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CONTENTS

PAGE

Political Textbook for Service Academies (A. I. Sorokin; PARTIYNO-POLITICHESKAYA RABOTA V SOVETSKIKH VOORUZHENNYKH SILAKH, 1979)	1
Book Describes Basic Military Training Material (A. I. Averin, et al.; SBORNIK MATERIALOV PO NACHAL'NOY VOYENNOY PODGOTOVKE, 1979)	35
Book Excerpts: Ballistic Missile Design (Yuriy Mikhaylovich Nikolayev, Yuriy Serenovich Solomonov; INZHENERNOYE PROYEKTIROVANIYE UPRAVLYAYEMYKH BALLISTICHESKIKH RAKET S RDTT, 1979)	47
Book Excerpts: Ideological Work at Unit Level Described (N. I. Smorigo, et al.; IDEOLOGICHESKAYA RABOTA V CHASTI: SODERZHANIYA, ORGANIZATSIYA, METODIKA, 1978).....	54

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POLITICAL TEXTBOOK FOR SERVICE ACADEMIES

Moscow PARTIYNO-POLITICHESKAYA RABOTA V SOVETSKIKH VOORUZHENNYKH SILAKH (Uchebnik dlya Slushateley Voyennykh Akademiy) in Russian 1979 signed to press 31 May 79 pp 2, 413-416, 3-33, 408-412

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Title: PARTIYNO-POLITICHESKAYA RABOTA V SOVETSKIKH VOORUZHENNYKH SILAKH (Uchebnik dlya Slushateley Voyennykh Akademiy) [Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces (Textbook for Cadets at Service Academies)]
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Editorial board: Adm A. I. Sorokin, Maj Gen V. K. Luzherenko, Col L. A. Ushakov, and Col A. P. Shurygin.

Brief Description:

This textbook presents the tasks, content, forms and methods of party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy. A central position is occupied by questions pertaining to the work performed by commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations to increase troop combat readiness, to accomplish the tasks of combat and political training and indoctrination of ideologically convinced, disciplined, skillful and courageous defenders of the homeland. The specific features of party-political work in a combat situation are discussed. This textbook is intended for service academy cadres, officers and general officers of the USSR Armed Forces.

Table of Contents

Introduction 3

Chapter 1. CPSU Leadership -- Foundation of Military Organizational Development. Party Agencies in the Army and Navy.

1. CPSU Leadership -- Main Source of Strength of the USSR Armed Forces 11

2. System of Party Leadership in the Army and Navy 23

Chapter 2. Leninist Principles of Party Leadership.

1. Essence of Leninist Principles of Party Leadership .. 34

2. Scientific Substantiation of Policy 35

3. Collective Nature of Leadership 37

4. Selection, Placement and Indoctrination of Cadres ... 42

5. Monitoring and Verification of Execution 46

6. Unity of Ideological and Organizational Work 50

7. Indissoluble Bond With the Masses 51

Chapter 3. One-Man Command in the Soviet Armed Forces. CPSU Demands on Moral-Political, Fighting and Psychological Qualities of Military Cadres.

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on One-Man Command as the Most Important Principle of Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces 55

2. CPSU Demands on Military Cadres and Their Work Style 61

3. Work of Commanders, Political Agencies and Party Organizations on Strengthening One-Man Command 69

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Chapter 4. Party Organizations in the Soviet Armed Forces and Ways to Achieve Further Enhancement of Their Role and Influence on All Aspects of Army and Navy Life and Activities.	
1. Army and Navy Party Organizations -- CPSU Fighting Detachment in the Armed Forces, Their Structure and Tasks	75
2. Ways to Enhance the Role and Influence of Party Organizations on All Aspects of Army and Navy Life and Activities	82
Chapter 5. Komsomol Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy.	
1. Komsomol -- Faithful Assistant and Combat Reserve of the Communist Party. Structure and Tasks of Komsomol Organizations in the Army and Navy	93
2. Party Direction of Komsomol Organizations	107
Chapter 6. Ideological Work in the Army and Navy. Ways to Achieve a Further Increase in Its Effectiveness Under Present-Day Conditions.	
1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Importance of Ideological Work. Tasks of Ideological Work in the Army and Navy Under Present-Day Conditions	114
2. Organization of Marxist-Leninist Training of Officers, Political Training of Warrant Officers, and Party Schooling in the Army and Navy	126
3. Political Instruction Classes for Enlisted Personnel and Noncommissioned Officers	132
4. Mass-Agitation and Cultural-Educational Work in the Unit and on Board Ship	141
Chapter 7. Sociopsychological Problems of Study and Shaping of the Personality of the Individual Soldier and the Military Collective.	
1. The Individual and Group Approach in Party-Political Work	152
2. Psychological Structure of the Serviceman and Its Study ..	156
3. Psychological Phenomena in the Collective and Their Study	164
Chapter 8. Indoctrination of Soviet Military Personnel in a Spirit of Fighting Alliance With the Armies of the Brother Socialist Nations.	
1. Essence and Significance of the Fighting Alliance	170
2. Content, Forms and Methods of Work to Indoctrinate Military Personnel in a Spirit of Combat Alliance With the Armies of the Brother Socialist Nations	180
Chapter 9. Military Indoctrination and Its Organization in the Unit and on Board Ship.	
1. Essence and Content of Military Indoctrination	192
2. Military Indoctrination in the Unit and on Board Ship	199

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Chapter 10. Party-Political Work to Strengthen Military Discipline.	
1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on Soviet Military Discipline. The Enhanced Significance of Military Discipline Under Present-Day Conditions	208
2. Content, Forms and Methods of Work by the Regimental (Ship) Commanding Officer and Party-Political Edifice to Strengthen Military Discipline	212
3. Indoctrinational Role of Disciplinary Practices. Analysis of the State of Military Discipline	221
Chapter 11. Party-Political Work to Increase Vigilance and Combat Readiness of Units (Naval Ships).	
1. The CPSU on the Necessity of Further Increasing Vigilance and Combat Readiness of Troops Under Present-Day Conditions	227
2. Content and Basic Directions of Party-Political Work to Increase the Combat Readiness of Units (Naval Ships) and Subunits	236
Chapter 12. Socialist Competition in Units and on Naval Ships.	
1. Competition -- A Powerful Means of Increasing the Social Activeness of Military Personnel	238
2. Organization of Socialist Competition in Units and on Naval Ships	
Chapter 13. Psychological-Pedagogic Fundamentals of Improving the Process of Personnel Combat Training.	
1. Psychological-Pedagogic Conditions of Activities of the Commander as Leader and Organizer of the Process of Training Personnel	269
2. Improving the Principles of Military Training	275
3. Methods and Forms of Training Personnel	289
Chapter 14. Party-Political Work to Mobilize Personnel for Excellent Mastery and Skilled Utilization of Combat Equipment and Weapons, Exemplary Performance of Combat Alert Duty, and Improvement of Field (Air, Sea) Proficiency.	
1. Role of Man and Machine in Modern Warfare. CPSU Demands on Military and Military-Technical Training of Personnel	299
2. Mobilization of Military Personnel for Skilled Mastery of Combat Equipment and Weapons	305
3. Party-Political Work on Combat Alert Duty	314
4. Party-Political Work in Accomplishing Tasks of Achieving Field (Air, Sea) Proficiency	321
Chapter 15. Moral-Political and Psychological Training of Unit (Naval Ship) Personnel for Combat Operations in Contemporary War.	

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- 1. Modern Demands on Moral-Political and Psychological Qualities of Personnel 328
- 2. Ways and Methods of Moral-Political and Psychological Training of Regiment (Naval Ship) Personnel 333

Chapter XVI. Party-Political Work in a Combat Situation.

- 1. Tasks of Party-Political Work in Units (On Naval Ships) in a Combat Situation 352
- 2. Party-Political Work in Preparing for Combat Operations .. 360
- 3. Party-Political Work in the Course of Combat Operations .. 371
- 4. Features of Party-Political Work in a Combat Situation in the Branches of the Armed Forces 374

Chapter 17. Political Work Among Enemy Troops and Civilian Population.

- 1. Significance and Content of Political Work Among Enemy Troops and Civilian Population 387
- 2. Organization, Forms and Methods of Conduct of Political Work Among Enemy Troops and Civilian Population 396

Conclusion 408

Introduction

The Soviet people are successfully accomplishing the tasks of building communism. Under the guidance of the CPSU, our country's toilers have achieved world-historic victories and accomplishments in the six decades of Soviet rule. They have defended the homeland in bitter combat, have gained for it universal recognition as a bulwark and standard-bearer of peace, and have raised it to the heights of social progress. The society of advanced socialism built in the USSR has become the most important result of the selfless labor of Soviet citizens. The party has elaborated and is consistently implementing a scientifically substantiated economic strategy aimed at a steady rise in the material and cultural living standards of our people. On the foundation of dynamic development of the economy, the social countenance of the Soviet society is acquiring new features and its social homogeneity is becoming strengthened. A new historic community of people -- the Soviet people -- has been established in our country.

Soviet man is shaped and tempered in the struggle for communism. The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" stated: "He combines within himself ideological conviction and enormous vital energy, a constant striving toward the heights of knowledge and culture, and a sense of collectivism and comradely mutual assistance. The Soviet citizen has a strong love for his socialist homeland. Inspired labor in the name of communism has become the content of his entire life."¹

The history of the Soviet people, their military and labor victories, and their outstanding accomplishments are inseparably linked with the activities of the Communist Party as the guiding and directing force of our society. It worthily performs the role of political leader of the worker class and of the entire Soviet people. "Our party holds high the revolutionary banner of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, carries out its historic mission with honor and fights tirelessly for the triumph of Communist ideals."²

The contemporary period is characterized by further enhancement of the party's leadership role in society and by intensification of its theoretical, political and organizational activities. The CPSU devotes considerable attention to strengthening and development of Leninist standards of party life and principles of party leadership, deepening of intra-party democracy, increased demandingness on each and every party member and improvement in the qualitative composition of party ranks, as well as consolidation of a Leninist work style. The resolutions of the 20th CPSU Congress, the decisions of the October (1964) Central Committee Plenum, and the resolutions of the 22d, 23d, 24th, and 25th CPSU congresses are of fundamental importance for improving all aspects of party guidance of society.

The 25th CPSU Congress emphasized that "the dynamism of development of Soviet society, the growing scale of building communism, and our activities in the international arena imperatively demand a continuous rise in the level of party guidance of development of the economy and culture, indoctrination of citizens, and improvement in organizational and political work in the masses."³

Knowledge of the theory and practice of party organizational development helps correctly understand the essence of party leadership. Party organizational development is the science of the laws governing and patterns of development of the Communist Party and enhancement of its leadership role, the principles of party structure, the forms of organization and internal party rules, of the methods and modes of organizational and ideological work with the masses, and direction of economic construction, governmental and public organizations.

Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces is an inseparable component part of party organizational development. Party-political work is scientifically substantiated ideological and organizational activity to implement Communist Party policy in the army and navy, to indoctrinate personnel in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism and mobilization of servicemen to carry out their assigned tasks. Its solid ideological-theoretical principles comprise Marxism-Leninism, Leninist teaching on the party, the ideas of our great leader on defense of the socialist homeland, and CPSU policy. Theory of party-political work is closely linked with history of the CPSU, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, scientific communism, military science, education science and psychology.

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In the party-political work conducted in the Armed Forces by commanders, political agencies, political workers of units and naval ships, army and navy Communists are reflected the laws governing and patterns of development of the Communist Party, the Soviet state and its military organization, shaping of people's personality, character and cognitive activity, as well as the diversified processes and phenomena of societal affairs and practical military activities.

Also inherent in party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces are specific patterns which define its relationship with sociopolitical factors and internal development. Following are basic patterns of party-political work: determination of its objectives, tasks and content by CPSU ideology, policies, decisions and practical party activities; enhancement of its role in implementing party policy in the Armed Forces and performance of the missions assigned them; conformity between its content, forms and methods on the one hand and the concrete conditions of life and combat activities of army and navy and specific features of the historical situation on the other; dependence of its state on the level of training of military cadres, their political and professional qualities.

Scientific substantiation, high quality and effectiveness of party-political work are ensured by consistent implementation of its most important principles. These include the Leninist principle of party-mindedness and a class approach to problems of military organizational development and indoctrination of Soviet servicemen; the principle of organic link between ideological and party organizational activity in the army and navy and the practical building of communism, party and national affairs, and the missions performed by the Armed Forces. These include the principles of concreteness and purposefulness, continuity and efficiency, a high degree of activeness, flexibility in selection and application of means, forms, and methods of influencing the consciousness of military personnel.

Party-political work in the Armed Forces is totally subordinated to indoctrination of staunch and courageous defenders of the socialist homeland, ardent patriots and internationalists prepared to dedicate all their energies and if necessary their very lives to the cause of defending the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community, as well as the achievements of socialism.

Party-political work occupies a special place among the factors which dictated the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the savage and bloody wars forced upon our country by imperialism.

Based on experience in directing the nation's defense during the years of civil war, V. I. Lenin drew the following conclusion: "...Wherever political work with the troops is carried out in the most thoughtful manner... there will be no lack of discipline in the army, there will be better smartness, precision, spirit, and more victories."⁴

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, who served through the entire Great Patriotic War as a top official of army and front political agencies, states that one can

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scarcely exaggerate the importance of party-political work. It toughened the men's hearts and souls and inspired them to feats of valor.⁵

Party decisions focus emphasis on consistent improvement of the USSR Armed Forces taking account of the threat of war existing under present-day conditions.

The most reactionary forces of imperialism, arms manufacturers and militarists, and devotees of "cold war" have joined together in an extensive campaign against international détente, are continuing to escalate military budgets and are demanding the development of increasingly more destructive and cruel weapons, making reference to a "Soviet threat" which they themselves have concocted. They are endeavoring to crush by force the liberation movement of peoples and are meddling in the internal affairs of other nations.

The Peking leaders have become shameless accomplices of imperialist policy. With their unprecedented, brazen bandit attack on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, they exposed once and for all to the entire world the insidious, aggressive substance of the hegemonistic, militaristic great-power policy they are pursuing. Peking's unilateral decision to terminate the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PRC constituted evidence of total departure by the Maoist leaders from the principles of proletarian internationalism and socialism. It has now become obvious to all mankind that the Peking rulers have departed from the socialist road, have openly embraced a position of anti-Sovietism and have fully closed ranks with the policies of reactionary imperialist circles. Today their policy represents a serious threat to world peace. In view of the contemporary situation, the CPSU is concentrating attention on the deep-rooted sources of the might of the Soviet Army and Navy and is placing on commanders and political workers enormous responsibility for further all-out development of the qualities of an army of a new type, which characterize the Soviet Armed Forces.

"Our army," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "is indoctrinated in a spirit of deep devotion to the socialist homeland, to the ideals of peace and internationalism, to the ideals of friendship among peoples. The Soviet Army differs from bourgeois armies precisely in this point. It is precisely for this reason that Soviet citizens love their army and are proud of it."⁶ This general thesis defines the most important result of development of the USSR Armed Forces and purposeful party-political work. At the same time it states the decisive precondition of maintaining an adequate level of army and navy fighting efficiency and combat readiness and one of the main conditions for maintaining and consolidating for the Armed Forces a prominent place in the system of Communist indoctrination of Soviet citizens.

The high praise stated at the 25th CPSU Congress for our army as a school of indoctrination obligates us to construct party-political work in such

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a manner that it ensures unswerving improvement in the ideological and moral conditioning of military personnel and is focused primarily on maintaining the Armed Forces in a state of continuous combat readiness. "It is necessary to achieve a situation," stated USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, "whereby, organizing training and indoctrination of personnel, each commander and political worker clearly understands what new moral, physical and psychological tests our fighting men will encounter in actual combat if the imperialists initiate war and with what reserve of strength -- combat, ideological, moral -- it is essential to prepare the defenders of the homeland in time of peace."⁷

A scientific approach to accomplishment of these tasks presupposes innovative search for the new and advanced and the ability of military cadres knowledgeably to control the process of training and indoctrination of personnel, welding together of military collectives, organically combining party-mindedness with thorough competence and knowledge of military affairs. Successful leadership of a regiment, naval ship, engineer service, or any area of staff operation is inconceivable without the commander, military engineer and staff officer continuously raising his ideological-theoretical level, active participation in party-political work, and mastery of all aspects of the art of organization and indoctrination of military personnel, army and navy youth. One of these aspects is the ability to see the main thing in one's work and to approach the task of improving guidance of this work, as was emphasized by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 18th Komsomol Congress, in conformity with a Leninist statement of the question -- what we should teach young people and how they should study in order to become worthy builders of communism.⁸

Thorough study of the course on party-political work boosts the political level and ideological toughening of military leader cadres and helps improve their work style and assists them in successfully accomplishing the task of further strengthening the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces, as is demanded by the CPSU Central Committee in the decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Indoctrination Work."

The subject of the course on party-political work as a scientific and scholarly discipline at service academies is the fundamentals of party organizational development in the army and navy, Leninist principles of party leadership, principles of construction and forms of organization of political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations, the content and methods of their ideological and organizational activities, the system and basic elements of political training, mass-agitation and cultural-educational work in the Armed Forces.

Following are the principal course objectives:

to arm cadets with knowledge of theory and practice of party organizational development and party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy;

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to develop in cadets excellent moral-political qualities of the one-man commander and Soviet military engineer, who are called upon to implement CPSU policy in the Soviet Armed Forces;

to develop in cadets ability and skills in ideological and organizational work in military units and on naval ships.

Following are the leading forms of the learning process in studying the course in party-political work: independent study of the writings of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, party documents, lectures, seminars, individual discussions, lectures to the cadets by commanders and political workers from army and navy line combined units, tour of duty and practical experience in army and navy line units, and writing of reports. Questions pertaining to party-political work in a combat situation are also studied in solving tactical problems and in conducting command-staff exercises with cadets.

Following is the basic literature used in studying this course: the works of V. I. Lenin, the CPSU Program and Party Rules, materials, resolutions and decisions of party congresses and conferences, party Central Committee plenums, CPSU Central Committee decrees, documents of the international Communist and worker movement, the Statute on Political Agencies of the Soviet Army and Navy and Instructions to CPSU and Komsomol Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, general military regulations, orders of the USSR Minister of Defense and directives of the Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, as well as the proceedings of armed forces conferences.

Party theory and policies and the fundamentals of party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy are studied in an organic unity with study of experience in building communism, international activities of the CPSU, and its ideological struggle. Particular importance is assumed in connection with this by assimilation of the inexhaustible theoretical wealth and lofty examples of a Leninist approach to organizational and ideological-indoctrination tasks contained in the writings and speeches of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and other Communist Party and Soviet Government leaders.

This textbook is intended to assist service academy cadets in a systematic and thorough study of the most important problems of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces. Cadets will also be assisted in studying this course by monographs, books, special collected volumes, pamphlets and other publications discussing current problems of ideological and organizational work of commanders, political agencies, army and navy party and Komsomol organizations.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 1 February 1977.

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2. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, page 62.
3. Ibid., page 65.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 39, page 56.
5. See L. I. Brezhnev, "Malaya zemlya" [Little Land], Moscow, 1978, page 24.
6. "Materialy...", op. cit., page 76.
7. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1979, page 287.
8. See L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Current Problems of CPSU Ideological Work], Vol 2, Moscow, 1978, page 561.

Chapter 1. CPSU Leadership -- Foundation of Military Organizational Development. Party Agencies in the Army and Navy

1. CPSU Leadership -- Main Source of Strength of the USSR Armed Forces

The entire history of the Soviet state persuasively attests to the fact that successful building of socialism and communism is possible only under the leadership of the Communist Party -- tried and tested vanguard of our people, leader and organizer of their brilliant victories and great feats. "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union..." stated CPSU General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his report to the 25th CPSU Congress, "is worthily performing the role of political leader of the worker class, of all toilers, of the entire people."¹

The USSR Constitution formally states that the Communist Party is the "guiding and directing force of Soviet society, the core of its political system, governmental and public organizations..."² Armed with Marxist-Leninist teachings, the CPSU directs the efforts of the people toward the highest goal -- building of a classless Communist society. Directing all aspects of life and activities in the Soviet state, the party is also constantly concerned with increasing its organizing influence on development of the Armed Forces.

The Communist Party, headed by V. I. Lenin, established the Worker-Peasant Red Army and defined its historical function, features, sources of strength and invincibility. The army is one of the most important component elements of the Soviet state. V. I. Lenin stated: "We need a powerful Red Army to defend the worker-peasant government against brigands, that is, against the landlords and capitalists."³

The Soviet Armed Forces have had a great and glorious fighting history. The Soviet Army and Navy owe all their victories in the war and their

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peacetime successes in increasing combat readiness first and foremost to the organizing, guiding and indoctrinating role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU Program stresses: "The basic foundation of military organizational development is Communist Party direction of the Armed Forces, strengthening of the role and influence of party organizations in the army and navy."⁴

Communist Party activity pertaining to direction of the USSR Armed Forces is carried out in many areas. Principal areas include the following: elaboration and implementation of current questions pertaining to defense of the achievements of socialism, military theory, and the principles of Soviet military organizational development; furnishing the army and navy with modern combat equipment and weapons; further improvement of troop organization and structure, proportional development of the services, branches and arms, system and methods of control; training, indoctrination and placement of military cadres; execution of measures pertaining to improving party-political work and increasing its effectiveness; strengthening of the fighting alliance with the armies of the socialist nations.

Communist Party direction of the Armed Forces is manifested first and foremost in the fact that all matters pertaining to defense of the socialist homeland, military organizational development, military theory and practice are settled in precise conformity with party ideology and policy, on the basis of party decisions.

V. I. Lenin pointed out on numerous occasions that our military organizational development is being successfully achieved precisely because it is being carried out in a spirit of overall Soviet organizational development, the chief element of which is leadership and guidance by the Communist Party.⁵ On his proposal the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) issued a special decree on 25 December 1918 entitled "On War Ministry Policy," in which it is stressed that "the policy of the War Ministry, as that of all other ministries and agencies, shall be carried out on the precise foundation of the general directives issued by the party in the person of its Central Committee and under its direct supervision."⁶

Supervising and directing military organizational development, the Communist Party elaborates and implements the scientifically substantiated military policy of the Soviet state, determines the political goals and tasks of the USSR Armed Forces, and monitors the activities of military agencies. Questions pertaining to organizational development of the Armed Forces and their directions by the CPSU are constantly examined at party congresses, conferences, and Central Committee plenums.

At each historical stage the party has elaborated and implemented a policy which most fully corresponds to the goals of securing defense of the Soviet homeland.

In determining its military policy under present-day conditions, the party proceeds from the position that as long as imperialism remains in existence there will continue to be a danger of aggressive wars. Taking

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this into account, the CPSU views strengthening of this country's defense capability and the military strength of the Soviet Armed Forces as one of its principal tasks, the obligation of the entire Soviet people and one of the most important functions of the Soviet state.

This point is also formally stated in the new USSR Constitution. "The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people shall be reliably to defend the socialist homeland and to be in a state of continuous combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor," states Article 31.

Communist Party direction of the Armed Forces is also manifested in the fact that the CPSU Central Committee deals directly with the root, fundamental questions of military life and activities and is concerned on a daily basis with strengthening their fighting efficiency and combat readiness.

The party Central Committee determines the military doctrine of the Soviet state, the principal directions and areas of development of military science, modern weapons and combat equipment, and concerns itself with correct combination and planned development of the services, branches and arms, and with combat and political training of personnel.

"...The CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the Government of the USSR, and all who are directly involved in matters of strengthening national defense," stated L. I. Brezhnev at a Kremlin reception honoring service academy graduates, "display maximum concern for increasing army and navy combat might and improving military equipment and combat proficiency of personnel. Matters of defense of the homeland are given priority attention in all our work."⁷

The party and its Central Committee determine matters of strengthening army and navy combat might collectively and on a scientific basis. When making a decision pertaining to the Armed Forces, the CPSU Central Committee thoroughly studies the state of affairs, concrete conditions and situation, and confers with military officials. Party and government leaders regularly visit military units and naval ships and acquaint themselves with the daily life, routine and training of the troops as well as practical personnel training and indoctrination activities. Large-scale exercises and troop maneuvers are attended by officials of local party and Soviet agencies. All this enables the party and its Central Committee correctly to resolve the most complex problems of national defense capability and military organizational development.

L. I. Brezhnev noted in the CPSU Central Committee report to the 25th CPSU Congress, when discussing Central Committee activities pertaining to strengthening national defense capability and improving the Armed Forces: "We are able to report to the congress that we have accomplished much in this area. Improvement has been made in furnishing the Armed Forces with

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modern weapons and combat equipment, and there has been an improvement in quality of combat training and ideological conditioning of personnel. The fact is... the Soviet people can be assured that the fruits of their productive labor are being reliably protected."⁸

Improving this nation's defense in the face of a military threat both in the West and East, the Communist Party is forced to expend a great deal of money on defense. "We are spending on defense as much," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech to the voters of Moscow's Baumanskiy Rayon on 2 March 1979, "as is absolutely essential. No less, but also no more. In conformity with the situation."⁹

Our capabilities have also increased substantially in the area of allocating funds for defense in recent years. "Never before has our country possessed such vast economic and scientific-technological potential. Never before has its defense capability been so strong, so reliable,"¹⁰ noted L. I. Brezhnev in his report at an official joint session of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet marking the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The Communist Party elaborates, enriches and implements the principles of Soviet military organizational development. Leninist principles of military organizational development are generally defined as the fundamental, basic points of Leninist teachings, in conformity with which CPSU practical activity has been carried out in the area of establishment, strengthening and development of the USSR Armed Forces. The principles of military organizational development are subdivided on the basis of content into sociopolitical, organizational, training and indoctrination.

Sociopolitical principles proceed from the very nature of our societal and governmental system. They include the following: Communist Party direction of the Armed Forces; a class approach to organizational development of the Armed Forces; unity of army and people; fidelity to proletarian internationalism.

CPSU guidance of the Armed Forces is a basic sociopolitical principle of Soviet military organizational development.

The Communist Party exercises political guidance of the army and navy. It is armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, is closely bound to the people, welded together by party discipline, and possesses unsurpassed qualities of inspirer and organizer of the masses. In December 1918 the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) emphasized that the army of a socialist state cannot be built, develop and become strong without party leadership and guidance.¹¹ Under present-day conditions the role of the Communist Party in leadership and guidance of the Armed Forces is becoming even greater. Military councils, commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations implement the party line and party principles in the military.

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One of the most important sociopolitical principles is that of class approach to organizational development of the Armed Forces. From the very beginning our army was created in conformity with the character of the socialist system, the goals and tasks of the Soviet state.

The resolution at the 8th Party Congress on the military question stated: "The revolutionary character of the army is determined first and foremost by the character of that Soviet regime which creates this army, which specifies its objective and thus transforms it into its own instrument. On the other hand conformity between this instrument and the Soviet regime is achieved by the class composition of the main body of military personnel, by the organization of commissars and Communist cells, and finally, by common party and Soviet guidance and direction of military life and activities."¹² The Soviet Armed Forces have retained up to the present day their class sociopolitical content.

Unity of army and people occupies an important place among the sociopolitical principles of Soviet military organizational development.

The substance of this principle lies in the fact that the party and government, supported by the socioeconomic and political system, the alliance between the worker class and peasantry, and the sociopolitical unity of the Soviet society, carry out military organizational development in such a manner that the broad masses take part in it, while the Armed Forces in turn maintain a constant link with the Soviet people, rely on their support and feel their social influence. In 1919 V. I. Lenin stated in his draft Program: "The Soviet organization has made it possible to create an armed force of workers and peasants which is more closely linked with the toilers than before..."¹³ Under present-day conditions the social base of this principle has become considerably broadened, and it is manifested in the numerous and diversified forms of link between army and people and in the people's concern for their Armed Forces.

The principle of proletarian internationalism is another basic sociopolitical principle of Soviet military organizational development. It is expressed in the fact that all socialist nationalities and ethnic groups in the USSR possess a common military organization -- the Armed Forces, the most rigorous equality of rights and obligations of all this country's citizens in carrying out one's military duty is observed, and indoctrination of Soviet military personnel is conducted in a spirit of friendship and brotherhood among the peoples of the USSR.

With the establishment of other socialist nations, implementation of this principle expanded beyond the limits of a single country. Strengthening of their unity and deepening of the fraternal friendship between Marxist-Leninist parties "considerably increase the united strength and influence of socialism on the course of international events."¹⁴

Sociopolitical principles play a determining role. They exert decisive influence on all other principles.

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Organizational principles encompass questions pertaining to the internal structure of the Armed Forces, the forms of their organization, and methods of leadership and control.

Following are the basic organizational principles of Soviet military organizational development: cadre organization of the Armed Forces; centralization of leadership and one-man command; continuous improvement in organizational structure, coordinated and commensurate development of services, branches and arms; maintenance of conscientious military discipline on the basis of intelligent combination of methods of persuasion and coercion; continuous combat readiness of this country and its Armed Forces to repel aggression.

The organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, their quantitative and qualitative composition are determined proceeding from an assessment of the international situation and the tasks of ensuring the security of the socialist homeland ensuing therefrom; the nation's internal situation, especially the state and capabilities of the economy and character of social relations; development of weaponry; cultural-technical level of army and navy personnel and manpower reserves as a whole.

Consistent application of Leninist organizational principles, tested by the experience of Soviet military organizational development, serves as a most important condition for a high degree of combat efficiency of our Armed Forces.

The principles of training and indoctrination in the Soviet Armed Forces are grounded on Marxist-Leninist methodology. They pursue the objective of arming servicemen with profound political, military, technical and specialized knowledge and developing in them the practical skills and ability to conduct armed combat.

The basic principles of training and indoctrination include the following: Communist ideology, party-mindedness, a close link with this nation's life and the missions performed by the troops; unity of political and military indoctrination; systematicness and consistency in training; combination of indoctrination in the collective with an individual approach to each man, high demandingness on subordinates with solicitude for them, etc.

Embodied in the principles of Soviet military organizational development are Leninist ideas on defense of the socialist homeland, which have totally retained their paramount role up to the present day. They serve as a most important point of reference for the activities of all commanders, political workers and engineer-technician personnel.

An important area of Communist Party activities pertaining to leadership and direction of the Armed Forces is the training and improvement of military cadres.

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Military cadres constitute a support for party and government in the Armed Forces and are their plenipotentiary representatives. It is precisely through the cadres of command, political and engineer-technician personnel that the CPSU implements its ideology and policy in the Armed Forces. Therefore the question of military cadres has always occupied and continues to occupy one of the principal positions in the activities of our party.

The Communist Party has elaborated scientific principles of work with cadres. They boil down essentially to the following: to select cadres on the basis of their political and professional qualities; intelligently to combine older and more experienced with young cadres and to observe succession of leadership; to evaluate cadres on the basis of their deeds and performance results; correctly to utilize the knowledge and experience of officials; to impose high demandingness on cadres.

Thanks to the solicitude of the party, the Soviet Army and Navy today contain thoroughly trained military cadres capable of successfully accomplishing the increasing tasks of troop leadership and command.

One of the areas of Communist Party leadership and direction of the Armed Forces is continuous concern for the development of Soviet military science and art of warfare.

Proceeding from the objective laws of development of military affairs, the party and its Central Committee display tireless concern to ensure that Soviet military science, military strategy, operational art and tactics always meet contemporary demands.

Military science is called upon to conduct research in the interests of all-out securement of development and training of the Armed Forces in conformity with the character of a potential war, to reveal its content, character, objective laws, the forms of their manifestation and the principles of art of warfare proceeding from these laws. Additional tasks of military science include disclosure of totally new directions in the evolution of weapons, combat equipment, the modes of their employment, innovative elaboration of the problems of strategy, operational art and tactics, and constant refinement, applicable to changing situation conditions, of the missions of the Armed Forces and the directions of their organizational development and training. Improvement of existing and development of new weapons and military equipment is an important area of military science. Military science plays an important role in elaboration and improvement of the forms and methods of troop training and indoctrination.

The Communist Party demands that military cadres critically study, analyze and consider the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War and know well the strong and weak points in the military science of our potential adversaries.

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Extensive possibilities are opening up under present-day conditions, more than at any time in the past, for development of military science. Utilizing advances in mathematics, physics, cybernetics and other sciences, it is capable of objectively and accurately evaluating the prospects of improvement of military affairs and to present the most well-substantiated recommendations on all matters of military organizational development.

CPSU leadership and direction of the Armed Forces is also manifested in the fact that a well-proportioned system of political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations, on which one-man commanders rely in their practical activities, has been established and is operating in the army and navy.

With all their work political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations strengthen the combat might of army and navy, ensure the party's day-by-day influence on military life and activities, and seek to ensure a personal example on the part of Communists and Komsomol members in accomplishing the tasks of combat and political training. The strength of the army of the socialist state, in contrast to bourgeois armies, is grounded on a high degree of political consciousness on the part of military personnel and on a deep awareness of their patriotic duty, international tasks and the necessity of fighting for the triumph of communism. Therefore in the area of military organizational development the party has always devoted and continues to devote unremitting attention to party-political work in the Armed Forces.

In 1919 a party Central Committee letter entitled "On Party Work in the Red Army" emphasized: "...In order for the Red Army to be genuinely socialist it is essential that it be not only class in composition but also that military personnel clearly and correctly understand their class interest. And this requires party work within the military."¹⁵

Aggravation of the ideological struggle in the world arena, enhancement of the role of the morale factor in warfare of today, improvement in the technical equipping of troops, and a substantial improvement in the general-educational and cultural level of all categories of military personnel imperatively demand further strengthening of party-political work in the army and navy.

Displaying solicitude for the Armed forces, the CPSU Central Committee adopted a number of decisions, among which of exceptional importance is the 21 January 1967 decree entitled "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy."¹⁶

This decree demands improvement in all activities of military councils, commanders, political agencies and party organizations to the level of present-day demands and a substantial increase in the effectiveness of party-political work to boost troop combat readiness, to improve the quality of combat training and to strengthen military discipline.

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The CPSU Central Committee has implemented important measures aimed at improving party-political work in the army and navy. In particular, they include the following: establishment of political directorates of the separate Armed Forces services, railway troops and military construction units, and an airborne troops political section; transformation of the party committees of central establishments, headquarters of districts and groups of forces, and military educational institutions into political sections; introduction of deputy commanders for political affairs in the companies (batteries) and equivalent subunits; establishment of higher military-political schools and expansion of the institution of staff propagandists and exempted Komsomol workers in line units; ratification of a revised Statute on Political Agencies and Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy (February 1973); ratification of Instructions to Komsomol Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy (December 1974); holding of an Armed Forces Conference of Party Organization Secretaries (March 1973), an Armed Forces Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries (April 1974), an Armed Forces Conference of Ideological Workers (January 1975), an Armed Forces Conference of Excellent Performers in Combat and Political Training (May 1975), etc. All this has had a positive effect on organization of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Commanders, political agencies and party organizations are constantly improving their work style and methods and are more vigorously and concretely influencing performance of combat and political training tasks and strengthening of military discipline and the political-morale state of personnel.

The Leninist idea of firmness of party leadership and direction of the Armed Forces was consolidated in the documents of the 25th CPSU Congress. The Central Committee Report to the congress emphasizes; "During all these years the party focused proper attention on strengthening our country's defense capability and improving the Armed Forces."¹⁷

As our country advances toward communism, the importance of the party's leadership activities and the strength of its influence on the further development of society are constantly increasing. This is dictated by growth in the scale and complexity of the tasks of building communism; by the development of socialist democracy; by an unprecedented upswing in the productive activity of the masses and the involvement of additional millions of toilers in management of production and affairs of state; by the increasing significance of Marxism-Leninism and theory of scientific communism in societal affairs and the evolution of society; by the increased international significance of building communism in the USSR.

Enhancement of the party's role in the area of the military organizational development at the present stage is due to a number of factors. First of all, tasks connected with preventing imperialist aggression and preparing the nation and its Armed Forces for a resolute rebuff to the foe are becoming more complex. Defense of the achievements of socialism encompasses all areas of societal affairs: economics, politics, ideology,

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science, and culture. Our country's military efforts are based on the might of its economic, moral-political and scientific potentials.

Secondly, enhancement of the party's role in leadership and direction of the Armed Forces is due to root changes in the technical equipping and arming of the military, in modes of combat operations, and to the increasing complexity of the tasks of combat and political training. Qualitative changes in military affairs, the character and features of contemporary warfare demand constant improvement of military organization, methods of training and indoctrinating troops. Therefore the party is constantly concerned with ensuring that the organizational structure of the different services, branches and arms is in conformity with the increased demands of military affairs, that military-scientific thought is focused on development of new modes of warfare and the most effective methods of combat, moral-political and psychological training of troops.

Third, enhancement of the role of the moral-political factor in war, if the aggressors initiate a war, will demand of the personnel of our army and navy and of the entire Soviet people an unprecedented exertion of spiritual and physical forces. Only the Communist Party, its tireless indoctrinational and organizational work, and the personal example of Communists in skilled and selfless performance of military duty can ensure the ever-increasing moral-political and psychological superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the armies of the aggressors.

Fourth, the international tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces have broadened. They are called upon to defend against aggressors not only their own country but, together with the armies of the other brother nations, the entire socialist community as well. Elaboration of collective measures for defending the world socialist system and coordination of the military efforts of the Warsaw Pact member nations enhance to an even greater degree the role of the CPSU and its Central Committee in guiding and directing the Soviet Armed Forces, in internationalist indoctrination of Soviet servicemen, and in strengthening their ties with personnel of the armies of the nations of the socialist community.

Thus enhancement of the role of CPSU leadership and direction of the Armed Forces is dictated by expansion and the increasing complexity of the tasks of military organizational development and an increase in the historical responsibility for the security of our homeland, for the nations of the socialist community, for preserving and strengthening peace.

2. System of Party Leadership in the Army and Navy

The CPSU exercises its leadership role in the Armed Forces through the military councils, commanders, political agencies, the political edifice of units, and party organizations.

The party assigns to military councils a special role in organizational development and strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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The military councils are permanently functioning, collegial directive agencies in the Armed Forces branches, districts, fleets, groups of forces, armies, and flotillas. They are empowered to examine all important questions pertaining to military life and activities, operational, combat and political training of combined units, units and naval ships, and indoctrination of personnel.

The membership of the military councils is ratified by the CPSU Central Committee at the request of the USSR Minister of Defense and Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The military councils bear responsibility for execution in the army and navy of party and government decrees and orders of the USSR Minister of Defense; for continuous combat and mobilization readiness, combat and political training, military discipline, and strengthening of one-man command and the political-morale state of personnel; for adoption and mastery of new weapons and combat equipment by the line units; for training, study, selection and placement of officer cadres; for political work in the line units and other matters.

The military councils perform their job in close contact with local party and Soviet agencies. The CPSU oblast committee, kray committee or union republic Communist Party Central Committee secretary sits on the district, fleet, army and flotilla military council.

The work of the military councils is organized through meetings, which are held at least once each month. The commanding general serves as chairman of the Military Council. At the meetings the military councils receive reports from commanders, political workers and chiefs of arms and services on the state of combat readiness of units and combined units, combat and political training, military discipline of personnel, and adopt effective measures to correct existing deficiencies.

Military Council decrees are executed by orders of the commander in chief and commanding general.

Thus military councils, invested with extensive authorities and powers by the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government, play a large and responsible role in ensuring continuous troop combat and mobilization readiness.

Political agencies occupy an important place in the system of party leadership and direction in the army and navy. They have existed since October 1918. The experience of history has confirmed their necessity and great importance in army and navy life and activities both in peacetime and in time of war.

Political agencies of the Soviet Army and Navy are the directing and guiding party agencies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the USSR Armed Forces. Political agencies are guided in their activities by the CPSU Program and Party Rules, and by the decrees of party congresses,

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the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government. They also organize their practical activities on the basis of the Statute on Political Agencies, orders of the Minister of Defense and directives of the Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Political agencies strengthen the combat might of army and navy with their diversified activities, ensuring the party's day-to-day, total influence on the Soviet Armed Forces.

Ideological work occupies an important place in the activities of political agencies. The most important tasks of political work include uniting military personnel behind the Communist Party and Soviet Government, their indoctrination in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism and in a spirit of total dedication to the people, to the socialist homeland, proletarian internationalism, a fighting alliance with the armies and the brother socialist nations, and conscientious performance of military duty. Toward these ends political agencies organize Marxist-Leninist training of officers, general officers and admirals, political training for warrant officers, political instruction classes for enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers, supervise party training, agitation-propagandist and cultural-educational work, as well as the military press.

Political agencies focus primary attention on increasing troop vigilance and combat readiness. They influence, knowledgeably, vigorously and on a daily basis, all aspects of combat and political training, together with commanders organize socialist competition for personnel, systematically synthesize and disseminate advanced know-how in party-political work, objectively evaluate the state of affairs in the line units, wage a campaign against embellishment of the actual state of affairs, conceit, complacency, unnecessary simplification and relaxation of demands in training and indoctrinating personnel, and assist commanders in correcting deficiencies hindering improvement in the combat readiness of combined units and units.

An important task of political agencies is all-out strengthening of one-man command, military discipline in the army and navy, and indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of strong responsibility for absolute and precise execution of the demands of the military oath, military regulations and commander orders.

Political officials supervise party, Komsomol and trade union organizations and the activities of the party-political edifice of combined units and units. On the basis of unflinching observance of Leninist standards of party life and the principles of party leadership, they tirelessly boost the activeness and aggressiveness of party organizations, exert regulating influence on growth of party ranks, develop initiative and activeness on the part of party members, and increase their responsibility for meeting the demands of the CPSU Program and Party Rules. Political officials have the task of teaching commanders, deputy commanders for political affairs, and secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations practical party-political work.

22

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Important tasks are assigned to political agencies pertaining to supervision of Komsomol organizations, indoctrination of Komsomol members, and ensuring their leading role in training, service, and military discipline.

Political agencies, together with trade union organizations, organize socialist competition for army and navy workers and employees and mobilize them for successful accomplishment of production targets and adopted socialist pledges.

Political agencies devote daily attention to maintaining close ties with the military masses. They regularly study the men's moods and requirements and promptly respond to their requests.

Political agencies study and place political cadres and participate in selection, placement and certification of officer personnel, and scientific-teaching personnel as well at educational institutions.

Political agencies maintain close contacts with local party and Soviet agencies, public organizations, enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhoses, take part in the work of local party committees, and regularly inform them on political work in military units.

The principal significance of the demands imposed by the party on political agencies under present-day conditions consists in these agencies tirelessly improving their activities, boosting them to a level corresponding to the new stage of development of the Armed Forces, and achieving effectiveness of party-political work in all areas, especially in matters connected with improving combat readiness, quality of combat and political training, and strengthening military discipline.

Political agencies are established by the USSR Ministry of Defense and Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy in conformity with the structure established determined by the CPSU Central Committee.

Supervision of party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy is exercised by the CPSU Central Committee through the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, with authority equivalent to a CPSU Central Committee division. In order to ensure collective decisions in determination of the most important matters pertaining to party-political work and indoctrination of cadres of party-political workers of the Armed Forces in a spirit of observance of Leninist standards of party life and the principles of party leadership, by decision of the CPSU Central Committee a Bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy was established. Bureau decisions are implemented by directives and instructions of the Chief of the Main Political Directorate.

In the Strategic Missile Forces, Ground Forces, National Air Defense Forces, Air Force and Navy there are political directorates functioning,

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which supervise party-political work in the line units, military educational institutions and establishments of the corresponding Armed Forces branch and which bear responsibility for the status of this work.

Political directorates also function in the border and internal troops.

Supervision of party-political work in the military districts, groups of forces and fleets, in the military construction and railway troops is performed by the appropriate political directorates; by the appropriate political sections in the airborne troops, in the armies and flotillas, in long-range bomber and military transport aviation, in combined units and at military educational institutions.

The political sections of combined units, military educational institutions and establishments supervise party-political work and organize it directly in the units and on naval ships, in faculties and departments of service academies and schools, and are responsible for its status; they exercise supervision of party and Komsomol organizations as well as the work of deputy commanders for political affairs of regiments, naval ships and independent units. The political sections of combined units concentrate principal attention on active organizational and indoctrinational work in the units and subunits.

Matters pertaining to ideological conditioning of personnel occupy the center of attention of the combined unit political section. It has responsibility for organization and conduct of ideological work.

The political sections of combined units participate in setting up groups and select Marxist-Leninist officer training supervisors; they monitor the ideological content and organization of political training of officers, warrant officers, enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers; they supervise the activities of officers' clubs, other clubs, libraries, universities of Marxism-Leninism, and party evening schools.

The combined unit political section devotes considerable attention to performance of combat training tasks and strengthening of military discipline. It organizes prompt and timely communication and explanation to personnel of party and government decisions and directives from the Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Directorate on matters of combat training and strengthening military discipline, exerts party influence on military personnel, and endeavors to increase their feelings of responsibility for performance of their service duty.

The combined unit political section establishes party and Komsomol organizations in the units and on naval ships, and approves the secretaries of primary party and Komsomol organizations; it carries out indoctrination of party and Komsomol activists and teaches them practical skills in working with the men; it checks the performance of party and Komsomol organizations, evaluates their work, supervises acceptance of new members into the party and Komsomol, and issues party and Komsomol documents.

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The political section is headed by the political section chief. He organizes all the work of the political agency and is personally responsible for its status.

The deputy chief of the political section directs the activities of political instructors, personally draws up political section work plans and organizes verification of their execution. He should be well informed on the state of party-political work in the units. He is authorized, in the political section chief's absence, to sign and issue party and Komsomol documents.

The political section renders concrete assistance to the party organizations of the units, trains party activists, synthesizes and effects practical adoption of advanced party work know-how, organizes and directs the activities of the party evening school.

The political section organizes propagandist-agitation work in the combined units, directs the activities of unit propagandists, and offers methods assistance to political training group leaders.

One of the political section instructors is responsible for the state of mass-cultural work in the combined unit. He instructs club managers and directors of unit libraries, gives them practical assistance in achieving a high ideological level of conducted measures, and continuously monitors to ensure proper utilization of propaganda means and facilities.

The assistant political section chief for Komsomol work is responsible for the organization and status of Komsomol work in the combined unit. He performs his job in the units and on naval ships in close contact with commanders, political workers and party activists. Staff Komsomol work instructors, designated from the best-prepared enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and warrant officers, work under his supervision.

The party and Komsomol document records instructor is responsible for proper records and safekeeping of blank forms and proper filling-in of forms, and is in charge of maintaining records on Communists and Komsomol members both in the political section, in the units, and on naval ships. Assignment of specific responsibilities to political section personnel enables them to organize their work in a concrete manner.

Party commissions are formed under the auspices of political agencies, which review decisions of primary party organizations in matters of acceptance to CPSU membership, as well as examining cases of minor offenses committed by Communists and Komsomol members. The party commissions, under the supervision of the political agencies, take part in verifying observance by party members of the CPSU Party Rules and their observance of party and military discipline. In all their activities they seek to increase the feeling of responsibility on the part of Communists for implementation of party policy.

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Successful accomplishment of the difficult and responsible tasks facing the units and combined units is ensured by the combined efforts and coordinated work of the commander and political section.

Relations between the combined unit commander and political section chief are characterized by good coordination, businesslike contact, and mutual support. In the process of daily personal contact the commander informs the political section chief on tasks being accomplished and instructions received from senior commanders as well as on the decisions they have made. The political section chief in turn reports to the commander on work being performed pertaining to political and military personnel, strengthening of the political-moral state and military discipline among personnel, and informs him on activities and the most important decisions of party and Komsomol organizations and on critical remarks and suggestions made by Communists.

This practice enables the combined unit commander and political section chief to gain thorough knowledge of the men's daily lives, produces a unified approach to evaluation of the state of affairs and makes it possible to concentrate the efforts of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations as well as all personnel on accomplishment of current tasks.

The political sections of military educational institutions are called upon knowledgeably to examine the process of training and indoctrination of enrolled personnel in conformity with present party demands, and actively to influence selection, placement and indoctrination of scientific-teaching cadres, high-quality execution of curricula and curriculum schedules, improvement of teaching-methods and scientific research work, and strengthening of ties between military educational institutions and line units.

An important role in implementing party policy in the army and navy is assigned to the political edifice of units and naval ships. It stands closest to the soldier masses and is always where personnel training and indoctrination tasks are directly carried out and where the requisite moral-political and fighting qualities are formed in the men.

The political edifice of the regiment (naval ship) includes the regiment (ship) deputy commander for political affairs, a propagandist, and club director. In addition, the unit contains exempted party committee (bureau) and Komsomol committee secretaries, who are elected by the established procedure. Battalions, combat departments of ships of rank 1 and 2, as well as companies, batteries and squadrons contain deputy commanders for political affairs.

The tasks assigned to the political workers of units and subunits are determined by party and government decisions, USSR Armed Forces regulations, Instructions to CPSU and Komsomol Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, by orders and directives.

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The regiment (naval ship) deputy commander for political affairs organizes party-political work and bears direct responsibility for the state of this work. One of his main duties is organization and conduct of party-political work to increase the combat readiness of the regiment (ship). He personally takes part in drawing up the combat and political training plan, supervises Marxist-Leninist training of officers, teaches commanders practical political-indoctrination work, plans and organizes political instruction classes, propagandist-agitation and cultural-educational work. The most important area of his work is strengthening of one-man command, discipline and the political-morale state of personnel. He conducts measures pertaining to organization of socialist competition.

The duties of the regiment (ship) deputy commander for political affairs in the area of party work are diversified. He constantly and deeply examines the practical activities of party and Komsomol organizations, regularly and systematically trains and indoctrinates party and Komsomol activists.

The regiment (ship) propagandist is responsible for the status of propagandist-agitation work and personally conducts propaganda among enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and officers. The propagandist supervises the activities of political instruction class group leaders, holds seminars for them, organizes exchange of experience and know-how, and verifies the ideological content of and methods employed in conducting political training classes. Together with subunit political workers, the propagandist selects agitators and works with them. The club director organizes club mass-political and cultural-educational work, dissemination of military-technical knowledge, and supervises the library operation.

The tasks of the regiment (ship) party committee (bureau) secretary and Komsomol committee secretary are spelled out in the Instructions to CPSU and Komsomol Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy.

The duties of battalion deputy commanders for political affairs are for the most part the same as those of the regiment deputy commander for political affairs, with the difference that they are carried out on the scale of their subunits.

One of the important measures carried out by the party for the purpose of strengthening the political edifice on the basis of the 21 January 1967 CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" was introduction of the position of deputy commander for political affairs in companies, batteries, squadrons and equivalent subunits. This important political and organizational measure was dictated by a qualitatively new stage in development of the Soviet Armed Forces, broadening of the tasks performed by them, enhancement of the role of moral-political and psychological training of personnel, and increased demands on combat readiness of units and subunits.

The Communist Party is constantly concerned with strengthening party-political work in the army and navy and endeavors to encompass all Soviet

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servicemen with political influence and to transform the company, battery, squadron and combat unit into a center of political-indoctrination work with personnel. This defines the role and place of the subunit political worker.

L. I. Brezhnev highly praised the activities of political workers during the years of the Great Patriotic War in his memoirs entitled "Malaya zemlya" [Little Land]. "The genuine political worker in the army," stated Leonid Il'ich, "is that person around whom people gather; he is thoroughly knowledgeable about their moods, needs, aspirations and dreams, and he leads them to self-sacrifice and heroic deed. And if one considers that the fighting spirit of troops has always been acknowledged to be the most important factor in troop staunchness, precisely the political worker was given the sharpest weapon during the war years. He toughened and tempered the hearts and souls of the fighting men, without which neither tanks nor guns nor planes would have brought us victory."¹⁸

Successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned to unit political agencies and the party-political edifice depends in large measure on their work style and methods. The main thing in their activities is daily organizational and political work among the military personnel masses. Following are the most important features of their work style: a high ideological level, high principles, purposefulness, a scientific, innovative approach to solving current problems, unity of word and deed, strict planning and execution, a high degree of organization, demandingness on oneself and others, a close bond with the soldier masses, regular and systematic monitoring and verification of execution. Also characteristic of the work style of political agencies and all army and navy political personnel is a high degree of professionalism and a businesslike character, thorough penetration into the essence and substance of combat and political training, and concern for increasing the effectiveness of party-political work.

The CPSU Central Committee greeting to Soviet Army and Navy political agencies, commanders and political workers in connection with the 60th anniversary of establishment of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council Political Directorate states: "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union expresses its firm conviction that army and navy political agencies, as directive party agencies of the CPSU in the Armed Forces, and political workers jointly with commanders and all army Communists, carrying out the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress, will continue in the future making every effort to strengthen ties with the military personnel masses, forming in them a scientific philosophical outlook, total dedication to Communist ideals, love of the socialist homeland, proletarian internationalism, with their impassioned party word and personal example leading the men to exemplary performance of their honorable duty to defend the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, the cause of peace and socialism."¹⁹

Communist Party leadership and direction comprises the basic foundation of Soviet military organizational development, the main source of the strength.

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and might of the Soviet Armed Forces. Communist Party activities pertaining to guidance and direction of military organizational development are of a multifaceted character and are increasing to an even greater extent at the present stage. This is a logical process which is influenced by the international situation and by the increasing complexity and broadening of the missions performed by the Soviet Armed Forces pertaining to defending the achievements of our homeland and of the entire socialist community.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], page 62.
2. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" [Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], Moscow, 1977, Article 6.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 39, pp 151-152.
4. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1976, page 112.
5. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 40, pp 76-77.
6. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuz. Dokumenty 1917-1968" [The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents, 1917-1968], Moscow, 1969, page 35.
7. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following a Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, Moscow, 1973, page 49.
8. "Materialy XXV...", op. cit., page 83.
9. Brezhnev, L. I., "Vo imya schast'ya sovetskikh lyudey" [In the Name of Happiness of Soviet Citizens], Moscow, 1979, page 10.
10. Brezhnev, L. I., "Velikiy Oktyabr' i progress chelovechestva" [The Great October Revolution and Progress by Mankind], Moscow, 1977, page 9.
11. See "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh...", op. cit., page 35.
12. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], Eighth Edition, Vol 2, Moscow, 1970, page 67.
13. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 38, page 92.

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14. "O 60-y godovshchine Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 31 yanvarya 1977 goda" [On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. CPSU Central Committee Decree of 31 January 1977], Moscow, 1977, page 17.
15. "KPSS o Vooruzheniykh...", op. cit., page 106.
16. Ibid., pp 414-418.
17. "Materialy XXV...", op. cit., page 83.
18. Brezhnev, L. I., "Malaya zemlya" [Little Land], Moscow, 1978, page 24.
19. PRAVDA, 26 May 1979.

Conclusion

Under the guidance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, large and complex tasks are being accomplished in this country pertaining to building the material and technological foundation for communism, improvement of societal relations and forming of the new man. The party is tirelessly campaigning to secure favorable peaceful conditions for building communism and is implementing a persistent and purposeful policy aimed at further international détente and strengthening of world peace. The CPSU is focusing constant attention on further strengthening this country's defense capability, on leadership and direction of the Armed Forces and improvement of army and navy combat readiness for defense of the achievements of socialism. Party-political work, the ideological and organizational activity of military councils, commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of army and navy are of enormous importance in accomplishing all the tasks assigned to Soviet military personnel.

Studying problems of party organizational development and party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces, military leader cadres and all army and navy Communists are arming themselves with knowledge of the Leninist principles of party leadership, the content, forms and methods of organizational-party and ideological activity and the functions of political agencies and party organizations both in peacetime and in a combat situation. This helps them more deeply analyze their practical activities, to see the strong and weak points of these activities, and to reach the necessary conclusions, seeking increased effectiveness of party-political work with personnel.

Just as fulfillment of the demands of the 25th CPSU Congress on improving quality and effectiveness is being advanced to the forefront for the country as a whole, it is acquiring primary significance in the area of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces.

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The category of effectiveness in the broad meaning of the word presupposes attainment of optimal results with the least expenditure of time and labor. This concept, however, cannot be adequately transferred from the area of economics to processes of political work. Party-political work is effective when it introduces substantial changes into the consciousness and deeds of Soviet military personnel. Therefore effectiveness of party-political work is defined as the degree of attainment of stated objectives with optimal utilization of available capabilities.¹ In a practical aspect as regards army and navy conditions, increase in its effectiveness "signifies strengthening of party influence on all root processes taking place in the Soviet Armed Forces, and particularly strengthening of combat might and increasing troop combat readiness and Communist ideological conditioning of personnel."² Precisely this serves as its main, principal criterion, expressing primarily the aggregate results of party-political work over a comparatively extended period of time.

By criteria of effectiveness of party-political work we mean those distinctive attributes on the basis of which one can judge achievements in forming a Communist philosophical outlook and indoctrination of Soviet military personnel, as well as increasing their social and sociopolitical activeness.

Effectiveness of party-political work is manifested in two aspects: in the consciousness and conduct both of individual military personnel and of large military collectives. In conformity with this it is also correct to speak of groups of its criteria and indices -- spiritual and practical (behavioral).

The spiritual and intellectual criteria of effectiveness of party-political work include new knowledge, cognitive activity, Communist conviction, ideological-theoretical competence, class maturity, sociopsychological state, and orientation. The principal indicators of the spiritual-intellectual criteria of effectiveness are degree of conscious mastery and depth of comprehension of the points of Marxist-Leninist theory and CPSU policy, the tasks facing the Armed Forces, and striving by Soviet military personnel toward intellectual improvement; level of formation in military personnel of diversified, stable and vigorous class interests, implacable opposition to alien ideology, unscientific views, ideas and theories; the state of the public mood and public opinion.

The main criteria of effectiveness of party-political work in a practical or behavioral form are military-labor and sociopolitical activeness, and morality of conduct by Soviet military personnel, and particularly Communists and Komsomol members. Indicators of this group of criteria include unity of views and actions, activeness of life position, and conscientiousness in performing one's professional and civic obligations; high quality of military labor, an endeavor more deeply to understand military affairs and to raise one's level of combat skill, combat readiness and military discipline; exemplary performance by Communists and Komsomol members in combat and political training; implacable opposition toward

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shortcomings; ability to work on a volunteer basis; innovative attitude toward the assigned task, and initiative; purity of moral countenance, honesty, responsibility, willingness and ability for comradely mutual assistance, etc. It is also correct to add to the indicators of this group degree of preparedness and competence of political agencies, commanders, political workers, and party activists to conduct extensive organizational and ideological activity among military personnel on performance of tasks assigned to units and ships.

The criteria of effectiveness of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces are very diversified.³ Their breadth is determined by the characteristic features of the Soviet way of life and the spiritual countenance of Soviet military personnel. Effectiveness of political work is grounded on the conscientiousness of military personnel, their Communist moral fiber, which L. I. Brezhnev graphically defined as a fusing of knowledge, conviction and practical action. The party sees in concrete deeds a measuring stick of success of the political indoctrination of the masses.⁴

Thorough knowledge of the problems of theory and practice of party organizational development and party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces enables political agencies, commanders, political workers, and party organizations to determine scientifically substantiated and proven ways to increase its effectiveness in units and on naval ships, corresponding to the level of the demands of the 25th CPSU Congress.⁵

Of fundamental significance among measures to achieve further improvement of all party-political work and attainment of greater effectiveness is a scientific approach to its organization in the army and navy. Its essence lies in the fact that all party-political work with personnel is organized in conformity with Marxist-Leninist theory, with the principles of party organizational development and CPSU policy, on the basis of scientific methods of analyzing the processes of life and activity of military collectives, taking into account new phenomena engendered by the evolution of military affairs, and the features of concrete conditions of the activities of the unit (ship).

One of the decisive conditions for a general upsurge in effectiveness of political work is continuous improvement in the moral-political and professional qualities of command and political cadres and an increase in their competence and responsibility for assigned areas; the ability to concentrate the efforts of subordinates on the main, root questions of improving quality of combat and political training, accomplishing the tasks of combat readiness and strengthening military discipline, self-critically and objectively to evaluate achievements, to reveal shortcomings, as well as all-out development of innovativeness and initiative on the part of personnel and unswerving observance of the Leninist principles of organization of socialist competition.

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Improvement in effectiveness of party-political work presupposes daily improvement of ideological work in the army and navy and qualitative improvement in the ideological conditioning of Soviet military personnel.

The proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress and the party Central Committee decree entitled "On Further Improving Ideological and Political-Indoctrination Work" note the importance of a comprehensive approach to statement of the entire question of indoctrination. Applied to army and navy conditions, it enables one effectively to form in military personnel excellent moral-political and fighting qualities and organically to combine teaching servicemen military skill with political and moral indoctrination, instilling in personnel a high degree of discipline, respect for Soviet laws, and observance of the standards of socialist morality.

Communists are the acknowledged vanguard of the Armed Forces. The effectiveness of party-political work depends in large measure on their active participation in the work of army and navy party organizations, skillful placement of Communists in decisive sectors, and further strengthening of the party organizations of subunits. The interests of increasing its effectiveness are also served by mastery by commanders, political agencies and party activists of modern methods of planning ideological and organizational work with personnel and improvement of work style and system of monitoring and verifying execution of decisions.

The task of improving the quality and effectiveness of party-political work in the army and navy occupies a central position in the activities of military cadres. Profound knowledge of theory of party organizational development, the scientific foundations, laws, patterns and Leninist principles of party-political work, and skilled utilization of the rich arsenal of forms, methods and means of ideological influence on personnel makes it possible successfully to resolve the problems of raising their ideological and organizational activities in the area of implementing CPSU policy in the army and navy, indoctrination of Soviet military personnel on the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, and mobilization of military personnel for accomplishing the complex tasks facing the USSR Armed Forces in the area of reliable defense of the socialist homeland.

FOOTNOTES

1. See A. A. Yepishev, "Nekotoryye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh" [Some Problems of Ideological Work in the Soviet Armed Forces], Moscow, 1975, page 45.
2. "Praktika partiynoy raboty v armii i flote" [Practical Party Work in the Army and Navy], Moscow, 1977, page 20.
3. For a discussion of the theoretical principles of determining criteria of party-political work, see "Kommunisticheskaya propaganda: voprosy

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teorii i metodiki" [Communist Propaganda: Problems of Theory and Methodology], Moscow, 1974, pp 172-206; A. A. Yepishev, "Nekotoryye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh" [Some Problems of Ideological Work in the Soviet Armed Forces], Moscow, 1975, pp 45-61; P. V. Pozdnyakov, "Effektivnost' Kommunisticheskoy propagandy" [Effectiveness of Communist Propaganda], Moscow, 1975, pp 241-294.

4. See "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], page 76.
5. See "Praktika partiynoy raboty...", op. cit., pp 20-33.

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BOOK DESCRIBES BASIC MILITARY TRAINING MATERIAL

Moscow SBORNIK MATERIALOV PO NACHAL'NOY VOYENNOY PODGOTOVKE in Russian 1979
signed to press 12 Dec 78 pp 1-11, 118-121

[Table of Contents and two sections of book compiled by A. I. Averin, M. A. Belikov and Yu. P. Subbotnik]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: SBORNIK MATERIALOV PO NACHAL'NOY VOYENNOY PODGOTOVKE [Digest
of Materials on Basic Military Training]
Publisher: Prosveshcheniye
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Brief Description:

The book has been recommended by the Main Directorate of Schools, USSR Ministry of Education.

Organizational and instructional methods recommendations on planning and conducting basic military training in schools, safety measures and rules during classes on this subject, and several norm documents are located in this digest to help military leaders.

The fourth edition of the digest has been subjected to considerable re-working: documents containing recommendations on equipping and improving the training and material base for basic military training, the "Statute on the All-Union Komsomol Military Sports Game, 'Orlenok'", "On Approving the List of Visual Training Handbooks and Training Equipment for Basic Military Training", etc., have been included in it.

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The third edition was put out in 1976.

Table of Contents	Page
Improving Basic Military Training in a School	3
Defending the Socialist Homeland (Extracts from the Constitution of the USSR)	12
On Universal Military Service.....	13
An Instructional Methods Letter on the Work of the Military Instructor in a School.....	18
Instructional Methods Recommendations on the Military Patriotic Indoctrination of Students in General Educational Schools During Non-Class Time.....	44
Norms for Evaluating the Knowledge, Abilities and Skills of Students in 9th (10th) - 10th (11th) Classes in Basic Military Training...	77
On Approving the List of Typical Visual Training Handbooks and Training Equipment for Basic Military Training in General Educational Schools.....	106
Recommendations of the All-Union Seminar of Basic Military Training Instructional Methods Study Room Managers (Instructional Method- ologists) in Advanced Training Institutes for Teachers on Further Improving Work With the Military Instructors of General Education Schools and Pedagogical Institutions	118
The Statute on the All-Union Komsomol Military Sports Game, "Orlenok".....	121
Safety Rules and Measures When Conducting Basic Military Training Classes in Secondary General Educational Schools and Pedagogical Institutions.....	131
Recommendations on Equipping and Improving the Training Material Base for Basic Military Training in a General Educational School, Secondary Special Educational Institute, Professional and Technical Education School, and a Training Center.....	142
The Decree on a Mass Sports Camp for Youth.....	167
Improving Basic Military Training in a School	
In accordance with the USSR law, "On Universal Military Service," Basic military training for upper class students has been introduced into	

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general educational schools. A crucial task has been given to the school-- to prepare youth to carry out an honorable patriotic duty: the performance of service in the USSR armed forces, and defend the socialist homeland.

The party and government are taking all necessary steps to further strengthen the country's defensive capabilities and improve the power of the Soviet army and navy. In its work in the field of military construction, our party proceeds from the fact that strengthening the country's defense capabilities and the military might of the armed forces is a task for all the people, especially youth.

The 24th and 25th CPSU congresses pointed out the need to increase our motherland's defensive might and instill in Soviet people a spirit of high vigilance and constant readiness to defend the great accomplishments of socialism. L. I. Brezhnev said in the CPSU Central Committee's report to the 25th CPSU Congress: "Strengthening the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride in the country of the Soviets and in our motherland, and the readiness to rise to the defense of socialism's accomplishments in the consciousness of the workers, especially the younger generation, has been and remains one of the party's very important tasks."¹ In connection with this, a school's work in further improving the military and patriotic indoctrination of Soviet youth and forming high moral, psychological and physical qualities in them is acquiring special importance.

The shortening of the periods of service in the armed forces and the equipping of the army and navy with the latest equipment and weapons require an increase in the quality of the youths' basic military training before their call up for active military service.

It is known what great importance V. I. Lenin attached to the workers' military training. He wrote: "Neither in peacetime nor in wartime can one forget... about the science of firing, about spreading the ABC's of military affairs widely and deeply among the masses."² Under modern conditions, the "ABC's" of military affairs are directly linked with the basic military training which is conducted for 140 hours with students in the 9th (10th) and 10th (11th) classes of general educational schools. Two hours a week in the 9th (10th) and 10th (11th) classes are allotted in a school's training plan for studying military affairs and the fundamentals of civil defense. Basic military training is a very important component of the overall system for preparing youth to serve in the armed forces and protect the Soviet motherland and socialism's accomplishments. Its basic task consists of giving pre-induction and induction age youth the necessary knowledge and skills, equal to a soldier's individual training, and the appropriate military and patriotic indoctrination so that, when they are inducted into the armed forces, they will be able to master modern weapons and military equipment in a short time.

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During the basic military training process, students must learn Lenin's precepts on defending the socialist motherland and the party's and governments decisions on questions about building and strengthening the Soviet army and navy; understand the historic purpose of the Soviet armed forces, their nature and distinctive features; and be imbued with the awareness that service in the USSR armed forces is the honorable duty of Soviet citizens. During the classes, the future fighting men must be acquainted with a soldier's actions during combat, study the basic requirements of the military oath and troop regulations, the construction of an automatic rifle and light machine gun, and receive practice in firing small caliber rifles and--when possible--live rounds from an automatic rifle.

The military technical training provided for by the program in schools permits upperclassmen to acquire basic knowledge and skills in one of the military technical specialties: vehicle driver, motorcyclist, radio-telephone operator, electrician, surveyor, tractor operator (for rural schools), and other specialties.

During classes on civil defense students study the characteristics of the enemy's weapons of mass destruction, ways to protect against them, and radiation and chemical reconnaissance instruments; and acquire practical skills in using individual and collective protection equipment.

Girls in the 9th - 10th classes study the fundamentals of military affairs and civil defense together with the young men, and acquire a combatant's knowledge and skills separately from them.

While studying all the sections and topics in the basic military training program, the upperclassmen receive the necessary moral, political, psychological and physical training; and acquire high discipline, organizational and drill skills in accordance with the requirements of troop regulations and future military service in the ranks of the Soviet army and navy. One of the most important tasks of basic military training is to instil in the students devotion to the Communist Party and the socialist motherland and inculcate in them a respect for the glorious Soviet armed forces, an interest in military service and a desire to follow the profession of a Soviet officer.

In order to strengthen the knowledge and skills acquired during basic military training classes, five days (30 hours) have been allotted to 9th class youth for practical classes during the summer production practical work. As a rule, these classes are conducted at a training base looked after by troop units and military sports camps. During these classes, youth are acquainted with military equipment and weapons and the accommodations and life of unit personnel, and fire live rounds from an automatic rifle. Where possible, they are shown the equipment and weapon in action.

During non-class time, military training, popular scientific documentary, and military patriotic films are shown for the students; and circles on the

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fundamentals of military affairs and the study of equipment and weapons; paramilitary games and trips; and visits to troop units where the upperclassmen are acquainted with the life, living conditions and training of soldiers, the combat traditions of subunits and units, and weapons and combat equipment, are organized. To help school directors and military instructors, the USSR Ministry of Education has developed and issued sample circle and department programs on the fundamentals of military affairs. As a rule, the circle's work on studying equipment and weapons is conducted separately with 9th and 10th class students.

The film centers of military districts and garrisons must pick out popular scientific, documentary, and military patriotic films for the schools in the prescribed order without collecting payment for their rental. Training films are shown simultaneously to the entire 9th class and separately to the entire 10th class, and sometimes jointly to the 9th and 10th classes in accordance with the basic military program and training plan.

Tenth class experience in conducting basic military training has demonstrated its vitality, need and effectiveness. Everywhere it has been noted that the introduction of basic military training contributes to improving the entire system of training and indoctrinational work in a school, raising the students' discipline and organizational ability, and preparing in a better qualified way youth for military service in the Soviet army and navy.

Letters and testimonials frequently arrive in schools from troop unit commanders. They convincingly show that basic military training is exerting a positive influence on the formation of the young fighting men. The letters pointed out that young men, who have received not only the necessary knowledge and skills in the fundamentals of military affairs but also the appropriate moral and psychological preparation for military service in the armed forces, are arriving in the army. School graduates, who have undergone basic military training, quickly enter into the rhythm of army service and successfully master the conditions and requirements of military life. The knowledge of the fundamentals of military affairs permits them to master combat equipment and weapons more successfully. Many secondary school graduates become excellent soldiers in combat and political training during their first year of military service, and then rated specialists. School military instructors also receive many letters from their former students which gratefully note that the basic military training, received in the school, made their mastery of combat equipment and the performance of military service much easier.

The quality of the basic military training and its indoctrinational significance is directly dependent on the military instructor's military and pedagogical qualification level, and on his ideological and political maturity and instructional methods skill. The well known Leninist statement that in any school, the ideological and political direction of classes is entirely and exclusively determined by the composition of the lecturers, pertains completely and fully to the role of military instructors in the students' basic military training and patriotic indoctrination.

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At the present time, military instructors, primarily from the ranks of reserve officers, conduct basic military training in secondary schools. The majority of them are CPSU members and many were participants in the Great Patriotic War. They are ideologically tempered people who possess multifaceted military knowledge and great life and military experience.

Being bearers of the glorious combat traditions of our people and their armed forces, they successfully carry out the upperclassmen's military training and actively participate in military patriotic work, instilling in the students the continuity of generations and devotion to the socialist motherland, Communist Party and Soviet people--thoroughly preparing the youth for military service in the ranks of the Soviet army and navy.

The majority of military instructors conduct classes at a high ideological, theoretical and instructional methods level, ensuring the students' firm and deep knowledge of the fundamentals of military affairs. They skilfully carry out the training in close union with ideological, political, and military patriotic indoctrination; and make wide use of material from the 25th CPSU Congress, CPSU Central Committee plenums, the new Constitution of the USSR, and other party and government decisions during the lessons.

In order to successfully carry out the critical task of preparing youth to defend the socialist homeland, the military instructor must not only possess deep military knowledge and high moral and political qualities but also be able to transmit the knowledge to his pupils and master methods for training schoolboys. Without pedagogical knowledge and instructional methods skills, it is difficult to count on carrying out the training and indoctrination of youth successfully.

At the same time, quite a few reserve officers and sergeants, the majority of whom do not have a teaching education and experience in working with schoolboys, are working in general educational schools and pedagogic institutions as military instructors. Many of them violate the elementary requirements of modern didactics and instructional methods. They do not know how to divide up training time correctly, they cover new material superficially; they do not consider the connection between subjects; they often replace a lively narration with dictated material from a training handbook, military regulations and manuals; they devote little time to the students' practical training and the use of active training methods, visual aids and technical training systems; they do not display the required exactingness toward the students' observance of prescribed rules of conduct; they do not achieve high discipline, organizational ability and drill appearance. These military instructors very much need to raise pedagogical qualifications; they need systematic instructional methods help, especially on ways to organize and conduct basic military training classes.

During recent years, a definite system for raising the qualifications of school military instructors has taken shape in the majority of the country's republics and oblasts. All newly appointed military instructors undergo a

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month's orientation course at a troop unit base. Many military instructors are trained during qualification raising courses at advanced training institutes for teachers. The refresher training of military instructors during courses is repeated every five years. Instructional methods associations of military instructors have been created in each rayon (city). Monthly classes, an exchange of work experience, and -- during school vacations-- seminar classes are conducted on their basis. Every fourth military instructor, who does not have a higher education, studies at the correspondence or evening departments of teaching institutes. As a rule, one day a week is allotted to military instructors in all the country's schools for the raising of their qualifications. Many school directors and teaching institute directors have begun to provide more effective help to military instructors in the preparation and conduct of lessons.

However, in a number of oblasts, rayons and republics, the necessary attention is not being paid to the selection of military instructors, their pedagogical training and the raising of their qualifications.

The work of some advanced training institutes for teachers is not always satisfactory. In some of them, they do not involve officers from troop units and civil defense staffs and instructors from the military departments of institutes and military training establishments in the conduct of classes with military instructors during the courses.

In a number of advanced training institutes for teachers, the progressive experience of military instructors is not studied and disseminated sufficiently, and they do not give them effective instructional methods help. Therefore, the educational organs and the directors of advanced training institutes for teachers must pay special attention to raising the qualifications of military instructors and devote serious attention to this work.

Some school directors, thinking that their knowledge of the fundamentals of military affairs is insufficient, transfer all basic military training questions to the jurisdiction of the military instructor, they do not check on his classes, and they do not give him the necessary instructional methods help.

At the same time, the functional duties of officials and the procedure for organizing basic military training in a school are accurately explained in the Statute on Basic Military Training. The military instructor is directly responsible for the students' military training, and the school director ensures the high quality conduct of classes according to the basic military training program and directs the pedagogical activity of the teacher's collective toward the carrying out of the students' military patriotic indoctrination during class and non-class studies.

Experience from conducting basic military training in schools convincingly shows that a director, who possesses a lot of administrative and pedagogical

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work experience, can provide considerable, highly qualified instructional methods help to a military instructor in his pedagogical growth.

It is also necessary to remember that the thorough preparation of students to defend the Soviet motherland is the critical task of the school's entire pedagogical collective and that the ideological, moral and psychological preparation of the students to defend the socialist homeland is accomplished in the entire system of training and instructional work, primarily during the training process. Therefore, each teacher in the school must -- in organic union with the material being studied--skilfully and intelligibly explain to the students the international policy of the party and the Soviet government and questions about strengthening the country's defensive capabilities; demonstrate the historic assignment of the Soviet armed forces; instil love for the Soviet army, military affairs and the military profession; form the moral and political qualities which are needed by a future defender of the motherland and hatred for imperialism; and, where possible also communicate the elements of military knowledge. The lesson system for general educational subjects forms in the students a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, develops a class approach to the analysis of social phenomena, and puts a firm foundation under the deep and conscious love for the socialist motherland.

In connection with the growing complication of military affairs, requirements have grown on the non-Russian fighting men's knowledge of the Russian language. In the army, the training of fighting men is conducted in the Russian language. M. I. Kalirin, an outstanding figure in the Communist Party and Soviet government who devoted a lot of attention to the indoctrination of youth and Soviet fighting men, has said: "You will not manage in the army without the Russian language. Our regulations are drawn up in Russian. Combat orders are written and commands issued in it. Russian serves as the language of intercourse between all USSR peoples. Russian is the language of Lenin."}

The basic military training of upperclassmen--whose main goal is to prepare youth for service in the army--must absolutely be conducted in the Russian language regardless of what language the training in other subjects is conducted in. The interests of preparing youth for the country's defense and of raising the combat capabilities of our armed forces require this.

Successful training in military affairs requires that the training material base for basic military training be improved, that the equipment of military study rooms be constantly renewed and replenished, and that visual training aids and technical training systems be acquired and skilfully used during the training process. The question of constructing shooting ranges for firing small caliber rifles is especially acute. The experience of a number of oblast educational organs, which have organized the construction of shooting ranges on shared beginnings with professional technical schools, military commissariats and DOSAAF committees, deserves attention.

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The basic military training of upperclassmen in general educational schools is a matter of great state importance. It requires the great attention of educational organs, pedagogic collectives and the social organizations of the schools.

The level of basic military training and military patriotic indoctrination in schools must answer the requirements of the USSR law "On Universal Military Service," the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, and the decrees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

A. I. Averin, Chief of the Basic Military Training Section of the USSR Ministry of Education and honored RSFSR school teacher.

Recommendations of the All-Union Seminar of Basic Military Training Instructional Methods Study Room Managers (Instructional Methodologists) in Advanced Training Institutes for Teachers on Further Improving Work With the Military Instructors of General Education Schools and Pedagogical Institutions.

Appendix to the USSR Ministry of Education Instructional Letter dated 25 August 1977, No. 56-M.

The 25th CPSU Congress pointed out the need to raise the level of training and indoctrinational work in secondary schools, improve the equipping of training and instructional methods study rooms, and bring training methods in accord with the requirements of modern life.

Guided by these decisions, the participants in the All-Union seminar examined the state of the students' basic military training and the condition of military patriotic indoctrination work with military instructors. They consider their primary tasks to be:

improving the work of raising military instructor cadre qualifications based on their thorough ideological, political, theoretical and instructional methods re-training;

studying and disseminating progressive experience accumulated in basic military training; and

raising the quality of developments in instructional methods materials and providing more effective help to the instructional methods associations of military instructors.

In order to further improve the work with school and pedagogical institution military instructors, it is necessary:

-- to take steps to carefully select and appoint instructors for the courses to raise the qualifications of military instructors; regularly examine and

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discuss the plans and contents of lectures and class, group and practical lessons in the study room's council or lecturer's aktiv;

-- to distribute students among the training groups in accordance with their education and work experience;

-- to pay special attention to increasing the instructional methods training of military instructors and developing in them the ability and skills to work on their own with training literature. It is advisable to have in the study room a graph on the progress of the courses to raise the qualifications of oblast, kray and city military instructors. This graph must be conveyed to each military instructor and ensure his timely and qualitative performance without allowing a decrease in the number of students in the courses and in the periods of their training. Along with overall course training, it is necessary to organize and conduct on a wider basis special purpose courses on specific questions in the training and indoctrinational work of military instructors, continuously operating seminars, and lectures and tutorials on the most important subjects in basic military training and in raising the qualifications of military instructors;

--to improve the work of studying, summing up and disseminating progressive experience in basic military training and the military patriotic indoctrination of students in schools and pedagogical schools. The dissemination of progressive experience must be accomplished by publishing articles with instructional methods advice in the periodic press; putting out digests and brochures; publicizing this experience in lectures and reports, during seminar classes in the courses to raise qualifications, conferences and meetings, and in the visual agitation of the advanced training institutes for teachers. The systematized and summed up material must be brought to the attention of all directors and military instructors in schools and pedagogical institutions no less than once a year. On the basis of the summed up experience, it is necessary to prepare and submit for the examination of educational organs proposals to improve the students' training and indoctrination.

--to improve the preparation of training and instructional materials to help military instructors and raise their ideological, theoretical and instructional methods level. Manuscripts of instructional methods developments, handbooks, and recommendations should be examined in the councils of instructional methods study rooms. The most qualified military instructors, VUZ military department instructors as well as ones in the pedagogic and psychology departments, military commissariat officers, and workers in national education organs and advanced training institutes for teachers must be included in the composition of author's collectives.

-- to develop a set of training and instructional methods materials and visual aids which a military instructor must use when preparing and conducting each class;

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-- to direct the work of instructional methods associations toward providing more effective help to military instructors in preparing for classes, and searching for more precise forms and methods for conducting them; one must make broader use of such forms of instructional methods work as the conduct and discussion of open lessons, instructional methods classes, discussions of lesson plans worked up by military instructors for the coming lessons, etc.;

-- to provide a military instructor with help in his self-education work by compiling for him lists of recommended literature on the different subjects in basic military training and military patriotic indoctrination, developing themes for papers and course projects, arranging tutorials on completing these papers and projects, and exercising control over the progress of the military instructor's independent work;

-- to develop, together with the other instructional methods study rooms in the advanced training institutes for teachers, proposals for realizing the links between basic military training subjects and general education subjects, especially with history, social science, literature, physical training, chemistry, physics, etc.;

-- to establish closer ties between instructional methods study rooms, basic military training, educational organs, military commissariats, local CD staffs, Komsomol and DOSAAF Committees, public health organs, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society on all questions which form the goals and content of the students' basic military training and military patriotic indoctrination.

In order to ensure the successful solution of the tasks to further improve work with military instructors, the seminar participants consider it necessary to complete the creation and equipping of basic military training instructional methods study rooms in all advanced training institutes for teachers in the near future in accordance with the instructional letter of the USSR Ministry of Education dated 16 January 1974, No.05 -14 -13 IN, "About Using in Work the Recommendations on the Instructional Methods Study Rooms of Advanced Training Institutes for Teachers" and regularly-- no less than once every five years -- conduct at central (republic) advanced training institutes for teachers courses to raise the qualifications of basic military training instructional methods study room managers (instructional methodologists) located in oblast, kray and republic advanced training institutes for teachers.

FOOT NOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [25th CPSU Congress Materials], Moscow, 1976, p 75.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collection of Works] Vol 10, p 358.

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3. M. I. Kalinin, "O kommunisticheskoy vospitanii" [On Communist Indoc-
trination], Moscow 1947, p 177.

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BOOK EXCERPTS: BALLISTIC MISSILE DESIGN

Moscow INZHENERNOYE PROYEKTIROVANIYE UPRAVLYAYEMYKH BALLISTICHESKIKH RAKET S
RDTT /ENGINEER DESIGN OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH SOLID FUEL ENGINES/ in
Russian 1979 signed to press 7 Mar 79 pp 1-5, 38, 83, 146, 184, 240

[Annotation, Table of Contents, Foreword, Excerpts from chapters 1-5, and
Bibliography from book by Yuriy Mikhaylovich Nikolayev and Yuriy Semenovich
Solomonov, Voenizdat, 5,500 copies, 240 pages]

[Excerpts] The book presents methods of designing guided ballistic missiles
with solid fuel engines which are used primarily in the initial stage of
designing a missile system. It demonstrates the importance of these methods
for substantiating decisions going into the development of a missile and for
updating possible values of its flight performance.

The book is intended for specialists working in the field of missile tech-
nology and for students in senior courses of higher educational institutions
familiar with the fundamentals of missile designing.

Material presented in the book is based on data published in open Soviet and
foreign press.

Contents

	Page
Foreword	4
Chapter 1. General Information on Guided Missiles	
1. Basic Requirements for UBR [Guided Ballistic Missiles]	5
2. Concise Information on Design and Flight of UBR	9
3. Stages in Building a UBR and Problems Solved in Designing	23
4. Concept on Effectiveness of Missile Systems and Criteria for Its Evaluation	27
Chapter 2. Fundamentals of UBR Flight Theory	
1. UBR Flight in Passive Leg of Trajectory	38
2. UBR Flight in Active Leg of Trajectory	46
3. Power Engineering Capabilities and Maximum Flight Range of UBR	56

47

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	Page
4. Hit Accuracy of GCh [Re-Entry Vehicle]	66
5. Basic Concepts of Dynamic Features of UBR	76
Chapter 3. Characteristics of Component Elements of Solid Fuel UBR	
1. Re-Entry Vehicle, System for Penetrating Missile Defenses, and Control System of UBR	83
2. Solid Rocket Fuels and Their Basic Characteristics	91
3. Solid Fuel Rocket Engines	101
4. Control Members of Solid Fuel Missiles	130
5. Characteristics of Material Used in Missile Building	137
Chapter 4. Preparation of Initial Data for Design	
1. Tasks and Content of Ballistic Design	146
2. Forming the Payload	149
3. Evaluating the Range of Values of Basic UBR Characteristics	156
4. Selected Features of the Choice of Certain Fundamental and Design Solutions	164
5. Features of the Selection of a Solid Fuel	174
Chapter 5. Determining Design Parameters of UBR	
1. Design Parameters and Methods of Their Determination	184
2. Analysis of Geometric and Mass Characteristics of Solid Fuel Missiles	191
3. Approximate Ballistic Analysis of UBR	220
4. Effect of Change in Certain Parameters on Flight Performance of UBR	227
Bibliography	240
Foreword	

Designing guided ballistic missiles is a complex and important stage in their development. Interrelated problems on the missile as a whole and on its individual systems and elements must be solved in the process. This procedure presumes the systematization and generalization of accumulated experience in missile building and the development of new methods for complex analysis of the missile which take fuller account of the mutual effect of individual technical solutions.

This book makes an attempt to present the content of methods for designing guided ballistic missiles with solid fuel rocket engines which are being used in engineering practice in the initial design stage.

Chapter 1 provides general information about guided ballistic missiles and on stages and tasks in designing. It also provides the concept of the effectiveness of missile systems.

Chapter 2 presents fundamentals of flight theory of ballistic missiles and their control to the extent necessary for rational selection of basic design parameters of a missile in ballistic designing.

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Chapter 3 contains basic information on the design and operating principle of the primary assemblies and aggregates of a solid fuel missile, including re-entry vehicles, control systems, means of protection against missile defenses, systems supporting their functioning, solid fuel charges, and control and stabilization members.

Subsequent chapters provide a detailed analysis of the stage of preparation and substantiation of basic initial data for ballistic design, and they reveal the tasks and content of this important stage in the process of designing the overall missile.

Design methods of performing power-weight, geometric, and ballistic analyses are provided, as applicable to the features of selected type schematic and design diagrams of missiles and their elements, which allow establishing a link between the basic missile design parameters and its flight performance.

The facts and figures given in the book are based on material of the open Soviet and foreign press.

Chapter 1: General Information on Guided Missiles

Guided ballistic missile (UBR) is the term customarily given to an unmanned flying craft provided with rocket engines and a control system (SU) and intended to deliver a re-entry vehicle (GCh) to the target along a trajectory which, for its primary extent, represents that of the flight of a freely thrown object.

The UBR is a component of the missile system (RK), which also includes ground launch equipment assemblies supporting the launch preparations and launch of the missile. For this reason the design of the UBR cannot be viewed in isolation from design of the RK.

The process of creating a UBR is very complex and many-sided. The content of this process is determined by demands placed on the UBR and RK as a whole being developed as well as by schematic and design solutions adopted and which determine the missiles' design and functioning in flight and their effectiveness of operating at the target. Let us examine the primary stages in the development and tasks accomplished in designing the UBR.

Chapter 2: Fundamentals of UBR Flight Theory

The science of missile flight (the term "external ballistics" also is widespread in the literature) is a further development and practical application of dynamics of movement of a solid body. In the general case, the flight theory of UBR involves the solution to the following primary tasks:

--calculating the trajectory and other basic characteristics of movement of missiles with known characteristics;

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- determining optimum regimes of movement and flight trajectories;
- analysis of missile stabilization and conditions for controlling it;
- a study of the influence of various disturbing factors on missile flight characteristics.

The Soviet and foreign literature presently reflects matters relating to missile flight theory rather fully and widely. Therefore this chapter will examine briefly the basic provisions and principles representing the greatest practical interest in designing in the initial development stage.

As shown by the practice of foreign missile building, a knowledge of this information is needed above all for rational selection of the schematic and design diagrams of the solid fuel UBR, and for determining its basic weight, geometric and thrust characteristics in combination with flight trajectory parameters which best meet the demands placed on them.

Chapter 3: Characteristics of Component Elements of Solid Fuel UBR

In forming schematic and design solutions for the missile, one must have, as a supplement to the basic information on flight theory presented in Chapter 2, a rather complete idea of the basic elements comprising the UBR. The GCh, the system of means for penetrating missile defenses, the control system and sustainer engines should be included above all among these elements.

Together with information of a general nature about these elements, this chapter presents the basic relationships permitting a determination of their working characteristics, which is necessary for identifying the basic tactical-technical characteristics of the missile under development and for performing a comparative evaluation of different variants of solutions in the process of its design.

Chapter 4: Preparation of Initial Data for Design

Designing the UBR requires coordinated decisions to be made on a number of various problems related to the most diverse fields of science and technology. The mutual relationship and interdependence of these problems makes the task of seeking compromise solutions in designing a UBR many times more complex than the solution to problems in any individual field of technology.

In practice, these features make it necessary to perform UBR design by cycles in several approximations, which as a result facilitates the process of seeking and substantiating rational solutions. This cyclic nature in performing the work is especially characteristic in initial stages of creating a UBR. As already was noted in Chapter 1, a preliminary design is produced at the beginning of development, which includes the so-called ballistic design and development of design-layout drawings of the missile and its basic elements.

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This chapter examines the basic tasks and content of ballistic design, as well as selected methods being used to form initial data or to substantiate individual propositions being used in the process of ballistic design.

Chapter 5: Determining Design Parameters of UBR

The selection of missile parameters comprises the basis of the second stage in ballistic design and consists of a quest for that optimum combination out of the possible multitude of combinations of various missile parameters which most fully meets a specific quality criterion.

This chapter provides approximate analytic relationships for determining geometric, weight and ballistic characteristics of missiles, and it formulates methods for determining and optimizing basic design parameters which allow these tasks to be solved without resorting to the use of a complex mathematical apparatus and the results of detailed design work.

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BOOK EXCERPTS: IDEOLOGICAL WORK AT UNIT LEVEL DESCRIBED

Moscow IDEOLOGICHESKAYA RABOTA V CHASTI: SODERZHANIYA, ORGANIZATSIYA, METODIKA in Russian 1978

[Book by Maj Gen N. I. Smorigo, candidate of historical sciences, editor, Col L. S. Balashov, Maj Gen V. S. Glushchets, Maj Gen V. N. Zenin, Col K. M. Pogozhev, Col A. E. Sabel'nikov, Maj Gen N. I. Smorigo, Col (Res) I. V. Forofonov, and Col V. P. Khrobostov]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: IDEOLOGICHESKAYA RABOTA V CHASTI: SODERZHANIYE, ORGANIZATSIYA, METODIKA (Ideological Work in a Unit: Content, Organization, Methods)

Authors: Maj Gen N. I. Smorigo, candidate of historical sciences, editor, Col L. S. Balashov, Maj Gen V. S. Glushchets, Maj Gen N. I. Smorigo, Col (Res) I. V. Forofonov, and Col V. P. Khrobostov

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Annotation:

On the basis of experience, study, and propaganda of the historic resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the authors reveal the content, organization, and methods of ideological work at a unit. Principal consideration in the book is given to the activities of commanders, political workers and the party and komsomol organizations in raising the quality and effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist training of officers, the political studies of ensigns and warrant officers; political work with soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and master sergeants; mass propaganda, cultural, and instructive

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work; and the propaganda of military and technical knowledge. Questions of organizing ideological and political work with personnel when performing combat duty, in exercises, and on naval cruises occupy a definite place.

Table of Contents:	Page
Chapter I. Real Problems of Ideological Work in the Army and Navy	3
1. Tasks of Ideological Work at the Present Stage	3
2. The Complex Approach to Educating Soviet Troops	12
3. Ideological Education Work of Party and Komsomolsk Organizations	20
Chapter II. Marxist-Leninist Training of Officers and the Political Study of Ensigns and Warrant Officers	40
1. Content and Organization of Marxist-Leninist Training Methods for Conducting Studies with Officers	41
2. Political Training of Ensigns and Warrant Officers	59
Chapter III. Political Studies with Soldiers, Sailors, Sergeants, and Master Sergeants	67
1. The Fundamental Form of Troop Education	67
2. Organization of Political Studies in a Unit	69
3. Problems of Methods in Conducting Political Studies	75
Chapter IV. Organization of Mass Agitation Work	85
1. Concern About Content and Increasing the Effectiveness of Mass Agitation Work	86
2. Forms, Methods, and Means of Mass Agitation Work	92
Chapter V. Cultural Educational Work	113
1. An Element of Ideological Work	113
2. The Military Unit's Club and its Function	116
3. Content and Forms of the Unit Library's Operation	127
4. Cultural Education Work in the Subunit	129
Chapter VI. Several Problems of Organizing Ideological Education Work During Combat Alert, Exercises, and Naval Cruises	133
1. School for Combat Morale and Psychological Toughening	133
2. Organization and Characteristics of Ideological Work on Alert Duty, in Exercises, and on Naval Cruises	139

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Table of Contents (continued):	Page
Chapter VII. Political Education Work and Strengthening of Military Discipline	158
1. The Important Specification of Combat Readiness	158
2. Main Trends, Forms, and Methods of Political Education Work in Strengthening Military Discipline	161
3. Shaping and Unifying the Military Collective	171
Chapter VIII. Organizing the Propaganda of Military Technical Knowledge	176
1. Effective Medium for Improving the Technical Knowledge of Personnel	176
2. Main Forms of Propaganda of Military Technical Knowledge	179

Chapter I

Real Problems of Ideological Work in the Army and Navy

1. Tasks of Ideological Work at the Present Stage

The life of the Soviet state and the multifaceted and creative activity of the Communist Party and our people are now being developed under the mighty and ever increasing influence of the 25th CPSU Congress, which was an event of world-wide significance and an important historic landmark in the development of communism in the USSR. It provided answers to actual and fundamental questions of the present and thoroughly developed and enriched Marxist-Leninist theory. The Soviet people, inspired by the impressive challenges outlined by the congress, are unremittingly and purposefully solving the goals set by the party for the economic, socio-political, and spiritual development of our society.

Great importance is attached to educating the new man who possesses a communist world outlook, ideological conviction, a high level of education, and moral culture. A most important role in this matter belongs to ideological work.

The significance of ideological work and the communist education of party members and the entire Soviet people is growing immeasurably under the present conditions. This stems from a number of domestic and foreign political factors.

Firstly, the rate and tasks of CPSU theoretical activity broaden in the stage of mature socialism, and the level of scientific Marxist-Leninist management is raised by the varied sectors of communist development. As was noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, a lot has been done in past years to

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work out the actual problems of Marxist-Leninist theory. At the same time, the requirement for its further creative development is currently becoming still greater and will raise a number of problems for thorough research.

Secondly, the growth of the role of ideological work is explained by the unprecedented amount and depth of revolutionary and transforming party activity and the significant novelty of the tasks being resolved by it. This also increases the role of man, his spiritual maturity, and readiness, will, and ability to build communism. Especially timely today are the words of V. I. Lenin that "the more thorough the transformation which we want to effect, the more it is necessary to raise interest in it and a conscientious attitude towards it and to convince new people, new millions and tens of millions, of the need".* The political and working activeness of the Soviet people in fulfilling the grandiose goals of the 10th FYP and the long-term plans of the party depend to a decisive degree on the effectiveness of ideological influence on their awareness.

Thirdly, renewal of socio-economic conditions in our country as a consequence of the steady and rapid development of science and technology is one of the reasons causing the growth in significance of ideological work under current conditions. The consciousness, informed nature, and overall education and culture of the Soviet people are growing. In this connection, questions of the efficacy and reasonableness of our propaganda and its sharpness and cogency acquire a special meaning. It is extremely important to also consider that new and modern generations of Soviet people are now starting out in life who bring with them new knowledge and new and increased spiritual interests.

Fourthly, the increase in the role of ideological work arises from foreign policy factors which reflect the new aspects of today's international situation. As the 25th CPSU Congress pointed out, favorable progress in world politics and detente are creating auspicious opportunities for the wide diffusion of the ideas of socialism. On the other hand, however, the ideological antagonism of the two systems is becoming more active and imperialist propaganda more refined. Intensification of the struggle with bourgeois and revisionist ideologies requires further improvement in the Marxist-Leninist education of communists and the vast masses of workers and the heightening of their political vigilance and ability to give a timely and effective rebuff to all hostile and ideological sabotage.

An increase in the significance of ideological work and communist education of the Soviet people is earnestly supported by a broad complex of measures which our party and its Central Committee implemented in this direction during recent years. On the basis of the resolutions of the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses, as well as a number of adopted Central Committee decrees, a qualitatively new stage is being achieved in ideological education work.

V. I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 42, p 140.

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As the 25th Congress emphasizes, however, we have no reason whatsoever for complacency; modern conditions are pushing new tasks ahead of the party's ideological activity.

Growth in the significance of ideological work expresses an intensification of the role of the spiritual factor, not only in the socio-economic development of our country, but also in strengthening her defense capability and improving the army and navy. At the same time, it is necessary to note that the increase in the role of ideological work under the conditions of our army life is also a consequence of the growth of the historical responsibility of the USSR's Armed Forces for ensuring favorable external conditions for building communism and the reliable protection of the great achievements of socialism; the expansion of their international missions; the specific developmental processes of military matters which have been expanded on the basis of improving armaments and combat equipment plus the qualitative changes in personnel which are taking place; and the extraordinarily exacting demands which modern warfare makes on the moral, political, military and psychological qualities of troops.

The formation of a communist world view in the Soviet people and army and navy troops is a leading determining trend and the core of all ideological work. Studying Marxism-Leninism arms them with a clear understanding of party policies, the ability to uphold the principles of communist ideology and evaluate all social phenomena from genuinely scientific positions. The strengthening of a communist world outlook and Marxist-Leninist ideas in the consciousness of military cadres and all personnel facilitates to a great extent their education in party spirit and an implacability to the enemies of socialism and hostile anticommunist ideology.

The 25th CPSU Congress pointed out that the mass study of Marxism-Leninism constitutes a most important feature of developing social consciousness at the current stage. And if we say that recent years were especially fruitful in the area of raising the scientific level and improving the content of communist education, then we see one of the reasons for this in the creative development by the party of ever active revolutionary Marxist-Leninist study.

The extensive access by military servicemen to the most abundant theoretical legacy of V. I. Lenin is a remarkable occurrence in the ideological life of the army and navy. In developing the communist world view of our country's young generation, documents of the CC CPSU (dedicated to such historical celebrations as the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, Karl Marx' 150th birthday, V. I. Lenin's 100th birthday, the 30th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy) have placed an extremely important role. In them, they have obtained the creative development of genuine problems of Marxist-Leninist theory which is the world view and methodological basis of ideological work.

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In the CC CPSU resolution "On the Tasks of Party Study in Light of the Resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress", special attention is given to the need for the thorough adoption of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism as a single international doctrine; the historical experience of the CPSU; the creative contribution to theory which is contained in the resolutions of past CPSU Congresses and its CC plenums, the works and speeches of L. I. Brezhnev and other party leaders; and in the documents of the international communist movement.

Of great significance are the CC CPSU decrees "On Increasing the Role of Verbal Political Agitation in Fulfilling the Resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress" and "On the Status and Measures of Improving Lecture Propaganda":

The policies of the CPSU are rightfully called Marxism-Leninism in action. The formation of a scientific and communist world view is inconceivable without a thorough and proven exposure of personnel to CPSU policies--the vital basis of the Soviet social and state system. Commanders, political organs, and party organizations are striving to conduct the study of Marxist-Leninist theory with party policy in an integral unit in close connection with the practice of building communism.

The main goal of all ideological work under present conditions is a more thorough study of the 25th CPSU Congress' historic resolutions in which party policy in all spheres of its domestic and international activity for the forthcoming period were concentrated and expressed in a remarkably thorough way. At the center of attention of military cadres and all military servicemen is Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "The Record of the CC CPSU and Immediate Tasks of the Party in the Area of Internal and External Policy" which is a model for the creative development of Marxism-Leninism under current conditions and a document of enormous inspiring and mobilizing force.

In the report at the 25th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that communist integrity is a fusion of knowledge, convictions, and practical actions. In this connection, the need was pointed out for transforming the knowledge being acquired by the people into an active and vital position and into a guide for action in resolving the vital tasks of building communism and increasing the economic and defense might of the Soviet state. The party considers the study of the materials and resolutions of the 25th congress as an important premise for steadfastly putting them into practice. This is why it is so necessary in the process of ideological work and political studies in all their forms, that a close tie be ensured with the practice of building communism, with propaganda of the Soviet people's achievements in the struggle to realize the resolutions of the 25th party congress, and with the tasks of building the military so that ideological and political education might be implemented in close unity with personnel education during the process of daily military labor.

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It is necessary that each armed defender of the socialist Homeland should deeply understand that military labor is one of the specific forms of people's socially useful activity and that service in the Armed Forces is the honorable obligation of Soviet citizens, and defense of the socialist Fatherland is their sacred duty. At the same time, it is necessary to make maximum use of the educational opportunities of military labor under the conditions of strained combat training, exercises, cruises, flights, and the fulfillment of combat alert missions. Building up the efforts in increasing the education role of the Soviet Army as a school for ideological and physical toughening, endurance, discipline and orderliness, and a school of military skill is a matter of honor for commanders, political workers, and party and komsomol organizations.

In providing a close amalgamation of political and work education, it is important to widely use such mass movements as socialist competition. It is aimed at better mastery of military equipment, increasing combat skill, and strengthening combat readiness. In recent years, it has received unprecedented scope in the army and navy.

Strengthening the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism in the consciousness of all our troops, plus pride for our Homeland, and a readiness to stand up in defense of the achievements of socialism as one of the main aims of ideological work.

In the struggle for building socialism and in the battles for its protection, new and harmonious relations have sprung up between the classes and social groups and the peoples and nationalities of our country--relations of friendship and cooperation. On the basis of social ownership in the means of production, the unity of economic, social, political, and cultural life, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and communist ideals, a new historic community of peoples has come into existence--the Soviet people. This new historic community of peoples is discovering an ever higher degree of consolidation under the conditions of developing socialism. Socialism has engendered a new type of patriotism integrally joined with internationalism.

In carrying out the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress, commanders, political organs, and party and komsomol organizations are devoting much energy to the matter of patriotic education of troops and simultaneously to strengthening their internationalist consciousness. In this work, it is considered that the patriotism of citizens in a socialist society is realized in the devotion and loyalty to their Homeland and to the concord of socialist countries, and that socialist patriotism and internationalism includes proletarian solidarity with the working class and laborers of all countries. A large spot is allotted to explaining questions connected with strengthening the unity of fraternal countries of socialism in the military area and combat collaboration of the personnel of the countries' armies--members of the Warsaw Pact.

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A significant place in ideological work, under the conditions of developing a socialist society, is occupied by the propaganda and explanation of the growth of the guiding role of the Communist Party, the outstanding results of its activity in the building of communism, the country's economy, the social and political development of our society and the armed defense of the achievements of socialism. It is important that all military servicemen should produce and deeply feel the dynamism of developing the Soviet society and should realize the greatness of the matters of the party and the people, and their own participation in the outstanding successes of the country of the Soviets.

A real problem of ideological work and its most important aim is the thorough and reasoned elucidation to personnel of the CPSU's foreign policy activity, the current international situation, the exposure of imperialism's aggressive nature, the education of personnel in the spirit of elevated vigilance, and the perpetual readiness to rebuff any aggression.

Supported by the resolutions of the 25th Congress and the subsequent documents of the CPSU, and considering the current events in the world arena, it is necessary to convincingly show personnel that our party manifests an unwearied concern over providing favorable external conditions for building communism. The correlation of forces in the world now has changed radically in favor of socialism. International relations are being built more and more on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation of states with different social systems. Detente of international tension has become a reality. However, it has not abolished the laws of class struggle and it does not signify a relaxation of the hostility of the two opposed social systems. Based on a thorough analysis of the contemporary situation in the world, the 25th CPSU Congress showed that in response to the successes of the cause of detente, forces of reaction and materialism have become active which would like a return to a time of "cold war" and a balancing on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. They are intensifying the arms race, developing new kinds of weapons, maintaining tension, and are striving to keep or attain their own military presence in strategically important regions of the world. The reactionary and aggressive nature of imperialism remains unchanged in the most varied forms in our day.

In this connection, it is necessary to strive in order that clearly permeating our ideological education work is the thesis that the steadfast desire for peace in the foreign policy course of the CPSU has always been matched, and will be matched with a readiness to rebuff any aggressor. "No one should have any doubts", stated L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "that our party will do everything so that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union might henceforth have at their disposal all the means necessary for carrying out their responsible mission--to be the guard of the Soviet People's labor and a bulwark of a universal peace."*

Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress. Moscow, 1976, p 83.

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Ideological work is called on to promote a correct understanding by all troops of the practical missions which result from this thesis in order to increase the army's and navy's vigilance and combat readiness.

Such an actual task as the decisive struggle with bourgeois and revisionist ideologies is of great significance.

The ideological antagonism of the two systems is one of the fundamental forms of class struggle in the modern world. The successes of socialism and communism plus favorable shifts in world politics are creating propitious conditions for the wide spread of Marxist-Leninist ideas. At the same time, bourgeois ideology, in adapting to the new conditions, is becoming more refined and subtle. The ideological struggle encompasses the entire complex of views, ideas, and spiritual values of the two opposing forms of life--socialist and bourgeois. And as the 25th CPSU Congress pointed out, there can be no place for neutralism and compromises. A high level of political vigilance and active, energetic, and persuasive propaganda work is required of our side. By exposing hostile ideology, we cannot but devote special attention to the problems of ideological struggle in the military area and in the sphere of military theory and history and to exposing the different kinds of falsification.

Under contemporary conditions, the moral education of the Soviet people and troops of the Armed Forces takes on a special significance, the essence of which is to form their communist moral convictions and aspirations, and readiness and capacity to consciously subordinate their personal interests to society's interests of worthy fulfillment of patriotic and international duty. Moral education encompasses virtually all aspects of the existence and way of life of personnel and the interrelations in the troop collective.

The contemporary stage of the Soviet Armed Forces' development which has increased demands on the moral, political, and combat qualities of personnel oblige commanders, political workers, and party and komsomol organizations to devote considerable attention to the problems of troop education in ideological work. One cannot but note that here and there propaganda on troop subject matter is still conducted without the proper depth and purposefulness. Occurrences and facts of living realities, the life of units, ships, and subunits are not adequately considered in it. Occasionally the aggressiveness and military applicability of it is insufficient.

It is necessary to direct more concentrated efforts of ideological, political, moral, legal, and military education on further strengthening the military discipline and unity of army and navy collectives. It is necessary in these goals, to continually conduct legal propaganda and to more actively use all the means of ideological work in order to raise the consciousness of each military serviceman and for thorough elucidation of the demands of the party, the USSR Constitution, the military oath, and the Armed Forces' regulations on discipline and its increased significance. One of the actual tasks is to create a healthy moral climate by means of ideological

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influence in the military collective and to raise its activeness and exactingness in the struggle for irreproachable behavior of each troop and the strict observance of regulation interrelationships. In the work of strengthening the discipline and orderliness of the troop collective, considerable significance ought to be given to the propaganda of the heroic military traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy and of its own district, fleet, formation, unit, and ship.

When we speak of the basic trends and actual problems of ideological work, let us remember that its paramount goal always has been and will remain the education of troops in the spirit of a deeply understood and realized personal responsibility for the country's safety, and the maintenance of the high level of combat readiness of troops and naval forces and each unit and ship. The means of ideological work are called on to have a more active and effective influence on the struggle for further strengthening troop discipline, the achievement of high-quality accomplishment of all military training missions and norms, and the excellent knowledge and care of weapons and equipment. In the sphere of ideological influence, it is also necessary to steadfastly support the problems of the moral, political, and psychological training of troops and the formation in them of high military morale and psychological qualities during field, flight, and naval training and daily military service.

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