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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 675

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MAURITIAN DUPLICITY OVER U.S. PRESENCE HIT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 31 Mar 80 p 42

[Article by Herve-Masson: "Mauritius, Island of Lies"]

[Text] The double cross is traditional for parties in power. When it fails, it suffices to postpone elections, and it is time to prepare a new maneuver.

Perhaps because nothing very spectacular happens there, perhaps because political life is soft-pedalled there, international opinion takes hardly any interest in Mauritius. Very small (2,000 square kilometers with its dependencies, Rodrigues and some other small islands), overpopulated (nearly 1 million inhabitants, with a galloping rate of increase), this former British colony, which became independent (?) in 1968, is nevertheless one of the strategic keys in the southwestern part of the Indian Ocean. Economically and culturally more highly developed than its island neighbors, with two good, well-sheltered ports (Port-Louis and Mahebourg), and with its sovereignty extended over several atolls where oil might be found very soon, Mauritius could have as much importance as its big neighbor, Madagascar.

If Mauritius were to quit the Western alliance and adopt a truly nonaligned foreign policy, the entire strategic balance presently existing in the Indian Ocean would be upset. But Prime Minister Ramgoolam (who has reigned for a quarter of a century) and his sycophants of the Labour-PMSD (Mauritian Social Democratic Party, conservative and resolutely pro-Western) coalition government do not intend to inconvenience the Western powers to whom they are selling off their homeland bit by bit, in exchange for military support that may eventually be needed against the active leftist forces in the country, the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) in particular. The MMM remains the bete noire of the West and its accomplices in power in Mauritius.

The double cross is the key to all Mauritian policy, foreign as well as domestic. It is sometimes difficult to keep from being caught in it. When the Afghan crisis broke out, Mauritian ministers, including Prime Minister Ramgoolam, the minister of finance, Vice Prime Minister Sir V. Ringadoo,

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the minister of agriculture, Sir Satcam Boolell, the regime's strong man and Ringadoo's rival, lauched into thundering declarations. They protested the reinforcement of the American Navy and Air Force in the Indian Ocean, a "zone of peace." They even went so far as to demand restitution of the island of Diego Garcia,¹ which they recently (1965) ceded to the British, knowing very well that a nuclear base would be made of it. Only Gaetan Duval, former minister of foreign affairs and leader of the PMSD, was candid enough to declare his attachment to the Western cause. He even threatened to leave the government coalition if the Ramgoolam government adopted coercive measures against the United States. What a joke!

Actually, the high flights of patriotism by the government were intended solely for domestic consumption. The coalition in power was, in effect, only flapping its wings.² And the MMM, a progressive party, close to presidents Ratsiraka and Rene, has always demanded the return of Diego Garcia to Mauritius and the dismantling of the American base. For the government, it was quite simply a matter of "luring" the MMM: whence its declarations in a very progressive tone regarding Diego Garcia and the militarization of the Indian Ocean.

But the MMM rejects any idea of a coalition with the Labourites. Its secretary general, Paul Beranger, has expressly affirmed this. "It would be suicidal to contract an alliance with Labour, which has led the country to catastrophe and which is more and more detested by the electorate. It would be madness to join company with Ramgoolam and his troops to administer the inflation, the devalued currency, the poverty and the corruption."

There is therefore no MMM-Labour compromise. The government, disappointed, has taken back its marbles. Boolell, who had gone into a stall after trying to supplant his friend Ringadoo, immediately reached an accomodation with the prime minister. The latter, for his part, has initiated a rapprochement with his PMSD partner. The result was not long in coming: in a statement to the conservative newspaper LE CERNEEN, of 4 March, Boolell explained that Diego Garcia could be left to the Americans if they paid a good price! For only money counts for these professional discount merchants. The ludicrous progressive ploy is ended, and Mauritius is officially resuming its alinement with the West.

The Salary Freeze

Simultaneously, the government has hardened its positions vis-a-vis the MMM, and at the same stroke, with the electorate. After being postponed once already, the municipal elections that were to be held in April have been put off to December. If they really take place! The government knew it was defeated in advance. The prime minister, pulling in his horns, does not consider it necessary to summon the Parliament, as should have been done in the present context of economic failure and after the ravaging of the island by three cyclones. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, who up to the present has tried to give himself the brand image of a man who is respectful of democratic forms, no longer cares about them. For him, anything goes in order to retain power and the privileges attached to it.

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The government has decided to freeze the civil servants' salaries, but it did not hesitate to increase the transportation allowances for its incompetent and useless ministers. Prestige expenditures and expensive ministerial junkets around the world will continue at a good clip. The Mauritian people, for their part, will tighten their belts still another notch.

Since the democratic way--the way of elections in particular--is impracticable for the opposition, another way might tempt the Mauritian population: the way of violence. Isn't this what the government would want, so that it could thus have the hope--with the aid of foreign forces, in readiness on Reunion and on Diego Garcia--of reducing the MMM by force, on the pretext of who knows what plot?

But what Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and his sorcerer's apprentices do not want to see is that on the day that the Mauritian people, discouraged and desperate, take up arms, neither paratroopers nor Marines will be able to overcome them.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FPPS CALLS FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF INDIAN OCEAN

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 31 Mar 80 p 39

[Article by Maryam Sysle: "The Peace Congress"]

[Text] Calm waters, happy lands: these were the two concerns--with a thousand implications--of the most recent meeting of the Seychelles Progressive Front.

The expansion of the big powers' naval fleets in the Indian Ocean is arousing sharp anxieties in the countries bordering it, and especially in the Seychelles, where, as is known, this problem has been the dominant concern since the installation of President France Albert Rene's progressive regime. Thus some new initiatives, based notably on the recent United Nations resolution asking that everything be done to transform this region into a zone of peace, have recently been taken in Victoria. The kickoff was given by the extraordinary national congress of the Progressive Front of the Seychelles People (FPPS)--the country's highest political body, which also includes the representatives of the various sectors of the population--meeting in Victoria on 24 February last. At the conclusion of the proceedings, a resolution was adopted condemning the militarization of the Indian Ocean by foreign powers--which, it is specified, are taking the recent events in Iran and Afghanistan as a pretext for strengthening their dangerous presence--and calls for dismantling of all the foreign military bases in the region. The congress calls for restoration to Mauritius of the island of Diego Garcia, which is located some 1,700 kilometers east of the Seychelles and which the United States proposes to transform into a nuclear base; it asks that no country of the region grant military facilities to foreign powers, and that those which have already done so reconsider their decision. Finally, it calls on the bordering states to carry on permanent consultation, without which nothing can succeed, and to decide on positive and effective measures to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, in conformity with the United Nations decision.

A Diplomatic Effort

This resolution, adopted after an intensive campaign of explanation by the government and the press of the Seychelles lasting several weeks, is not an

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act of pure form but marks the beginning of a vast diplomatic effort. An expression of the will of the Seychelles people, it has been transmitted to the secretary general of the OAU, for communication to the member states, as well as to all the embassies accredited to Victoria. Moreover, and in the same line of thinking, organization of the second conference of the progressive parties of the Indian Ocean is under study. In particular, it was the subject of talks between the Progressive Front of the Seychelles People and Paul Beranger, secretary general of the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), on the occasion of the latter's recent visit to Victoria. We recall that the first conference of the progressive parties of the Indian Ocean, which met at Mahe in the Seychelles from 27 to 29 April 1978, had already asked for demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and denounced the destabilization attempts to which the progressive countries of the region are continually subjected.

But the extraordinary national congress of the Progressive Front of the Seychelles People also concerned itself with the domestic problems, especially the problem of improving concertation among the leading structures of the population, as well as articulation between the party organisms and the state.

To this end, the respective roles of the branches of the Progressive Front, on the one hand, and of the Popular Assembly on the other hand, were specified. While the branches have the essential function of mobilizing the people, the members of the Popular Assembly must also remain in close liaison with the inhabitants of the various districts, so as to be capable of transporting their desiderata and their proposals either to the executive committee of the party or to the government, or to any other state institution. In return, all proposals, such as bills, have to be examined by the "branches." In other words, all the resolutions adopted by the extraordinary congress are aimed at establishing a permanent and more effective dialog between the people and their leaders, through the structures of the party and of the state.

"Unemployment Work Projects"

In addition, it is noted that the government has just taken a number of important measures in the social area in order to overcome unemployment, which remains a crucial problem in the Seychelles, since at the time of the overthrow of the Mancham regime in June 1977, two out of three persons were jobless.

Thus, by the terms of a bill announced by President France Albert Rene in his 1980 budget speech, a daily benefit of 20 rupees will be paid to all persons who are jobless and do not already receive a social allowance or a retirement pension. In exchange, those who receive the benefit must accept jobs offered to them by the labor service, in accordance with their ability.

For this purpose, a number of "unemployment work projects" devoted to various projects such as construction of walls or roads, cleaning of the water-

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conduction systems, drainage of rivers, clearing of land, etc, will be started. Among the proposed projects are, in particular, the construction of a wall 6 miles long along the eastern coast of Mahe, as well as construction of a second road connection that will link Victoria, the capital, with the airport some 10 kilometers distant. This initiative will thus enable persons without paid work to obtain the means for their families to live, while taking part in tasks of national construction. The Seychelles government, as one sees, is striving to keep its promises.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN SCORED FOR DIEGO GARCIA OCCUPATION

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 31 Mar 80 pp 40, 41

[Article by Emilie Ramey: "Diego Garcia, the Eye of the Pentagon"]

[Text] For the Indian Ocean countries, this atoll transformed into an American base is the symbol of the destiny that eludes them: their own....

In the beginning, it was a miniscule archipelago, sleeping in the middle of the blue waters of its lagoon: the Chagos. Living very modestly from picking and fishing, 2,000 "islanders" inhabited it for several generations, making slim profits from gathering coconuts for a Mauritian company whose practices were a bit on the slave-driver side: Chagos Agalega Ltd.

But the archipelago became a base, for to its misfortune, it is located right in the middle of the Indian Ocean, at a practically equal distance from the Straits of Hormuz, Aden and Djibouti, the Mozambique Channel and the Philippines. The British, who owned these island from the heyday of their imperial expansion, had already used one of them as a small telecommunications base during World War II: the atoll of Diego Garcia.

And when the British government of Harold Wilson undertook to withdraw the Union Jack from most of the British bases "east of Suez," he wanted to keep the Chagos, detached from Mauritius in 1965. With three other archipelagos taken from the Seychelles, he formed in 1965 the "British Indian Ocean Territory" (BIOT), and assigned the management of this group to the Royal Navy.

The conditions of the cession of Diego Garcia by Mauritius are better-known today, after 15 years of awkward silence on the part of the Labour government of Port-Louis: the abandonment of Mauritian rights over the Chagos, and compensation in the amount of 665,000 pounds sterling were in exchange for London's renouncing the organization of a referendum on the independence of Mauritius--a vote which the friends of the present prime minister, Ramgoolam, were afraid of losing.

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Subsequently, events went very fast for the occupants of the archipelago: in April 1967, London signed with the American government a 50-year agreement by the terms of which the two powers committed themselves to using the BIOT islands jointly for their defense. And in 1970, the two capitals announced their intention to establish a naval communications base on Diego Garcia. It was then that the "islanders" were firmly asked to take the road of exile: freighters loaded people and animals on in several waves, leaving not a living soul on the island; the place had to be cleaned up before the Americans landed.

In Washington, the Pentagon's strategists already had plans for the Diego Garcia atoll. When the American Senate obstinately refused funds for the American Navy to start construction of the 13th aircraft carrier asked for, it did grant the \$200 million needed for transforming this Indian Ocean atoll into a sort of "fixed aircraft carrier," with a runway 3,600 meters long, a telecommunications station, tanks and docks, an antiaircraft defense system, etc.

An exceptional geographical situation, no natives, savings: the arguments formulated by the Pentagon hit their target. In 1977, after 5 years of work, the main job was finished, and a handful of carefully selected American journalists could note that the work was sometimes done at night, by floodlight. Several naval reconnaissance airplanes--four-engine P-3C Orion crammed with listening devices--were already based there.

Because of Iran's falling out of the American military orbit, and especially the aid of Soviet troops given to Afghanistan, the American government decided to accelerate this work and to look farther ahead: \$170 million was made available for the next 4 years, to lengthen the runway to handle the big planes, such as the B-52 bombers. It has also been decided to dredge the lagoon, to permit big ships, such as the cruisers and aircraft carriers, to anchor in the Diego Garcia roadstead.

Thus, the atoll should gradually become a multipurpose base, capable of serving as a relay for the Subic Bay and Clark installations in the Philippines, where the main elements of the American Pacific fleet are based. An ultra-advanced listening and data-analysis system will be able to track all movement of ships or airplanes in the region, like the South African Silvermine. Maintenance docks will make it possible to supply and repair the ships of the Indian Ocean squadron. The crews will be able to relax on this "American land," without waiting for their ships to put in at the distant bases of the Mediterranean or the Pacific.

Thus, the American armed forces' permanent arrangement in the Indian Ocean will be in place: the highly "deterrent" presence of one or more aircraft carriers, accompanied by their squadron in the latitudes of the Gulf and of the Straits of Hormuz, with the possibility of using support points at Bahrain and Oman and in Pakistan; more frequent visits by American ships in the ports of the Red Sea (Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti), as well as on the East African coasts (Kenya, Comores, Reunion); and the maintenance of a

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corps of 1,800 Marines in the region, on board three troop transports, equipped with landing materiel (helicopters and amphibious vehicles). This is the outline of the famous "5th Fleet" which the Pentagon dreamed of setting up, between the 6th Fleet of the Mediterranean and the 7th Fleet of the Pacific.

The whole will be articulated with the airborne strike force of 110,000 men being created in the United States under the command of General Paul Kelley, as well as with the bases of the Pacific (to which 320,000 American soldiers are already attached). The Pentagon, profiting from the military "mobilization" decreed by President Carter, is studying means for cooperating more actively, west of this zone, with the Egyptian and Israeli armies, and to the east, with the Australian army, so as to fulfill this old dream.

Several weak points remain, though: the Red Sea, where there is an active Soviet presence (Yemen, Ethiopia); India, which wants to remain nonaligned, at least on the military level; and the southwest part of the Indian Ocean, with the existence of several progressive regimes hostile to the American projects (Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles) and a South Africa which is very embarrassing to the West's brand image.

The Mauritian government--the same one that "sold" Diego Garcia to the British and the Americans for a bit of bread--has belatedly arrived at condemnation of the atoll's transformation into a military base, as if this development were just now taking place. Harassed by the opposition from the left for several years, in January it took a position against the projects to enlarge its old island, for the first time since 1965.

The conference on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, to be held soon in Sri Lanka, will very certainly concentrate its attention on the atoll, since many Indian Ocean countries want to challenge the American presence on Diego Garcia. They will argue, on the one hand, that Great Britain had violated international law by dismembering one of its colonies (Mauritius), and then transgressed people's right to self-determination by deporting the "islanders" despite their desire to remain in their home; and on the other hand, that the existence of a base of such importance in the region turns all their countries into marked targets. But more than this will doubtlessly be needed to deter the Pentagon from going ahead with its war preparations.

The Islanders' Long Wait

"We, inhabitants of the Chagos islands, Diego Garcia, Peros, Banhaus and Salomon, have been wrenched from these islands because the government of Mauritius sold them to the British government to build a base there. Our ancestors lived in slavery on these islands, but we are their heirs. Despite our poverty, we did not die of hunger. Here on Mauritius, when our animals were unloaded, an enclosure had been prepared to receive them, with grass and water. For us half-slaves, nothing was done. We are disoriented, not knowing what is going to become of us...." Thus do the "islanders"

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deported from Diego Garcia to Mauritius express themselves, in a manifesto signed by 422 families (out of 434). For 15 years, they have been living a nightmare: installed miserably in the lower-class outskirts of Port-Louis, they have adapted poorly to urban life and have remained rootless. The first financial compensation was not paid to them until 1978, whereas the Mauritian government collected the profit from the sale of the archipelago right after the transaction, in 1965.

Meanwhile, the opposition parties on Mauritius, and certain newspapers in Great Britain and the United States, had called attention to their fate, causing trouble for the administrations of the three countries implicated in this deportation affair. The Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) opened fire in 1975, accusing Prime Minister Ramgoolam of having "robbed" these unfortunates. Then the lawyer Gaetan Duval, activator of the Mauritian Creole right, appealed to the High Court of Justice of London, maintaining that Great Britain had to continue to concern itself with the fate of these "islanders": he said they were still British subjects, since their island had been ceded to London before Mauritius obtained independence.

The "islanders," bounced from one interlocutor to another and multiplying their complaints, committees and hunger strikes, are the bad conscience of the Labour government of Mauritius, whose responsibilities are obvious. But the Americans are also trying to exculpate themselves: according to the Pentagon, the place was empty when the American Navy personnel began installing themselves in the Chagos.

The British, for their part, want people to forget this inglorious episode from the end of their colonial history: a London lawyer, Mr Sheridan, arrived in Port-Louis last November bearing new proposals from Mrs Thatcher's government for "final and definitive" compensation. He proposed to distribute among the deportee families a further sum of 1.25 million pounds (10 million francs) on condition that the "islanders" sign a release whereby they "abandon all titles and rights to return to Diego Garcia."

Finally, in consequence of the intervention of members of the Mauritian left, most of the deportee families refused to sign this document, despite the attraction of the sums offered. The Mauritian government itself officially kept its distance from the British attorney's proposal, to which, however, it had lent assistance at the beginning. And again, the "islanders" are asking for justice: quite simply, return to their home.

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INTER-~~AFRICAN~~ AFFAIRS

FRENCH INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS TO AFRICA REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 851

[Text] On the occasion of the technical week which was held in Abidjan on 14-18 April 1980, by the National Institute of Higher Technical Education of the Ivory Coast and the French Federation of Mechanical and Metal-Processing Industries (FIMTM), an event of which we will speak at greater length under the heading "Ivory Coast," the FIMTM distributed export statistics for the French mechanical industries to West and Central Africa. We have reproduced these statistics below. The figures given are expressed in thousands of French francs.

Key:

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| 1. Consumer goods | 17. Nigeria |
| 2. Equipment goods | 18. Senegal |
| 3. Semiprocessed goods | 19. Sierra Leone |
| 4. ECOWAS | 20. Togo |
| 5. Ivory Coast | 21. UDEAC [Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa |
| 6. Cape Verde | 22. Cameroon |
| 7. Benin | 23. Congo |
| 8. Gambia | 24. Central African Republic |
| 9. Ghana | 25. Gabon |
| 10. Guinea | 26. Chad |
| 11. Guinea-Bissau | 27. Other countries |
| 12. Upper Volta | 28. Burundi |
| 13. Liberia | 29. Rwanda |
| 14. Mali | 30. Sao Tome and Principe |
| 15. Mauritania | 31. Zaire |
| 16. Niger | 32. Grand total |

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	(1) BIENS DE CONSOMMATION			(2) BIENS D'ÉQUIPEMENT			(3) BIENS INTERMÉDIAIRES			TOTAL		
	1977	1978	1979	1977	1978	1979	1977	1978	1979	1977	1978	1979
(4) I - CEDEAO												
(5) Côte d'Ivoire	73 474	93 243	87 834	678 958	876 479	727 953	37 707	36 235	40 595	790 139	1 005 957	856 382
(6) Cap-Vert	6	38	92	374	2 176	3 597	4	3	2	383	2 217	3 691
(7) Bénin	7 713	8 207	9 217	40 932	76 075	118 550	2 318	2 070	4 575	50 963	86 352	132 342
(8) Gambie	2 008	505	403	1 778	2 472	3 765	29	25	17	1 972	2 691	3 920
(9) Ghana	7 360	11 839	5 887	19 046	17 085	5 771	527	216	215	21 581	17 806	6 389
(10) Guinée	63	806	714	58 511	97 644	114 002	4 710	6 398	3 110	70 581	115 681	122 999
(11) Guinée-Bissau	6 438	7 986	7 971	7 776	6 267	6 361	-	751	19	7 839	7 824	7 094
(12) Haute-Volta	1 945	2 668	3 030	91 658	67 393	57 915	4 888	4 866	6 716	102 964	80 245	72 602
(13) Libéria	9 545	7 287	8 400	5 521	10 878	8 019	161	394	352	7 627	13 940	11 401
(14) Mali	9 151	3 542	4 862	79 757	88 274	105 825	4 285	3 013	4 131	83 597	98 574	118 266
(15) Mauritanie	9 047	11 439	18 559	124 018	37 644	68 258	3 602	1 284	2 684	137 071	42 550	75 804
(16) Niger	24 973	38 244	30 589	134 757	177 743	281 819	5 070	6 875	11 947	148 874	195 857	312 325
(17) Nigeria	27 407	28 671	32 766	439 383	589 948	328 821	19 008	21 632	12 386	483 364	650 824	371 806
(18) Sénégal	11 360	12 285	14 368	203 612	218 101	268 725	20 352	18 240	25 456	251 271	265 012	326 947
(19) Sierra-Leone	208	545	500	1 457	3 224	3 686	151	879	342	1 816	4 448	4 528
(20) Togo	11 360	12 285	14 368	68 650	253 284	152 140	3 554	5 905	4 436	83 564	271 474	170 944
(21) II - UDEAC	180 862	228 239	225 380	1 856 088	2 524 687	2 255 207	108 646	108 486	116 953	2 253 556	2 861 452	2 597 530
(22) Cameroun	40 781	44 678	57 601	264 481	469 047	556 981	21 509	21 007	29 829	326 781	534 732	644 411
(23) Congo	20 668	38 204	24 391	130 143	151 591	189 099	12 801	12 895	7 428	163 612	202 690	221 458
(24) Centralrique	5 195	4 224	3 664	18 318	26 195	21 535	2 700	1 843	2 104	26 212	36 062	27 307
(25) Gabon	53 211	31 321	44 346	540 786	341 389	312 828	28 560	20 392	15 310	622 557	393 102	372 484
(26) Tchad	3 570	3 716	1 150	43 914	103 983	27 788	928	1 392	745	48 412	109 091	28 683
(27) III - AUTRES PAYS	123 439	122 143	131 692	997 642	1 052 205	1 108 231	66 458	57 329	55 416	1 187 574	1 271 677	1 295 339
(28) Burundi	285	781	950	3 485	3 639	6 410	53	15	186	3 823	4 415	7 546
(29) Rwanda	434	657	1 329	2 792	9 146	11 967	51	293	744	3 282	10 098	14 040
(30) Sao Tomé et Pr.	22	22	22	712	207	1 284	63	-	-	797	-	-
(31) Zaïre	5 727	8 403	8 317	111 409	149 761	104 033	4 893	5 290	9 182	122 029	163 454	121 532
(32) TOTAL GÉNÉRAL	320 789	360 263	367 678	3 072 133	3 779 647	3 487 132	178 204	171 393	182 521	3 571 101	4 311 086	4 035 987

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ECONOMIC SITUATION OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 852

[Text] The Bank of Central African States (BEAC) recently published an analysis of the economic situation of states in its region of issue at the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980. We have extracted a number of reports.

In the agricultural sector, the results of the 1978-1979 season for the principal export products were on the whole favorable, particularly in Cameroon.

As regards forest exploitation, Cameroon experienced an advance in its exploitations of undressed timber and lumber while in the other states production and exports were short of their 1978 levels.

With respect to oil and ore production, 1979 registered an increase over the preceding year, except for Gabon oil, whose production prospects for 1980, however, are encouraging. In Cameroon, foreign trade caused a net improvement in the balance of trade, as the result of inclusion of oil in foreign trade statistics.

--Cacao--Purchases of cacao recorded in Cameroon as of 21 January 1980 by the National Basic Necessities Marketing Office for the 1979-1980 season totaled 95,428 tons compared to 82,351 tons on the same date during the preceding season; i.e., an increase of 13,077 tons: on the same date in 1980, exports totaled 32,534 tons and deliveries to local factories totaled 15,887 tons. In Gabon, the results of the present season compared to those of the previous season reflected a decrease of over half (337 tons compared to 834 tons), although the purchasing price went up. In the Congo, the 1978-1979 season supplied 2,772 tons compared to 2,275 tons in 1977-1978.

--Coffee--The provisional results of the coffee harvest in Cameroon for the 1978-1979 season totaled 106,784 tons, while forecasts for the 1979-1980 season call for 107,000 tons, including 30,000 tons of Arabica. The Central African Republic has experienced a continuing decline in coffee production since the 1975-1976 season, and the commercialized harvest in 1978-1979 totaled only 8,635 tons (-2,239 tons compared to the preceding year). In the Congo, production also declined, with 4,839 tons in 1978-1979 (-275 tons compared to 1977-1978).

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--Cotton--Good results were obtained in the 1978-1979 cotton season, with increased tonnages totaling 46 percent in Cameroon and 14 percent in Central Africa. In Cameroon, the 1979-1980 season, as of the end of December 1979, produced 20,967 tons of cotton-seed (28 percent over the preceding season).

--Livestock raising--As of the end of November 1979, Cameroonian livestock totaled 3.2 million head of cattle (divided among the provinces of Nord, Nord-Ouest and Est), 2.4 million goats, 2.2 million sheep and 1.5 million swine. The two modern slaughterhouses in Douala and Yaounde showed increased activity at year's end of 50 and 75 percent, respectively.

--Tobacco--For the last 3 years, tobacco production in the Central African Republic has experienced a net decline and the number of tobacco growers continues to decrease. The 1979 harvest was 1,799 tons (including 764 tons of wrapping tobacco and 1,035 tons of cut tobacco), compared to 1,972 tons in 1978 and 2,753 tons in 1977; the market value of the harvest was 216 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs in 1979 (426 million in 1977).

--Timber--In Gabon, the drop in the production of okoume which was 3.8 percent in 1978 compared to 1977 was aggravated in 1979. Production in the first 10 months of 1979 totaled 972,835 cubic meters (-6 percent); the decrease is attributable in part to the defective road system and the insufficiency of investments. The placing in operation of the Libreville-Ndjole trunk of the Transgabonese Railroad should permit more rational exploitation of the second forest region. As with okoume, the production of ozigo in Gabon is also on the decline with 46,489 cubic meters for the first 10 months of 1979 (-16 percent).

In the Congo, purchases by the Congolese Timber Office during the first three quarters of 1979 totaled 29,519 cubic meters (-42 percent).

In Cameroon, exports of undressed timber recorded at the Port of Douala as of the end of October 1979 totaled 302,115 tons, an increase of 8 percent; shipments of 78,885 tons of lumber represented an increase of 23 percent.

In the Central African Republic, exports of timber in the first 6 months of 1979 totaled 18,848 tons, a decrease of 36 percent compared to the corresponding 6-month period in 1978.

--Oil--Oil production in Cameroon in 1979 totaled 1.7 million tons; two new fields were placed under exploitation. In Gabon, production totaled 8.1 million tons for the first 10 months of 1979 (compared to 10.6 and 11.3 million tons for the 12 months of 1978 and 1977, respectively). In the Congo, crude oil production in 1979 totaled 2.5 million tons (5 percent). Two new deposits, which seem promising, will be placed under exploitation in 1980 and 1981.

--Mineral products--During the first 11 months of 1979, manganese ore production in Gabon totaled 2 million tons, an appreciable increase over 1978. The exploitation of Gabonese uranium ores supplied 1,028 tons of concentrates during the same period, also an increase. In Cameroon, aluminum production

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amounted to 21,367 tons during the first 6 months of 1979. In the Central African Republic diamond production in 1979 totaled 314,100 carats (10.80 percent over 1978) and exports totaled 300,200 carats.

--Industry--In Camroon, the industrial sector, for the period April 1978-March 1979, experienced a pretax turnover of 164.4 billion CFA francs (6 percent).

--Prices--The rise in consumer prices for the African family was generalized in 1979; the increase ranged from 7.80 percent in Yaounde, to 11.1 percent in Libreville to 15.7 percent in Bangui.

--Trade--Camroon's trade during the first 9 months of 1979 reflected an appreciable improvement in the balance of trade, whose deficit was reduced from -39.6 billion CFA francs in September 1978 to -27.3 billion in September 1979, a reduction of 31.08 percent of the deficit. This favorable development resulted from an increase in exports (24 percent in worth) and from the more moderate increase in imports (12.37 percent); exports of crude oil, totaling 38.7 billion CFA francs, were in third place during the period under consideration, after coffee and cacao, on the list of Cameroonian exports.

In the Central African Republic, the positive balance of trade for the first 6 months of 1979 totaled 1.5 billion CFA francs, a slight decline (-0.1 percent) compared to the corresponding 6-month period in 1978.

--Finance--As of 31 December 1979, paper money and coins in circulation in the five states of the region of issue of the Bank of Central African States totaled 166.3 billion CFA francs (15.91 percent above the end of 1978).

The volume of deposits in the banking system (excluding Chad), as of the end of November 1979, totaled 180.7 billion CFA francs, an increase of 12.1 percent above the end of November 1978. The increase in deposits was particularly marked in Cameroon (22.7 percent), and Gabon experienced a decrease of 3.6 percent in bank deposits.

Also as of the end of November 1979, the total credits in the economy (excluding Chad) amounted to 498.3 billion CFA francs compared to 446.7 billion 1 year earlier (11.6 percent); expansion has slowed down (19.6 percent for the corresponding period in 1978). The economy of Cameroon experienced a more rapid flow of export products, reflecting an increase of credits to industry; and of import and consumer products. In the Central African Republic, a drop in activity affected the development of credits in the economy. In the Congo, the advance was moderate. The decrease experienced in Gabon basically affected the building-public works sector, as well as import trade.

The overall deficit posture of the national treasuries (except for Chad) as regards monetary institutions has been reduced from 62.1 billion CFA francs as of 30 November 1979 to 29.4 billion as of 30 November 1979. The Cameroonian treasury has a net credit posture of 43 billion CFA francs, while the Central African Republic and the Congo have debit positions.

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Finally, the net foreign holdings (excluding Chad), as of the end of November 1979 reflected an overall debit balance of 3.2 billion CFA francs, a significant improvement over November 1978 when this debit totaled 31.3 billion CFA francs. Although Cameroon and the Central African Republic have a credit posture, the Congo and Gabon are debtors vis-a-vis foreign countries.

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ECONOMIC STATUS OF WEST AFRICAN MONETARY UNION REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 pp 849-851

[Text] CBWAS, the Central Bank of West African States recently published its annual report on the development of the economy in the West African Monetary Union countries (WAMU).

The overall improvement of climatic conditions which prevailed in the member countries of WAMU during the year 1978-1979 led to an increase in agricultural production in comparison to the preceding year. Variations in the trading of main products are listed in the following chart:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION OF WAMU
(in 1000 t per growing season)

	1975-56	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79
PEANUTS:				
In the shell				
Senegal	1177.8	956.9	441.7	781.7
Shelled				
Benin	7.0	7.9	2.7	1.3
Upper Volta	13.1	4.7	1.8	1.0
Niger	3.8	7.2	14.0	10.0
COCOA:				
Benin	1.1	2.3	1.4	3.7
Ivory Coast	234.6	235.8	306.0	318.0
Togo	17.8	14.1	16.7	12.4
COFFEE:				
Benin	0.1	0.8	0.4	0.1
Ivory Coast	308.1	291.3	195.7	275.0
Togo (trading)	6.2	9.4	4.1	4.9
COTTON SEED:				
Benin	20.1	17.5	13.9	18.7
Ivory Coast	65.1	75.4	103.0	114.9
Upper Volta	50.7	55.3	38.0	60.0
Niger	11.1	7.2	3.8	4.4
Senegal	39.0	45.4	37.1	33.8
Togo	9.7	7.0	4.5	12.6
KARITE:				
Benin	12.4	2.9	8.3	0.2
Upper Volta	48.5	32.4	56.7	7.3
Togo	5.4	1.2	6.7	1.2

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In 1979 raw material prices followed an upward curve through the year, the increase being however more marked in industrial products, minerals and metals than in agricultural products. The index in CFA francs of the main basic products exported by WAMU countries after slight gains between January and April, going from 286 to 290 points, registered a strong rise in May and June reaching 301 and 324 points respectively, but, later, this index shrank and was at 295 points in November 1979.

The recovery of peanut production in Senegal after the drought which seriously crippled the yields from the 1977-78 harvest led to a marked increase of quantities traded. For the whole of WAMU the sale of peanuts in the shell amounted to 797,700 t against 469,000 t in 1977-78, that is an increase of 70 percent.

A slight rise in cocoa production from the Ivory Coast showed, despite the decrease in production in Togo, an improvement of roughly 3 percent in the total trading amounting to 334,093 t. Benefiting from the recovery after a year of drought the coffee trade increased by 39.5 percent with a harvest of 279,488 t.

With the exception of Senegal the trade of cotton seed registered a rise with a total of 224,366 t (+ 22 percent).

The expansion of foodstuff crops has been helped by good climatic conditions and by promotion movements started in certain states.

Industrial activity developed satisfactorily in certain countries notably in Senegal and Benin where the activity of oil mills benefited from adequate supplies after the 1977-78 drought. On the Ivory Coast the industrial sector continued its development. In Upper Volta and Togo progress was not so marked and the activity of the secondary sector was maintained at a level comparable to that of the preceding year. Niger industries, consisting mostly of oil mills, had a difficult year because of insufficient supplies of peanuts and, for the spinning mills, of cotton.

Concerning the mining sector phosphate extraction has shown a slight rise despite the slump which continued on the international market. Uranium production registered a significant improvement with the start of production of a second exploitation plant of the Niger deposits.

African consumer prices followed a moderate course during the first trimester of 1979. Starting with the second trimester, a rising tendency developed under the double influence of the increased cost of imported goods and the increased internal demand for specific local products.

Benin--Thanks to better climatic conditions Benin, in 1979, had a more satisfactory economic development than in 1978.

Measures to start up agricultural production again obtained convincing results, notably for cotton and palm oil. In food crops, maize production reached 250,000 t, a level leaving a surplus for the needs of the future maize factory at Bohicon.

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During the year 1978-1979 the specialized State company put on the market 18,740 t of cotton seed (+34.9 percent) which furnished 7,154 t of fiber after ginning.

Trade of palm products consisted of 58,443 t of palmetto (+ 10.5 percent) and 20,574 t of areca (+ 98.1 percent). Consequently oil production, the main industry of Benin, returned to a normal activity level and Sonicog (National Co of fat industry) was able to export part of its production.

On the industrial plane the completion of the Save dam constitutes the preliminary phase of the Benin-Niger sugar project. The Onigbolo cement plant and the mixte oil mill of Bohicon had a start in the domain of civil engineering. Petroleum research was strengthened by the participation of Norwegian firms and the building of a refinery of crude (cost estimate: 45 CFA billions) is provided in the 3 year-plan.

The building and public works sector showed a sustained activity in 1979.

For the year 1979 the growth rate of the GDP is estimated at roughly 14 percent in current terms.

On May first 1979 the guaranteed minimal interprofessional wage per hour was raised and prices for African consumer goods remained stable for the greater part of the year.

Ivory Coast--The strong economic expansion recorded for 1976 and 1977 was followed in 1978 by an adjustment period. The significant improvement in climatic conditions in 1979 bringing about a renewal of agricultural production for home consumption as well as for exportation led to a definite amelioration of economic activity.

Thus, estimated at current rates, the GDP should indicate for 1979 a growth of the order of 12 percent, near the growth rate noted for 1978.

With 275,019 t marketed (+ 79277 t) during the year 1978-1979 the coffee producers earned a total revenue of 68.8 CFA billions against 48.9 billions the preceding year. The low world price of coffee during the first 4 months of the year was followed by a sharp rise, then a stabilization in the last months, which permitted the stabilization bank to increase significantly its export earnings in comparison to the preceding year.

Ending on 30 September 1979, the cocoa marketing campaign reached 318,049 t and the Ivory Coast kept its position of first world producer which it snatched from Ghana the preceding season. Producers shared a revenue of 79.5 CFA billions (+ 3 billions).

Benefitting from climatic conditions and from the increase in cultivated acreage, the traded harvest of cotton seed consisted of 114,886 t (+ 11.5 percent).

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Forecasts of banana and pineapple production for 1979 were only partially fulfilled; pineapple growing is hurt by a problem of profitability, the costs of production increasing steadily while selling prices remain stable.

The harvest of palmetto and the deliveries of areca will yield an oil and cattle-cake production at least equal to that of 1978. The "palm plan" whose implementation is entrusted to Sodepalm aims on completion at a production of 250,000 t of palm oil, that is more than twice the present production which already puts the Ivory Coast in the rank of first African exporter and Third World exporter of palm oil.

In the north of the territory the implementation of the sugar program goes on. For the year 1978-79 cane sugar production reached 53,000 t against 32,210 t for the preceding year.

Still insufficient to cover the country's needs, rice production for the year 1978-79 totals 507,000 t (+ 32,000 t).

With financing by the World Bank, the reforestation plan on 20,000 ha of forest reservations is pursued. In the context of limitation measures promulgated to reduce the production of 5.1 m³ millions in 1976 to 4.2 m³ millions in 1980, exports of rough timber and sawn logs will indicate in 1979 a shortfall from 1978.

Petroleum production, up to now on the research level only, is going to take on concrete form, starting in the second semester of 1980 by the exploitation of recognized petroleum deposits. During the year the capital of SIR (Ivory Coast Co of refinery) was raised from 2 to 7 CFA billions in order to finance the doubling to 4 millions of t of crude of the refining capacity of the Vridi installations.

After a sustained progress until April with a rise of 10 percent, the index of industrial production (apart from energy and public works) initiated a slight reversal. The textile industry, first in the secondary sector on the basis of its turnover, suffered from the international crisis in textiles and the expansion programs foreseen for 1979 were postponed because of uncertainty in the disposal of production. Among the actual achievements of the year the agro-industrial complex of Sinématiali came into production; its annual output of 3000 t of tomato concentrate should cover a third of the internal consumption.

During the year the tourist infrastructure was augmented by the opening of 2 new hotels in Abidjan (6.5 CFA billions).

As in 1978 salaries were raised starting January first 1979. After a moderate progress in the beginning of the year, African consumer prices registered a sudden increase during the course of the second trimester, then they stabilized: a rise mostly due to the increase in price of foodstuffs.

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Upper Volta--In spite of poor climatic conditions agricultural production came out with better results than in 1978 and the shortfall in cereals was diminished from 176,000 t to 100,000 t. The trading of cotton reached the record level of 59,957 t of cotton seed (+ 57.6 percent), which furnished after ginning 20,099 t of fiber.

In consequence of its cyclic character the harvest of karite almonds consisted of only 7263 t (against 56,653 t the preceding year). Peanut production showed a new low with only 1000 t of nuts traded while sesame trading greatly picked up (4251 t). Fruit and vegetable exports showed a decrease of 15 percent (1157 t).

During the year 1978-1979 Sosuhv (Sugar Co of Upper Volta) produced 31,018 t of sugar (- 3.3 percent).

In cattle raising the year 1979 was marked by an improvement in trading markets: outlets for export were diversified (Benin, Ghana Liberia, Ivory Coast and others).

Initially foreseen for the beginning of 1978, the exploitation of the marble and limestone deposit in Tiara started only at the end of the third trimester of 1979 with the objective of obtaining 10,000 t of marble and 30,000 m² of mosaic a year.

The Tambao railway project was relaunched in 1979. The project, revised on a more economical base foresees a reduction of the exploiting capacity for the manganese ore deposit and the construction of a cement plant of 150,000 t capacity annually, whose cost is estimated at (9 CFA billions).

The installment of a touristic infrastructure continued in 1979 with the construction of a hotel of international standing at Ouagadougou (3.5 CFA billions).

In January 1979 a graded salary raise was decided upon. Thanks to a more abundant and better distributed food production the price index for African consumption registered a drop for most of 1979.

Niger--Niger economic expansion was strengthened in 1979 thanks to the exploitation of uranium ore deposits.

On the agricultural plane the situation has been satisfactory on the whole; the country managed to insure from now on its selfsufficiency in the field of cereals (in 1974 its needs were covered only to 72 percent). The cotton harvest of 1978-1979 allowed to trade 4,412 t of cotton seed (+ 16.1 percent) giving after ginning 1486 t of fiber. The situation is less satisfactory for peanuts whose production cannot reach the level of 100,000 t regularly attained before the period of drought.

A program of restocking of cattle, undertaken after the drought of the years 1972 to 1974, was completed to 68 percent by the end of 1978.

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In the course of the first nine months of 1979, uranium production rose to 2,533 t versus a forecast of 3,550 t for the whole year and compared to a production of 2,109 t for 1978; the increase is the result of the start of activity of Cominak (Mining Co of Akouta). With the creation of the Mining Co of Tessa N' taghalue (with a capital of a billion CFA) Niger finds itself endowed with a third exploitation plant of its deposits of uranium ore.

The fall in peanut production seriously compromised the activity of oil presses; the supplies of nuts represent only a tenth of the milling capacity.

In 1979 the cement plant of Malbaza was able to maintain its production level of cement and clinker.

A new hotel (4.7 CFA billions) will soon double the reception capacity of the capital Niamey.

Starting May 1st 1979, the guaranteed minimal interprofessional wage rate was raised. The general price index for African consumption progressed slowly and regularly during the year 1979, the increase being slightly less than in 1978, that is 8.8 percent against 10.1 percent.

Senegal--Senegalese economy in 1979 initiated a phase of moderate recovery following the overall favorable development of agricultural production by reason of better climatic conditions. If production shows a decrease for cotton, it indicates a rise of 77 percent for peanuts and 61.9 percent for millet.

Economic activity on the whole was better served, notably the oil mills which constitute the dominant sector of industry.

Estimated at present rates, GDP registered an increase of roughly 18 percent compared to 1978.

Senegal regained in 1978 its normal level of peanut yield with a total of 917,300 t (trading and seed refunds). Deliveries to oil mills consisted of 668,075 t that is 72.8 percent of the controlled volume against 270,627 t the preceding year (57 percent). The increase in production permitted to share a total revenue of 32.4 CFA billions among the farmers (against 17.7 billions in 1977-78).

With 33,802 t cotton trade showed a shortfall of 8.8 percent; revenues distributed to producers amounted to 1.8 CFA billion.

Industrial fishing suffered in 1979 from the scarcity of tuna and catches were inferior to those of 1978; the part of supplies to the French represents 89.6 percent of the yields.

Industrial production on the whole showed a clear improvement over 1978 mostly because of the renewal of activity by the oil mills.

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In spite of the slump in the international market of phosphate the extraction of Senegalese deposits furnished in 1979 1.65 million of t of calcium phosphate, a quantity roughly 5 percent greater than in 1978.

Salt production from the salt flats of Sine-Saloum in 1979 was maintained at 140,000 t.

In the Senegalese economy tourism is growing each year. Total receipts provided by tourism exceeded 13 billions in 1978, thus situated in third rank in foreign currency inflow, after peanut products and phosphates.

On the wage plane an interim subsidy of 10 percent was authorized in the private sector in March 1979. The consumption price index which had remained relatively stable through the first 5 months of the year showed then continuous tension and the rise comes to 9.5 percent for the year against 2.9 percent for 1978.

Togo--A new rain pattern did not permit in 1979 the necessary recovery of agricultural production in Togo. Trading of cocoa during the year 1978-79 consisted of 12,366 t (- 25.9 percent). The policy of replacement in coffee plantations is beginning to give results: trade totalled 4,330 t (+ 5 percent).

Recovering strongly, cotton seed production showed 12,610 t against 4,517 t the previous year. The spreading of the Bon variety expressed itself by a 93.3 percent proportion thereof in the total quantity traded in the year 1978-79. Greatly increased palmetto yields consisted of 5,499 t.

The main mining activity of Togo, the exploitation of phosphate deposits feeds the processing installations of the Office togolais des phosphates (Togo phosphate Co) which totalled 2.7 millions of t (+ 3.1 percent) for the first 11 months of the year 1979 (the demand of EEC countries remains constant). Cimao, the multinational company of West African Cements, could not start working in 1979 as initially scheduled.

After a strong expansion registered in 1978, the building-public works sector registered a certain slowing down.

In industry, alone, brewing enjoyed a significant growth of its production in 1979. In view of a decline in local sales, ITT (Togo textile industry) had to proceed to a diversification of its production, oriented more and more towards the making of knitted articles destined for European exports; the proportion of exports went from 36.8 percent to 53.2 percent during the first semesters of 1978 and 1979.

Togo Petroleum Co which had suspended its activity in September 1978 following managerial difficulties proceeded to the restarting of its refinery in April 1979.

Over the first 8 months of the year 1979 the general price index for the African family consumption increased by 8.1 percent against 1.8 percent for the corresponding period of 1978.

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BRIEFS

SOUTH AFRICAN TRAINING FOR MOZAMBIQUE DISSIDENTS--Mozambican dissidents are planning to establish training camps in South Africa. Following Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe, whence their "Voice of Free Africa" was broadcast, they took refuge in Malawi. However, President Hastings Banda would like them to leave the country. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1009 7 May 80 p 5A]

SOUTH AFRICAN CORN TO MOZAMBIQUE--To combat shortages, the World Health Organization (WHO) has approved a new program of food assistance to Mozambique in the amount of 32 million escudos. Most of the assistance--which will consist of 733 tons of powdered milk and 235 tons of butter--is destined for schools and community institutions. An agreement was also signed in late February for the delivery by South Africa of corn to Mozambique. According to South African governmental sources, this contract is of the same type as the one concluded last year by South Africa for the delivery of 200,000 tons of corn to Zambia. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 583] 10992

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ANGOLA

RUSSIAN PROGRESS ON AFRICAN CONTINENT DISCUSSED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French No 1610, 4 Apr 80 pp 69, 102-103

[Interview with Jonas Savimbi by Jean Larteguy: "The West Is Handing Africa to the Russians"]

[Excerpt] Larteguy: Have the Chinese helped you?

Savimbi: Yes. They sent 350 tons of weapons to Dar-es-Salaam for us. But the Russians exerted pressure on Nyerere, the president of Tanzania, and the weapons never reached us. They are still there.

Larteguy: What is your situation today?

Savimbi: We hold all of the South of Angola and a part of the North, except for Luanda, the provinces of Molonge and Lunda and the Benguela railroad. Out of a total population of 6.5 million inhabitants, we control in fact 3 million. We have 15,000 regular armed men and 10,000 militiamen, who still have only rudimentary weaponry. All that we lack is modern weapons.

We are encircling the cities and the posts held by the Cubans and the militiamen of the MPLA. They have to be supplied by plane. But we have nothing with which to shoot the planes down. Our defeat has been in the West. And this battle we are waging is yours. The Russians have made of Angola their base for expansion, where they are maintaining major reserves in men and materiel. They did not do this until they understood that the West would let them do it. When Mengistu was last in Ethiopia, they rallied 5,000 Cubans from Angola and sent them there as reinforcements to save him.

Through Angola the Russians are on the Atlantic, and through Ethiopia and Aden they have access to the Red Sea. Little by little, the neighboring countries are coming under their influence. Egypt has escaped but the Sudan is seriously threatened. Tanzania has fallen prey to the talons of the Soviets. Zambia is in a delicate situation. It purchases substantial military materiel from Russia, but has no personnel to make use of it.

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There is not a single MIG pilot. Then came the advisers, and then the Cubans. And it will be as it was in Angola.

Portuguese decolonization effected under communist party control enabled the Russians to establish themselves in all the former colonies: in Angola, but in Mozambique as well. In 1977 and 1978 the Soviets tried twice to take over Zaire. They only failed thanks to the intervention of the French and the Moroccans. Then they began again, despite all the agreements signed between Luanda and Kinshasa. It will take them 10 years but they will succeed. Kenya is still free of their influence, but they have just gained a foothold in the Seychelles just opposite. If Rhodesia slides into the Soviet camp--and I greatly fear it--it is the end for Namibia.

The Russians are coming dangerously close to their final goal which is to take over South Africa, to control its riches, and the Cape, which would allow them to block passage between the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

Larteguy: Can Zaire resist Soviet pressure for very long?

Savimbi: I know President Mobutu. He is a man for whom I have enormous esteem. But he is alone, desperately alone. The situation in Zaire is tragic. It is for this reason that the West should not hesitate to support Mobutu, whatever criticisms of him there may be. It is not a question of the man himself. The fate of Africa is at stake. If Zaire slips into the Soviet orbit, the Sudan is lost and Egypt cannot resist for long alone.

The Fate of Europe Is at Stake in Angola

Morocco is threatened and so is Tunisia. The Polisario Front admirably fits into the plans to destroy stability in the northern part of the African continent. Qadhafi is the financial backer, the KGB is the foreman and Algeria, naively, hopes to snatch the chestnuts from the fire. But when one dines with the devil, one should have a long-handled fork--and Algeria's is not long enough. The Russians want to cut Africa in two, to isolate the moderate countries--Cameroon, Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast and Senegal--and smother them. In the midst of the Maghrib which it will have won, a Sahel where it is already well established, and a tightly controlled Black Africa which will have to toe the mark.

Larteguy: But what then do they want?

Savimbi: To control all the wealth of Africa in raw materials, to control all the maritime routes to bring Europe to its knees. It is Europe which is their target. And what is Europe doing to defend itself? It is waiting. It is in Angola that the fate of Africa, and thus that of Europe, hangs in the balance. The Russians are ready for any crime in order to win out.

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Larteguy: As in Afghanistan, where one by one they had their faithful followers assassinated when they refused to become their slaves: Daoud, Taraki, Amin--and tomorrow Karmal.

Savimbi: Like Agostinho Neto in Angola.

Larteguy: Neto died of an illness.

Savimbi: No, he was eliminated by the Russians like Amin and the others, when he sought to make contact with the West and with me.

When they learned that Neto had approached me through the intermediary of President Senghor and that he wanted to arrange peace, they became very concerned. Already the good neighbor agreement they had signed with Zaire was a source of displeasure to them. The Russians needed war to achieve their plans for conquest and they wanted fires to break out everywhere.

Without war, they no longer had any pretext for remaining in Angola. War requires weapons. These they could furnish, as needed, with mercenaries to use them. But peace represents a threat to them, for it shows them up for what they are--blunderers and blockheads. They cannot supply bread, much less make wheat grow. Their experts in farm matters have proved incompetent everywhere. And in economics, it was the same thing.

Neto wanted peace, and in making plans for it, he condemned himself to death.

Larteguy: It was said he had cancer of the liver. They had only to wait awhile.

Savimbi: The Russians were in a hurry. They did not want Neto to pick up speed. Let us say that at best they hastened his death. Neto had not been well for a long time. He knew about his condition. He was a physician too. He was not dying, far from it. He had just made a long tour through the country, or at least to the places which he could visit, those which he controlled or which the Cubans controlled for him. He had held meetings and gatherings in each town. I listened to him on the radio and I can assure you that his voice was that of a determined man, in full possession of his faculties, not at all weakened. He was attempting to strengthen his popularity, to show that he stood clearly apart from his burdensome protectors. And all of this before making the plunge, for he was preparing to go over to the Western camp. On his return, he was much fatigued. What happened then we know from his personal physician, Eduardo Dos Santos, an Angolan who had been forced to take a Portuguese name and who is now a refugee in Uganda.

After examining him, Dos Santos advised his patient, who was himself a physician, to consult a French, or at least not a Russian, specialist. He suggested that he ask a Parisian endocrinologist whose student he was when

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he did his specialized study to come to Luanda. And he asked the Central Committee about it and obtained its agreement. There was never a question even for a moment of hospitalizing Neto, except to make some tests on him. Which indeed shows that his condition was not serious and that there was no urgency.

Peace Is a Threat to the Russians

The Russians learned that a Frenchman was to be called in. They opposed this, and loaded Neto onto a plane for Moscow. With Dr Eduardo Dos Santos, since they could not very well insist that he abandon his patient. Neto's wife always went everywhere with him. Had his condition been thought serious, she would not have left his side. But in this case she stayed in Luanda. It was to be but a quick round trip. At the Moscow airport, the physician and his patient were escorted to separate cars and taken to different hotels.

Santos was left for 2 days without news. At the end of the second day they sent for him to take him to a clinic, to the bedside of Neto, who was dead, as a result, he was told, of an operation to which he had agreed. He was asked to countersign the death certificate.

Neto had always told him that he would never undergo surgery. Dos Santos found it intolerable that he, the attending physician, an Angolan like his patient, who was after all a chief of state, had not been consulted before such serious surgery. He refused to sign the document.

Later, to put an end to the constant rumors circulating in Luanda about the assassination of Neto, and after Santos had told the whole story, the Russians proposed that an investigation commission be sent to Moscow. Which was never done.

An unknown, one Eduardo Dos Santos, who bore the same name as the physician but was in no way related, was put at the head of the country. Raised in Russia and married to a Russian, he had never fought for the liberation of his country. Unknown to anyone, he only existed for the Russians, and thus offered every guarantee.

Larteguy: Do you really believe that Neto was assassinated?

Savimbi: Absolutely. Neto could no longer tolerate the Russians. He was looking for a way to get rid of them. The Russians knew that. They did not want to commit the same error as they did with Sadat. They killed him --and without taking too many precautions either.

This is the new Soviet tactic, perfected after they were forced out of Europe, and utilized in Afghanistan. All of the leaders who show the slightest inclination toward independence are assassinated. For example in Kabul, Daoud, Taraki, and Amin. They want nothing now but "gauleiters."

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The Russians manipulated the liberation movements. They wanted to appear in the eyes of the Africans as the defenders of freedom from the various imperial and colonial empires. When these liberation movements had won power thanks to Soviet help, they could only, they believed, prove their gratefulness by entering into their zone of influence. But these movements, once they gained power, soon realized that the Russians, if they might have been useful for achieving liberation, by providing weapons and advisers, no longer served any purpose and were a burden now that peace was restored. And they turned to the West, which alone could provide the economic aid they needed. After some failures, the Russians reached the point, as in Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and tomorrow Zambia, of a brutal and military colonialism. Each victim was made to sign an aid and solidarity pact covering 25 years, justifying intervention by the Red Army and the execution of traitors . . . anyone who revolts, from the president to a simple soldier, anyone who refuses to exchange one kind of colonialism for another, vastly more ferocious, brutal and racist. And merciless.

In Angola, the people want only to rebel against the Russians and their mercenaries, even the partisans of the communist MPLA. If a communist leader begins to feel solidarity with his men, to lend his ear to their complaints, to attempt to achieve a little independence, he becomes suspect. He is liquidated and replaced by another.

Larteguy: What is it that you need?

Savimbi: Individual miniaturized missiles. The situation in Angola could be changed radically in our favor if we had only a few Milan or Sam 7-type missiles, ground-air missiles which are not very costly. And anti-tank missiles which cost still less.

We have held the brush, more than half of the country, for 4 years, against Cubans, Russians, East Germans, against the troops of the MPLA. We have laughable weaponry, while they have automatic machine guns, tanks, planes, helicopters and artillery.

They occupy all of the large cities, all the key points, but they are trapped there. The Cubans do not risk sorties unless they have at least company, if not battalion, strength. With the support of artillery and an armored escort. And they never venture very far.

They are surviving only thanks to the planes which bring their supplies of foodstuffs and ammunition from Luanda. We are not very far from the airports. It would suffice for us to be able to shoot down three or four planes and the pilots would be unwilling to make any further landings. They organize convoys with armored escorts. If we destroyed their tanks, who could they find to act as escorts?

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Larteguy: Who could supply you with the missiles?

Savimbi: The French or the Americans. If we have these missiles, the battle is won. We could isolate the Cubans in all their garrisons, and also the troops of the MPLA. A soldier who is left 2 weeks without food supplies, as is well known, either cannot fight or flees. I have sought missiles everywhere, and found none.

The Cubans Are Bad Soldiers

Larteguy: The French are ignoring you for reasons of domestic policy. In the case of the Americans it is because they have no interest in Africa. But the Americans, following the seizure of the hostages in Tehran and the invasion of Afghanistan, seem to be waking up.

Savimbi: If the Americans act on two fronts, in Afghanistan and Angola, the Russians are likely to find themselves in a terrible bind. But the Americans seem to want to concern themselves only with the Middle East. We hold two-thirds of Angola, from Namibia to the gates of Luanda, the capital, and we are adjacent to Zambia. We can go to the aid of Zaire and Zambia, which are particularly threatened. Zambia is not moving toward the Russians because it is afraid, it does not feel protected. The Russians are in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania.

Larteguy: Don't the South Africans have miniaturized missiles?

Savimbi: No, because of the arms embargo. They were not prepared for a war of tanks and planes. They did not expect the massive arrival of the Russians.

Larteguy: What are the Cubans worth?

Savimbi: In the field, nothing. In 1975 and 1976, they won out over us because they had tanks and we had no anti-tank weapons, because our men lacked military training. Today the Cubans do not dare venture into the brush. And also they do not leave their tanks. They are afraid of us. In 4 years, they have not succeeded in reopening the Benguela railroad. And yet they have gone flat out in the effort.

We have questioned Cuban prisoners. Some of them believed that they were coming to fight the South Africans, and others had no idea at all where they were going. They are very divided among themselves. There are black Cubans and white ones. Fidel Castro first sent whites. But when independence was proclaimed, all those whites made a poor impression. They seemed to want to take the place of the Portuguese and the people gave them a very cool welcome. Then Castro sent blacks. But when these blacks realized that they were there to kill other blacks, they became supporters of our cause. They passed information to us. On such-and-such a day, a certain column will pass here or there. Watch out, they told us.

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When a zone is firmly held by the UNITA, the Soviet commanders prefer to send white Cubans who lead the MPLA militia. They have no confidence in the black Cubans any more, since they systematically try to contact us.

The Cubans are not good soldiers. If they attack, one has only to hold out against them 30 minutes, and they relent and withdraw. The Portuguese, who were not exactly supermen, were much better fighters, and at least they knew the terrain.

If we were but given a few missiles, the situation would be entirely different in 6 months. Unfortunately for us, East Germans are arriving. At the beginning, there were only 600. Now there are 2,500 and they have taken over all the police, security and intelligence services. Before we knew everything that happened within the party, the general staff, the government. Since they have come our sources have almost dried up.

The Soviets are making a tremendous effort to establish and organize an Angolan communist party. The MPLA has changed its name and become the Labor Party. When they realized that the Angolans did not understand this kind of organization very well, the Soviets took 6,000 children, by force, between the ages of 7 and 15, and sent them to Cuba for a period of 7 years. They are taking a very long view. These 6,000 children cut off from their roots will be the party cadres of tomorrow. They think that the Angolans who are already adults are not re-educable, and that they make very bad communists.

Portuguese Colonialism Was Much More Tolerant

Larteguy: Why don't the Angolans take to communism?

Savimbi: The Angolans are all believers. They are Catholic, Protestant or animist. The Cubans tease them, saying that their MIG aircraft explored the sky and found no God there. And the Angolans began to ask themselves: "Why are the communists attacking our God? Because they want to impose theirs upon us." And they ceased to trust them. They are attached to their family structures. An Angolan is very attached to his plot of earth, his village, his tribe, his forest. He is a great homebody. Threaten an Angolan 100 miles from his home, even if his family and livestock are with him, and he is lost. He thinks that he is no longer in Angola, because he has left the land where his ancestors are buried. He is displaced.

Now the communists sent the people from the North to the South and vice versa, systematically, in order to break up their lifestyle and destroy these solidly anchored traditions. As soon as they can, those who have been sent away from their homes escape in order to go back again, to return to the tombs of their ancestors. In Africa, one is nothing without ancestors. Some 85 percent of the Angolans live in the rural sector and adhere to these structures.

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The residents of Luanda know nothing of life in the bush. They were born in the city, spent their youth there, later went to Portugal and speak no African dialect.

This is the case with Neto, who was born in 1922, knew no language but Portuguese and could only communicate in that tongue. Now 80 percent of the Angolans neither know how to read or write nor do they speak Portuguese. When the MPLA leaders want to speak to the people, they have to do it through an interpreter. And they needed yet another interpreter to understand what the Russians were saying to them.

The Portuguese left, and immediately the Russians and the Cubans came. For the Angolans, colonialism continued with different colonizers. They had never had independence. They discovered that the Portuguese colonialism against which they had fought for 15 years was vastly more tolerant and more tolerable than that of the Russians, the Germans and the Cubans.

Larteguy: What do you plan to do?

Savimbi: We must act very quickly before the communist regime, which is not tolerated and is unstable, has time to strengthen itself. And the Russians are determined to use every means up to genocide. Look at Afghanistan. Africa began to slide toward the Soviet sphere after Portuguese decolonization. Angola was occupied by the Cubans. It was a test. The West did not react, which encouraged the Soviets to go farther. They gained a hold over the former Portuguese colonies thanks to the help of the Portuguese Communist Party. In order to chase these new colonialists out of Africa, it is necessary first of all to liberate Angola.

I have spoken with a number of African chiefs of state. They have told me: "If you succeed in correcting the situation in Angola, if you can obtain aid from the West, we will be reassured. We will no longer fear the Russians. We will know that it is possible to oust them."

Just Give Us a Few Missiles

We Angolans have provided proof that, very poorly equipped, we were able for 4 years to hold at bay 35,000 Cubans, 2,500 East Germans, 2,000 Soviets and 80,000 Angolan communist militiamen and soldiers. There were 25,000 of us, including only 15,000 regular soldiers. Without even a single DCA [anti-aircraft defense] weapon. Because the people were entirely behind us, and continued their battle for the liberation of Angola. Give us just a few Milan or Crotal missiles, whatever. And we will chase the Russians and the Cubans out of Angola. Zaire will be safe, and the Sudan, and all of Africa will be liberated and will turn toward the West again. Help us to push the Soviets and the Cubans out of Africa, to defend ourselves against this new colonization, more merciless than what it replaced because it hides behind the mask of an ideology urging the pseudo-liberation of the black continent. Or else we are lost, and you Europeans will be lost with us.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

NICARAGUAN TROOPS PRESENT--London, May 6 REUTER--Guerrillas fighting the Cuban-backed government in Angola said today that 500 Nicaraguan troops had joined the Cuban forces there. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) said in a communique issued from its London office that the Nicaraguans had gone to Angola after Luanda asked the Cuban Government for an increase in military aid. The communique said the Angolan Government made the request because of what it called the failure of a Cuban offensive begun in March against FNLA controlled areas. [Text] [PA061939 London REUTER in English 1922 GMT 6 May 80]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

OUBANGUI FRONT'S GOUMA CITED ON CONTINUATION OF LIBERATION STRUGGLE

LD080945 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr-11 May 80 pp 38-40

[Interview "In February" with Abel Gouma, chairman of the Oubangui Popular Front by Ginette Cot Cotonou: "It Is not Over"]

[Text] [Question] Mr chairman, how did your movement react to the French intervention of 20 September 1979?

[Answer] In my capacity as a WHO official I am dutybound to display "restraint and tact." But since this international organization states explicitly in its personnel regulations that international officials "do not have to renounce their national feelings or political or religious convictions," I am happy to meet with AFRIQUE-ASIE.

The extent of the struggle that the Central African people were waging--a struggle unleashed by the Central African young people--was such that we in the Oubangui Popular Front [FPO] knew that Bokassa's despotic and bloody regime was going to fall. But, as I have already had occasion to state, the FPO's reaction to the French intervention was one of surprise.

[Question] Yet certain people in Africa considered that this operation had a positive aspect insofar as it resulted in the overthrow of a dictator whom people did not know how to remove....

[Answer] To consider that the French coup d'etat in Central Africa had a positive aspect would tend to lend credibility to the assumption that France was a stranger to the political situation which prevailed under Bokassa. What was this situation, in fact? The government of Bokassa the tyrant deprived citizens of the most elementary freedoms--trade union, professional, political and so forth. He built more and more prisons, set up more and more administrative internment centers, ordered more and more house arrests and maintained a plethora of scandalously highly paid vile police informers when our people were greatly in need of schools and hospitals.

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His political regime was characterized by abuses of power, favouritism, corruption of traditions, a spirit of division among the communities and arrogance. And it was France that provided him with the means--political, economic and military--necessary for the application of such a policy directed against the Central African people and their needs but oriented toward the satisfaction of foreign--in this case, French--interests. We Central Africans say rather that the French military intervention and occupation in Central Africa--our country--smacks of an interventionist strategy for the defense solely of French interests, which Bokassa was no longer suited to administer.

- [Question] Finally, it appears that the sole arguments of the "public safety" government and its supporters to claim legitimacy for President Dacko are his election as head of state 25 January 1964 and Bokassa's armed coup on New Year's Eve 1966. What is your view on this?
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- [Answer] The complaint which we lodged with the OAU in October 1979 and which we also brought to the attention of the United Nations and the nonaligned movement--a complaint of "an attack on the national independence and sovereignty of the Central African people"--destroys Dacko's purported legitimacy on the basis of the 25 January 1964 election. It states: "...considering... that the French Government, like many other governments, recognized the Bokassa government which ousted Dacko 1 January 1966; that this recognition signified in legal terms that the Bokassa government was the sole legitimate representative of the Central African state on both the national and international planes; that Dacko's mandate had thus become void; that, furthermore, it is undeniable that Dacko was Bokassa's political adviser, a function he performed until the latter's downfall; that Dacko's acceptance of this function was tantamount to the relinquishing of his mandate by himself...."
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[Question] How do you explain the fact that Bokassa was able to last so long?

[Answer] In my 4 December 1979 appeal to the Central African people I tried to answer this very question. The prime reason was the lack of democratic freedoms which the ousted leaders imposed on our country for over 20 years in order to exploit its riches all the better for their own profit and, above all, for the profit of the foreign masters who installed and supported them and of whom they were never more than puppets.

I said that instead of creating the conditions which would have enabled our people to defend themselves against fascism of any kind, these leaders plunged back into obscurantism this people which had barely emerged from the brutalizing period of colonialism [indigenat] and forced labor and forced the young into perverted practices such as alcoholism. To further accentuate this obscurantism while they were "lining their pockets" with "foreign aid," they banned newspapers and the provision of any information to the public.

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The results of this criminal policy against the spirit are clear: 20 years after independence a foreign country decided to overthrow the bloody head of state that it had hitherto supported. With the aid of its own troops this state organized and staged a coup d'etat and got its paratroopers to install the man whom it itself had chosen. These paratroopers' first action was to grab our national archives in order to take them elsewhere, while occupying the country militarily and, when necessary, lending local troops a strong hand, as on 29 October 1979, in crushing any manifestation of discontent by the humiliated population.

The second reason which explains what happened is that the elite circles which should have dissociated themselves in one way or another from a regime which they knew to be doomed in the long term had sunk so far as to employ terms like "papa" and other nicknames, the better to show their submission and servility with respect to leaders whose ludicrousness they were aware of.

If all this was able to happen it is because these elite circles allowed the installation of "presidents for life" who did not hesitate to go to the absurd lengths of getting themselves crowned "emperor." You can serve your country at the technical level but you are not bound to serve it at the political level if you consider that its policy does not correspond to the national interest. And this can be manifested in various ways. As this kind of stand, which requires a certain sense of responsibility, has not been taken, there is nothing surprising in the fact that our country's policy is decided in Paris.

[Question] In your view, were there forces in existence on the eve of 20 September capable of seeing through to the end the fight started by the young in January 1979?

[Answer] It is certainly too early to identify our organization's role and place in the development of the process which was intended to lead--and did lead--to the downfall of the dictator Bokassa. This means that, as far as the FPO is concerned, the fight for our people's effective liberation from the yoke of the despot and our country's liberation from foreign domination must continue after Bokassa's ouster, as before.

The FPO is a national liberation movement rooted among the Central African people's masses. But from the moment that, following the tragic events of January and April 1979, other organizations which also calimed to advocate liberation (of Oubangi or Central Africa) were formed, it can be said that the political chessboard or chessboard of resistance to Bokassa's dictatorship broadened. This is why, before 20 September, people referred to Sylvestre Bangui's Oubangi Liberation Front [FLO] and Ange Pattase's Central African Popular Liberation Movement [MLPC]. As soon as they emerged the FPO proposed that we form a united front to overthrow the tyrant, irrespective of possible political differences between us. If the existence--albeit short lived--of the opportunist FLO was unable to mislead us, the MLPC through its methods--notably certain clamorous declarations and initiatives --did not help us in our political quest for the formation of a joint front of struggle.

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[Question] What is your view of the accusations leveled against Libya at the time of the September intervention and subsequently against the Soviet Embassy --accusations which, moreover resulted in the recent severance of relations with these two states?

[Answer] The FPO's objective is real independence for Central Africa. This is of great political importance for us: our people's inalienable duty to determine its policy in a sovereign manner and thus without outside interference. As soon as there is interference in our affairs--as in the case with France--there is of necessity an attempt on its part to tell governments in place, such as the Dacko clique, which partners to choose on the basis of what it regards as its private preserve. What disdain for human rights!

[Question] What is your assessment of the new government's activity, particularly in terms of the recovery plan elaborated by Paris?

[Answer] Given that the installation of the Dacko government was a pure operation of colonial reconquest to which certain elite political and intellectual circles unfortunately lent themselves, it is clear that the new president--who, moreover, is no more than a returned stranger--and his government are engaged in activity which is disastrous for Central Africa's social and political future. We are heading increasingly toward a social catastrophe which Bokass's "imperial" adviser is preparing for us along with his internal and external accomplices.

Do you know that in the weeks following his installation Dacko stated that there was no longer a state in Central Africa? In his view, Central Africa must become a French department of which he would be the governor appointed and protected by the mother country, with all the ensuing social, economic and political consequences. Dacko and his government are playing with the future of an entire people. This is a criminal act.

As for the economic "recovery plan" for Central Africa, it has to be said that colonialist France is consistent. It intervenes in a foreign country at the request of no legal authority and installs a government there irrespective of the sovereignty of the people in question. It prepares plans dreamed up on the banks of the Seine by people whose concerns have nothing in common with those of the colonialized people.

This plan--the "Central-Africanized Barre Plan," to use the terminology of one of our communiqués--places special stress on the development of trading crops (cotton, coffee, tobacco, rubber and so forth) to the detriment of food crops.

If France wants to contribute to a real policy of economic recovery for the country, let it demonstrate its desire to really cooperate with our people by first ceasing to interfere in our internal affairs via measures impeding the Central African people in their quest for a political solution to their problems, which is a precondition for any plan whatever.

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[Question] What is your view of the trials and sentences currently going on in Bangui?

[Answer] It must be said immediately that the real trial has not yet taken place. At this time nobody can fool the Central African people on this point. The Dacko government is arresting and trying stooges who, it must be said, do bear responsibility in the intrigues and tragedy experienced by the country. But the real culprits--Bokassa, his personal adviser Dacko and their principal accomplices--are still spared. Popular pressure on this puppet government to see that justice is done is growing. This is why, despite the pitiful diversionary and intimidatory maneuvers, the Central African people and elite circles, or at least some of them, are rejecting--and will increasingly do so--servile collaboration with a regime which has been imposed from outside and is unjust to boot.

[Question] What prospects can be envisioned?

[Answer] The sacrifices of our Central African children, like those of the children of Soweto, continue the example of our glorious warrior ancestors who, throughout the continent, knew how to fight to defend every inch of Africa against the foreign invaders and their external [as published] collaborators. In Central Africa, the war of Komgo-wara against the French colonialist and exploiter in 1928-1930 is the most recent example of the Central African people's fighting spirit. That was a war against domination and injustice and for freedom.

You will see that I can't stop mentioning the word freedom. The liberation struggle of dominated and colonized peoples stems from this concept, whose significance in the Central African sociopolitical context is different from that in West Europe. It is more realistic in our country. We Central Africans want to live free lives. We want to be liberated from colonialism--that French colonialism which, according to recent but incomplete information, has over 4,500 soldiers occupying our country to insure the implementation of a policy decided in Paris. Maybe the French people will understand what freedom and independence mean if they remember their fight against German Nazism and the policy of the Vichy government, the collaborator of the German occupier.

All the vital forces of the Central African nation--be it on the political, trade union, professional or youth planes--are waging a decisive struggle for a free and independent Central Africa.

[Question] Could you identify the FPO's place in this fight?

[Answer] The FPO is a national liberation movement born in 1972. We recently demanded its recognition as such by the OAU liberation committee. It is a movement of patriots who, outraged by the abuses of power, extravagances and stupidities of Bokassa and his regime, decided to engage in

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action to save the country. Comrade Yangongo Barthelemy, a courageous man who always directed the internal and clandestine branch of the movement at the cost of a thousand and one difficulties, effectively summarized our objective: "General insurrection with a view to overthrowing the tyrannical regime at large in the country."

Open to the most courageous, active and honest Central African citizens, embodying the common and permanent interests of the oppressed masses, united by iron discipline and a selfless devotion to just causes and based on a progressive ideology, the FPO proposes to establish a more just, free and independent Central African society. At the moment its program consists in this all-embracing response. The FPO is a Central African national opposition movement. Therefore it is political. If it has to unite with other national forces in specific conditions to continue the struggle it is now waging against the Central African people's exploiters, it will do so.

The Dacko government has been installed exclusively to serve the interests of colonialist and imperialist France. We are struggling to preserve our people's interests in freely agreed and mutually advantageous cooperation both with France and with any other country which respects our political independence and national sovereignty. We in the FPO think that these are bases on which agreement can be reached.

[Question] To what extent can Africa in particular and the Third World in general help the Central African people in their struggle?

[Answer] The charge which we mentioned above and which our movement submitted last October to the OAU, the United Nations and the nonaligned movement aims both in form and content to ask that no independent African or Third World country worthy of this name recognize the Dacko government imposed by France on the Central African people, who have been fighting dictatorship since official independence in 1960. Bokassa's dictatorship is continuing with Dacko. We think that until the French troops withdraw from Central Africa and free elections are held in which our people can choose their leaders, nonrecognition of the Dacko government constitutes aid [to us].

This illegal government constantly pushes its despotism further by arresting and deporting dozens of opposition politicians. We must make every effort to secure the immediate release of all Central Africans arrested for political activities, including Patasse. In this connection we also need help from Africa, the Third World, international organizations and all democrats.

[Question] On 21 January 1980 the Dacko government published a communique entirely devoted to you and which seems to make threats toward you. How do you react to that?

[Answer] Thank you for mentioning this aspect of my life which is connected with the political struggle I have been waging for 20 years for my people's

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real independence and dignity. This communique which you mention and whose political significance was quickly noted by our movement was slanderous and threatening. For it to stoop to such steps, the Dacko government must have no political arguments to put to the FPO and the Central African people other than the lies and threats with which they aim to attack me personally.

This is an old story. For Dacko and his French protectors I am a threat and I have been ever since the death in 1959 of Barthelemy Boganda whom I was about to succeed had it not been for France's opposition to me. As he did before, Dacko would like to stop me expressing my feelings on the misfortunes of my country which has now been recolonialized.

My strength and that of the FPO lies in the support we have from our people in the battle we are fighting for real independence and national dignity against our oppressors and the exploiters of our natural wealth and, today, against the usurpers of the fruits of struggle for which the young martyrs of January and April 1979 were massacred.

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CHAD

HABRE REPORTED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR NEW VIOLENCE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Apr 80 p 30

[Article by Mohamed Maiga: "Hue and Cry Over a Strong Man"]

[Text] The military truce observed between the different Chadian factions since the agreement concluded on 11 August 1979 in Lagos (Nigeria) has reportedly been short-lived. Since the break of dawn on 21 March 1980, Ndjamen, the capital, has lived by the sound of gunfire and shooting by automatic weapons. No longer does anyone doubt the possibility of another civil war. This time, the battle for control of Ndjamen has begun.

Trivial Incident

One man seems to be at the root of the renewed tension: the famous Hisssein Habre, minister of defense of the National Union Government of Chad (GUNT, headed by Goukouni Oueddei), accused of having awakened the old Chadian demons so recently laid to rest. All the armed forces are now converging on the capital: reinforcements coming from the east to back the men of the minister of defense; from the north, elements of the People's Armed Forces (FAP) to support the head of the government; from the southeast, soldiers from the Common Action Front (FAC) of Acyl Ahmat (minister of foreign affairs) and Mahamat Abba Said (minister of interior). Finally, since 23 March, after being hastily equipped, the troops of Col Abdelkader Wadal Kamougue, from the south, reached the outlying districts of the capital. Just as in February 1979, all the protagonists are hemming in Ndjamen, but this time, a common enemy has been identified: Hisssein Habre.

A trivial incident of the kind one sees every day ignited the powder: On the night of 20-21 March 1980, a FAC military patrol encountered elements from Hisssein Habre's Northern Armed Forces. At about 0500 hours, the first volleys were fired and on the morning of 21 March, the FAP of the head of the government and those of the hot-headed minister of defense took up positions at various locations in the capital. The FAP-FAN battle was beginning, with Hisssein Habre's men going so far as to attack the residence of Goukouni Oueddei. The two truces obtained on 22 and 23 March thanks to the mediation of Marcel Beaux, French ambassador, and Colonel Ladry, commanding officer of the 1,200 soldiers of the French Expeditionary Corps, were

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never observed and the "line of demarcation" between the two armies, which grosso modo confined the FAP to the European sector of Ndjamen and the FAN to the African district, was rapidly crossed.

Devoured by Ambition

Actually, the slight hope of stabilizing the country by the Lagos accords began to dwindle away as early as the end of January. According to his colleagues in the National Union Government, Hissain Habre is allegedly the person mainly responsible for this new outbreak of violence. Devoured by ambition, the fiery minister of defense is evidently not contented with any but the top post, which is why he reportedly rejected and then sabotaged the complete demilitarization of the capital decided upon by the Lagos accords and delayed the arrival of the inter-African neutral force.

To date, only 550 Congolese have entered Ndjamen, where they scarcely distinguished themselves in recent fighting. The Guinean and Benin elements are still absent. Continuing his march to power, Hissain Habre went on the attack on 16 March, when his men, scorning the 11 August agreements, drove Mahamat Abba Said's men out of Bokoro, in central Chad.

Shortly thereafter, the FAN occupied Mongo, in the same region, constantly improving their positions and undertaking a "cleanup operation with a radius of 100 kilometers." Will the minister of defense resist the combined attacks of his colleagues and adversaries in the National Union Government? For the time being, his men are the best equipped and he enjoys the "neutrality" of the French Army. But by stirring up troubled waters, Hissain Habre, accused by his enemy brothers of being France's man, has created unanimity against himself.

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CHAD

MILITARY ACTION ALONE WILL RESOLVE SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Mar 80 p 726

[Text] On 22 March, violent fighting broke out in Ndjamena between the FAP (People's Armed Forces) of President Goukouni Oueddei and the FAN (Northern Armed Forces) of Minister of Defense Hissein Habre.

Tension had been discernible for some time and Robert Galley, French minister of cooperation, had himself described the situation in Chad as "extraordinarily dangerous" only a short time ago (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 15 February 1980, p 389).


After 13 months of calm, which were not without incident, however, and during which considerable changes took place in the Chadian political balance, the capital is once again the scene of street fighting causing many victims and substantial material damage. There are brief ceasefires.

The situation is more serious than ever. The fighting in February 1979 (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 16 February 1979, p 433) destroyed part of the city, which was far from being completely restored when the new confrontations took place. The native population of southern Chad fled the capital and has not yet returned, and it was that native population which constituted the core of the national administration. The great majority of the Europeans, mainly French, who agreed to remain after the events of last year (they once numbered several thousand) were evacuated from 22 to 24 March. Outside of the French troops (1,100, compared with 2,600 in 1979), the foreign colony in Ndjamena includes only the Congolese troops of the African neutral force (550) and some 100 French civilians.

What one is forced to label as a failure of the political solution worked out with difficulty in 1979 and which was short-lived, the signing of the Lagos accords, no longer provides any hope of a settlement of the Chadian problem that will not leave deep marks on a country torn apart even before it was united in its national consciousness and on the African continent, where Chad's neighbors cannot fail to be concerned about such a chaotic situation.

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- FAP** : Forces armées populaires (Goukouni Weddeye). 4)
- FAO** : Forces armées occidentales. 5)
- FAN** : Forces armées du Nord (Hissène Habré). 6)
- FACP** : Front d'action commune provisoire (Front populaire de libération, Première armée Volcan, Conseil démocratique révolutionnaire, Frolinat fondamental). (Ahmat Acyl). 7)
- UND** : Union nationale démocratique. 8)
- FAT** : Forces armées tchadiennes (Kamougué). 9)

Key:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political-military divisions in Chad 2. Libyan pressure 3. Aozou Strip occupied by Libya 4. People's Armed Forces (Goukouni Oueddei) 5. Western Armed Forces 6. Northern Armed Forces (Hissein Habre) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Provisional Common Action Front (People's Liberation Army, First Volcan Army, Revolutionary Democratic Council Fundamental FROLINAT) (Ahmat Acyl) 8. Democratic National Union 9. Chadian Armed Forces (Kamougue) |
|---|--|

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In 1979, it appeared that only the Chadian north and south, two major blocs opposed to one another because of language, culture, religion and ways of life, were in conflict. But now one can see that the absence of unity in an immense and overpopulated north, where great ethnic diversity reigns under the superficial cover of Islam, is a permanent source of confrontation.

Who is actually fighting in Ndjamená at the end of March 1980? The men of a president originally from Tibesti, the Teda Tou (Teda or Toubous from Caillou), against those of a minister of defense who is also Teda, but from the Plains -- that is, one of the Annakaza whom secular antagonisms pit against the Teda Tou within the group called the "Gorane" by the "Arabs" who live further south and whose demographic weakness does not exempt them from constant conflicts born of the proximity of microsocieties.

The 11 factions into which power in Ndjamená had been divided until recent times cover only partially the ethnic puzzle made up by the north and the south in Chad. Through a simple interplay of rather long alliances and truces interspersed with fighting, Chad could fuel a state of permanent insecurity against which a modern army could do little, unless at the express request of a strong, united government. This is the sad experience which France is now undergoing at its own expense.

By virtue of an unexpected turn of events explainable by the feeling of betrayal which southern Chadians had following the neutrality of the French troops in the February 1979 fighting in Ndjamená, it is now Colonel Kamougue, head of the FAT (Chadian Armed Forces) that were driven out of the capital by Hissein Habre's men, then the allies of those of Goukouni Oueddei, who is now coming to the aid of the chief of state. According to certain sources, he enjoys Libyan military aid. It is also said that the Chadian minister of foreign affairs, Ahmat Acyl, one of the most notable leaders of the FAC (Common Action Front), which groups various "Arab" and pro-Libyan movements, has taken the side of President Oueddei against the minister of defense, labeled as a ringleader, an ambitious individual and a troublemaker.

The fighting in Ndjamená was preceded by other battles in the eastern region of the country, the most recent of which took place only a few days ago. Fighting over control of the road linking Ndjamená with Abeche, the capital of Ouaddai, were the FAN, pitted against certain elements of the FAC. The position taken by Ahmat Acyl is therefore along the line of the conflict that for several months has set him against Hissein Habre within the provisional government which has never truly been able to apply the Lagos accords.

What will happen now? An FAP-FAT alliance is undoubtedly only temporary, so great are the antagonisms between the two parties, one of which represents the populous, agricultural south, while the other is from the arid, empty Tibesti. But it is military action, not negotiation, that will probably untie the Chadian knot. It is impossible to discern the features of a Chad at peace. If Hissein Habre is the ambitious man denounced by his enemies,

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and if he is beaten, the situation will be clarified. But if he wins over forces superior in number and demonstrates administrative qualities sometimes attributed to him, then he will once again have to rule a country which, given its diversity and size, it is impossible to govern unless one has at least the tacit consent of all its inhabitants.

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GHANA

BRIEFS

ADB CACAO LOAN--The African Development Bank (ADB) in December granted a loan of 8 million UC [units of account] (approximately 2,161 billion CFA francs) to Ghana for reactivation and modernization of the cacao processing plants at Tema and Takoradi. The ADB loan will finance 78 percent of the estimated cost (11.6 million UC) of the 10-year project. The bank's commitments to Ghana (for eight projects) now total 38.54 million UC. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 511] 10992

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

USSR RAILROAD CARS, LOCOMOTIVES--As a follow-up to the mission (headed by the Guinean minister of foreign affairs) that went to the Soviet Union in response to the "very disturbing frequency" of railway accidents on the Debele-Conakry line (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 15 February, p 378), the USSR has made a gift to Guinea of 42 cars and five locomotives, according to an announcement by the Democratic Party of Guinea. The announcement does not, however, provide any details concerning this result of the "urgent mission" sent by Guinea to confer with the Soviet Government, nor does it say whether the Soviet gift represents compensation for the many losses sustained by Guinea. We may recall that within a period of 5 years there have been four accidents on the line linking the Kindia bauxite mines--which are operated by a mixed Guinean-Soviet company--to the port of Conakry, resulting in four deaths and the loss of 147 cars, five locomotives, 54,307 tons of bauxite and 500 meters of railroad track.

[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80
p 503] 10992

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LIBERIA

'REUTER' EXAMINES STATE OF NATION'S ECONOMY

AB070957 London REUTER in English 0856 GMT 7 May 80

[Article by Stephen Powell]

[Text] Monrovia, 7 May (REUTER)--The military coup in Liberia has shattered the old political order and businessmen here fear it could also mean the collapse of the economy.

The new government has given assurances that there will be no major changes in the country's free enterprise system. It is trying to soothe jittery businessmen who have seen their premises ransacked for the second time in a year.

Riots in April last year, sparked by a proposed increase in the price of rice, caused about 70 deaths and \$60 million in damage. Most of the looting was done by soldiers.

After the April 12 coup which ousted the government of President William Tolbert there was a fresh outbreak of looting. Once again it was principally soldiers who helped themselves to goods and robbed Africans and Europeans alike at gunpoint.

Damage this time was estimated at only several million dollars, but businesses, many of them Lebanese, now are exceedingly apprehensive.

Business sources said about 80 per cent of importers have simply stopped placing orders and that the country faces shortages of a wide range of goods.

For the moment the shops are full. The shelves are crowded with an impressive array of everything from American dill pickles to scotch whisky. But it seems unlikely to last long. The sources said Monrovia's biggest, Lebanese-owned, supermarket has now stopped importing.

Apart from the problem of looting, there is concern over whether businesses will be able to send money out of the country as easily as they did under the Tolbert regime.

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The military government of 28-year-old Master Sergeant Samuel Doe has imposed temporary banking regulations, restricting the flow of money out of Liberia.

Liberia, which has the U.S. dollar as its currency, has traditionally been used by importers as a springboard for re-exporting goods to other states in West Africa. The previous government had no system of export licences and profits could leave the country freely.

One business source said bluntly: "Liberia has only one attraction. It is in the dollar area and you could transfer profits abroad."

Now, under the new government, money cannot be freely transferred abroad and export licences are needed.

Import-export businesses stress that Liberia on its own is a market of negligible importance. Most of the country's [figure indistinct] million inhabitants live outside the cash economy.

Businessmen concede that, in the long term, tightening up on the outflow of money could benefit the country. Liberia has long been a classic example of a country whose natural resources are being extracted by international big business while too few profits are ploughed back into the economy.

But they fear the economy could collapse before the transition to a more equitable system is made.

The new minister for planning and economic affairs, Dr Togbanah Tipoteh, has stressed that the coup-makers have inherited a deeply troubled economy.

Dr Tipoteh told a recent press conference that on April 11, the eve of its fall, the government of President William Tolbert had only five million dollars in hand. He added that the Tolbert government had overspent 25 million dollars with the Bank of Liberia and owed foreigners nearly 700 million dollars.

The economy has been rocked by the rise in oil prices and the world steep slump, which has hurt its iron ore industry. In recent years iron has accounted for about 70 per cent of exports.

The new government is likely to face daunting problems, because while revenue is likely to drop expenditure is almost certain to rise.

Business sources said revenue would drop because many companies would not show a profit because of the looting and would not pay taxes. In addition, the severe drop in the level of imports will mean considerably less government income from import duties.

Expenditure is set to rise because the military government has doubled the pay of privates to 250 dollars-a-month and also announced increases for the lowest-paid government employees.

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Sergeant Doe has also pledged that the government would reduce the price of rice, which would mean a government subsidy.

Business sources said there were two possible ways for the government to make ends meet. One was to move off the dollar and print its own currency. The other was to rely on foreign aid.

To move off the dollar would almost certainly spell disaster, according to economic experts, so that the only real option is foreign aid. Dr Tipoteh has already said Liberia will retain the dollar.

The need to rely on foreign aid appeared to be the main factor behind the government's decision to halt the executions of Tolbert officials, after the brutal death of 13 officials on April 22 caused an international outcry.

The foreign country with the biggest stake in Liberia is the United States, which traditionally had close relations with this West African state. U.S. assets in Liberia are estimated at about 500 million dollars, mainly in iron and rubber.

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MALI

DOMESTIC SITUATION MAY ATTRACT UNDUE FOREIGN ATTENTION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1009, 7 May 80 pp 36-37

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Who Wishes To Overthrow Moussa Traore?"]

[Text] "As a last resort, Mali should be sold to the U.S. The money would be distributed to all the Malians, who would then be told: Now disperse! Go somewhere else! There is nothing more to do here!" The fact that the Malians themselves--well-known nationalists, and even chauvinists--can make such jokes about the very existence of their country shows well that national disarray has reached intolerable proportions. While waiting for the Americans, however, two other powers are seriously suspected of wishing to get involved in Mali. There is France, which is more easily forgiven for suspending its budgetary assistance than for having announced its decision through the press in JEUNE AFRIQUE ("Let them keep their nice little billion," President Traore said). And then there is the Soviet Union which has manifested its sympathy for the government of Bamako following the March protests by suddenly increasing the number of its military advisors.

Convulsive Jolts

Mali, vexed and suspecting France of wishing to strangle the country, has reportedly turned to those who were always willing to provide it with arms if not money and economic assistance: the Soviets. However, there is a difference: a new route must be found for the shipping of these arms and the corresponding ammunition. Indeed, neighboring Guinea, which had provided the transit route for military equipment to Mali, has been blocking such shipments for the past 3 months, as reprisals against Gen Moussa Traore who, 2 years ago, reproached President Sekou Toure with wishing to intervene in Malian affairs, telling him: "Mali does not have to learn from anyone." Thus, for the first time, the Malian crisis is taking international dimensions. It is not excluded that Mali, caught between its bankruptcy and its domestic tensions, could undergo anew a series of jolts, the results of which could no longer be ignored abroad.

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The last ultimatum from the students, who were asking to be received by the president, expired on 25 April. This time, however, there were certain nuances in their demands which, unlike the preceding ones, no longer included "the immediate and unconditional departure of Moussa Traore." But the students are still demanding the definitive recognition of their movement, the UNEEM (National Union of Malian Students and Pupils), which was ordered on 20 January 1980 to integrate itself in the UNJM (National Union of Malian Youth) controlled by the UDPM (Democratic Union of the Malian People), the sole party. However, the most significant demand presented by Malian youth concerns specifically the UDPM. They are not demanding its dissolution, but its purging, as well as the departure of those accused of being behind the repression of the March demonstrations: Sory Coulibaly, political secretary; Commandant Mamadou Keita, accounts secretary; Amadou Thiam, administrative secretary; Dr Mahmadou Dembele, secretary for foreign relations.

It was expected that Gen Moussa Traore would transform the meeting of the party's national council on 8 and 9 April into an extraordinary congress which would deal with a purge of the apparatus. However, self-criticism was not the order of the day, and the party's congress will reportedly not be convoked until June.

Why is it, then, that all of a sudden, the students, who were "determined to go to the bitter end," are no longer demanding Moussa Traore's resignation? There are two reasons, the first exclusively Malian, the second tied to the likely covetous desires from abroad.

Saving Face

Moussa Traore has recently received tacit approval from his countrymen after he declared: "I do not stay in power because of an inordinate love for power. However, I do not want my great-grandchildren to feel ashamed of an ancestor who abdicated his responsibilities." These words carry a great deal of weight in Mali where, because of a sense of "dignity" that reaches the absurd, no one--it is said--has ever admitted defeat in 2,000 years of history! An irreducible enemy of Moussa Traore's even admitted to us: "Moussa spoke like a true Malian. At least, he has this much left." Let it be noted that another Malian, President Modibo Keita (overthrown in November 1968), said one day: "No one will ever say of me: here is the former president of Mali."

However, this discrete psychological compliment does not entirely explain why the students have (temporarily) lowered the level of their imprecations against Moussa Traore. Indeed, the most far-fetched rumors are circulating in Bamako on the preparation for coups and counter-coups. In certain usually well-informed circles, they are even saying that the president is ready to leave under a face-saving device. According to those rumors, he reportedly arranged with his chief of general staff, Commandant Sory Ibrahima Sylla, to proceed to a so-called coup d'etat during a presidential

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trip abroad. Thus, Moussa Traore could leave while, at the same time, keeping his honor intact because he would be "overthrown" and would not actually "resign." However, this is hard to swallow: neither the chief of state nor his chief of general staff would become party to such an absurd scheme, and moreover, the Malian regime would not simulate a coup d'etat for the simple reason that it actually fears one.

Upon his return from Kuwait and France, Gen Moussa Traore convoked a meeting of all superior officers at the Kati military school on 18 April. In essence, he said to them: "We must close ranks, the army must form a solid bloc. If trouble continues, a foreign power might be tempted to foment a coup d'etat." Without actually have been named, France appears to be the "No 1 suspect." This meeting at Kati unanimously decided to face all attempts and confront all temptations.

Col Filifing Sissoko, Moussa Traore's chief of cabinet for 12 years, was put in charge of preparations to face all eventualities. He can count on the support of young officers trained in the Soviet Union. A member of the World Peace Council, he has been able to attract the good will of certain intellectuals of the left, but has never been willing to abandon a behind-the-scenes role for the limelight. This retiring attitude stems from shyness as well as from a taste for secrecy of a man who is a well-known, brilliant strategist and is not adverse to battle. This has won him the admiration of non-commissioned officers and soldiers in a professional army where it is said today: "If Moussa Traore and Filifing are overthrown, we are capable of making a counter-coup."

Divergences

But is the army "united like a solid bloc?" Doubtlessly yes, at the basis, but different penchants are attributed to Moussa Traore's last companions who took power with him on 19 November 1968 and are still around. There are three: Col Youssouf Traore, nicknamed--obviously an exaggeration--the "ayatollah" because of his popularity among certain of his marabout friends; Col Filifing Sissoko, of whom it is said that he will never make a coup d'etat against Traore, but could well do it "against someone else." Col Amadou Baba Diarra, officially No 2 in the party, has friends among the intelligentsia and is reputedly sympathetic to economic liberalism, contrary to Sissoko. Undoubtedly, Moussa owes the fact that he still remains in power to the underlying rivalry between his three faithful followers. All three of them enjoy some advantages, but they are also equally convinced that nona could win over the other two.

This is all the more true since none of them could be suspected of allowing himself to be tempted by a foreign power.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

ADB, ADF AGRICULTURAL FINANCING--The African Development Bank (ADB) has granted a loan of 8 million UC [units of account] (2.161 billion CFA francs)--and the African Development Fund (FAD) a loan of 8 million UCF [expansion unknown] (1.99 billion CFA francs)--to Mozambique for the partial financing of the Lioma development project. The ADB loan is payable in 20 years (including a 5-year deferral of payment on principal) and the FAD loan in 50 years (including a 10-year deferral of payment on principal). The primary goals of the project are to increase food production through the rehabilitation and expansion of four abandoned plantations in the Lioma region; to create jobs for the residents of that region who are unemployed or underemployed; and to improve the living conditions of the local population, who will benefit from the supply of water, electricity, public health facilities, schools and housing. The project comprises the following aspects: the purchase of machinery and implements for road building; the clearing of 11,520 hectares of land; the construction of plantation roads; the purchase of agricultural machinery and implements; the partial mechanization of the dry farming of corn on 15,840 hectares; the supply of vehicles and materials; the supply of water; the construction and equipment of schools; and the modernization and expansion of the dispensary at Lioma. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 583]

INCREASED COTTON HARVEST EXPECTED--It appears probable that cotton production in the Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado may reach 16,000 tons during the 1978-1980 [sic] season--a figure substantially larger than that for last season. The greater part of the cotton crop is grown by the family farms. Of the 74,000 hectares designated for the current season, 21,000 hectares are farmed by the 1 de Maio Company (formerly SAGAL [expansion unknown]). Cabo Delgado Province has at its disposal 133,000 liters of pesticides and insecticides for the 1979-1980 crop year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 583] 10992

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SOMALIA

BRIEFS

EDF AGRICULTURAL FINANCING--The supplementary financing of the Golwein-Bulo-Mererta project (a grant of 4.5 million UCE [expansion unknown]) is intended to defray the expense of the supplementary investment necessary to complete the first stage of the development of the Golwein-Bulo-Mererta perimeter, which has already benefited from credit extended by the second and third EDF [European Development Funds]. This first stage has experienced difficulties relating primarily to the rise in unit prices and to certain changes in the technical conception of the engineering work. Plans call for the basic infrastructure of the perimeter (now in process of development) to consist of a 2,500-hectare area planted to grapefruit for export and food crops for local consumption. During the first phase 185 hectares of grapefruit will be planted following completion of the irrigation and drainage system and the construction of access roads, all of which is specifically covered by the supplementary financing under the fourth EDF. Certain infrastructures will be added (an electric power plant and a workshop, among others) relating to equipment and technical assistance. Bids will be solicited locally for the remaining construction work, while the equipment will be purchased on the international market under a system of open or restricted bidding, depending on the circumstances. The 185 hectares of grapefruit will produce 5,500 tons of fruit. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 492] 10992

IRRIGATION FINANCING--The reorganized Jenaole-Bulo-Marenta irrigation project in Somalia (Stage I) has just received a loan from the African Development Fund (FAD) in the amount of 8 million units of account (approximately \$9 million). The principal goal of the project is to increase the production of the basic food crops (rice, corn, sesame) and also the production of forage crops. The project (implementation of which will require 6 years) is designed to improve the irrigation system that supplies water to some 2,227 hectares which are at the present time insufficiently irrigated, and also to irrigate a new perimeter of 1,483 hectares. The estimated total cost of the project is approximately \$20 million. The Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of Somalia are participating in the financing. Implementation of the project will probably begin in 1980 and will extend over a period of 6 years. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 579] 10992
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UGANDA

BRIEFS

AID TO ASIAN REFUGEES--Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Narasimha Rao on 28 March announced that the government in Kampala was ready to receive all Ugandan citizens of Asian origin who had been expelled or forced to leave under the regime of Idi Amin Dada. The Kampala government furthermore announced that it has established a commission charged with studying the demands for compensation from all those Ugandans of Asian origin who were deprived of their property under that regime and whose number has been estimated at something like 40,000. The five-member commission was placed under the chairmanship of a former Minister of Justice, Mr Peter Nakambo-Mugerwa. We recall on this subject that the two big business groups, Mehta and Madhvani, have already returned to Uganda and have resumed their activities on new foundations in association with the government (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 March, p 698). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 820] 5058

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ZAIRE

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CHARGED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 p 28

[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "After prison, exile"]

[Text] The international organizations and foreign governments are denouncing the arbitrary arrests and tortures.

What is going on in Zaire? Massacres, tortures, arbitrary arrests, people disappearing--according to some sources. Nothing, if we are to believe Nguza Karl I. Bond, commissioner of state for foreign affairs, for whom "The Republic of Zaire has every reason to have a clear conscience. This is an organized, respectable, and respected state which practices democracy."

But that does not prevent more than a hundred citizens, both male and female, from preferring exile each month. In France, after the refugees from South East Asia, the Zairians are most numerous. And their eyewitness accounts--which tally with reports obtained directly from Zaire--are more than alarming.

Massacred or Drowned?

On 4 February 1980, the United States State Department submitted to the Senate a report on human rights violations in Zaire. Just one month later, AI (Amnesty International) submitted a document to the United States Congress concerning arbitrary arrests and prison conditions. In February, Amnesty had already sent President Mobutu a 20-page report on imprisonments, tortures, and political murders while the FIDH (International Federation of Human Rights) finally on 25 February demanded the creation of a commission of inquiry on the massacres which reportedly took place in eastern Kasai in July 1979. These "so-called massacres," which Kinshasa persists in denying, however are confirmed by many eyewitnesses.

The first version comes from the families of the victims: at 1100 on 19 July 1979, for reasons that remain obscure, the mixed Kamannyola unit--

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which includes several women--opened fire on adolescents--whom certain opposition members had pictured as members of a vacation colony but who in reality were looking for diamonds along the Lubilash river at Katekalay, about 20 kilometers from Mbuji-Mayi. According to identical eyewitness testimony, the result is rather serious: 215 dead. Some were killed by bullets; others were drowned as they tried to escape across the Lubilash. On 23 July, five members of the parliamentary delegation from eastern Kasai asked the chairman of the Executive Council at Kinshasa to establish a commission of inquiry on the "killings perpetrated at Mbuji-Mayi."

The second version comes to us from the authorities: "On 17 July 1979, the gendarmerie put out a dragnet looking for clandestine diamond traffickers. In the clash between the forces of law and order and the criminals, the latter at most suffered three dead." It was admitted however that others might have drowned. In November, Karl I. Bond proposed that an international inquiry commission go to Kasai.

Inquiry Commission

For obvious reasons, the FIDH did not agree to join the commission of representatives of African states and Amnesty for its part refused to become the arbiter between these two versions of a 4-month-old event. The two humanitarian organizations contacted thus declined the offer. But 3 months later, FIDH demanded that this commission be in effect established. Master Jacoby, secretary for judicial observations of the FIDH, threatened: "If the Zairian authorities do not authorize us to conduct this inquiry, we will make our files public." For the time being, Zaire agreed in principle but it is allowing the affair to drag out: "If Mobutu takes his time, that is because the job of corruption and intimidation of witnesses and families of victims has not yet been finished," says Paul Mocado, president of the National Congolese Movement. "The moment they are sure of them, the commission will get the green light."

But then other accusations were added to the file on the Zairian leaders. In particular, arbitrary arrests were reported to have multiplied over the past 2 years. Traditionally reserved for intellectuals and students, they today involve all categories of the population.

Died of Hunger

In Paris, after the CIMADE (Ecumenical Aid Service), Mrs Prost, who since the start of the year received more than 400 Zairian refugees, commented quite formally: "The refugees now are workers, lower-level civil servants who were imprisoned for going on strike in order to get wages that had not been paid for several months. In the case of many of them, their only crime is to have had a parent who was implicated--or presumed to be implicated--in some kind of political affair. We are also getting women

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with their children. They were interrogated and imprisoned simply because their husbands were strikers. This is a new and entirely peculiar phenomenon in Zaire." As for the conditions of detention, they are by general agreement shocking.

The United States State Department for its part noted that "almost all prisons are overcrowded. Food, clothing, and care are insufficient just about everywhere." According to Amnesty, 20 prisoners died of hunger and disease in 1978 at the Lokandu military camp in Kivu; several more died at the Ikafela and Irebu camps in the province of Equator and at the Kasagi camp in Shaba; 40 died at the central prison in Kinshasa. Eric Tandun, 25, had the following eyewitness testimony to present: "I was arrested on 8 December 1977 because I had written an article on university reform. I was locked up at the Lubumbashi CND (National Documentation Center). There were 40 of us in a cell, 5 meters by 7 meters. There were railroad strikers there, along with diamond smugglers, the writers Pieus Ngandou and Mudimbe, and the philosopher Kinyongo. For 3 1/2 months I stayed there with the others, 24 hours a day. In March 1978, I was transferred to the Kinshasa CND. There were 30 of us in each cell. They included doctors, male nurses, advisers in the office of the president, Belgians, West Africans, and Haitians accused of trafficking in ivory and diamonds plus one Frenchman. Every day, at 1400, we were entitled to a handful of rice and boiled black beans. But except for aspirin and valium, we got no medications. With my own eyes, I watched a man die of hunger. I stayed there 5 months."

Sexual Tortures

Those who, like Eric, went through the CND still show the marks of their suffering on their bodies: "At Lubumbashi, we were stripped to the waist and beaten with belts. But the real torture came at the Kinshasa CND. I saw men being brought back to the cell in a terribly shocking state."

In Paris, the COMED (Medical Orientation Center) doctors, who each week examine the refugees, discovered traces of torture: "We have seen women who became sterile or who suffer from serious gynecological troubles as a result of sexual torture. We also found skin lesions due to electric burns." Fractures of the hands and skull injuries as well as burst uterums are the rule here. A report by Amnesty mentions amputations and disfiguring. "Persons escaping from the Ikafela camp had their fingers and toes crushed with a hammer and then they were sent back to their cells where they rapidly died of starvation." The attitude of the Zairian leaders to these accusations was to deny everything and to "show and tell."

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The CICR (International Committee of the Red Cross), which visited all prisons throughout the country, states that "collaboration with the authorities is good. It is true that we never had any access to the administrative detention centers, such as the CND, but negotiations are under way and look good."

So, that means that if the CICR remains on the spot, the problems remains what it is.

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ZAIRE

BO-BOLIKO DISCUSSES ECONOMIC PLANS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 820

[Text] Mr Bo-Boliko Lokonga, first commissioner of state (premier) of Zaire, in recently commenting on the broad outlines of the action program drafted by the Executive Council for the year 1980 on television, first of all presented a detailed explanation of the objectives contained in the "Mobutu Plan" which, he recalled, is a very special plan aimed at putting the management of the administration in order, stabilizing government finances, and reviving the national economy. Regarding its implementation, the first commissioner of state noted that certain prior requirements were necessary to launch this plan.

On that score he indicated that, to revive agricultural production with a view to remedying the food shortage, it would be indispensable to have tools and seeds; this is the reason for the agricultural equipment factory at Kintambo, the establishment of agricultural centers, and the law on development agreements with the enterprises.

In the transportation field, the money collected from friendly countries was allocated to a great extent to the transportation enterprises for their equipment and the improvement of roads and walkways.

Until agriculture produces the desired results, it is necessary to optimize the mining industry which until now is the main source of foreign exchange.

Mr Bo-Boliko also stressed the need for economic regional decentralization, permitting the equitable distribution of assets throughout national territory. This is why economic and social councils were established in the regions.

As for the 1980 action program, the first commissioner of state indicated that it would resume simple efforts aimed at realizable objectives. Every 3 months, each state commissioner should report on how the tasks assigned to him are being accomplished. This action program, he thinks, can be carried out only if the entire government machine becomes credible once

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again, after getting rid of awkward and uncivil officials and civil servants. Day after day, the government watches as the material resources, indispensable for its development, are being diverted or stolen by a handful of bad citizens. To put an end to this situation, the Executive Council this year is launching a policy of domestic control aimed at detecting cases of bad management and correcting them while punishing the guilty.

Responding to a question on devaluation, the first commissioner of state declared that it had become inevitable because of the failure to comply with certain commitments undertaken toward international monetary organizations. Nevertheless, steps have been taken to make sure that this difficult phase will be negotiated without any harm to the population.

Thus, the importing of half a score of basic products will be guaranteed with the country's own foreign exchange resources throughout the year. Priority manufacturing industries will regularly get foreign exchange to import raw materials. The new tax schedule on income has been eased in terms of greater benefit for the workers.

Concerning the economic operators, who must return to Zaire the foreign exchange which they obtained following the sale of coffee abroad, the first commissioner of state noted that the problem of returning foreign exchange did not arise in connection with exporters who go through the Bank of Zaire. The problem does however come up for swindlers who go through Kisangani, Goma, and Matadi. The OZACAF [Zairian coffee office] is preparing a list of those operators in order to force them to return that foreign exchange.

Touching on the threat of massive layoffs of workers in private enterprises, Mr Bo-Boliko reiterated the opposition of the Executive Council to this process as a recovery solution while admitting the difficulties facing the enterprises which are forced, due to the economic downturn, to operate below capacity; he recommended improvements in order to prevent increasing unemployment.

In the matter of the fight against price rises, the first commissioner of state blamed the executive officials and certain cadres for the tremendous price rise resulting from their action of systematic sabotage in the implementation of the directives issued by the Executive Council on this subject. He reaffirmed that the government will continue to impose its authority so that what little the country produces or imports may be equitably distributed at official prices. With this same concern in mind, a list of taxes, currently in print, will be made accessible to all; no tax may be demanded of the people in the absence of that document.

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As for the rise in prices on services rendered to the population by certain public-interest government enterprises, such as REGIDESO [Water and Power Distribution Administration], SNEL [National Electric Power Corporation?], etc., Mr Bo-Boliko explained that the government no longer has the vast funds it had in the past and now faces an alternative: it can either cut off subsidies and these enterprises will cease to function or it can ask the citizens to pay more for the services rendered.

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