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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 673

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 673

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SOVIET, AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA DISCUSSED

Africa Penetrated

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Feb, 5 Mar 80

[27 Feb 80, pp 60-61]

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] For a long time the Soviet Union has wrapped itself in the cloak of natural ally and unconditional, if not disinterested, defender of the peoples of the Third World and the Africans in particular. As much by its material aid and military and diplomatic support as by its position-taking in the international arena, the USSR has unquestionably contributed to acceleration of the emancipation process of colonized peoples.

From Natural Ally. . .

For their part, the Africans were all the more encouraged in their struggle because they were convinced that their "just cause" had the firm and total support of the Soviet Union. The ultimatum addressed by the Kremlin in 1956 to the French and British governments, following the Suez expedition, bears witness to this. Similarly, the agreement by the USSR to sell Czech arms to Egypt or to build the Aswan Dam at a time when, after having been called upon first, the United States had shied away. All of these actions convinced the Africans that they were not condemned eternally to their tete-a-tete with the West. And that, thenceforth, if Paris, London or Washington attempted blackmail, they could spontaneously turn to Moscow with the assurance of just reparation.

The Africans could not fail to be fascinated by this mythical colossus. All the more so because it was a question of a faraway and practically unknown country. And also because the colonial powers, with their impressive batteries of propaganda, did not stop attacking the colossus. Consequently, in the mythology of the era, Moscow at one and the same time represented the gods of virtue and power, whose alliance and, with greater reason, whose friendship of necessity would be translated throughout Africa into rapid and harmonious economic development, the end of social misery and cultural alienation.

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...to Imperial Power

However, with the accession of our countries to independence, the cordon of security set up around the Soviet Union was not long in breaking. With many forms of exchange and cooperation assisting, the USSR is no longer the sanctuary enveloped by a halo of mystery that it was previously. Africa discovered with stupefaction, and not without bitterness, that the Soviet Union is acting just like any other great power. And that it is more ready to procure arms, therefore, to contribute to political liberation, than to build factories and, to say it all, to help in economic development. More serious than that, when the USSR engages in economic competition with the West, it uses the same techniques and same methods as the latter. To attain the same objective; i. e., the delivery of our raw materials at the lowest price.

Of course, unlike the Western powers, the USSR does not have multinational companies, oil fields or financial interests to defend in such or such African country. All the same, Moscow, just like Washington, London or Paris, has a need to carve out spheres of influence. In other words, to obtain naval and air bases, to install expeditionary corps, to place marionettes at the head of our governments, by force if necessary. This can be seen in Afghanistan today.

This great-power policy, during the last few years, has deeply cut into the Soviet Union's public image. A policy which is so prejudicial to Moscow that it tends to demonstrate that in Africa there is no real difference between the USSR and the United States: each is seeking to implant itself on our continent with the sole concern to preserve and extend its political, economic or financial interests there.

A Regrettable Image

That is the conclusion reached by Marc Yared in the political-military sector and Philippe Simonnot in the economic sector. This a regrettable image which the Soviet Union has every interest in improving at the risk of seeing the disappearance of the store of sympathy it built up at the dawn of African independences.

USSR Taking Root

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Feb 80 pp 62-63

[Article by Philippe Simonnot]

[Text] The Soviet Union is trying to increase its trade with Black Africa. However, it also wishes to take root there: by rationalization of the material bases of its presence, it has its sights on making itself, as well as its satellites within the socialist camp, attractive partners for the Africans. That for economic reasons and no longer for military reasons.

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Such is the principal conclusion of a one-of-a-kind study just conducted by Gerard Wild, of the Center for Prospective Studies and International Information (CEPII-France): a document which is about to be published in the COURRIER DES PAYS DE L'EST.

The CEPII expert, who examined all the agreements made between the socialist camp and the countries of South Saharan Africa during the last few years, notes first that the period 1973-1978 was a "good time" for the African policy of the USSR, contrasting with the previous 5 years (1968-1973), when the USSR had concentrated its efforts on the Arab world and the Indian peninsula.

Thanks to Portugal

This reorientation of the Third World strategy of Moscow is easily explained: on the one hand by the Soviet setbacks in the Near East, principally in Egypt, and on the other hand by the opportunities offered by the decomposition of the last European colonial empire. Of the six new partners which the Soviet Union has won in Africa in the last few years, three--Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau--are former Portuguese colonies. These countries are also the "principal mainsprings" of Soviet-African trade. Similarly, the CEPII recalls, the Soviet Union in 1958-1963 had profited from the breakup of the French empire, particularly in Guinea and Mali.

Thus, at first sight, Soviet progress in Black Africa seems to be based on a classical mode. Since politics by "nature" abhors a vacuum, the USSR, in whole or in part, is taking the place of those who are departing. As the CEPII study puts it: "It is principally the demand of the African countries which is the origin of the development of relations: Soviet economic penetration is determined by the African partners themselves."

Also classical is the fact that "the direct hold on the (African) elites, whether they be military or civilian, continues to be a privileged relation of the (Soviet) presence." In the military sector, the important role played by the USSR in the training of cadres is tied to deliveries of arms which accompany the penetration (see the article by Marc Yared). "The student sector," the CEPII notes, "is also the subject of particular attention: more than 40 percent of the Third World's students trained in the USSR are of African origin."

Soviet Discretion

Also classical is the exaltation of the big, prestigious projects which recalls the adventure of the high dam at Aswan in Egypt; exploitation of diamond mines in Guinea; extraction and enrichment of polymetallic ores in the Congo; irrigation works in Zambia, Mozambique and Ghana; hydroelectric power plant in Juba, Somalia; iron and steel plant in Kvara, Nigeria; road and railway infrastructures in Madagascar; port facilities in Angola.

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Classical, finally, in the nature of the trade: the USSR exports machinery and equipment and basically buys raw materials for food: coffee, cacao, exotic fruits.

Therefore, it is with the weapons of trade that the USSR is now seeking to counter the West and no longer with the spectacular economic aid to which Moscow was accustomed for a long time. Consequently, the USSR is being more respectful of the economic realities of the countries. This is particularly true in Angola, where Moscow seems to want to prevent this country from implementing a "too radical" economic policy which would threaten to make it a "too burdensome" partner, by disorganizing a still fragile economy.

Its discretion goes to the point of respecting the interests of Western companies, particularly Gulf and other companies engaged in oil exploitation, perhaps in this case because it does not have the mastery of offshore techniques. Similarly, in Mozambique and Madagascar, Soviet efforts are concentrated on the "vacuums to be filled" and not on "a brutal restructuring" of the economy.

Moreover, the study notes an increase in the sale of raw materials in Soviet purchases of African products. Except for bauxite and tin, the USSR has huge reserves. We might also ask ourselves what interest it has in encouraging production outside its territory. The CEP II provides three hypotheses:

1. The USSR is engaged in a supply strategy similar to that of the United States: in order to substitute foreign raw materials at bargain prices for national resources at high extraction costs.
2. The USSR is attempting to directly control its potential competitors on the world market for raw materials and to thus enhance its own resources, at the same time as those of its partners.
3. The USSR is seeking to draw as close as it can to the neighboring countries which are suppliers of the West (Zaire and South Africa) to destabilize them.

According to the CEP II, Moscow doubtless is playing on all three courts at the same time, by favoring the insertion of its satellites into economic relations with Africa. The USSR would thus see itself "progressively charged" with responsibilities as the exclusive supplier of its European satellites; its reserves of raw materials available for the Western market and convertible into strong foreign currencies would increase; in exchange, the African countries "would benefit" from a market sufficiently protected to assure them of industrialization without excessive fluctuations.

Less political or militant, more rational and, in a nutshell, more intelligent, Soviet imperialism is on the testing grounds of Black Africa. It

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remains to be seen whether, with the renewal of the cold war, its American competitor will seek to contain the USSR, indeed to push it back. As for the interest the Africans have in this battle of giants in their territory, it is problematic. Everything is proceeding as if they can no longer choose between the two camps to profit from their rivalry.

Just as if they were once again enlisted.

An Imperial Power

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Feb 80 pp 63-66

[Article by Marc Yared]

[Text] On 28 February 1955, the Israeli army launched a raid on the territory of Gaza, which was administered by Egypt. Sixty-nine Egyptians were killed. Incapable of hitting back, President Gamal Abd el-Nasser, humiliated, asked the United States for arms. Washington set as a condition the adherence of Egypt to the Baghdad Pact which was directed against the USSR. At that point, Nasser turned to Moscow. In June 1955, for the first time in history, a state in the Soviet bloc, Czechoslovakia, agreed to deliver arms to an African country, Egypt. This agreement, which had formidable echos in the Arab world and on the Black Continent, was to serve as a model of Soviet-African military cooperation for 20 years.

When?

First great constant: it is almost always for the purpose of escaping a danger of subversion or invasion that African states request or accept massive military aid from Moscow. For Egypt, we have seen that the catalytic element was first the Israeli raid in 1955 then, and above all, the Suez war in 1956. Somalia followed the example of Egypt after the 1964 defeat in the face of Ethiopia and to escape pro-Western encirclement (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya). The Sudan needed arms to crush the separatist guerrillas in the south, who were active up to 1972. Algeria, which was manhandled by the Moroccan army in 1963, was seeking to change the balance of forces in its favor. The power of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) was threatened by pro-Western rival organizations in 1975. In 1977, revolutionary Ethiopia was undermined by centrifugal forces which were seeking to reestablish the imperial system or to split up the country. Mozambique which was harboring the guerrillas of southern Africa, in 1977-1978 was subject to fearful batterings by the Rhodesian army. The socialist regime of Sao Tome and Principe in February 1978 feared the imminent landing of "reactionary" mercenaries. Quite recently, in November 1979, Kenneth Kaunda's Zambia ordered a dozen Mig 21's from the Soviet Union to defend itself against Rhodesian air raids.

Why?

Why does the Kremlin respond to the appeal of these African states? Does it have a preestablished plan for implantation on the Black Continent? It

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is true that, in the 1950's and at the beginning of the 1960's, the Soviet Union was seeking principally to defend itself, to stop the spread of all those hostile alliances (NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact) created by the United States. Moscow is satisfied with seizing opportunities to "fly to the rescue" of those who call upon it.

This pragmatic, flexible attitude serves the interests of independent and nonaligned Africa.

Soviet military aid permits the breaking up of the arms delivery monopoly held for a long time by the West. As acknowledged by Sadat, Soviet aid "lifts the morale of Third World countries; they know they can now appeal to someone in their struggle to rid themselves of the colonial hegemony they have endured for centuries."

How Much?

Soviet military aid, substantial if not decisive, permits partial modification of the balance of forces on behalf of the recipients. From 1970-1976, Moscow was the number one arms supplier--32 percent of the total--in sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa excepted). In 1977, the Black Continent received more than one third of Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World, and the same year nearly 55 percent of the military personnel of developing countries trained in the USSR were Africans.

It is partly thanks to Soviet advisers that Egyptian, Somali and Tanzanian officers--some of whom were trained in Moscow military academies--performed brilliantly on the field of battle: the Israeli-Arab war in October 1973, the beginning of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict in 1977 and the Uganda campaign in 1978-1979.

Libya has become a gigantic arsenal accommodating 2,000 T-54, T-55, T-62 and T-72 tanks, as well as 100 missiles and 130 fighter planes made in the USSR. And that is only the beginning. In 1980-1981, the Jamahiriya is to receive from Moscow 400 fighter planes, 10,000 armored cars and 90 missile-launching patrol boats.

Similarly, Algeria now has a crushing superiority in air and armored forces over its Moroccan rival. It has nearly 700 T-54, T-55, T-62 and T-72 tanks, missiles, 252 combat planes, 22 fast torpedo boats and 6 patrol boats.

How?

Up to the mid 1960's, Soviet military cooperation was all the more appreciated because it was complemented--at times--by a large contribution to the development of its African partners. That was the situation with Egypt which benefited from this complementary aid in the building of the giant Aswan Dam.

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What is more, Moscow does not couple its military aid with political or other conditions, which are capable of undermining the sovereignty of its "clients," while the West imposes adherence to its military pacts or free disposition of bases. The Kremlin respects the nonalignment of Nasser or Sekou Toure, feeling that they are natural allies whose countries sooner or later will join "scientific socialism." The Soviet Union goes so far as to sacrifice--as in Egypt--communist Africans on behalf of "national democratic regimes."

This attitude has not kept the Kremlin from accumulating setbacks since the end of the 1960's. One after another, Ghana in 1966, the Sudan in 1971, Egypt in 1975, Guinea in 1977, Uganda in 1978, and Equatorial Guinea in 1979, put an end of their privileged relations with Moscow. The turnabout of Egypt in particular, where the Kremlin had invested considerable sums, gave the Soviet Union a veritable trauma and caused a revision of the policy followed up to then.

New Look

Now, Moscow is opting for military cooperation only, to the detriment of economic assistance. Nonaligned African governments are neglected in favor of "Marxist" regimes. The dispatch to the rescue of the latter by Cuban troops and East German advisers is systematically encouraged by the Kremlin.

In Angola, since 1975; in Ethiopia, since 1977, in Mozambique, since 1978 (see box); thousands of communist military advisers are working to establish a single party and to forge the apparatus of state, of the unions, the army and the security services. This process of providing cadres for allies in Africa, designed to guarantee their loyalty, has resulted (as was the case in South Yemen and in Afghanistan in 1979) in the liquidation of chiefs of state judged not too sure. Even if certain rumors have pointed up Soviet meddling at the time of the attempted putsch of Nito Alves in Angola (May 1977). Or collusion between Havana and certain Ethiopian Marxist leaders to the detriment of the chief of state, Haile-Mariam Mengistu.

Repression and Expansion

Another consequence of the Soviet new look: to keep friendly governments in place, troops of the Soviet bloc are directly engaged in the repression of guerrilla movements which benefit solid popular groups. That is particularly the case in Eritrea and the Ogaden where liberation fronts, which are clashing with Ethiopian and Cuban troops, are increasingly broadening their base.

From these three big African bastions, Moscow is making ready to spread out to neighboring countries. Ethiopia is already harboring Sudanese, Malian and Djibouti opposition movements. Angola is serving as a sanctuary

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for Namibian guerillas--trained by Cuban and East German officers--and since 1978 has had an expeditionary corps in Sao Tome and Principe led by Soviets and Cubans. Mozambique is the rear base for guerrillas from Zimbabwe and South Africa, who are instructed by experts from Havana or East Berlin. The objectives of the Kremlin are control over raw materials (see map on page 64), energy sources, the coastline of the Indian Ocean (the oil route) and archipelagos.

With regard to its traditional nonaligned partners, Moscow is becoming more and more demanding. It only agrees to supply them with sophisticated arms on condition that these remain under the control of Soviet experts, who are the only ones with authority to determine when they are to be used. Thus in 1980-1981, 5,500 Soviet advisers and 300 Czech advisers will supervise the use of advanced materiel in Libya.

An "Imperial Power"

Moscow also exerts "friendly" but constant pressure so that "progressive" African states will grant it fishing rights¹--this was the case with Equatorial Guinea until the overthrow of the dictator, Macias Nguema--sign friendship treaties and grant military facilities to the Soviet navy and air force. At the end of 1979, the Mozambican president, Samora Machel, still was refusing to grant such facilities to the Red Army.

With a presence inside the structures of Marxist states, efforts to control or repress liberation movements, an unrelenting fight for influence with the West for the control of oil and raw materials, military aid with increasing conditions: the Soviet Union is behaving in Africa today like a great imperial power.

Africa Penetrated--Part II

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 p 81

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] Relations between Africa and the United States have gone through various phases. Kept in the background for a long time by the colonial powers (Great Britain, France and Portugal), Uncle Sam burst forthrightly into the continent during World War II. First in North Africa, where the arrival of powerfully-armed American soldiers was to teach the local populations that there was a country decidedly stronger than the colonial powers. Next in Black Africa, where it was necessary to await the end of the war and the return of the colonial troops to hear the Senegalese "infantrymen" boast of the strength and wealth of the U. S. army. This myth

1) It is public knowledge that Soviet fishing trawlers, which ply their way through the fishing areas of certain Third World countries, are often equipped with modern radars to detect the movements of naval and air units and to intercept communications.

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of wealth and comfort, in accordance with which the Africans wound up perceiving the whole of American society, was to be accentuated by the movies.

Hollywood flooded Africa (as it did other continents) with a profusion of films presenting America as a veritable land of plenty.

However, with the launching of the wars of liberation, the magic mirror was not long in shattering. Based on the abstract theme of independence and liberty, the honeyed language of the American leaders did not in the least fool the African nationalists. In Algeria as in the Congo, in Guinea-Bissau as in southern Africa, the militants knew that America was remaining in the second line behind the French, Belgian and Portuguese colonial troops.

In the name of Western solidarity in the fight against "communism" and subversion, the United States supplied all the military and financial support needed by the colonizers. And that contributed heavily to the tarnishing of the public image of Washington in the eyes of Africans. Every time a guerrilla fell, the Africans knew that he was directly or indirectly the victim of the arms if not the logistical or financial means furnished by the United States.

Similarly, the persistence, not to mention the consolidation, of the apartheid system in southern Africa, on the one hand, and the challenge for the Arab world represented by Israel, on the other hand, contributed to increasingly day by day nourish a profound resentment of the Africans with regard to the United States. In fact, no one is unaware of the close and varied ties which Washington is maintaining both with Pretoria and Tel Aviv. Are not American investments in South Africa alone greater than in all the other countries of Black Africa combined? For a long time, everything was proceeding as if only South Africa (because of its fabulous mining resources) was of interest to the United States. The other countries were left in custody of the European colonizers.

However, for several years now Washington seems to be seeking a policy and a strategy for Africa. First because it is necessary to think about protecting and, if possible, developing the essentially mining investments (oil, bauxite, copper, chromium, diamonds, gold) which were made here and there by American multinational companies. But principally to react against the strategic breakthrough and the political successes brought off against the Black Continent by the Soviet Union.

In any event, to be successful in a real African policy, the technological advances of America, its food surplus, as well as the improvement in the condition of black Americans and the policy of human rights, are so many precious aces in the hole for the Africans.

Sophie Bessis and Francois Soudan present the multiple facets of Afro-American relations in the following pages.

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Toward an African 'New Deal'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 82-83

[Article by Sophie Bessis]

[Text] "If the Russians and Americans want to come here, I wish them well," General de Gaulle said in regard to Africa in 1963. Premonition? The United States which, after 1960, counted on the former colonial powers to keep Africa in the Western sphere of influence, has during the last few years perceived that the European "umbrella" did not do much to stop Soviet penetration from the shores of the Mediterranean to those of the Indian Ocean. The imperatives of detente, the isolationist persuasion of the United States after the Indo-Chinese defeat, in part explain the weakness of American reactions to the offensive strategy of the Soviets in Africa since 1975.

At present, even if it has certain military facilities in Monrovia, Mombasa, Berbera or Diego Garcia, the United States does not have a single military base in Africa and not one Yankee boy is stationed there. As for its diplomacy, this is far from being spectacular despite the few overtures made by Andrew Young and President Carter's trip to Nigeria and Liberia in April 1978. Of course, American-African declarations of solidarity on the community of interests between Africa and the United States are more frequent than ever. American aid for development is more oriented toward Dakar, Yaounde or Ouagadougou than 10 years ago. U. S. IDA officials are becoming increasingly more familiar with cooperation dossiers. However, Washington now seems to be hesitating between the implementation of a containment strategy and a certain amount of laissez-faire which up to now has characterized its policy. Does the limited scale of its interests on the continent explain this hesitation to engage itself more deeply? Is the United States confident of the virtues of economic liberalism and its multinational companies to defend its positions? Or does it believe that Soviet influence has not yet reached intolerable limits?

Setting aside South Africa, which is a special case (see the article by Francois Soudan on p 86), American-African relations are more important and more complex than one might believe. The United States has need of Africa (see the article on minerals on p 83) from which it receives 41 percent of the oil it imports. Twenty percent of its total imports of oil comes from Nigeria which is the second largest supplier of the United States after Saudi Arabia. Forty percent of Libyan hydrocarbon exports are sent to American ports. The United States also buys oil from Gabon and Angola. As for Algeria, it sells a great part of its natural gas to American companies such as El Paso, Distrigas of Boston, Trunkline lng [liquid natural gas] and Panhandle. The EXIMBANK has over \$1 billion credits for Algeria which sends 56 percent of its total oil production to the United States (8 percent of American imports).

Dividing Line

One fact is clear in this listing: American-African trade does not follow the dividing line between moderate and "progressive" countries. On the

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contrary, Algeria which half-heartedly criticized the "Kabul coup" is one of the principal partners of the United States in Africa, while Morocco which is resolutely positioned on the Western side is the number one African commercial partner of the Soviet Union. Another example: apart from oil exports, Libya, reputed moreover to be a veritable rear base of the USSR, receives private American investments with open arms: in 1979, several American companies, including General Electric and large agricultural companies, signed a series of contracts with the Libyans totaling in excess of \$400 million. The anti-imperialism of Colonel Qadhafi is not keeping 5,000 Libyan students from attending American universities with his blessing. In southern Africa, Angola has been careful not to oust the Gulf Oil Company, the number one oil company operating in its territory, which continues to conduct profitable business. Conakry, Guinea accepts and encourages American investments which are particularly important in Fria bauxite. What is more, the country would have a hard time surviving without American food aid which totaled nearly \$75 million in 1962-1979; contracts for the supplying of grains for 1979 alone totaled \$6 million.

For all that, the United States has not abandoned its traditional positions in Africa: Liberia, of course, which in a way is like the "51st state" of the Union, but also Zaire, Kenya, Gabon where U. S. Steel is one of the biggest stockholders in the COMILOG (Ogooue Mining Company) which exploits the manganese of Moanda. As for military assistance and arms sales, it is the "sure" allies who benefit the most: Egypt is generally at the head of the list since the signing of the peace treaty with Israel, followed by Morocco and the Sudan which in 1978 was the largest African buyer of American arms. In 1978, Zaire, Nigeria and Kenya also figures among the principal clients of American arms industries.

Nonagonizing Revision

That said, private American investments in Africa, including South Africa, are not over 3 percent of their total overseas investments (see table on p 84); i. e., the same percentage as in 1950. However, in the United States, more and more politicians are saying that Washington has every interest in revising its African policy or rather elaborating a real policy with regard to Africa. According to a growing number of experts, the time has passed when the job of "protecting the continent" could be left to others, since, from Ethiopia to the former Portuguese empire, the USSR has at every opportunity taken advantage of the disintegration of Western positions. Although the importance of the Western Mediterranean has been recognized for a long time by the Pentagon and the State Department, Africa south of the Sahara is becoming one of the regions in which the United States has "vital interests" to defend, if only because the "oil route" almost completely follows the contours of the continent. No one in Washington, however, envisions a directly interventionist policy: no matter what American power may be, it cannot deploy itself everywhere at the same time; and Asia largely continues to be its priority, not to mention Latin America. But a series of actions would permit the United States, while avoiding the accusation of "great, wicked imperialist wolf," to

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establish a real community of interests with the African states. The main points of this new deal propose, among other things, to increase development aid which would total \$2 billion per year, to encourage the countries to make a real economic development effort, to cooperate closely in African policy matters with European states, particularly France and Belgium, and to foster rapprochement between moderate Arabs and Black Africa. It is in this perspective that we must in particular view the new role attributed to the Egyptian army: freed from war, Egypt is being oriented by the United States toward the defense of Western interests south of the Sahara. However, the entire political class is far from being convinced that Africa is now an important stake for the United States. As for the problem of South Africa, it is far from being settled. The fact of the matter is, if the Americans have "vital interests" to safeguard, it is needed in this country that such interests are to be found; and all Americans are aware of this. Some think that pressure should be exerted on Pretoria to force it to give up apartheid; others feel that in no event should a risk be taken of breaking off with the southern state. In any case, it seems that hesitations with respect to the attitude to be adopted toward the "pale power" in part explain the absence of a real American strategy in Africa. Or is this perhaps the supreme cleverness? While the Soviets and their allies are getting bogged down in operations which make them unpopular everywhere, the Americans are little by little making themselves economically and technically indispensable in Africa. However, for several months, the chess game has been speeding up. That may well change things. Already new anti-Soviet alliances are being drawn up: the American secretary of defense, Harold Brown, who was in Peking in January, spoke at length about Africa with the Chinese representatives.

Valuable Aces in the Holes

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 83-86

[Article by Sophie Bessis]

[Text] By cutting off grain sales to the USSR to show its opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Red Army, the United States officially introduced food blackmail into the arsenal of weapons to be used against countries which too blatantly oppose it. If they were confronted by such an ultimatum, many African countries would find themselves in a most uncomfortable position, a position which could even be tragic for some of them. In fact, a number of African states depend upon foreign countries and particularly the United States for their supplies of foodstuffs. If we add to that the other means of American pressure, whether this be at the level of world trade, its budgetary preponderance in international financial organizations for development or through its multinational companies, we can measure the difficulties which Africa would encounter were it to take exception to a future mandate by the United States.

However, the world's number one power is not invulnerable. In order for it to operate its enormous industrial and military machine, the United

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States needs a certain number of minerals which its subsoil has in insufficient quantities. In 1978, the United States imported 98 percent of its manganese consumption, 97 percent of its cobalt, 93 percent of its bauxite, 92 percent of its chrome, 48 percent of its antimony, 50 percent of its tungsten, 62 percent of its zinc, 77 percent of its nickel, 20 percent of its copper, etc. Total nonferrous mineral imports amounted to \$21 billion. The United States, therefore, is far from being self-sufficient in the sectors judged to be strategic. This situation, moreover, can only be accentuated to the extent that technological progress requires increasingly sophisticated alloys in the various branches of the iron and steel industry: it is already known that U. S. imports of copper and bauxite will increase considerably in the next few years.

A Geological Scandal

Does Africa, the veritable reservoir of all kinds of minerals, have a card to play in this sector in the event of conflict with the United States? A mere glance at the continent's mine production and reserves shows that it is not totally helpless in the present game of international relations in which the power struggle is dominant. Conakry, Guinea is in third place worldwide in bauxite production; and, according to some estimates, its reserves could be half the world total! Chromium, cobalt, copper and manganese are being extracted in considerable quantities from the subsoil of Zimbabwe, Zaire, Zambia, Gabon and South Africa. Africa is also present to a lesser degree in world zinc, lead, nickel and tin production. This inventory could well remind one of Ali Baba's cave; however, it is strongly tempered by the political realities: the richest countries on the continent--is this by chance?--are solidly tied to the West. This is particularly true of South Africa which has a near monopoly on the production of certain minerals: it is in second place worldwide in the production of antimony, after China; it provides 28 percent of world production of chromium, 2/3 of African manganese production, nearly half of African nickel production, a not inconsiderable part of copper and platinum production, not to mention gold and diamonds, of which it has the world's largest deposits. Of course, it is one of the principal suppliers of rare metals to the United States. Southern Africa as a whole has often been described as a "geological scandal." There is some truth in this expression: between the two of them, South Africa and Zimbabwe have 97 percent of the world's chromium reserves. Zimbabwe also has 31 percent of African nickel production (eighth largest world producer). As for neighboring Zambia, with nearly 10 percent of the world copper production, it shares with Zaire (5.6 percent of world copper) the copper belt which is one of greatest natural resources of that part of the continent. However, although Zambia is one of the big suppliers of the United States, the latter also receives supplies from Canada, Chile, or course, and is itself one of the largest world producers. With large production of other rare minerals, Zaire also holds a prominent place among the great mining countries of Africa. As for manganese, Gabon, Upper Volta, Morocco and Algeria have large reserves.

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Therefore, it is understandable that at this juncture the West is concerned about "destabilization" of the continent and will do everything in its power to maintain the status quo. For this reason, it supported a solution in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe in which the moderate wing of the black majority would have a voice and on several occasions saved the pro-Western government of Mobutu from bankruptcy. The fact of the matter is that the stakes are high.

Security Bases

Although with regard to "strategic" minerals the large producers are rather dispersed, which permits the United States to diversify its sources of supply, American officials are worried about their too great dependence on a continent which they consider as not too sure. One of them recently emphasized: "Consciously or not, we are in the process of undermining the bases of our national security and placing ourselves for survival in the hands of unstable, foreign countries which are subject to many vicissitudes..." The situation is all the more worrisome because there is no way to remedy it over the short term. The participation of American firms in the capitalization of the big companies which control mining extraction in Africa and their concern over "friendly" governments do not shelter them from coups d'etat or the upsetting of alliances. This was seen in Asia and not too long ago. For the moment, their supplies are not threatened: the producing African states are still far from forming effective cartels. The divergent interests of Third World countries often win out over that which should bring them together; and the South African is not ready to make way for the black majority. However, there is awareness in Washington that the United States no longer rules as master of the world and that coming political changes will not all be to its advantage. That is why mining exploration has been stepped up in America itself: there was a recent discovery of new reserves of platinum, manganese and cobalt. The government is not in a hurry to exploit them: for the moment, they are a security stockpile against the day when customary suppliers are lacking. What is more, the government is awaiting the day when world prices are high enough to make exploitation profitable. For, if the United States knows its weaknesses, it also knows to what point the African countries have need of selling; what would Zambia or Zaire do if they were no longer able to sell their copper? Where would Guinea be if no one bought its bauxite? In order to have real pressure capabilities with respect to buying countries, these states should free themselves of their situation as individual producers. Only then will they be able to begin to negotiate on a footing of equality with their clients in the affluent countries. Today, Africans are not in control of the game. If they reach this point one day, the factors of the equation will be seriously altered. The United States is aware of this and is preparing for it. It is up to Africa to know how to use its aces in the hole.

[see next page for chart]

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CHART

Direct, Private, American Investments in Africa (in millions of dollars)

| | 1960 | 1965 | 1970 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|------|
| Total investments abroad | 32,778 | 49,217 | 78,178 | 124,212 | 137,244 | |
| Total investments in Africa | 925 | 1,904 | 3,482 | 3,996 | 4,467 | |
| South Africa | 286 | 528 | 868 | 1,582 | 1,665 | |
| Rest of Africa | 639 | 1,376 | 2,614 | 2,414 | 2,802 | |
| Including: | | | | | | |
| Libya | 99 | 424 | 1,012 | 65 | 362 | |
| Liberia | 139 | 201 | 187 | 334 | 348 | |
| Nigeria | -- | -- | -- | 535 | 341 | |
| Zaire | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 250 |
| Gabon | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 170 |
| Kenya | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 150 |

(--) Figures not available

Source: "Africa and the United States" (New York, 1978)

Africa's Position in World Production of Nonferrous Minerals in 1977

| Minerals | % Use | Principal African Producers |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Antimony | 24% Automobile batteries, fire extinguishers, chemical products | South Africa |
| Arsenic | 18% Insecticides | Namibia |
| Asbestos | 15% Construction, surfacing | South Africa |
| Bauxite | 16% Aluminum | Guinea |
| Chromium | 54% Metallurgy, chemical industry | South Africa-Zimbabwe |
| Cobalt | 66% Metallurgy, magnets | Zaire-Zambia-Morocco |
| Copper | 22% Construction, electricity | Zaire-Zambia-South Africa |
| Industrial diamonds | 88% Abrasives, drilling equipment | Zaire-South Africa-Botswana-Ghana |
| Flourine | 15% Steel, fluorine, aluminum | South Africa |
| Germanium | 52% Electronics | Zaire-Namibia |
| Manganese | 52% Steel, alloys | South Africa-Gabon |
| Phosphate | 36% Fertilizers, detergents | Morocco-Tunisia-Togo-Senegal-South Africa |

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| Minerals | % Use | Principal African Producers |
|----------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Platinum | 87% Catalyzers | South Africa |
| Tantalum | 27% Electronics, superalloys | Mozambique-Nigeria-Zaire |
| Uranium | 26% Electric energy | South Africa-Namibia-Niger |
| Vanadium | 52% Metallurgy | South Africa |

(Percentage of world production, excepting the USSR, East Europe and China)

Source: AEI, vol I, no 1, 1979

U. S. Food Power

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 p 86

[Article by Sophie Bessis]

[Text] The countries of the Sahel will have to import nearly 1 million tons of grain this year, according to estimates of the CILSS (Inter-State Committee to Fight the Drought in the Sahel). In 1980, Algeria will buy more than 2 million tons abroad. Egypt, the Sudan, Morocco, etc. are large importers, as are most of the countries north and south of the Sahara; and, according to FAO and World Bank projections, their purchases of foodstuffs are threatening to increase in alarming proportions from now to the year 2000.

In 1979-1980, the United States will export 140 million tons of wheat, corn, fodder grains and soybeans. During the average year, it takes care of 50 percent of world exports of wheat, 60 percent of fodder grain exports, 30 percent of rice exports, 50 percent of vegetable oil exports. What is more, the United States has in its territory a large part of the world's wheat stockpile. Nearly one-fourth of the country's agricultural areas are producing for export; and the United States is today selling more grain to foreign countries than all the other world exporters combined. In 1979, total food exports brought it \$32 billion. That is not all: 80 percent of total food aid to the Third World comes from the United States. When we realize that even the members of the committee set up by President Carter to study the problem of hunger acknowledge that American aid is conditioned by "a concept of national security," and that such aid is above all "an instrument designed to serve the short-term political interests" of the United States, we are better able to measure to what point the dependence of African countries with respect to America is dangerous. Food aid does not of necessity go to impoverished countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Kenya and Zaire have for a long time been among the principal beneficiaries of American generosity. Since 1978, Egypt "deprived" of aid since the 1967 war, is once again at the head of the list of African countries. However, Algeria and Nigeria, whose good graces the United States wishes to court because of its oil dependence, also are receiving large amounts of grains. An embargo is not the only weapon.

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African leaders are beginning to understand what the Americans have known for a long time: the political dimension of their food dependency with regard to the big Western producers.

Blackmail by Racists

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 86-87

[Article by Francois Soudan]

[Text] "South Africa nonaligned? Why not?" This thought expressed by a diplomat accredited to Pretoria is not exactly a jest: this country is often called the African outpost of the West and which described itself as the bastion of white capitalism, seems, today, more than ever tempted by the virtues of isolation and the games of trade-off. This is true to the point that it is no longer possible to consider South Africa as an unconditional partner of the United States in Africa.

Durban, 15 August 1979. Before delegates of the National Party, Prime Minister Pieter Botha, set forth the new principles of South Africa's foreign policy; the "Botha line": "Everyone should know this: we are not definitely committed to the Western cause. The time has come to re-examine our foreign relations. Since World War II, it seemed to go without saying that we could be counted upon as allies of the West in the event of conflict. Such an alinement implies a certain degree of reciprocity. And the Western countries have shown themselves to be deceptive in our regard..."

"Codes of Conduct"

This warning is only one facet of the "overall strategy" implemented by Pieter Botha and his advisers since the fall of the former prime minister, Johannes Vorster, at the end of 1978. For them, a single tactic is de rigueur: the old reflex of the laager, that circle of wagons which the first Boer colonists formed to protect themselves against attacks by Zulu warriors. The pullback to the southern bastion. This survival strategy, which in the internal sector is translated into a degree of relaxation of apartheid, has three dimensions in foreign policy. The construction of an autonomous, nuclear defense designed to deter any aggressive impulse on the part of the continental allies of the Soviet Union (Angola, Mozambique and perhaps tomorrow Zimbabwe and Zambia); the strengthening of the economic ties which make these same countries dependent upon South Africa, particularly in the sector of modern technologies and communications network (that is the basis of the plan for a "Southern Economic Community" which was prepared by Pretoria); finally, use of the strategic and economic blackmail weapon with regard to the West.

Strategic blackmail, first. The Cape route is vital for the oil supplies of Europe and the United States: 75 percent of the crude oil and 44 percent of the freight making up the foreign trade of NATO countries round

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the Cape of Good Hope. This role of sentinel of the communication routes, of vital importance at this time of strained detente, South Africa now indeed intends to make pay off. In exchange, for example, for a partial lifting of the embargo on arms and a certain degree of indulgence with respect to its nuclear tests.

Strategic Blackmail

But most particularly blackmail in the economic sector and especially as regards the supplying of minerals to the West. South Africa is one of leading world producers of 24 so-called "strategic" minerals; number one for gold, platinum, vanadium and antimony; second for chromium and manganese; third for diamonds, uranium and natural gas. Ninety-one percent of the chromium imported by the United States, 52 percent of the vanadium, 27 percent of the gold and 25 percent of the platinum come from South Africa. An even more accentuated dependence for the other Western countries, particularly Japan (87 percent of the chromium and 62 percent of the vanadium) and the Federal Republic of Germany (52 percent of the manganese, 50 percent of the vanadium and antimony). The strategic implications for the West of this state of affairs are enormous because of the fact that, outside South Africa, there are no large reserves of crucial minerals--such as gold, platinum, manganese and vanadium--except in the Soviet Union.

For Pieter Botha and his advisers, it is a question of an equal number of aces in the hole to be used. Several times in 1979, South African officials brandished the minerals weapon. The effect sought seems to have been achieved: the Western attitude toward South Africa appears to have changed somewhat. The watchwords of economic boycott of the 1960's, pressures designed to cause the disappearance of apartheid, the antiracist "codes of conduct" demanded by their respective governments of the thousands of Western companies located in South Africa are now almost nothing but memories. The Soweto riots in 1976, the pro-Soviet independences of Angola and Mozambique, and the depressed prices of many minerals had at the time weakened South Africa. However, from the Cape to Pretoria, the winds of euphoria are blowing once again; white power imposed its solution on Namibia and nothing is possible without it in Zimbabwe. America consults and courts white power. A "high risk" country as recently as 2 years ago, South Africa has again become a blessed land for foreign investors. Nothing astonishing in that: at a time when the average rates of profit of the big Western companies is around 15 percent, the rate in South Africa is 25-29 percent.

"The United States wanted to govern here in our stead," one of Botha's political advisers said a month ago. "But the day when Kissinger said"--it was in Lusaka on 27 April 1976--"that the whites in southern Africa must yield or disappear is in the past. Today, it is up to the Americans to adapt. Our doctrine is conditional neutrality."

"Can we boycott South Africa?" This was the question Western governments were asking themselves a few years ago. The question tomorrow might well be: "How can we keep Pretoria from boycotting us?"

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SURVEY OF AFRICAN OPINION ON CURRENT CONCERNS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Mar 80 pp 48-53

[Article by J.-L. B.: "Results of the Special Opinion Poll--Africans, What Is It That Concerns You?"]

[Text] African public opinion, that fickle arbiter at once courted and feared by sitting governments, has expressed itself thanks to JEUNE AFRIQUE. Through our opinion poll, "Africans, what is it that concerns you?" whose results we publish below, we have an initial picture of it. This picture will be completed and fleshed out over the months with new public opinion polls.

Well then, who are these Africans of 1980? The numerous responses that we received indicate that they are moderately politicized, distrustful of their leaders, aware of the importance of economic development, concerned by social problems and the evolution of liberties, and worried about the risks of conflict on the African continent.

That is to say, they have their feet on the ground: Health (75 percent) counts most for them (question No 1), ahead of family (48 percent) and job security (33 percent). Cultural identity, a less concrete concern, nevertheless occupies fourth place (31 percent). It comes ahead of money (30 percent), love (29 percent), religion (19 percent), and--what is most surprising--ahead of housing (only 16 percent). Social prestige and power received very few votes (11 percent and 7 percent, respectively).

There is a certain degree of realism, then, that one finds also in those topics which interest Africans most (question No 2): Economic development (82 percent) and the improvement of infrastructure (71 percent) distinctly head the list. Third place is a major revelation: 60 percent for human rights. This is undoubtedly a new aspiration which belies the well-known thesis of the leaders according to which human rights is a "Western" notion which could not be of concern before a country emerges from underdevelopment. For African opinion the two concerns are not contradictory. Then comes inter-African cooperation (56 percent), a hollow slogan in the mouth of politicians never followed by results. The improvement of purchasing power was frequently mentioned (51 percent),

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but perhaps one would have expected as much in these times of crisis. Fairly far behind, one finds universal education (38 percent), the upholding of family structure (26 percent), religious renewal (12 percent), and the reinforcement of the armed forces (11 percent).

Were these focuses of interest shared by their fellow-citizens (question No 3)? Not always, our readers answered. There is little difference as regards economic development (72 percent), the improvement of infrastructure (67 percent), universal education (37 percent), the maintenance of family structures (27 percent), and the strengthening of the armed forces (11 percent). But Africans feel that around them not enough interest is taken in the defense of human rights (35 percent) or in inter-African cooperation (26 percent), but, in contrast, that there is too much concern with the improvement of purchasing power (68 percent) and religious renewal (17 percent). A highly significant result! It may be thought that the trend in favor of liberties and cooperation, since these are individual responses, is not aware of its strength. This prevents it from becoming a veritable public opinion movement. Let us hope that our public opinion poll contributes to it.

It is, however, necessary to qualify this conclusion. The discrepancies in opinion about human rights and inter-African cooperation also stem from another fact: these questions are of interest to an elite, the one which reads JEUNE AFRIQUE, which is better informed, better educated, more politicized, and better off than average (as indicated by the personal data accompanying the responses). But they are of less concern to society overall. That is to say, it is often the elites, the economic and political intellectuals, who initiate public opinion movements.

What are at present the principal subjects of concern to Africans (question No 4)? First, social inequalities (56 percent), followed by foreign interventions (51 percent) and the morality of leaders (34 percent), testimony to the very relative confidence given to them. The slow pace of economic development is of less concern (21 percent). The same is true of the price of gasoline (21 percent), Africans being undisturbed by the alarmist campaigns on this score. The breakup of the traditional family (14 percent), the escalation of religious movements (9 percent), and especially the strengthening of the armed forces (3 percent!) were mentioned only by a minority of readers.

Twenty years after their independence, the fact of statehood is widely taken for granted (question No 5). The matter of national borders is by far, for 58 percent of our readers, the most important. Ethnic (11 percent), inter-African language (10 percent), and religious (9 percent) discrimination seems secondary. The matter of the division between Francophone and English-speaking peoples is even more marginal (5 percent).

As for heads of state, none of them really imposes himself at the continental level (question No 6). Julius Nyerere, the one most often mentioned as a leader "who plays an important role," polled barely 12 percent

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of the vote. Then came Felix Houphouet-Boigny (11 percent), Anwar al-Sadat (10 percent), Leopold Senghor (9 percent), Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi and King Hassan II (8 percent), and Alhaji Shehu Shagari (5 percent). None of them truly represents the aspirations of Africans, either: Senghor polled only 11 percent, Houphouet-Boigny 10 percent, as did Nyerere, Hassan II 8 percent, Ahmadou Ahidjo 6 percent, Sadat and Didier Ratsiraka 4 percent. What can one deduce from these opinions? Their leaders do not "send" the Africans. It should also be noted that among the most popular leaders only those heads of state who are ideologically indifferent (with the exception of Ratsiraka) were mentioned. For Sadat, it seems that Africans view the peace that he signed with Israel as very important but that his personality does not inspire great sympathy.

Concerned by the economic situation and foreign interventions and distrustful of their heads of state, the Africans are not optimistic. More than half of them believe that things are "getting worse" (question No 8) in their country (54 percent) as well as their region (55 percent). And 80 percent think that the risks of conflicts' multiplying or becoming more serious are "very great or fairly great" (question No 9). They mentioned first the situation in the Sahara (55 percent), ahead of southern Africa (39 percent), the Horn of Africa (18 percent), and Chad (9 percent).

You will find these last two questions mentioned again in our next polls, as well as that on the ranking of leaders. They are interesting, not just for today's results, but also because their evolution which will enable us to discover the major trends in African public opinion.

Question 1: Would you indicate what is most important for you in the following list?

| | |
|-------------------|----|
| Love | 29 |
| Money | 30 |
| Power | 7 |
| Family | 48 |
| Social prestige | 11 |
| Religion | 19 |
| Cultural identity | 31 |
| Job security | 33 |
| Housing | 16 |
| Health | 75 |

The results of this table (the total of the three top choices for each response) varied little as a function of occupation, age, political leaning, or geographic origin. In each of these categories, health came first, as it did overall. The trend was more marked--which is not a surprise--among those over 40 years of age: 90 percent listed health and 61 percent listed family. Students were the only ones to place cultural identity in second place ahead of family (53 percent compared to 47 percent). Those leaning to the right assigned more importance to money than to the family (48 percent compared to 47 percent). Finally, religion had greater importance north of the Sahara (31 percent) than in Black Africa (11 percent).

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Question 2: Here is a list of problems. Would you indicate which ones interest you most, personally?

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| The economic development of your country | 82 |
| Religious renewal | 12 |
| The defense of human rights | 60 |
| Universal education | 38 |
| The maintenance of family structures | 26 |
| Improvement of purchasing power | 51 |
| Strengthening of the army in your country | 11 |
| Cooperation among African countries | 56 |
| The improvement of infrastructure (schools, hospitals, transportation) | 71 |

There was a high degree of consistency in these responses. The senior cadres and those over 40 were more interested than the overall group in economic development (89 and 88 percent respectively). Intermediate-level cadres, respondents between 30 and 40 years of age, and those leaning to the right were the only ones to place the improvement of purchasing power ahead of the defense of human rights, even before inter-African cooperation. Purchasing power and cooperation were of greater interest in the region south of the Sahara than in the Maghreb. Discrepancies between personal focuses of interest and the presumed interests of fellow-citizens were significantly the same for all categories.

Question 3: And in your opinion, which problems are of most concern to your fellow-citizens?

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| The economic development of your country | 72 |
| Religious renewal | 17 |
| The defense of human rights | 35 |
| Universal education | 37 |
| The maintenance of family structures | 27 |
| Improvement of purchasing power | 68 |
| Strengthening of the army in your country | 11 |
| Cooperation among African countries | 26 |
| The improvement of infrastructure (schools, hospitals, transportation) | 67 |

Question 4: Among the following problems which two are of most personal concern to you?

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------|----|
| The price of gasoline | 21 |
| The escalation of religious movements | 9 |
| The breakup of the traditional family | 14 |
| The intervention of foreign powers in Africa | 51 |
| The strengthening of the army in your country | 3 |
| The morality of the leaders | 34 |
| The slow rate of economic development | 21 |
| Social inequalities | 56 |

Totals often exceed 100 since several responses could indeed be given to the same question.

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Only the senior cadres and students--whose responses were often close--were more concerned with foreign interventions (52 and 58 percent respectively) than social inequalities (48 and 50 percent). They were also the most severe when it came to the morality of leaders (40 and 35 percent). The price of gasoline is of little concern to students (10 percent), the sympathizers of the left (11 percent), and the young (15 percent), in contrast to those over 40 years of age (28 percent) and those leaning to the right (38 percent). The morality of the leaders and social inequalities were of less concern to the right than to the left. Between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa the significant differences involved the price of gasoline (16 percent and 25 percent), the morality of the leaders (28 percent and 37 percent), and social inequalities (65 percent and 50 percent).

Question 5: Among the following borders, which, for you, has most importance?

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| The national borders of your country | 58 |
| Religious borders | 9 |
| Ethnic borders | 10 |
| Linguistic border between Francophone and English-speaking peoples | 5 |
| Linguistic borders among African languages | 11 |
| No opinion | 6 |

National borders were by far the most important for the great majority of our readers. Students assigned more importance to ethnic borders than others, namely white-collar workers (13 percent and 5 percent respectively). Islam's strength undoubtedly led to the mention of religious borders much more often in the Maghreb (18 percent) than in Black Africa (4 percent). It was the other way around for African languages (5 percent and 14 percent respectively).

Question 6: At this time, which is the African head of state who, in your opinion, plays the most important role in Africa (regardless of your personal sympathy)?

| | |
|------------------------|----|
| Julius Nyerere | 12 |
| Felix Houphouet-Boigny | 11 |
| Anwar al-Sadat | 10 |
| Leopold Sedar Senghor | 9 |
| Mu'ammarr Qadhafi | 8 |
| Hassan II | 8 |
| Shehu Shagari | 5 |
| Others | 18 |
| None of them | 19 |

More than one-third of the Ivorian respondents and a similar percentage of Senegalese and Moroccans singled out their heads of state. This had the

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effect of downgrading the performance of the other leaders. Sadat and Senghor obtained more balanced results--as many responses from the right as from the left, from citizens of the Maghreb states and Black African states. Nyerere and Houphouet-Boigny were mentioned especially south of the Sahara while Hassan II was mentioned in the north. The former projected an image of the left while the latter projected an image of the right. Senghor had little attraction for the young, but a great deal for those over 40. Qadhdhafi scored best among respondents under 25 years of age (13 percent). But he was outdone by Sadat (14 percent). Behind Shagari, (Nigeria) few leaders polled significant percentages: 3 percent for Sekou Toure, 2 percent for Chadli Bendjedid, William Tolbert, Habib Bourguiba, Ahmadou Ahidjo, etc.

Question 7: Which African head of state meets your aspirations best?

| | |
|------------------------|----|
| Leopold Sedar Senghor | 11 |
| Felix Houphouet-Boigny | 10 |
| Julius Nyerere | 10 |
| Hassan II | 8 |
| Ahmadou Ahidjo | 6 |
| Anwar al-Sadat | 4 |
| Didier Ratsiraka | 4 |
| Others | 24 |
| None of them | 23 |

While, compared to the earlier question, some percentages are different in this table which gauges the popularity of the heads of state, the internal variations are the same: Senghor and Sadat are popular everywhere, whereas Houphouet-Boigny and Nyerere do not "make it" in the Maghreb any more than Hassan II is popular south of the Sahara. Qadhdhafi's score dropped: He did not impress anyone, not even the young (5 percent). Ahidjo, Bourguiba, and Ratsiraka made their appearance in this ranking, but it is essentially in their own countries that they are relatively popular. With the exception of Seyni Kountche (4 percent), the other leaders had negligible scores.

Question 8: At this time, would you say that things are getting better or worse?

In your country?

| | |
|----------------|----|
| Getting better | 44 |
| Getting worse | 54 |
| No opinion | 2 |

In the countries of your region?

| | |
|----------------|----|
| Getting better | 40 |
| Getting worse | 55 |
| No opinion | 5 |

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The sympathizers of the right were the only ones to feel that things are getting somewhat better in their country (52 percent) and in their region (49 percent). South of the Sahara the opinions were divided regarding the future of the region (49 percent against 48 percent) whereas the pessimistic tendency was distinctly up in the Maghreb, where 66 percent of our readers felt that things are getting worse. It will not be surprising that the Saharan conflict was the case most often mentioned (see question 9).

Question 9: Do you think that at the present time the risks for the multiplication or aggravation of conflicts or wars in Africa are:

| | |
|--------------|----|
| Very great | 27 |
| Fairly great | 53 |
| Fairly small | 15 |
| Very small | 4 |
| No opinion | 1 |

Specifically, which conflicts do you have in mind?

| | |
|--------------------------|----|
| Sahara | 55 |
| Southern Africa | 39 |
| Horn of Africa | 18 |
| Chad | 9 |
| Angola | 3 |
| Zaire | 2 |
| Tunisia-Libya | 2 |
| Central African Republic | 1 |

Students and senior cadres headed the list of those for whom the risks of war were slight or very slight (21 percent in the two cases). The partisans of the right were the most optimistic with 29 percent viewing existing risks as "slight or fairly slight." As in the case of the preceding question, pessimism was greater north of the Sahara, 87 percent of our readers in the Maghreb perceiving the dangers of conflict to be "very great or great."

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FAC ALLOCATIONS FOR 1979 LISTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 pp 490-491

[Text] FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund) aid to the states of Africa and the Indian Ocean during 1979 totaled 650.7 million French francs (compared to 515.5 million in 1978). To that amount should be added a 5-million-franc subsidy granted to the Republic of Haiti (dam construction and support for rural development and mineral prospecting). Those operations are part of the Title VI budget (investment expenditures) and thus do not include expenditures for technical assistance, budgetary aid, research, or other operations for which the FAC has also taken responsibility.

The distribution by sector of the Aid and Cooperation Fund's aid for 1978 and 1979 is shown below (in millions of French francs [MF] and percentages).

| | 1978 | | 1979 | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|------|-------|------|
| | MF | % | MF | % |
| General studies | 21.5 | 4.1 | 19.6 | 3.0 |
| Rural development | 218.0 | 41.9 | 181.2 | 27.6 |
| Industrial and mining development | 50.6 | 9.7 | 63.6 | 9.7 |
| Infrastructure | 97.7 | 18.8 | 162.7 | 24.8 |
| Health and social facilities | 35.2 | 6.8 | 41.2 | 6.3 |
| Education and training | 78.9 | 15.2 | 88.4 | 13.5 |
| Cultural action and information | 16.9 | 3.2 | 62.0 | 9.5 |
| General and supervisory expenditures | 1.7 | 0.3 | 37.0 | 5.6 |
| Total | 520.6 | | 655.7 | |

The chief allocations to the various state programs are shown below.

FAC 1979: Principal Allocations
(in millions of French francs)

General studies

| | |
|---------------------------------|-----|
| Cape Verde | |
| Air coverage of the archipelago | 0.6 |
| Guinea-Bissau | |
| Air coverage of urban centers | 0.8 |

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| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Operations of general interest | |
| Technical and economic studies | 2.4 |
| Studies of methods for vacuum-packaging products | 0.4 |
| Subsidy to the National Geographic Institute for basic mapmaking equipment | 4.0 |
| Contribution to increased capital for the BCEOM [Central Study Office for Overseas Equipment] | 0.9 |
| Programs for the use of new forms of energy | 8.5 |
| Programs for exploiting geothermal sources | 2.0 |
| Rural Development | |
| Benin | |
| Aid to agricultural research | 0.5 |
| Support for rural development activities | 1.5 |
| Contribution to completion of the Ouidah-Nord palmgrove | 1.4 |
| Burundi | |
| Improvements for protection of the Kiriba Forest | 1.8 |
| Reforestation | 3.0 |
| Cameroon | |
| Development of ricegrowing in the upper Noun Valley | 2.0 |
| Expansion of irrigated ricegrowing in the Yagoua region | 5.4 |
| Cape Verde | |
| Exploration for underground water in Sao Nicolau | 2.5 |
| Central African Republic | |
| Support for the Technical Office for Agricultural Planning | 1.7 |
| Development of cottongrowing by the UCCA [Central African Cotton Union] | 3.2 |
| Research in the development of cottongrowing | 4.3 |
| Congo | |
| Small-scale mechanization of farming in the Pool region | 2.7 |
| Restructuring of tobacco production | 1.7 |
| Afforestation with eucalyptus in the Pointe Noire region | 3.4 |
| Agroindustrial complex in Mantsumba | 1.5 |
| Relaunching of agricultural research | 1.5 |
| Ivory Coast | |
| Development of animal production | 0.8 |
| Industrial sheepraising in Toumodi | 1.0 |
| Djibouti | |
| Support for scientific research | 0.5 |
| Gabon | |
| Food production programs at Lambarene and Franceville | 0.4 |
| Afforestation with eucalyptus in Haut-Ogooue | 1.0 |
| Guinea-Bissau | |
| Development of peanut growing | 2.5 |
| Upper Volta | |
| Hydroagricultural development of the Sourou Valley | 2.0 |
| Development of the Volta valleys | 8.0 |
| Development of agriculture | 3.0 |

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| | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Madagascar | |
| Agricultural hydrology studies | 2.5 |
| Training of cadres for cotton production | 1.0 |
| Rural development study of the valleys south of Lake Alaotra | 5.5 |
| Mali | |
| Truck farm production and canning industry in Baguineda | 1.5 |
| Studies of irrigation areas | 1.4 |
| Construction of small dams in Dogon country | 3.1 |
| Reclamation of the Dire Plain | 1.5 |
| Mopti rice operation | 2.0 |
| South Mali integrated development project | 3.0 |
| Mauritius | |
| Master plan for water resources development and management | 2.5 |
| Mauritania | |
| Construction of the Kaedi agricultural research center | 2.5 |
| Plant health protection for palmgroves | 0.7 |
| Irrigated areas in the Senegal Valley | 3.5 |
| Niger | |
| Restoration of the Dallol-Maori "roneraie" | 1.0 |
| Integrated development of the Dosso region | 2.6 |
| Relaunching of peanut growing | 0.8 |
| Rwanda | |
| Development studies in the Bugarama region | 1.5 |
| Rural development in Bugesera-Est Giseka-Migongo | 3.0 |
| Development of protein resources | 1.6 |
| Senegal | |
| Sine-Saloum experimental units | 1.0 |
| Support for the Senegalese Agricultural Research Institute | 1.0 |
| Development of the Senegal River Valley | 7.6 |
| Technical assistance for rural development | 2.4 |
| Participation in development of the Debi-Lampsar Project | 2.0 |
| Seychelles | |
| Support for rural development | 1.0 |
| Participation in setting up a tuna fleet | 12.0 |
| Togo | |
| Integrated development of the maritime region | 2.1 |
| Development of coffee and cocoa production | 0.9 |
| Expansion of the cottongrowing zone | 5.3 |
| Zaire | |
| Development of vegetable crops in the Mbanza-Ngungu zone | 1.3 |
| Development of agricultural production in Western Kasai | 0.6 |
| Development of truck farming in Kinshasa | 1.6 |
| Retraining of agricultural cadres | 0.4 |
| Operations of general interest | |
| Contribution to privately sponsored rural programs | 0.8 |
| Interstate operations | |
| Contribution to the Inter-African Center for Hydraulic Studies | 1.2 |
| Subsidy to the Association for the Development of Ricegrowing in West Africa | 2.8 |

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| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Participation in the special antidrought program in the Sahel | 20.0 |
| Regional rice production program at Richard-Toll | 2.0 |
| Flood studies of the Niger River | 2.7 |
| Transportation of food aid | 10.0 |
| Industrial and Mining Development | |
| Cameroon | |
| Prospecting in Sud-Ouest | 2.0 |
| Inventory of hydroelectric sites | 1.5 |
| Central African Republic | |
| Pilot workshop at Bakouma for processing uranium | 7.2 |
| Congo | |
| Electrification development | 1.8 |
| Ivory Coast | |
| Sugar complex at Borotou | 7.0 |
| Guinea-Bissau | |
| Prospecting in Nord-Est | 3.0 |
| Mali | |
| Phosphate project in Tilemsi | 1.4 |
| Mineral prospecting | 0.9 |
| Studies of the iron deposit in Bafing-Makana | 2.0 |
| Contribution to the capital of the Koutiala oilworks | 4.0 |
| Mauritius | |
| Subsidy to the Bureau of Standards | 0.5 |
| Mauritania | |
| Copper exploration in Sud-Est | 1.5 |
| Rwanda | |
| Preparation of a map of mineral sites | 0.6 |
| Zaire | |
| Mineral exploration | 2.0 |
| Inventory of mining resources | 1.5 |
| Operations of general interest | |
| Miscellaneous subsidies | 0.5 |
| Subsidy to the Geological and Mineral Prospecting Office | 24.0 |
| Contribution to increased capital for the Gabon Forest Company | 1.4 |
| Infrastructure | |
| Benin | |
| Expansion of the port of Cotonou | 4.0 |
| Study and development work for setting up a ground telecommunications station | 0.3 |
| Burundi | |
| Support for air navigation | 1.0 |
| Establishment of a cell for development and town planning | 2.0 |
| Self-propelled vehicle for transportation on Lake Tanganyika | 10.0 |
| Cameroon | |
| Realignment of the Douala-Edea railroad | 3.5 |
| Construction project for the port of Rocher-du-Loup | 5.0 |

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| | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Study and development work for telecommunications | 4.0 |
| Advance to Air France for contributing to the capital of Cameroon Airlines | 12.6 |
| Central African Republic | |
| Road programs | 6.0 |
| Equipment for the Central African Agency for River Transportation | 3.0 |
| Comoro Islands | |
| Support for civil aviation | 3.0 |
| Congo | |
| Diversion of the Congo-Ocean rail line to the potassium mining zone | 12.4 |
| Realignment of the Congo-Ocean Railroad | 13.0 |
| Railroad equipment | 3.5 |
| Ivory Coast | |
| Construction of the Abidjan postal sorting center | 3.0 |
| Gabon | |
| Studies for the ore terminal at the port of Owendo | 1.6 |
| Upper Volta | |
| Studies for the Ouagadougou-Tambao Tambao railroad project | 1.2 |
| Madagascar | |
| Antananarivo telephone exchange | 4.0 |
| Road link between Maintirano and Majunga | 5.0 |
| Mali | |
| Studies for completion of the Tossaye Dam | 0.8 |
| Mauritius | |
| Elimination of solid wastes | 2.0 |
| Aid to the Construction and Public Works Laboratory | 0.5 |
| Niger | |
| Dosso-Zinder microwave link | 5.6 |
| Studies for the Kandadji Dam | 1.3 |
| Studies for extending the railroad from Parakou to Niamey | 5.0 |
| Rwanda | |
| Cell for town planning and housing | 2.3 |
| Support for air navigation | 1.8 |
| Seychelles | |
| Establishment of a team for hydrography and rock removal | 2.0 |
| Chad | |
| Repairs to the Ndjamenia Airport | 10.0 |
| Zaire | |
| Support for air navigation | 1.3 |
| Assistance to the National Road Office | 2.0 |
| Support for the Urban Development Office | 0.5 |
| Interstate operations | |
| Contribution to the Diama Dam (an OMVS project) | 15.0 |
| Contribution to the outfitting expenses of ASECNA [Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar] | 15.0 |

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Social Development

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Benin | |
| Support for Benin television | 2.4 |
| Burundi | |
| Outfitting and modernization of the University Hospital Center | 2.0 |
| Cameroon | |
| Training of village personnel | 2.4 |
| Construction of the Ngaoundere Technological University | 7.0 |
| Cape Verde | |
| Modernization of radio equipment | 4.0 |
| Central African Republic | |
| Aid in the fight against major endemic diseases | 0.7 |
| Congo | |
| Contribution to the literacy program | 1.3 |
| Ivory Coast | |
| Training of workers and supervisors | 1.4 |
| Support for the National Office for the Promotion of Ivorian Enterprises | 2.5 |
| Vocational training for the development of radio and television | 1.0 |
| Program for educational television | 6.0 |
| Djibouti | |
| Antituberculosis campaign | 1.5 |
| Expansion of the Boulaos school complex | 2.0 |
| Construction of the teacher training school | 5.2 |
| Aid to radio and television | 1.0 |
| Gabon | |
| Vocational training (agriculture and energy) | 2.6 |
| Support for the Moyabi International Decametric Wave Center | 5.0 |
| Upper Volta | |
| Aid to rural health | 2.5 |
| Aid to public health | 10.0 |
| Support for the Office for the Promotion of Upper Voltan Enterprises | 4.4 |
| Training of young farmers | 2.0 |
| Expansion of the Ouagadougou Library | 2.1 |
| Madagascar | |
| Support for the establishment of thorough studies in applied biological sciences | 1.0 |
| Mali | |
| Aid in the fight against major endemic diseases | 0.4 |
| Establishment of the Mali Museum | 2.0 |
| Mauritius | |
| Support for technical education | 3.5 |
| Mauritania | |
| Subsidy for outfitting the Nouakchott Technical Lycee | 2.3 |
| Niger | |
| Support for school television | 1.5 |
| Niamey Higher School | 3.3 |
| Aid to Niger television | 30.2 |

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| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Rwanda | |
| Modernization of the Ruhengeri Hospital | 7.5 |
| Aid to primary craft education | 2.2 |
| Contribution to the transportation of export products | 5.0 |
| Senegal | |
| Aid to public health | 1.1 |
| Training of village personnel | 2.8 |
| Training of Dakar-Marine personnel | 1.0 |
| Construction of St Louis University | 10.0 |
| Equipment for the National Criminal Investigation Police | 1.2 |
| Seychelles | |
| Support for the hotel management school | 1.5 |
| Chad | |
| Aid in the fight against major endemic diseases | 1.5 |
| Shop equipment for the vocational training center | 1.2 |
| Emergency aid for Chadian government administration | 10.5 |
| Togo | |
| Support for the Center for the Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises | 1.3 |
| Zaire | |
| Equipment for the Kinshasa Technical Institute | 2.8 |
| Technical support for the Voice of Zaire complex | 5.0 |
| Supplying of a television transmitter | 1.7 |
| Operations of general interest | |
| Emergency health operations | 1.3 |
| Subsidy to Catholic Friendship and miscellaneous private charitable organizations | 3.7 |
| Training of farmers in rural families | 3.0 |
| Schooling for French children | 8.0 |
| Technical equipment for various private charitable organizations | 8.4 |
| Broadcasting of television programs by French Radio and Television | 3.7 |
| Interstate operations | |
| Fight against onchocercosis | 5.0 |
| Medical action against major endemic diseases | 4.0 |
| Training of road carriers at the Council of the Entente | 1.5 |
| Establishment of the Higher School for Railroad Cadres | 1.0 |

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CCCE COMMITMENTS FOR 1979 DETAILED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 pp 486-489, 491

[Passages in slantlines printed in italics or boldface]

[Text] In the course of its 1979 operations, the Central Bank for Economic Cooperation increased the total number of its /easy-term loans/ by 24.3 percent, created a /new category of loans/ better adapted to the needs of the poorest countries and for the first time granted aid to Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Haiti.*

The increase in operations contributing to rural development made it possible to allocate over a third of all investments to this sector, while a particular effort was made to improve the transport networks. The institution has simultaneously stepped up the aid it contributes for the studying and realization of projects for the technical training of personnel.

While the number of operations has on the whole been considerably increasing, some reduction in the implementation of three major projects has been noted. This has both limited the amounts of the loans that were granted at "second-window" market terms and on the average expanded the role played by the Central Bank in the financing of each of the projects.

Improvement of Loan Terms

Investments: After more than tripling between 1974 and 1976, Central Bank annual investments have increased at a more moderate pace during the past 3 years:

* For 1978, compare MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 February 1979, p 495.

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| | Amount (millions of francs) | Number of Operations |
|------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1975 | 655 (+67%) | 55 |
| 1976 | 1,272 (+94%) | 65 |
| 1977 | 1,339 (+5%) | 73 |
| 1978 | 1,493 (+12%) | 88 |
| 1979 | 1,602 (+7%) | 98 |

This relative stability of real volume of investments since 1977 in fact conceals an increase in the number of operations and especially a very clearcut improvement in the distribution of loans between the two windows.

Central Bank Investments
(in millions of francs)

| | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|-----------------|-------|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Loans: | | | | | | |
| First window | 372.5 | 482.6 | 650.9 | 800.4 | 965.6 | 1,200.4 |
| Second window | | 170 | 613.6 | 521 | 521 | 399.5 |
| Joint Ventures: | 2.3 | 2.4 | 7.8 | 17.9 | 6.5 | 2.6 |
| Total | 374.8 | 655 | 1,272.3 | 1,339.3 | 1,493.1 | 1,602.5 |

So-called /"first-window"/ loans at preferential interest rates, which constitute the chief function of the Central Bank, have in fact increased over the past 5 years from over an average quarter of all loans each year to 373 million francs in 1974 and to 1.2 billion in 1979. They will amount to 1.5 billion in 1980, thus having quadrupled since 1974 in terms of current monetary value or will amount to 2.4 times as much in real terms.

/"Second-window"/ loans, advantageous because of the long term involved but whose interest rates can only be managed by the most highly industrialized countries or be contracted for particularly profitable operations, did not amount to as much as they did in prior years: 400 million francs in 1979. The result is that the Central Bank's share of classical operations, whether loans at reduced interest rates or joint venture transactions were involved, rose from 52 percent of its investments in 1976 to 75 percent in 1979.

In addition to this favorable evolution of the distribution of aid grants was the creation within the first window of a new category of loans, limited to /the poorest countries/ or those subjected to exceptional difficulties. These loans with a term of 30 years, that is, twice as long as the average term for other loans, are provided with a first payment due date extended to 10 years (instead of 5) and bear interest at 1.5 percent during that period and at 2 percent thereafter. These terms mean that the "gift element" contained in these loans comes to 70 percent of the amount of the loan. In 1979 an installment of 148 million francs was allocated for the granting of such loans.

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At the same time and despite the general rise in interest rates, thanks to aid provided by the Treasury, the Central Bank was able to maintain its usual terms for other /"first-window"/ loans, for which the average interest rate was set at 5.85 percent (as against 5.95 in 1978) and the average term at 15 and a half years.

Deposits: The growth in investments since 1975 has continued to have repercussions on deposits rather than on payments due to the 5-year grace period generally granted borrowers. This has resulted in a new increase in net disbursements which -- let us remember -- had multiplied tenfold in 5 years, bringing the Central Bank's share of French public aid to countries in its operations zone to almost 20 percent.

Evolution of Central Bank Disbursements
(in millions of francs)

| | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|---------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Deposits | 299 | 359 | 582 | 793 | 991 | 1,016 |
| Payments | 238 | 230 | 243 | 241 | 253 | 233 |
| Net disbursements | 61 | 129 | 339 | 552 | 738 | 783* |
| Central Bank share of French public aid (%) | 2.9 | 5.5 | 14.2 | 18.4 | 18.9 | 19.1* |

The comparison between 1979 deposits and investments made in prior years, however, indicates that certain programs, namely the biggest ones, are carried out over a fairly long period of time, often more than 3 years. Central Bank investments are thus truly multiannual in nature in conformity with the desires of the developing countries. This explains the high figure for "unpaid balances" at the end of each year.

"First and second-window" loan unpaid balances at year's end (millions of francs):

| | |
|-------------|-------|
| End of 1975 | 952 |
| 1976 | 1,642 |
| 1977 | 2,196 |
| 1978 | 2,684 |
| 1979* | 3,257 |

More Favorable Distribution to Poorest Countries

Limited to 14 countries until 1974, the Central Bank operations zone at present includes 31, since the institution was authorized to operate in Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1979. All told, this involves over 120 million rather poor people, since in 1977 those

* Estimate.

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countries with a per capita income of over \$500 [a year] comprised only 8 percent of the population, as against 55 percent for those with an average income of under \$299.

Moreover, drought, low prices for metals or political difficulties particularly affected the poorest countries of the zone in the 1970's, such that their GNP per person remained on the average unchanged between 1970 and 1977. On the contrary, it grew at the rate of about 1 percent a year on the average in those countries with incomes of from \$300 to \$500 and 3 percent in the upper income bracket countries.


This is why, although the most highly industrialized countries offer better investment possibilities, in the geographical distribution of its loans, the Central Bank has made a point of making /more room for the poorest countries over the past few years/. Even though figures for 1 year are not always significant due to the existence or absence of major projects in a given country, we may note a very clearcut tendency toward the growth of credit granted countries with per capita incomes under \$300, since these loans have multiplied 6.4 times in 4 years and their share of the total went from 16 percent in 1975 to 42 percent in 1979.

In 1979 this line of development was favored by the creation of the new, easy-term loan category which has enabled [borrowers] to finance operations of interest to rural development in the poorest countries or those that have been the victims of drought over the past few years (Mauritania and Senegal). Moreover, of the 148 million francs allocated for these special-term loans, 76 million have formed the object of an /exceptional aid grant to the countries of the Sahel/, which for each project shared in a Central Bank loan on a 3/4 to 1/4 basis.

It was particularly in connection with this that the institution extended its first aid grant to Cape Verde, while the first transactions in Sierra Leone, Somalia and Haiti consisted of ordinary first-window loans for a water-supply program, a study for a cement works and the construction of a hotel complex, respectively.

And lastly, we may mention the importance of the loans granted Cameroon (314 million francs) and Niger (246 million) as well as the resumption of operations in Madagascar (243 million in 2 years) since 1978.

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Key:

1. Annual Central Bank investments in the countries of Africa and the Indian Ocean.
2. Millions of francs.
3. Loans guaranteed by the Treasury.
4. Second window.
5. First window (including joint ventures).

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Geographical Distribution of Central Bank Aid Grants
(countries classified by average income brackets in 1977)
(in millions of francs)

| | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | Total |
|--------------------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|-------|---------|
| From \$100 to \$200: | | | | | | |
| Niger | 6.9 | 134.7 | 113.7 | 81.7 | 245.7 | 582.7 |
| Mali | 14.8 | 55.1 | 44.3 | 42.3 | 57.5 | 214 |
| Upper Volta | 4.2 | 38.3 | 40.7 | 17.1 | 85.6 | 185.9 |
| Chad | 21 | 50.6 | 11.6 | 12.8 | .2 | 96.2 |
| Rwanda | | 5 | 28 | 1.2 | 54.3 | 88.5 |
| Zaire ¹ | | 20 | 22.6 | 10 | 12.2 | 64.8 |
| Others | .4 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 1.8 | 34.9 | 50.8 |
| | 47.3 | 310.6 | 267.7 | 166.9 | 490.4 | 1,282.9 |
| From \$200 to \$300: | | | | | | |
| Madagascar | 26.5 | 2.9 | 6 | 149 | 94 | 278.4 |
| Mauritania | 31.1 | | | 158.9 | 6.6 | 196.6 |
| Benin ² | 1 | 13 | 21 | 39.9 | 40.1 | 115 |
| Others | | | 1 | 1.3 | 43.2 | 45.5 |
| | 58.6 | 15.9 | 28 | 349.1 | 183.9 | 635.5 |
| From \$300 to \$500: | | | | | | |
| Cameroon | 88.5 | 267.6 | 241.8 | 453.8 | 314.3 | 1,366 |
| Senegal | 90.1 | 83.3 | 144.4 | 165.4 | 140.1 | 623.3 |
| Congo | 46 | 27 | | 42 | 55.7 | 170.7 |
| Togo | 10.2 | 72 | 3.2 | 32 | 9.4 | 126.8 |
| Djibouti | | | | | 32 | 32 |
| | 234.8 | 449.9 | 389.4 | 693.2 | 551.5 | 2,318.8 |
| Over \$500: | | | | | | |
| Ivory Coast | 174 | 342.1 | 410.5 | 202.6 | 174.2 | 1,303.4 |
| Gabon | 98.8 | 104.4 | 160 | 73.4 | 147 | 583.6 |
| Mauritius | 40 | 33 | 47 | 3.1 | 54 | 177.1 |
| Seychelles | | | 23.2 | 3 | | 26.2 |
| | 312.8 | 479.5 | 640.7 | 282.1 | 375.2 | 2,090.3 |
| Grand total ³ | 653.5 | 1255.9 | 1325.8 | 1491.3 | 1601 | 6327.5 |

1. Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Comoro Islands, Somalia.
2. Guinea, Haiti, CAR.
3. Joint operations among several countries not included.

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Major Aid Grants for Rural Development and Transport

Since French aid in other forms is largely oriented toward the development of general education and facilities, over the past few years the Central Bank has devoted three-quarters of its aid grants to directly productive activities. Furthermore, the sectors involved, that of rural production in particular, are the ones that doubtless pose the biggest problems in terms of initiative as well as the completion of projects.

In 1979, however, hydroelectric power production having in the past few years required large Central Bank investments, no major dam project was launched, since the need for renovation and modernization of transport networks had assumed emergency proportions.

This is why the percentage of investments devoted to the production sector was a bit lower than it was in 1979 (65 percent). Although all the while developing its activities in the rural sector and also in the tourist sector, the institution devoted more of its resources to transport and telecommunications equipment.

Rural development: The implementation of new terms for loans consisting of very long-term maturity and very low interest rates, better adapted to the poverty of rural areas, enabled the Central Bank to considerably increase its operations in this sector, operations which went from 347.8 million francs in 1977 (26 percent of its investments) to 559.1 million in 1979 (34.9 percent).

Thus with this procedure, 24 operations could be launched in Cape Verde, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal for the development of dry farming of grains and fruits, the creation of small, irrigated areas, the improvement of stockraising and forestry or to provide villages with a water supply.

These aid grants are aimed at satisfying "essential needs" in a part of the Sahel still plagued with drought. For the richer forest area where, nevertheless, the problem of providing protein-rich food arises, loans have been granted for both lake and coastal fishing operations, in Ivory Coast and Cameroon. At the same time, major programs have been funded, in part at second-window terms, for the cultivation of cotton, palms and hevea in Cameroon (136 million) and palms in Gabon (103 million).

The double standard the Central Bank is pursuing in its support for traditional farming and farming for export has been extended through the major effort realized in 1979 to improve the firewood resources of the peoples of the Sahel through [new] plantations as well as to protect the exploitation of an Ivory Coast forest at present threatened.

Mining, industry, electricity, tourism: The sum of 485 million francs, or a bit less than for rural development, has been allocated for the development of industry and tourism. The biggest operation (140 million)

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was the second-window advance granted the Niger Government to enable it to finance its participation in the Tassa N'Taghalgue Mine, the operation of which should increase uranium production in the Arlit area from 4,200 to 5,700 tons. Overall investments now planned should come to 2.6 billion francs. Two other loans, which will increase Central Bank aid for this project to 460 million, are also planned.

Moreover, 145 million francs have been allocated to industries properly speaking: expansion of a cement works, a terrycloth factory in Cameroon, a clinker-crushing mill and a compound fertilizer factory in Ivory Coast.

More modest than in prior years (99 million), electricity sector programs will permit the development of thermal power production on Mauritius and in Niger.

Eight hotel-construction projects have at last been financed, thus filling the need for expanding tourism in Africa and increasing the number of big commercial hotels. In Mali, the two construction projects planned for Mopti and Timbuktu fall under the heading of a tourist network radiating from Bamako.

Public facilities: The financing of public facilities was exceptionally large in 1979: 184 million francs for the railroads; 122 million for roads, ports and airports; 157 million for telecommunications; 43 million for water-supply systems.

In the domain of railroads and telecommunications, acquisitions of equipment have often been paired with actions aimed at improving management through the training and staffing of personnel and the organization of maintenance services. In Congo, in particular, where rail-traffic difficulties encountered between Brazzaville and Pointe Noire have interfered with the exporting of lumber, an emergency program has been set up for the restoration of 10 locomotives.

The modification of Burundian, Malian and Rwandan airports should contribute toward making them available to large air-cargo carriers.

Distribution of Central Bank 1979 Operations by Sector

| | Millions of Francs | % 1979 | % 1978 |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Rural development | 559.1 | 34.9 | 23.9 |
| Mining | 140.8 | 8.8 | 11.8 |
| Cottage industries | 145.1 | 9.1 | 20.1 |
| Electricity | 99.5 | 6.2 | 12.6 |
| Tourism | 99.5 | 6.2 | 2.5 |
| Production sector total | 1,044 | 65.1 | 70.9 |

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|----------------------------|---------|------|------|
| Railroads | 184.2 | 11.5 | 8.5 |
| Roads, ports, airports | 122.1 | 7.6 | 8.5 |
| Telecommunications | 156.5 | 9.8 | 8.1 |
| Urban facilities | 43 | 2.7 | .2 |
| Public facilities total | 505.8 | 31.6 | 25.3 |
| Financial operations total | 52.7 | 3.3 | 3.8 |
| Grand total | 1,602.5 | 100 | 100 |

Methods of Operation

Cofinancing: During the past few years, the Central Bank has contributed to the financing of very big projects, particularly with the aid of Arab funds and banks.

In 1979, however, programs that were retained were most often of average size, such that the Central Bank was able to share in their financing to a greater extent than it ordinarily does. The Central Bank's share of the 3.8 billion in investments was 41 percent in 1979 (as against only 18 percent in 1978).

Note, however, that the Tassa N'Taghalgue uranium mine project is not included in the total because it represented only partial funding. If it had been included in its entirety, the investments funded would have amounted to 6.2 billion francs and the Central Bank's share would have been reduced to 25 percent.

Promotion of Projects: While one of the Central Bank's essential tasks is to contribute its aid to the technical and financial shaping of the projects submitted to it, more and more it has to exercise a function of /promotion/. The bank's creation of PROPARGO [expansion unknown], an industrial development company that looks for investors and itself shares in providing capital for new enterprises, bears witness to this concern. In 1979 two of the loans granted in Ivory Coast went to industries established by PROPARGO. The Central Bank has also explored ways of setting up miniglassworks and mincanneries.

The /financing of studies/ has more and more appeared to be necessary to permit the shaping of priority projects. This procedure, inaugurated in 1978, produced some dozen study operations the following year, among which we may cite: in Cameroon, the freeing of the Southeast Benoue region from its isolation, an inventory of hydroelectric power resources and irrigation of the banana plantations; in Guinea, a sugar-mill complex, a hydroelectric development project; in Burundi, development of Bujumbura Airport; in Ivory Coast, development of radio broadcasting and television.

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And thirdly, the Central Bank makes a point of very closely participating in the realization of limited projects of an experimental nature or /pilot projects/ to pave the way for later large-scale investments. In 1979 several rural development programs responded to this concern for technological innovation: the cultivation of wheat in Upper Volta, of corn in Mali, grain storage in Senegal, hograising in Ivory Coast, modernization of sheepraising in Niger, experiments with village forestry in Mali and village water systems in that country. Central Bank participation in providing capital for the Ivorian Tropical Technology Company stems from the same concern.

Aid for Management: Equipment programs achieve their goals only through proper management of the installations that have been set up. Central Bank supervisory missions keep watch over them and, if necessary, see to it that the terms for carrying out funded projects are modified. When these are given test runs, a follow-up evaluation mission learns from performance, from failures as well as from successes.

From its experience, however, the Central Bank has drawn the conclusion that management must prepare itself, particularly through the training of personnel and the organization of equipment maintenance. Then too, the biggest projects very often consist of a "training phase" and a "maintenance phase." The technical preparation of personnel is also the subject of financing, the importance of which was accentuated in 1979 (millions of francs):

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Forestry training in Ivory Coast | 27 |
| National Rural Development Institute in Senegal | 20 |
| Center for Mechanical Occupational Training and Industrial Maintenance in Ivory Coast | 36 |
| Training centers for the handling of electricity and water-supply systems in Cameroon | 20 |

Loans Granted by Central Bank to African and Indian Ocean Countries
(in thousands of French francs)

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| I. Production Sectors | |
| 1. Rural development | 559,050 |
| a. Food crops: | 97,270 |
| Grains: | 43,550 |
| Upper Volta: Experimental operation for wheat cultivation in the Sourou | 11,000 |
| Upper Volta: Project for the intensified cultivation of food crops in the west | 16,000 |
| Mali: Project for the intensified cultivation of corn in the south | 10,000 |
| Mali: Operation for the reintegration of migrant workers | 150 |

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| Senegal: Grain storage program (Kaolack, Kaffrine, Diourbel, Louga) | 6,400 |
| Fruit: | 26,680 |
| Upper Volta: Pilot project for fruit production | 19,680 |
| Niger: Fruit crop development project in the Gaya region | 7,000 |
| Miscellaneous crops: | 6,880 |
| Cape Verde: Agricultural projects for Sao Nicolau and Santiago Islands | 4,800 |
| Mauritania: Promotion of dry crops in the Assaba and Guidimaka regions | 1,200 |
| Mauritania: Reinforcement of crop pest control | 880 |
| Irrigated areas: | 20,160 |
| Upper Volta: Bagre irrigated pilot area | 9,400 |
| Mali: Construction of Costes Canal by Niger Office | 6,200 |
| Mauritania: Creation of 10 irrigated areas by drilling in the Tamourt en Naaj region | 3,120 |
| Mauritania: Creation of 10 village irrigation areas in the Senegal River Valley | 1,400 |
| b. Export crops: | 250,300 |
| Cotton: | 45,200 |
| Cameroon: Project to free the Southeast Benoue region from its isolation and provide it with facilities (first phase) | 43,200 |
| Cameroon: Study for the second phase of the project to free the Southeast Benoue region from isolation and provide it with facilities | 2,000 |
| Fruit, coffee, cacao: | 12,400 |
| Cameroon: Study for a banana-plantation irrigation project in the Cameroonian Banana Organization's (OCB) zone of operation | 2,000 |
| Mali: Construction of a warehouse for the preparation and storage of fruit destined for export (OPAM [Malian Agricultural Products Bureau]) | 1,000 |
| Togo: Program for the development of coffee and cacao production in the southwest | 9,400 |
| Oil palms, hevea: | 192,700 |
| Cameroon: Expansion of Mukete Plantations Limited oil-palm and hevea plantations | 10,700 |
| Cameroon: Hevea-planting program in the Kribi region (HEVECAM [expansion unknown]): | |
| First window | 60,000 |
| Second window | 20,000 |
| Gabon: Oil-palm-planting program in the Lambarene region (AGROGABON [Agricultural Company of Gabon]): | |
| First window | 61,200 |
| Second window | 40,800 |
| c. Stockraising: | 10,800 |
| Ivory Coast: Pilot project for hograising at Dimbokro (AFRIPORC [expansion unknown]) | 2,000 |

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| Niger: Program for the modernization of sheepraising in the Southern Tamesna region | 8,800 |
| d. Agricultural industries: | 75,600 |
| Cameroon: Swiss Farm Palm Plantation Company (SPFS) expansion program (oil-palm plantations and oilworks) | 25,400 |
| Ivory Coast: Construction of a palm-oil oilworks at Ikobe in the southwest (PALMINDUSTRIE) | 27,000 |
| Guinea: Studies and operations for the construction of a sugar-refining complex | 11,000 |
| Zaire: Acquisition of a truck fleet for the shipment of farm products by Nogueira and Company (second window) | 4,500 |
| e. Forestry: | 42,840 |
| Ivory Coast: Forestry training program (centers at Bouake and Banco) | 27,000 |
| Upper Volta: Construction of a forest-seed production center at Ouagadougou | 2,640 |
| Mali: Forest production and experimentation project | 6,160 |
| Mali: Pilot village reforestation project in the Fana region | 2,240 |
| Senegal: Plantation program in the Kaffrine region | 4,800 |
| f. Fishing: | 32,200 |
| Cameroon: Coastal fishing project | 10,000 |
| Ivory Coast: Fishing development project on the Buyo Dam lake | 19,200 |
| Ivory Coast: Completion of the second phase of the pilot operation for the development of small-scale maritime fishing set in motion by ARSO [expansion unknown] | 3,000 |
| g. Village water supply: | 26,400 |
| Upper Volta: Supplying of public works equipment for the construction and repair of village water-supply dams | 400 |
| Mali: Village water-supply project in the San region | 14,000 |
| Niger: Village water-supply project in the Liptako region | 5,600 |
| Senegal: Village water-supply project in three regions (Fleuve, Louga, Diourbel) | 6,400 |
| h. Training: | |
| Senegal: Creation of a national institute for rural development at Thies | 20,240 |
| i. Credits: | |
| Upper Volta: Volta Valleys Development Authority (AVV) farm-credit operations | 3,400 |
| 2. Mining | 140,771.8 |
| Niger: Share of stockholders' advances to be allowed the Tassa N'Taghalgue Mining Company (SMTT) which the Niger Government is responsible for (second window) | 140,000 |

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| Senegal: Partial funding (stockholders' advances) of Senegalese Taiba Phosphates Company (CSPT) investment program | 771.8 |
| 3. Industry | 145,150 |
| a. Cement: | 55,650 |
| Cameroon: Fourth Cameroon Cement Works Company (CIMENCAM) expansion program: | |
| First window | 19,250 |
| Second window | 19,250 |
| Cameroon: National Investment Company participation in providing an increase in capital for CIMENCAM (second window) | 5,000 |
| Ivory Coast: Installation of a clinker-crushing plant by the Southwest Cement Company (SOCIM) at San Pedro: | |
| First window | 6,000 |
| Second window | 6,000 |
| Somalia: Comparative study of different solutions for the completion and improvement of the Berbera Cement Works project | 150 |
| b. Fertilizers: | |
| Ivory Coast: Expansion of Ivorian Fertilizer Company (SIVENG) compound fertilizer plant at Vridi | 22,000 |
| c. Textiles: | |
| Cameroon: Construction of Cameroon Textile Company for Household Linen (SOLICAM) terrycloth factory | 14,500 |
| d. Miscellaneous industries: | 13,000 |
| Ivory Coast: Construction of a plant for the manufacture of labels and packing stamps and miscellaneous prepackaging materials by the Ivorian Industrial Printing Company at Yopougon | 6,000 |
| Ivory Coast: Ivorian Plastics for Farm Use Company SIMPAGRI) project at Abidjan | 2,000 |
| Gabon: Construction of a lubricant mixing plant by the Pizo Company for the manufacture of lubricants at Port Gentil | 5,000 |
| e. Training: | 36,000 |
| Ivory Coast: Establishment of a mechanical occupational training and industrial maintenance center (CMMI) at Jacqueville | 36,000 |
| f. Credits: | 4,000 |
| Madagascar: Across-the-board advance for the financing of long-term National Bank for Industrial Development (BNI) credit operations | 4,000 |
| 4. Electricity | 99,480 |
| a. Production: | 79,480 |
| Cameroon: Inventory of hydroelectric resources of the central-southern regions, the coast and the west | 8,000 |

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| Guinea: Feasibility study of the harnessing of the Konkoure River for hydroelectric power | 12,230 |
| Mauritius: Supplying of two banks of thermal generators for the Saint Louis power plant | 36,500 |
| Niger: First section of the Anou-Araren thermal power plant (supplementary loan) (second window) | 22,750 |
| b. Training: | |
| Cameroon: Establishment of Ombe Occupational Training Center by Cameroonian National Electric Company (SONEL) | 20,000 |
| 5. Tourism | |
| Congo: Construction of an international-class hotel in Brazzaville | 99,500 |
| Congo: Advance on Meridian Hotel Company frozen account to Congo Hotel Company | 24,000 |
| Djibouti: Construction of an international-class hotel in Djibouti | 1,700 |
| Haiti: Construction of a hotel complex at Pointe Labadie near Cap Haitien | 32,000 |
| Mali: Construction of two tourist hotels in Mopti and Timbuktu | 20,000 |
| Niger: Construction of the Air Hotel Company hotel in Arlit | 12,800 |
| Rwanda: Construction of a hotel in Gisenyi (supplementary loan) | 1,900 |
| Senegal: Expansion of VA-CAP [expansion unknown] vacation village at Cap Skirring | 4,300 |
| | 2,800 |
| Production sector total | 1,043,951.8 |
| Composed of: | |
| First window | 777,951.8 |
| Second window | 266,000 |
| II. Public Facilities | |
| 1. Transport | |
| | 306,290 |
| a. Railroads: | |
| | 184,200 |
| Benin: OCEN [expansion unknown] 1979-1981 investment program | 25,000 |
| Cameroon: REGIFERCAM [Cameroonian Railway Administration] equipment purchasing program | 20,000 |
| Congo: Emergency program for the restoration of Congo Ocean locomotives | 30,000 |
| Madagascar: RNCFM [Malagasy National Railway Administration] 1979-1982 investment program: | |
| First installment | 32,000 |
| Second installment | 58,000 |
| Senegal: RCFS [Senegalese Railway Administration] equipment program | 19,200 |
| b. Road transport: | |
| | 34,090 |
| Benin: Preliminary study for the launching of Trans-Benin Road Company operations | 90 |

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| Niger: Construction of an SNTN [expansion unknown] operations center at Lome | 4,600 |
| Senegal: Cape Verde Joint Transport Company (SOTRAC) equipment program | 29,400 |
| c. Ports: | |
| Cameroon: Practical utilization of long-term warehousing areas at the port of Douala | 30,000 |
| d. Airports: | |
| Burundi: Detailed technical studies for the development of Bujumbura Airport | 58,000 |
| Mali: Various modifications of Bamako Airport | 3,000 |
| Rwanda: Modifications of Kigali Airport | 5,000 |
| 2. Telecommunications | 156,500 |
| Benin: Automation program for district telephone exchanges | 15,000 |
| Burundi: Modernization program for national telecommunications network | 12,000 |
| Ivory Coast: Studies necessary to realization of the RTV [expansion unknown] development program: | |
| First window | 8,500 |
| Second window | 8,500 |
| Gabon: Priority telecommunications development program: | |
| First window | 20,000 |
| Second window | 20,000 |
| Mauritius: Telecommunications development program: first phase | 17,500 |
| Niger: Television and telecommunications development program (second window) | 55,000 |
| 3. Urban facilities | 43,000 |
| Cameroon: Modernization of Cameroonian National Water Company's (SNEC) Bassa Occupational Training Center | 5,000 |
| Upper Volta: Water-supply program in various urban centers | 23,000 |
| Sierra Leone: Water-supply program at Freetown | 15,000 |
| Public facilities total | 505,790 |
| Composed of: | |
| First window | 422,290 |
| Second window | 83,500 |
| I + II total | 1,549,741.8 |
| Composed of: | |
| First window | 1,200,241.8 |
| Second window | 349,500 |
| III. Financial Operations | |
| 1. Participations | |
| Ivory Coast: Ivorian Tropical Technology Company capital participation | 2,635 |

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| Senegal: Participation in increase of Industrial Company for Applications of Solar Energy (SINAES) capital | 135 |
| Chad: Participation in increase of COTONTCHAD [Cotton Company of Chad] capital | 200 |
| France: Participation in increase of Company for Economic and Social Development Studies (SEDES) capital | 400 |
| France: Participation in increase of French Foreign Trade Bank (BFCE) capital | 900 |
| 2. Advances | 50,100 |
| Senegal: Financing of a government investment program by the Senegalese National Development Bank (BNDS) (second window) | 50,000 |
| France: Advances on current account to SEDES | 100 |
| Financial operations total | 52,735 |
| Grand total (I + II + III) | 1,602,476.8 |
| Composed of: | |
| First window | 1,202,976.8 |
| Second window | 399,500 |

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF 1979 ARAB DEVELOPMENT LOANS

Paris INDUSTRIES ET TRAVAUX D'OUTRE-MER in French Mar 80 pp 140-142

[Article: "Loans and Technical Assistance of Arab Funds to Developing Countries: Second, Third and Fourth Quarters of 1979"]

[Except] During the second and third quarters of 1979, the Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries, the Islamic Development Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Iraqi Fund for Foreign Development, the Kuwaiti Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries, the OPEC Special Fund and the Saudi Development Fund have granted 60 loans, amounting to the equivalent of U.S.\$644 million. Technical assistance agreements, in the form of feasibility studies, amount to U.S.\$5.08 million.

During the fourth quarter of 1979, various assistance organizations in Arab countries have granted 28 loans to 21 developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, amounting to the equivalent of U.S.\$326 million, to finance projects in connection with electric power, airports, roads and bridges, water supply and waste water disposal systems, industry and agriculture. In addition, a technical aid of over U.S.\$1 million has been granted to one African country during that period.

On 31 December 1979, the Kuwaiti dinar was worth U.S.\$3.64; the Islamic [as published] dinar, U.S.\$1.15; the Saudi Arabian riyal, U.S.\$0.30; and the United Arab Emirates dirham, U.S.\$0.27.

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Tunisia

Phosphate Fertilizers--Construction of 2 phosphoric acid plants with a capacity of 1,000 tons per day, and 2 sulfuric acid plants with a capacity of 3,000 tons per day.

Total cost of the project: 800 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan: 218 million UAE dirhams, plus a 103 million capital investment. Terms of the loan: 12 years including 4 years' deferment at 6 percent per year (Abu Dhabi Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).

Tunisian Dairy Company--Capital investment of U.S.\$1.31 million to increase dairy production capacity. Terms not published (Islamic Development Bank).

Suselta Poultry Production Complex--Capital investment of U.S.\$1.80 million to increase production to 45 million eggs and 625,000 chickens per year. Terms not published (Islamic Development Bank).

Al Tawfiq Hospital--Capital investment of U.S.\$1.93 million for the construction of a modern 115-bed hospital with 6 operating rooms. Terms not published (Islamic Development Bank).

Gabes Water-Supply System--Water supply for the industrial zone northwest of Gabes; construction of seven wells, a water-pipe system and a distribution system.

Total cost of the project: 11.95 million Kuwaiti dinars. Amount of the loan: 3.30 million dinars. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment, at 6 percent per year (Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development).

Morocco

Gharb Area Development--Increasing agricultural production through irrigation (construction of electricity distribution, irrigation and drainage systems, and of regional development centers).

Total cost of the project: 1,161 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan: 40 million UAE dirhams. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment at 4.5 percent per year (Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).

Tamazaourt Dam--Construction of the Tamazaourt Dam on Oued Issen, and of a model village.

Total cost of the project: U.S.\$177 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$5 million. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment at 4 percent per year (OPEC Special Fund).

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Foreign Trade Financing--Purchase of crude oil to cover emergency requirements. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$15 million. Terms of the loan not indicated (Islamic Development Bank).

Sudan

Kenana Sugar Production--Preparation of 3,400 hectares to be planted in sugar cane, installing and outfitting crushing and refining facilities to produce 330,000 tons of granulated sugar per year.

Total cost of the project: 173.5 million Kuwaiti dinars. Amount of the loan: 6 million dinars. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment at 4 percent per year (Kuwaiti Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).

Foreign Trade Financing--Importation of refined petroleum. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$11.718 million. Terms not published (Islamic Development Bank).

Foreign Trade Financing--Purchase of finished jute products to cover emergency requirements. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$16 million. Terms of the loan not indicated (Islamic Development Bank).

Mauritania

Kiffa to Nema Road--Construction of a 436-km asphalt road, and supervision of the works.

Total cost of the project: 505 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan: 40 million UAE dirhams. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment at 3.5 percent per year (Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).

Guelbs Mining Project--In the Tiris area, production of 6 million tons of iron ore during an initial phase of the project. The project includes: ore enrichment, mining equipment, construction of a port, a railroad, a power plant, housing and training of personnel.

Total cost of the project: 1,832 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan: 80 million UAE dirhams. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment at 4.5 per year (Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Development of Arab Countries).

Amount of the loan: 10 million Kuwaiti dinars. Terms of the loan: 15 years with 5 year's deferment at 4 percent per year (Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development).

Amount of the loan: U.S.\$22 million. Terms of the loan not indicated (Iraki Fund for Foreign Development).

Cape Verde

Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments.

Amount of the loan: U.S.\$1 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Gambia

Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments.

Amount of the loan: U.S.\$1 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Mali

Sevare to Gao Road--Amount of the loan: U.S.\$7 million. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Guinea

Konakry Plastics Factory--Renovation and extension of the factory; technical training of the personnel.

Total cost of the project: U.S.\$14 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$6.5 million. Terms of the loan: 12 years including 5 years' deferment at 3 percent per year (Iraki Fund for Foreign Development).

Konkoure Dam--Technical assistance for the supervision of engineering studies.

Amount of the loan: 100,000 Kuwaiti dinars. Terms not published (Kuwaiti Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).

Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$2 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Renovation of the Road System--A 3 years' program including the procurement of equipment, spare parts, and road-maintenance equipment, and preinvestment studies for the rebuilding of the Konakry to Mamou road (270 km).

Total cost of the project: U.S.\$26.8 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$6 million. Terms of the loan: 16 years including 4 years' deferment at 4 percent per year (Arab Bank for the Economic Development in Africa).

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Renovation and Maintenance of Road System--A program extending over 3 years: training of supervisory personnel, procurement of equipment and spare parts, preinvestment studies.

Total cost of the project: U.S.\$26.8 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$6 million. Terms of the loan: 20 years with 4 years' deferment, at 4 percent per year (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa).

Upper Volta

Aid to Balance of Payments--Importation of durable goods, spare parts, food products and other consumer goods. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$1.5 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years with 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Benin

Credit Line in Favor of the Development Bank--Amount of the loan: U.S.\$4.5 million. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Niger

Foreign Trade Financing--Importation of refined petroleum. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$20 million. Terms not published (Islamic Development Bank).

Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$3.85 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment at 4 percent per year (OPEC Special Fund).

Exploitation of Energy Sources--Exploitation of local coal resources, construction of a coal power plant to increase electricity production and distribution in the Northwest.

Total cost of the project: U.S.\$136 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$7 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment at 7 percent per year (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa).

Development of Electricity Production--Project affecting Northwest Niger, and including two phases: coal utilization, construction of a power plant, of 20 and 132 kV powerlines, roads, water-supply systems, and housing, and job training.

Total cost of the project: U.S.\$136 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$7 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years with 3 years' deferment at 7 percent per year (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa).

Niamey to Balayera, and Niamey to Filingue Roads--Road construction project, to be completed within 18 months, to reduce to 430 km the distance between Niamey and Tahoua. Amount of the loan (technical assistance): U.S.\$1 million. Terms of the loan not indicated (Islamic Development Bank).

Cameroon

Cameroon Development Bank--Opening of a credit line. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$4.5 million. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Tchontchi to Guider Roads--Construction of a 30-km road and of paved side-roads totalling 3.8 km.

Total cost of the project: 47.26 million Saudi Arabian riyals. Amount of the loan: 12.3 million Saudi Arabian riyals. Terms of the loan not published (Saudi Development Fund).

Guinea-Bissau

Foreign Trade Financing--Importation of refined petroleum. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$10 million. Terms not published (Islamic Development Bank).

Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$1 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Zaire

Railroad Project--(Loan already mentioned for the first quarter in INDUSTRIES ET TRAVAUX D'OUTRE-MER, August 1979, p 467, before the agreement had been signed).

Amount of the loan: U.S.\$7 million. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Rwanda

Kitarama-Ruhingiri Road--Feasibility study and main layouts. Amount of the loan: 100,000 Kuwaiti dinars. Terms of the loan not published (Kuwaiti Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).

Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$4.5 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

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Burundi

Balance of Payments--Two loans to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments. Amount of the loans: U.S.\$11.1 million. Terms of the loans: 15 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Zambia

Railroad Project--Amount of the loan: U.S.\$4.5 million. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment at 4 percent per year (OPEC Special Fund).

Somalia

Importation of Cotton Yarns--Amount of the loan: U.S.\$5.3 million. Terms not published (Islamic Development Bank).

Somali Merchant Navy--Leasing two ships to Somali authorities. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$7 million. Terms of the loan not published (Islamic Development Bank).

Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$5 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Madagascar

Andekaleka Hydroelectric Project--Construction of a power plant having an initial power of 54 MW, including: one concrete diversion dam, one water intake structure, one tunnel, two turbines, and equipment procurement. Total cost of the project: 38.34 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan: 16 million UAE dirhams. Terms of the loan: 15 years with 5 years' deferment at 4.5 percent per year (Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).

Comoro Islands

Road Network Development and Maintenance--Construction of a 5.7-km paved road between Pomoni and Moya; construction of two bridges, two roadways, one drainage system, and one 90-m tunnel; procurement of road-maintenance equipment.

Total cost of the project: 1.5 million Kuwaiti dinars. Amount of the loan: 1.5 million Kuwaiti dinars. Terms of the loan: 40 years including 10 years' deferment at 1 percent per year (Kuwaiti Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).

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Seychelles

Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments and permit the importation of durable goods, spare parts, and industrial and agricultural equipment. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$ 200,000. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment at 4 percent per year (OPEC Special Fund).

Power-Supply to Braslin Island--Construction of a 2 MW power plant, of transformers, of a distribution network; civil engineering works. Total cost of the project: 1.3 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan: 800,000 UAE dirhams. Terms of the loan: 12 years with 2 years' deferment at 5 percent per year (Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).

Botswana

Protection of Animal Resources--Treatment of the foot-and-mouth disease; installation of complete laboratory facilities to produce 2 million doses of serum per year; construction of a laboratory at Gaborones, to produce 15 million doses of serum per year.

Total cost of the project: U.S.\$6.25 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$2.2 million. Terms of the loan: 10 years including 3 years' deferment at 2 percent per year (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa).

Aid to Balance of Payments--Importation of durable goods, spare parts, food products and essential consumer goods. Amount of the loan: U.S.\$2 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years with 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

Lesotho

Maseru International Airport--Amount of the loan: U.S.\$3 million. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BURUNDI, TANZANIA SIGN COOPERATION AGREEMENT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 17 Mar 80 p 38

[Text] Pursuing diplomatic efforts with a view to making Burundi known to the world and developing its international, and more particularly interregional, relations, President Jean-Batiste Bagaza paid a four-day visit to Tanzania in February. On that occasion, cooperation agreements were signed calling for the building of two roads, one leading from Lake Nyanza in Burundi to Kigoma in Tanzania, and the other leading from Muyinga in Burundi to Kobero in Tanzania. In addition, the road from Muyinga to Kibonbo via Kusulu will be repaired. Burundi will purchase supplementary rolling stock for the railroad linking Dar es-Salaam and Kigoma, on Lake Tanganika, in Tanzania, and will carry out port work in Kigoma and Bujumbura.

These agreements, which come within the framework of the privileged relations linking Bujumbura and Dar es-Salaam, should contribute to developing access routes for Burundi, an entirely landlocked country for which the main facility for egress abroad is the Tanzanian port of Dar es-Salaam on the Indian Ocean.

Burundi also makes use of the Kenyan port of Mombasa, but this route, which requires transit through Uganda and Rwanda, is longer and much more costly.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

GUINEA, SENEGAL PEANUT PROCESSING--According to the terms of a protocol signed in Conakry on 2 April, a Senegalese company, the SEIB (Baol Electric and Industrial Company) will establish a plant to refine peanut oil and table oil in Guinea. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 864]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TURKEY--The governments of Turkey and Central African Republic have decided to establish diplomatic relations on the embassy level. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 515] 5058

POSTAL CHECKS RESTORED--The 20 February 1978 ordinance, barring payment of public debts except through bank checks or in cash was repealed on 6 February 1980. This regulation was aimed at preventing payments with the help of postal checks; since deposits in the CCP [postal checking fund] are periodically used by the treasury, the postal checking service found itself without any funds and the service had lost all of its credibility. Today the government wants to restore the postal checking service network and reinstitute the postal checking functions in order to restore the confidence of the depositors. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 515] 5058

MEASURES AFFECTING TRAINEES ABROAD--A recent Central African cabinet meeting decided to restore order in the rather confused situation of Central African civil servants taking training courses abroad. Some trainees, as a matter of fact, stay abroad seemingly forever, taking all kinds of university courses or switching their special fields during their training courses. At this time, the Central African government maintains 442 trainees and their families outside the country; most of them are in France where some have been living for the past 16 years. The government will therefore take four series of measures: establishment of a commission charged with studying the situation of all trainees abroad, case by case, and to return on an emergency basis all of those who have finished their training courses or who have started studies for which they were not initially intended; no more disordered or fun courses; reduction of training course duration and publication of regular report cards, otherwise the individual will not get any pay and will be subjected to disciplinary punishment; continued supervision of course trainees by a specialised section which will operate in conjunction with the ministries of finance and of planning. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 515] 5058

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SOVIET PROFESSORS REPLACED--Mr Jean-Marie Bassia, doctor of physics, Central African professor at the University of Bangui, has been appointed dean of the school of sciences, replacing Mr Karin, a soviet instructor. The USSR as a matter of fact has stuck to its decision to recall all of its technical assistance personnel in spite of the desire of the Central African government to have the instructors remain following the break of diplomatic relations between the two countries. There had been 84 Soviet professors in the RCA [Central African Republic], including 24 at the university. Almost all of them were teaching scientific subjects. The departure of these instructors creates serious problems for the Central African authorities, particularly in the school of sciences, which has lost most of its teaching body, and in the provinces, where the Soviets were very numerous. The Central African national education minister has asked Morocco to receive 2nd-year and 3rd-year students from the school of sciences and that country has agreed. He also asked Central African professors in physical education to teach courses in biology in the high schools and he asked some employees of the ministry of agriculture to teach courses in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 pp 515, 516] 5058

MINISTER WARNS LEBANESE--Central African Commerce Minister Kabylo recently met with Lebanese merchants in Bangui in order to warn them against unlawful practices often observed among them, such as major violations of trade legislation, refusal to keep proper accounts, and employment of non-existent manpower. Mr Kabylo asked the Lebanese to work with the government for the country's recovery. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 516] 5058

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CONGO

BRIEFS

PCT DELEGATION TO USSR--Brazzaville, 7 Mar--In preparation for talks between the CPSU and PCT (Congolese Labor Party) soon to be held in Moscow, the politburo of the PCT in February examined "all the documents representing the party's contribution to this meeting." The PCT delegation to Moscow will be headed by Mr J. P. Thystere Tchicaya, member of the politburo for Ideology and Education; Messrs Lekoundzou, politburo member for the Plan and Economy, Bongou, general secretary of the Presidency of the Central Committee and Batheas-Mollomb, member of the Central Committee, will accompany him. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 575] 2750

ADB RAILROAD LOAN--Brazzaville, 7 Mar--The ADB [African Development Bank] has recently granted a supplemental loan of 2.80 million accounting units (approximately 774 million CFA francs) to the Transcongolese Communications Agency (ATC) to finance cost over-runs on the Congo-to-ocean railroad project (COCO) financed by the ADB. This loan is repayable in 12 years after 4 years deferral of amortization. We recall that the realignment of the CFCO has the purpose of eliminating the bottleneck in the section in the mountainous district of Mayombe, to increase the railroad's capacity. This operation is also intended to prevent substantial interruptions of railway threatened by precarious conditions in the main tunnel and on certain bridges. The ADB has already granted 10 [sic] million accounting units (15 million UC in 1976 and 5 million UC in 1978) for the purchase of rails, laying of the track, and the telecommunication components of the project, in all 7 percent of the project as a whole. The project's cost as of 1975 prices was on the order of 33.48 billion CFA francs. This cost has been exceeded and reached 41.33 billion CFA francs in January 1978, so that the financial package had to be revised. Today the cost amounts to 60 billion CFA francs. Thus there remains a shortfall of 20 billion CFA francs to be found if the project is to be brought to successful completion. Completion of construction is planned for December 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 575] 2750

ADB PALM OIL PROJECT LOAN--Brazzaville, 7 Mar--A second ADB loan of 8 million accounting units (approximately 2.16 billion CFA francs) was granted

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to the Congo to finance that country's Palm Oil Project. This project is aimed at the recovery of the Ouesso sector, principal production zone of the RNPC [National Administration of Palm Plantations of the Congo] in order to increase the production of palm oil now in a decline and to make possible the production of cabbage-palm which is at present non-existent. Palm oil production will thus increase from 3,000 tons to 6,000 tons, and cabbage-palm production will attain the volume of 1,600 tons. The project includes the renovation of non-existent [sic] plantations, creation of new plantations on an industrial scale, and renovation of the plantation's existing processing plant. The total cost will be 10.2 million accounting units, of which 77.5 percent is in foreign exchange. The project will be financed jointly by the ADB and the Congolese Government. The ADB loan will serve to finance the costs in foreign exchange of all the components and the costs in local currency related to new plantations. The execution of the work will extend over a period of 6 years. The agency responsible for execution is the RNPC. This is the eighth loan granted by the ADB to the Congolese People's Republic. The total of previous financing by the ADB for that country's account is 27.6 million accounting units, and is divided over 7 projects. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 575] 2750

RELATIONS WITH ECUADOR--On 13 February, diplomatic relations were established between the People's Republic of the Congo and Ecuador. An agreement along these lines was signed between the representatives of these two countries in the offices of the United Nations Secretariat-General in New York. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 518] 5058

CSC SECRETARY'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW--Mr A. Ondonda, member, Central Committee, PCT (Congolese labor party), permanent secretary of CSC (Congolese trade union confederation), in charge of international relations, returned to Brazzaville at the end of a journey that had taken him to Prague and Moscow. In Prague, Mr Ondonda attended a meeting of the WFTU, the OATUU, and the CSC with a view to preparing a pan-African seminar to be held in Brazzaville next March. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 518] 5058

PETROLEUM PRODUCTION TO INCREASE--The petroleum output of the Congo, currently about 2 million tons per year, is to experience considerable increase over the next several years. Confirming the recent suggestions of Mr Albin Chalandon (MTM [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS], 1 February 1980, p 245) ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company] - Congo estimates that, according to AGEFI, the exploitation of new deposits should permit the country to increase its output to 5 million tons within 3 years and to 8 million tons by the end of this decade. Mr Albin Chalandon, who has just been in the Congo, at which time he was received by President Sassou Nguesso, had an opportunity once again to express his confidence in the petroleum future of that country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 618] 5058

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CLASSIFICATION OF STATE ENTERPRISES--Following the Conference on Government Enterprises (MTM [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS] of 15 February 1980, p 391), further specific information was supplied by Congolese authorities on the classification of Congolese enterprises in three categories: (1) Enterprises to be developed (about 26). Those which are in a relatively sound condition regarding organization, management, treasury, and environment, and which are able to pay for their expansion or continue it (Hydro Congo, Congolese Lumber Office, Congo Glass

Factory Company, ATC (Trans-Congolese Communications Agency), Congo Insurance and Reinsurance, etc.). (2) Enterprises to be restored (about 25). Those which, continuing with the same company objective, present problems of organization, management, treasury, and environment that could harm their balance or their sound expansion and whose situation requires restoration (Loutete cement plant, Lina Congo, Congolese Ammortization Fund, National Commerce Office, etc.). (3) Enterprises to be reconsidered (about nine). Those whose marketing, management organization, technology, and environmental problems can lead either to a change in their company objective or to a reorientation of their activities or to a reorganization with a view to their restoration and development, or to their elimination (National Livestock Company, National Lumber Exploitation Company, National Palm Plantation Monopoly of the Congo, Transportation Company of Brazzaville, etc.). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 518] 5058

MARXIST CIRCLES SET UP--"Marxist Clubs" were opened 12 February at Brazzaville by Congolese interior minister F. X. Katali. The "Marxist Clubs" are seminars which are attended by all members of the PTC (Congolese Labor Party) who, with the help of these presentations, will receive "knowledge in the acquisition of the political, ideological, and technical conscience." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 518] 5058

MANGANESE EXPORTS--In 1979, COMILOG (Ogooue Mining Company), which operates the mines at Moanda, in Gabon, shipped 2,269,513 tons of manganese intended for export via the CFCO (Congo-Ocean Railroad) over a distance of 200 kilometers between Mont-Belo and Pointe-Noire. This tonnage has not been obtained since 1964 (2,255,400 tons in 1976). In recent years, this transit traffic developed in the following manner (in terms of 1,000 tons): 1977--1,853; 1978--1,678 (down 9.4 percent); 1979--2,269 (up 35.2%). The decline in traffic between 1977 and 1978 was the result of a manganese mineral sales loss on the world market at that time. The excellent traffic volume of COMILOG should favorably influence activities in the port of Pointe-Noire in 1979, whose results are not yet known. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 518] 5058

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

MINISTERIAL RESHUFFLE IMPROVES POLITICAL CLIMATE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 572

[Text] An Improved Political Atmosphere

The reshuffling of the government of Equatorial Guinea resulted in a noticeable improvement, as of the beginning of February, in the country's political atmosphere, which had been fairly tense due to the comparisons that could be made between the dictatorial government of Macias (or Macié) Nguema, and the one that replaced it, since individuals who had badly compromised themselves with the former regime were able to maneuver so as to remain in power.

The disgrace that has just assaulted them shows the good intentions generally ascribed to Lieut Col Obiang Nguema and other officers who played a determining role in the coup, despite their affiliation with the Fang tribe, and even with a lineage of this tribe to which the deposed dictator himself belonged.

The second vice president of the military government, Captain Ela Nzeng, was removed from office, probably for prevarication, and appointed ambassador to Peking. He was replaced by Capt Eulogio Oyo Riquesa, a Bubi (tribe from the island of Fernando Po, or Bioco, very much in a minority, making up about 10 percent of the country's population), which constitutes a restoring of tribal balance without precedent since independence, complemented by the arrival in the military cabinet of another Bubi, Capt Seriche Bioco.

Capt Mba Ognane, military governor of Rio Muni, was also put out of office. The special correspondent of the Gabonese newspaper L'UNION, Mba Nguema, recently reported that "two ships loaded with foodstuffs and products of first necessity, coming from Spain and destined for Rio Muni, were confiscated and put on a different course at Bata [principal town of Rio Muni] by local officials in power, to the detriment of a population that continues to vegetate in a condition of want.

Since Equatorial Guinea has the particular characteristic of having a military government and a civil government (Junta technica), the political

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housecleaning also touches the civilian team, some members of which having had the reputation of involvement in the evil doings of Macié.

Thus Mr Nguema Essono, former vice president under the dictator, who prided himself in having kept Macié in an unsuspecting state while the coup was being prepared, lost his post of technical secretary (equals minister) in the Office of External Affairs, being replaced by Mr Victor Ondo Mangué, a true opponent of Macié who had been imprisoned under the old government. Mr Nguema Essono was appointed ambassador at Addis Ababa.

Mr Batho Obama Nsuse, secretary for external affairs under Macié and technical secretary for security since the coup, was also removed. He was made charge d'affaires at Yaounde.

New arrivals observed in the civil government are a Fernandino (creole from Fernando Po), Mr Federico Messas Bill Kongue, and a Bubi, Mr Ernesto Calletano Tohorida, confirming the restoration of ethnic balance previously mentioned.

We present the complete list of the government at Malabo whose purpose, after the temporary period of the government of public safety constituted after the coup of last August, is to re-establish government, to provide better national representation in the exercise of authority, and to show the population that times have really changed; in this connection, the appointment of Captain Riquesa, second vice president and of Bubi origin, is highly symbolic, since he acted as prosecutor during Macié's trial last September, a trial which, as is known, resulted in a sentence of death and the execution of the fallen dictator.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

ADB LOAN--The BAD (African Development Bank) has just granted a loan amounting to 500,000 accounting units (or about 124.42 million CFA [African financial community]) to Equatorial Guinea with a view to financing studies relating to the modernization of the Bata international airport. The loan is repayable within 10 years, including a period of grace of 3 years. The following objectives are contemplated: by making it more functional and operational, enabling the Bata airport to play a real role in economic and social development for Equatorial Guinea which is in part insular and in part continental; to improve its infrastructure facilities and its superstructure in successive stages so that the installations will be in keeping with the transportation demand at any moment. A report had been drawn up in 1968 on reinforcing the extension of the existing runway (200 meters) by SFDTP (French Dredging and Public Works Company). The BAD proposed the following in order to update that report: (1) A master plan for the development of this airport for the next 15-20 years, indicating the various reasonably possible phases; (2) a technical, economic, and financial feasibility study. The results of the study and the master plan will help in preparing an implementation study and bidding invitations for an optimum work program to be carried out, as part of the first phase, in order to improve this airport. The estimated cost of this study is 500,000 UC [accounting units]. A period of 12 months has been provided to permit consultants to submit final offers. The coordinating body between the consulting engineers and the various technical departments will be the department of transportation of Equatorial Guinea whose officials constitute the counterpart team for the consulting engineers. This is the second loan given by the BAD group to Equatorial Guinea; the bank had recently granted a loan of 6.6 billion UC for the renovation of cocoa plantations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 516] 5058

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GAMBIA

ADF PEANUT PROCESSING LOAN RECEIVED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 564

[Text] Bathurst, 7 Mar--The Gambian peanut processing industry has received a loan from the ADF [African Development Fund] of 5 million ADF accounting units, or approximately \$5.5 million. The project thus being financed has already received a loan from the EIB on the order of \$3 million. The plan, in its first phase, is to upgrade the handling and shelling installations at Kawi, as well as the handling, shelling and processing installations at Denton Bridge. It will eliminate bottlenecks, increase the efficiency of the procedures, and will make possible the increase of tonnages of unshelled peanuts processed by the plant now in operation from 40,000 tons to the present volume of 65,000 tons.

The project includes the following: reconditioning the extraction presses at Denton Bridge, construction of auxiliary warehousing and processing buildings at Kawi and Denton Bridge, purchase and installation of electric power generating units, addition of cyclones to the shelling machines, purchase of vehicles and office equipment, loan of the services of engineer-advisers for implementation studies and supervision of the work.

Total cost of the project is estimated at in excess of \$10 million. The project will be financed jointly by the ADF, the EIB and the GPMB [Gambia Produce Marketing Board]. Its execution will take 3 years: it will start in 1980 and attain completion in 1982. The agency charged with execution is the Gambia Produce Marketing Board. Required goods and services will be obtained through international requests for bids, except for the general reconditioning of presses and digesters, which will be handled by the manufacturer of the machinery.

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GAMBIA

BRIEFS

ADB ROAD PROJECT LOAN--Bathurst, 7 Mar--The Banjul-Serrekunda road project in The Gambia which has been granted a loan on the order of a billion CFA francs by the ADB, aims to increase the traffic capacity of this road, and make the pavement capable of handling increasingly heavy traffic. Increasing the road's capacity will facilitate access to and egress from the city of Banjul for goods and passengers traveling between Banjul and Kombo St. Mary, a densely populated zone and the economic and administrative center of The Gambia. The project includes the following: updating the existing study; construction of a two-lane expressway separated by a divider from Banjul to Serrekunda (11.6 kilometers), as well as lighting for the new highway, loan of consultants and supervision of the construction work. The total cost of the project excluding taxes is estimated at 8 million ADB accounting units (approximately \$10.4 million). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 564] 2750

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

PORT COOPERATION WITH BRAZIL--Manuel dos Santos, state commissioner for transportation of Guinea-Bissau has left for Brazil. His visit is aimed at obtaining the participation of Brazilian firms in the dredging and extension projects for the port of Bissau. Financed in equal parts by the World Bank and the Kuwait Economic Fund, these projects will total \$25 million. Minister dos Santos will meet with Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, Brazilian minister of foreign affairs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 864]

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KENYA

BRIEFS

DROUGHT AFFECTS STOCKRAISING--Nairobi, 7 Mar--The drought afflicting Kenya for the past 9 years has reached alarming proportions, due to the particularly scarce rainfall in 1979, causing a severe shortage in cereal grains, according to the FRENCH PRESS AGENCY. The drought now affects the entire territory and every sector of activity from hydroelectric power to agriculture. The country's only hydroelectric power station, on the Tana River, has had to cut down its output by half, because of the low water level in the dam. Consequently the country's industries are operating at half capacity. Stockraising and agriculture are the worst hit. Milk deliveries have fallen from 700,000 to 410,000 liters per day and butter production has dropped from 280 to 72 tons per month. The authorities were compelled to import 2000 tons of butter from Europe for 3.4 million Kenyan shillings (approximately \$500,000). As a further consequence of the scarce rainfall of 1979, shortages in corn, wheat and rice have reached a critical level. Shortage of corn, the basic diet of Kenyans, was especially felt in the last 3 months at Nairobi and Mombasa. Prices of these three cereals rose by more than 29 percent by direction of the authorities, to encourage farmers to increase their production. Promised delivery of 60,000 tons of corn, 30,000 tons of wheat and 15,000 tons of rice which President Arap Moi requested from the United States during his recent visit there (MTM 29 Feb p 520) should enable Kenya to get by until the next harvests in the course of the year. But everyone wonders whether these harvests will be any better than those of last year, when the rains that normally give the signal for sowing seeds have not yet made their appearance. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 577] 2750

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LIBERIA

NATION SAID TO HAVE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 570

[Article: "Liberia, Development of Agriculture, an Imperative Necessity"]

[Text] As is known, in his annual message to Parliament delivered on 24 January (MTM, 15 Feb p 386) President William Tolbert announced a series of measures favoring agriculture. These measures related in their goals to "Operation Feed Yourself" in Ghana and "Operation Feed the Nation" in Nigeria, since renamed "Green Revolution" (MTM 22 Feb p 446), as noted by FRENCH PRESS AGENCY, mark a spectacular turning point in local economic policy.

This step was in fact made necessary by the situation currently prevailing in the country, partly the cause of the serious disorders that occurred there last year.

The world crisis had substantial effects on the export of iron ore and rubber, the two products from whence Liberia gets most of its foreign exchange. In regard to iron ore, of which the country is No 1 exporter for Africa and eleventh in the world, the minister of finance, Mrs Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, quite recently made no secret the fact that the future was especially dark (MTM 22 Feb p 445). Iron ore exports, which used to represent 74.7 of total exports, now only make up 55.4 percent.

According to the lady minister, the three companies show some 50 million dollars of deficit, Lamco alone showing \$26 million, and being at the point of firing 700 out of the 4,500 workers it employs.

As for rubber, which made up 13.2 percent of exports in 1977, though its future is less dark, thanks to a rise in world market prices which has worked out to the advantage of Firestone most of all, it suffers from the disappearance of a large number of small plantations, and the government program for reviving this sector will require years.

To be sure, Liberia has no lack of potential mineral resources: uranium, gold, barite, bauxite and even oil, for which there are encouraging indications off the coasts. But exploitation of these will require time and

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money. Also, for the short term, the country's salvation lies in agriculture and in a return to the land by many of its citizens, as they are being urged to do in the "Back to the Soil Movement." Development of agriculture will confer a great advantage in speeding the development of the back country, too long neglected due to the concentration of activities in the mining and rubber sectors. This development of agriculture, however, will, if it really goes through, also require a certain amount of time, and it is not expected that the country will meet its requirements in rice this year, a product of which it is a large consumer, and purchases of which on the outside represent a heavy financial burden (even though production has practically doubled between 1964 and 1976, in the latter year reaching 250,000 tons, with outside purchases increasing regularly: 31,000 tons in 1975, 37,000 tons in 1976, 59,700 tons in 1977...).

In contrast, agricultural exports are already showing encouraging developments. The proportion of coffee in the export total has risen from 1.4 percent to 9.6 percent from 1976 to 1977. Cocoa and oil-palms are improving. Finally, great hopes are placed in lumber (see exports for 1978 in MTM 20 Apr 1979, p 1007) thanks to a five-year plan begun in 1976 with the assistance of West Germany. Germany is incidentally making regular contributions in this sector, as has been the case quite recently (MTM 28 Dec 1979 p 3680).

It is, however, no less true that at the present time the country is in serious difficulties, which have their effect at every financial, economic, political and social level, and it was not without good reason that President Tolbert made a trip to Europe at the end of last year to ask for aid that Liberia will be able to count on (MTM, 21 and 28 Dec 1979, pp 3464 and 3680).

The external debt will figure at \$661.3 million, the budget deficit, largest in the country's history, will attain \$140.8 million against \$224.9 million in receipts, and the national per capita income, now about \$258, will be down by 10 percent in 4 years, while consumer prices will have increased by 16 percent as of last year. Moreover, as the minister of finance pointed out, "the expenses incurred for accommodation of the 16th OAU Summit Conference last July have certainly exacerbated the deterioration of our economy and our finances."

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LIBERIA

REGIME 'S ANTI-OPPOSITION MEASURES MAY HARM DEMOCRACY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Mar 80 p 41

[Article by Mohamed Maige: "The Opposition Decapitated"]

[Text] Two months to the day after it was officially recognized (8 January 1980), the opposition to the regime of Liberian President William Tolbert, the Progressive People's Party (PPP), previously a simple movement within the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), has been decapitated. Some 100 of its leaders, including the president and founder Gabriel Bacchus Matthews, were arrested and thrown in prison. Accused of treason and sedition (rebellion against the authorities), the majority are threatened with the death penalty or life imprisonment (for treason), or a minimum of 10 years in prison (for sedition).

This roundup, without precedent in scope, affected even government circles. On 12 March, Georges Boley, in charge, with ministerial rank, of the administration at the Ministry of Education, charged with complicity with "those guilty of treason and sedition," joined them in prison.

The dismantling of the opposition is the culmination of a test of strength which reached the point of no return on 6 March. Mr Matthews, protesting against the multiple arrests and the harassment to which his party had been subjected, appealed in the course of a public statement for an unlimited general strike with a view to forcing the president to resign and achieving the establishment of a "popular regime." On 7 March, he asked the militants and sympathizers of the PPP to leave the people's settlements, in particular Kru New Town, and to come to Monrovia to demonstrate their discontent peacefully to the chief of state. Since the president proved to be absent, on a tour of the interior of the country at that time, the demonstrators were dispersed equally peacefully. But the next day, the army raided the headquarters of the PPP. And the "traitor" hunt had begun.

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On 11 March, Mr Tolbert stated that it was not a question of banishing the opposition but only of ridding it of its "disturbing elements." In reality, the confrontation between those in the government and those in the opposition, latent since 1975, erupted brutally in the month of April 1979 during the violent demonstrations against the increase in the price of rice (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 956). Demanding "African Socialism" and denouncing the political and economic privileges enjoyed by the minority of Afro-American origin (3 percent of the 1.6 million Liberians) the PAL succeeded in breaking the political monopoly of the government's True Whig Party (TWP) and winning a position on the political chessboard.

Public Order

The tension between the PAL and the TWP was such that the municipal elections which were to be held in Monrovia on 13 November 1979 were postponed until 10 June 1980. Officially this was to allow the government to abrogate the property clause authorizing owners only to vote. In reality it was because the opposition candidate (then unknown) had every chance of carrying the capital. At the same time, and for the third time since the month of September, recognition of the PPP was delayed as a "threat to the public order." The army even surrounded the premises of the PAL, where the secretary general, Mr Oscar Quiah (worker) had just escaped the bullets of a sharpshooter.

The PAL was then, in January, transformed into a party (PPP), but without a doubt it did not await the proper moment nor did it play the democratic game. Its appeal for a general strike and the events in March auger the dawn of a hardening of the regime. To the detriment of democracy.

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MADAGASCAR

STOCK-RAISING SITUATION, FUTURE EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 580

[Article: "Animal Husbandry in Madagascar: Condition and Prospects"]

[Text] Last 17 January, veterinary doctor J. J. Ribot presented, to the Malagasy Academy in Tananarive, a report on the current condition of and prospects for animal husbandry in Madagascar, based primarily on a study carried out by the French company SEDES [Economic and Social Development Studies Company] at the request of the Malagasy government and paid for by the Aid and Cooperation Fund.

The number of livestock cattle in Madagascar is estimated at over 10 million head, including 3.15 million in the province of Toliary (Tulear) and close to 3 million in the province of Mahajanga (Majunga). Ninety percent of the cattle are zebu. The exploitation rate is approximately 10.3 percent, which corresponds to 1.05 million cattle slaughtered every year, equal to 132,700 tons of carcass meat, 7,000 tons of which are exported.

The number of small-hoofed livestock is far from insignificant, with some 650,000 sheep and 1.3 million goats, including 6 percent of the latter that are purebred Mohairs, concentrated in the Ampanihy region. As far as pigs are concerned, their number is estimated at approximately 1 million. The second, economic part of this report makes it possible to point out some important facts:

--Slaughterhouses supply major cities with only 95,000 head. For example, Tananarive gets 46.6 percent of its supply from slaughterhouses, 46.7 percent from the suburbs, and 6.7 percent from transported meats.

--The price of animals on the hoof in the producing areas is between 90 and 115 Malagasy francs per kilo, live weight. Delivered to Tananarive, this price is approximately 150 Malagasy francs.

--The supplies from the Omby state farm to the capital's slaughterhouse showed a 380-million Malagasy franc deficit in 1978. The sale of butcher meat at the official price, including tax, by Tananarive's shops shows a deficit, for the state farm, on the order of 3 percent of its business volume.

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--On the basis of the market research study that was done, the report suggests an increase in the price of beef that would be raised to 350 Malagasy francs per kilo for meat with bones and 420 Malagasy francs without bones.

--In other livestock, we note the slaughter of 492,000 young pigs, yielding close to 37,000 tons of carcass meat, and the slaughter of over 575,000 sheep and goats, producing over 10,000 tons of carcass meat.

--Exports of meat, primarily beef, have, for several years, been in the area of 7,000 tons. In the last few years, export business has shown a deficit, representing for exporters a loss of approximately 6 percent of their business volume, or approximately 65 Malagasy francs per kilogram of exported meat.

--Domestic meat consumption is 20.06 kg per capita per year, consisting of 14.65 kg of beef, 4.27 kg of pork, and 1.14 kg of goat meat and lamb. In Tananarive, meat consumption--poultry and fish--has gone from 44.2 kg per person in 1962 to 32 kg in 1978.

In the future, with the prospect of a population reaching 16,500,000 inhabitants and consumption, 26 kg of meat per person per year, we will need to have 405,000 tons a year available towards the year 2000, in addition to 200,000 tons of fish (12 kg per capita).

Consequently, we are going to have to encourage the development and intensification of animal husbandry. While, as far as pork and fowl are concerned, mass production unit projects can be set up and, as a matter of fact, are being studied, things are much different as far as cattle are concerned, because it now takes 5 to 6 years to produce an animal for slaughter. The best stimulation would appear to be a fairly substantial increase in the price of meat that would give farmers an incentive to produce more. In addition, all the zebu breeding projects should be accelerated in order to expand the most productive breeders.

Above all, we are going to have to set up and organize the collection, storage, and distribution of products and food by-products used to feed animals, without entering into competition with food for human consumption.

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MADAGASCAR

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EEC FOOD AID--Food assistance from the European Economic Community to Madagascar for 1979, in the form of 3,100 tons of rice worth approximately 280 million Malagasy francs, has just arrived in Antsiranana (formerly Diego-Suaréz); 500 tons of powdered milk and 3,300 tons of flour are also expected. The profit from the public sale of this gift from the EEC will help finance development projects. For example, the revenue from the previous sales of food aid made it possible to finance the construction of 47 storage hangars, purchase trucks and highway maintenance machinery, and research the development of certain farm regions in Madagascar. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 580] 9064

SOVIET PLANES--Two Soviet aircraft, which Madagascar bought from the USSR, were delivered in Tananarive last 28 February. They are two medium-size jet carrier aircraft: a "Yak-40" and an "Antonov-26." These aircraft, although assigned to the Malagasy Air Force, will also be used for transport and to supply areas that are difficult to reach overland. President Ratsiraka declared, on this occasion, that "the USSR has given us one Yak-40 and we have bought one. She gave us an Antonov-26 and we bought four. She lent us an Antonov-12 for a year and it has now been in operation for 2 years, and when we bought 1,000 tractors from the USSR, she graciously presented us with 200." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 580] 9064

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MALI

BRIEFS

FRG FLEET ASSISTANCE--The Federal Republic of Germany has granted Mali financial assistance in the amount of DM 6 million (approximately 1,320 million Malian francs). This assistance is aimed at rebuilding the fleet of the Malian Navigation Company. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 865]

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SENEGAL

PDS PROPOSES ROUND TABLE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 501

[Text] The first national convention of the Senegalese Democratic Party (liberal opposition, represented in the National Assembly), through its secretary-general, Master Abdoulaye Wade, on 22 February proposed a round-table conference of all of the Senegalese "active forces" in order "to proceed to an objective and in-depth analysis of the economic and financial crisis, to study the best solutions that are most in line with the nation's short-term, medium-term, and long-term interests, so as to surmount the crisis, to study structural, political, and institutional reforms necessitated by the current situation, and to prepare and supervise new, free and democratic elections."

Master Wade recalled that the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] in 1975 proposed the establishment of a national front consisting of all of the political parties for the purpose of carrying out a national program.

1979-1980 Fiscal Year Finance Correction Law

On 19 February, the Senegalese National Assembly adopted a bill correcting the finance law for FY 1979-1980. The corrected operating budget thus is balanced in terms of revenues and expenditures at a figure of 110.16 billion francs CFA [African Financial Community], considering the adjustments in expenditures which the Senegalese government must make for this fiscal year.

Among these expenditures, we note an increase in salaries from January until June 1980, requiring 2,845.17 million CFA, salary backpay following the coordination of civil service laws with 1.5 billion CFA, housing allowances for teachers with 629 millions, the increase in higher-education scholarships and funds for the University Projects Center with 555 million CFA, and government building maintenance at a figure of 400 millions. On the other hand, the subsidies given the public establishments and the mixed-management companies will be considerably boosted in order to enable them to cope with the difficulties in the semipublic sector.

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Mr Christian Valentin, who delivered the general report of the Finance and Economic Affairs Committee, indicated that financing these supplementary expenditures will be assured through an amount of 6.8 billion francs CFA from revenues obtained without any tax increase and without the creation of any new tax but due to the higher revenues and a reduction in public expenditures, in view of the austerity policy adopted by the government, especially through the elimination of 1,172 jobs, mostly subordinate positions, as well as an effort at rationalizing and organizing all of the ministerial departments.

On the other hand, the Senegalese National Assembly adopted a bill concerning the reduced rate of taxes on peanut oil which will be 5 percent of the VAT, whereas peanut oil had been taxed at the standard rate of 18.50 percent. This measure will make it possible to bring the real sales price closer to the consumer sales price.

The institution of a skimoff to the benefit of the government equipment budget from industrial and commercial profits, from the profits of non-commercial professions, and from the earnings of real properties, was also voted by the deputies, as was a bill establishing a skimoff from the tax yield on the business volume to the benefit of the Autonomous Amortization Fund and modifying the list of import and export duties recorded in the customs tariff. Customs duties for commodities originating in and coming from countries included in the minimum tariff will be raised from 5% to 10%, whereas the rate will be kept at 5% for those commodities which come from or originate in countries of the ECOWAS.

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SENEGAL

DEFICIT TRADE BALANCE REPORTED FOR 1979

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 17-31 Mar 80 p 38

[Text] The deficit in the Senegalese trade balance for 1979 is reported to be more than 50 billion CFA francs, despite the increase in the export volume and a decrease in imports. This was announced by the Senegalese prime minister, Abdou Diouf, although the head of the government told the national assembly that a new economic and financial recovery plan will be implemented in the next five years in order to reestablish the financial balances. It will include relaunching public investment, the creation of jobs, improvement of foreign trade, the balance of payments and savings, and a reduction in the debt service.

Where public finance is concerned, this plan will also be designed to eliminate the present debt of 19 billion CFA francs which Dakar has contracted with the monetary institutions. This is the reason the head of the Senegalese government believes that an effort to relaunch productive investment is necessary in agriculture, industry and mining. If it is true that an austerity policy must be pursued on the state level and that imports will be maintained at the 1977 level, wage increases were due as of the early months of 1980, ranging from 35 to 40 percent in the public sector, as well as an increase of 25 percent in the SMIC [interoccupational minimum growth wage] in the private sector.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

FRENCH-SENEGALESE AGREEMENT--Dakar, 7 Mar--According to an agreement signed on 28 February at Dakar between France and Senegal, France will contribute to sea-rescue operations in the maritime zone surrounding Sal Airport in Cape Verde: a French aircraft of the Breguet-Atlantique type, operating out of Dakar, will provide assistance in such rescue operations at sea. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 563] 2750

ARGENTINEAN PAKISTANI AGREEMENTS--Dakar, 7 Mar--Two cooperation agreements were signed on 25 February between Senegal on the one hand and Argentina and Pakistan on the other. These two agreements will permit Senegal to restore equilibrium to its negative balance of trade with these two countries. Signing the trade agreement with the ambassador from Argentina, Mr Osvaldo Marcial Branah, the Senegalese minister of commerce, Mr Serigne Lamine Diop, reviewed the trade balance situation between Senegal and Argentina. He noted that the latter country is the twelfth largest supplier to Senegal, with 4.121 billion francs CFA or 2.2 percent of the Senegalese imports. On the contrary, in the matter of exports, Argentina is not even among the top 20 customers of Senegal. Signing the second agreement with the Pakistani charge d'affaires at Dakar, Mr Ijag Bukhari, Mr Diop pointed out that Pakistan is the fifteenth largest supplier for his country, with 2 billion CFA francs, or 1.08 percent of Senegal's imports. Yet it does not figure either among the top 25 of Senegal's customers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 564] 2750

FUEL, MILK PRICE INCREASES--Dakar, 7 Mar--The price of motor fuel increased by 6 CFA francs in Senegal on 27 February. Following the most recent increase that took place last January, a liter of high test has gone up from 156 to 162 CFA francs, regular gasoline from 146 to 152, and the price of gas-oil from 94 to 100 CFA francs. The new increase in the price of motor fuel is explained from official sources as caused by increases decided upon by the suppliers of crude oil to the Senegalese oil refinery (Iraq, Algeria and Nigeria). The forecast for this year is that Senegal's oil bill will be on the order of 46 billion CFA francs, which represents 40 percent of Senegal's export revenues. In another sector, the price of

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milk also went up on 26 February. The new prices are as follows: 115 CFA francs for a 397-gram container of sweetened concentrated milk; 95 francs for a 410-gram container of unsweetened concentrated milk; 140 francs for the 530-gram container of sweetened concentrate; 50 francs for the 170-gram unsweetened concentrate. Finally, the 412-gram sweetened skim-milk concentrate container to be marketed by Senlait will be sold at 105 CFA francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 564] 2750

RICE CULTIVATION COMPLEX--The SCET [central company for territorial equipment] International is studying the establishment of an agribusiness complex essentially devoted to rice cultivation in the basin of Djerba for the SAED (Senegal Delta land improvement and exploitation company). This project on the one hand includes a study on hydroagricultural development and industrial as well as small-scale cultivation methods; on the other hand it involves the restoration of a rice plantation at Richard-Toll, northeast of Saint-Louis, where rice production will be attempted in the basin and the surrounding areas. This contract, involving F1 million, is financed by the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 502] 5058

PAKISTANI TRADE AGREEMENT--Senegal and Pakistan on 25 February signed a trade agreement under whose terms the two countries grant each other most-favored nation status which will permit Senegal to import light machinery, rice, cotton, fabrics, pharmaceutical products, textiles and sports material from Pakistan and export peanut products, phosphates, fertilizer, hides and skins from that country. The balance of trade between these two countries so far was in favor of Pakistan which, in 1979 in particular, sold rice to Senegal worth \$30 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 502] 5058

FORTHCOMING SWISS CREDIT AGREEMENT--During his working visit to Bern between 18 and 20 February, in response to an invitation from the Swiss government, Senegalese planning and cooperation minister Louis Alexandrenne was received by Mr Georges-Andre Chevallaz, confederation council member and president of the Confederation, as well as by federation council member Honegger, head of the federation department of public economy, with whom he reviewed the various aspects of economic cooperation between Switzerland and Senegal. Mr Louis Alexandrenne, together with ambassador K. Jacobs, the representative of the Confederation Council for trade agreements, presided over the negotiations on the mixed loan agreement involving 24 million Swiss Francs (about 2.5 billion CFA), drafted by the Swiss government and a consortium of Swiss banks to the Republic of Senegal. The loan agreement will be signed at Dakar at a date to be set. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 4] 5058

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STRENGTHENED PORTUGUESE RELATIONS--Following the meetings of the second large Senegalese-Portuguese commission, in Dakar from 18 to 21 February (see this publication, 21 February, page 438), economic circles in Dakar seemed to be expecting a slow increase in trade between these two countries which had remained rather small in spite of the 1977 trade agreement. According to IMF statistics, Portugal, with \$17 million per year, is Senegal's fifth-ranking customer but sales to Senegal are practically zero. This leads to a surplus, for Senegal, amounting to more than 3 billion CFA. The two countries also decided to develop their relations in various fields, such as tourism and culture, agriculture and industry, fishing, urban growth, and housing. Regarding tourist cooperation, an implementation document was signed to carry out the agreement which these two countries already have in this field. An appeal was issued for the intensification of exchange of experience in the field of cereal storage. With respect to industrial cooperation, the Portuguese side made a series of proposals designed to promote the assignment of its economic operators to the ZFID (Dakar industrial free zone). The possibility of creating mixed companies in the fishing sector were also studied. Senegalese promoters are to be the majority partners in the capital holdings. Finally, the discussions on cultural cooperation made it possible to look forward to reciprocal exchanges in this field and to look into the possible establishment of a system of diploma equivalency, exchange of missions and journalists between the press organizations of both countries, and finally the reciprocal grant of advanced training scholarships and postgraduate study scholarships. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 502] 5058

SHRIMP FISHERMEN'S STRIKE--The shrimp fishermen of Ziguinchor, Senegal, struck on 13 March, threatening to seize the shrimp processing plant and the warehouses of a shrimp dealer. On the morning of 14 July, the police took action against them. The demand remains: The fishermen, after selling their famous Casamance shrimp for two years at the 400 CFA francs for two kilograms which the plants would give them, want 1,100 CFA francs. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Mar 80 p 50] 5157

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

NEW FRENCH CREDITS--On 19 February, Mr Mahmud Nasser Rattansey, ambassador of Tanzania in France, and Mr Philippe Lagayette, deputy director, Directorate of the Treasury, French Ministry of Economy, signed a financial document through which France makes F100 million available in credits to Tanzania. This sum will be used to finance the construction of a hollow glass [stemware] factory. It consists of treasury loans on favorable terms and private loans guaranteed by COFACE (French insurance company for foreign trade). Following the financing made available to Tanzania in 1979 for the modernisation of the Dar-Es-Salaam airport, this document once again expresses the desire of both countries to develop their mutual cooperation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 520] 5058

DODOMA WATER SUPPLY PROJECT--A big water pipeline and sanitation project is now being worked out for Dodoma, the future capital of Tanzania. This project is supported by a loan from the BAD (African Development Bank) granted last December and amounting to 7 million accounting units (or about \$9.2 million). The project (which involves the following main elements: reservoir and pumping station, water pipelines, sewage mains, and conduits) is designed to give a population of 76,000 inhabitants the benefit of water pipeline and sanitation facilities now in existence. At the same time it is to promote the development of the capital's downtown area and the exposition area. The total cost of the project has been estimated at 13.9 million accounting units (about \$18.3 million). The work is to start in 1980 and it is scheduled for completion early in 1983. The executive outfit is the Capital Development Authority, P.O. Box 913, Dodoma, telex: 53177 Mjimkuu. The purchase of goods and services financed from the BAD loan will be handled through international bidding invitations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 520] 5058

FED LOANS--The European Development Fund has just granted Tanzania two subsidies: (a) 11,400,000 ECU for construction of a blacktop road about 40 kilometres long, to be used by the future cellulose plant at Mufindi; (b) 4,950,000 ECU for the improvement of the port of Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika. See details above under the heading "Mail from Brussels." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 69 Feb 80 0520] 5058

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TOGO

COFFEE, COCOA EXPORTS EARN FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 869

[Excerpts] Despite a drop in production during the last 10 years, coffee and cocoa still earned the Togolese economy a little over 20 billion CFA [400 million French francs) in 1978. This amount is almost equal to the earnings from phosphates (420 million French francs), the country's main export. According to the most recent statistics of the Ministry of Finance, Togo exported 22,700 tons of cocoa in 1978, for a total sum of 15.8 billion CFA. The main customers are the Benelux (14,102 tons for 8.9 billion CFA), the Federal Republic of Germany (3,876 tons for 2.9 billion CFA), the USSR 91,604 tons for 1.4 billion CFA), Poland (1,050 tons for 874 billion CFA) and France (800 tons for 643 million CFA).

Coffee exports earned the country, according to the AFP, 5 billion CFA. Benelux is the principal customer for Togolese coffee, with 4.101 tons; France imports 2,116 tons, the U.S. 700 tons and Spain 500 tons.

In order to preserve this important source of revenue, Togo launched several years ago an important operation aimed at renovating coffee and cocoa plantations, whose productivity had been steadily declining for 10 years. This state of affairs was mainly due to the aging of the trees and the poor maintenance of the plantations.

A 1974-1980 development project, financed by the I (Agricultural Development Institute) (\$6 million), the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund) (425 million CFA) and the Togolese government (700 million CFA) met with numerous difficulties, especially in regard to cocoa, mainly because of drought conditions and the indifference of the peasants. Indeed, the project for the renovation of cocoa plantations only reached 59 percent of its goal. However, in the coffee sector, goals were exceeded, and nearly 6,000 hectares were renovated or reopened.

Despite the fact that Togo is a small producer of coffee and cocoa, especially in relation to the Ivory Coast, Brazil or Ghana, it follows very closely all international negotiations on these products.

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ZIMBABWE

LESSONS TO BE DERIVED FROM ELECTIONS DISCUSSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Mar 80 p 25

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "The Lessons of Zimbabwe"]

[Text] The African leaders who are saluting the independence of Zimbabwe appear to be enjoying the triumph more than the prime minister, Robert Mugabe, himself. And yet the latest born of the African countries now seems to be in the best position to give Africa and the rest of the world several lessons.

The first of these lessons is the following: that the rifles placed in Mugabe's hands have already given his party an unquestionably strong political foundation. Only 2 years ago, as the leader of ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union] he was held to be much less clever than his adversary, Abel Muzorewa and also less popular than his comrade-in-arms, Joshua Nkomo. The truth is that at the time, no one wanted elections, largely because no candidate in a country where the voters had never been consulted, could claim an arithmetic preference, in the sense of greater popularity. After 4 March 1980, the reason for this is clear: the people of Zimbabwe voted for those who had the courage to struggle, to the detriment of those who believed they could compose a majority.

Second lesson: An electoral victory can be complete without there being any need to resort to a ridiculous 99 percent of the vote. What is more, Robert Mugabe with 62.9 percent, won, and to the point of preferring to bring people together rather than ostracising them, and going so far as to make proposals to his former foes with regard to the formation of a national front. In passing, it would be well to recall that British maneuverings were required for Africa to record one of the most democratic elections in its history. Certain African chiefs of state made themselves ridiculous by refusing beforehand to accept the results of the election. Later however, these same leaders became ecstatic in praising the orderliness of the voting. All because Mugabe won.

Third lesson: The conjuring up of a "diabolical Marxist" did not chase the African voters away. This lesson should serve those who wish to ensure the wellbeing and happiness of the people despite themselves. For a

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number of years, the whites in Rhodesia affirmed that "their blacks" were happier than any others. The voting in Zimbabwe proved the contrary to be the truth; those who it was believed were too happy to emancipate themselves or too stupid to liberate themselves clearly opted in favor of their own freedom.

The greatest lessons afforded by Zimbabwe are of universal import. Once again, the policy of spurious solutions failed. Abel Muzorewa, a pawn for Ian Smith and figurehead for the defenders of the "internal solution"--such as the American Henry Kissinger--literally melted away. Like Lon Nol in Cambodia. Like Thieu in Vietnam. South Africa should make a note of this message: it is preferable to negotiate in good time with true nationalists rather than give rise to belated vocations for a facade-like nationalism.

There is a final lesson remaining, one of democracy that the whole of Zimbabwe teaches us. It is the acceptance of the verdict handed down by the ballot boxes. The leaders of yesterday have bowed before it. Joshua Nkomo is too much of a nationalist and too good a politician not to acknowledge Robert Mugabe's victory. Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, a nationalist since the very first hour before undertaking the commitment, saluted the results with rectitude.

Even Ian Smith, putting a good face on his misfortune, today declared that Mugabe was a "courageous and responsible" man. Abel Muzorewa resigned himself to silence. It is true that with only three little end seats in the assembly, he will have no chance of making his party heard.

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