

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080019-1

8 MAY 1980

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(FOUO 10/80)

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8 May 1980

# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 10/80)

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USSR REPORT  
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INTERNATIONAL

BURLATSKIY SPECULATES ON FUTURE CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow VOPROSY FILOSOFII in Russian No 2, 1980 pp 112-125

[Article by F.M. Burlatskiy, head of the Department of Philosophy of the Institute of Social Sciences: "On the Socioeconomic and Political System of the PRC"]

[Text] What is the future of modern China? World public opinion is attentively following the struggles, the searches and sacrifices of this billion people and thirsts to understand what can be expected from China in the future. We will not make forecasts for the long-term future. We will ponder something else: what can be considered relatively settled, determined, as a tendency in the life of modern China?

We have before us thirty years of experience of the existence of post-revolutionary China--27 years under Mao Zedong and three years under his successors. There is no doubt that modern China is a unique and paradoxical phenomenon. A country which calls itself socialist, a state which considers itself a dictatorship of the proletariat, a party which declares that it is the "most consistent Marxist-Leninist party," is conducting a patently antisocialist foreign policy, directed against the countries of the socialist camp, the international communist movement, against the policy of peace and social progress throughout the world.

In the mid-50's, when this extremist course was born, it was possible to think that we were dealing with a random zig-zag in the political history of China, it was possible to expect that the forces would be found in the country which would restore the foreign domestic and foreign policy, and come closer to the positions of scientific socialism and internationalism. But now, when more than two decades of the "zig-zag" have passed, is it not time to evaluate anew what has taken place and to think about whether this "zig-zag" is not a stable phenomenon, which will find its continuation in the future as well in one form or another.

Radical Nationalism and Great Powerism

Not very much time has passed since the death of Mao Zedong. It is still too early to make final conclusions regarding the directions of the domestic

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and foreign policy followed by the new leaders of China, about their attitude toward the ideological and political heritage of the deceased chairman of the Communist Party of China. But yet certain tendencies have already appeared with a greater or lesser degree of certainty.

The first is the very obvious conclusion which suggests itself, and is contained in the futility of the hopes that the death of the "great helmsman" will lead to strengthening the unity of his successors. As is known, Mao Zedong conducted work that was gigantic in its scope and effort and unheard of in its cruelty, work directed against everyone who even in the slightest degree was able to be suspected of opposition leanings to his ideology, politics, or culture. The "cultural revolution," which led to dramatic consequences for the political system, for the higher leadership, for the whole party, had as one of its main goals to guarantee during the life and after the death of Mao the complete elimination of opposition forces, to insure unity on the platform of the "ideas of Mao Zedong."

We see now how illusory this hope was, how fruitless the gigantic efforts and sacrifices were. The death of Mao Zedong led to the most acute clash of forces on the political Olympus of China. The ideological platform of Maoism (just exactly like the "eleven great political campaigns" to which Hua Guofeng referred at the 11th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party have not given even a minimum guarantee against a new round of an acute struggle for power, for influence, and even over problems of ideology and politics.

The second and to a certain degree sensational event was the catastrophic downfall of the "leftists"--namely those leaders who were closest of all to Mao Zedong. The defeat of the "gang of four" is the defeat of the people who had practically the strongest influence on Mao Zedong in the last 10 years.

Thirdly, it is possible to establish the temporary consolidation of the new political leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The rapprochement of representatives of the "old guard"--Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying and others with figures from the period of the "cultural revolution," and particularly Hua Guofeng, for a certain time consolidated the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the PRC. But only for a certain time. Fundamental problems of policy still are not properly being discussed, the course of domestic, and particularly foreign, policy still is not being worked out and it is possible to foresee an acute struggle before this course is stabilized for an extended period. There is no doubt that the struggle around policy and ideology, just as before, is closely intertwined with the struggle for power and influence.

A symptom of the acute struggle between the "raisers" of the banner of Mao Zedong and the "undercutters" of this banner (this is the terminology of the official Chinese press) is the speech of the vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Ye Jianying at a meeting

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in Beijing devoted to the 30th anniversary of the PRC on 29 September 1979. It is acknowledged in the report that in the course of the "cultural revolution" the country was thrust into "chaos," "into an atmosphere of bloody terror," that implanted in the country was a "dictatorship rotten to the core and the most dismal fascism with a mixture of feudalism." The guilt for all this is placed, of course, on the "gang of four," although it is known to all that the "cultural revolution" was led by Mao Zedong, which was told about in the documents of the 9th and 10th congresses of the Chinese Communist Party.

Fourthly, it is possible to establish definite shifts in the domestic policy of the new leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in comparison with Mao Zedong's line. This concerns first of all the economic policy, the policy in the field of science, culture, and military affairs. The policy of the "four modernizations," enunciated, by the way, during the life of Mao Zedong, has been made the basis of all the domestic policy of the present Chinese leaders.

The new leaders of the Communist Party of China have considered it expedient to lean upon the cult of Mao Zedong in the hopes of strengthening their power and consolidating their forces in the party. In re-examining some or other clearly ineffective and unpractical policies of Mao, the new leaders nonetheless are "saving face" and are trying to be guided by the teaching of Mao in the struggle against these or other extremes of his policy. The foundations of the ideology of Maoism have not swayed. In this is the chief contradiction of the present moment, since the struggle for implementation of the proclaimed policy of the "four modernizations," the movement forward in this direction are becoming less and less possible with the preservation of Maoism as the ideological foundation of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese state.

What can be considered as stabilized in the development of modern China?

Now it is already possible to speak about fully revealed tendencies in the development of China which have cut a path for themselves across all the troubles of the struggle of the leading political forces with its movements "to the right" and "to the left."

In the 30 years from 1949 to 1979 the personal composition of the ruling clique in China has changed more than once. Were the serious changes in domestic and foreign policy connected with this? To a certain degree these were connected (excluding the period of 1949-1958 when in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party there were still internationalists and when continuing in operation were the general tendencies of unity, friendship, and cooperation of the PRC with the USSR and other socialist countries). The foreign policy of China proceeded, in essence, in the very same direction, although certain shifts were observed from isolationism and diplomatic passivity to a high level of activeness on the international arena. Domestic policy underwent great changes. However the overall

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course of economic, social and cultural policy in 1957-1979 with all the fluctuations also has proceed in one, Maoist, direction.

Of course, the different figures in China are greatly different from one another; each of them is distinguished by his own, often quite distinctive and striking individuality; in many ways their views also differ on some questions or others of ideology and politics. Nevertheless they are all (except for the consistent internationalists) brought together by certain common typical traits. These are personalities of a radical leftist national movement. Li Lisan is right when he says that they are all "leftists,"--leftists in comparison with rightists of the Chiang Kaishek type. Therefore, independent of whether they are "moderates," like Zhou Enlai, or "rightists" like Liu Shaoqi, "leftists" like Lin Biao, or "ultraleftists" like Jiang Qing, characteristic of these and others is radicalism, an inclination toward violence, social utopianism (to a greater or lesser degree) and, finally, the main trait--nationalism.

Both on the individual level and as public figures they are united by a burning hatred for national oppression and for national-colonial oppression, to which China was subjected, and the thirst for restoration of its independence, its grandeur. These just feelings, however, have played a malicious joke on many of the Chinese leaders, when the progressive nature of the national-liberation movement exhausted itself. A completely new problem, gigantic in its scale, arose: to accustom the Chinese nation of many millions to modern industrial and cultural and, moreover, socialist life. Here is where nationalism unexpectedly took on a negative charge, it became ballast, a burden, a very difficult obstacle on the path of struggle for solution of the new problems.

It was a great misfortune for the country that the new pleiade of leaders, raised under the conditions of the raging of Maoist leftism, extremism, and nationalism, was still prepared to a lesser degree than its predecessors for solution of the new difficult tasks.

The main tendency in the ideology of the leading political forces is, undoubtedly, nationalism. In addition, before us is a new type of nationalistic China. It differs from the Kuomintang type and in addition is like it. This difference could with a certain bit of conventionality be defined as radical-nationalism. This is a matter of nationalism having a certain social-class direction. This is nationalism which reflects the most radical currents which have arisen in the framework of the national-liberation movement and have spilled out beyond these limits. In addition, this is nationalism fermented on petty bourgeois revolutionary character with all of its excesses both with respect to social changes and with respect to the foreign policy line. We are inclined to call this new line radical-nationalism, and not social-nationalism, since its most characteristic trait is extremism, a tendency toward extreme methods and forms of its manifestation. This radicalism either may have or may not have a social tint, serve internal class transformations or ignore them,

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but it is always combined with an inclination toward coercion, toward excesses, with the ability to pursue different and even opposite social goals.

No matter what has been said by Mao Zedong, his successors and heirs, the national greatness of China for them is a synonym of great powerism. The fact that this is a typical manifestation of nationalism does not cause any doubt among any serious researcher or publicist writing about modern China. In the person of Mao Zedong and his minions we are dealing with ideologists of the nationalism of a previously oppressed nation, moreover a great nation, which over a millenium itself appeared in the role of oppressor of the "barbarian" nations surrounding it. Nationalism of this type is increased tenfold by remembrances of its own former many centuries of supremacy and the outraged feeling of humility in the period of colonial dependence.

The basic motto of this radical-nationalism is to turn China into a mighty power. Mao Zedong spoke about a mighty military power. The new leaders of China talk again and again about a mighty socialist power. However their motto of the "four modernizations" has military modernization as its basis. It is not hard to foresee that as time passes, the more namely this goal will come to the forefront. Military modernization--as the main support of political prestige in the modern world, the prestige of the country and its leaders; military modernization--as an effective palliative of the common national goal, unifying all strata of Chinese society; military modernization--as the guarantee of a new, perhaps, dominating role of the billion-strong China at the start of the next millenium.

"We are the greatest country in number of people, richness of spiritual traditions of the past and one of the most backward countries in economics and technology"--this sentence literally had not been uttered by Mao Zedong when it was adopted by the modern figures of China. When it is not possible in a short time to overtake the industrially developed countries ("the great leap forward"), a sole alternative remains--militarization. The slogan "steel and bombs" is transformed into "steel for bombs." And then the symbol of national power becomes mainly modernization of the army, the acquisition of nuclear rocket potential.

Let us remark that all the personalities mentioned above, including the most "right-wing" (Deng Xiaoping), have alluded to the theory of the "three worlds." China's role in these "three worlds" seems to them not at all like the role of one of the developing countries. No, they lay claim to supremacy--to the role of unifier of two worlds in the struggle against the two "superpowers," and at the present time exclusively against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist commonwealth. This is the role of an "inside-out superpower," the main might of which should be the system of alliances symbolizing the new redivision of the modern world.

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Of course, this is the next utopia: it is impossible to redivide the world when ignoring the objectively existing social conditions, and also the established traditional political relations and preferences. But this new social utopia is capable of turning one's head no less than the former, touching upon the internal development of China ("great leap," "people's communes," "cultural revolution"). Turned this time to the outside, the further along the more this utopia will do harm to the cause of the struggle for peace and social progress on the international arena.

The foreign policy orientation of the political leaders of China is based on the simplest premise about national advantages and interests, interpreted, however, from the positions of racial-nationalism and the goals of great-powerism subordinated to this.<sup>1</sup> National interests understood in this period have engendered and stimulate the orientation of modern China to those countries which manifest interest in the militarization of China, in consolidating its might, in its still greater affirmation of the positions of radical-nationalism. Clearly it is the countries of capitalism--the participants in the imperialist NATO block and other states which are being impressed namely by this new role of China.

Anti-Sovietism is the trump card in this nationalistic game. Using the policy of anti-Sovietism, igniting all fears and terrors, supposedly coming from the USSR, the Chinese leaders are obtaining large dividends: military and economic aid from developed countries of the West and Japan, active political support, and full moral rehabilitation. The Chinese leaders are gaining freedom of action within the country. The West does not care as long as the opposition is preserved between China and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.<sup>2</sup>

Extremism of the foreign policy of China is undoubtedly an established tradition. To where will it be directed? Right now its spearhead is directed against the USSR and other countries of socialism. The aggression of China against Vietnam was a reflection of the general course of the foreign policy of this country. Even at the present time in practical politics of China coming more and more to the forefront is the striving to affirm its hegemony in Asia and particularly in the Southeast. At the same time, it is not excluded that in the very near future China will turn on Africa. In exactly the same way it is impossible to rule out that by virtue of the growing rivalry it will become advantageous for the leaders of China not only and not so much to "play the card" or anti-Sovietism, but also the anti-Japanese, and the anti-Indian, and even the anti-American card. Radical-nationalism finds its manifestation in extremist foreign policy, the vectors of which may be directed to various sides.<sup>3</sup>

On what kind of socioeconomic foundation is the radical-nationalistic and great-power line of the Chinese leaders being carried out? In other words, what is the basis of the modern Chinese society?

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Petit Bourgeois and Semifudal "Socialism"

We must not be misled by the adherence of the Chinese leaders to the mottoes of socialism. Socialism has become the banner of the 20th century similar to the way democracy was the banner of the 19th century. Now no one is surprised by socialist slogans.

Now they are followed by social-democrats, trotskyites, left-wing radicals, Christian socialists, Arab and African socialists and even terrorists from the "red brigades." Maoism as an ideology and political practice occupies a special place in this movement. What is it?

Zealous admirers of China hastened to declare Maoism and the practical experience of the PRC, especially the experience of the "cultural revolution," as the Chinese "model of socialism." Typical in this respect is the position of the well-known revisionist theoretician R. Garaudy.

Advocating the idea of different models of socialism--the "Soviet," "Chinese," "Czechoslovak," and "French"--R. Garaudy overlooks the main one: socialism, substituting it for nationalism, scarcely concealed social radicalism and a revolutionary phrase. What remains of the Chinese "model of socialism" if, in the words of R. Garaudy himself, connected with it is an "adventuristic policy," based on "distortions and even crimes," "violent anti-Sovietism in the name of attempts to establish Chinese hegemony over the international communist movement," "a split in the camp of socialism," and so on? What remains of the socialist ideal if the nation becomes a victim of adventuristic experiments of the unchecked power of its leaders, laying claim to the role of creators of a new symbol of faith?

The very raising of the question of different models of socialism does not bear criticism. With all the features of these or other countries there exists a single historical type of socialism, just like the single type of capitalism, despite its more or less substantial differences in the United States, the FRG, Japan, and France.

This scarcely contradicts the necessity of creative application of the principles of socialism to the concrete conditions of each country, of each nation, of each given historical period. This requirement is especially important when talking about such countries as China, which has not passed through any significant stage of capitalist development and bears the load of the pre-capitalist method of production, the imperial traditions of power, which has been reflected in the particular features of the culture, ideology, and mass consciousness.

Socialist construction in China, a country that is backward in an economic respect, with a huge predominance of a peasant population, could not help but take on certain--and even very substantial--specific features. For instance, the degree of centralization and concentration of power, probably, should be higher than in other countries of socialism, both by virtue of

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the centuries-old traditions of power and the gigantic size of this country of many millions, as well as by virtue of the fact that the revolution in China was accompanied by a violent civil war. But how, all the same, should the essence of the sociopolitical structure of modern China be designated?

It seems that for the solution of this problem we are rendered invaluable assistance by the ideas of K. Marx and F. Engels relative to different political and social currents appearing under the slogan of socialism, expressed even in the "Communist Manifesto." Let us recall that given here is a description of four types of ideologies of socialism:

1. Reactionary socialism, which includes feudal socialism;
2. Conservative or bourgeois socialism;
3. Critical utopian socialism;
4. Communism.

Of especial significance from the standpoint of the problem of interest to us is the description of feudal and petit bourgeois socialism, reflecting the interests of two classes, which one way or another oppose the development of a capitalist society. Feudal socialism, in the words of K. Marx and F. Engels, is "half a dirge, half a lampoon, half an echo of the past, half a threat to the future."

Let us note that feudal socialism not only reflects the past of human history, but also is a threat to the future, and let us turn further to the description of petit bourgeois socialism that is especially important for us. K. Marx and F. Engels write: "In such countries as France, where the peasantry comprises much more than half of the whole population, naturally there was an emergence of writers who, standing on the side of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, in their criticism of the bourgeois system affixed to it a petit bourgeois and small peasant yardstick and defended the cause of the workers from a petit bourgeois point of view. This is how petit bourgeois socialism arose... This socialism strives either to restore the old means of production and exchange and along with them the old relationships of ownership and the old society, or it strives with a new force to cram modern means of production and exchange into the framework of the old relationships of ownership, relationships which were already demolished by them and needed to be demolished."<sup>4</sup> Certainly we are far from the affirmation that supposedly the history of modern China is a simple illustration of these conclusions of Marx and Engels, relevant for the most part to the reflection of the still not formalized social movement in literature. But still it is exactly these very valuable prognostic ideas of the founders of scientific socialism which give us the key to an understanding of what is taking place in China.

The initial positions for the battle for socialism in China were hardly less favorable than in France before the revolution of 1848, which was written about by K. Marx and F. Engels. On the eve of the revolution in 1949 China was a semifeudal society, the overwhelming majority of which was comprised of patriarchal peasantry, a country where landlord property rights were preserved, where capitalism received rather one-sided

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development, taking on the form of state-bureaucratic capitalism, in which the interests of high officials, the compradore bourgeoisie and foreign capital were closely intertwined.

In prerevolutionary China there were extremely few prerequisites for the transition to socialism: there was an undeveloped economy, a not yet formed working class, the absence of any significant stratum of specialists, a colossal burden of semifeudal relationships, traditions of imperial rule and patriarchal ideology. Under such conditions a central place was occupied objectively by the tasks of industrialization, of modernization of the national economy, of active growth of all productive forces as the basis for gradual and consistent rebuilding of social relations on socialist principles.

Such a policy was developed by the 8th congress of the Chinese Communist Party. However the left-wing nationalist elements, headed by Mao Zedong, not desiring to tolerate a prospect of an extended struggle for realization of the desired goal (turning China into a mighty state), began to force very radical transformations in the sphere of ownership, and then in the whole system of economic relations. Although this was passed off as socialism and even as communism, it had an imaginary socialist character and served as an excellent illustration of the statements cited above by K. Marx and F. Engels about the forcible cramming of modern means of production into the framework of old relationships of ownership.

The whole matter is in that putting the ownership of property in the hands of the state--as was predicted by K. Marx and F. Engels and confirmed by our era--is not at all identical to affirmation of socialist ownership and socialist production relations. There is no doubt that the prevalence of private ownership engenders an exploitative society. But does state ownership always inevitably lead to social equality and socialism? The experience of our century gives a negative answer to this question. State ownership is a flexible form of ownership. It may serve both socialist and non-socialist goals.

In our era it is possible to differentiate the following types of state ownership in nonsocialist countries:

1. State-monopolistic ownership under the conditions of developed capitalism, where the state sector comprises 20-30 percent in industry. Under such conditions the state on the whole expresses the interests of the monopoly (and also to one degree or another of the whole bourgeoisie), and state ownership ultimately serves the interests of these monopolies.
2. State-capitalist ownership, characteristic for countries of underdeveloped capitalism, which have not yet reached their monopolistic stage. This can be observed particularly in the developing countries of capitalist orientation, and also in many medium-developed capitalist countries, for instance, in Latin America. State ownership in developing countries of

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capitalist orientation attains 50 and sometimes 70-80 percent in industry, but it hardly serves as the basis for socialist relations and changes.

3. Feudal state ownership. This type of ownership can be observed in a number of developing countries, and particularly in Africa. In many cases feudal state ownership is intertwined with state capital, an example of which is Saudi Arabia.

What is the criterion for relating state ownership to socialist ownership? First of all the character of the production relations (the absence of exploitation), the nature of power (working class and laborers lead the state), the way of life (high living standard, satisfaction of economic and social rights and participation of the workers in management). State ownership becomes socialist not because it is state, but because it is in the hands of a socialist state, which disposes of the property in the interests of the working class and all laborers. This means that state property plays the same role played by the state itself. An important external indicator of the character of the system is the policy--economic, social, cultural and foreign policy as well.

Where does the national income go in China? To the development of military production, to the solution of nationalistic super-problems, to turning the country in a short time into the dominant power in the modern world? Or to the development of public production and fuller satisfaction of the needs of the workers? Who is distributing the property? Are the workers participating in administration of the state, in determining the economic and social goals of development? In other words, is a socialist democracy being implemented? What is the role of the state on the international arena, is it subordinating its own policy to the interests of the Chinese workers, is it entering into an alliance with other socialist nations and countries or is it subordinating its activity to the attainment of great-power goals? These are the questions, the answers to which will make it possible for us to judge properly the nature of the socioeconomic and political system in China.

As the Chinese leaders themselves note, in the last 10-12 years there has been a sharp intensification of the technical lag of the PRC behind the developed powers. In a number of its sectors, such as the automobile, tractor and aircraft sectors, not one large enterprise of the modern type has appeared since the beginning of the 60's. The proportion of small-scale semi-handicraft production occupies 50 percent in the gross product of industry. Backward productive forces comprise the real basis of the production relations, far from an industrial socialist base. It is enough to compare the productive forces of the PRC with the productive forces of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe in order to understand how far China is from the creation of the material and technical bases of socialism.

But even the existing productive forces are hardly being used for strengthening the socialist base. The policy of militarization of the economy

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has deformed the process of establishment of the productive forces of socialism. More than 40 percent of the state budget goes for the military industry, in other words, it is fully withdrawn from the sphere of social consumption of the Chinese population.

If we approach the understanding of socialism with such criteria, it is impossible not to conclude that modern China is extremely far from the truly socialist ideal. We are observing in it what Marx called a manifestation of petty bourgeois and even semifeudal "socialism" in economics and social relationships and radical-nationalism and great-powerism in ideology and foreign policy. This is reality, this is the present stage of the development of China.

Under such conditions the matter is not saved by the dominance of state ownership in the city and cooperative ownership in the countryside. Production relations are subordinate to those ideals which are far from socialism. Let us recall that from the very beginning Mao and his adherents undertook extreme measures in order sharply to reduce the time of socialization of ownership in the city and the country. At the beginning it seemed this was simply the result of revolutionary impatience, but soon it became clear that a feverish struggle for the national greatness and supremacy of China stood behind this.

Whereas in the Soviet Union socialization of industry and agriculture took almost 20 years, in China it took a little more than five years. In the Soviet Union the period of industrialization took not less than 15 years; in China an attempt was made to make this historic advance in 10 years, despite the lower starting level of economic development. The "Great Leap" and "communization" were, consequently, a continuation and intensification of that policy of the headlong and spasmodic "sprint for communism," which Mao Zedong and his adherents tried to thrust on the country after the victory of the people's revolution. The search for a particularly Chinese road to socialism, which found its reflection in the policy of the "great leap," "people's communes," and the "cultural revolution" ended in a total failure. Mao Zedong did not think about returning to the path of true socialism, embodied in the experience of the USSR and other countries of the socialist commonwealth. What remained? It remained to rebel, to destroy, to engage in political campaigns which would divert the party and the masses from recognition of the obvious fact: the Chinese "model of socialism" has turned out to be a social utopia or an open demagogy.

It is characteristic that Mao Zedong did not bequeath anything to his successors, nothing besides continuation of the campaign of the "cultural revolution," which found its theoretical expression in the slogan "continue the revolution under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat," which was wholly taken up by his successors. He did not leave any kind of "bequest" on the subject of a sociopolitical program for the further development of China. All his statements, expressions, and letters over the past years were devoted exclusively to the problem of the struggle with the "kaputists," in other words, to the problem of power. He did not even mention the future sociopolitical and socioeconomic program.

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Shortly before the death of Mao Zedong such a program was set forth by Zhou Enlai in the slogan of the "four modernizations," picked up subsequently by the successors of Mao, the new leaders of China. But what the relation of Mao Zedong was to this slogan remains completely unclear. There is no mention of the policy of the "four modernizations" in even one of his works or statements, not in any quotation cited by the new leaders, although repeated endlessly are the themes of ideological and political struggle on behalf of turning China into a mighty military power. Here is all the "constructive" baggage of Mao Zedong, which people like Roger Garaudy clearly based on ideas of anti-Sovietism call the Chinese "model of socialism."

Meanwhile the socialist transformation of ownership is a many-sided act. It pursues different goals: liquidation of the exploiter classes and the social grounds for exploitation of man by man, giving the masses access to management of the economy, raising the level of productivity of social labor. The socialization itself should be adequately prepared in the economic, social and cultural respects. Otherwise it can take on a one-sided and even deformed character, not contributing to a rise in productivity of labor or to accustoming the masses to management of production. Namely the latter is what occurred in China.

It goes without saying that the victory of state ownership in the city and formation of cooperatives in the countryside is a major achievement of the Chinese revolution. But this is only a frontier (although an important one), which it was especially necessary to take into account in China, where there were extended traditions of state socialization under feudalism.

The emergence of modern industry in China at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries in China was connected exactly with the development of state capitalism, and the first enterprises were under the ownership and disposition of the state. In China there was not or practically was not a class independent of the state, like the bourgeoisie in Europe in the period of primary accumulation and the first industrial revolution. The large industrial and trading companies arising at that time (for instance, the Chinese commercial steamship line, coal mines and others) belonged to the state or to officials. The development and flourishing of these or other private companies also wholly depended on the state, on its licenses and subsidies at the expense of tax monies. It is not by accident that the Chiang Kaishek government not only did not strive to destroy this tradition but, on the contrary, helped to strengthen it. In his book "The Fate of China," Chiang Kaishek insisted, in particular, on the idea of the development of a state economy. Considering all this, after the revolution it was necessary for the Chinese leaders to manifest especial discretion in carrying out socialization of property so that it would actually bear a genuinely socialist character.

In Marxist literature of recent years the opinion has been maintained that the social and political changes in the PRC did not go beyond the framework of the initial stage of socialist construction, and later the

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established sociopolitical structure was deformed under the influence of the regime of the personal power of Mao Zedong and his ideology.

However the struggle within the Chinese Communist Party took place not only in the sphere of ideology. Touching on the fundamental questions of the economic, social and political development of the country, it inevitably was reflected in the character, forms and rates of implementation of the social changes. The contradictory and erroneous policy was also reflected in the economy and in social relations. This is explained not by imaginary "leaps," but by genuine drops in the course of building the new society of China: from large-scale victories in its initial stage to economic declines in subsequent years; from significant victories in the struggle against feudalism and imperialism in economic construction to a sharp decline in the development of productive forces and a weakening of the country; from truly unlimited popular enthusiasm, directed at creative goals in the first years of existence of the PRC, to the raging of nationalism and simultaneously an increase in the passivity of the masses as a result of the disastrous experiments of the Maoists.

Indeed, what are the results of all these social experiments--the "great leap," "people's communes," the "cultural revolution," for which the Chinese people paid with 30 million human lives? The answer to this question is reduced ultimately to ascertaining how the workers, peasants and labor intelligentsia live now.

In essence, over the last 15 years we have been observing almost exclusively the life of just one stratum of China--these 30 million "ganbu," who will in any way take a place on the political ladder. Their struggle for power with all its accessories--the adherence of exaggerated and absurd labels, abuse of opponents, right up to physical reprisals on them, their obscene ideological and political polemics, in which it is possible with difficulty to find a rational kernel of real divergences, their flinging from extreme to extreme, from right-wing politics to leftist, from leftist to still more left-wing, from still more left-wing to right-wing--all this is a ripple on the vast sea of the laboring population of almost 1 billion in a great country. All the facts indicate that a socialist way of life has not been implemented in the PRC, but a way of life differing little from the former semifeudal systems.

How is the life of the Chinese peasants, who even now still make up the overwhelming majority of the population? Almost half of the peasant population has remained illiterate and, therefore, continues to believe in what its fathers and grandfathers believed in, and all the debates of the Chinese leaders about the "proletarian culture," whether it is Chen Boda, Lin Biao or Jiang Qing, sidestep them, like a ping-pong game, since these peasants are outside of their ordinary consciousness and their psychology.

The local press in China cites data about a marked worsening of the living standard of the population. For instance, in Sichuan Province the incomes

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of the population were reduced by 18 percent from 1974 to 1976. In Anhui Province they decreased by 20 percent from 1973 to 1976.

Announced recently was an increase in wages by 16 percent for workers and white collar employees with a "long term of labor service and a low wage," however up to now this promise has not been realized either. Established was a policy of a "low wage," strict control and a coupon system for distribution of foodstuffs, and objects of prime necessity with a simultaneous sharp increase in retail prices.

The PRC is 100th in the world with respect to amount of national product per capita, but with respect to volume of military expenditures it occupies one of the first places.

In exactly the same way it is hardly possible to see any essential changes in the way of life of the army of unskilled workers, who even now comprise the overwhelming majority of the working class in China. No change is evident either in the life of other strata of the Chinese nation, except for those who were touched directly by the recent political campaigns (as participants or victims).

The most dramatic legacy of China's feudal past is the sociopolitical passivity of the majority of the Chinese people. In fact even now they are the object and not the subject, not a creator of social changes which are planned somewhere on the top in the framework of the highest political leadership and which are accepted as proper by the whole nation. What is thought by this "clean sheet of paper" (in the words of Mao Zedong) and how it lives, in essence, is not the concern of the leadership of the country, it is important only that the nation accept submissively any political policy coming from above.

The most important criterion of a socialist society is the presence of power in the hands of the working class and all the workers. But it is namely in this that China is especially far from the socialist ideal. In China the working class has never performed political leadership of society. At the time of formation of the PRC there were only 3 percent workers in the ruling communist party. Although later (8th Congress of the Communist Party of China) there were 14 percent workers in the party, the highest posts in the party and state were occupied almost exclusively by people from the peasantry, the petit bourgeoisie of the city and the countryside and even landowners. At the border line of the 50's and 60's a regime of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship was established, a regime of the personal power of Mao Zedong. In the period of the "cultural revolution" about 17 million people, who shared the "ideas of Mao," were taken into the Chinese Communist Party. The representative system in the party and the government turned out to be completely paralyzed, the principles of socialist democracy were repudiated.

After the death of Mao much was done to restore the higher organs of the party, the state, and in the area of management of the economy. But the

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essence of the political system has remained what it was formerly. This is a non-democratic petit bourgeois system of power where political methods and customs (purges, slaughter of political opponents, the practice of administrative appointments and others) prevail which were characteristic for old semifeudal China.

It would have been possible to think that all this expresses only a certain initial stage in the construction of socialism. But here before us is the new Constitution of the PRG for 1978, the new Program of the Chinese Communist Party for 1977, in which a declaration is made of the same notorious idea of "continuation of the revolution under the conditions of dictatorship of the proletariat," the same "shake-ups" and internal struggle. The ideal of Maoism is socialism without any welfare, without any democracy, without any participation by the masses in administration, without any freedom of man. This "socialism" is based on the exploitation of the workers in the interests of the ruling military-bureaucratic group (ganbu) and the social ideas (military production, national greatness) formulated by it. In other words, this "socialism" is petit-bourgeois bureaucratic with clearly expressed feudal traits.

At one time V.I. Lenin wrote that a backward country can easily get started because its opponent has been suppressed, because its bourgeoisie has not been organized, but, in order to continue, it must have 100,000 times more circumspection, caution and tenacity. It is exactly in China that the gap was especially great between the magnitude of the tasks set forth and the poverty, not just material, but also cultural, which was noted by Lenin.

Now, based on experience gained, we can evaluate what the petit bourgeois, semifeudal "socialism" is which was written about even by K. Marx and F. Engels.

In the area of productive forces this is an economy where there is a predominance of manual and handicraft labor, a low level of mechanization, labor with a low level of productivity, the basis of which is made up of an illiterate peasantry and unskilled workers.

In the area of production relations this is state ownership which is used not for improving the well-being of the workers and all laborers, but for intensifying militarization. The workers are kept away from participation in management of the enterprises. Peasants associated in cooperatives are in fact deprived of the opportunity to decide problems of their own labor and life.

In the political area the power and will of the "ganbu" stratum prevails, a large part of which comes from the peasantry and petit bourgeoisie, but has become declassed and formed a social group serving as the support for the bureaucratic system of power.

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In the area of ideology this is the predominance of radical-nationalism and great-power chauvinism, which is embodied in the "ideas of Mao Zedong."

If we proceed from such an understanding of the socioeconomic and political system of the PRC, it is not necessary to be surprised at the country's political line on the world arena. The semifeudal, petit bourgeois "socialism" is in conflict with true proletarian socialism, just as during the time of Marx scientific socialism was in conflict with the petit bourgeois and anarchic pseudosocialist ideology.

The last question is: where is China going? It is possible hypothetically to imagine several versions of the country's development.

The first path is the gradual advancement toward scientific socialism on the basis of development of the economy, growth in the working class, the popular intelligentsia, accustoming the peasantry to an active political life, and development of a socialist democracy.

The second path is restoration of capitalism and a return to prerevolutionary relations, which is very unlikely.

The third path is extended preservation of the petit bourgeois and semifeudal forms of "socialism," the subsequent development of which in the future cannot be imagined even on a theoretical level.

Of course, we are wholly in favor of the first path of development for China, however the future will show the direction that China will follow. The fact is that in the country the radical-nationalistic forces have gained the upper hand and they, reflecting the long traditions of the past, are using the social, cultural and political backwardness of the masses, the objective difficulties of the noncapitalist path of transition to socialism in a country that is extremely backward in an economic and social respect.

Also appearing highly unlikely is the restoration of capitalism, since in the country there is not even one class or social group which would be interested in restoration of private ownership. Neither the workers, nor the peasants, nor the intelligentsia is interested in this. With respect to the growing group of the "ganbu," it even now is enjoying all the privileges of power and well-being in China. This group in fact has charge of state property, and transferring it to the hands of some private persons or others, even highly-placed leaders, would be of grave detriment to this group.

Then, apparently, the most probable is the extended development of China in the existing forms, which were inherited by the new leaders as the legacy from the former period of Mao. The slogan of the "four modernizations," which does not provide for any significant social transformations in the social and political system, reflects namely this tendency. This is a technological and technocratic slogan, but not a sociopolitical one.

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The popular masses will live under the same conditions and with the same relations as before. Their living standard, welfare, way of life, and participation in administration will depend not on themselves, but on the ruling political forces. These latter have for the long-term historical perspective selected the orientation of turning the country into a mighty power with a powerful military-industrial potential. This is an orientation to preservation and, perhaps, intensification of the poverty of the rapidly growing population of many millions in China. On the social level this is an orientation to a constant increase in the "ganbu" group as the main support of the Chinese state. On the foreign policy level this means growing great-power nationalism, directed first of all against neighboring countries to the southwest, southeast and to the north of China. In other words, over the duration of an extended period China will be a threat to its neighbors and on the whole for the cause of peace throughout the world.

Of course, this forecast, just as any theoretical prognosis, will be adjusted in time. A number of factors of a positive nature exist which may ultimately lead China on the road to genuinely proletarian, scientific socialism. This is first of all the steady growth in the working class, in the intelligentsia, the increased cultural level of the whole Chinese population, including the leading political forces, and finally the coming to power of a new generation of leaders.

This last factor deserves especial attention. We have seen that the young generation of leaders, the advancement of which laid the foundation of the "cultural revolution," has proven to be more leftist, more extremist than its predecessors, the representatives of the "old guard." Restoration of the "old guard" to leadership marked a return to a more moderate course, in any case in the field of domestic policy.

The matter can turn out differently if the course of the "four modernizations" becomes the basis of the domestic policy of the Chinese Communist Party for an extended period. It is not excluded that in this situation the more cultured and rationally thinking part of the Chinese Communist Party will flourish, the part capable of understanding and implementing leadership of a new course. And it is also not excluded that the future will belong namely to this group. Then coming to replace the clamorous ideologists will be businesslike administrators, proceeding first of all from the demands of effective development of production. The growing contingent of new leaders, which gradually will replace at the steering wheel the biologically dislodged representatives of the "old guard," possibly will bring with it a new spirit, a new high level of culture and civilization. Then a new stage may begin in the development of China, the tendency of which it is impossible to anticipate, for the prognosis depends on many external and internal factors.

We Marxists, whoever we may be, are experiencing the present tragedy of the Chinese people, plunged into many misfortunes and sufferings by the group under Mao Zedong. It is namely because near and dear to us are its

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interests, the interests of the Chinese revolution, the interests of the unity of progressive forces throughout the world, that we are defending and upholding the genuine interests of a great people. Only this will make it possible to preserve with colossal labor the attained alliance with the progressive and revolutionary part of the Chinese nation, and not push it to the insidious but, alas, so strong arms of the nationalists.

China is not simply a river. It is a sea of people. What can humanity expect from this sea? A storm? Rumbles in the sky? Or gradual development, based on intensification of industrial and social progress, similar to that which is occurring in other nations. Without glancing far into the future we want to believe that this sea sooner or later will flow into the great ocean of communist civilization, to which the future belongs.

FOOTNOTES

1. See: G. Apalin, "Beijing: Politics of Militarism and Fanning the Flames of War," MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1978, No 3, and also O. Borisov, "The Hegemonistic Policy of Beijing in the Far East," MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1978, No 9, and V. Vanin, "Beijing and the Chinese Emigration," MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1978, No 7.
2. See: "China Under Mao Zedong," KOMMUNIST, 1977, No 12, and also A. Kruchinin, V. Feoktistov, "How Mao's Successors Battle Against Socialism and Its Allies," KOMMUNIST, 1978, No. 5.
3. O. Borisov describes the extremist foreign policy of the PRC as social-chauvinism. We are putting analogous content in the concept of radical-nationalism (see: O. Borisov, "Along a Well-worn Rut," KOMMUNIST, 1977, No. 9).
4. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol. 4, p. 450.

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NATIONAL

REGIONAL FORECASTING OF POPULATION, ETHNIC PROCESSES

Leningrad IZVESTIYA VSESOYUZNOGO GEOGRAFICHESKOGO OBSHCHESTVA in Russian  
No 5, 1979 pp 403-409

[Article by B. M. Ekkel': "The Regional Population Forecast and Ethnic Processes"]

[Text] One of the most important tasks where population geography is actively involved in a solution is the task of a long-range forecast for the distribution of the nation's population. The forecasting of the population which acts as a most important component in the spatial systems arising as a result of the interaction of natural conditions, the economy and population at present is assuming particularly important significance.

Considering that the aim of social production in a socialist society ultimately is the fullest satisfaction of all the needs of its members, as well as that the distribution of the population in the various parts of the country has formed in the process of extended historical development and is marked by a substantial "conservativeness" of the most general features of this distribution, a long-range forecast of the size of the population (and particularly the labor contingents) to a significant degree will correct the forecast for the development of the regional economies of the USSR. This in no way plays down the significance and possibilities of planning efforts on the optimum redistribution of the population between the regions of the country.

For forecasting the population of a region, a number of models can be used, and these include a demographic model, a model of the migration balance and a model of the population's employment which directly establishes the relationship between the number of jobs and size and structure of the population [4]. It must be emphasized that the demographic model is the most constant, "base" model, while the remaining models can have a more "flexible" nature, they are marked by multivariance, and to a greater degree are complimentary to the demographic model. This emphasizes its determining role for forecasting the already existing population of a region.

For constructing a forecast of the population in our multinational country and its individual parts over an extended period, a substantial role is

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played by the census, by the ratio and distribution of the peoples populating it and the change in the characteristics of these peoples over time [5].

The forecasting of the national composition of the population of the nation and its individual regions for the purposes of forecasting the population per se, and the population as a component of the man--economy--nature system has particular importance for the following factors.

1. The various peoples are in different stages of a "demographic transition" [3], and this determines the various types of the natural movement of the population, and, in turn, this influences the size of the nationalities, the age-sex structure, the size of the family, and so forth [5].

2. To a varying degree different peoples participate in migration processes. For this reason over the foreseeable future, the national composition of the USSR population to a significant degree will influence the possibilities of the redistribution of the population between the regions of the country, particularly those with labor surpluses and labor shortages [10].

3. As a result of the deepening process of the ethnic merging of the peoples in the USSR, the number of nationally mixed families is growing, and the indicators for the natural and mechanical movement for these families, as well as their difference from the corresponding indicators for the families of a uninationaional composition, still have not been given proper attention by the researchers.

4. A majority of the types of human activity to one degree or another possesses an ethnic cast, be it the labor skills and domestic features which have accumulated historically in the ethnos, or the specific features of the effect of the ethnos on nature [1,5]. This, in turn, cannot help but influence the nature of the long-range employment of the population and the territorial structure of the economy, housing construction, the consumption structure, and the specific transformation and conservation of the environment in regions with a differing national composition of the population.

5. The guiding line of the party and government in nationality relationships is the flourishing and merging of all the peoples of the USSR and achieving the actual equality of peoples in all areas of state and cultural construction. In this context, the placement and level of socioeconomic development among the various peoples of our country for an extended time to come will influence the distribution of centralized capital investments.

Undoubtedly, the designated factors cover only the most important aspects which determine the necessity of forecasting the size, ratio and distribution of the Soviet peoples.

In addition to the differences in the natural movement of the population and the national composition of the migrants, the change in the national composition of the population in the different regions of the USSR is strongly



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influenced by ethnic processes (here and below in their narrow meaning, that is, the processes leading ultimately to a change in the ethnic affiliation of people). Let us examine in more detail the spatial aspects of these processes directly linked with the territorial features of the distribution of the peoples and their quantitative relationships.

Interethnic contacts and the related ethnic processes have occurred with varying intensity in all stages of human history. As a rule, interethnic contacts occur under the condition of a common or contiguous territory of the interacting peoples. Two basic variations of the territorial interaction of peoples are distinguished: border and integral contact [8]. With a border contact there is an interaction of the peoples in the zone of the ethnic border, and comparatively small groups of the peoples in contact are involved in the interaction. An integral contact arises with a major territorial shift of the peoples or their individual groups. The ethnic contacts which develop as a result of such a territorial shift involve large masses of the peoples in contact.

In our country both territorial varieties of interethnic contacts are widely represented, and in a number of instances they are superimposed one on the other and are difficult to differentiate.

Under the conditions of multinational regions, it is essential to know the direction and rate of occurrence of the ethnic processes depending upon the ratio of the number of peoples in contact and the level of "disperseness" and the reciprocal penetration of the peoples "one with the other."

Let us examine a certain territorial unit in which there is an international contact of ethnic group (A) with a surrounding people of different nationality. For our purposes, it is most suitable to divide the territory into elementary cells of intensive population contacts (ETC) which are comprehensive regions having complete sets of the functional subregions necessary for the daily life and activities of the adult working part of the inhabitants [16]. Here we would assume that all the ethnic groups in the studied territorial unit live mixed together, and the probability of the establishing of contact between any two individuals does not depend upon their national affiliation. The first condition is best satisfied by the large industrial cities and new cities which create "international centers." The realizing of the second condition is a question of the distant future, and depends upon a weakening of the national aspect in the life of the population, although a whole series of researchers even now has noted a tendency toward its weakening. The established ETC are the operational units for the regional forecast of the population, since for precisely these territorial cells it is possible to construct balance models of population employment; the demographic and ethnic structure of the population in the ETC (considering the long-range changes in its territory) are the real basis for the remaining types of forecast models. The most suitable for the ETC is the procedure proposed by ethnographers for calculating the theoretical probability of the concluding of international marriages between the representatives of different ethnoses [2, 11] and which has already been tested out and amended in a series of research [6, 7, 14].

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


Fig. 1. Theoretical probability of the establishing of interethnic contacts for an ethnic group depending upon its share in the population of a region.

All contacts in the region can be considered as 1.00.  $x$ --the share of the ethnic group in the region's population;  $y$ --the share of contacts of the ethnic group in all the contacts of the population in the region; 1--the total number of contacts in the given ethnic group, 2--intraethnic contacts, 3--interethnic contacts.

The designated studies were based on the notion that the theoretical probability of a combination of two independent phenomena equals the product of the frequencies of each phenomenon individually, that is, the product of the share of bachelors of nationality  $i$  in all the bachelors of the region by the share of brides of nationality  $j$  in all the brides of the same region [2]. In practice we often do not have data available on the national affiliation of those entering marriage, and the ethnic processes in no way can be reduced to just the marriage and family contacts. Proceeding from this, the theoretical probability of the establishing of interethnic contacts between the representatives of ethnic group (A), independently of their national affiliation, can be calculated as the product of the share of the ethnic group (A) in the entire population of the ETC ( $P_A$ ) by the share remaining for the remaining population of the ETC ( $1.00 - P_A$ ):  $B = P_A \cdot (1.00 - P_A)$ .

For example, if the share of ethnic group (A) in the population of the ETC is 0.35, then considering all the possible ethnic contacts in the region as 1.00, and the number of possible contacts of ethnic group (A) equal to 0.35, we find the theoretical share of the interethnic contacts for ethnic group (A):  $0.35 \cdot (1.00 - 0.35) = 0.2275$ .

The theoretical share of the intraethnic contacts of ethnic group (A) is determined as  $0.3500 - 0.2275 = 0.1225$ .

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Fig. 1 traces the theoretically probable share of interethnic contacts for ethnic group (A) depending upon its share in a region's population. The curve for intraethnic contacts is described by the equation  $y_1 = X^2$ , and the curve of interethnic contacts is described by the equation  $y_2 = -(x-0.5)^2 + 0.25$ , where  $0.00 \leq x \leq 1.00$ . The graph illustrates well the pattern that the smaller the share of the ethnic group in the population of the ETC, the greater the share of the contacts of this ethnic group which falls on the surrounding foreign groups.

The obtained pattern cannot be used directly to postulate the results of the ethnic processes, since in addition to the already indicated constraint conditions, among the ethnic groups in contact the sex and age composition can not only vary significantly (this in principle could be eliminated in examining the ratio of assumed bachelors and brides), but also the resulting national composition of the population in the ETC is determined in two stages: 1) the nationally mixed marriages, 2) the national self-determination of children born in nationally mixed families.




Fig. 2. Ratio of theoretical probability and actually occurring number of births in nationally mixed families (Udmurt ASSR, Russians).

x--share of ethnic group in population of territorial cell;  
 y--share of births in nationally mixed families; 1--theoretical probability of the birth of a child in a nationally mixed family, 2--administrative rayons, 3--cities.

But still, if the theoretical probability of the interethnic contacts does not fully describe the ethnic processes, it is significantly correlated with them. As an illustration of the above stated, let us examine the ratio of the theoretical probability of the interethnic contacts and the actually occurring share of the number of children born in nationally mixed families among the children born for which at least one of the parents was Russian,

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in the rayons and large cities of the Udmurt ASSR (Fig. 2). Since each 10 youths of one nationality can create 10 nationally mixed families, but not more than 5 uninational ones, the theoretical probability of birth in a nationally mixed family will be calculated from the following formula:

$$y_A = \frac{2-2x}{2-x} 100,$$

where x--the share of the ethnic group (A) in the population of the region.

Regardless of the existing dispersion of points on the graph and the significant deviation from the theoretical values, it is beyond dispute that the actual number of births for Russians in the nationally mixed families in the Udmurt ASSR rather well correlates with the share of Russians in the population of an administrative rayon or city, and this applies particularly to the large cities. The correlation dependence is most successfully described by a second-order parabola. However, we assume that the actual dependence ascertained on the basis of the ETC on a graph will be closest to a hyperbola with a symmetrical axis  $y = x$ . This reflects the intensification of the ethnic processes, when the share of the ethnic group in the population is either completely insignificant, or decisively predominates over the share of the foreign groups around (the processes of assimilation or assimilating).

The nature of the foreign surroundings of a people also influences the amount of the deviation of the actual frequency of births in nationally mixed families from the theoretical probability of interethnic contacts, in addition to the choice of the territorial cell for studying these contacts. For considering the latter factor, using the concept of a "coefficient of desirability" of interethnic contacts could be of great significance [6, 7, 11], and this should be calculated for each pair of peoples in a territorial aspect.<sup>1</sup> This is a subject of special research.

The concept of the theoretical probability of interethnic contacts makes it possible to approach another important problem, that is, assessing the complexity or patchyness of the national composition of a region's population. The concept of the patchyness index of national composition was for the first time proposed by V. V. Pokshishevskiy [12], and of the works on the constructing of a patchyness index for cities we could mention the article of L. F. Monogarova [9]. We have used a patchyness index for the national composition of a region's population<sup>2</sup> (in the ideal of the ETC) reflecting

<sup>1</sup>One of the first statistical indicators of this sort is the indices of "attraction" and "aversion" of M. V. Ptukha [13], with which it is possible also to analyze ethnic contacts.

<sup>2</sup>Without considering the territory of contact under the name of the socio-

ethnic density in the form  $S = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^K (n_i)^2}{N^2} 100$ , where  $n_i$ --the size of national group  $i$ ,  $K$ --the number of national groups,  $N$ --the size of the population in the region, the index formulated by E. Piasecki in 1964 [17].

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the theoretical probability of the interethnic contacts, if the intensity of these contacts were caused solely by the ratio of the ethnic groups in contact [15]

$$M_j = 1.00 - \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i.$$

where  $M_j$ --the patchyness index for the national composition of the population of region  $j$ ;  
 $n$ --the number of ethnic groups living in region  $j$ ;  
 $\pi_i$ --the share of ethnic group  $i$  in the total number of the population living in region  $j$ .

Using the given patchyness index, it is possible to compare the level of the multinationality of a population on different territories, and to judge the patchyness of the national composition of the population in the regions over time. Moreover, using the patchyness index of the national composition of the population it is possible to compare the theoretical and practical spread of interethnic contacts within the limits of the ETC.

On the basis of the published materials of the 1970 All-Union Census, we have examined the ratio of the patchyness level of the national composition of a population in the national-autonomous formations of the USSR with the spread of nationally mixed families (Fig. 3). Regardless of a certain hypothetical nature of the comparison made (the patchyness index and the share of nationally mixed families are given not for the ETC, but rather for the entire undivided territory of the national autonomous formation), out of the aggregate of national autonomous formations we have selected those where a significant portion of the population is comprised of representatives of peoples which because of particular features of everyday life and culture and the existing experience of international contact, as a rule, take a rather active part in the various forms of interethnic interaction up to including family and marriage relations. Thus, the northern and Far Eastern national-autonomous formations stand out in an increased share of nationally mixed families, and here the population has been formed predominantly of migrants from the European portion of the country (Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, peoples from the Volga Region, and others) and representatives of the indigenous nationalities. At present, here there is occurring a process of the assimilation of the ethnic groups and a reduction in the values of the patchyness index of the national composition of the population [15].

We assume that in constructing the regional population forecasts, the employed demographic model can be broken up into a series of models according to the nationality principle. The forecast of a region's population should consist of the population forecasts for the individual nationalities with an obligatory subdivision into urban and rural inhabitants. This corresponds to the differing types of the natural movement of the population. The elaboration of the forecasts for the individual national groups requires a thorough reorganization of current statistical reporting and census data which to a maximum degree should be presented in an ethnic breakdown.

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


Fig. 3. Ratio of the patchiness level of the national composition of the population in the national-ethnic autonomous formations of the USSR with the spread of nationally mixed families.

M--patchiness index of the national composition of the population, C--the share of nationally mixed families in all families;  
 1--Jewish AO [Autonomous Oblast], 2--Karelian ASSR, 3--Khanty-Mansi AO, 4--Komi ASSR, 5--Chukchi NO [National Okrug], 6--Karyak NO, 7--Khakass AO, 8--Nenets NO, 9--Taymyr NO, 10--Komi-Permyak NO, 11--Yamalo-Nenets NO, 12--Evenk NO, 13--Yakut ASSR, 14--South Ossetian AO, 15--Adzharian ASSR, 16--Adygey AO, 17--Abkhas ASSR, 18--North Ossetian ASSR, 19--Gornyy Altai AO, 20--Bashkir ASSR, 21--Udmurt ASSR, 22--Nakhichevan ASSR, 23--Ust'-Ordynskiy NO, 24--Chuvash ASSR, 25--Buryat ASSR, 26--Mordvinian ASSR, 27--Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, 28--Karachai-Cherkess ASSR, 29--Karakalpak ASSR, 30--Kalmyk ASSR, 31--Tuva ASSR, 32--Mari ASSR, 33--Tatar ASSR, 34--Gornyy Badakhshan AO, 35--Aginskiy (Buryat) NO, 36--Checheno-Ingush ASSR, 37--Degestan ASSR, 38--Karabau AO.

For the possibility of considering the results of ethnic processes in the forecast (in 1970, 13.5 percent of the families in the USSR were nationally mixed, and this percentage was significantly higher among the families being formed), it is essential to work out a special model of the ethnic processes. In our article a possible approach to constructing such a model has been presented in a general form.

We must particularly caution against a mechanistic approach to analyzing ethnic processes. For simplifying the model, we have viewed them in the narrowest sense. In actuality, in addition to the "abrupt-shift" transition

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from one national affiliation to another, there are equally essential "ethnoevolutionary changes in the ethnos" ([1], p 153). And the latter play possibly not such a marked role in changing the characteristics of peoples, but over the long run the failure to consider them can to a significant degree influence the accuracy of the forecast. In the ideal the model of ethnic processes, like a demographic model, should consider: 1) the processes of a weakening of national aspects in the life of the population (like the temporary strengthenings of these aspects at certain stages); 2) the spread of the features of the urban way of life and the evening out of national features by them; 3) the reciprocal penetration of the national cultures of the Soviet peoples and the selection of the particular features of everyday life and the economy which are most successful for the existing social and natural milieu, and certain other aspects.

It is essential to point out that both in the migration model and to a great degree in the model of population employment, the fixing of ethnic aspects is also of substantial significance. At present, without considering the national composition of the population, we cannot construct either a population forecast or the particular forecasts of the natural movement of the population, migration, urbanization, environmental conservation, and much else.

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BOOK ON UZBEKISTAN'S POSITION AMONG THE SOVIET REPUBLICS

Tashkent UZBEKISTAN V YEDINOY SEM'YE SOVETSKIKH RESPUBLIK [UZBEKISTAN IN THE UNITED FAMILY OF SOVIET REPUBLICS] in Russian 1978 signed to press 29 Mar 78 pp 1, 229-241, 246, 247

[Table of Contents and Chapter 8 of book by N. D. Khudayberdyev, Izdatel'stvo "Uzbekistan", 247 pages, 10,000 copies]

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#### International Ties of Uzbekistan

Uzbek SSR, like all of the other Soviet republics, actively participates with equal rights in the development of the foreign policy of the Soviet government, in the adoption of legislative acts relating to questions of international life and in the ratification and denouncement of international treaties, agreements and conventions.

Our Soviet Union is a multinational state. And experience has shown that the basic features of the federative structure of the USSR has fully justified itself. Noting this in an address at the May (1977) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev subsequently emphasized that to the sovereign rights guarded by the USSR, there are "added new ones, such as the right of the republics' participation in the solution of questions by union organs relating to the jurisdiction of the USSR."<sup>51</sup>

In the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Uzbek SSR is represented by 35 deputies and in the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet--by 43 deputies. Uzbek SSR has three representatives chosen to the Permanent Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Two representatives of Uzbekistan have been chosen to the Permanent Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Council of Nationalities.

The Chairman of the Presidium of Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet has been chosen Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan--a member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers by virtue of his position is part of the Government of the USSR.

Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet Dilyara Tashpulatova, a spinner at the Namangan Silk Fabrics Combine imeni 50-Letiye Uzbekskoy SSR, was selected Deputy Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Thus, the official representatives of each union republic take part in the preparation and implementation of the Soviet Union's foreign-policy actions.

Regardless of the form and methods of the foreign-policy activity of the Soviet republics at the various stages of the development of the USSR, its nature has been and continues to be the same--the implementation of Lenin's foreign policy and ensuring of favorable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism.

Representatives of the Uzbek people take an active part in the work of the sessions of the UN General Assembly. Official representatives of Uzbekistan, being on the staffs or serving as leaders of USSR delegations, have taken and continue to take an active part in the work of specialized UN organs, as well as international conferences and meetings. They worthily represent the Soviet Union at many international forums. Such was the case

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at the 19th Session of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (EKADV) in Manila, at the 31st Session of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Ocean in Delhi, at the 37th Session of the UN Economic and Social Council (EKOSOS) in Geneva, at the 7th Session of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (EKA) in Nairobi, at the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia in Maputo and at a number of sessions of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Uzbek SSR is taking an active part in the work of the Commission for Human Rights, the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Democratic Federation of Women (MDFZh), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (VFDY), the International Red Cross (MKK), the International Organization of Journalists (MOZh), the World Federation of Linked Cities (VFPG) and others.

Uzbekistan is actively participating in the work of the Committee of Solidarity of the Countries of Asia and Africa (it includes a permanent representative of Uzbek SSR) and the Committee of Solidarity of Writers of the Countries of Asia and Africa.

A ponderable contribution to the struggle of the Soviet people for security and peace among peoples is being made by the Republic Committee in Defense of Peace, the Uzbek Committee of Solidarity of the Countries of Asia and Africa and the Uzbek Society of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries.

Our republic is increasingly frequently becoming a place for international meetings. And we are rightfully proud of the fact that the capital of sunny Uzbekistan--Tashkent--has become a symbol of friendship and peace. In 1958, when a Conference of Writers of the Countries of Asia and Africa was held here, the voice of international solidarity, then figuratively called the "spirit of Tashkent," could be heard loudly. Here come public figures, scientists and specialists from the entire world for joint discussion of important scientific and social problems. In the period from 1965 to 1976 alone, more than 80 international seminars and symposiums were held in our republic.

With each year, there is an increasing flow of foreigners arriving here for the purpose of becoming acquainted with our life and with our successes achieved in the years of the Soviet power. The Uzbek people receive with the hospitality that is characteristic of them prominent party and state figures of Asia, Africa, Europe and America, parliamentarians, diplomats, correspondents, men of science, culture and art, as well as tourists. In 1976 alone, the republic was visited by 617 foreign delegations consisting of 4,239 persons and 90,000 tourists.

Our tourists are also going abroad. Also in 1976, more than 8,000 persons visited more than 30 foreign countries.

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Uzbek SSR with its multifaceted, highly developed economy makes a marked contribution to the expansion of the international economic ties of the Soviet Union. The republic exports many of its goods and imports products that it needs from other countries.

Goods of our republic appeared for the first time on the international market in 1932. Eighty percent of its exports at that time consisted of cotton fiber and only a small share was made up of agricultural machinery and medicinal preparations.

Today Uzbekistan supplies sets of machines and equipment for chemical cotton cleaning and textile enterprises, large hydroengineering structures, machines for sowing, cultivating and harvesting cotton, excavators, compressors, overhead cranes, diesel engines, cable products, electronic instruments, radio tubes, motion-picture equipment, hydrometric instruments, transformer substations, pumps, hard alloys, refrigerators, cotton fiber, furs and much else--a total of 130 descriptions of various products of heavy and light industry. More than 220 of the republic's largest enterprises work on exports.

In 1976, Uzbek SSR within the framework of the Soviet Union's general exports supplied its products to 60 countries of the world, including 16 countries of Europe, 18 of Asia, 18 of Africa and 8 of America. Seventy percent of its exports go to socialist countries.

The popularity of manufactured products bearing the inscription "Made in Uzbekistan" is largely promoted by international fairs and exhibitions where many of our products are highly rated. Thus, the Vostok spinning-twisting machine manufactured by Tashtekstil'mash and also the silk PK-100ShL spinning-twisting machine, Uzbek grape wines and furs have repeatedly been awarded gold medals. Products shown in Leipzig, Casablanca, Paris, Tokyo, London, Rio de Janeiro, Izmir, Algiers, Bucharest, Madras, Mexico, Teheran, Delhi, Damascus, Brussels, Stockholm, Goteborg and other cities have inevitably drawn the interests of representatives of foreign business circles.

Foreign countries readily exhibit their products in Uzbekistan. In 1976, the inhabitants of our republic had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the exhibitions: Orgtekhnik-76 [Office Equipment-76] of the Japanese firm of Tokyo-Boeki, products of the Polish Tekstylilteks Foreign Trade Enterprise, laboratory equipment and measuring instruments of the Hungarian Metrimpeks Foreign Trade Association and with exhibitions of medical apparatus and cotton-ginning equipment of different countries.

Responsibility for the development of foreign trade relations lies with the Uzbek SSR Chamber of Trade and Industry [Torgovo-promyshlennaya palata], which has been since 1969 a member of the Afro-Asian Organization of Economic Cooperation (AFRAZES). This international non-governmental organization includes the trade, industrial and agricultural chambers of 49 countries of Asia and Africa.

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Uzbekistan together with the other republics of the USSR contributes to the strengthening of the national economies of developing states.

The largest hydroelectric power station in Afghanistan has been erected at Nagla (near Kabul) with the assistance of Uzbek planners and specialists.

Sredazgiprovodkhlpok Institute is actively participating in the planning of irrigation systems in Algeria, Syria, Iraq and other countries.

The Dzhahalabad Irrigation Complex was built in Afghanistan on the Kabul River. It consists of a dam, a hydroelectric power station, a reservoir, arterial canals, an irrigation network, industrial and auxiliary enterprises and housing settlements.

Since April 1973, the Meskene in Syria has been under development. As many as 600,000 hectares of new land are to be irrigated; this will double the area of irrigated plowland in Syria. There is also being built a state farm on an area of 4,000 hectares; here thin-fiber cotton is to be cultivated. At the present time, the bigger part of the work has already been completed.

In Iraq, specialists from Uzbekistan are doing large-scale work on improving the water supply of tremendous areas of land in the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

Geologists of Uzbekistan are providing considerable assistance to the peoples of developing countries. Today they can be found in India, Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, Guinea, Bangladesh and other countries, where they have been able to find new deposits of coal, nonferrous and rare metals, natural gas and other mineral resources. Because of mercury deposits found by Uzbek geologists, a large ore mining and smelting combine is being built in Algeria.

While supplying developing countries with necessary technical documentation and equipment, Uzbekistan at the same time is sending its specialists for the purpose of installation and putting into operation of industrial facilities and also for the transmission of accumulated experience to local cadres. At the present time, about 820 Uzbek specialists are working in 48 countries at different installations being built with the technical cooperation of the Soviet Union.

Uzbekistan is providing significant aid in the training of national cadres for developing countries. In 1961 there was opened at Tashkent State University a preparatory department, where persons coming from the countries of Asia and Africa study the Russian language for continuation of training in the Soviet Union. During the years of this department's existence, 1,486 students from many countries were put out. In the VUZ's of our republic hundreds of young men and women from 28 African and Asian countries have already acquired specialties as engineers, irrigation specialists and physicians.

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The republic's scientific and cultural ties with foreign countries grow and expand with each year. In 1976 alone, 55 of our scientists and scientific associates visited abroad, where they took an active part in the work of various international scientific forums.

Thus, scientists-chemists went to India to the 4th Indo-Soviet Symposium and scientists from physico-technical institutes--to the United States. The trip of a delegation of leading scientists of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences headed by President A.S. Sadykov made a fruitful trip to Poland.

In their turn, 90 delegations totaling 450 foreign scientists and specialists, mostly from the United States, India, France, the FRG and Japan, in turn were received at scientific institutions of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences.

International scientific ties are also maintained through the regular exchange of scientific literature, photocopies and manuscripts.

A number of scientists and specialists from socialist, capitalist and developing countries have done probationary work at scientific-research institutes of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences. Thus a staff member of the U.S. Geological Service studied for 30 years the achievements of Uzbek scientists in the field of geochemical forecasting of earthquakes. The director of the Institute of Chemistry of the Mongolian People's Republic did his probationary work at the Institute of Chemistry of Plant Substances researching alkaloids.

The work achievements of scientific collectives and individual scientists of Uzbekistan are known far beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union. The names of Vsevolod Romanovskiy, Kara-Niyazov, Abid Sadykov, Sabir Yunusov, Khamdam Usmanov, Ubay Arifov, Yalkin Turakulov, Saged Sirazhdinov, Yakh'ya Gulyamov, Galina Pugachenkova are highly respected in scientific circles of various countries.

Uzbek scientists are taking an active part in the work of international scientific organizations. Academician of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences S.Kh. Sirazhdinov is a member of the Scientific Association of Mathematicians-Statisticians (the Hague), Academician of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences T. Zakhidov is a member of the International Zoological Academy in Agra (India), corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences S.Yu. Yunusov is a member of the German Academy of Natural Science (Halle).

The opinions of our scientists are listened to; people collaborate with them in the working out of the most important problems of contemporaneity.

International ties of the republic's scientists will be further developed in the Tenth Five-Year Plan. Plans for joint research with Mongolian scientists are of broad scope--in physics, chemistry and mathematics, with Polish colleagues--in cosmic-ray physics, with specialists of the GDR--in

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biophysics and biochemistry. Joint researches will also be carried out with scientists of the United States--on solar energy and India--on the chemistry of natural compounds.

The Academy of Sciences' main library is carrying on reciprocal exchange of publications with foreign scientific institutions. This contributes to the dissemination abroad of truthful information on the cultural and scientific achievements of Uzbekistan. In 1976, a total of 38 countries took part in exchanges with the main library: 9 socialist, 19 capitalist and 10 developing countries. There were received 1,339 books and 2,363 periodicals and continuing publications. In exchange 162 books and 5,462 periodical publications were sent.

Of two academic journals being published in Uzbekistan, two (GELIOTEKHNIKA [Solar Power Engineering] and KHIMIYA PRIRODNYKH SOYEDINENIY [Chemistry of Natural Compounds]) are regularly reissued in the English language in the United States. There also have been published in recent years in that country monographs of Academician of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences U.A. Arifon "Interaction of Ions with a Metal Surface" and Doctor of Technical Sciences D. Fayzullayev "Laminar Movement of Multiphase Media in Pipelines."

In the past ten years, the scientific and creative ties of Tashkent State University have been expanded with VUZ's and scientific institutions of a number of foreign countries. It is a member of the International Association of Universities and maintains contacts with Beijing (China), Rangoon (Burma), Lucknow and Delhi (India), Indiana (United States), Rabat (Morocco), Katmandu (Nepal), Tunis (Tunis), Karachi (Pakistan) universities. Many of Tashkent State University's professors and instructors have taught in the VUZ's of India, Afghanistan, Vietnam and other countries. Major scholars of the university of the likes of professors T.Z. Zakhidov, A.S. Sadykov, T.T. Tulyaganov, S.K. Mirkamalov and others have traveled to the United States, France, England, India, Nepal and Cuba to establish scientific contacts and read lectures.

Scholars of Afghanistan, India, the GDR, Iraq, France, the United States and other countries in their turn have taught at Tashkent University.

The main library of Tashkent State University last year conducted book exchanges with 178 foreign institutions in more than 35 countries of the world, from which it obtained 1,445 scientific works.

The writers of Uzbekistan also have broad international ties. A two-sided meeting of Soviet and Colombian writers took place in our republic; there also have been a creative meeting with participants of the 3rd International Seminar of Translators and Publishers of Soviet literature, Days of Macedonian Poetry, Days of Soviet Literature in Uzbekistan involving the participation of writers from the countries of the socialist community, a four-sided meeting of writers from the USSR, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh--participants of the 5th Alma-Ata Conference.

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The USSR Writers Union and the Soviet Committee for Ties with Writers of the Countries of Asia and Africa jointly with the Writers Union of Uzbekistan and the Republic Committee for Ties with Writers of the Countries of Asia and Africa held for the first time in the history of the Afro-Asian movement in Tashkent a meeting of young writers of the countries of Asia and Africa. More than 80 persons from 54 countries participated in it.

In the last three years, more than one hundred foreign delegations of writers and about 50 delegations, who came to Uzbekistan for various public organizations, were guests of the Writers Union of Uzbekistan. In 1976, the republic was visited by 12 foreign writers' delegations, numbering 47 persons.

The trips to Uzbekistan, creative disputations with writers of the republic, visits to industrial enterprises and folkhozes and meetings with people are often reflected in the works of foreign writers. Thus, on the occasion of the 50th-anniversary of Uzbek SSR, there was issued a book "Svetoch bratstva" [Torchbearer of Brotherhood] whose authors were writers of socialist countries--participants of Days of Soviet Literature in Uzbekistan. The achievements in the building of the economy and culture of Soviet Uzbekistan also find their reflection in a book by the American artist and writer Fl-ton /Feks/\* "With the Eyes of a Black," the Senegalese writer Jean Briere "Another World." In Bulgaria, two books have been published by the well-known poet Yordan Milev--"People and Deserts" and "Eastern Poem." Many stories and poetical works have appeared on the pages of the foreign literary and art press.

Uzbek literature has received broad recognition abroad. In recent years, books of our authors have been reissued in the languages of more than 20 peoples of the world. The growing prestige of Uzbek books is borne out by the participation of Uzbekistan in international book expositions.

Much work is being done by the republic's publishing houses in the dissemination of progressive foreign literature. Thus, the Publishing House imeni G. Gulyam put out in the last three years more than 60 works by writers of the countries of Asia and Africa. The recently formed Progress Publishing House is putting out Soviet belles lettres and political literature as well as works of classical Uzbek literature in the languages of the peoples of the countries of Asia and Africa.

The pages of the journals ZVEZDA VOSTOKA and SHARK YULDUZI have included on its pages 15 works by authors of the foreign East, including from such countries as the Philippines, Republic of South Africa, Ivory Coast, Turkey, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Mali, Guinea, Ghana and Vietnam.

The development of friendly and cultural ties is promoted by tours of foreign representatives of the arts in Uzbekistan and artists of Uzbekistan abroad. Last year, various collective collectives of the republic traveled to 40 countries of Europe, Asia and Latin America.

\* Name in slantlines is in transliterated form.



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The judges of the International Cinema Festival in Delhi awarded the Uzbek director A. Khamrayev as second prize the Silver Peacock for the film "Chelovek ukhodit za ptitsami" [The Man Takes Care of the Birds].

The Prize imeni Abdul'kasim Firdousi, set up jointly by the Soviet and Iranian governments in connection with the 50th anniversary of the establishment of friendly relations between the two states, was awarded in Teheran to Professor Sh. Shamukhamedov, doctor of philological sciences, of Tashkent State University for researching the creative heritage of Abdul'kasim Firdousi and translating into the Uzbek language the poem "Shakhsname."

The Koplár Miklós Medal was awarded to Uzbek SSR Honored Worker in Culture and winner of the Prize imeni Khamza the Tashkent artist Emon Kalontarov for art works created by him during the days of his visit to Hungary.

An important role in the development of cultural ties is played by brother cities. Tashkent has become linked with the following cities: Patiala (India), Karachi (Pakistan), Tunis (Tunis), Tripoli (Libya), Marrakesh (Morocco), Skoplje (Yugoslavia), Seattle (United States); Almalyk has become linked with the city of Kitwe (Zambia).

In developing ties with foreign countries, Uzbekistan is making a worthy contribution to the realization of the Soviet government's policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and bolsters the cause of peace and friendship among peoples.

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