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JPRS L/9096

19 May 1980

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 3/80)



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EAST EUROPE REPORT
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

USSR, POLAND UPDATE LEGAL AID, REPRESENTATION TREATY

LD191543 Moscow CHELOVEK I ZAKON in Russian No 3, signed to press 7 Feb 80
p 33 LD

[Article by V. Gridin: "USSR-Poland: A New Stage in Legal Cooperation"]

[Text] On 23 January a protocol was signed in Moscow to the treaty between the USSR and Poland on legal aid and legal relations in civil, family and criminal cases. The protocol was signed by USSR Justice Minister V. I. Terebilov on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and by Polish Justice Minister J. Bafia on behalf of the Polish State Council.

The existing treaty between our countries was concluded in 1957. The main provisions of this treaty have kept their significance even today. However, during these years our countries' legislation has been substantially renewed and the friendly relations between the USSR and Poland have been further developed in all spheres, including reciprocal legal aid. Considerable experience has been amassed in the application of the treaty.

Taking this into account, the need has arisen to introduce changes and additions to the treaty, certain aims at developing and deepening cooperation between justice institutions in the fraternal countries.

The protocol considerably expands the rights of citizens of one state on the territory of the other. Thus, Polish citizens appearing in USSR courts and other institutions which deal with civil, family and criminal cases enjoy the same legal rights as USSR citizens, are exempt from legal expenses, enjoy free legal aid, and have the right to bequeath and inherit property on USSR territory. USSR citizens receive the same rights on Polish territory. The scale of legal cooperation between justice institutions is also broadened. In particular, it is envisaged that both states will be under obligation to prosecute their own citizens who commit any crime in the other treaty state.

The protocol provisions raise legal cooperation between the USSR and Poland to a new level.

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BULGARIA

LUKANOV ON LIMITED EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS ON COUNTRY

[LD100845 Editorial Report LD] Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French on 31 March-13 April 1980 carries a 41-page supplement on Bulgaria containing reprints of parts of various official speeches made by Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov, articles on Bulgaria's history and agricultural and industrial achievements, exports, culture, education and sports in Bulgaria, an interview with Bulgarian Vice President Peko Takov on Bulgaria's socialist development and its relations with recently liberated peoples and an article on economic development containing a few apparently exclusive statements by deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers Andrey Lukanov and the following short interview included as an insert:

"The Western press, including the press specializing in economic questions, systematically talks of the 'world crisis' whenever it discusses inflation, unemployment, stagnation and other such ills which have become chronic. However, they are not caused by any so-called 'world crisis' but by capitalism's international crisis. Socialism is perfectly healthy. Does this mean, we asked deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers Andrey Lukanov, that the socialist countries are not affected by the monetary chaos and the economic recession affecting the Western countries?

"We have not completely escaped the consequences of the general crisis of capitalism," he replied. "All countries which have an economy open to the rest of the world--as we do--and play an active part in the international division of labor are suffering its effects in some way or another."

"But he added: 'The real question is not whether we are affected by this crisis but whether our economic system enables us to better withstand its consequences. Thanks to our central planning and our economic stability on the domestic plane and to socialist cooperation on the external plane our national product is growing at an annual rate of 6.5-7 percent, our industrial production by 7-8 percent and our foreign trade by 12-14 percent. In short we are affected by the crisis but we are not suffering a crisis ourselves.'"

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POLAND

FRENCH RESEARCH GROUP SPECULATES ON POSSIBILITIES OF ANOTHER RIOT

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 18-24 Feb 80 pp 34-35

[Article by Jean Grandmougin: "Self-Criticism in Warsaw"]

[Text] Breaking with custom, Mr Brezhnev had declined, "on the advice of his doctors" to attend the Eighth Congress of the Polish Communist Party in Warsaw, an absence which was instantly followed by that of the first secretaries of all the communist parties of Eastern Europe.

What was the reason? One sentence of the Polish vice minister for foreign affairs was being repeated last week throughout the halls of the congress: Poland "is not happy with the situation" created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Mr Gierek did not make mention of it. His lengthy address, customary for such a congress, stayed on the subject of the "development of socialist Poland."

--We cannot deny the fulfillment of the 70's, he declared.

The fact is that, during the 10 years since he became secretary general of the Communist Party, Poland has risen to the level of the 10th industrial country in the world. Second in the Eastern bloc after the Soviet Union, its economic potential could now exceed that of East Germany or Czechoslovakia.

--We have not been able to provide for everything. We have not been able to avoid shortages, admitted Mr Gierek nevertheless.

Last fall, in the mining basin of Upper Silesia, firedamp explosions and fires cost the lives in one month of about 100 coal miners. A former underground miner, Mr Gierek tried to step up work safety measures. However, since half of its revenues goes toward repaying a foreign debt which is close to 20 billion dollars, Poland exports as much coal as it can in order to make some gains. Thus there is a frantic mining activity, with safety suffering from it. The planning director and vice prime minister, Mr Wrzaschwyk, acknowledged that Poland's expansion has dropped to the level of the postwar

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years. The Communist Party admits in its reports that "electricity cuts are reducing many workers to forced inactivity. Production is being decreased before our very eyes and the country is being plunged into darkness." Absenteeism affects 8 percent of the employees.

--If absenteeism were reduced by one half, it was said on television, we would get back the work of another 100,000 people.

Mr Gierek restated:

--We must redouble our efforts. The most extensive and severest diagnosis on Poland was made by a research group of about 100 members, whose initials "DIP" stand for "Experience and Future." In reality, it is a club comprised of communists (including two central committee members) and Catholics who are sometimes opposed to the government. DIP's report, 155 pages in length, affirms: "The country is deeply in debt, with supplies sorely lacking. Retaliatory strikes are on the increase. Disorganization in planning has reached scandalous proportions."

The fundamental analysis: with "ideological values" crumbling, the "government in itself," with benefits attached to it, "has in fact become the "principal motivation." Since the peasants' sons have no greater access to higher education than before, "social distinctions have increased," and a new caste has been formed, which enjoys special privileges and favors, including housing, automobiles, or cards permitting access to "special stores" reserved for party members. The fact that statistics have been faked from the beginning falsifies all decisions. "No one knows what we have. There is no balance sheet," complains DIP. People do not have any idea who is really producing what: it all ends up in "social inertia and aggressiveness."

Fewer births. A lower level of education and institutions that are obliged to teach a history opposed to the truth. "Above all, the crisis we are experiencing is political in nature," DIP warned.

"Economic difficulties are increasing. The social situation is getting worse," the Episcopate stated at the 71st Plenary Conference. Deploring "a shameless method of assigning administrative, educational and cultural positions," it mourned the fact that the criterion for recruitment "is not competence, energy or honesty, but affiliation to an official ideology." And "the corruption is spreading."

Since Poland has had popular uprisings on three occasions--in 1956, 1970 and 1976--the hierarchy senses that, in the case of a fourth uprising, the Russian tanks could be brought in against Warsaw, and is trying to advocate patience among the faithful. In its last report, DIP warned: "In the next two or three years, the decline in standard of living which awaits us will extend beyond the people's breaking point. Sooner or later an explosion will occur in the style with which we are familiar. However, this time it will surpass in intensity everything that we have seen in post-war history."

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Since the publication of that alarming report, DIP has been notified that from now on it is forbidden to hold plenary session. Only the Communist Party is to have a congress.

[Photo caption] The Palace of Culture in Warsaw, site of the Polish Communist Party Congress. A cautious departure from Soviet strategy, which provoked a very firm restatement by Mr Suslov, Kremlin ideologist. To the right, Mr Gierek at the platform: "We have not been able to avoid shortages."

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ROMANIA

ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC PROSECUTORS DISCUSSED

Bucharest PENTRU PATRIE in Romanian No 3, Mar 80 pp 6-7, 22

[Interview] Florin Dimitriu, assistant chief prosecutor in the municipality of Bucharest, by Haralamb Zinca: "In a Continual Fight To Establish the Truth, To Avoid Any Errors"; date and place not given

[Text] Haralamb Zinca: Comrade Prosecutor, right from the start I want to thank you for having agreed to participate in our magazine's "Conversations." We know how busy you are and....

Florin Dimitriu, assistant chief prosecutor in the Prosecutor's Office of the Municipality of Bucharest: No matter how busy we may be, we must also find time to have a chat with the representatives of the press. I thus await with pleasure the start of the conversation.

[Question] From the high rostrum of the 12th congress of our party, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu reaffirmed the retributive principles that are put at the basis of the complex activity of the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior, the Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Justice. What influence have these principles had and are they having in the activity of the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office?

[Answer] We have entered not only a new decade but also a new stage of development of our society. One of the leading objectives noted in the decisions of the congress refers to continually strengthening the spirit of order and discipline in all sectors of social life, the certainty that everything that is accomplished is protected with sternness, in a permanent climate of justice and legality, a climate that allows the full affirmation of the human personality, of the new man, a builder of the socialist society. The instructions of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu and the documents of the 12th congress ask the Prosecutor's Office to continually improve its activity, starting from its basic tasks: the providing of respect for the laws, public peace, the legitimate interests and rights of the citizens, and socialist and personal property, the combating and prevention of any violations of the legal norms, and the defense of the sovereignty and integrity of the homeland. In consequence, the influence that you mentioned has

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shown us the necessity of proceeding, on the basis of the accumulations obtained, to a new quality.

Question For the body of the Prosecutor's Office at which you work, for a prosecutor, what does the achievement of a new quality in their activity guided by laws mean?

Answer I believe that I would exhibit unwarranted shallowness if I felt that this dialectical process of proceeding to a higher stage of work is easy, that everything can be resolved by means of a simple, routine statement. "Ready, comrades, tomorrow we are proceeding to a new quality." In reality, we are dealing with a complex process, with profound implications also in the areas of superstructure. You cannot obtain a new quality in your specific work except by means of a courageous, revolutionary fight with routine, inertia, incompetence and poor specialized training. Ultimately, you can obtain a rise in exigency in your sector of responsibility by vanquishing, first inside you and then outside you, a certain bureaucratic mentality.

The coordinates of a new quality are, in fact, the permanent aspects specific to the activity of the Prosecutor's Office. Within their framework, the prosecutor is called upon to increase his exigency, firmness, spirit of justice, and concern for man...in the dual sense of legality: no innocent person is to bear the rigors of the law, but, at the same time, no violation of the law is to go unpunished. The prosecutor seeks at the same time to make his contribution to punishing the violations and infringements of the law in a varying manner, in relation to the degree of social danger of the acts and of the person of the culprit. Thus, a continual struggle to establish the truth in all cases, to eliminate any errors in holding someone criminally responsible, to avoid any mistakes in deprivation of liberty, to strictly respect the constitutional rights of the citizens, such as the inviolability of the person, of the domicile, of human freedom and dignity.

Question Comrade Prosecutor, in many capacity as a journalist and writer, I am in continual contact with life, with the ordinary man in the street, as they say, and I have often happened to note that this ordinary man sometimes has a unilateral image of the Prosecutor's Office. For many, the Prosecutor's Office means the man in a robe who accuses. Look, we are offered the possibility--of course, within the limits of the space that we have--of correcting this unilateral image. In fact, what should the citizen of our times see in the institution at which you work?

Answer The citizen should see in the Prosecutor's Office that institution created by our socialist state, with the mission of being vigilant to provide a climate of legality, order and discipline, the body empowered to step in promptly to eliminate abuse, illegality and injustice, which, to the same end, acts firmly to call to account those who disregard the norms of social cohabitation and the laws of the country. It should be known

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that the socialist humanism that characterizes the policy of our party and state has nothing in common with toleration of the manifestations of violating public order and peace, harming the public and personal property of the citizens and wounding the human personality and dignity.

The citizen should appeal with complete trust to the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office, he being convinced that the only aim of this organization consists of providing his rights and freedoms, guaranteed by the constitution and the other laws of the country.

Question I have heard it said that if an ordinary citizen enters into a conflict with an institution or enterprises and suffers harm because of this conflict he does not have a possibility of taking the other party to court, that, anyway, he does not have a possibility of winning such a suit. What is true and what is not true in such a viewpoint?

Answer The question is extremely interesting. I too have noted, in my practice, the existence of such opinions. They have their origin in the past abuses and errors, exposed and condemned with principledness by our party. Beyond doubt, the law gives and guarantees to the citizen the right to take a socialist unit to court. It depends only on him, on the defense and evidence that he also provides, in order to really give proof that would justify the putting of such a suit on the docket.

Question Is it thus a question of procedure?

Answer Once the trial has begun, the legal contest is open. In fact, at first sight, the dispute between an individual and an institution seems unequal, risky. This is only at first sight because, in fact, citizen X has entered into a conflict not with the institution but with persons who represent the institution and who can be right or wrong. But it is better to resort to an example. An older woman could often be found in the corridors of the Prosecutor's Office, bustling about with inexhaustible energy. Naturally, she wanted justice to be done for her. She has lost a suit with a construction enterprise. What had happened? Her husband, a worker on one of the sites of the enterprise, was fatally injured in a work accident. The investigation at the scene of the accident, done superficially, established the fault of the victim. The suit was not decided in the widow's favor. The woman did not relent. She took many steps. Ultimately, justice was done for her. But, in order to achieve this, it was necessary for the only witness to the accident to admit, tormented by pangs of conscience, that he had given false testimony. We thus come to the key of the suit. The widow of the victim had entered into a conflict not with the enterprise but with a few individuals: with the chief engineer of the site, with other personnel at the workplace. They, as it eventually resulted, were directly at fault for the accident, for the death of a man and, according to the law, they had to bear the consequences. However, they preferred to buy the conscience of the only eyewitness to the accident, in order to emerge scot-free from the suit.

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[Question] This example is very interesting and instructive. When it is a question of a fatal accident, the consciences of people illegally involved in causing the event begin to waver. In my work of documentation I too have encountered such situations. In such circumstances, the most hateful element seems to me to be the deliberately untruthful witness who can hold justice in check. But I would like to now approach another aspect of the problem. The prosecutor too is like everybody else. Thus, he too is subject to mistakes.

[Answer] In our work, it is important that these mistakes, by means of rigorous and strict supervision of the responsible factors, be discovered in time, that they not be repeated, that there thus be avoided the shortcomings that are of a nature to inflict harm on the most important social values, such as freedom, dignity, and integrity of socialist and personal property. The prosecutor can avoid these mistakes by continually raising his political and professional training, his degree of consciousness, the strength of his sense of responsibility. Besides these things, however, it must be kept in mind that the very system of work within the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office is of a nature to discover and eliminate the errors of one or another of the prosecutors before they produce effects. I have in mind the fact that a large number of documents and solutions provided by prosecutors are subject to verification or confirmation by the higher-ranking bodies, and in other cases, not few in number, the solutions adopted are the work of the work staff in one sector of activity or another.

[Question] What does a prosecutor encounter in his complex activity of re-establishing the truth?

[Answer] You can easily imagine that scores of pages would have to be filled for an at all complete answer to your question. Consequently, I will be as brief as possible. In his effort to establish the truth, the prosecutor is confronted mainly with the attempts, sometimes desperate, of those interested in concealing the data of the truth and even with the dishonesty of those brought to make their contribution to establishing states of affairs. In other cases, those who took cognizance, in one way or another, of the act committed either did not perceive the event correctly, due to, say, a defect in one of the five senses of man, or the memory, influenced by fatigue, age and so on, loses accuracy, especially on the details, or subjectivity enters into the description of the act that occurred, which is very dangerous for establishing the truth. This is what kind of difficulties, put in a few words, a prosecutor encounters in his complex activity. I would like to give an example. A young woman of 17 years of age fell from the 4th floor of an apartment house, and shortly after she was transported to the hospital she died. Initially, it not being known if she had jumped, had fallen or had been thrown, the hypotheses issued were suicide, accident or homicide. If we had analyzed the facts according to the statements of the two witnesses who said that, coming among the first to the spot, they had heard the victim saying that she had been thrown from the floor, we would have come to a wrong conclusion: homicide.

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The investigation, done carefully, established, on the one hand, that the two witnesses had come to the spot when the victim had already been put in the ambulance and, consequently, the statements made by them were mere fabrications. Thus, when it is a question of establishing the truth, no effort on our part is useless. I want to emphasize that, along with the science of investigating the scene of the incident by means of criminalistics, of taking statements, of discerning, of studying thoroughly, the prosecutor must also exhibit a high degree of perspicacity and maturity, of thorough knowledge of social life, perseverance and enthusiasm in performing the tasks that devolve upon him. In my opinion, a prosecutor cannot think of the duties that devolve upon him only in the hours of work. The work of the prosecutor presupposes continual concern and constant efforts, sometimes day and night, in the fight to establish the truth.

Question In order to establish the truth, under conditions of complete legality, certainly you collaborate constantly with the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior. How do you rate this collaboration?

Answer For strict respect for the laws, creative collaboration, in a critical and self-critical spirit, from which the justice of our society can only gain, is promoted. When more complex cases arise, such as, for example, the cases of Rimaru, Samoilescu and others, joint investigatory staffs that helped to discover the truth and to adopt suitable legal solutions have been organized. It is right for it to be known that in recent years the young personnel of the Prosecutor's Office have benefited from a program of extensive, multilateral, thorough education. Many of the past mistakes, condemned by the party, also had their source in the poor professional training of some of those called upon to defend the laws, the truth. Today, the prosecutor studies legal medicine, criminalistics, psychology, sociology, criminology and so on. All this knowledge, in contact with life, with practice, has as a result a maximum point that is characteristic of the competent prosecutor. Of course, the passing of the years also bestows maturity and wisdom.

Question We are building socialism, we are building a new type of economy, of social relations. The party and the state are putting a big accent on forming the socialist consciousness of the new man. In fulfilling this noble ideal, our party and state have created and developed an entire system of education and instruction. The arts too are called upon to work in this direction. We have also seen recently that on the plane of the activity of the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior, the Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Justice there is also found a leading task: popularization of the laws of the country. Beyond doubt, the achievement of this task is also part of the laborious activity of forming the consciousness of the new man. How do you rate this matter?

Answer As we know, the documents of the 12th RCP Congress provide diversified forms for achieving a permanent link between the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office and the citizens. Of them, I would mention especially

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the meetings with the worker personnel in enterprises and institutions, with the citizens in many districts. In these meetings, we put an important accent on popularizing the laws, on knowing them, on explaining the social and political sense of all the regulatory acts.

Question I have attended several conferences on the topic of knowing the laws, and some of them seemed rather boring to me.

Answer I too am of the opinion that, in some cases, the presentation of the laws is done dryly, in a not very interesting form. The audience, of course, is not an informed, specialized one. Consequently, I feel that a greater effort should be made to find interesting and convincing forms.

Question Perhaps, therefore, the treatments based on concrete cases have a greater influence on the audience. In nearly every enterprise there is a jurisc~~on~~ult. All taken together, they represent an army of intellectuals specializing in the law. How are they participating in the fulfillment of this important desire?

Answer Unfortunately, to a slight degree. In many cases, speakers from outside the enterprise or institution are depended upon.

Question Do you feel that, in such meetings, the speakers explain the indissoluble connection between public property and the citizen's standard of living?

Answer No. It is a shortcoming not only of those who concern themselves with popularizing the laws but also of the propaganda. Some people do not know thoroughly enough the economic mechanism that connects the two concepts: public property and personal property, and they do not know what values they and their families lose when harm is inflicted upon public property. On this matter, I feel that television, radio, the press and literature could make a bigger, more instructive contribution, periodically initiating drama shows on the topic of "Let Us Know the Laws of the Country," starting, of course, from concrete cases. I believe that they would be highly appreciated shows.

Question Do you have a--let me say--special reason for regarding knowledge of the laws by each citizen as an extremely important matter?

Answer I would mention, first of all, the fact that knowledge of the law confers personality and certainty on man. He will know, naturally, how the laws protect him, but, at the same time, he will also know how they can punish him in the case of violating them.

Question Is ignorance of the laws perhaps the basis of many infractions?

Answer Unfortunately, yes, and on many planes.

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[Question] Probably, negligence during the work schedule has its origin in this reality.

[Answer] This is so. However, negligence, from a viewpoint of the law, embraces various forms.

[Question] From my journalistic experience I know that some young people come easily and rapidly before the courts, because of negligence at the workplace. Especially in the socialist trade network. I ask myself: would it not really be better for the professional and legal knowledge to be imparted to these young people--naturally, by a commission of the enterprise from which the juriconsult is not missing--before being employed and having values put in their hands, that is, for a rigorous briefing to be given to them?

[Answer] As far as I know, something is also being done in this regard. But such a proposal is worth retaining, I believe. It can be useful.

[Question] How is the capital's life, seen from inside the Prosecutor's Office?

[Answer] In relation to other capitals in the world, I can state that the daily life of Bucharest is quiet, as it ought to be.

[Question] The Prosecutor's Office can be compared to a seismograph.

[Answer] If you are referring to the fact that a prosecutor is present in the city's life for 24 hours out of 24 hours, yes, we are like a seismograph, because the law obliges us to be present where acts that could affect social order are produced, to maintain legality, to provide legal solutions. From an analysis of these events there result the serious consequences of phenomena that in everyday life seem trivial but, in reality, produce, in certain situations, true tragedies. I shall give only two examples: a technician, behind the wheel of his car, was on the verge of seriously injuring a pedestrian--an old man who was violating the traffic regulations--and avoided the accident at the last second. Upset, however, he got out from behind the wheel and attacked the pedestrian. The latter fell, struck his head and died on the spot. It seems absurd, does it not? You avoid the fatal accident, but you kill him in a moment of nervous disorder. Is it not a tragedy? Here is what happened to a student. He was returning home in the evening, from the department. A young man from the district came up to him and asked him for a cigarette. The student answered, "I do not have one, I do not smoke." And after three paces, he found himself with a knife stuck in his back. Fortunately, the life of the student could be saved. However, who will save the fate of the culprit and how will it be saved? The tragedy struck two families all at once.

Not few are the cases in which deviations from work discipline or violations of regulations which seem minor at first sight and which are easily

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overlooked have serious consequences, resulting in significant harm inflicted upon the economy. A night watchman, who was supposed to stand in front of an automatic fire alarm system, was playing backgammon. When he awoke from the game the flames had covered the institution whose protection against fire he was supposed to provide.

Question Criminology should have a big say in the activity of preventing antisocial manifestations. Is there a science of criminology, does the Prosecutor's Office appeal to its generalizations?

Answer The need for a body that studies the causes of antisocial deviations is being felt more and more in the field of prevention of infractions. The bodies of the Prosecutor's Office have performed many studies on criminology, but the findings made should have been thoroughly studied by specialists in other fields, such as sociologists, psychologists, educators and psychiatrists. However, we are still tributary to mistakes in the past, when criminology as a science was ignored. We must revitalize it. Only it, through the analysis of categories of infractions, can offer us, on scientific bases, the solutions for creating a strong system of prevention.

Question Comrade Prosecutor Florin Dimitriu, I thank you, on behalf of the readers of the magazine PENTRU PATRIA, for the kindness with which you responded to our invitation.

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ROMANIA

VIOLATIONS OF LAW ON KEEPING SECRETS REVEALED

Bucharest PENTRU PATRIE in Romanian No 3, Mar 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Nichifor Pietris: "To Preserve Secrecy Means To Apply the Provisions of the Law...But Not Just..."]

[Text] A discussion with the responsible factors in the Ilfov County Inspectorate of the Ministry of the Interior who are called upon to watch the manner of application of the provisions of the law that regulates the preservation of state secrecy brought out a pleasing fact: greater concern by the responsible factors for the activity in this field to be within the spirit and the letter of the law.

Ilfov County is experiencing unprecedented development in all fields. With a significant agrarian percentage within it there perform their activity a number of research institutes of the greatest importance for our agriculture to experience truly scientific development.

In this field too, as in so many others, Romanian intelligence has many priorities. A firsthand endowment, combining the effort and the thought inspired by the elan of triumphant communism. An asset that must always be increased. And protected. It, and the people who create it. These splendid people who, by means of their creative effort, by means of their searching restlessness, make the fields of wheat, of corn, more beautiful in the golden sun of the plain and of abundance.

A Stoplight at the Vidra ICLF [Research Institute for Vegetable and Flower Growing] and a Less Pleasant Memory

The image that you find here, in this institute, gives you the feeling that order and discipline are at home here. The room used for the protocol department is suitable from all viewpoints. A place in which the guests are

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received with hospitality and the proper, but also traditional, Romanian respect. Ghinea Marin, the head of the special department, performing duties along a line of protocol, strikes me as an example of civic conduct, for whom the provisions of the law are the letter of the law. The notes of conversations and the other documents stipulated by law are properly drawn up. In addition, the matter of inventions, of research topics, is well regulated, all in the spirit of Law 23/71. The people know the provisions of this law, and the responsible factors perform the duties that devolve upon them along this line. The badge is not absent from anyone's chest, an emblem resembling a decoration, which lends, it seems, extra maturity to each wearer. If there is still need of such.

All these things suggest to the visitor an invigorating air. This has been achieved by means of a collective effort, although sometimes it was not understood that in this institute each department bears the responsibility for applying the law. And even if the event that was told to me refers to the past, it bears relating, since it shows a certain mentality that, I was told, is encountered more and more rarely in the institutions in Ilfov County.

Initially, there had been a discussion. Questions and answers about Law 23/71, with examples and the relating of consequences of negligence or indifference. The meeting, interesting and instructive, lasted far past the planned time. Both the lecturer--a security officer--and the audience--employees at the ICLF--had something to communicate.

And yet chance brought an officer to the institute a few days later.

In midsummer, after the end of the workday.

Mere professional curiosity.

"What else is new?"

"Hardly anything," the doorkeeper said.

"Who is the duty officer?"

"I."

"But, the doorkeeper?"

"I, too."

"This is not exactly in order," the officer said to himself and decided to make an inspection according to the regulations.

In the institute, everywhere, closed offices.

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But, surprise. In the office of the scientific director, everything unsecured. The key in the locker, and documents with a secret character inside. The scene was also repeated somewhat in the office of the director of the institute. With slight differences. Here the door was locked, but the window was open. Without special effort, by climbing through the window, one could get inside. In the unsecured office, documents having an official secret character.

There followed a report of contravention, which the scientific director refused to sign, the payment, within 48 hours, of half of the minimum fine provided by law, temporary anger and a lasting friendship based on esteem and understanding.

A Positive Report and Two Negative Events

The place of the inspection: the Agricultural and Food Industry Bank of Ilfov County. The date: 4 February 1980.

The participants: Adrian Munteanu, the duty officer, Otilia Roman, chief inspector, personnel department, an officer of the inspectorate. The report notes that here the provisions of Law 23/71 are followed precisely. Among other things: there is a register for records of the state secret documents; they are given only to those who have the management's approval; and this approval has been given only to those who, through official duties, have need of these documents. The report also notes that the state secret documents are kept in lockers located in a suitable room (provided with bars on the doors and windows).

Containing the conclusions of the inspection made at the Ilfov Office for Cadaster and Territorial Organization (OCOT), another report notes, however, diametrically opposed facts. Among other things: in office No 7--on the third floor--there was an open locker in which secret documents (19 in number--our note) and documents having the character of official secrets were left. The director was informed by telephone. He came to the department and in his presence these documents were noted in the report, then put in a metal locker on whose door the seal was affixed (according to the law--our note).

Naturally, the person guilty of violating Article 19/10 of Law 23/71--that is, Comrade Maria Vasile--was punished (she had taken these documents from the special department and had forgotten to return them).

A mere accident? Let us say so. But also at this institution, in the last 2 years, the archives located in the basement of the building were flooded twice, with one-fourth of the material, all having a secret character, thus being damaged. The use of the basement for reasons of space was invoked. But as far back as 1978 it had been pointed out to the responsible factors of this institution that the documents were not stored properly and it had been asked that the proper steps be taken. It had been promised that they

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would be taken, but there was tardiness in putting these measures into practice. And the irreparable was produced.

An accident? No. It is a question of ignoring the obligations provided by law. The head of the institution--the law stipulates--is responsible for the proper preservation of the property of the institution.

Law 23/71 specifies: "The heads of the socialist organizations will provide continual control over the preservation and handling of the documents that constitute state secrets, for preventing and discovering any losses, alterations, destruction, thefts or transmission or disclosure of them" (Article 6, Paragraph 2).

Finally, the proper steps have now been taken at the Ilfov OCOT. Although rather late, we too must say with regret.

The Forgetful Persons Who Overshadow the Work of Others

There is a saying filled with wisdom that we all know: "Do not put off till tomorrow what you can do today." However, unfortunately, in the concrete application of the provisions of Law 23/71, situations are still found when either these provisions are ignored or purely and simply they are forgotten. Which, in essence, also means "ignored." A mere shrug of the shoulders, accompanied by the excuse that "Occupied with other tasks purely and simply I forgot them; I promise that the next time it will not happen again," is of a nature to show that some of those invested with the right to have access to secret documents do not honor in all circumstances the trust accorded them.

An inspection at the Water Management Office showed that on the respective day the matters connected with the precise observance of the legal provisions on the preservation of state secrecy were not even well managed. Those who made the inspection noted first the positive things. We too enumerate them as they are in the report. There is a register for records of the secret documents, completed daily, and the register for delivery and receipt of them. However, there also were secret documents removed from the department and not returned on time. The forgetful persons: Gheorghe Bucur, Nicolae Ciuca and Dionisie Gyorfi. Explanations and excuses were found on the spot. But, aside from them, reality shows that although the provisions of the law were known, the three had consciously ignored them. "After all, why should we bother to return them, when we will perhaps need them again tomorrow and...." And other such explanations.

Consequently, the report dots the "i." "It is necessary," it says in black and white, "for the documents to be returned on time and for the leadership of the Water Management Office to control more closely the way in which the provisions of the law on the preservation of state secrecy are applied."

And the next incident is also regarded as preservation of secrecy. It is a bit out of the ordinary, but it is not unique. In the documentation done

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in institutes in the range of Ilfov County I have noted a few cases that bring to light, once again, the interest that some Western circles exhibit in Romanian intelligence. In the account that follows, I will respect the heroine's wish to not give her name. I will call her the engineer. But in her story--I am sure--others will also be recognized.

The fellow had approached her when the engineer still had 2 weeks of a stay abroad. She had come, 2 and $\frac{1}{2}$ months ago, for specialization, and everything had been going, until then, without incident. The woman was in the habit of taking on foot the road from the hotel to the institute where she was attending the specialization course. The road did not measure more than 1 and $\frac{1}{2}$ km, and at the end of the program in the afternoon she was traveling slowly, tired after a day of feverish work. The man addressed her first in French. She did not know French. Then German. No, the woman shook her head, surprised by the fellow's behavior: a man stops you on the street and wants to talk with you. If not French or German, perhaps the lady spoke English. Yes, the engineer knew English. Just fine. "Then it will be a pleasure for us to talk." "A man who wants to approach a woman," the engineer thought, and the action amused her. "I know you," the fellow said, "I have seen you passing by here." "It means, sir, that my person interested you." And again she smiled, amused by the incident. She was a woman past her prime, and even if this had not been so, an affair did not interest her. All the more then and under such conditions. Since it was clear to her that the fellow who was then smiling at her wanted this. "I have a Mercedes," he said, "and we could spend the weekend together. There are places worth seeing. Here or nearby. In a few hours we can be in Paris. Or elsewhere." The incident no longer amused the woman. It disgusted her. What did the individual take her for and what was he thinking?! That she burned for merrymaking with him?! She thus said coldly, sharply, as sharply as she could, that she wanted him to not bar her way any longer because neither Paris nor anything else interested her. Without paying him any more attention, she turned around and headed quickly toward the hotel. However, the incident alarmed her, especially as her memory told her that she had seen the fellow before. Where? She thought that even somewhere around the hotel. Or even on the street. Had he followed her? Had it been a mere coincidence? She had almost forgotten the incident, because she had tried to forget it.

Two days later.

In the secretariat of the institute, the professor's secretary asked her to enter his office. "The professor is still with a gentleman," the secretary responded to the engineer's question. In the professor's office, however, was just the fellow. And at that moment the engineer understood that the meeting on the street had not been an incident of a romantic type.

And her supposition immediately proved to be true. The fellow revealed his true identity to her: policeman. "Was that so?" "And what does the gentleman want?" the engineer wanted to know.

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Routine matters. "For example," he said, "where she works in Romania, who her husband is." He knew everything, he added, but he wanted to see if she was sincere. "I want to gather material on your country, because only by knowing some details can I propose some actions for your country's benefit." "The embassy here has very good documentary material on my country. And it is the most authoritative source." "I know, but I do not need official things."

The policeman wanted something else. However, the woman before him was not disposed to such a thing. The collaboration that had been proposed to her did not interest her, although it had been done while invoking the good relations between the two countries. She refused any talk on such a subject and rose to leave.

"I have not finished," the fellow said in a sharp voice. The sweetness had vanished from his voice. He understood that he had no chance, and the fact visibly irritated him.

The coin also had another side. And this other side was a cascade of threats. He was going to see that it was known in her country that she had met with a policeman. And then, goodbye to the trips abroad. And so on, and so on.

The engineer listened. She bit her lips. Fear had crept stealthily into her heart. Still, he was not a man who would easily be put off. The individual continued to show his true colors. He threatened, he spoke about the rights of man, about the engineer's lack of patriotism.

"If you continue," the woman rose from the armchair, with a gesture that said many things, "I will inform the embassy." She headed determinedly toward the door and opened it.

"See you later. No, goodbye forever, sir."

And she slammed the door. Hard. The windows shook slightly.

The secretary was amazed. "What manners," the expression on her face seemed to say.

After another 3 days.

"Pardon me for stopping you. However, I want the things discussed to remain between us. Or else...." "Or else, what, Mr Policeman," was on the engineer's lips. But she kept quiet. She turned her back. With fellows of his type it is right to not prolong a conversation.

We stop here with the account of the events. What followed meant true psychological warfare. Each day, until departure, the engineer found her luggage searched.

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This is a typical case of an attempt at enticement into an activity inimical to our country. It should be borne in mind from the start that the engineer was asked not for data connected with her workplace but for general information. In other words, an apparently inoffensive thing. The request to supply data about her workplace or her comrades was probably planned for the second stage. In this case, the attempt began with a just as inoffensive romantic attempt. A walk, a meal at a restaurant, a little attention, a piece of jewelry and so on are usually the beginning but not the end of the path.

Once engaged on such a course, you end by truly falling into the cleverly laid trap. In our case, with the first attempt failing, the second, more subtle and thus more dangerous, was made. Then, from promises to threats or, if it had been possible, to blackmail. Yet, to be sincere, the threat to which the engineer had been subjected is also called blackmail. Then, in the face of the engineer's incorruptibility, her firmness and, if you wish, her patriotism, the systematic searching of her luggage was undertaken. That is, you were not amenable, so just wait, we will show you. A vulgar matter, if you wish, but very effective, oftentimes, for breaking someone's morale. However, here too, as in so many other cases, it failed. And this is because each specialist going abroad, for specialization, a symposium and so on, knows that he takes with him property that belongs not just to him but is the property of his fellow workers, of the community in which he lives, of the country. And extremely few betray when it is a question of the country.

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ROMANIA

BACKGROUND, TRAINING OF MILITIA OFFICERS

Bucharest ~~PESTRU~~ PATRIE in Romanian No 3, Mar 80 pp 8-9

[Article by Eugen Teodoru: "An Emblem of Youth"]

[Text] After a long time, I came upon the old occupation of teacher and I felt flattered by this privilege that was given to me. I was offered a talk on the subject of following the coordinates of life, from which the plans and aspirations of a new generation were not absent. I was the guest of the UTC [Union of Communist Youth] organization of the school and I noted the contribution of enthusiasm, of effervescence, the endowment of ideals which animated these young people full of energy and which they put forth with their characteristic generosity, in order to serve and support concretely the communists found at the head of all the initiatives for continually improving the process of education and instruction. I had before me as partners in the discussion some young people in uniform, heedful of what they said to me and of what I imparted to them in my turn. They were curious to know, in particular, what impression was left in me by the visit to their school, situated in a picturesque mountain landscape, with the life that bustled in the big, spacious, white buildings and the accompanying courtyards, where their human community was preparing intensely for a career filled with responsibilities.

The sincere, youthful faces, reddened by that healthy mountain air, and the wide-awake eyes trained on me obliged me to frame my remarks as nicely as possible, to cover the things known to them, in language that attracted them.

I resorted to counterpoint. I described the conditions of two decades ago, which were more restricted, and the level where military education in general and, it goes without saying, that in their institution are. These realities, put face to face, brought out convincingly the obvious progress achieved by their school and the coordinates that it is following due to the many endowments that have occurred over the years and to the rise in the teaching quality of the staff of officers. The teachers and instructors, the everyday educators, the direct commanders and the lecturers are mostly young and very well trained, enthused purely and simply by their

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mission, since the human material that they have on hand assures them of a teaching success almost without fail. All that remains is for the teaching staff to leaven this dough, spiritually speaking, as carefully as possible, so that it rises visibly.

I observed the officers and students at work, in class hours, on the firing ranges, in the gymnasiums, on the sports grounds, and I immediately realized that sweat flows in abundance here, so that the efficiency in practice will be as complete as possible. To be a noncommissioned officer in the militia, or in any department specific to the Ministry of the Interior, means to have a mature character, a clear conscience, patience coupled with self-denial beyond reproach, a spirit of sacrifice, an example of conduct before the population, which watches you and judges every gesture, every word, since you represent on the street, at intersections of roads, in airports, railroad stations, ports and marketplaces, in cities and communes, on highways, the vivid expression of respect for the law and public order, a sentry called upon at any hour of the day and night to come to the aid of the citizen when he asks him to protect his physical, moral and material integrity, his family and home. I believe that there is no instant in the 24 hours that measure an earthly day that one or more noncommissioned officers are not on duty at a hotspot, near the citizens, in order to step in, to maintain order in a more or less complicated case. In all these circumstances, however, he must exhibit ability, competence, since knowledge of the laws and of the duties that devolve upon its representatives constitutes a basic obligation. In addition, he must be endowed with much tact, discretion and humanity, so that partiality and arbitrariness are not established in the place of legality and objectivity. It is known that the presence of the man in the blue uniform and cherry-colored epaulets occurs particularly in the unbroken commotion of the street, of the events that take place there, and the flagrant is produced when you do not expect it, in such circumstances. The virtues that the students acquire in this necessary school are accumulated through effort (no one is born educated). Consequently, the "great laboratory," deployed and compartmented in accordance with the current educational requirements, bears the stamp of these immutable laws, which govern the relations between the teachers and the students. Among the school's achievements are the facilities of the specialized halls, for the social and political sciences, for the specific disciplines, the crime labs, the halls for teaching traffic regulations, the firing ranges, the military training grounds, the huge hall where it says "Mens sana in corpore sano" on the arch of the entrance. And many other things. The majority of the teaching and testing halls are equipped with electronic apparatus, illustrative posters, maps, sketches and blackboards. Projection apparatus is not absent. It reproduces sequences from the great experience of the militia apparatus, the hard cases solved by it. The various problems on which the bodies of penal prosecution act and the measures that must be applied, depending on the terrain and the circumstances in which the infraction occurred, are in the sight of these lessons, excellently organized. The feeling that you get from visiting the work halls where the students are trained is that science and technology,

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the modern methodology, the latest achievements in this field have made a substantial contribution to the field of the fight against social evil and its bearers. One conclusion comes forth by itself: whatever deception, whatever ruses the lawbreakers may use to hide the traces of their harmful acts eventually prove futile. The handling of the technology by these specialists, plus the capacities of discernment and intuition that are developed and perfected here, are of a nature to form reliable personnel for preventing inhuman acts or, if they have been produced, for eliminating the consequences of the infraction.

I spoke earlier of the human material, of the degree of perception of the students. Well, you find that these aspiring young people are equipped for this profession, have the necessary qualities.

The overwhelming majority of them come from a working-class environment. They are graduates of general schools, even of secondary schools, to which are added the schools for vocational training, which have taught them a trade: diemakers, milling machine operators, lathe operators, construction workers, mechanics and so on. As a result, they know the murmur of the country, the pulse of the big and small urban or rural settlements, the mentality of the people around them, because they come from the people, then becoming the protectors of their gains. In this fertile ground is planted the knowledge of the profession of militia noncommissioned officer, which suddenly changes the viewpoint of their intellectual and moral values. From this angle, we understand why a part of them then go to the school for officers, climbing to higher ranks. As a result, I was not deceiving myself when I sensed the open, chivalrous competition between the students of the school, engendered by the youthful ambition that is naturally opening up so many paths to the sons of these people.

I was impressed by the fact that the solid professional training is combined with an essential requirement for a servant of contemporary law: training in handling motor vehicles, which can no longer be absent from the stock of knowledge of a militiaman nowadays. I admired with my own eyes an extraordinary hall of automobile simulators.

The school feeds on its own learning, drinks from the hopes that flourish in these hearts loving the homeland, its people, the communist creeds of the country; the fervent need to also share these feelings in warm words, causing some of them to fashion their thoughts into verses, to commit them to the logs of this "mountain ship," which is ascending to the heights of specific education.

Here, for instance, is the revelation of one of the most gifted students of the school, distinguished in the political and military training, in the specialized disciplines, a secretary of the UTC organization, a very good colleague and eager for excellent results for his subunit: Student Sgt Marius Anghel.

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"Give a shout/ From the huge silver step/, Toward the huge golden step/.
Take your gaze from one column/ And direct it to another column/, To the
column of the infinite!"

The climate of the school at the foot of the Carpathians is also part of
the climate of the homeland. Characters are worked and formed here, and
this atmosphere of work, of molding of spirit, is due to a select staff of
teachers, in the unit where officer Constantin Pavelescu works, along with
the secretary of the party committee, officer Remus Motorga, and young of-
ficer Ion Nastase, the secretary of the UTC committee.

The invigorating air of the locality drifted among the white pavilions.
Impeccable cleanliness prevailed everywhere. In the courtyards, the stu-
dents showed respect for superiors, marching in parade formation. The rig-
ors of voluntary discipline predominated everywhere.

This educational institution, with people taken as from an album with lac-
quered pages, added a thrilling element to my activity as a reporter. The
green silhouettes of the fir trees that border the walks of the school and
the crests of the mountains that cut the skyline bear, to the young people
here, the emblem of the splendid Romanian landscape.

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YUGOSLAVIA

DJILAS QUESTIONS SOVIET SOCIALISM

Paris COMMENTAIRE in French Spring 30 pp 3-13

[Article: "Is the Soviet Union a Socialist Country?"]

[Text] We are pleased to publish the article that Milovan Djilas has kindly written for us. Need we remind our readers who he is?

Born in 1911, he became a member of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1932. He belonged to that party's politburo from 1937 to 1954. In 1954, he was vice president of the Yugoslav Republic and president of the National Assembly. The experience he accumulated during 22 years of militant life and observation of "socialist" reality brought him into conflict with his party. He is one of the rare Communist leaders who stopped being one without being expelled. He gave up all his functions in 1954.

Since then, he has been arrested twice and has spent 9 years in Marshall Tito's prisons. He has been able to leave his country only once, in 1969, to give some lectures in a large university. After that, his passport was taken away from him. He continues to assert and declare with absolute moral and intellectual independence what he believes to be the truth.

His latest book published in France is "Une Societe Imperfaite": le Communisme Desintegree" [An Imperfect Society: Communism Disintegrated] (Calmann-Levy, 1969). His war memoires will soon be published by Robert Laffont.

Is the Soviet Union a socialist country?

This question should seem a senseless one today. Let us postulate that the Soviet Union is a socialist country. Does this designation make it better or worse? Does the Soviet reality thereby change? Naturally, certain things remain what they are, without reference to whatever political or ideological description it gives of itself or what others assign to it. But the answer

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is not and cannot be so simple where the Soviet Union and socialism are involved. For not only in the USSR but throughout the world there exist movements which cannot help but believe that the Soviet Union is socialist--with deficiencies, perhaps, but socialist in spite of everything. Today, this faith is neither "scientific" nor unconditional, as it was: everything is now known about the USSR, although not everything has been explained. That is why it would be more precise to talk today about the necessity of asserting that the USSR is socialist, not by the effect of an instinctive belief, but out of a need to defend the faith, even if one does not believe in it. If the communist movements did not have at least this belief, they would lose the meaning of their existence, of their activity. Even more, the Soviet order would lose its significance if it perceived that it is not socialist. How would the camps, with the millions of lives destroyed, the insane trials and the mad ideological liquidations be justified? What would be the rhyme or reason of the domination over Eastern Europe and the expansion elsewhere in the world? For the more violent and closed that powers and systems are, the more firmly they stick to ideologies.

Yet all this barely touches the reason why the Soviet leaders and the Communists of the entire world have to believe--partly justifying the Soviet "defects" by the "imperatives" of the "stage considered"--that the USSR is a socialist country. For this question has already become an empty one even within the framework of communism itself, by the fact that there are already a multitude of communisms. Which is the true one? Which is the most socialist?

There is no valid criterion that makes it possible to measure social systems. Discussion about the socialist or nonsocialist character of the Soviet Union is purely dogmatic. Either can be proved, depending on what one understands by "socialism."

As for myself, I consider (and it may be that this is the ultimate consequence of my dogmatism and my Utopias) that the Soviet Union is not a socialist country. And I believe this because its reality, with its unpredictable variations, cannot coincide with the theoretical abstraction. Why expect from the Russian Revolution and from Lenin more fidelity to the hopes and the theories than from the previous revolutions and revolutionaries? The fact that the USSR is obliged to state precisely the reasons for the teachings that it has not fulfilled, or been able to fulfill, because of the fatal divergence between theory and practice, is itself the proof that the USSR is not what it claims to be. Even the Ottoman sultans were not the most just, the most brilliant and the most Islamic, despite their declarations. The fact that it cannot get out of the hopeless that encloses it forces the Soviet order to justify itself by the socialist and doctrinaire hopes that had inspired its advent. Everything about it is perverted: one cannot distinguish constraint from ideology, prison from liberty, or free labor from slave labor. There is no country without police, of course but the ideological police dominate in the USSR. Whatever one thinks of socialism, it is all the same so fine a thing, at least in theory, that it would be unreasonable and inappropriate to identify it with the monstrous Soviet reality and with the disfigured ideology that inspires it.

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Soviet Power and Russian History

Theories serve more often to justify failure than to inspire success. Thus in recent years--by reason of "detente"--the West has been swamped by theories according to which the Soviet Union is only a continuation of czarist Russia. This theory appears in different variants, such as, for example, the one that says that the Russians have always lived under a despotic regime and should be left free to live that way: so long as they leave us in peace, we shall do the same for them!

There is in this theory, or these theories, a grain of truth and a mountain of naivete, precisely because they have a catch in them that is contagious and dangerous, both for itself and for others.

Any ruling power, even a communist one, is based on realities and cannot help but be national: even the communists, despite their pretension, cannot "construct" a culture, a language, a past and a national character. Let us simplify: the longer a communist power lasts, the more it has national characteristics, whether it likes it or not. Naturally, I speak of those that go well with communism, and vice-versa, and which, in today's world, arise in any manner in all nations.

One could thus conclude that the Soviet-Russian communists are more nationalistic than the other communists--this for the simple reason that they are still "No 1" today: that is, the strongest and the most industrious in the propagation of communism.

Today, this national trait of the Soviet--more particularly, the Russian--communists is expressed in the Leninism that developed, in the past, as a Russian variant of Marxist and internationalist ideology and that presented itself as such to itself and to the others. This was the situation up to Stalin, who codified this ideology and imposed it as an international form of the expansion of the Soviet state. Those who adopt Marxism-Leninism today condemn themselves by their own hand to submission, at least ideological submission, to the USSR. But where is the dividing line between what is Russian and what is Soviet, between heritage and innovation, in the USSR? This question divides even the most recent Soviet emigration (the third one). Some, of nationalist orientation, argue that Bolshevism--or Communism--was imported from Europe, and that not only does it have nothing in common with the Russian "national spirit," but it has also distorted this "spirit" and destroyed tradition. The others, of rationalist and democratic inspiration, consider that communism is an international phenomenon, and therefore a Russian one also, and that it took root first in Russia because of specifically Russian conditions.

Each of the two postulates of the Soviet opposition contains part of the truth, even though they are fundamentally irreconcilable.

But do ideas have frontiers? And where has communism not been "imported"? Likewise, is the fault of the Russians less that they impose on others an

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idea that is not "purely Russian"? In such case, we are turning in the vicious circle of dogmatism. Modern communism is the product of the industrial era. But some of its roots go deeper: they should be sought in the religions, especially orthodox Christianity. Or perhaps in human destiny, in human existence, in man's aspiration to equality and fraternity through a perfect, Utopian order. Today, of all those beautiful dreams there remains only the policy of a military-industrial power--that is, of the privileged dominant social class of the party's bureaucracy, with nationalism and internationalist ideology at its base.

No multinational state, not even the Soviet Union, can permanently and firmly apply a policy of hegemony and national assimilation. Even czarist Russia did not do so in a systematic manner, although it was the "jail of the peoples" and did its best to achieve denationalization (especially of the Ukrainians). But any multinational state, especially if it is absolutist, is forced in time to resist the principal social strata of the most powerful nation or to reach a settlement with the "liberties" of the minor nations. This is happening in the Soviet Union. The Soviet power is not imposing denationalization by force. Even Stalin's displacement of the Tatars was not a denationalization but an uprooting on account of "treason." Likewise, Russification--even though adoption of the Russian language and recognition of the Russians as the dominant nation are insisted upon--is but the Soviet power's fundamental principle on the national question. Stalin, although a Georgian, stirred up Great-Russian chauvinism. For him, the essential thing was power, personal power and that of the party's apparatus, power that consolidated and rooted itself all the more as it based itself on the tradition and form of the Russian state. The Soviet leadership acts in a similar way today. This leadership, by its composition and its methods, is presently "Great Russian." The Russian elements in the party bureaucracy are given a helping hand. But the "unity" of the Great-Russian bureaucracy of the party with the bureaucracies of the minority parties is more readily encouraged, just as czarist Russia encouraged the unity of the aristocracies. Bolshevism, Sovietism, are essentially Russian: could they triumph and maintain themselves if they were not? But "sin" is not uniquely Russian; everyone is steeped in it and has shared its "merits." The national discontent today is far more an aspiration toward a way of life that corresponds to the spiritual and material desires to live in a noncommunist, "non-Russian" manner that resistance to Great-Russian exploitation and denationalization. For all suffer from the same sickness: even the Russians desire a personal form, more Russian, less communist. Political centralism, achieved through the centralist and monolithic party, corresponds best to the "Russians," the party's biggest and most privileged nucleus. This centralism is related to the centralism of the czarist bureaucracy, but they are not identical either in their ideas or in their social position, and even less in their possibilities. Czarist absolutism was inspired by an apathetic orthodox faith, it was largely based on the aristocracy, and it was greatly limited by the agrarian character of the country.

Today, everything is different, but the bond with "holy Russia" is not and could not be broken. Antisemitism is professed today--under the "Leninist"

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mask of anti-Zionism--as a symptom of the firing-up of the most fanatical and most violent forces. It would be absurd to accuse or to justify the Russians more than others. The peoples are victims, but not entirely innocent ones: even the Russian communists are Russians, just as much as the Chinese communists are Chinese. They have to be shown their chimeras, among which the belief in their specificity is the most frequent, and in the last analysis, the most disastrous for themselves. These illusions are most often expressed by force: one wants to impose one's models and one's ideas on the others. In the face of force, arguments, no matter what they are based on, are valueless if they are not founded on force. One has to be ready even for armed resistance in order to oppose the Russo-Soviet illusions, which are violent and armed.

Will the USSR Become a Rightist State?

The Soviet state, although grafted onto the czarist state, is quite a new phenomenon by virtue of the ideas and the social base which it has built for itself and maintains for its needs. Czarism was heading, somewhat irregularly, toward a constitutional monarchy. From Alexander II on, Russia was a rightist state, with many defects and inconsistencies, of course. The constitutional forms were consolidated under the reign of Nicholas II after the 1905 revolution. The czarist power and system were heavy with their despotic and Asiatic heritage, but a good many people do not know, or do not want to know, that the Bolsheviks were printing their organ, PRAVDA, legally, and had their deputies in the Duma.

The Soviet state is not undergoing any kind of evolution. The rare changes are imposed by circumstances or by the ambition of the leaders, but there is no evolution toward a more rational and more open order. Thus, the Stalinian constitution of 1936 only dissimulated, by means of purely verbal liberties, an immense and monstrous terror. The new constitution, that of Brezhnev, represents a step backward by comparison with Stalin's constitution. The expression "Soviet people" is an attempt to dissimulate the strengthening of Great-Russian hegemony. Law is subordinated to "socialism." The Communist Party is institutionalized (in this regard, the Yugoslavia of "self-management" has seniority) as the directing and dominant force.

The Soviet state is not a rightist state. Furthermore, no communist state is. I would even dare, in this case, to make a prophecy: the USSR will never become a rightist state in the true sense of the word. Not only because no dictatorship is or could be a rightist state in our era, but because the Soviet Union, by its nature, by the way in which it was conceived, by the means and ends of its existence, cannot become a rightist state, if "rightist state" implies the obligatory character of law, obligatory for the ruling power as well. In the USSR, there is no real legal and juridical power. Power, property and ideology belong to the party. Even if the laws exist, they serve to protect and regulate the power and the interests of this single social force. States are forced, by international law and interests, to behave toward the USSR as toward other states. But it would be naive and dangerous to believe that the USSR is a legal state, a state in the image of other legal states.

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A Petrified Ideology

The Soviet ideology--Marxism-Leninism--has been sterile since Stalin. Stalin understood that ideological creativity prevented the installation of the party's privileged and state-centered bureaucracy. He therefore codified the ideology. Stalin put the final touches on the symbiosis of Leninism and statism begun by Lenin. Ideology is petrified, but it is in this way that it has become usable as a means of power and expansion. The power and the shadow of Stalin are propagating over the world despite the anathemas and criticisms aimed at them. This is why it would be wise and realistic to evaluate the possibilities for utilization of ideology of ideology, rather than its degree of fossilization. The communist bureaucrats of the entire world, whether they are in power or hankering after it, do not presently need a coherent ideology, based on facts. Ideology is by its very essence superficial and empty, even when it appears to express profound and rational fluctuations of life. At the time of Hitler's invasion, the Soviet leaders had the idea of decreeing--quite so; for in the USSR, ideas are decreed!--the orthodox faith in the place Marxism-Leninism, but they never dreamed of renouncing their monopoly of power. The gloominess and simplistic character of the present ideology favor precisely the dominant class that is stabilized in the Soviet Union and the movements that tie their fate to it in one way or another. The orthodox faith became too "old hat" and ineffective to build a world empire, just as the other religious and philosophical teachings are too "old hat" for those who want to monopolize power so as to construct a "new man" and a "perfect society."

The Center and the Periphery

Communism as a worldwide, centralized movement does not exist.

Communisms exist everywhere, different in each country by their day-to-day policy, but with identical "ideals": totalitarian power "in order to" build a "new" society. Local conditions continue to force the communists to obtain support from--even to submit to--the Soviet Union. The common and internationalist ideal is presented as the major reason for these relationships, even though what is truly involved is an irresistible aspiration to total power. No communist party so far has ever shown itself ready to renounce this nonideal ideal in the interest of its people, of its homeland. The national communisms remind one of the rebel vassals who often remain more feudal than the suzerain. There are variants, of course, but variants of the initial model, of the Soviet model. Wars are possible between communist states, and they are already occurring (Vietnam-Cambodia, Somalia-Ethiopia). But for the time being, these are wars for domination, never for a change of the system. The Soviet Union can count everywhere--even in the most independent communist states, such as Yugoslavia, Albania and China--on potential "ideological" fifth columns.

World communism has disintegrated into national parties and the Soviet zone. There is no longer a world center of the "party." Nonetheless, Moscow remains the center in its capacity as the communist superpower. The totali-

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tarian forces of the world, communist and other, turn toward Moscow and find support there. The totalitarian aspirations in the world join in the hegemonism and military expansion of the Kremlin. These forces have the wind at their backs: Moscow is unconcerned and behaves in an ostensibly contemptuous manner toward the communist renegades--Eurocommunism, national communism and other revisionisms. From being a world ideological center, Moscow has become--this transformation began already under Stalin--an expansionist world force. The occupation of Afghanistan could be a turning-point in awareness, in getting rid of illusions about the USSR, but for Moscow this constitutes only one link in the long chain of its expansionism.

Revolutions are inherently aggressive. They imagine themselves to be the expression of "eternal truths." They believe they have monopolized the happiness and light of the future. Each communist revolution claims to play a world role, or at least, to enrich the "treasury" of Marxism-Leninism and of socialism. But such a possibility is really given only to the USSR, by reason of its power and its capacity to propagate its Messianism, by arms if need be. The Soviet party was the first to brandish this "truth," but it could not fulfill its world and historic role without recourse to arms. The other parties have not had this chance, this privilege, and this is why they belong to the lower order. There can only be one "chosen" party, like the "chosen people": the others can be independent or play a role only provisionally or imaginarily. For independence is above all a spiritual attitude, a creative awareness. It will be seen--for that matter it has already been seen--that Yugoslavia, with its anti-imperialist role denuded of originality and semidependent, has not done anything very much within the non-aligned movement except to pave the way for Soviet expansionism. This is true also for the revolutionary and aggressive actions of Vietnam in Kampuchea and of Cuba in Africa. Revolution and ideology are part of politics. And the booty is divided up according to power and wealth.

The Soviet System Is Changing--But How?

The Soviet system is changing. Slowly and irregularly, but it is changing. If it were not changing, the Soviet system would have stirred up against it those who constitute its support and enjoy the privileges that it offers them. But what is this change?

The Soviet system, by modifying its internal structures, does not offer any prospects for the evolution of other "non-Soviet" social forms or forces.

The Soviet system is a closed one, even for its own citizens. In it, one cannot choose either a different government or a different society. There are no revolts, class revolts or ideological ones. Only personal protests can arise: the madness of heroes. There are no classes with clearly defined limits. This is true also for ideologies and interests. Ideological power is the only source of privilege and the only way that leads to paradise. The majority are discontent, it may even be that the vast majority are discontent, but no one can undertake anything, for no one knows what he should undertake. Let someone propose the introduction of stockholder companies or

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elimination of the kolkhozes, and an immense majority of economists and philosophers will take him for an oddball despite the fact that state ownership and the kolkhozes are unproductive. All are incorporated into the system, "absorbed" by the power and by the ideology. This gives the Soviet system a terrifying collective force that one finds only among conquering tribes in the periods of their transformation into peoples.

This Soviet system cannot be changed by itself. Manifestations of opposition, "standing off" from the system, lead to a void or take one backward toward the vicious circle of the system.

Any new social formation--and this is doubtlessly the case with the Soviet system--clarifies the past eras in a new way. Many other military empires did not change essentially: they rotted from the inside, and once their decomposition was started, were destroyed by insurrections. This fate lies in wait for the USSR also. But meanwhile, a lot of water will flow in the Volga and a lot of blood will be spilled in the world.

The Soviet leaders know that they cannot catch up with the West on the technical level. But they can force the West militarily. They have already forced the European countries to work for them. They cannot--for the moment at least--succeed in this by means of direct military action. This is why they are applying a policy of "detente" in Europe, while they appropriate to themselves the raw materials of the underdeveloped countries by means of alliances and military and revolutionary interventions.

The closing-off of society, economic inefficiency and Messianic ideology lead to military expansion. The Russians and the other peoples of the Soviet empire have to get themselves killed in order for the system to be able to live. The internal forces of the Soviet system are such that not only do they not brake military expansion, they push it. Expansion and oppression constitute the base, the force of the system, inseparable, mutually dependent, without taking into account the internal fluctuations and the degree of technology. The dominant class has no objective or justification other than increasing its power over people.

I had called (in the TIMES of London) the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 the possible beginning of World War III, but a war that could still be prevented. Now, after the occupation of Afghanistan, I wonder: is it already too late? The Soviet Union could be stopped solely by a superior force. Such a power remains to be built. And the Soviets must also perceive that this force is superior to them. It is very unlikely that these two conditions will be fulfilled before the cataclysm.

The Class Struggle in the USSR

The classes and the class struggle were not first remarked by Marx, but it was he who formulated them as a fundamental law of history--of history up to Marx, naturally. Although I have long considered that there is no "fundamental law" of human society, I often tell myself that many of Marx's theo-

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ries, including his theory of the classes, are most applicable to the USSR. As I have already stressed, there are not any clearly defined classes in the Soviet Union. Only the party's professional bureaucracy is clearly delimited, rooted and extended to all the cells and all the forms. What is this social stratum, this "new class," to be called: a caste, a partitocracy (Av-torkhanov), a political class, apparatchiks? For someone, like myself, who does not go in for the systematic, scientific fashion of thinking, it is all the same. The essential fact is that this stratum has a monopoly on society and that it draws from this monopoly material and other privileges which it awards to itself at its pleasure. The dominant and monopolistic ideology is the ideology of this stratum, quite precisely as Marx said. Now according to Marx and Lenin, this stratum, by the fact that it holds a special and privileged position in production, does not work, but has means and income at its disposal and transforms itself into a power set above society. This social stratum's view of the world is in effect the image that it has of itself and of its mission, a distorted, ideological perception. In brief, Marx would have had a lot to say about the Soviet system if he were to review his own analyses of early capitalism and the Oriental despotisms.

Soviet Pragmatism

Which is more pragmatic: the United States or the USSR? Indisputably, the USSR, despite the fact that the Soviets rule out pragmatism as a philosophy. Although their mode of production is irrational, it is mainly their conquests that are senseless. Although they were doctrinaires, and precisely because they were doctrinaires of a "particular stamp," Lenin and Stalin rank among the most realistic, the most pragmatic of politicians. The roots of this pragmatism lie in Marx's thesis that interpretation of the world has no usefulness if it does not mean changing of it. According to Marx, therefore, doctrine has meaning if it goes hand in hand with action, if it serves a purpose. The Soviet leaders have neither prejudices nor ideals, neither faith nor hope: power has nothing to do with all that. Every action, especially external action, is weighed, calculated, prepared for. But they are not exempt from human weaknesses and errors, with the reservation that for them, errors do not constitute a sin but rather a misstep to be corrected in the following phase, by the aid of experience. And since they too are human, they will commit an enormous, a catastrophic error: their conquest will one day provoke the anger of the majority of humanity, and people will become aware of an unsuspected evil, never before seen, that propagates rashly through the world.

Power and Ideology

The economic weaknesses of the Soviet system are often overestimated in the West. Some even think that the system could be softened by technological and cultural cooperation. The Soviet economy, among other things, is really inefficient--perhaps the most inefficient in the world--and not only in agriculture but in industry too. This leads to a standard of living that is incomprehensibly, unjustly low for a country that abounds in natural and human resources. The "error" is at the heart of the system, in the monopoly

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of the party oligarchy and apparatus. But this does not mean--as is too frequently and malevolently stressed by the professional anticommunists--that the Soviet authorities desire the misery and unhappiness of their people. Every power wants well-being, success, but those that achieve them are rare. This is true also for the Soviet rulers. The trouble is that they identify well-being and the good with their concepts and their interests. That is why the Soviet criteria are different: there is no misfortune or evil great enough for the party bureaucracy to beat a retreat from its "historic" aspirations. This means also that it is possible to do business and reach compromises with the Soviets to the extent that it does not threaten their exclusive possession of power.

Westerners or Slavophiles

Politics is life, a concentrated, rationalized life. It is for this reason that political ideas can become vital in proportion to their degree of symbiosis with the spontaneous and irrational aspirations of the masses.

Now let us set aside the theories. Who has greater prospects in the Soviet Union--the "Westerners" or the "Slavophiles": Sakharov or Solzhenitsin? I would say right off (though my views are closer to those of Sakharov) that Solzhenitsin--that is, the national and orthodox current--has greater chances, at least at the beginning of postcommunist Russia. It is incorrect to think that Russia has been and has remained a "servile spirit" and an "enslaved country." Even in Russia, the seed of democracy had germinated. All of Europe's 19th century was illuminated by the freethinking Russian writers and heroes. Even the absolute Stalinist terror could not stifle the spirit of liberty. But it is also true that in Russia, the dominant structures of politics and ideology have remained autocratic. The passage from orthodoxy and czarism to Bolshevism was not so incomprehensible and unacceptable to the lower strata. The faltering Church and the autocracy were replaced by ideology and the police state. Europe has not been and is not immunized against the totalitarian forms. No one has a patent on liberty, not even Europe. Liberty is always created in a new, concrete manner.

Russia is European without being so: everything depends on one's point of view. Europe attracted the so-called enlightened strata, part of the intelligentsia and of the aristocracy. The lower strata and the power have remained Russian, as at the beginning. I think that these strata would accept Solzhenitsin more readily than Sakharov. Sakharov is too rational, too democratic, for a Russia that has not known the rationalist philosophies and the parliamentary era.

Let us not try to figure out what such a Russia would signify for Europe. For the moment, it suffices to hope that it would not desire to impose its beliefs and forms on the world by force, although Soviet ideologues are already appearing who consider that the camps and the purges are only Messianic sacrifices for Russia and that only an all-powerful Soviet power can create the conditions for conversion of the entire world to the orthodox faith.

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The Distress and the Future of the Opposition

The fatal petrification and progression of the Soviet system oblige one automatically to conclude that the opposition is sterile and in distress. In fact it is difficult to give the dissident currents any chance whatsoever, if we take it to mean coming to power or even a change, a reform of the system. The system is the result of innumerable and varied programs: no one has any clarity or consistency on essential questions (the modes of ownership, the forms of power, the national question).

No one has truly dug deep into the reasons for the opposition and the repudiation. Furthermore, this was not possible in the face of the monolithism of the system: even the opponents of the 19th-century Russian czars had no realistic visions, no program. The system had begun to rot, but it did not decompose. In itself, by the fact of its decomposition, it offers no credible prospects to anyone. In the absence of any movement, it has heroic men. This is Russia's "trouble": and Russia has always cherished them.

But the opponents are not useless or without any future, any more than they were in the czarist epoch. Banished from the system, they stir up awareness by their protests and their sacrifices, and they wrench the most creative and most considerable minds away from the system. They lay bare the imperfection of the system's monolithism. They show that faults and ferments of decomposition exist. They diminish the insolence of the powerful and unmask the fraud of their "truths." Even more, they constitute a link, the only link between their people and the free people of the entire world. Life has not stopped. If they do not have their chance today, they will have it tomorrow, when they will belong to a "glorious past." Finally, they are brothers and comrades in suffering of all those who struggle--as they are able and in the name of any idea whatsoever--to improve the human condition and extend the liberty of man. Solidarity is their duty and their right. Without it, men would have mutually destroyed one another. Those who consider--because they are without influence, alone and persecuted--that "this is simply better than nothing" commit an error and a sin: they are the only good that Russia and the peoples of the Soviet Union can offer to the world and to their future. The visions and sacrifices of today are not always the future reality, but the reality has always been preceded by visionary sacrifices.

Heraclitus says that nature loves to hide itself. Thus the "new" Brezhnevian reality has mystified the world. Yes, the world, the entire world, Soviet and non-Soviet.

After Khrushchev's removal, followed by the enthronement of Brezhnev, there was a lot of talk about "re-Stalinization." The system has been quite simply corrected and adapted in various ways. In an initial phase, Khrushchev's frankness was pleasing to the dominant stratum, anxious to reduce the protagonists of the Stalinist terror to powerlessness. But Khrushchev's ambitions went farther. He had begun to impose confused ideas and carried out some ill-considered, unverifiable experiments. The enthronement of a

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different leader was required in order to balance and rationalize the system.

Khrushchev's overzealous "de-Stalinization" deprived the party bureaucracy of its "glorious" past, and by the same token, of a "radiant" future.

Brezhnev's personality--unimaginative, heavy, unintellectual and spiritless--satisfied the needs of the party's oligarchy. If it made him a dictator, it is because the centralist and nondemocratic political structure requires its.

The personage and the epoch coincided. The political reality was dissimulated and fooled the politicians of the West. It was thought, it seemed, that so monotonous an epoch and so drab a personage could not engender anything important. But things did happen, in an indiscernible and impalpable manner: the bureaucracy of the Soviet party consolidated itself, and the Soviet-Russian state's seizures turned into worldwide expansionism.

Evaluation of Brezhnev's reign, as of any historical phenomenon, depends on one's point of view; and from the point of view of the party bureaucracy and Soviet imperialism, this reign, still uncompleted, has succeeded, even if it could have been crowned with more successes.

Peoples and their eminent protagonists manifest, depending on the conditions and the necessities, sometimes one quality and sometimes another. The Russian people are obsessed--always, ceaselessly--by their missionary labor. This characteristic is valid for others too and should not be considered necessarily negative. But the Russians are the most coherent in this regard, the most "consistent," perhaps because of their irresistible bent for final, ideal, eternal solutions. Russia is not separated from the West solely by its system and political aspirations but also by something deeper: by its way of thinking, its manner of reasoning. The Russians--not all of them, to be sure, but those who occupy the summit of the hierarchy--start from absolute, a-priori truths, while the "Western" way of thinking only trends toward [line missing] entire, especially when they want to be beneficiaries. Russian literature, which is incomparable in the depth to which it probes psychologies and fatality, is entirely, almost entirely, prophetic. The Russians continue to believe in the prophets, and follow them. The West, on the contrary, has understood at times that the prophets are a necessary additive for enrichment of understanding, but that following their teaching leads to misfortune and defeat. No one has fabricated the destiny of the Russians. When it arrives, they will perceive clearly that, like the Germans, every people has its own Messianism and that for this reason, it will not want to adopt their "truths" and their "assistance." Messianism, though not a malady specific to the Russians, is a typically Russian malady. The obverse of this malady--its remedy--is found in the West, in pragmatism. Messianism is only at first sight more spiritual, less vulgar, than pragmatism. We now have the opportunity to perceive the madness of the former and the futility of the latter.

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The Soviet Union and Western Europe

I do not believe that the Soviet Union intends to occupy Western Europe by force, but I am convinced that it would like to enslave it. Occupation without war would be the most desirable for it, the most ideal of forms. The Soviet power knows perfectly well that it cannot rival the West: such rivalry has never existed, each has followed its own evolution. The Soviet soul is force, power. Why not subjugate Western Europe, since for the time being it is not possible to subjugate the United States and force it to produce for Russia? The expansion in Africa, Asia and elsewhere is only a general repetition of the subjugation of Europe. Raw materials are, naturally, welcome to the Soviets, although they are not short of them for the moment. But it would be foolish to believe that the Soviets will set themselves to aiding Africa or Indochina, since they themselves have no shortage of dearths and penuries of African or Indochinese type.

The Communists and the Soviet Union

It is the Chinese who best judge the Soviet Union, its intentions and plans. However, the Chinese do not have a bigger or smaller brain, still less a different brain. The Chinese--in terms of system and ideology--come from the same stock as the Soviets, they have the same social "ideal," but at the same time, they are separated from the Soviets and in conflict with them. They have had intimate contact with them. The Yugoslav estimations are not very sure, even though the Yugoslav political system is close to the Soviet one. Weak, isolated, bewildered and carried away by the Utopia of non-alignment, the Yugoslavs hope that Soviet intentions will not one day be so mischievous and so perverse. In this specific case, it would be better not to nourish hopes, not to have illusions.

Communism and the Soviet Union are linked historically, spiritually, fundamentally. However, it would be wise to separate them in political practice. Communists revolt against the Soviet Union, although communism has been and still is the instrument most heavily used for the expansion of the Russo-Soviet state. Communist states are ready to resist Soviet aggression.

Uprisings, wars and revolutions are part of humanity's current history. What can the peoples, the social groups, do except take up arms when the dominant power, by its irrationalism and its violence, impedes their evolution toward greater liberty?

The Myth of Revolution

Idealizing revolution--revolution as fate, revolution as last enchantment, as midwife of history--is the fruit of European thought, a relatively new creation. The cold, rational, "scientific" analysis of the French encyclopedists first of all, and later of the Marxists and the anarchists, created this myth and the mystique of revolution. This mystical discovery is largely at the origin of the glorification and idealization of the French Revolution and especially of the Russian Revolution. This belief implies not only the necessity of revolution, but also the most ardent eschatology. It leads

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to the most disastrous illusion of the industrial era and of modern thought. In effect, revolution and its consequences are not separated from the revolutionary mystique. In plain language: the profound vulgarity of power and of the new oppressors is justified, even identified, with mystique and Utopia. At the same time, mystique and Utopia are presented and accepted as the proofs of the triumph of revolution.

Russia received this mystique from Europe and, "Russifying" it, imposed it on the entire world. But Europe did not thereby rid itself of its spiritual daughter. There are many admirers--especially in the Latin countries, where the "celestial kingdom" and revolutionary rhetoric are appreciated--of the "achievements" of the Soviet comrades and of the "historic importance" of the Russian Revolution. Even worse, they treat the Russian Revolution as the "historic" sequel of the French Revolution. There is as much truth in this ideological scheme as in identification of the French with the Russians: that is all there is to it. Thus, Europe is disarming spiritually in the face of "Russia"--in other words, in the face of Soviet expansion.

The Soviet Union has adopted the myth of revolution as its own. Even more, it makes use of this myth to dupe the West, especially the European communists. Reproaching "certain parties" for their incomprehension (this holds true for the French CP also), NOVOE VREMIA (New Times) explains the invasion of Afghanistan this way: "Does the internationalist solidarity of revolutionaries imply only moral and diplomatic support, wishes for success, or does it also involve...offering material aid, including military aid? ... In fact, when a system of socialist states exists, to dispute the right to such assistance would be quite simply incoherent. Renouncing the possibilities at the disposal of the socialist countries would in fact mean avoiding doing one's internationalist duty and making the world return to the era when imperialism could at its will stifle all the revolutionary movements with impunity" (according to POLITIKA of 17 January 1980).

Aristotle quotes this verse from an unknown poet: "Truth is one, deceit is multiple." Conquest and enslavement have multiple motivations, but there can only be one struggle against them.

The Soviet Union, the West, and War

The West fears war more than the Soviet Union does. Perhaps because the Western societies of today (this "today" is important, because it has not been thus always and everywhere) can exist without war. This fear is accompanied in the West by a profound fear of atomic war. There is something fatalistic in this fear, but even more, it is demoralizing. Obviously, this panic does not come from awareness of an atomic cataclysm. People think the same way in the East, in the Soviet Union, this fact is well-known, although one does not find antiatomic demonstrations or "revolts of conscience" by atomic researchers there. Therefore, something deeper, more existential, must be involved. Living in the East, in Yugoslavia, I have not succeeded in deciphering this enigma, even in part. I would only say that there is less fear of atomic war in the East because people are convinced that the

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Soviet government would reply with the same weapons and perhaps with even more terrifying weapons if the West were to use the atomic weapon. Isn't this the reason for the Western panic? In the West, one is not convinced of the cynicism of the governments in power.

I recall that when the Americans dropped the first atom bombs on Japan, Kardelj prophesied that the atomic weapon could rule out war in general. Tito showed himself more prudent, more imprecise in his conclusions. I did not believe that atomic weaponry would succeed in eliminating war as a means of policy, because I started from the Marxist dogma on the fundamental incompatibility of capitalism and socialism. I continue to think the same thing, though I do not believe very much in an atomic war and though I have abandoned the doctrine of irreconcilable antagonisms. Today I simply consider that it is not possible to invent a theory, a system, that satisfies everyone: there will always be some "special" people or "geniuses," social groups, ideologies, beliefs, entire peoples discontent with the situation and the existing relationships. War is at least as human as peace. As for fear of war, and even of atomic war: those who cross the frontier of death survive and triumph.

Milovan Djilas
Belgrade, December 1979-January 1980
(translated from the Serbian)

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