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14 April 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 13/80)

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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AFGHANISTAN

AFGHAN REBELS VOW TO FIGHT UNTIL END

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 23 Feb 80 pp 95-98

[Article by Patrice Franceschi: "With the Afghan Rebels"]

[Text] Facing Soviet units whose troop strength is constantly increasing but which so far have been confined to approaches to the cities and main roads, the Afghan guerrilla fighters are stepping up their harassment. Before and after the Kabul coup on 27 December, Patrice Franceschi lived for several weeks among the mountain soldiers, with a photographer, Pascal Manoukian.

"I am fighting the communists because those people have no god and are trying to prevent us from praying to Allah. The communists say that everything should belong to everyone. I could not stand to share my wife with anyone or to loan my trousers or my house! Those people are bad, very bad!"

Sadiq pauses to gulp down some scalding hot tea. It is cold outside and the snow covers the infinite steppe, swept by the wind. The warmth of the small fort lulls us. For several days, we have eaten and slept, rolled up in heavy covers, in big earthen barracks, half in ruins. No fighting troubles the silence of the immense plain, hemmed in by rugged mountains in the north and the south. Here, in the rebel camp of Hezbi Islami in the Afghan province of Zabul, everyone awaits the enemy.

Sadiq is one of the 13 officers who lead the 300 men in the camp. He deserted from the Afghan Army. "Five months ago, I belonged to a mechanized regiment. In our unit, there were 19 khalqui officers, supporters of Hafizullah Amin. For a long time, along with other officers and soldiers, I had wanted to defect to the moudjahiddines [rebel soldiers]. One night, we waited until the khalquis were eating together at the mess and we took them by surprise and machine-gunned them. Then we came here, with the equipment we could take, and those who wanted to followed us. Now we are fighting the communists."

But with what means? This camp, one of the best equipped of the rebels, is nothing but a bunch of old forts and underground pillboxes covered with

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sheet metal and earth. Heavy weapons are everywhere: in holes, ditches, crevasses, all Russian, taken from the enemy or brought in by deserters. There are old field guns, outdated mortars, small-caliber antiaircraft batteries and two armored troop transports.

In camp, life goes on as if the war were nothing but a distant rumor. During the day, the men roam about, sleep or share the chores of bringing in wood and water. Impromptu bakers knead their loaves of bread in their smoky cave. Cooks prepare the potatoes and corn, the main staples at meals. A tailor cuts and sews in his dirt hut, without ever managing to make the ill-matched clothes worn by the rebels look like uniforms. The garments are not adequate for the winter and the men cough constantly. They can only get warm in the evening, in their pillboxes, where makeshift stoves burn.

"We Follow the Crows"

During the day, they march, or rather, float in wornout boots, without stockings. They wrap themselves up in whatever coats they can find, wool or cloth, civilian or military. Their entire fortune is in their pockets. No rank insignias are visible, but they do wear party badges, keychains with the effigy of their leader Gulbuddin Ekmatiar, the hero of the illiterate peasant become a moudjahiddine. They believe in him as they do the Prophet.

The Afghan rebellion is probably the poorest in the world. They fight with everything they have -- and nothing. And yet, this camp is the best armed one that we saw. Nearly every man has his Kalachnikov. Elsewhere, they often have only old pop guns to pit against the tanks. Even getting enough to eat is a problem. The men eat very little here. All supplies come from Pakistan, by truck. When the road is blocked because of winter weather, they pray to Allah and wait.

In camp, they train only rarely. "It is useless," Sadiq explains. "We are used to the terrain and to war. In our country, we learn to use weapons when we are children." Nor is there enough ammunition. "We have very little and we have to keep it for fighting. When we practice firing, we do so without bullets. The important thing is to aim and not to lean on the trigger. With the antiaircraft batteries, we follow the crows as if they were planes. That is sufficient." Sadiq is not joking. In his holy war, he is afraid of nothing, especially of the Russians. He scorns them. "They are very afraid of us."

What if they sent paratroopers against the camp? "We would be very happy. We could make gloves and tents with their parachutes. But they have never attacked us. Twice they sent planes. They bombed the Pakistanis near us, but they didn't kill anything but a dog."

Later, in the nearest foothills of the mountains, Sadiq disinterred two corpses in a ravine. "They were khalquis (supporters of Amin) that we captured. They managed to escape, but we caught them here. I crushed

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the first one's skull with a rock. The second one did not resist very much. We beat him so badly that he was completely black and blue and very weak."

The fate of the prisoners is always settled in this fashion. This nameless civil war is cruel and merciless. The only prisoners that escape death are those about whom some doubt remains.

When they are Russians or communists, torture is almost the rule. "When we capture them," the rebels told us, "we kill them slowly, very slowly. We put their eyes out and take their ears off with needles and then we cut off their noses. We pull their fingernails out and then we cut off their fingers, their forearms, arms, and then their legs. When they capture one of our men, they pull out his beard by bits and drag him behind a cart until he dies." The Russian prisoners are also very frequently emasculated, but our comrades remain prudishly silent about this.

One day, we met with the head of the camp in his command post, which was connected by field telephone to different positions. This "commanding officer" is as young as his junior officers and does not conceal his ambitions: "Making it to Kabul is not very hard; everyone in the country is with us. But next we shall take Samarkand and Bukhara, where our Muslim brothers are. Then we shall go as far as Tashkent and one day, we shall reach Moscow. It will take a long time, but when we are done with the communists, the whole world will be done with them!" We were to hear these words often from the mouths of other officers in the Hezbi Islami Party, both the most powerful and the most fanatical in the rebellion. The others are more modest in their ambitions, more moderate.

Transistors are here, as they are everywhere. In the evening, the men in their pillboxes religiously listen to the news broadcast by the Hezbi Islami radio station. The party has its own transmitter, somewhere in the Konarha, it is said. Kabul tries to jam the broadcasts, but without great success.

Seated around the radio are bearded Pashtos, wearing the traditional turban, smooth-faced Hazaras fond of the Afghan Army caps, Nuristanis with blue eyes, said to be the descendents of the soldiers of Alexander the Great, Tadzhiks, Turkmen also. Most of the Afghan ethnic groups are represented here. In the field, at least, the Hezbi seems to have achieved a certain unity, much more than at the general headquarters in Peshawar in Pakistan, where one finds only Pashtos, the dominant ethnic group.

Frequently, rebels groups appear out of the night and come into the fort. They come from Pakistan and go to the different fronts in the region. The camp is a relay station also for those who pester the Kandahar-Kabul road, one of the country's vital arteries.

Great Pashto leaders with richly embroidered garments, boys 15 to 20 years old who affect a hardened air, spit on the walls and handle their weapons all day long: The moudjahiddines come from all strata of society and all

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age classifications, but the poorest are always the ones who serve the rich at meals, who do the chores. Even here, the prestige of having gone to school or attended university, the power of money and family make the difference.

On Christmas day, we went to a second, smaller camp 15 kilometers further north which defends an approach to the road to the main camp. Some 64 men and two officers occupy the some 15 pillboxes overlooking the approach.

The leader of the position is a Turkmen. His assistant, called Aziz, is a young Tadzhik with very kind eyes. Formerly an officer, he once had in his unit a French professor. In his timid voice, he recites: "La tour Eiffel a trois cents metres de haut, en bas on voit la Seine...."

With the announcement of the coup d'etat of Babrak Karmal, we returned to Kabul and witnessed the last fighting between the supporters of Amin and the Soviets. We spent the week in the feverish atmosphere created by the Russian invasion. Stopped twice, we managed to rejoin the rebels. Disguised as Turkmen moudjahiddines, we reached Konarha Province after long days of walking. Two men accompanied us: Tamim and Iaria. Tamim was a young engineer who belonged to the Jamiat Islami Party. "Before," he says, "when my mother asked me to kill a chicken, I always refused. I couldn't stand it. Now I have killed two communists that we tortured with electricity and it didn't bother me at all, really, not at all."

Vagabond of War

Iaria, his companion, is considered a hero. He is a Nuristani with blue eyes, blond beard and Roman nose. He is the first to have declared the holy war in his region. What did he do before? "He roamed around the mountains and valleys," they say evasively. "Since that time, he has been everywhere, a vagabond of war and violence."

In the valley of the Kunar River, the villages have been "liberated" for several months by the guerrillas. Daily life goes on as it did before, but starvation threatens and the men trade their pickaxes for guns. Here, there is no unity in fighting. Disorder reigns. The men fight for their tribes, their villages, their parties, without worrying about others, but their faith is the same. The sense of danger also.

"The worst thing is the armored helicopters," Tamim explains. "They come down right close to us and massacre us with rockets, guns and machine guns, but we cannot bring them down with our rifles. We are also afraid of the mines. We step on them without being able to do anything about them. But we are not afraid of the planes. They have a hard time maneuvering in the mountains. The tanks are very vulnerable. We jump on them and blind them with mud. Then we can neutralize them just with Molotov cocktails." A little further on in the valley, we found a man, alone, wearing a cape. Imprisoned for months in Djelalabad, he has just been released by the new

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regime of Babrak Karmal. He is returning to his village. The news of his return spreads like wildfire. Along the way, men wait for him with open arms, embrace him and make an escort for him.

The city of Asadabad in Konarha is occupied by the government troops and the Russian advisers. The moudjahiddines hold the peaks around the city, whence they harass their adversaries.

But the rebels do not have the weapons they need to attack the city in force and the soldiers are not sufficiently masters of the terrain to be able to venture beyond their positions. One is therefore left with classic guerrilla warfare, harassments and hand-to-hand fighting. The Russians have not yet crossed swords, except perhaps in Badakhstan, on the border of the Soviet Union.

"With Our Teeth If We Have To"

Winter's end is approaching. With the thaw, the moudjahiddines fear major offensives from the Russians.

In Peshawar, they make haste slowly to achieve unity and obtain foreign military aid. The six main parties discuss the terms of their alliance.

In the villages, pillboxes, caves and trenches, on the other side of the border in Afghanistan, the rebels wait, quite determined to attack the enemy as soon as spring comes, if he comes to earth, determined to fight until the end, "with stones, with our teeth, if we have to." "You will see them in combat tomorrow," Tamim says. "They are not afraid of bullets like normal men are. They are something else."

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ALGERIA

NEW DIRECTIONS OF ECONOMIC POLICY REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 pp 248-249

[Text] Ten months after the establishment of the new Algerian administration springing from the fourth Congress of the FLN, which had brought President Chadli Bendjedid to the head of the State and the party, a wind of change seems to blow over Algeria.

Nevertheless this change does not involve overturning policies, because institutional structures and the philosophy of power remain untouched, nor does it involve questioning economic strategy, whose objective remains the establishment of socialism in Algeria under party and state administration.

The changes that have just been announced in Algiers were expected by everyone, desired by the majority of the people and in fact they are the product of two years of policy consideration and economic suspension. They are hardly explained by the tragic demise of President Boumediene, who was said to have intended to adjust his economic policies to the new national and international realities.

Since the end of 1977 Algeria was experiencing an economic transition stage between two planning periods. The third 5-year plan under development was to follow the previous 5-year plan and be accepted preliminarily by the FLN Congress. Then the long illness and subsequent death of the former Algerian chief of state completely upset the plan and policy priorities. The regular Congress, which originally was supposed to allow establishment of the new FLN structures and investigate the 5-year plan, had to be convened hurriedly to resolve the problem of succession to President Boumediene. A second, special Congress is anticipated for next spring to approve the plan.

In fact, Algeria's new leaders, while setting in motion the administrative system, chose to give themselves an extension to review the results of 10 years of rapid industrialization, learn the lessons of the two preceding economic plans and make an inventory of the country's present and

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future needs and possibilities, and as a result of all the information thus gathered to determine the country's long term economic goals.

This is what, as a first step, has just been done by the FLN Central Committee, Algeria's supreme policy body, which during its second yearly session specified the country's economic direction for the decade. At a second stage this is what the special FLN Congress must ratify when it calculates for the 5-year plan the financial expenditures for each area of the national economy during this period.

On publicly disclosing the results of the debate on Algeria's economic choices that has just unfolded at the highest policy level, the Central Committee only verified one of the basic principles of the new Algerian leaders' policies, that of "continuity within change": continuity regarding the principle of industrialization indicated by all of Algeria's basic policy provisions, continuity of the state's chief role as the country's major economic instrument, continuity of the policy economic independence for Algeria and finally continuity within the system of political and economic choices that are all directed toward building a solid foundation of socialism in Algeria.

Priority of Fulfilling the People's Needs

But beyond the political and economic principles, which of course remain unalterable, the new economic directions as they have just been specified by the FLN Central Committee demonstrate a clear will--previously expressed by President Bendjedid--to grant priority to the people's daily needs, while redirecting the rapid industrialization policies carried out for 10 years in a less restraining way for the people's standard of living and the country's foreign finances.

In fact, it was verified, according to the Central Committee, that the "distortions and imbalances" that affect the economy after a decade of rapid development have reached such large proportions that it became necessary for Algeria to halt its policy of investment in heavy industry to make up the slowdowns recorded in other areas, restore order to a strong manufacturing system operating below its capacity.

From now on the era of rapid industrialization is finished--which allowed Algeria to invest about 170 billion dinars in 10 years--appealing on a tremendous scale for foreign loans, excessive technology, and a cumbersome technical aid. This experience, which certainly allowed Algeria to establish one of the most impressive manufacturing structures in the third world, nevertheless created disorders considered intolerable in the economy: use of hydrocarbons only as a means of foreign financing, growing indebtedness, excessive recourse to foreign personnel and financing, run-away imported inflation, sectoral imbalances worsened by the tentacle-like growth of manufacturing over fertile agricultural land, without considering the persistent scarcity of widely consumed products, a scarcity

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attributable as much to extreme bureaucratization of trade channels as to a slowdown in production.

In fact, not only economic factors seem to have induced the Algerian leaders to curb the country's "advanced" industrialization. Indeed it became evident to them that this industrialization--using extreme technology on a large scale, the increasing recourse to foreign technicians and to western capital that industrialization implies--was really starting to hamper Algeria's independence.

In a very well-observed report published several days before the FLN Central Committee meeting, AFRICAN REVOLUTION the FLN publication, had sounded the alarm: it intended to show with supporting figures how "the multinational companies" particularly American and West German, succeeded during this industrialization period in "surrounding the strategic sectors of the national economy through loans, project studies, profit-taking, providing equipment, technical aid, the export market."

Illustrating the "vulnerability of the Algerian economy" which, the publication asserts, "is existing today integrated into businesses divided by international capitalism" and made "the object of an agreement in the imperialist system," AFRICAN REVOLUTION specified that "petrochemicals and computers have become the reserved domain of companies of American origin, machine industry that of West German companies, light industry that of Italian, French and West German firms."

AFRICAN REVOLUTION brought very serious charges against certain western companies which, it said, strove to systematically thwart Algerian development efforts by "planning"* abandonment of construction yards through "arranged bankruptcies." AFRICAN REVOLUTION also disclosed mistakes in design and inadequacies in the construction of factories entrusted to foreign firms. Lastly the weekly warned the Algerian leaders against increasing foreign debt which, it asserts, has tripled since 1973, and it denounced "the spiral of extra expenses" practiced systematically, it says, by the Western partners in building factories which, everything considered, often cost Algeria two or three times more than anticipated.

The above is the basis for the FLN Central Committee's recommendations in this area: Draconian reduction of the "degree of dependence in relation to foreign economies," restriction on appeals for foreign resources and control over recourse to foreign cooperation, Algerianization in all areas, a more extended diversification of Algeria's economic partners with a clear preference for third world and socialist block countries.

* AFRICAN REVOLUTION alludes to abandonment of construction yards by two West German companies following the bankruptcy of their parent company in the FRG.

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The central axis of Algeria's development being directed from now on, at least for this decade, toward fulfillment first of the people's needs, industrialization policies are going to take a new direction favoring conversion industries at the expense of heavy industry, particularly metal and steel-working.

The development model chosen a dozen years ago will find itself greatly changed. Development of heavy industry to which priority had been given then was in fact supposed to carry along the whole economy. Contrary to expectations it did not succeed in providing agriculture with the means of increasing its production and its productivity.

Thus the economic area that will specifically receive more attention from the Algerian leaders is agriculture, whose production is far from fulfilling the food needs of a people whose number and standard of living are growing at a rising rate. The development of this strategic area, which has been until now one of the poor relations of investment policies, will be the main topic of the next session in March of the FLN Central Committee, which at the time of its previous meeting had studied the three other priority areas of Algeria's new economic and social policies: housing, waterworks, education and training.

Agriculture and Housing

By favoring agriculture and the conversion industry necessary for producing consumer goods the Algerian leaders intend to maintain the country's independence in food, dangerously threatened by increasingly larger imports of food products, and in the second place to protect Algeria from a possible threat of use of "the food weapon" against it.

A whole industry tied to housing (particularly cement factories and construction material) is called upon moreover to undergo an unprecedented development, to set up a building program of several hundreds of thousands of dwellings. The housing problem has reached alarming proportions during recent years. Also it has been determined from this moment that during the present decade all means will be set in motion to deliver 100,000 dwellings yearly to the extent that minimum building of 70,000 dwellings would at best prevent the present crisis from worsening.

Similarly to the choice of priority areas that, like housing, agriculture, waterworks and local manufacturing, will benefit from massive investments in the next five year plan, vast improvements were strongly recommended by all the policy authorities in the administration of Algeria's production structure to improve production and productivity, considered clearly inadequate.

The FLN Central Committee was quite resolute on this topic: "efficiency in operations, strictness in management and better discipline in work" are the present triptych of "the production battle" whose purpose is to

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involve Algeria during this period. To achieve this the Central Committee recommends "vigorous activity to remove obstacles to strengthening the organization of socialist management of our economy and the smooth working of the system of administration and management of the economy at all levels." This work must be strengthened by restructuring and reorganizing state companies and ventures, whose huge size hinders good management, to "improve the technical, economic and financial results of the production capacity for goods and services." Lastly all the economic forces are asked to carefully watch over "rules for production growth, for reducing costs and improving quality especially by setting up production plans for ventures."

To induce workers to improve production and productivity a series of measures has already been taken--and others are expected during the coming months--tightly linking wage levels to production and profitability levels. Moreover, from now on managers will be obliged to keep up a stricter examination as much on the scale of their business, within the framework of socialist business management, as on the national level by establishing a general surveillance of finances and an auditing office.

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ALGERIA

BRIEFS

SAUDI ARABIA CRITICIZED--After the recent raise of \$2 in price of Saudi crude oil the Algerian agency APS vigorously criticized, on 28 January, Sheik Yamani, Saudi oil minister, who had refused an equal price increase for crude at the time of the OPEC conference in Caracas last December. "One thinks that the price raise of a Saudi barrel is a fair transaction today," APS particularly writes, "but one must admit that it is occurring 36 days after the OPEC conference, while the latter ended without results at that time. The Riyadh government is applying the price raise that Mr Yamani denied," adds APS, which emphasizes that "since the Caracas meeting this increase responded to market conditions that the Saudi minister pretended not to understand." The APS believes that this "error of judgment" by Mr Yamani cost the Saudi treasury \$20 million a day. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 249] 9545

COOPERATION WITH USSR--Before traveling to Prague the Algerian labor and professional training minister, Mr Mouloud Oumeziane, made an official working visit to the USSR, where he and the delegation he headed "observed the organization of labor and the social sector, of the system of classification of jobs and salaries, all matters of great current importance in Algeria." The measures to set in motion to examine and to enlarge cooperation between Algeria and the USSR in professional training and in other branches linked to labor and employment were studied. Mr Mouloud Oumeziane stated that it had been agreed with the soviet party to build in Medea a national institute for the training of teachers for 1,000 students, as well as apprenticeship centers in various regions of Algeria. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 249] 9545

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ACTIVELY-EMPLOYED RESIDENTS--As of 1 January 1980, the active population in Algeria was estimated to be 3,710,766 people, that is 20.03 percent of the resident population thought to be 18,524,786, according to figures of the Planning and National Development Ministry. In the working-age bracket (18 to 59) estimated to be 7,715,614, there are 3,524,243 workers (45.67 percent)--3,279,915 men (89.95 percent of the resident male population in this age bracket) and 244,328 women (only 6.31 percent of the resident females in the same bracket). The 15-17 year-old active group is 58,176 (48,404 male, 9,772 female) or 4.57 percent of the residents in that age bracket. The active over 60 group is estimated at 128,348 or 11.83 percent of the residents in the bracket. From these figures, APS concludes that the "gap" between the male resident population and the active male population in the 18-19 age bracket is not significant since the percentage of active males is 89.95. There is a significant "gap" for females in the same bracket, for the percentage of active women is only 5.31 and the women in this category represent more than half of all working-age women. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Mar 80 p 615]

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LEBANON

CONSEQUENCES OF SYRIAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL DISCUSSED

Review of Crisis

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 15-21 Feb 80 pp 18-21

[Article: "Lebanon, Difficult Withdrawal"]

[Text] The breath of the cold war has touched Lebanon. The Syrian decision to withdraw the deterrent forces and regroup them in the Biqa' valley has touched off a silent crisis of confidence between Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad and Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis.

Syria is demanding that the Lebanese government cease its vacillation, begin the dialogue among the Lebanese, deploy the army evenly throughout the south, and take a decisive position regarding attempts to drag Lebanon into "Camp David."

As for official Lebanon, it is said that the determination to withdraw gives it difficult options and justifies its hesitation, given the expansion of the gulf between the Lebanese parties to the dialogue and the armed Palestinian presence. While the Maronite "Lebanese Front" and some of the Islamic forces support Sarkis' position to deploy the army to the south and to substitute it for the Syrian forces in the event of their withdrawal, the leftist "Nationalist Movement" was quick to protest that it has no confidence in the army, "because it was built on the same sectarian basis which led to its collapse in 1975 during the war." The Palestinian Resistance says that the decision to deploy the army ignores its legal presence which was guaranteed by numerous agreements with the official authorities.

On the foreign level, Western diplomats are trying to create the impression that Gromyko's visit to Damascus last week was behind the sudden Syrian decision, along with Syria's desire to shift world attention from the issue of Afghanistan to the Middle East question.

While Washington is betting that the Syrian withdrawal will not happen, Israel is hurrying to play the withdrawal card also. Its protective umbrella is being spread, "not only over the Christians in the south but also in the north as well," to use Begin's expression.

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In the midst of these public and private positions, a tornado is stirring the skies over Lebanon. Will it be overcome by peace? Or, will it touch down, causing damage once more over the land?

Al-Asad's Ten Objections to Sarkis' Position

This report, received by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI from its Beirut office, contains the complete story of the dispute between Presidents al-Asad and Sarkis, and the surrounding circumstances and secrets of the meetings and political movements between Damascus and Beirut, which accompanied the announcement of the Syrian decision to withdraw.

If the events of Lebanon were measured by weeks, with each week being symbolized by an issue or crisis and then ending, in order to begin another week with a new issue or crisis, then the first week of February, 1980, carried the symbol of all the weeks of Lebanese crises and issues for the past 4 years up to today.

If dealing with the weeks of crises in Lebanon has become a habit among some of the parties to the dispute or the factions concerned with the situation, whether Lebanese or Arab, then the first week of February was very concerned with a meeting of all parties and groups, in which all the political and military cards and various types of pressures were used to settle it, and in which all the words were spoken. Old accounts were a part of it. Truth also reveals the past in the hope that it will light up a ray of hope toward the future.

What happened in Lebanon in the first week of February, 1980?

It is a long story, born with the start of the crisis in Lebanon, growing along with developments and becoming entangled in its complexity, in a climax of delicate, highly sensitive circumstances. Were the introductions of relaxation to be found in the climax of developments?

It is a story of relations between Lebanon and Syria, and a story of relations among the political forces in Lebanon. It is a story of how the Lebanese crisis became so involved with developments of the Middle East crisis, and a story of labor pains which some are afraid will end in the ruins of some settlement or other in the region. Is it the desired settlement, or a plot to solve the Arab-Israeli struggle at the expense of that little bit of Arabism still remaining?

It is the tale of a crisis of confidence in its broad outlines, rearing its head between the basic elements of government in Lebanon, and the various political forces, between some of them and the Lebanese army, and between the government in Lebanon, or some of it, and the government in Syria. Did the developments of the first week in February settle this confidence crisis, and who were those who paid or will pay the price for that, and how?

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To understand all that has happened and is happening, a quick analysis of events is not enough. Some of them are connected with issues which the people in Lebanon have forgotten. Some of them are little bits of a picture which cannot easily be put together so as to form a complete picture, and some of them also fall within the category of half-truths, of which half remains and the other half was unknown to most of the people, we could even say unknown to all the people.

The story from the beginning of the explosion.

To the extent that the withdrawal of the Syrian forces, acting as Arab deterrent forces, from the coastal region extending between Beirut and al-Zahrani, and their regrouping in the area of Jizayn and the Biqua' valley, was an issue having ramifications in connection with the likelihood of Israel carrying out a commando military attack, so to the same extent the announcement of the Syrian forces' determination to withdraw from Beirut and its suburbs, and to forsake the police role, is an issue having ramifications connected with the heart of the relatively silent crisis between Lebanon and Syria, and the latter's campaign to unfold events with all their explosive possibilities and dangers on both the security and political levels.

To the extent that the first Syrian withdrawal confused all the factions on the Lebanese scene, so to the same extent the coming likelihood of the second Syrian withdrawal is confusing all the factions at first, and then causing everyone to face the most difficult choices with regard to the nature of relations between Lebanon and Syria, the role of the Arab deterrent forces, the role of the Lebanese army, and last but not least, the role which President Sarkis must play in confronting all that.

On 26 January, the [authority] for the Arab deterrent in Lebanon was renewed. The Tunis reports about the meetings of the League council referred to the fact that the six months renewal did not pass without heated debate over what practical achievement these forces had made in ending the Lebanese crisis. Tunis news reports also stated that the Syrian delegation had not let such questions as these pass with comment. They said that Damascus was not responsible for the government in Lebanon's lack of desire to achieve steps toward accord, so as to put an end to the deterrent role in the Lebanese regions.

Despite the fact that renewal of the deterrent was done by unanimous vote of the nations in the League council, officials in Damascus considered such positions to be a negative feeling of sympathy regarding their role in Lebanon.

Syrian officials felt that behind the tone of the Lebanese foreign minister, Fu'ad Butrus, in his televised speech on 21 January, was something that fortold Lebanon's determination to request withdrawal of deterrent forces from specific areas in Lebanon, so that these withdrawals would be as if they were conditions for the continued presence of the deterrent, and as

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points which the government in Lebanon would score for the benefit of the Maronite "Lebanese Front," in accordance with Damascus' thinking.

Perhaps this was what caused the Arab deterrent forces to begin a move to regroup its forces and to stop its police action role along the southern coast of Lebanon. This situation generated such headlines as, "Probable Dangers From Israeli Commando Attack." However, it was the harbinger of warning for those with ears to hear and eyes to see.

These first steps were taken on Sunday, 27 January, and left extensive reverberations and apprehensions, which did not go beyond a search for alternatives to fill the security vacuum. This caused those Lebanese and Palestinians who were making efforts to get to the bottom of these moves to be afraid that it was the beginning of a "disciplinary action" against the Lebanese and Palestinian sides, and a Syrian attempt to make everyone understand that the Syrian role in Lebanon was still as "first and final authority."

The Syrian moves and the assembling of its forces in the south aborted all plans to deploy the army to the south and left the nation facing a closed road. How could the state send the army to the south after the road to Tyre had been stripped of security all the way from Beirut to Tyre, the whole length of the coast, with the assistance of the Syrians and without cover from the Nationalist Movement and the Palestinians?

Division Within the Cabinet

The cabinet met on Tuesday 29 January 1980, and reviewed the situation and recent developments. At this session, the details of which were conveyed to the Syrian officials, the ministers debated the benefit from the presence of the Arab deterrent forces when they were behaving in such a way as to embarrass the Lebanese state.

The cabinet, in this debate, split into two factions: one of them included President Sarkis, Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus, and Minister of Public Works Butrus Harb; the other side had Prime Minister Salim al-Huss and Minister Talal al-Mar'abi.

The debate in this session of the cabinet went beyond debate over specific circumstantial developments to such a degree that Minister Butrus Harb called for the withdrawal of the Arab deterrent forces and the deployment of the army to fill the security vacuum in sensitive areas of the capital and the suburbs. Prime Minister al-Huss refused to continue such a debate immediately after the renewal of the deterrent authority. He also refused to debate the legality of their presence at a time when the ink was not even dry on the document sent to the secretariat general of the League of Arab States in Tunis requesting renewal.

Possibly this session could have remained under the seal of secrecy, but what happened was that it had important significance, and something very

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very like the minutes of the session was conveyed to Syrian officials in Damascus, who considered it to be an act of violence by a part of the government against the legality of the deterrent force and its presence during the coming stage. These words made the situation worse and compelled the Syrian leaders to try to settle this issue once and for all.

On Saturday 2 February 1980, Syria informed its allies in the leftists Lebanese Nationalist Movement that it would withdraw its forces from the area of Beirut and its suburbs, in order to regroup them in the nearby mountain areas. It told them that this step would be taken within 48 hours and urged them to take measures to take over the vacated places. Syria conveyed the same information to the leaders of the Palestinian Resistance and also informed Brig Gen Sami al-Khatib, commander of the Arab deterrent forces, so that he could inform the Lebanese government, out of consideration of the fact that its police role had ended, although its deterrent role would remain so long as its forces were still in nearby areas and capable of moving quickly to settle any clash or security outbreak.

Here the crisis reached its climax. The government in Lebanon understood that Syria had, in one stroke, faced it with difficult options, and that the talk about requesting withdrawal of the deterrent from part of the Beirut area had become null and void, after Syria itself had raised this issue of withdrawal, with all its ramifications and dangers facing Lebanon.

President Sarkis felt that a Syrian move such as this was a "teacher's slap" to embarrass the government and to confront it with its difficult responsibility. President Sarkis called an urgent meeting on Sunday, 3 February, which was attended by Prime Minister Salim al-Huss, the foreign minister, the defense minister, the commander of the Arab deterrent forces, and the commander of the army.

An attempt has been made to evaluate what happened. The prime minister's view was that this step went beyond the question of security arrangements and tactical deterrent withdrawals, and brought the whole issue of the nature of Syrian-Lebanese relations to the test, as well as raising the issue of where this crisis could lead, in terms of relations, from the repercussions on the security situation and the possibilities for disruption with all its ramifications.

Prime Minister al-Huss' sources say that he felt President Sarkis' view of the crisis did not necessarily reflect a desire to achieve an urgent solution. He told him that dealing with the situation does not merely require ascertaining the extent of the security vacuum which the withdrawal of the Syrian forces would create, but rather it warranted "an indepth search for the motives for what has happened, what might happen, or what will happen in the near future."

Prime Minister al-Huss said that he would undertake contacts with Damascus in order to learn the facts, although discussion of this subject "would not go into the question of the army's ability to assume its duties when the deterrent leaves."

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Al-Huss' Mediation Between Sarkis and Damascus

The most difficult political action with regard to any crisis is the action which occurs in the midst of a contrary calculation which warns of an explosion, the dimensions of which no one knows. This difficult action faced Prime Minister Salim al-Huss when he began his action with regard to Syria. The Lebanese prime minister felt that the basic problem was not what was happening, but that there were accumulations from the past, about which the Syrians had talked, regarding relations between them and President Ilyas Sarkis. Accordingly it was incumbent upon him to intervene, acting as a conciliator between the two sides, in the hope that this conciliation would result in putting an end to the grave crisis.

The story began with a visit to Damascus.

Sunday evening, 3 February, Prime Minister Salim al-Huss contacted Syrian Prime Minister 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Qasim, from the office of Brig Gen Sami al-Khatib, commander of the Arab deterrent forces. Minister Talal al-Mar'abi was present.

Al-Huss told al-Qasim that he would like to visit Damascus to pay his respects on the occasion of his [al-Qasim] forming the new government. Al-Qasim welcomed al-Huss, who told him he would visit him tomorrow if there were no objections to that.

Al-Qasim replied by welcoming him, indicating that he had a meeting of the cabinet at noon. Al-Huss said that he would be in Damascus at 1000, and that he also hoped to meet with President Hafiz al-Asad to discuss matters of the hour, especially the new security factors in connection with the Syrian forces' desire to withdraw from certain parts of Beirut and its suburbs. At this point, the Lebanese prime minister felt that his Syrian counterpart was not aware of all the details of the Syrian move, but the commitment to the following day's visit would be an incentive for him to learn more.

Prime Minister Salim al-Huss says that his visit to Damascus began with the customary meeting with the Syrian prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs. Although this meeting was frank in reviewing the crisis, the indepth discussion and any decision-making was left to President Hafiz al-Asad in the second meeting that same day. In his meeting with Prime Minister al-Qasim and Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, al-Huss touched on three factors dominating the crisis:

1. The specter of a miscalculation and the pressure of time which was running out, particularly since Monday coincided with the end of the 48 hours which Syria had set to begin its withdrawal.
2. The considerable rigidity in the positions, especially Prime Minister al-Huss' inability to move his two arguers from their positions in defending the need to continue implementing these military steps no matter what the

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circumstances. 'Abd al-Halim said that he had conveyed a similar position to the Nationalist Movement delegation the previous day with no result.

3. The vagueness of the goals behind these Syrian military steps, and the vagueness of the reasons which led to choosing this time for implementation. Al-Huss tried to discuss some of the justifications raised by al-Qasim and Khaddam, but he was unable to work out a complete picture of the alternatives desired by Syria, in the event a desire existed to go beyond the points about which it complained.

Al-Asad's Case Against Sarkis

Prime Minister al-Huss had to wait until 1600 to meet with President Hafiz al-Asad. He began to write down in his notebook the points raised by al-Qasim and Khaddam, in the hope that his discussion with the Syrian president would touch on them.

In the meeting with al-Asad, al-Huss had no need to open his notebook to refer to the points raised by al-Qasim and Khaddam. The Syrian president saved him the trouble. He began to delineate a group of complaints that Syria had regarding the conduct of the government in Lebanon, while always emphasizing the Prime Minister al-Huss was not the one about whom the complaints centered.

President al-Asad said a great deal about the crisis in Syrian-Lebanese relations. He said that Lebanon "had not been friendly in its discussion of the need to keep the Arab deterrent force on its territory." He said that this was manifest at the Tunis summit, and during the opening of the last session of the UN General Assembly. Moreover, visitors and envoys from meetings with President Sarkis and Minister Butrus had conveyed [the same thing] to him. Al-Asad said that some of those visitors had heard from President Sarkis a description of the deterrent troops which made them appear to be occupation forces.

The Syrian president opened President Sarkis' dossier, summarizing what he believed the Lebanese president's position to be. It can be summarized by the following points:

1. He does not want to take steps to settle the matter of accord, but rather he wants the views of the Lebanese Front to prevail.
2. He does not want to end the "peculiar position" which the Lebanese Front is following in its relations with Israel.
3. He does not want to rebuild the united foundations of Lebanon.
4. He does not want to build a balanced, national army, but rather he wants to complete a sectarian army as was the case in the past.
5. He does not want to settle the matter of dealing with Israel within army circles and political forces, and he does not want, in effect, to put a stop to "the traitorous officer" Sa'd Hadad.

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6. He does not want to put an end to the activities of forces hostile to the Syrian regime, the most notable being the Moslem Brotherhood activities from Lebanon, under the protection of the Lebanese Front.
7. He does not want to mobilize the Lebanese army against the Zionist foe, but on the contrary he leaves room for organizations to fill the army with hostility against Syria.
8. He does not want to be a ruler nor an arbiter, but rather a faction within the framework of the Lebanese Front.
9. He does not want to grant legality to the Arab deterrent forces, but rather he constantly seeks to create doubts about their role.
10. He does not want to apply all the agreements which have been reached in the Lebanese-Syrian summit meetings in Damascus and Latakia.

The Syrian president was not content just to enumerate the points of the dispute about the Lebanese issue, but on the contrary he dealt with the question of the Middle East crisis in some detail. The Syrian president said that the tendencies of the government in Lebanon are in harmony with the Camp David plans, and that they want to enter into the peace movement, at which the United States of America is hinting. Al-Asad said that he has advised President Sarkis several times to stay away from such a policy as this, and he requested that in their last meeting in Tunis, when he felt that Sarkis wanted to get into the peace movement, whenever Jordan entered it.

Syrian circles say that this point might be the real reason for all the positions which Syria has taken, particularly the latest one pertaining to regrouping its forces in Lebanon. These circles say that Syria chose the timing exactly, because Lebanon is not capable of choosing between accepting the Syrian stipulations or rejecting them.

These circles consider that what has happened is tantamount to imposing the problem, with all its dimensions, on Lebanon, so that it can only go toward an understanding with Syria and, consequently, reject the American plans. These circles give an example of that by saying that Lebanon might be better able to make a move after completion of the discussion of self-determination which might be achieved by the middle of this year.

As for Lebanese circles, they think that there is a Syrian-Soviet agreement, caused by the Afghanistan crisis, and that Syria wants to concentrate world attention on the situation in the Middle East. These circles say that agreement between the Syrian and Soviet positions does not necessarily mean congruity right up to the end, and that Syria is still a free-agent, capable of action, provided that it possesses a basic few of the Middle East crisis cards.

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Sarkis: He Waited and Watched

We return to the Damascus meeting between President al-Asad and Prime Minister al-Huss. The Lebanese prime minister returned to Beirut and went directly to the presidential palace to apprise President Sarkis of what he had heard from the Syrian officials and in order to tell him of the possibility of obtaining a few days delay in the implementation of the Syrian withdrawal, in expectation of a solution to the crisis of relations between the two countries.

Prime Minister al-Huss sensed that President Sarkis was somewhat upset because of the deteriorating situation in relations with Syria, but he also felt a desire to wait for matters to crystallize more clearly, since the Syrians wanted action from him. Al-Huss tried to encourage Sarkis to contact the Syrians to set a date for a summit meeting, but he sensed the president's desire to broach the matter in a routine way through the foreign minister, and not as a matter of urgency which would preclude any other developments.

It is worthwhile to refer here to the fact that President Sarkis, during al-Huss' visit to Damascus, was secretly receiving the American ambassador in Beirut, John Gunther Dean. President Sarkis' circles say that the ambassador brought him something which caused him to be reassured that the Syrians would not allow matters to reach the explosion point in Beirut, and that they would not allow the line separating east and west Beirut to revert to confrontation lines as was the situation 3 years ago. The betting is on the extent to which the Syrians go with their step. This assessment was in accord with that of Talcott Seeley, the American ambassador in Damascus, after his meeting with Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam 2 days before.

The most prominent points which observers are trying to determine regarding the current crisis are:

1. The extent to which relations between Lebanon and Syria must go and, consequently, what is necessary to satisfy Syria that Lebanon has changed its position and no longer rejects its presence, and that they are bound together in regard to the Middle East crisis.
2. The practical role of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon; must they re-assume the role of policeman but not the role of the military deterrent?
3. The government's desire to take or not to take any step toward accord among the Lebanese factions.

It has clearly emerged from all the positions of the Nationalist movement parties that, in practice, they do not support the position of the government in Lebanon. It has been clearly demonstrated that what support they had shown for giving the army extensive security in the south and in the security gaps has markedly diminished.

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Moreover, it has become clearly obvious that the Lebanese Front positions have been aimed at creating a broad current against the Syrian presence in Lebanon.

As regards the Palestinians, it has become evident that they prefer not to revert to military confrontation and prefer not to be forced to assume security duties in areas of the capital, which would in practice result in their being distracted from their role in the Arab-Israeli struggle.

American circles in Beirut say that the Syrian betting was that Lebanon could not refuse the offer they made. This might not be a practical bet, because of the dangers that any explosion in the crisis could engulf the entire region. Other Western circles think that any compromise would only result in increasing the internal struggle in Lebanon, because Sarkis would find himself once more facing the difficult choice of abandoning the Lebanese Front in exchange for improving relations between himself and the Syrians.

Sarkis has been through this crisis before, and he almost resigned. Does the idea come through that there is something more than meets the eye behind these new developments? Is the solution to the crisis contained in them, or will they lead to a bigger, more widespread crisis which, consequently, would result in the dangers of that very partition which Syria has said it intervened in Lebanon in order to prevent!?

Or will the government, the government of Dr Salim al-Huss, pay the price by compelling the two to resign by means of withdrawing some of its ministers?

The solution remains--a point in the middle, but the extremism of the positions of all the forces can only encourage increased convulsions, unless what is going on is pressure being supplied by all the forces, on the basis that, "intensifying a crisis is my relaxation."

Opposition to Deployment of Lebanon Units

Paris AL-WATAN AL-ARABI in Arabic 15-21 Feb 80 pp 22-23

[Article: "Sarkis Pleads: My Hands are Tied; the Resistance and the Nationalist Movement Oppose the Government's Decision to Replace Syrian Troops With Lebanese Army Units"]

[Text] Beirut has interpreted the Lebanese government's decision to replace the Syrian troops, in the event they are withdrawn, with its army as tantamount to a challenge to and refutation of Damascus. While the Maronite Lebanese Front and the traditional and liberal Islamic forces supported the decision, the leftist National Movement and the Palestinian Resistance were quick to protest against it.

Those around Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis respond to Syria's placing the responsibility on him for the crisis, which has recently broken out

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between the two countries, by saying that "certainly one acknowledges the existence of errors, but it should also be acknowledged that President Sarkis' hands are tied, and he is unable to act, neither on the level of building a balanced army, nor on entering the south, nor on controlling security in all areas, nor in using Arab and international assistance to get the specific Lebanese factions moving toward dialogue."

These circles add that those who put the responsibility on him for the situation's deterioration, "know better than anyone else why he has not acted. They are the ones who kept and are still keeping him from success. The protest over the mere deployment of the army along the demarcation lines in Beirut constitutes a clear and recent reply to the fact that there are forces operating in Beirut that do not want Lebanon to have the power to protect itself and stop the bloodshed."

At a time when republican palace circles are still uncertain about the deep motives behind the Syrian decision to withdraw, they are beginning to accept the view of the European diplomats here that the Afghanistan crisis, the disturbance in the international balance, and the eruption of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union have all cast their shadows over the Lebanese crisis and the internal situation.

Beirut Stocks Up, Calls Upon Its Militias

Beirut witnessed widespread uneasiness as a result of the report of Syria's decision to withdraw, and the civilian population began to stock up on food supplies, while Lebanese militias called up their forces in both the eastern and western sectors. The Palestinian Resistance did the same.

When the leftist National Movement confirmed the seriousness of the Syrian decision, it sent a delegation to Damascus to represent it. In addition, Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss went to the Syrian capital, as well as several prominent Lebanese, including former president Sulayman Franjiyah, who is bound by warm, personal friendship to President al-Asad, Mr Rashid Karami, the previous prime minister, Mr Kamel al-Asad, president of the Chamber of Deputies, and Mr Walid Jumblatt, the senior Druze leader and head of the Socialist Progressive Party. Yasser 'Arafat and a number of Palestinian Resistance leaders also held similar meetings with Syrian officials, in order to ascertain the motives and reasons for the sudden decision to withdraw.

The Nationalist Movement and the Resistance Protest

A significant development unexpectedly befell the position of the Palestinian Resistance and its ally the Nationalist Movement. That was the Lebanese cabinet's decision "to task the Lebanese army to make the necessary, emergency preparations to fill any security vacuum, along the entire length of the demarcation lines, at the vital public utilities, and at all state offices and organizations, and to give priority to the coast line extending from Tripoli through the commercial center of Beirut and to the rest of the vital public facilities."

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The Resistance and the Nationalist Movement declared reservations about that, while the Maronite Lebanese Front and the liberal and religious Islamic groups (Sunni and Shiite) were quick to support it.

Some observers interpreted the decision to deploy the army to replace the withdrawing Syrian troops as tantamount to a refutation of the Syrian decision, or a challenge to it, to the effect that "if you withdraw, the state will be able to fill the vacuum that you leave."

Sarkis and Al-Huss: Who Will Pay the Price?

Political sources have said that the cabinet's decision to deploy the army was the result of American advice.

The Nationalist Movement says that deployment of the army in order to plug "the security vacuum" in the most dangerous of its gaps, i.e., on the demarcation lines in Beirut, would expose the army to the danger of complete collapse as happened in 1975.

The Movement believes that the army with its present composition could not play an unbiased security role between the factions. The Nationalist Movement's motive behind this is to emphasize its belief that the army was rebuilt on the same sectarian bases which led to its downfall. To put it clearer, they mean that the Maronite sect still dominates it.

The other objection that the Nationalist Movement has to deploying the army to Beirut is that it would occupy the deterrent forces' positions, most of which are an integral part of the defenses and positions of the western sector, which were occupied by Movement militia and the Palestinian Resistance, whereas the Lebanese Front refused to allow the army to deploy in its zones or to concentrate in its positions along the demarcation line.

Who Will Occupy the Syrian Positions?

From here, the import of the Syrian position was that the deterrent forces, in the event of their withdrawal, would call upon the Nationalist Movement to occupy the positions which they would vacate along the demarcation lines.

The position of the Palestinian Resistance has been no less strong than the Nationalist Movement's position. Its protest was directed against the fact that the decision to deploy the Lebanese army ignores the fact of the authorities' recognition, through its agreements with the Resistance, of the armed Palestinian presence. This conviction continues to be prevalent despite assurances which Prime Minister al-Huss hastened to issue.

Military experts within the Resistance and the Nationalist Movement believe that Syria's withdrawal of its forces from the coastal road from Beirut south to Sidon and al-Zahrani was tantamount to a practical expression of its dissatisfaction with President Sarkis' attempts to deploy army troops in those sections in the south controlled by the Movement and the

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Resistance, but not in the border strip controlled by the troops of the renegade Maj Sa'd Hadad whom Israel supports.

They add that the Lebanese government has not understood the significance of the Syrian withdrawal from the south, and therefore it was surprised by the decision to withdraw from Beirut, which is a supplementary part of the first decision.

As regards the Lebanese Front, it was quick to welcome the Syrian decision to withdraw, despite the deep feelings of anxiety over the possibility of renewed civil war. The Front, in its communique and its leaders' statements, supported the government's decision to deploy the army in Beirut. The Front's leader, former president Camille Chamoun, was quick to endorse the Syrian decision to withdraw, by issuing a group of "reassurances" to the Palestinian Resistance and the Moslem inhabitants of west Beirut, to the effect that the Front wished them no harm and that it had no desire to renew the fighting in the capital.

The Lebanese Front newspapers were very anxious to publish joint pictures of the leaders of their two main parties, the Kata'ib [Phalangist] and the Liberals, in order to suggest their solidarity with the Christian residents. However, violent clashes are still continuing 40 km northeast of Beirut, between the two parties' militias, in which 13 have been killed and twice that number wounded.

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LIBYA

SWEDISH FIRM TELUB SELLS MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TO LIBYA

Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 31 Jan 80 pp 23, 25

[Article by Goran Jonazon]

[Text] At the same time as the little-known Telub firm in Vaxjo was gearing up for a wide-ranging public relations campaign to make itself known the firm became the center of mass media interest. It was revealed that Telub had undertaken to give special training to handpicked students from Libya.

The formal client is the Libyan armed forces. The explosive foreign policy area where Libya is located is not on the Swedish green list for defense materiel exports. Many would classify the training in the same way as a rifle or a machine gun.

Suddenly everyone was talking about little unknown Telub (which started out as an electronic service firm for the military).

In practice this satisfied the requirements of applying one of the basic principles of public relations work--the principle of perception and recognition.

"But we're not really that clever," said Telub president Benkt Dahlberg. "It was more of an accident that the technical school and the Libya contract came to public attention at the same time as we launched our pitch to industry. But naturally we have nothing against it if the reports about the school lead industrial people to take an extra look at our campaign material. I don't think anyone regards us as a controversial or dangerous cooperating partner. At any rate we haven't run into that sort of reaction."

What Telub is trying to do today is let industry know that the firm's personnel and equipment constitute a unique area of competence that


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in the long run industry can't do without. Primarily in the area of microdata technology, but also in areas such as project analysis, maintenance planning, education and technical documentation.

Telub is trying to profile itself as the leading technological consultant for Swedish business firms. The slogan of the campaign is "comp," short for "communications," which they claim is a word for the 1980's, an amalgamation of "computer" and "communications." The word is said to have been coined by futurology scholars at Harvard University in the United States.

That is a minor issue--Telub is in the midst of an advertising campaign (costing roughly 1 million kronor) with full-page ads and four-color campaign leaflets.



Production and Distribution Between Defense and Civilian Production

Key:

- 1. In percentages
- 2. Defense
- 3. Civilian

Under the presidency of Benkt Dahlberg Telub has increased civilian sales so that they now exceed military sales.

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Sharply increased sales of technical services on the civilian market are an "absolute must" for Telub. In reality Telub is a consultant firm with sales amounting to 242 million kronor.

Only 75 million kronor of total sales by the parent company can be assigned to production of its own goods.

Thus Telub is in practically the same predicament as almost all other defense industries. The company can keep afloat in the technology area but it must have new customers.

Telub first saw the light of day in 1963 on paper but it didn't really get started until 1965. A study had shown that demand for military materiel maintenance resources would increase and it was decided to put a unit in Vaxjo and give it the form of a company. At first Telub was owned by FFV [expansion unknown] (51 percent) and the defense-oriented electronics firms Philips, L.M. Ericsson, Siemens, Aga, Decca, SRA, Saab and Standard Radio (49 percent). Since 1976 Telub has been a subsidiary of FFV which bought out the private electronics firms at a cost of 16.2 million kronor.

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MOROCCO

PARIS MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS MOROCCAN COMMUNIST LEADER ALI YATA

LD030705 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Apr 80 p 29 LD

[Interview with Ali Yata, secretary general of the Moroccan Party of Progress and Socialism in Paris by Jean-Louis Buchet: "The USSR Is not Supporting the POLISARIO"--date of interview not specified]

[Text] JEUNE AFRIQUE: Your party press gives the impression that you are vacillating over Afghanistan....

Ali Yata: Our position is moderate. We support the Afghan people's right to independence and sovereignty without foreign interference. The Soviet troops must leave Afghanistan as soon as possible. Nonetheless we are trying to understand why these painful events have taken place. We have to point out that some imperialist powers have not hesitated in intervening in Afghanistan since the April 1978 changes. (Note) (Date of Taraki's pro-communist coup d'etat--JEUNE AFRIQUE editor's note)

JEUNE AFRIQUE: How?

Ali Yata: By financing, training and arming Afghan counterrevolutionary elements. There were bases, particularly in Pakistan, with U.S., Chinese and Egyptian instructors.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are all the Afghan rebels counterrevolutionaries?

Ali Yata: Not all. But those who are carrying out actions are. They train poorly-educated people from the lower classes. They rouse them against the government by using religious feelings.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Does it not bother you that Karmal arrived in Kabul in the wake of the Red Army?

Ali Yata: I do not like that expression. Babrak Karmal is a well-known Afghan politician who has been waging an anti-imperialist and antireactionary struggle in his country for years. His battle cost him dearly. Hence his exile after the 1978 changes.

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JEUNE AFRIQUE: In short, you do not share King Hassan II's theory that the Afghanistan affair, like the Sahara affair, is part of an overall Soviet Bloc offensive in the Third World?

Ali Yata: No. There is undoubtedly an offensive but it is being launched by the imperialist West led by the United States which is trying to regain the positions it has lost in recent years. In this context it supports regimes which are on the point of collapse. For instance it intervened in Shaba to help Mobutu maintain his power. Unfortunately Morocco took part in this foreign imperialist intervention in Zaire. However events in the Sahara must not be confused with events in Afghanistan or with other African affairs. In the latter cases the West is defending its privileges but here Morocco is still waging a national liberation struggle.

An Unpredictable Man

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Is Angola's role in Shaba not comparable with Algeria's role in the Sahara?

Ali Yata: I do not think so. Angola did not intervene directly. The Zairian rebels played the main role in Shaba. Algeria however is intervening in our affairs through the POLISARIO and even directly. In order to impose Algeria's leadership Boumediene and the present leaders tried to prevent Morocco from rebuilding its territorial unity. Then there is al-Qadhdhafi. He dreams of building a vast and unviable Saharan entity.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: The POLISARIO's weapons are mainly supplied by the Soviet Bloc....

Ali Yata: The USSR sells arms to Algeria and Libya. Not to the POLISARIO. The USSR did not refuse to sell arms to Morocco. It was Morocco which refused to buy them.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Could the Soviets be innocent in this affair? They certainly voted against Morocco at the United Nations....

Ali Yata: The socialist countries did indeed join the movement at the United Nations. That was because the Algerians were cleverer and more active than us. They succeeded, by various means, in giving the POLISARIO stature and passing it off as a national liberation movement. That does not mean that the USSR or the socialist countries support an Algerian solution. I recently had discussions with the socialist countries' leaders: They want an all-embracing solution which takes Moroccan and Algerian rights into account.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: However Algeria has for years staked a great deal on the POLISARIO. Why should it suddenly stop?

Ali Yata: Because this strategy, drawn up by two men who have now vanished from the political scene, Boumediene and Bouteflika, has not succeeded

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despite vast resources: Morocco has not been brought to its knees. At the same time Boumedienne's economic policy has not produced results. Algeria is experiencing serious social problems despite its oil. In addition the people, brainwashed by vast campaigns, have not espoused the POLISARIO's case. Then...as for Libya, al-Qadhdhafi has made blunders. Politicians in all countries are now worried: How, they say, can we cooperate with an unpredictable man who changes his friends and opinions at every turn?

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TUNISIA

GAFSA INCIDENT SEEN AS PEOPLE'S REVOLT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 3 Mar 80 p 17

[Article by Adel Wahid: "The Calm Before the Storm"]

[Text] "I don't need anyone; France is with me." This phrase, delivered like a slap in the face to Ahmed Mestiri, leader of the "social-liberals," who had come to express his loyalty, is in its conciseness the consummate expression of both the person and the policy of the Tunisian chief of state. Pretending to remain calm after the shock of Gafsa, Habib Bourguiba and his seraglio are in fact profoundly disoriented. They still fear the worst because the domestic and foreign repercussions of the revolt in the southern mining city are far from dissipated.

Evidence of this fact is the skirmishes which on 20 February still continued in the regions of Kasserine and Djebel Khemir (100 kilometers north of Gafsa). Further proof, in Tunis itself, is supplied by the student demonstrations, the slogans hostile to French and American intervention and to the king of Morocco, particularly at the Schools of Liberal Arts, Law and Economics, still closed and guarded by the police. Additional evidence is the veiled hostility of the trade unions, whose silence takes on the value of unequivocal censure, or the malaise that has emerged in the government machinery, particularly the armed forces, police and customs, where the discovery of sympathies for the Gafsa insurgents partially explains France's intervention. Finally, there is the failure of the official campaign attempting to blame foreign countries for the revolt and to justify to national and international opinion the appeal for help sent to Paris.

The single success is relative: recovery of part of the "opposition," whose sole ambition is to be swallowed up in the corridors of government or, in the case of the small groups, to gain official recognition. The old enlightened dictator, who has always used illness as a political asset, has once again taken advantage of the ambitions of the Mestiris and other social democrats, whose vacillating political moves should surprise no one.

As is his wont, Bourguiba pulled strings...in a vacuum, even within certain leftist circles, which, however, he has never spared.

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What danger can then be threatening Tunisia, causing students with known progressive opinions to sign a motion denouncing "the odious aggression against our nation" and declare themselves ready to "defend the nation's territorial integrity and its gains"?

One may wonder whether the motion -- already disputed, it would appear -- is not the result of a machination of the Destour, which is now trying to take on a nationalist image by stirring up a xenophobic campaign against Libya and also against Algeria, but in a shameful, roundabout way. It always finds complacent pens in the foreign press to distill insinuations that are bandied about and that, when amplified by other periodicals -- such as the Tunisian weekly known for its Western and neocolonial affinities -- have become precise accusations buttressed by arguments taken from the reports of Bourguiba's police.

The efforts made by the Tunisian Government are contradictory. On the one hand, it tries to make people believe that the Gafsa revolt was completely organized abroad, whence the justification of French intervention. Then it tries to minimize that same revolt by presenting its protagonists -- all Tunisians, it scornfully admits -- as being politically weak, puppets manipulated by adventurers. Its arguments are so contradictory, so feeble, that it has not been able to convince a single African nation.

The position of the OAU Council of Ministers reflects the general circum-spection with regard to the Tunisian position on Libya's role. The list of countries that have manifested their support is significant: Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Gulf countries, China, all customers or allies of the United States and France, protectors of the Bourguiba regime and the real masters of Tunisia. The postponement of the first council meeting of the Arab League, which was to examine the complaint filed by Tunisia, is due to the reticence and skepticism of many member countries, which asked for time to reflect and obtain "clarifications" on the conditions of French intervention and the underlying reasons for the Gafsa affair.

It now appears obvious that the Gafsa events are the pretext allowing these two major imperialist powers -- France and the United States -- to define their plan for encircling the progressive regimes in the region, making the "mild and liberal" Tunisia an offensive springboard and a hotbed of tension particularly interesting for the strategists in Washington and Paris, for it makes it possible to achieve a bond between Morocco and Egypt. The promptness of the French intervention (requested by the "French party" headed by Mrs Bourguiba and the Tunisian ambassador in Paris, Hedi Mabrouk, according to the "supreme combatant") and the acceleration in the supplying of American arms to Tunisia are not so much an illustration of the inability of the Tunisian Army to meet an armed action at home as they are of a will to occupy a position rapidly, thereby creating the conditions for a strengthened presence. As early as 7 February, in fact, American transport planes unloaded M113 tanks at the military airport in Tunis. On 13 February, Prime Minister Hedi Nouria announced the delivery of the

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first "defensive" weapons. These arms, joined with those "spontaneously" offered by Moroccan King Hassan II, will serve to beef up the Tunisian Army, which the government -- keeping its eye on it because of the role it might be tempted to play in the crisis -- is mobilizing against Libya.

In this context, the matter of the continental shelf between the two countries takes on a new dimension. As soon as the anticipated cooling off of the Gafsa uprising, the affair could well serve as a pretext for armed tension already foreshadowed by the war on the air being waged by Tunis and Tripoli. The entire problem consists precisely of quelling Gafsa. This will apparently be difficult because it is not only all of southern Tunisia that is in turmoil -- particularly the inhabitants of Gafsa, who are counting their dead -- but the entire country of Tunisia, hunkered down in the calm that precedes the storm.

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