with empty pockets but with a rich soul and an infinitely big heart, rather than on that of the revolution.

N. O.: Could this discontent crystalize in any way?

P. Thorez: The most revealing in this respect is the popularity of the exogenous thesis of the socialist revolution. This idea, cherished by Solzhenitsyn, was taken up and developed here and there, most officially. The works of Pikoul, published in a periodical, drew only a rectification in PRAVDA. They described the revolution as the result of a Jewish-German plot with the Russian people as its victim. Discontent and, more broadly, the need for a historical explanation and the search for an identity had been channeled through a nationalism which shows up both inside and outside the power structure. Here the nostalgia for Stalinism meets with Solzhenitsyn's prophecy. No one can predict the outcome of this marriage.

Jean-Pierre Rey



Paul Thorez

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

VOTE TO BE TAKEN ON ISRAEL BOYCOTT

Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 14 Apr 80 p 2

[Report: "State Council's Decision on the Opinion of the Government Approving Implicitly the Boycott of Israel"]

[Text] The State Council will have to issue an opinion on recourse against the "Barre Circular" which interprets the 7 June 1977 law (Article 32), better known as the antiboycott law." A masterpiece of hypocrisy, this article would make any kind of interpretation possible and the government which had been watching over it, has drawn a conclusion which eliminated any substance from the text for all practical purposes. Based on this opinion, Coface guaranteed contracts with Arab countries stipulating that the signatory enterprises pledged not to deal with Israel. Some companies may have even been banned from markets guaranteed by Coface because people of Jewish origin were members of their board. Hence the appeal to the State Council. It seems that the supreme jurisdiction would lean toward the annulment of the "opinion" of the prime minister (J. O. 24 July 1977) indicating abuse of power.

Comment: At Matignon and Deniau this is considered a minor matter within a text of the 7 June law according to which the new articles of the penal code condemning boycott "are not applicable when the facts considered in these articles are consistent with the governmental directives adopted within the framework of its economic and commercial policy, or else in the course of the implementation of international agreements." Should the State Council annul the opinion of the prime minister, other directives in the same sense would be immediately issued. What is essential for the government is to protect French-Arab trade.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

CREPEAU ON POSSIBLE LEFTIST COALITION TO DEFEAT GISCARD

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 7-13 Mar 80 p 39

[Interview with MRG [Left Radical Movement] Secretary General Michel Crepeau by Thierry Pfister: "Michel Crepeau: 'I Fully Intend To Play the Part of the Spoiled Brat '"]

[Text] LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR. Are you one of the many candidates for the presidency of the republic?

Michel Crepeau: There is no use in being a candidate just for the fun of being a candidate. If the left as a whole gets into the 1981 election with the intention of winning and eliminating Giscard, the movement of the left wing radicals will be entirely ready to join in the fight. Shop interests will move aside. On the other hand, if each left wing party has in mind presenting its own candidate with its own program and the election ends up getting turned into a mere discussion of ideas, why would you want us to stay out of it?

N. O.: To beat Giscard, then, according to you, the 1974 tactics would have to be retained, that is, only one candidacy for the left?

Mr Crepeau: Up to now the left has gone into the presidential election seeming not to know that it comprises two ballots. So it must be possible in the first round to give voice to the left in all its diversity and, in the second, to display its unity. All the same, priority would still have to be given to the fight against Giscard and not the rivalries between communists and socialists. All French people know that except the party leaders, who do not seem to understand it. This political argument is somewhat unrealistic, and it often gets out of hand. It is upsetting.

N. O.: For the left to be able to show its unity, such a thing would, at any rate, have to exist.

Mr Crepeau: The presidential election goes beyond the confines of parties. Besides, these confines are no longer in keeping with current political realities. They are a reflection of the disputes and ideas of the 19th

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century. The reality of today is that we are confronting a sort of elective monarchy. Two major trends are in a head-on encounter: on the one hand the forces of change; on the other those of conservatism. All those who have won or almost won a presidential election have taken care to identify themselves with one of these two trends, while putting themselves above parties. Such was the case with Georges Pompidou, Francois Mitterrand and Valery Giscard d'Estaing.

The representative of the left would have to take his place above his political party, if he wanted to have a chance of winning.

N. O.: The Socialist Party will logically have to defend the options of the "Socialist Project."

Mr Crepeau: The "Socialist Project" has not substantially changed the approach which was that of the "Common Program." Everything goes right on as if we had not, on four occasions, lost out in important competitions. Where I am concerned, I have, since 1972, been very cautious about the "Common Program," even though I have loyally played the game of unity of the left. Our failing is that we were unable to mobilize youth, the 18-year-old constituents who represented an important portion of the voting public. And if the left is not capable of mobilizing youth, it is because it does not answer questions of the future. It remains Jacobin, technocratic and centralizing. This policy produced EDF (Electricity of France), and where the nuclear case is concerned, anyone can see that nationalization does not necessarily bring about democratization.

In fact, the left's talk remains very conservative. The left keeps its old values. To be sure they are worth something, but I think that while principles are eternal, their application in a changing world must also change. An answer to the real questions of our times must be given. Which neither the "Common Program" nor the "Socialist Project" really does.

N. O.: It is on record that you would carry out a campaign in 1981, if you were to be a candidate.

Mr Crepeau: I fully intend to play the part of the "spoiled brat" a bit. I am quite free to say what I think. This is a privilege of another kind. I want to stir things up. The left really needs it.

We are going to put out a manifesto next June which will not, I hope, be just another book. And we are going to say frankly what we think, even if we have to offend certain left wing sensitivities. By showing, for example, that the democratization of teaching is a failure. The teachers who talk to you about self-management deny the pupils' parents the right to discuss the content of teaching and programs.

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Another example: employers, the unions, everybody, in a word, accepts a fiscal system that penalizes employment. Even during a period of unemployment I do not hear anyone questioning this rule. This country has become a big dormitory. It is about time it woke up. Unfortunately the people in the left wing prefer to hem themselves in, some in a cell, some in a section, and cut themselves off from the world. Others take refuge in illusions, like the leftists, or go in for angling. A reaction is needed. We are at the crossroads of an evolution. Straight thinking and telling the truth are therefore required. That is what the MRG must be used for.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

SHIELDING COMPUTERS FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS DISCUSSED

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 21 Apr 80 pp 43-44

[Article by Francois Lebrette: "Computer Files Under Protection"]

[Text] "The computer is the preferred tool of those in power. It is used to exploit, classify, control, repress..." That explanation given by CLODO (Committee to Liquidate and Deter Computers) to justify the attacks the other week in Toulouse on the IBM and CII centers, is hardly new. It is a reprise of the myth of "the totalitarian computer."

Another myth making its reappearance at the time of those attacks: The supposed fragility of a society entrusting its memories to magnetic tapes.

These fears, opposed and complementary at the same time, hardly seem justified in practice. One could even defend the opposite theory: Computerization has increased the security of the files as much as those in the files. A paradox which the operator of one of the 125,000 electronic files in France summed up with a quip:

"If the STO [expansion unknown] files in Augsbourg had been on a computer, Marchais' past would not have come out so easily."

Moreover, it would have run less risk of destruction, accidental or not.

The safeguards are twofold: Technical in the duplication of tapes and legal. In France, the 6 January 1978 Law very severely limits the conditions for the creation and use of electronic files. The main objective: To prevent the file from containing a "profile" of the subject. A National Commission on Computers and Freedom, financed by the Ministry of Justice budget but answering only to the State Council and the court of accounts, is in charge of its application. Members of Parliament and magistrates elected by their peers make up the clear majority: 12 out of 17, two others appointed by the presidents of parliamentary assemblies and the last three by the government.

"In practice, we watch to see that the information carried on the file cards does not go beyond the express purpose of the file," they say at the

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commission. For example, a sports association will not be authorized to have its members' financial status appear on its lists.

All information, even harmless, the accumulation of which would make it possible to discern the personality of the subject, is also banned. A fortiori, the law forbids any mention of political, racial or religious affiliation (exceptions are provided for unions or political parties). The commission's investigative authority is unlimited. No national or private files can be concealed from it.

In practice, how are things done? The files of the subscribers to VALEURS ACTUELLES, for example, can carry only the name, address and expiration date of the subscription. There is a duplicate file kept in a sort of castle stronghold at the head offices on Avenue Kleber, a tower surrounded by water with a drawbridge, protected from fire.

Since this kind of file must constantly be updated, it has a weekly rotation in a specialized van. The human factor's revenge on the computer: The exchange can take place only between persons who already know each other on sight. In case of personnel changes, introductions must be made.

The system is allowed to protect itself against any threat of the destruction of a tool vital to the company, consequently reducing markedly the cost of insurance for loss of operation. Theft? Very much in fashion some 10 years ago when files were on microfilm, this type of crime has become extremely difficult with the computer.

"I would be incapable of stealing my own file," says the man in charge of subscriptions to VALEURS ACTUELLES.

In fact, to use a tape, one must know the proper "keys" for each card file for each enterprise, analogous to the personal number of the magnetic cards giving access to the bank note distributors.

There is still the problem of using this file. VALEURS ACTUELLES' case is rather special. The company's policy is to refuse any utilization outside of the sending of the magazine and subscription renewal forms. It is thus never used as a soliciting tool by a magnetoscope salesman or an investment company, for instance.

This is an exception. The majority of private files (and sometimes even public files, fraudulently) are sold, rented or exchanged, moreover, without the occasional user knowing any details about the names in the file. He therefore runs the risk of soliciting people who are already his clients.

Now a Frenchman, from birth to death, is documented on an average of 500 times. From the civil registry of births to that of deaths, passing through social security, the telephone directory, his bank, the stores where he pays by check, etc.

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This explains the proliferation of mail solicitations he may receive, sometimes for the same product. A company must simply have rented different mailing lists with his name on them (for example, a school directory, a private mutual insurance company or sports association roster). An examination of the wording of the address can often determine the original list.

Under the current legislation, an individual can, with difficulty, defend himself against such solicitations. He does have the right. The following example was given to the Commission on Computers and Freedom:

If you buy an automobile and in the following weeks you are solicited by a company selling accessories or a specialized magazine, you can demand that the automobile company remove you from their mailing list.

La Redoute mail order company -- the largest private mailing list in France -- has even made some innovations in this area recently. Its order forms must, from now on, contain a special space in which to indicate acceptance or refusal of subsequent commercial use of the client's address.

The majority of commercial files are very imprecise in regard to the "target" aimed at. Thus the temptation to "cross" several lists, interconnecting them. For example, by crossing the list of a high fashion house's clients with the list of Air France's customers who have taken at least two trips a year, then with an international credit card's list, one can choose a clientele with a relatively precise "economic profilé." This is done in the United States. It is strictly forbidden in France.

"That is exactly the type of activity which falls under the arm of the law prohibiting interconnections," said a commission member.

A draconian law: Even the security services -- DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance] or SCECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service] -- do not have the right to conduct this kind of filtering. Distrust of the risks of interconnection goes very deep. Notably, it explains the commission's delay in giving its opinion on the future electronic identity card. By carrying a code of an individual's surname, given names, date and place of birth, such a card would in fact give him a "lifetime identifier" and any file adopting the same code could be interconnected.

This leads then to the myth of the "great file" capable of telling everything about everyone's life. That kind of exposure would be totalitarian, some futurists say. More probably that kind of system would not be exploitable and the strongest police state in the world would be buried quickly under the avalanche of irrelevant information.

Finally, one might wonder if the fear of computer files is not more dangerous than the files themselves. To carry out their task successfully, since some 15,000 new files are created every year, the Commission on Computers and Freedom runs the risk of becoming an additional bureaucracy.

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Already, to "manage" the 125,000 existing files, it has decided to resort...
to a computer. The files file, in brief, the only admissible interconnec-
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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ALAT UNITS' SPEED OF REACTION DEMONSTRATED IN 1979

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 16 Feb 80 pp 42, 43

[Article by Jean de Galard]

[Text] As of 31 December 1979, ALAT's [Ground Forces Tactical Air Support] fleet included slightly more than about 100 planes, with about 60 on line, and 560 helicopters, with slightly more than 500 on line.

The number of flight hours of this group of aircraft in 1979 amounted to 165,420: 13,800 in the case of the planes (about 15 Broussards and about 50 L-18s) and 151,620 for the helicopters, i.e., Alouette IIs and IIIs (260, including a certain number of Alouette III/SS IIs), SA-341 Gazelles (140), about 30 SA-341 Gazelle/Hots and SA-330 Pumas (130). The helicopters' total number of night flight hours was 10,300.

Expressed in percentages, the breakdown of the four major activity areas of ALAT helicopters in 1979 was the following: tactical forces, 51.6 percent; drills, 30.0 percent; security forces, 14.7 percent; overseas presence missions, 3.7 percent.

Within the combat helicopter regiments, activity was divided as follows, expressed in percentage of flight hours: 40 percent in the case of light helicopters (mainly SA-341a); 28.5 percent for armed helicopters (Alouette III/SS IIs and SA-341/Hots) and 31.5 percent for tactical helicopters.

Features of ALAT Activity

The activity of ALAT units during the past year was characterized simultaneously by an increase in the number of overseas presence missions, greater participation in volume in major exercises over and outside national territory, very broad consideration given to instruction and testing, and a sharp increase in missions performed for the benefit of civilian organizations.

The participation of the Fifth Combat Helicopter Regiment [RHC] and the Third Light Helicopter Group [GHL] in foreign operations conducted for the benefit of countries linked with France by cooperative agreements also earned last year for these two units (as well as the Second Company of the 17th Parachute Engineering Regiment) an honorable mention in army bulletins by

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the minister of defense. The Fifth RHC, based in Pau, amassed a total of more than 1,700 flight hours in 18 months for its part in these operations. The Third GH, based in Rennes, flew more than 2,000 hours in less than 12 months.

This participation of ALAT in foreign operations during overseas missions demonstrated the high availability level of engaged units and the strong drive of their members, as well as the flexibility of the new ALAT organization. The speed of reaction was considered particularly satisfactory by the high command.

The participation of ALAT units in 1979 in major national exercises--particularly "Exentia" and "Saone"--and in an overseas exercise ("N-Diambour II" in Senegal) was marked by the diversity of missions performed and the number of activity areas covered.

During the "Exentia" exercise, in which 75 aircraft of security and tactical forces participated from 21 to 27 April 1979, 1,230 hours were flown in 1 week.

During the "Saone 79" maneuver from 1 to 5 October, 110 aircraft of the First Army Corps' tactical forces ran up a total of 1,325 hours in 5 days.

Finally, during the "N'Diambour II" joint services exercise in Senegal from 8 to 15 December, in which Senegalese and French units participated, 12 helicopters of the Fifth RHC, engaged at the side of four Senegalese Forces helicopters and two Cape Verde French Forces helicopters, flew 215 hours carrying out helicopter transport operations in particular.

All of these large-scale exercises as well as smaller scale missions, performed in the context of operational unit training, made it possible to note greater continuous action by ALAT on the "battlefield" as well as greater ability of its crews for night flights.

Most flights during the "Exentia" exercise were performed under very marginal weather conditions. The "Saone" maneuver enabled ALAT to move at night, using only its own mobile radio assistance units, a body of nearly 50 aircraft.

Finally, the use of light-intensification binoculars permitted the movement of aircraft into the front zone under very discreet conditions. Experimentation in this area will make it possible to determine the needs which will give rise to the third generation of this type of equipment.

Otherwise, on the level of efficiency, the gradual replacement of the SS 11 antitank missile with the Hot antitank missile, whose performance is superior, should make it possible to reach a higher level. Testing of the SA-341/Hot system with three flight units--the first of which made it possible to train the first crews at the Luc school*, with the two others being set up at the

*The ALAT School of Instruction is located in Luc in the department of Var.

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Third RHC based in Etain--has produced very positive results. Two target practice drills were conducted last year, the first in May. The third drill began last week.

The first of the 120 SA-342 M helicopters commanded by the ALAT returned on 1 February 1980 to the ALAT testing center in Valance, where it will continue to be evaluated this spring.

"Instruction" activity spent in drills represented 30 percent of the total flight hours of ALAT helicopters in 1979, but it must be noted that crew instruction also continues in the units. Within the units, about one-third of flight hours is devoted to operational training at the patrol, flight or regiment level. Another good percentage of flight hours makes it possible to assure that the technical condition of crews in units is maintained.

Testing of new equipment also continues in units in the context of routine exercises or much more important maneuvers.

As we already mentioned, last year the testing of nighttime visual aid equipment, previously started and then continued by the night testing center in Luc, was also performed in units. It has led to tactical evaluations conducted on one hand with the light helicopters of the First Army Corp and the 11th GHL.

With regard to instruction and so that future captains will become accustomed to piloting under poor visibility conditions as soon as possible, ALAT is preparing to make general use of operational flight with instruments. Next year, every pilot coming out of the Dax school will have to have the VOI qualification = operational flight with instruments. The establishment at Dax for the time being and then gradually in the units (each RHC or GHL will have its own) of LMT 150H flight trainers should help to make it easier and less expensive to obtain this qualification.

Finally, 1979 was characterized by an increase in the number of missions performed by ALAT for civilian organizations.

As road assistance, the three Alouette III helicopters stationed in Dijon, Montpellier and Toulouse for four summer months handled some 600 medical evacuations.

As humanitarian missions, on requisition ALAT helicopters carried out about 50 evacuations last year, particularly in the mountains.

In connection with fighting forest fires in the Mediterranean area, ALAT planes and helicopters carried out many observation and liaison missions in the course of more than 350 flight hours.

During ORSEC [Disaster Relief Organization] operations (snowstorms and floods), ALAT helicopters flew about 20 hours to provide assistance to disaster victims or to evacuate them. Finally, in Djibouti on 30 October 1979, following the

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derailment of a train about 40 kilometers from the capital, five ALAT Pumas evacuated more than 100 persons at night, nearly 45 of whom were injured.

Easy Maintenance, Good Availability

For all ALAT helicopters, average overall availability reached 73.2 percent last year; it was 73.6 percent in 1978.

It is logical to think that ALAT has worked to obtain an availability level close to the maximum especially for its aircraft participating in overseas missions. As for the number of maintenance hours per actual flight hour, it was (not counting fourth-level operations performed by the manufacturer): 2.5 hours for the Alouette IIs; 3.5 hours for the SA-341s; 5 hours for the Alouette IIIs (including weapon system); 8.5 hours for the SA-330 Pumas.

Satisfactory Safety Level

Let's start by giving a definition of an air accident and a serious air incident, as used in the ALAT.

There is an air accident every time that equipment is destroyed or a crew member is fatally injured. There is a serious air incident every time that there is serious equipment damage (requiring fourth-level operations) or serious injury to a crew member.

ALAT suffered two accidents last year, resulting in a 0.12 rate per 10,000 flight hours, and four serious incidents (0.24 per 10,000 hours).

This rate of 0.12 is one of the lowest in ALAT's history; it was first reached in 1974, but the rate of serious incidents that year was 0.47. In 1978, the accident rate was 0.29 per 10,000 hours and the serious incidents rate was 0.23.

If we consider all accidents and serious air incidents occurring over the last 16 years by classifying them all as a "serious air occurrence," a satisfactory development is noted. In 1964, the rate was 4.04 per 10,000 flight hours; in 1968, it was 1.03; beginning in 1972, it dropped below 1; last year, it was 0.36.

Statistically, this development is satisfactory to the ALAT command; it is even more significant since the missions of crews are carried out on board more complex aircraft under more difficult operational conditions and since the number of night flight hours rose from 1,760 in 1972 to 11,200 in 1978 and to 10,320 last year. Night flight hours represented about 7 percent of total hours (10 percent in the case of twin-turbine aircraft and 6 percent in the case of single-turbine) and correspond to the goal set by ALAT commander Gen Maurice Cannet.

Several factors may explain the favorable development noted in recent years concerning the level of safety: strictness of directives implemented in

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the units; strictness of maintenance procedures; improvement in continuing instruction of pilots and mechanics; very great severity in punishing any lack of discipline; very great preventive effort.

With regard to flight safety, however, we must definitely be careful not to expect constant improvements. The effort consists of trying to maintain the lowest possible rate below which no improvement seems possible.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PERSONNEL TRANSFERRED FROM CNES TO ARIANESPACE

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 Apr 80 pp 42, 48

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Temporary Arianespace Organization for Personnel Transfer"]

[Text] The JOURNAL OFFICIEL dated 31 March carried the response of French Minister of Industry Andre Giraud to a written question from Deputy Antoine Porcu concerning the principle and methods of establishing the new Arianespace company, created as of 26 March for the production, marketing and launching of the European Ariane rockets.

The minister of industry pacified the fears of the honorable parliamentarian, making it clear that the CNES [National Center for Space Study] and the French national companies hold the majority stock in the new company, and announcing that a protocol of agreement between the CNES and the trade unions calls for a temporary 4-year organization for the transfer of personnel from the center to Arianespace. (The official name of the company is Arianespace and not Ariane-Espace, but we have retained the spelling used in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL in quoting the question.)

The complete text of the statement of Mr Antoine Porcu and that of the minister of industry are carried in full below, because we believe that they will answer the questions of many readers.

A "Legitimate Concern"

In his written question submitted to the National Assembly on 4 February 1980, Mr Antoine Porcu called the attention of the minister of industry to "the legitimate concern of the personnel of the National Center for Space Study with regard to the recent creation of the Ariane-Espace mixed company (originally Transpace) and the consequences it may have both on the research activities of the CNES in the launcher field and on the regulations and conditions of work for the personnel, as well as our national independence in the aerospace industry sector. The development of the Ariane program, following the success of the launching at Kourou, thanks basically to the technological and human capacity of the CNES as well as the financial

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effort required of each French taxpayer, led to the establishment of a mixed capital company in which French and foreign private groups play a significant role. If the CNES and various national companies, such as the SNIAS or the SEP [European Propellant Company] occupy a key place for the time being from the point of view of ownership of the capital committed to the establishment of this new structure, the fact nonetheless remains that powerful private French groups such as Thomson-CSF [General Radio Company] and Matra, as well as West German (Erno, Man), Belgian (Sabca), and Swedish (Saab-Scania) groups are well situated. In addition, the current project is only 95 percent covered, the remaining 5 percent being guaranteed by various banking groups."

Mr Antoine Porcu expressed the belief in fact that "the creation of Arianespace is in fact leading, despite its multinational nature, to a massive transfer of a specifically French technological and human potential (management of the CNES launchers) on the one hand, as well as a substantial portion of the public capital, on the other, toward the valorization of private French and foreign, including very particularly West German, capital."

The deputy voiced the fear that "the creative genius, the technological experience and the vast financial effort crystallized in this specifically national structure which is the CNES is thus threatened with dismemberment for the greater profits and the future prospects of large multi-national financial groups. It is pertinent to note that such a transfer is being effected while the most costly investments (launching base, research equipment, computer apparatus) have already been made at the expense of the French taxpayer. Moreover, this transfer comes just when vast perspectives for the future are developing in such little-explored realms as communications and direct television satellites which, it is known, will have multiple industrial effects and will create jobs. In this connection, there is a whole new industry such as that producing ground receiving antennae, in which France enjoys a clear technological lead, which is thus in danger of being shared to the profit of West German or Belgian industrialists and bankers. Given this prospect, the management of the CNES launchers, with headquarters in Evry where the personnel is highly skilled, is in danger of dismemberment and authoritarian transfer to Ariane-Espace."

Therefore, Mr Porcu said, "it is legitimate to require, as was done with the cadres and technicians of the CNES, that the creation of Ariane-Espace should in no way prevent the full maintenance of the activities of the CNES in the launcher field and that the process of distributing tasks between the CNES and Ariane-Espace should in no way lead to a decrease in the CNES research on launcher guidance or a revision of the regulations or the working conditions for the personnel. More than ever, on the contrary, the prospects are great in the realm of industrial repercussions and commercial uses of this research activity. The prospects for development offered by the newly developing aerospace remote control and telecommunications industries requires more than ever that each researcher and agent at

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the CNES have exceptional working conditions and job security. Now in this realm, this requirement is seriously threatened. Doesn't the transfer of a large part of the personnel to a mixed capital group augur a probable challenge of the gains both in the realm of compensation and working conditions?

Similarly, the deputy added, "the preponderant role played by the SNIAS (8.5 percent) and the European Propellant Company (8.5 percent) in the Ariane-Espace capital, if indeed it allows domestic companies to hold majority stock for the time being, nonetheless involves the risk of generalizing job instability. In fact, in recent years, fixed-term contracts (generally 2 years) have been routine with the SNIAS and the SEP, pertaining both to cadre personnel and technicians. The management of these companies argue the currently precarious nature of the marketing of their products. This apparent short-range view is designed to conceal the intention of generalizing job instability in this field in order to increase the potential profit, which is the greater since the expected American market is vast."

In conclusion, Mr Antoine Porcu thus asked the minister of industry "what is planned in order:

To guarantee the permanent predominance in the years to come of French public capital in Ariane-Espace;

To guarantee the development of the activities of the launcher administration at the CNES; and

to guarantee the status of CNES personnel and prevent any deterioration in their working conditions or wages, both at the CNES and within the framework of their basic activities at Ariane-Espace."

Government Assurance

In his response, the minister of industry noted that:

"The establishment shortly (the creation of Arianespace was effective as of 26 March 1980) of the Arianespace company, a French legal corporation, the stockholders of which will be mainly, along with the CNES, which will hold a minority block, the leading industries (public and private, French and European) manufacturing Ariane, is designed to guarantee the mass production and proper marketing of the Ariane rocket launcher. This new activity, which is the continuation of the development phase being completed, will come, like the preceding one, within the framework of the European space agency. A statement is currently being submitted for the endorsement of the nations participating in development. The nations will remain the owners of the research and assets they have financed. Additionally, it is planned that the company will pay the state a royalty for the use of the space center in French Guiana. It is thus not at all a question,

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as the honorable parliamentarian says, of transferring assets financed in large part by the French taxpayers to private groups."

"The stock held by the CNES and French public capital companies accounts for 51 percent of the total (Arianespace capital)," the minister noted, while admitting that "it is not possible to include in the bylaws of a corporation having foreign stockholders any provision guaranteeing that this percentage will always remain the same."

Thus, Andre Giraud went on to explain, "it is nonetheless clear that the intentions of the government and the managements of the various establishments and enterprises involved is to maintain this distribution which reflects the role they have played in the development of the rocket launcher and a general balance resulting from long negotiation."

Concerning the situation of the personnel, Andre Giraud stated that "the provisions as a whole in no way lead toward the dismemberment of the CNES launcher administration which, in the years to come, will retain responsibility for major new developments. Only the teams within this administration responsible for the manufacture of the first promotion and launching series (accounting for less than a third of the launcher administration at the CNES) will be gradually transferred to the company in 1980 and 1981. Their status has been the focus of great concern. Specifically, a protocol, which is being negotiated between the CNES administration and the trade union organizations, calls for a complex of provisions guaranteeing the rights acquired and establishing a transitional plan for 4 years allowing the employees to choose their assignments on the basis of known circumstances. Naturally, those who remain with the launcher administration of the CNES will retain their present status."

In conclusion, the French minister of industry said he was optimistic about the future of the new Arianespace company.

"The credibility earned on the international level by the Ariane program, which has been further strengthened by the success of the first launching last 24 December, creates prospects for industrial production and marketing which are of great interest, and may lead in the 1980s and 1990s to an average of 4 or 5 launchings per year. Such a situation cannot but benefit employment. The government, aware of the role played in this achievement by the CNES engineers and technicians, clearly intends to reserve a key role for this body in the development which cannot fail to occur in this sector of activity which is indispensable for our autonomy."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

UPDATE ON SUPER-ETENDARD DELIVERIES TO NAVY

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Apr 80 pp 27-29

[Article by Jean de Galard: "33 Super Etendard delivered to French Navy-- close to 80 percent availability"]

[Text] Today, the Dassault-Breguet Company--which is building the carrier aircraft called Super Etendard, of which 71 units have been ordered for the French Navy--released 35 aircraft from its assembly line at Bordeaux-Merignac. The first two were prototypes and were never delivered to the French Navy which took delivery of its first aircraft--number 3 in the series--in June 1978.

Thus 33 aircraft were delivered this day to the French Navy, equipped with a SNECMA [National Corporation for Aircraft Engine Design and Construction] Atar 8K50, 5,000-kgp jet engine. However, not all of them are as yet in operational service.

Squadron 11F, based at Landivisiau, received its first Super Etendard in August 1978; it is today fully operational after having gotten all of its 12 aircraft in February 1979. As of 20 March, it had chalked up more than 4,000 flying hours, including 460 at night and more than 600 deck landings. Squadron 14F, likewise based at Landivisiau, received its first six aircraft in June; last month it took delivery of its 12th and last aircraft. As of 20 March it had likewise chalked up 1,650 flying hours, including 140 at night.

The series No 35 aircraft was delivered to Landivisiau on 21 March; this is the first of the aircraft that will equip Squadron 17F, based at Hyeres-Le Palyvestre. currently still equipped with Etendard IV M. Squadron 17F will be operational with 12 aircraft by the end of this year.

The activities of both squadrons, 11F and 14F, in 1979 were such that no pilot in both units flew less than 15 hours per month. Moreover, in the course of three tours of duty on aircraft carriers representing a total of 30 working days in 1979, Squadron 11F carried out one quarter of

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its total air operations last year. This means that a maximum in terms of cost-effectiveness was achieved during periods of shipboard duty.

This month, each of the two squadrons will put in about 250 flying hours.

Overall, the production and operations schedules were completely complied with. Last year, the operations of Squadron 14F were oriented toward "flight tests" from the aircraft carrier Clemenceau, following release from IPER (periodic maintenance and repair inspections), acceptance, on this vessel, of the really operational aircraft carrier reference system, and training of its pilots. Squadron 11F in turn concentrated on assault missions at sea and, during its periods of carrier duty, demonstrated that navigation precision, following a period of familiarization on board an aircraft carrier, prior to the in-flight utilization of the inertial navigation system, was just as good as the accuracy obtained after familiarization on land. The pilots of Squadron 11F furthermore last year proved that the Super Etendard was capable of carrying out a new mission: search and intelligence gathering. At the beginning of this year, Squadron 11F recorded its first night-time carrier landings. The most recent ones took place last week; they made it possible to qualify another two pilots; the squadron now has three qualified in this fashion. Last week's carrier duty tour furthermore made it possible to experiment at night and along with the automatic pilot and the automatic stick [control] not yet used in all of the squadron's aircraft. This kind of experimentation is by way of a supplement to the tests performed at CEV [flight test center] with aircraft No 32. The results were considered satisfactory. A method for night-time carrier landings to be used in conjunction with the Super Etendard is now being worked out.

In terms of armament, the year 1979 was used by Squadron 11F to go through several cannon and rocket firing programs as well as dropping live 250-kg bombs and 500-kg practice bombs. Overall, 20,000 rounds of cannon ammunition were fired, as well as 1,400 rockets and 250 bombs, including 220 practice bombs. This entire firing program proved the validity of the memory-storage ballistics concept.

Neither the AM-39, nor the Magic were fired in formation. As far as the former is concerned, one may say that the possibility of simulated firing makes it possible to provide missile firing training. Regarding the latter, one may observe that the interception mission is not a priority mission. A first series of training sessions in firing this missile was to be held last week in the South-West (participation of the Mont-de-Marsan base and the Landes test center). Last year, Squadron 11F of course did participate in exercises using the ANT--the tactical nuclear weapon.

The availability of this aircraft was very satisfactory; it was more than 80 percent in Squadron 11F which is more experienced; it was close to

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75 percent in Squadron 14F whose pilots--for the most part flying Crusader aircraft recently--did not have any experience with the Etendard IV M. Right now we are witnessing a rise once again in the availability coefficient within Squadron 14F.

The commanders of both squadrons feel that the aircraft is quite in line with what they have been expecting according to the specifications on the program card; the worries they might have had as to the operation of the navigation and attack system disappeared quickly; the general problems encountered were of the same nature as all those which arise whenever a new aircraft is placed in service.

From the motor of the inertial system via the Agave radar, which has been considerably improved over the years, the equipment on the Super Etendard performed satisfactorily in overall terms. It took a lot of work to get the motor qualified for "in-flight employment" but "today everything is fine." The TBO [operating time] of the 8K50 today is still what it was 14 months ago: 180 hours. The VOR/ILS equipment has been mounted on all aircraft ever since No 13. It is working satisfactorily. Aircraft No 32 was the first to be equipped with the "tandem" consisting of automatic pilot and automatic stick and the first aircraft thus equipped will reach the squadron by the end of Autumn.

The permanent presence, at Landivisiau, of a team of designers and the regular arrival of technicians from SAGEM [Corporation for the General Application of Electricity and Mechanics] made it possible to make big strides in the availability of systems.

Pilots of Squadron 11F acted as instructors for the pilots of Squadron 14F who are currently in turn training the first pilots of Squadron 17F. The first LMT flight simulator will be delivered in May. Pending their installation and utilization, it was necessary to spell out the training criteria. Three of these were defined: for pilots with long experience in the Etendard IV (1,500-2,000 flying hours), ten flights in the Super Etendard were considered sufficient; for less experienced pilots, who nevertheless did already have formation training, 50 flights were considered necessary; for the young pilots who had just come from Squadron 59S (carrier fighter school) with 400-500 flying hours, more than 100 flights were specified.

The training of future Super Etendard pilots on the ground is taken care of by the SIT (technical instruction section) at the base which has worked out an instruction method of remarkable effectiveness, involving conventional resources (instruction sheets numbering 21, prepared by six instructors in the Super Etendard), audiovisual aids (more than 300 slides and 500 posters), as well as four instruction and maintenance simulators, covering the engine, the electrical system, fuel, and SNA [air navigation]. The training course for pilots on the ground takes

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3 weeks. For mechanics ashore, the training courses vary according to their special field: 2 weeks for armorers, 5 weeks for SNA as well as equipment specialists and mechanics.

For trouble search and detection operations, the ATEC test bench of Aerospatiale plays a great role.

Next year, the 71st Super Etendard will be delivered to the Naval Air Arm at the end of a production program turning out two aircraft a month.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

NEW MAINTENANCE SCHEDULES FOR SUPER-ETENDARD REVIEWED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Apr 80 pp 29, 31

[Text] The Aeronautical Subdirectorate of DCAN (naval construction and naval weapons directorate,) at Toulon was charged with "major maintenance" on the Super Etendard because of the experience which it has acquired in connection with fourth-echelon maintenance on Etendard IV and in view of the similarity of the air frames of the two aircraft. The first two aircraft will come in at the end of 1980.

For the Super Etendard, an inspection of the IREF (repair inspection through component maintenance) was selected; the content of this inspection emerged from an analysis inspired by the MAPIE (analytical method for preparation of initial maintenance program) guide, whose practical implementation involves information science equipment.

Complete Checkup in Three Inspections

The basic principle behind an IREF applied to the Super Etendard consists of inspecting the aircraft every 3 years (or 900 hours) and to check out the following during each inspection: programmed system operations (periodicity: one IREF); programmed nonsystem operations (periodicity: two or three IREF); random sample operations (probes); occasional operations, deriving from orientation, inspection, or data processing from documentation.

In the Naval Air Arm, maintenance is spread over four levels or echelons. The IREF combines the third and fourth echelons. This policy makes it possible to improve the operational availability of aircraft because it guarantees a better check on aircraft and gives us the maintenance volume that is best suited to flight safety and operational needs. The application of different IREF makes it possible completely to check the same aircraft in three inspections or over a period of 9 years of operations. Besides, the equivalent of one complete aircraft is checked out in three successive aircraft and the different inspections are applied through circular switching. This latter procedure makes it possible to keep permanent tabs on all of the aircraft in the inventory.

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Fixed and Variable Assignments

The content of the IREF inspections includes fixed assignments, connected with the arrivals and departures of aircraft, and variable assignments which involve maintenance tasks properly speaking.

Each task is defined by its nature, its periodicity, its cost, and its geographic location (the aircraft being cut up into zones). All of the variable tasks together are defined on the basis of a logic analysis deriving from the MAPIE guide which in turn was drafted on the basis of the American MSG-2 standard.

The purpose here is to take care of only necessary tasks sufficient to guarantee flight safety and operational employment of Super Etendard aircraft without any major action to be performed between maintenance inspections and also to conduct these inspections at minimum cost, realizing that the aircraft idle time derives from that same objective.

Three Inspection Approaches

The analytical study includes the following: a "structural" study, a "system" study, and a "inspection of zones" study.

The "structure" study consists of spelling out the maintenance program to be applied to the important elements of structure during the safe lifetime of the aircraft which is estimated at 4,000 hours, or 15 years. Only the primary elements, which are the structural elements that involve safety, are the subject of study. The others, called secondary, are checked during the zone inspections. A rating system based on fatigue, aging, inspectability, and comparison to similar elements in the Etendard makes it possible to determine the periodicity of action to be taken.

The "systems" study is intended to spell out a maintenance program to be performed on the components of a system, following a logical process, analysing the causes and consequences of equipment failures in their systems. The study involves two distinct approaches: (1) a study of possible failures in the system, taken as a whole, which makes it possible to determine the preponderant elements; (2) a study of failures of each component, with possible repercussions on the system.

The synthesis of these studies makes it possible to determine the tasks to be carried out and their periodicity.

The "inspection by zone" completes the logical studies performed on the level of the airframe and the systems. It makes it possible to check on the secondary elements of the airframe. This inspection involves the general state of the equipment and makes it possible to perform minor

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operations justified in economic terms. On the level of systems, inspection by zone makes it possible to establish the good condition of connections, as well as the outside appearance of components. This surveillance also makes it possible to detect minor defects that could lead to developments causing unexpected failures.

The various studies performed lead to the establishment of a task library which must be arranged in the form of inspections. The combinations of the various tasks are put together as a function of the following objectives: regrouping tasks with the same periodicity; standardizing the overall costs of the various inspections (in order to come up with a regular expenditure) by breaking nonsystematic work with the same periodicity up into essentially equivalent parts.

The codification of all tasks makes it possible to handle the various combinations by means of information science which facilitates operations. This procedure makes it possible to define the following for each IREF: all of the tasks to be carried out; the distribution of tasks by zone, by phase, by subcontractor, and by specialty; the cost of different operations; the necessary spare parts: equipment, elementary components; the controlled tasks.

The sampled tasks are added on top of the programmed tasks as a function of the frequency of sampling and the ranking of the aircraft concerned. Occasional tasks, springing from the inspection of the aircraft or the processing of documentation (visual equipment inspection) are handled manually and are added on top of the tasks defined earlier. Where occasional tasks assume a repetitive character, they are then inserted in the programmed activities as a whole.

Well-Adjusted Program

The lengthy experience acquired by the Aeronautical Subdirectorate of DCAN at Toulon, in the matter of carrier aircraft maintenance, particularly on the Etendard IV, made it possible to prepare a maintenance program which is well adjusted to the characteristics and employment of the Super-Etendard by applying new maintenance methods to it.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

SINGLE REPLACEMENT FOR AIR FORCE, NAVY AIRCRAFT

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 Apr 80 p 27

[Article by Jean de Galard: "The Same Aircraft for the Air Force and the Navy"]

[Text] As the French government prepares to choose the light twin turbo-jet, of foreign construction, slightly fewer than 40 of which will soon be in service in the Air Force for training its transport pilots and in the Navy for training its patrol-plane and liaison pilots, it is of interest to review the route that the general staffs of the two armed forces followed to arrive at the situation as it stands today.

For a long time, the Air Force has been conducting the basic training of its future transport pilots with the Dassault MD-312 twin-engine planes used at Avord by Training Group 319. The student pilots fly them for 100 hours if they come from Salon (the "officers" program) and 135 hours if they come from Cognac (the "noncommissioned officers" program) before being awarded their wings as military pilots.

These planes, powered by SNECMA [National Aircraft Engine Design and Construction Company] 12 T piston engines, went into service in...1952. This means that the problem of replacing them was first raised several years ago. The command of the Air Force schools knew that despite several improvements made in the meantime, there would still be some 20 MD-312's at Avord in 1981 that could provide 12,000 hours of flying time during the year, but that the end of their flight potential would definitely come in 1982.

To replace these MD-312's, it was out of the question to have a specific plane developed (whence the absence of a program plan), in view of the small quantity (about 25 planes) needed by the Air Force. The Air Force was therefore led, quite naturally:

- in an initial phase, to examine the foreign twin-engine jets on the market;
- in the second phase, to eliminate those that did not appear suitable for carrying out the various missions envisioned (or whose unit cost appeared too high) and consider only those which, by their inherent qualities and their performance characteristics, seemed most capable of providing what was expected;

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--in the third phase, to proceed, at the same time as the Navy, which had adopted the same point of view, and jointly with the CEV [In-Flight Testing Center], to carry out trials of three possible candidates for the succession to the MD-312; they are described in the following pages.

The results were brought to the attention of the minister of defense. The final decision is not up to him. Credits were earmarked in his 1980 budget to finance the purchase of an initial batch.

For the Navy, the route followed was a little more winding.

For a long time, the 56 S squadron, based at Nimes-Garons, served the Flight Personnel School (EPV) of the Navy Air Force (otherwise known as the non-pilot flight personnel) and the air controllers school with 17 C-47 twin-engine planes, while the 55 S squadron, based at Ajaccio-Aspretto and equipped with nine Nord 262 turbojets, served for the twin-engine specialization training, otherwise known as future-pilot training, for the Breguet Atlantics, the P2V Neptunes and, of course, the N-262's.

When the problem of replacing the C-47's of the 56 S squadron arose, the Navy first considered buying a number of Nord-262's, resumption of production of which was being envisioned by AEROSPATIALE [National Aerospace Industrial Company] at that time. Since this idea of resumption was not followed through, the Navy considered, in a second phase, buying either British HS-748's, or preferably, Dutch F-27's, on the assumption of an order by the Netherlands government, of New-Generation Atlantics (ANG). When the American Orion was finally chosen over the European ANG to equip the Dutch Navy (the decision was made in December 1978), the French government decided to end the negotiations with Fokker to replace the DC-3's of the EPV. Only the HS-748 solution remained.

Some thinking was then done, within the aeronautical division of the Navy general staff, to reexamine the problem as a whole.

Was it in the last analysis judicious, at a time when the successive rises in the cost of fuels was beginning to weigh heavily on the budgets of the armed forces, to call on airplanes with the tonnage of the HS-748's, equipped with turbojets of more than 2,000 HP (eSHP [effective shaft horsepower]), to replace the C-47's?

The needs of the Ajaccio specialization school appeared identical to those of the Air Force, and since the latter was considering, for its part, replacing its MD-312's with a light twin turbojet chosen from among various foreign planes, the Navy came quite naturally to adopt the following solution: (1) the C-47's of the 56 S squadron will be replaced by 12 Nord 262's; nine of them will be those of 55 S squadron (Ajaccio) and the other three will be taken from among the 10 other Nord 262's that the Navy has and which are presently scattered in other units; the Cuers shop will be assigned to change over these 12 planes, which will be equipped with a radar, a navigation system and consoles before being assigned to the EPV; (2) the

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Nord 262's of 55 S squadron will be replaced by the same twin turbojet as is decided on by the Air Force (the ordering of a dozen aircraft is envisioned), which will logically lead to single maintenance; (3) the Nord 262's taken from the other Navy units will be replaced by planes of the same type, the purchase of which, on the second-hand market, has been entrusted by the Navy to AEROSPATIALE.

The Navy would hope to have its first two light twin turbojets delivered to Ajaccio at the end of the year.

At Avord and Ajaccio, the same twin turbojet will therefore be used for the training of the future pilots of the Transall, the Atlantic, and the Nord 262.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

COMMENTS ON NATIONAL MILITARY POLICY COLLOQUIUM

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Apr 80 p 42

[Text] The colloquium sponsored last Saturday by PARADOXES* on France's military policy came just at the moment when debates are beginning on the foundations of this policy. Chaired by Michel Debre, led by Professor Dabezies, this colloquium consisted of a discussion of three reports on the following topics: "National independence and defense" by Jacques Vernant and Jean Klein, "The adaptation of the military defense apparatus" by Gen (CR) Pierre Gallois, and "Technical, industrial, and financial capability" by Roger Chevalier and Pierre Dabezies.

It would be impossible for us to summarize these three reports, which cover approximately 80 pages; here we can only give some impressions of this meeting that was followed very attentively by a select audience, which included Pierre Messmer and Air Force Generals (CR) Francois Maurin and Michel Fourquet.

The Policy Followed for 20 Years Does Not Need to be Changed

In the first report we heard that nothing in the international situation justifies a revision of our security policy which has been defined and followed for about 20 years. France has the technical and financial capability to pursue such a policy which is supported by a national consensus. Attempts to seek

* A complete report on this meeting will be published in the next issue of the journal PARADOXES, 120 Champs-Elysees, 75008 Paris.

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a European policy are impeded by the fact that Germany is barred from having a nuclear capability. The Europeans will certainly play a larger role in coming years, but they will remain divided. France, with its independent nuclear forces, will be called upon to play an even more important role.

The "Inspiring" and "Disturbing" Report by General Gallois

The report given by General (CR) Pierre M. Gallois, described by Mr Debre as "inspiring" and "disturbing," reminded us that the initiative lies with the East, that the Soviets only engage their forces when they can be certain of the outcome, and that their doctrine and their means are in harmony. General Gallois distinguished between missions conducted in defense of France and its essential interests (defense of the national territory and defense of overseas departments and territories), and missions which are essential but not immediately vital, among which he included the use of intervention forces outside of Europe.

To carry out its first missions, the strategic nuclear forces must have at least eight to 12 missile-launching submarines and also another category of strategic deterrent weapons. General Gallois pointed out the interest inherent in solutions such as the use of commercial planes converted into missile transporters, or bombers extending their flight range by a supersonic air to surface missile. Such possibilities can form an added two or even three aspects to the French deterrent force. He mentioned the conditions for the use of the French ANT [Tactical Nuclear Weapons] and asked that the forces responsible for the defense of overseas territories be strengthened and given high quality equipment. For intervention missions outside of Europe, he recommended the development of the conventional resources of the Navy, the formation of two or three intervention units with airborne materiel, and the provision of the Air Force with transport and combat equipment enabling it to intervene at a very long range.

In a noteworthy commentary, discussing the report given by General Gallois, Pierre Messmer supported this presentation, except for the section on tactical nuclear weapons, which he considers essential for reaching moving targets. He also supported the construction between now and the year 2000 of about 15 nuclear submarines, which would demand a tripling of the efforts made between 1960 and 1980. The comments made by Generals Fourquet and Maurin, and those by Mr Debre and Professor Huntzinger, generally agreed with the conclusions

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reached by General Gallois which challenge the concepts of national service and the relative shares of the three branches of the armed forces in the budget, and which stress that priority should be given to mobile weapons over stationary weapons. All these remarks lead to a return to predominance of Title V over Title III in the budget.

A Policy within French Capabilities

The Chevalier-Dabiez report pointed out a number of facts that are not always appreciated for what they are actually worth, such as the synergy existing between military and civilian products, particularly in aerospace--both in the nuclear field and in aircraft construction--the different types of cooperation used, and the absolute need for exports to ensure the survival of our national weapons industry.

Like General Gallois, Mr Chevalier showed the present invulnerability of the missile-launching submarine system, and he asked that efforts be made to develop this system even further, to harden the warheads, and to produce a military observation satellite in order to avoid any surprise effect in case of hostile initiatives. Mr Chevalier pointed out that the creation of these systems is within France's technical and financial capabilities.

He rejected the cruise missile, because France can not, with its resources, manage to reach a saturation effect with arms of this type and, in any event, the saturation effect created by the United States is forcing the USSR to create a specialized defense system. Mr Chevalier then pointed out the lesser vulnerability of the S-X mobile missiles in relation to silo-based missiles.

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FRANCE

BRIEFS

EXOCET MM-40 MISSILE--Aerospatiale has just published the first photograph of the launch of its antiship missile, Exocet, in its MM-40 version. This launch was made on 27 February 1980 at the CEM [Mediterranean Test Center] from the test ship Ile d'Oleron, which has been made available to the missile developer by the Navy (see AIR & COSMOS no 805). The MM-40 missile intercepted its target perfectly, and the shot confirmed the flight performances expected from this test: in particular, the range of the missile (over 70 km). Aerospatiale says that the production of the MM-40 has already begun for the three foreign countries which have ordered this missile. The Exocet in all versions has been ordered by a total of 23 countries, including France (MM-38, AM-39, and SM-39). [Text] [Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Apr 80 p 53] 7679

PORT EQUIPMENT AID--France may participate in providing some port equipment to Saudi Arabia. [Transport Minister Joel] le Theule will soon go there to look into this possibility. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 28 Apr 80 p 5]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

TRADE WITH CHINA LAGGING BEHIND OTHER EUROPEAN PARTNERS

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 3 Apr 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by Piero Ostellino: "The Italians Are Not Very Enterprising in Their Trade With China"]

[Text] Beijing--Italian-Chinese trade in 1979 amounted to \$600 million (a little over 500 billion lire). French trade with China amounted to \$700 million, English trade to \$807 million and German trade to over 2 billion (2026). Among the major European countries, we are, therefore, in the last place in trade with China, while the Germans, as usual, are in the first place. But this is not the problem. What concerns us above all are the prospects.

For 20 years, we have been exporting to China almost always the same products: chemical fertilizers (approximately 45-50 billion lire), laminated iron and steel and other steel products (approximately 80 billion), motor vehicles (14-16 billion), almost monopolized by Perlini, a medium-size industry in Verona which produces trucks and other means for land movement. In short: we have not diversified our exports, as the others are doing, nor do we give any indication that we are planning to. The risk is that the competition from some Asian countries in the chemical field will subsequently increase the difficulties of exporting to China.

The French export 450 million francs worth of steel products, that is, more or less what we export, but also 316 million francs worth of machinery and other mechanical apparatus, to say nothing of 150 million worth of office machines and electronic equipment. The Germans, who also export \$284 million worth of pipes and \$225 million worth of other steel products, have an export total of \$427 million worth of machinery of all types, that is, equal to almost three-quarters of our entire trade. The English, finally, export 21 million pounds sterling worth of machinery for the production of energy, 46 million pounds sterling worth of specialized machinery (29 for the mines alone), 31 million worth of industrial equipment and 13 million worth of instruments for measuring and control.

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The figures for England and France are not even large, while those for Germany are beginning to become important. But they indicate that between these markets and the Chinese one something is happening, while Italy continues to fight a rearguard action, that is, continues to export to China products with a very low added value. Big business, which would be necessary to make our trade with China rise, is lacking. The same actors are always on stage: Montedison and ANIC [National Agency for the Hydro-generation of Fuel] for fertilizers, the steel industries of the IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute], Perlini for trucks. The rest is made up of small and medium firms, not of single businessmen.

We are the only ones to register a negative balance in the balance of trade with China (approximately 30 billion lire, which is stupid). The French register a positive balance of 55 million francs, the English 76 million pounds sterling, the Germans \$958 million. Even in this case, we are not talking about big figures. But we are still talking, however, of figures which are indicative of a difference between the other European countries and ours which should be corrected.

The Chinese have not yet made a definitive decision about the sectors to entrust to Italy within the range of their imports. But our own uncertainties contribute to a great extent to increase the Chinese uncertainties. After the visit by Hua Guofeng to Italy, last November, people expected that a few important leaders of our public and private industry would try to seek to put into effect the good political premises created by Hua's visit. Instead, nobody showed up. The Italian industrial environment, both public private, still seems paralyzed with the fear of compromising their business with the Soviet market. In the absence of a pro-Chinese industrial lobby, even the government remains passive.

Nevertheless, something could be done. The margins for maneuvering are the following. Some 30 percent of the Chinese trade is practically monopolized by Japan. For their part, the Chinese do not conceal the fact that they nourish very strong hopes from their relations with the United States, which today has a trade with China which is more or less analogous to the German trade. The rest of the pie can be had by Western Europe, where the Germans have the lion's share, the English and the French are politically and promotionally very active and dynamic and the Italians continue to stagnate, both from the political and the promotional viewpoint.

For the next 2 years, the advice from the experts on the Chinese market to the Western operators is this: to adapt the approach itself to the Chinese financial restrictions, that is to the impossibility for the Chinese to pay in cash for what they purchase. To aim not so much at the sale of new equipment as at the sale of machinery which can modernize the equipment already in existence in China. We must, therefore, propose the purchase of machinery which is not very advanced and if necessary even used, but which can be easily absorbed by Chinese industry. Not to give up negotiating

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contracts of greater breadth, but knowing that it will take a lot of time and no little patience before reaching an agreement (even more than a year). To study the possibility of combinations which would allow the utilization on the international market of the products paid in compensation by the Chinese. To examine the various possibilities offered by the Chinese provinces, one by one, avoiding generalizing and accepting the reticences and the difficulties opposed by the central organisms.

One such example is offered by the so-called "commercial banks" which are fairly active in the entire area of Southeast Asia and, now, even in the Chinese market. They identify possible business, serve as mediators between the parties and, often, provide the financing for the agreements.

Antonio Belloni, 34, a Valtellinese, the very active representative of the Credito Italiano in Hong Kong for Asia (with the exception of Japan), maintains that to win the trade war over the Asian market and the Chinese one in particular, Italian management must first of all win two battles: the first one consists of the identification of the real problems of the countries of the area and of the true interlocutors to whom it must address itself; the second consists of finding suitable financial solutions to the industrial projects to be carried out.

It is especially during the last year--maintains Belloni--that we have begun to see the fruits of the research by the possible spokesmen for Italian industry possibly interested in China (State commissions, local administrations, institute for the management of the credits with foreign countries, etc.) after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and the launching of the programs of rationalization of the economy itself on the part of the new Chinese leaders. As manager of Orion, the "commercial bank" which groups banks of the six countries (Great Britain, Japan, United States, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, represented by the same Credito Italiano), he promoted the financing of civil projects in Thailand (for the account of the Vanini), in the Philippines (for the GIE [Economic Interest Group]) and he does not exclude the possibility of being able to do as much, some day, in China.

Asia, and China itself are, for Belloni, a unique opportunity for Italian industry to reacquire a competitive mentality, that is to rediscover the market, with its hardships, but also with its certain advantages. But for that to happen, we must create the political premises even before the commercial ones, we need channels of a general nature even before the specific.

Finally, the Italian businessmen in Beijing, the representatives of our banks in Hong Kong have done their best and even more. But it is not enough. We need a strategy on the part of our industry, we need a policy on the part of our government.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

COST, AVAILABILITY, CONSUMPTION OF ELECTRICITY IN PIEDMONT

Rome ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME in Italian Nov-Dec 79 pp 55-62

[Article by Francesco Corbellini: "Consumption and Availability of Electrical Energy in Piedmont"]

[Text] Only the utilization of nuclear energy will be able to cover the Piedmont region's energy deficit for the 1990's--a deficit equal to more than 60 percent of the demand, which is growing at a rate of about 5.3 percent per year.

Within a few weeks will begin the dry-run tests of what we at ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] call the alleviation plan and the newspapers call "programmed blackout." Nothing serious will happen this winter, especially here in the north; but these first difficulties are a warning signal of a deeper crisis that may occur within a few years.

In the graph of Figure 1, the lower line represents the maximum load that can be supplied in the coming years on the assumption that only the power plants presently under construction and those for which we already have authorization are built. The upper line represents the foreseeable demand up to 1990, the target year of our operational program. As you see¹, we are already in a slight deficit, we will have a short breathing-space in 1982-83, and then the situation will get gradually worse and worse and--in the absence of new construction--will become completely ungovernable toward the end of the 1980's.

If we consider energy rather than power and it is not possible to start construction of new basic power plants, the national energy deficit will reach 109 billion kWh [kilowatthours] in 1990, equal to 30 percent of the expected demand. This expected demand (364 billion kWh as against 167 bil-

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1. The text of this article constituted the opening paper, read by the president of ENEL at the Regional Conference on Energy called by the Piedmont Regional Council together with the Council Intercommission on Energy Problems and held in Turin on 19 and 20 October last.

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


Figure 1. Forecast of power demand in continental Italy and maximum load supplyable with existing installations and those under construction or already ordered.

[Key]:

- 1. Forecast demand
- 2. Maximum load supplyable

lion in 1978) has been calculated by very restrictive criteria: indeed, even in the absence of an expected 4-percent increase in output, in line with the government's medium-term indications, it considers that appreciable reductions in electricity consumption will be achieved with a strong energy-saving policy, among whose anticipated strong points is a substantial expansion of combined electricity-heat production and significant development of solar power in the south. In relation to a spontaneous growth of electric-power demand under pre-oil crisis conditions, the new scenario shows a 10-percent reduction in 1990, with a saving of 40 billion kWh.

Piedmont's deficit, which in 1978 was almost 5.5 billion kWh (31.5 percent of total regional demand), as indicated in Table 1, would in 1990 exceed 19

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Table 1. Regional Distribution of Energy Deficit in 1990 (on average assumption of demand growth and building only of installations under construction or authorized as of 31 December 1978)

Regions	Surplus (+)/Deficit (-) in Relation to Electric-Power Demand			
	1978 (actual consumption)		1990 (estimate)	
	billions/kWh	deficit %	billions/kWh	deficit %
Piedmont	- 5.465	31.5	- 19.200	60.2
Valle d'Aosta	+ 2.348	--	+ 1.200	--
Lombardy	- 8.293	23.5	- 25.200	37.8
Trentino-Alto Adige	+ 4.266	--	- 0.100	1.1
Veneto	- 2.193	15.1	- 1.000	3.4
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	- 0.367	8.1	- 2.200	22.9
Liguria	+ 9.200	--	+ 8.700	--
Emilia Romagna	+ 2.953	--	- 8.600	30.7
Northern Italy	+ 2.449	--	- 46.400	25.0
Tuscany	- 1.982	18.1	- 10.500	48.6
Umbria	- 0.207	6.2	- 3.400	53.1
Marche	- 1.678	64.1	- 6.000	8.3
Lazio	- 0.055	0.5	+ 8.900	--
Central Italy	- 3.922	14.0	- 11.000	17.1
Abruzzi	- 0.151	5.9	- 4.400	63.8
Molise	- 0.322	60.7	- 1.200	75.0
Campania	- 6.583	68.6	- 20.500	79.5
Puglia	- 0.248	2.6	- 9.100	41.6
Basilicata	- 0.249	22.4	- 2.100	65.6
Calabria	+ 5.529	--	- 0.300	3.0
Southern Italy	- 2.024	7.7	- 37.600	54.3
Sicily	+ 1.443	--	- 7.000	24.5
Sardinia	- 0.072	1.0	- 7.000	42.5
Italian islands	+ 1.371	--	- 14.000	31.0
Total for Italy	- 2.126 ⁽¹⁾	1.3	-109.000	30.0

(1) Deficit compensated for, in 1978, by the positive balance from exchanges with foreign countries, made available in northern Italy.

The regional distribution of deficits is indicative in nature, in view of the greater uncertainties regarding demographic and economic developments at the level of each region. It should be stressed that in addition to the impossibility of supplying the quantities of energy indicated, the situation forecast for 1990 would be accompanied by an extremely low level of quality of service for the demand rate suppliable; in addition, under such conditions, annual consumption of hydrocarbons for thermoelectric produc-

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tion would reach, throughout the second half of the 1980's, a level of about 40 Mtep [expansion unknown], as against 23.6 Mtep consumed in 1978.

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billion kWh, corresponding to more than 60 percent of the forecast demand, growing at a rate of about 5.3 percent per year.

The figures involved therefore make it unthinkable to be able to cope with this situation by importation of energy from other regions or from abroad. In addition to everything else, the insertion of the European interconnection presupposes the maintenance, by each participating country, of comparable standards of "quality" of service; a drop of quality in a given country would result in its exclusion from the interconnection by the other participants, who would not tolerate the repercussions on their networks of frequent service deficiencies in the network of the partner in difficulty.

To meet the country's future electric-power needs, we intend to operate by taking as a point of reference the guidelines indicated by Parliament in the resolution of 5 October 1977, "aiming at a percentage reduction of the oil component and increasing the contribution from and exploitation of the alternative sources," therefore pursuing the revival and development of hydroelectric uses, broadening geothermal energy wherever possible, greater use of coal, experimentation with new integrative sources, combined electricity-heat production, and various other actions for energy-saving, as well as "balanced and controlled use of nuclear energy," with the maximum guarantees for protection of health and safeguarding of our natural patrimony.

As regards the residual hydroelectric resources, an up-to-date review was made, at the conference which we held in Siena at the end of June, of what can still be achieved in this field in Italy. The possible new contributions in Piedmont can be summarized as follows:

(1) Work in Progress

--Construction of the new Quincinetto plant, with an annual 80-million kWh increase in basic production capacity, over and above the production by the old small power plants of Carema and Quincinetto.

--remodelling of the Bardonecchia plant, already nearly complete, and of the Acceglio plant (additional 20 million kWh/year).

--Alto Gesso production and pumping plant, with a power of 1,190 MW [megawatts]. It will also have a basic production capacity of 190 million kWh per year, but this is in large part dependent on obtaining authorization for connecting subsidiary basins with the Rovina plant; it should go into service by 1980-81.

--In addition, the concession proceedings for the new Piedilago pumping plant in the upper Val d'Ossola, with a power of 1,000 MW, are in progress;

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this plant too could contribute a basic production capacity--about 100 million kWh/year, not including several subsidiary capacities--if connection of the Cairasca and Bondolero runs is authorized.

(2) Confirmed Availabilities Relative to Plants Studied by ENEL

These involve 14 new utilizations--indicated in detail in Table 2--with a total production capacity of about 1.4 billion kWh per year (including the capacity of the plants under construction as indicated under heading (1)), with a cost of more than 740 billion lire.

(3) Other Availabilities So Far Identified by ENEL Relative to Plants Currently under Study

These involve 10 new utilizations--indicated in detail in Table 3--with a total production capacity of a little less than half a billion kWh per year.

Study of the residual availabilities is proceeding in accordance with a general program that is being developed for all the regions.

(4) Minor Resources

This is a question which has aroused public interest far beyond its effective importance and on which, therefore, it is advisable to furnish detailed and exhaustive information.

In recent days, ENEL's board of directors has considered the restoration of all small inactive Italian power plants with a power of at least 100 kW, production capacity of at least 200,000 kWh per year, and production cost of up to 50 lire per kWh--therefore double the present cost component of fuel oil in the cost per kWh produced by the thermal plants--thus a very open criterion for reutilization. As regards Piedmont, the situation with the small inactive and abandoned power plants is summarized in Table 5.

The small inactive power plants with power of more than 100 kW all fall within the established limits that I referred to, and therefore they will all be restored.

We are now studying the way to recover a certain proportion of hydroelectric production capacity from the abandoned small power plants also.

As regards those which it appears to us, on initial examination, should not be reactivated, either because of cost too high at this time or because of power or production capacity lower than the minimums, or for other reasons, we intend to carry out a joint study with the regions, in order to evaluate and decide together, for each case, what the most suitable use of the water is: that is, whether it can or should be put to other hydraulic uses--irrigation or city water--or whether it can be put to hydroelectric uses; and if so, to see whether there are projects by local or private bodies inter-

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Table 2. Residual Hydraulic Resources of the Piedmont Region

Hydrographic Basins Used and Names of Plants	Confirmed Availabilities			Average Annual Basic Production Capacity ⁽¹⁾ (GWh)	Cost at 31 Dec 1978 prices (millions of lire)
	Province	Installed Power (MW)			
Quincinetto II (Dora Baltea)	Aosta-Torino	22		120	21,900
Alto Gesso connection	Cuneo	--		135	15,500
Piedilego connection (Cairasca run and Bondolero run)	Novara	--		141	15,200
Lower Dora Baltea					
Mazze-Villareggia	Torino	7.4		42.3	
Villareggia-Depretis	Torino-Vercelli	12.5		76.1	
Subtotal		41.9		514.4	52,600
Stura di Ala and Stura di Valgrande					
Arnas-Piena della Mussa	Torino	83.6		15.1	
Pian della Mussa-Mondrone	Torino	55.5		87.6	
Mondrone-Ceres	Torino	71.1		222.1	
Subtotal		210.2		324.8	259,000
Cannobio (Val Cannobina)	Novara	56.1		141.5	99,000
Varallo (Valsesia)	Vercelli	42		125	83,200
Oulx (Dora di Bardonecchia)	Torino	24		67	52,000
Salbertrand (Dora Riparia)	Torino	29.6		86	45,700
Candoglia (Valle Grande)	Novara	31		63.8	26,100
Isola-Ponti (Alto Tanaro)	Cuneo-Imperia	100		129.7	87,400
Grand Totals		534.8		1,452.2	742,600

(1) Including subsidiary production equivalent to 86 GWh [gigawatthours] per year.

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ested in exploiting it. From this joint examination effort we should therefore end by leaving out only those potential utilizations that are not economically feasible for anyone.

Table 3. Residual Hydraulic Resources of the Piedmont Region

Hydrographic Basins Used and Names of Plants	Identified Plants Currently under Study		Estimated Average Annual Basic Pro- duction Capacity (GWh)
	Province		
Upper Stura di Demonte - Corburant Run			
Callieri	Cuneo		
Terme	Cuneo		
Total			74
Upper Stura di Demonte - Rio Freddo			
Rio Freddo I	Cuneo		
Rio Freddo II	Cuneo		
Total			65
Vinadio-Demonte (Stura di Demonte)	Cuneo		95
Moiola (Stura di Demonte)	Cuneo		50
Germanasca Run			
Prali	Torino		
Perrero	Torino		
Total			68
Combanera (Stura di Viu)	Torino		84
Malesco (Ticino-Melezzo run)	Novara		34
Estimated Total Annual Production Capacity			470

(5) Hydroelectric Plants of the Public Utilities of Turin

In addition to construction of new plants and restoration of inactive plants, we must also concern ourselves with better utilization of the existing plants. I refer in particular to the Turin Public Utilities' Valle Orco plants, the concessions for two of which expire in 1981.

According to the law, ENEL will succeed to these concessions; on the other hand, the Orco plants constitute a unitary system from the point of view of hydroelectric operations, and therefore it is not economically suitable, or

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Table 4. Production Cost of Electrical Energy in Lire per kWh (1)

<u>Cost Categories</u>	<u>Power Plants</u>		
	<u>Nuclear</u> 2 X 1,000 MW	<u>Coal</u> 4 X 640 MW	<u>Fuel Oil</u> 4 X 640 MW
Capital costs, operation ¹ and maintenance	10.97	6.50	5.00
Fuel	5.83	14.80	25.00
Total (foreign-exchange component)	16.80⁽²⁾ (6.46)	21.30 (13.80)	30.00 (22.45)

(1) At constant currency value.

(2) Including fuel reprocessing and power-plant dismantling.

Table 5. Small Inactive and Abandoned ENEL Hydroelectric Power Plants in Piedmont (Situation at 30 September 1979)

<u>Small Power Plants</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Power (kW)</u>	<u>Unit</u> <u>Power (kW)</u>	<u>Annual</u> <u>Production Capacity</u> <u>(millions/kWh)</u>
Inactive				
--with unit power less than 100 kW	1	55	55	0.2
--with unit power equal to or higher than 100 kW (1)	6	2,688	448	11.0
Total for inactive (7)		(2,743)	(392)[sic]	(11.2)
Abandoned				
--with unit power less than 100 kW	20	994	50	3.6
--with unit power equal to or higher than 100 kW	29	11,601	400	45.2
Total for abandoned	(49)	(12,595)	(257)	(48.8)
Grand Totals	56	15,338	274	60.0

(1) This does not include: the Crava I and II small power plants, for which restoration and automation are already in progress; the Carema small plant, which will be subtended by the new Quincinetto II plant (which will furnish a net production-capacity increase of 80 million kWh/year); and the Spineto small plant, which is being returned to the Cavour Canals Administration.

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manageable, for the national collectivity to consider the separate operation of a part of them. Therefore the problem now arises of finding a solution which--while adhering to the prerogatives that ENEL cannot renounce, for reasons of an institutional nature--make it possible to continue with unitary operation of these installations, and also with a view to substantial restoration of them, in order to increase their productivity, and especially their power, and to new uses of the watercourses that supply them, while safeguarding, obviously, the interests and requirements of the Public Utilities.

These objectives could all be achieved with the transfer to ENEL in 1981 of all the Valle Orco plants--those reaching termination dates and those with deadlines to come--upon compensation of the Public Utilities with adequate indemnification, commensurate with the value of the "nonreversible" projects transferred, and with supplying, until the concession termination dates, of the quantities of energy that the Public Utilities would have produced in all its power plants in the residual period, at a price corresponding to operational costs only.

For these new projects and for others under study, considering the magnitude of the financial commitment related to them and the fact that part of the power obtainable would be in excess of the needs of the Public Utilities and would be very useful to the national network, the establishment of a mixed company could also be considered--a company in which the interests of all would be safeguarded, and with the participation of the Region or of whomever the Region will wish to designate.

I suggest this solution on a personal basis, because, among other things, it would require an amendment of the law on which ENEL is established.

In point of fact, Piedmont's hydroelectric potential that is still technically utilizable, as regards the installations studied or identified by ENEL, can be evaluated, in round figures, at little less than 2 billion kWh per year. Therefore, activation of all these plants by 1990 would cover only a tenth of the energy deficit forecast for that year.

The picture does not change substantially even if one takes account of the additional input that could result from initiatives under study by third parties, which, to the best of our knowledge, would be on the order of several hundred million kWh per year.

The new input from other renewable energy sources--solar, wind and biomass--will be able to contribute energy production in 1990; solar energy, in particular, is expected to help cover the low-temperature thermal needs. Moreover, Piedmont's geothermal resources are of modest importance, and in any case are not economically usable for production of electric power.

There follows from this the necessity of using nonnational sources, and basic installations, to cover the major part of Piedmont's additional electric-power needs--as, for that matter, the rest of the country will have to do also.

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The turbogas plant under construction at Alessandria, equipped with two 90-MW sets, which we count on putting into service in the coming months, will be able, because of its intrinsic characteristics, to contribute to coverage of the peak loads, but with a very marginal input in terms of energy (200 million kWh per year).

The same is true for the Alto Gesso and Piedilago pumping plants. For the new basic power plants that will therefore have to be built in the coming years, the greatest possible use of coal is one of the energy-policy directions fixed by Parliament in the October 1977 resolution, as is combined production of electric power and heat for urban heating.

ENEL is pursuing these objectives with commitment, and in Piedmont, a specific step toward them is the planned expansion of the Chivasso power plant, already provided for in Law 880 of December 1973, and in relation to that expansion, the plant for remote heating of the city has also been studied.

As is known, contacts and negotiations with the Region and the Commune have been under way for some time with a view to an agreement on the modalities for establishment of this new plant--composed of two sections of 320 MW each, with a production capacity of more than 3.5 billion kWh per year--and in order to obtain the necessary authorizations; there have been contacts and negotiations also with the parties interested in ensuring the supply of coal--and in the Po Valley, the question of supply presents serious technical and economic problems of transport. It is to be hoped that a solution can be arrived at as soon as possible, considering also the fact that the problem of remote heating is presented in a more favorable way today because the recent decree-law No 438 on the restraining of energy consumption has provided incentives for remote-heating plants in the form of sinking fund contributions.

For ENEL's part, I can only confirm that all possible scope is being given to this project as well as to other remote-heating proposals that might take specific form in the Region.

Even with the input from the new Chivasso units, we will in any case still be far from a balance--or at least from an acceptable deficit situation--between electric-power availability and demand in the Region, with all the consequences on regularity of service--and therefore on productive activities and on civil life--that such a situation involves, and as regards also the plan for programmed withdrawals.

It is therefore necessary to arrive quickly at a decision on the siting of the planned nuclear power plant.

Within the national framework, law 393 has proved very difficult in application because it has thrown onto the small Commune the enormous responsibility of deciding a question of national importance and because differences of behavior have arisen between the center, the Parliament and the

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national parties, and the local administrations and the parties at the local level.

Before emergency solutions are considered, with Parliament taking the decisions upon itself again, in the absence of decisions by the regions and the communes, all means must be tried to obtain consensus at the local level.

First of all, with greater incentives than those given so far. It is necessary to change from so-much-per-unit contributions to a system that involves the Region in the life of the power plant also: in other words, an incentive related to the kWh produced. One form of incentive could be based on interregional trade in energy: a region that produces energy for the rest of the country must be compensated for the part exported.

Another incentive, related to the kWh produced, should be given to the development areas.

The power plant will thus become a continuous generator of induced activities.

The incentives should be used for improvement of the ecological environment of the zones affected by the power plants, and at the community level, should counter the disadvantages resulting from the territorial restrictions imposed by the presence of the power plants.

Naturally, development of nuclear power is tied to the unalterable condition of achieving the highest standard of safety, a standard that takes into account not only what has been done in other countries, but also our particular local conditions, so as to guarantee protection of the workers, the population and the environment, not only during normal operating conditions but also under conditions of any eventual incidents.

Other speakers will talk about these problems. It seems to me that as the person responsible for the electric-power agency, it is up to me to review the reasons that make it essential to use nuclear energy to cover Italian electric-power needs.

There are substantially three such reasons:

(1) Nuclear power is destined to become increasingly the most economical system by far for production of electrical energy. As indicated in Table 4, the cost per kWh of nuclear origin is evaluated at 16.80 lire (in constant 1979 lire), the cost per thermoelectric kWh produced from coal is 21.30 lire, and the cost per thermoelectric kWh from fuel oil is 30.00 lire. Within a few years, Italian industry will find itself in conditions of gross inferiority in relation, for example, to French industry, which at that time will be able to count on low-cost energy supplied from nuclear power plants.

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(2) The foreign-exchange component of the cost per nuclear kWh is about 6.50 lire, as against about 14 lire per coal-produced kWh and 22.50 lire per fuel-oil kWh. A nuclear kWh therefore has a foreign-exchange component barely 30 percent of that for a kWh produced from fuel oil.

(3) Nuclear fuel is not subject to momentary supply crises. The supplying of nuclear fuel begins years before the time of use; the physical dimensions generally permit easy storage, and therefore the proportion of energy produced from nuclear power is not subject to the sudden changes of humor of the oil-producing countries and thereby helps increase a country's degree of real independence.

A problem that has been given special attention with regard to the installation of a nuclear power plant in Piedmont is that of the cooling water.

I will not dwell on the details of this problem, which have been examined in various specific aspects with reference to the areas presently identified in the Region.

I would only like to mention that the water resources available for the area along the Po downstream from Tanaro appear sufficient, while for the area near Trino Vercellese, rationalization of uses should be carried out in a coordinated program that provides, among other things, for releases from our hydroelectric reservoirs so as to maintain the minimum values with an appropriate integration flow. For the area involved by the Dora Baltea, the cooling water should be tapped both from the river and from the irrigation canals.

Naturally, whatever siting may be decided on, I want as of right now to give the fullest guarantees of the safeguarding of the minimum flows--guarantees that will be expressed in a formal commitment with the drawing-up of an appropriate convention.

The objective should be to arrive at an agricultural-water situation that in several respects is better than the one before the installation of the power plant. Furthermore, the energy crisis makes it necessary to reach an understanding between ENEL and farmers, because it is the duty of all that the residual warm water from the thermal and nuclear power plants, which today is wasted, should have an ultimate use in agriculture and pisciculture. This alliance between ENEL and farmers should find application also in intensification of rural electrification, in strengthening the under-electrified zones, and in electrification by new sources (solar, wind, biomass) of houses that it would be extremely expensive to connect to the network.

This year's report of forecasting and programming shows clearly the government's desire to reward, not only in terms of incentives but also in terms of securely available electricity, those Regions that have collaborated in the past and that propose to collaborate in the future for resolution of

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electric-power problems. There is therefore a choice that each Region will have to make: whether to rank themselves among those which, when the verbal activism is over, resign themselves to living on the energy charity of the other parts of the country--for as long as that will be possible--or among those that work concretely to solve their own problems by themselves.

The discipline with which this conference has been organized leads one to hope that Piedmont, in its tradition of seriousness and industry, will set Italy an example of how, with democratic consensus, one's own energy problems and the energy problems of the country can be solved.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PRODI REPORT ON STATUS OF AUTO INDUSTRY

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 4 Apr 80 p 8

[Article by Eugenio Palmieri: "Italian Auto Industry Has Resources; Higher Productivity Needed for Recovery"]

[Text] Rome--Twenty-eight typewritten pages represent the pitiless (but with much hope of recovery) x-ray that the Prodi Commission put together on the automobile crisis. Timeliness was respected and the document was handed yesterday to Budget Minister Andreatta who will turn it over to the CIPI [Interministerial Industrial Policy Coordinating Committee]. There is widespread crisis in the sector and it is tied to a constant loss of the Italian industry's competitive position which was unable to bear the heavy and repeated blows by foreign manufacturers: In terms of share of the market we have returned to the 1960 levels by a progressive drop in productivity (which risks becoming irreversible) and to the tardiness with which social, political and government forces became aware of the looming threat.

Here are the most significant parts of the document:

Market in a Nose Dive--After having affirmed the auto industry's role as a propulsive force, the document notes that in the 1970 to 1979 decade the market position of Italian producers weakened considerably compared with that of major foreign producers. In 1970, the document reports, about 6.6 million automobiles were registered in the nine EEC nations (including Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland). Of these, 1,228,000 were Italian. Specifically, Fiat captured 18 percent of the market and was the foremost EEC producer: This position deteriorated until it dropped below 10 percent at the end of the decade.

While Italian industry lost ground, Japanese and non-EEC European producers entered the market at first timidly and then more boldly.

On European markets, Fiat's position is equal to 3.5 percent of the French market, 3.25 percent of the German, and 4.5 percent of the British. Renault's position in Italy is now about 10 percent; that of Peugeot-Citroen, 7 percent; Volkswagen-Audi, 3.5 percent; Ford, 5 percent; GM, 4.2 percent.

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Japanese industries have now acquired between 2 and 3 percent of the French market, more than 6 percent of the German market and more than 10 percent of the British market. In Italy, so far they have a negligible share of the market.

Productivity--However, what is most striking is the progressive drop in productivity of our industry despite technological progress and the quantity of investment. ISRI [Institute for Industrial Research] data show that Italian industrial productivity has dropped 12 percent; British, 7 percent, while production in France and Germany increased 24 and 26 percent respectively. The position seems to have worsened in the past 2 years. This statement is valid even in light of strong differences in the cost of labor which on 31 December 1979 equaled 7,402 lire per hour at Fiat, 8,971 lire for a representative French factory and 11,375 for a representative German plant. Despite these differences in the cost of labor and the similarity of facilities, the cost per unit produced is much higher in Italy compared with foreign competition and this is translated into a growing loss of competitive position. All this is due to factors of an organizational character, to the limited hourly utilization of facilities, to different production schedules and the frequency of unforeseen interruptions. The differences in the cost of production, together with the difficulty of delivering "the product required in the time required" was shown in the loss of percentage of market.

World Clash--The automobile oligopoly is on the eve of a clash which will establish future market shares for an entire generation: In the front lines of this battle will be the productive and public administration structures of the world's four strongest industrial nations: The United States, Japan, Germany and France.

Participation in this fight, with an active role by Italian firms, will be conditioned mainly on the choices made in the coming months.

The Conditions--The Prodi Commission is convinced that Italian firms can still be in this fight on condition that: They continue (and even accelerate) the pace of innovation and investment; radically increase the use of facilities and overall productivity; accelerate the testing of innovative models in production in Italy; proceed to a profound restructuring of the parts industry; introduce substantial improvements in administrative policies both in the field of production and sales and services; make gradual changes in the strategies of placement of plants, easing congested situations as much as possible and favoring movement of plants toward the south.

The Parts Industry--The need to strengthen our parts industry seems to be of primary importance. A similar instrument, in the view of the commission, could be the promotion of new plants in the south both through joint ventures between Italian producers and through similar ventures with foreign producers (namely, British and American) who have experienced

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difficulty in their entrance into the continental market due to opposition of the French Government and objective difficulties in entering the German market.

However, it is the view of the commission that cooperation in the field of parts should be broadened among all Italian automobile firms since the rationalization of this sector is a necessary condition for the economic balance of the automobile industry.

Public Financing--The commission notes first of all that public resources destined to innovation in the automobile sector are extremely low both in absolute terms as well as in comparison with what occurs in other countries. Consider, for example, that from the time the IMI [Italian Credit Institute] fund for research was established until today the number of applications for the automobile, parts and accessories sector (including tires) totaled no more than 50 billion lire.

The Sector Plan--The commission believes that this matter would require a still more detailed study of the problem of the sector which could not be the subject of the present analysis. This refers particularly to an examination of factory strategy plans, their productive programs and the financial resources of plants for the purpose of establishing the congruity of means with the objectives adopted and particularly the possible need for outside aid.

It also seems to the commission that the new cognitive phase can be carried out through the instrument of the sector plan provided for in Law 675. In this sector plan it would be possible to analyze the capacity of aid offered by present legislation and eventual innovations necessary to designate public policy in regard to the automobile industry.

Balance of Trade in Automobile Sector

(in millions of dollars)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	Sep 79
Federal Republic of Germany	7,708	10,101	11,888	13,345	12,075
France	3,356	2,964	3,946	5,018	4,460
Italy	1,667	1,472	1,653	1,556	889
Great Britain	1,974	1,713	1,282	539	1,004

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Productivity in Automobile Industry

(base 1972=100)

Country	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Great Britain	98	91	92	96	93
France	103	101	100	120	124
Germany	107	103	112	119	126
Italy	95	93	83	89	88
Sweden	107	117	109	97	100
Japan	106	97	107	126	135
United States	92	88	85	97	108

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BRIEFS

TROUBLE FOR ENCLAVES--The intelligence services of the Kingdom of Morocco are encouraging the creation of nationalist groups in Ceuta and, above all, Melilla. In the latter city, claimed to be part of Morocco's territory, a so-called "Muslim Association" is being formed and it is indirectly controlled by the authorities in Rabat. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 27 Apr 80 p 5]

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END

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