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USSR Report

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BOOK EXCERPTS: STUDY ON WAR AND THE ARMED FORCES

Moscow VOYNA I ARMIYA--FILOSOFSKO-SOTSIOLOGICHESKIY OCHERK in Russian
1977 pp 1-6, 402-415

[Book edited by D. A. Volkogonov, A. S. Milovidov, and S. A. Tyushkevich]

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Annotation

This work examines the pressing problems of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. The collective that created this book tried to make broad use of the rich theoretical legacy left by the classicists of Marxism-Leninism, decisions and documents of the CPSU, and the entire world communist movement, to reflect more fully the tremendous experience our party has had in leadership of military development and armed defense of the socialist fatherland, and to account for recent advances enjoyed by the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. Antiscientific bourgeois conceptions and the viewpoints of rightist and "leftist" revisionists are unmasked.

The book is intended for a broad range of readers interested in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. It is recommended as a training aid in Marxist-Leninist training afforded to officers and to students of military educational institutions.

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Introduction

History is proceeding on a relentless course of revolutionary transformation of the world, initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution. The international positions of socialism are growing stronger and expanding with every year. The successes of the national liberation movement are increasing. The laborers are intensifying the class struggle against the oppression of monopoly, and against regimes of exploitation. The revolutionary-democratic, anti-imperialist movement is acquiring ever-increasing scope. More and more millions of people on our planet are becoming conscious of the ideals of Great October. "Not a single event in world history," said CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a report at a joint solemn meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Great October, "has ever had such profound, far-reaching consequences to mankind as did the Great October Socialist Revolution. The brilliance of the October thunderbolt lit the way to the future for the peoples of many countries. History began marching forward in giant steps."*

Peace is an important prerequisite of mankind's progress. Nations have always dreamed of a secure, just peace, a peace devoid of social and national oppression; but throughout the centuries and millenia, wars have flared up on Earth one after another--social forces opposing the aggressive policies of the classes of exploitation were a little too weak and

* PRAVDA, 3 November 1977.

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disorganized. In our time, peace has acquired a dependable support--the power, unity, and activity of world socialism, and its ever-stronger union with all progressive and peace-loving forces.

Faithful to the principle of socialist internationalism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is doing everything possible to insure the conditions for peaceful development in our country and in other countries of the socialist fraternity, and to insure peace and security of all nations. The main result of its foreign policy, notes the Accountability Report of the Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, is that "the international position of the Soviet Union is now stronger than ever before. This is our fourth decade of peace. The positions of socialism have grown stronger. Relaxation of tension has become a dominant trend."*

At the same time the congress emphasized the need for high alertness, and the importance of maintaining the energetic activities and units of all forces of peace and good will. The opponents of relaxation and disarmament have many resources at their disposal. Attempting to adapt themselves to new international conditions, these reactionary forces are displaying aggressiveness, they are utilizing various forms of activities, and they are attacking peace from different directions. We cannot forget for a single day that although the possibilities enjoyed by imperialism for aggressive actions are now significantly limited, the nature of imperialism has not changed. The question of war and peace remains the main question of modern times.

In the present struggle between opposing social systems in the international arena, the problem of war and peace is being solved in all spheres of social life and activity--in economics, politics, ideology, and culture. Experiencing serious setbacks and failures in domestic and foreign policy, and bridled by the powerful revolutionary forces of modern times, imperialism is laying special hopes on ideological sabotage, and it is mobilizing the forces and resources of ideological disorientation of the masses to an increasing degree.

Marxism-Leninism provides the sole workable solution to the problem of war and peace. Deeply revealing the laws governing society's development and revealing the reactionary social essence and scientific groundlessness of various bourgeois and revisionist viewpoints on war and peace, it serves as a dependable foundation for development of correct strategy and tactics in the struggle for peace, for prevention of war, and for international security.

Marxism-Leninism also provides the sole workable solution to the problems of war and armies inseparably associated with a more-general problem--the problem of war and peace. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and armies

* "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 34.

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makes up a system of viewpoints on these problems, and its premises are based upon fundamental conclusions of dialectic and historical materialism, political economics, and scientific communism.

The teaching on war and the army is an organic part of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on society. Utilizing the categories and concepts of dialectic and historical materialism, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army studies the most general, fundamental problems of the essence of war as a social phenomenon, the origin and class nature of war and the army, the relationship between war and politics, the mutual relationship of the economic, scientific, sociopolitical, and moral-political factors of war, the social nature and types of wars, the role of the masses and the personality in war, the role of ideology in war, and other issues. Being the most general and profound, the premises of historical materialism perform an integrative function within the entire structure of sociopolitical knowledge of war and the army, thus permitting us to view them in their dialectic unity with different elements of the structure's foundation and superstructure.

In addition the teaching on war and the army makes use of the categories and concepts of political economics, scientific communism, and other sciences. These are used in the analysis of the economic dependence of war and the army, the role of the economic factor in war, the relationship between war and the society's economic life, and the economic principles of a state's military power. Moreover the teaching on war and the army examines, in the sociopolitical aspect, the relationship between war and revolution, armed defense of the socialist fatherland, the essence and laws governing development of the army, unique features associated with scientific command and control in military affairs, and so on. All of these problems are naturally not divorced from one another. In their sum total and in their dialectic interaction, they represent a single, integral Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army has a creative nature. It is constantly developing, and assuming new content. Using the ideological-theoretical legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as the basis, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal communist and workers parties are consistently and persistently enriching this teaching with new premises and conclusions in correspondence with changes occurring in the conditions, the relationship of forces in different stages of society's development, and objective trends in the historical process.

One of the most important prerequisites of scientific leadership of the troops and of improving the work styles of our regular military personnel is to deeply master the entire sum of knowledge contained in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, and to learn to utilize it competently in practice. This task has acquired special urgency in the present stage of development of the Soviet Armed Forces, a stage of swift development of military science, and a deepening process of differentiation and, concurrently with this, integration of military knowledge.

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Preparing this book, the author collective tried to make the fullest possible use of the rich ideological-theoretical legacy left by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, decisions and documents of the CPSU, and the entire world communist movement, to more fully reflect the tremendous experience our party has acquired in leadership of Soviet military development and armed defense of the socialist fatherland, and to account for all recent advances enjoyed by the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

The structure of the book reflects the Marxist-Leninist approach to integrated analysis of the problems of war and the army.

The book consists of three parts.

The first part analyzes fundamental issues of the teaching on war and presents the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of war, its sources, and its essence and place in the historical process.

The second part of the work reveals the mutual relationships and interaction of material and spiritual forces in war, and it characterizes the military power of the state and the basic laws governing the course and outcome of wars, the mechanism of their action, and their utilization by social forces.

The third part of the book examines the origin, essence, and laws governing development of the army, its place and role in social life and in the state of war and peace, and the nature of modern armies and military alliances. The concluding chapter illuminates the methodological functions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

The book devotes a significant amount of room to criticizing the anti-scientific bourgeois and revisionist viewpoints on the causes, nature, and social consequences of war, and on the social nature and purpose of the army.

The author collective expresses the hope that this work, which is dedicated to systematized presentation of the fundamental premises of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, will be of assistance to our regular military personnel in improving their theoretical training and in their practical activity aimed at completing the tasks associated with persistently increasing combat readiness, posed by the 25th CPSU Congress to the Soviet Armed Forces and spelled out in the new USSR Constitution.

Conclusion

A theoretical analysis of the fundamental problems of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and of its methodological functions permits us to make a number of general conclusions.

Arising from the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army was a natural consequence of the revolution made by Marxism in philosophy, economic and political thought, and military theory. The works of Marx and Engels on

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military issues, development of their ideas by V. I. Lenin, and his thorough and profound analysis of the problems of war and the army in a new historical era made up the fundamental content of this teaching. It enjoyed further development in subsequent years, and it continues to undergo creative development by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, by other fraternal communist parties, and by Marxist scholars with a consideration for socio-political changes occurring in the modern world and the deep transformations occurring in military affairs.

The laws governing arisal and development of war and armies and the class-political content of these phenomena are the subject of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. As the classicists of Marxism-Leninism showed, profound analysis of such an important subject is possible only if a comprehensive, integrated approach is taken to it. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is a result of such a comprehensive, integrated analysis of the fundamental problems of war, armies, and military affairs through the resources of mainly dialectic and historical materialism, as well as Marxist political economics and scientific communism, with the achievements of historical and other sciences being utilized as well.

The truth of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army has been confirmed by sociohistorical practice. It has been demonstrated especially clearly and persuasively by the victorious outcome of many revolutionary wars of the proletariat and the masses against imperialism, in behalf of socialism, and in defense of its achievements, by the world-historic victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, and by the successes of national wars of liberation against colonialism. It has been confirmed by the inviolability of the defensive power of the socialist fraternity, and by the effectiveness of the political and military support it gives to nations fighting for national independence and social progress.

Creative, Marxist-Leninist analysis of problems associated with war and armies is especially necessary today, in the continuing struggle of progressive forces for peace and international cooperation, and for the liberty and independence of nations. It is especially necessary, first of all, if we are to make an objective scientific analysis, from party positions, of the modern sources of wars and the military danger, the aggressive nature, and the essence of militarism, the fundamental types of wars in the modern era, and their role in the historic process, and secondly if we are to develop a correct relationship to these phenomena in the working class and among all laboring masses, and substantiate the grounds for the policy followed by the communist parties in relation to the problems of war and peace, military construction, and military defense of socialism.

Marching forward from the positions of proletarian internationalism and constantly accounting for the interests of the laboring masses and the prospects of social development, the CPSU and other fraternal parties resolutely condemn imperialist, predatory, unjust wars and firmly stand

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on the positions of an active struggle for peace and social progress. The position of abstract pacifism is alien to communists. They believe it to be their international duty to halt all transgressions upon the achievements of socialism and upon the unity and integrity of the socialist fraternity, and to provide all possible support to the just struggle of peoples for national liberation, for democracy and socialism, against imperialism, and against all forms of exploitation and oppression.

Analyzing the laws governing the arisal and development of the army, its place in the political superstructure above the economic foundation, and its nature, features, and functions, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army defines the ideological-theoretical fundamentals of socialist military development. The fundamental principle of the Soviet military development is leadership of the armed forces by the Communist Party, and augmentation of the role and influence of party organizations in the army and navy. The guiding role of the party in military development is being continually raised together with growth in the scale and complexity of the tasks associated with defending the achievements of socialism against the aggressive intrigues of its enemies.

Basing themselves on the concrete conditions of the present historical era and the achievements of scientific-technical progress, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its Central Committee are doing everything necessary to constantly strengthen our country's defense capability and improve its armed forces. The availability of modern weapons and military equipment in the armed forces is improving continuously, and the quality of combat training and ideological indoctrination of the personnel is rising. As L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in the Accountability Report of the Party Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, "...the Soviet people may be assured that the fruits of their creative labor are dependably protected." *

The Soviet Armed Forces are performing their international missions in a common formation with armies of the fraternal socialist countries. Ideological, sociopolitical, economic, and military unity of socialist cooperation serves as the foundation of their power and invincibility. Growth in the strength of mutual relationships and the gradual convergent growth of socialist countries are a law of their development. One of the important forms of cooperation among fraternal socialist countries is the Warsaw Pact. It dependably serves the interests of peace and socialism. The armed forces of the allied states are in a high state of combat readiness, able to guarantee the peaceful labor of fraternal peoples.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is the immediate methodological base of the socialist state's military doctrine and military science. The essence of its laws, categories, and fundamental premises are an implementation for formation and scientific substantiation first of all of the political

* "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 83.

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content of military doctrine, and it indirectly influences its special, military elements. Marxism-Leninism and its teaching on war and the army direct the ideological and methodological development of socialist military science, impart to it a class-proletarian party nature, stimulate a creative approach to solving pressing problems, and strengthen its ties with revolutionary practice. Military science of the socialist state, which analyzes the specific laws of conducting and supporting wars, development of armed forces, and the means of warfare, accounts for the action of economic, political, ideological, and moral-psychological factors, and when it analyzes these factors it relies upon the conclusions and methodological principles of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

Aggravation of the ideological struggle in the international arena, caused on one hand by the deepening general crisis of capitalism and, on the other hand, by the successes of socialism and the entire world revolutionary process, embraces all spheres of ideological and social psychology. The ideological struggle is being waged in relation to fundamental issues of social development, to include the problems of war and peace, war and revolution, and the role of military coercion in the historical process. Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is our effective weapon in the present ideological struggle. It is able to reveal the reactionary essence of the ideology and practice of militarism, and its main force--the reactionary imperialist circles of the USA. The teaching on war and the army is used as the framework for analyzing and criticizing class, ideological-theoretical, and methodological foundations of the military doctrine and military-political conceptions of imperialism, bourgeois military science, the militarist ideas of the Maoists, and other opportunist distortions of Marxist-Leninist premises concerning war, armies, and development of military affairs.

Considering the unceasing military adventures of imperialism, the Communist Party and its Central Committee have imposed an important and honorable task upon the Soviet Union's military personnel--supporting the high combat readiness of the armed forces. Performing this task, regular officers and all personnel of our armed forces are doing a tremendous amount of hard work. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army plays a large role in ideological and methodological support to this work. It actively participates in the formation of the Soviet soldier's viewpoints, convictions, and ideological-political countenance, it promotes a deep understanding of the essence and significance of military service in the army of a socialist state, and it arms military personnel with the most important principles and premises directly guiding their concrete practical activities. Persistent study and creative application of Marxism-Leninism and its teaching on war and the army is a guarantee of further successes in all areas of military science and practice.

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BOOK DISCUSSES ARMY AS INDOCTRINATION SCHOOL

Tashkent SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA -- SHKOLA VOSPITANIYA in Russian 1977 signed to press 10 Oct 77 pp 1-2, 108, 3-5, 29-37, 107

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Brief Description:

This book discusses the establishment and development of the Soviet Armed Forces, the troops of the Red-Banner Turkestan Military District in particular, and the principles of Soviet military organizational development. Special attention is focused on the most important of these principles -- Communist Party leadership of army and navy.

The author comprehensively discusses the role of the USSR Armed Forces as a school for instilling in young people excellent moral-fighting, ideological-political qualities, as a school of life and maturation.

This book is intended for a broad readership.

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School of Life 67

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Introduction

The Soviet Army, engendered by the Great October Revolution to defend the young Soviet Republic and the cause of the workers and peasants, was and remains the flesh and blood of our people. The Soviet Army occupies an important place in this country's affairs, in its history, in the spiritual world of the Soviet citizen. It covered itself with unfading glory during the years of civil war and the struggle against imperialist intervention and displayed examples of unprecedented heroism of millions of fighting men, commanders and political workers during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

Our Army enjoys the deep trust of the toilers and the sincere love of the people. The source of the army's strength and invincibility lies in a growing unity between the Soviet Army and the people.

For Soviet citizens service in the military has been and remains a productive school of courage and acquisition of excellent moral qualities, a school of skill, ideological and physical conditioning, discipline and organization. Soviet fighting men are indoctrinated in a spirit of internationalism, brotherhood, solidarity and mutual respect of all nationalities and ethnic groups of the Soviet Union. Our Armed Forces constitute a united amicable family, a living embodiment of socialist internationalism.

CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his Report to the 25th CPSU Congress the enormous role played by our military in indoctrinating Soviet citizens: "Young boys enter the military family lacking life experience. But they return from the military as men, who have gone through the school of self-mastery and discipline, who have acquired technical, professional knowledge and political training."*

Young people also go through a fine school of indoctrination in the troops of the Red-Banner Turkestan Military District.

* "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, pp. 75-76.

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The fighting men of the Turkestan District, just as all personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy, inspired by the outstanding achievements of the Soviet people in implementing the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and achieving the targets of the 10th Five-Year Plan, are carrying out their duty to the homeland with even greater self-sacrifice. They are continuing to redouble their efforts in military labor in order to honor 1977 -- the year marking the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution -- with achievement of new and higher performance results in training and service, and increased combat readiness.

The history of the Red-Banner Turkestan Military District, an integral part of the valiant USSR Armed Forces, is the history of the heroic military labor of all generations of Turkestan fighting men: those who pounded the interventionists and Basmaks in the mountains and arid deserts, those who fought fearlessly against the fascist invaders during the trying years of the Great Patriotic War, and those who vigilantly guarded this country's southeastern borders in the postwar period. It is also being written by the present generation of Turkestan fighting men, who guard our homeland's southern borders.

The Communist Party devotes considerable attention to the ideological-political conditioning of toilers, especially youth, and their indoctrination in the revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions of the people. It was noted at the 25th CPSU Congress: "Establishment in the consciousness of the toilers, and particularly the younger generation, of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride in the Land of the Soviets, in our homeland, willingness and readiness to come to the defense of the achievements of socialism has been and remains one of the party's most important tasks."*

Especially favorable conditions are being created today for successful accomplishment of this task, when the country is making preparations to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces.

One of the most important factors in strengthening the military-patriotic indoctrination of this republic's toilers is the enlistment for this work of persons who have gone through military service and reference to the heroic history of the Soviet people and the glorious fighting history of the USSR Armed Forces, including the troops of the Red-Banner Turkestan Military District, which will celebrate its 60th anniversary on 4 May 1978. Turkestan fighting men are vigilantly guarding the southern borders of the Land of the Soviets and are tirelessly strengthening the indestructible friendship with the toilers of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, on the soil of which they are performing their honorable and difficult service.

* Ibid., page 75.

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Foundations and Principles of Soviet Military Organizational Development

The entire heroic path trod by the USSR Armed Forces convincingly attests to the fact that they possess unshakable foundations, that the party and Soviet Government adhere to solid principles in military organizational development.

The Soviet Army and Navy, as an instrument of the socialist state, have evolved together with the entire nation, passing through two very important stages in this process. The first stage is connected with the socialist state of dictatorship of the proletariat, and the second with transformation of this state into a state of all the people, with the worker class playing a leadership role.

The present, second stage of development of the Soviet Armed Forces is rooted in the past. Also inherent in it, however, are specific features dictated by important changes in the sociopolitical nature, designation and functions of the Soviet military organization and a sharp increase in its military might.

In the process of building a new life in our country, important changes have taken place in the social and governmental structure. The complete and final victory of socialism has been achieved in our country.

The Soviet people, guided by the party, have proceeded with building the second phase of the Communist society. Important changes in the socioeconomic area have evoked profound changes in sociopolitical affairs, which have found summary expression in development of the state of dictatorship of the proletariat into a socialist state of all the people. All this of course has affected the Soviet Army and Navy.

They have been transformed from an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat into an instrument of a state of all the people.

The truly popular character of the Soviet Armed Forces under present-day conditions is expressed in the fact that defense of the socialist homeland and service in the Armed Forces is the sacred duty of all Soviet citizens, regardless of their social status, national and other features and differences.

Important changes, caused by the profound sociopolitical changes in our country, have taken place not only in the social nature of the Soviet Army and Navy but also in their function and features.

With the total and final victory of socialism in the USSR, the Soviet Armed Forces no longer perform the role of one of the regulators of relations between classes, that is, they have lost their internal function, which was characteristic of them in the past. At the present time their entire might is directed outward, against the imperialist aggressors and their insidious intrigues against the Soviet Union, the world socialist

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system and the national liberation movement of peoples. Only the army of a socialist state is capable of losing its internal function at a certain stage of its development.

The next important change in the function of the Soviet Army and Navy is connected with the fact that our nation and its Armed Forces must today perform broader and more complex tasks in the international arena than prior to establishment of a world socialist system. In the past defense of the socialist homeland was limited to the borders of the Land of Soviets. Today it extends to the entire socialist community. And since the USSR is the mightiest socialist power, the Soviet Army and Navy naturally comprise the principal military strength of the entire world socialist system and the main obstacle in the path of the aggressive aspirations of the U.S. and other imperialists.

Our party and the Soviet state are carrying out military organizational development on the specific foundations and principles articulated in the writings of V. I. Lenin and in CPSU documents. Under present-day conditions they have experienced further development in the Party Program, in the resolutions of the 22d, 23d, 24th, and 25th CPSU congresses, and in the new Law on Universal Military Service Obligation.

The fundamentals of Soviet military organizational development are aspects of life in our society which decisively affect the USSR Armed Forces, their social nature and function.

The socialist mode of production and the socialist economic system form the economic foundation of Soviet military organizational development.

The socialist societal and governmental system, the alliance of the worker class and peasantry, the sociopolitical and ideological unity of society, and the friendship among the peoples of the USSR comprise the sociopolitical foundation.

Marxism-Leninism constitutes the ideological-theoretical foundation of Soviet military organizational development.

Also proceeding from the foundations of Soviet military organizational development are its principles -- the basic ideas or theses which guide the party and Soviet Government in their military policy and Armed Forces organizational development, as well as all agencies of the Ministry of Defense, commanders, and army and navy party organizations. These principles, which are inseparably linked with the general principles of governmental and party organizational development, divide into three groups: sociopolitical, organizational, and principles of training and indoctrination of personnel.

Reflected in sociopolitical principles are the most important aspects of the character and function of the Soviet Army and Navy, the main directions and areas of link between the Armed Forces and this country's societal affairs, and the root foundations of the Soviet socialist system. The most

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important of these principles is the principle of party direction of the Armed Forces.

The class principle is an important principle of Soviet military organizational development. Today it has lost its significance in the sense of domestic army and navy manpower acquisition based on class selection, for the Soviet Armed Forces have become an organization of all the people. The class principle is still implemented today, however, in political and military indoctrination of personnel. Only its thrust is focused outward, against imperialism and bourgeois ideology.

Unity of army and people comprises the following principle of organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. In contrast to bourgeois armies, which are separated from the people and placed in opposition to the people, the military organization of the world's first socialist state is closely linked with the toiler masses and reliably defends their interests.

The principle of internationalism plays an enormous role in Soviet military organizational development. It is embodied in the fact that all nationalities and ethnic groups in the USSR possess a unified military organization -- the multinational Armed Forces, that all citizens of this country, regardless of their nationality, possess equal rights and duties to defend the socialist homeland, that army and navy personnel are indoctrinated in a spirit of friendship of the peoples of the USSR, in a spirit of brotherhood with the peoples of the socialist nations and a fighting alliance with their armies, and in a spirit of deep respect for all people of labor and awareness of their international duty to the toilers of the entire world.

The principle of internationalism also expresses today the fighting alliance of armies of the socialist nations and their joint defense of the achievements of socialism against imperialist aggression. It is organizationally embodied in the Warsaw Defense Pact, which was signed in May 1955 in the capital of the Polish People's Republic by almost all European socialist countries.

This treaty spells out the mutual obligations of the parties to the pact in case of an armed aggressor attack on a country or group of countries which are signatories to the pact. If such an attack occurs, all members of the pact will offer the allied country immediate assistance with all means, including employment of military force.

In the process of cognition by Soviet military science of the laws governing and patterns of armed struggle, synthesis of our country's military experience and utilization of everything of value from the practical experience of organization of the armies of other nations, the principles of organizational development of the USSR Armed Forces were formed. The substance of one of these principles consists in conformity between the form of military organization and the concrete historical conditions and tasks

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which the army and navy will be performing in a future war if the imperialists initiate one.

The principle of maintaining a cadre regular army proceeds from application of this more general principle in the present-day situation. So long as the imperialist nations possess powerful regular armed forces and reject complete and universal disarmament, the socialist countries are forced to maintain and improve their cadre armies.

The principle of continuous improvement of the organizational structure of army and navy and harmonious development of all services and arms continues to retain its significance.

The principle of centralism plays an exceptionally important role in Soviet military organizational development. Its unflinching implementation is especially important today, when the army and navy are equipped with nuclear missile weapons and when there continues to be a threat of sneak attack by the imperialist aggressors with employment of weapons of mass destruction.

The essence and substance of this principle lies in the fact that all units, with their headquarters and other control entities, are most rigorously subordinated to the central governmental agencies and to the unified Supreme High Command. Lower echelons are accountable to higher echelons in all matters and activities and unswervingly carry out their orders, directives, and instructions.

The principle of centralism is ensured by exterritorial unit formation, designation of top-echelon command personnel by government agencies, and corresponding command and verification of execution proceeding in a downward direction.

The CPSU Program states that one-man command is a most important principle of organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and is inseparably linked with centralism. The essence of one-man command lies first and foremost in the fact that the commander bears full responsibility for the condition and status of the unit or combined unit entrusted to him and for the combat and political training of personnel. All the commander's orders and instructions shall be executed by his subordinates unquestioningly and immediately.

The role of one-man command has increased to an even greater extent today, for contemporary war, especially with employment of nuclear weapons, will be distinguished by an unprecedentedly dynamic character and by swift situation change. Essential today more than at any time in the past is an efficient commander of strong will and invested with full authority.

One-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces is organized on a party basis. This means that commanders function as implementers of party policy in the army and navy, that in their work they rely on the support of party and Komsomol organizations and work in constant contact with political agencies

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and political workers. The principle of conscious military discipline is closely linked to the principle of one-man command. No army can exist without discipline. But in contrast to bourgeois armies, where discipline is based on class supremacy and coercion, military discipline in the armed forces of socialist nations is based on the conscientiousness of military personnel and on the common interests of commanders and their subordinates in ensuring the security of the socialist homeland.

Of course reliance on conscientiousness in strengthening military discipline does not exclude the employment of measures of coercion on military personnel who are remiss in performance of their military duty.

In connection with the development of nuclear missile weapons and other modern armament, the role of military discipline has increased immensely.

The organizational principle of continuous and constant combat readiness by our Armed Forces has become particularly important today.

Training and indoctrination of Soviet Army and Navy personnel are also organized on certain principles.

What are these principles?

Communist ideology and party-mindedness in the training and indoctrination of personnel define the general political thrust and class character of the process of spiritual and intellectual shaping of military personnel and all training and indoctrination work in the army and navy. Communist purposefulness, political awareness, and ideological staunchness, expressed in unwavering dedication to the cause of the party and the interests of the Soviet people and our socialist homeland, form the foundation of the moral-fighting qualities of our military personnel and comprise the most important motivation in the service and combat activity of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The principle of unity of training and indoctrination predetermines the indissolubility of the process of spiritual-intellectual shaping of the fighting man and arming him with requisite military and technical knowledge, skills, and combat proficiency. "Indoctrinate in training and train in indoctrinating" -- profound pedagogic significance is contained in this formula of organization of the training and indoctrination process in the army.

The principle of teaching troops what is essential in war and in conditions maximally approaching actual combat expresses the practical thrust of the entire training and indoctrination process in the army and navy and determines the principal objective of combat training of personnel. Under present-day conditions the concrete content of this principle has become more profound and diversified than in the past.

The principle of conscientiousness and activeness of personnel in training and indoctrination defines a broad group of demands on organization

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and methods of the training and indoctrination process in the troops. It consists essentially in all-out stimulation of personnel training and service activities and in developing in personnel a profoundly aware, productive attitude toward mastering military affairs and combat specialties.

The principle of systematic, sequential training and indoctrination reflects the general structure of the training-indoctrination process in the subunit and unit and applies both to its planning and organization as a whole and to each training class and the training of each individual specialist.

The principle of individual approach with reliance on the collective characterizes the sociomethodological thrust in forming and shaping each man individually and the military collective as a whole. This principle is grounded on respect for the individual, his aspirations and interests, characteristic of our society, while at the same time a spirit of collectivism, comradeship and mutual assistance is expressed in it, a spirit which is so characteristic of the people of our socialist system. The individual approach enables an officer more deeply and comprehensively to study each one of his subordinates, his character and personality, views and interests, to determine his strong and weak points, and to awaken in him an inner drive and energy essential for successful mastery of military affairs.

The great advantages of the socialist system constitute powerful sources of the strength and invincibility of the Soviet Army and Navy. The principles of training and indoctrination of military personnel we have examined here, reflecting the objective patterns of the training and indoctrination process in the army, create the requisite foundation for scientific organization of military labor. Mere theoretical knowledge of these principles is insufficient, however. The ability innovatively to put them into practice is essential.

Conclusion

The Soviet Armed Forces have had a heroic history. Created and indoctrinated by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party for defense of the achievements of the Great October Revolution, and warmed by the affection of all the people, they watchfully and vigilantly performed and continue to perform honorable military service.

In numerous battles with our foes, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces have not only defended the honor, freedom and independence of their socialist homeland but have also continuously rendered fraternal internationalist assistance to the toilers of other countries in their struggle for social and national liberation from the fetters of capitalist slavery and fascism.

Our army and navy have always constituted a powerful factor in preserving and consolidating peace and in preventing wars initiated by imperialist

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aggressors. They are continuing to perform this noble mission today as well, vigilantly guarding, together with the armies of the nations of the socialist community, the grandeur of the achievements of socialism.

Soviet military personnel, including those of the Red-Banner Turkestan Military District, sacredly honor the instructions of the 25th CPSU Congress: "Guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and serve as a bulwark of world peace."

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BOOK EXCERPTS: POLITICAL TEXTBOOK FOR CIVILIAN SCHOOLS

Moscow PARTIYNO-POLITICHESKAYA RABOTA V SOVETSKIKH VOORUZHENNYKH SILAKH
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This work was edited by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Assistant Professor, Major General P. I. Karpenko.

Annotation

This textbook presents the missions, content, forms, and methods of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces. The discussion centers on the work of commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations aimed at raising the combat readiness of units, ships, and subunits, completing the tasks of combat and political training, and nurturing ideologically persuaded, disciplined, competent, and courageous defenders of the motherland. The unique features of party-political work in a combat situation are also illuminated.

The book is intended for students of civilian VUZ's.

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Introduction

The great people of the Country of the Soviets are building mankind's first communist society. They are performing this world-historical revolutionary deed under the guidance of their tested organizer and leader--the Leninist party. "Armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine," states Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, "the Communist Party defines the general prospects of the society's development and the USSR's domestic and foreign policy line, it guides the great creative activity of the Soviet people, and it imparts a planned, scientifically grounded nature to their struggle for the victory of communism."

Under the diverse influence of the ideas and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, we are working in all areas of communist development on a scale of grandiose scope and diversity. The political wisdom and foresightedness of the party of Lenin, the deeply scientific grounds of its decisions, the active party organizational and ideological work being done by party organs and all communists, their personal example, and the selfless, creative labor of the Soviet people are insuring continuous growth of the country's economic, scientific-technical, and spiritual potentials, improvement of socialist social relations, and our successful progress toward communism.

Adoption of the new USSR Constitution, which is an extremely important landmark in the history of our Soviet motherland, was an outstanding contribution by the party to communist development. The new Fundamental Law is the result of a tremendous amount of work, of analysis and generalization of the profound changes which have occurred in Soviet society in the 40 years following adoption of the 1936 Constitution, and of the constitutional experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The grandiose achievements of the Soviet people are having a revolutionary influence upon world events, and they are strengthening the positions of real socialism, and the forces of peace and progress. It is in the name of this humanitarian goal that the Communist Party and Soviet government are implementing their foreign policy course. The success we have been able to achieve in relaxation of international tension has dispelled the immediate threat of a nuclear conflict. However, the danger of war has not been eliminated completely. "...the present phase of world development," states the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution", "is typified by greater intensity of the class struggle in the international arena. Aggressive imperialist forces

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are spurring on the arms race, which is a serious threat to the peace and security of nations, and they are trying to do everything possible to hinder relaxation of tension. Reactionary circles are organizing ideological sabotage against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as slanderous anti-Soviet and anticommunist campaigns; they are also trying to intervene in the internal affairs of socialist and other countries."*

Under these conditions the Communist Party and the Soviet government are successively, constantly, and persistently implementing a policy of restraining the forces of war and aggression, they are actively fighting to consolidate peace on earth, and they are taking all necessary steps to reinforce the defense capabilities of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist fraternity. And although the Central Committee faces many important and unpostponable matters concerning management of the national economy and sociopolitical development and concerning international relations, all issues pertaining to the country's defense are under its unweakening attention. Recent important evidence of this can be found in the addition, to the Fundamental Law of the USSR, of a special article declaring defense of the socialist fatherland to be the most important function of the state, and an affair of all the people.

Personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces sense the firm leadership and guiding role of the Communist Party every day, and they are responding to its attention and concern by selfless military labor directed at raising combat readiness. The oath of the Soviet soldiers, given to delegates of the 25th CPSU Congress, to selflessly serve the Communist Party and the Soviet people, to be forever in high combat readiness, and to fulfill any order of the beloved motherland to protect its sacred borders** is a battle program of life and activity of the troops and naval forces.

The Communist Party's activities in managing military development are multifaceted. The party defines the military policy of the Soviet state, develops the scientific fundamentals of organizing and developing the armed forces, concerns itself with providing modern equipment and weapons to the army and navy, selects, places, and educates personnel, and directs the personnel's efforts at completing the task of protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces is an inseparable part of the Communist Party's revolutionary transforming activity. Throughout the entire history of Soviet military development, it has been an efficient means of implementation of the CPSU's policy in the armed forces, in creation of the moral and political foundation of their fighting power and

* "O 60-y godovshchine Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 31 yanvarya 1977" [On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. CPSU Central Committee decree, 31 January 1977], Moscow, 1977, p 20.

** See "XXV s'yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz. 24 Fevralya--5 marta 1976 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet" [Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 24 February--5 March 1976. Minutes] Vol 1, Moscow, 1976, p 433.

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combat readiness, and in exercise of party influence upon the military masses; party-political work is one of the indispensable conditions of attaining victory over enemies of the Soviet motherland.

Party-political work insures maintenance of a political approach to the execution of missions, it imparts profound ideological content to all activities of privates, seamen, sergeants, petty officers, warrant officers, officers, generals, and admirals, it imparts a conscious, active, and purposeful nature to this activity, it forms high moral, political, and combat qualities in the personnel, and it mobilizes Soviet soldiers to successfully complete the missions facing the Soviet Army and Navy in peacetime and wartime.

V. I. Lenin viewed political work to be one of the most important foundations of Soviet military development, and a mandatory prerequisite of high combat readiness and battleworthiness of the army and navy. He saw a direct dependence between the morale of the troops, their combat proficiency, and victory over the enemy on one hand and the effectiveness of party-political work on the other: "...wherever...political work is conducted in the troops with the greatest concern..., there one will find no laxity in the army, there its bearing and morale are better, and there the victories are more frequent."*

The leader of the party was constantly concerned about the quality of political work, he personally participated in its organization and conduct, he showed a constant interest in the state of political work in the troops, and he patiently taught commanders and political workers the art of indoctrinating and mobilizing the masses for successful completion of missions. He demanded from his military workers that they never weaken political work, that they constantly monitor it, that they raise its efficiency, and that they deeply study and master the advanced skills associated with sociopolitical practice.**

M. V. Frunze, an outstanding Soviet army organizer and troop commander, and one of V. I. Lenin's students and colleagues, placed a high valuation on the role of party-political work. "Political work," he said, "has been and will always be the foundation of our military development. The party has played and will continue to play a guiding role in all of our military policies. We cannot imagine strengthening the military power of our country and strengthening the power, internal cohesion, unity, and discipline of our Red Army apart from such party work."*** He treated political work as a special sort of weapon which would have the decisive significance in certain situations.

* Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 56.

** See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 50, pp 271,328,348; Vol 51, pp 4-5.

*** Frunze, M. V., "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, 1965, p 250.

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CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out the tremendous significance of party-political work many times. Discussing fundamental changes occurring in the military equipment available to the troops and naval forces, the changes in the nature and means of combat activities, and the growing requirements imposed on the moral and political training of the personnel, he emphasized: "Party-political work with the personnel, and their ideological development have always been and continue to be a mighty weapon of our army. The power of this weapon has been tested in the fire of combat. It continues to strike fear in our enemies today."*

Following Lenin's commandments, the Communist Party takes care to see that the party-political work would undergo constant improvement in the Soviet Armed Forces, that it would be purposeful and effective, and that it would satisfy modern requirements.

The goal and content of party-political work in the army and navy, and the principles of its organization are spelled out in Lenin's teaching on the party and on defense of the socialist fatherland, by the CPSU Program and Charter, by decisions of the party congresses and plenums of its Central Committee, by CPSU Central Committee decrees, by statutes and instructions approved by the party Central Committee, and by orders and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

The CPSU Central Committee has adopted special decrees on the fundamental issues of party-political work. Taking account of the greater requirements imposed on the morals and political training of the personnel, and the new tasks, the concrete conditions, experience, and practice, these decrees have spelled out the content, forms, and methods of the work done by military councils, commanders, political organs, and party organizations to implement party policy in the Soviet Armed Forces, communist indoctrination of soldiers, maintenance of troops and naval forces in constant combat readiness, and assurance of successful completion of training missions and combat missions in the most diverse situations.

The CPSU Central Committee 21 January 1967 decree "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy"**, documents of the all-army conferences of party and Komsomol organization secretaries and of ideological workers, and a scientific-practical conference of army and navy political executives, and the new edition of the Statute on Political Organs and the instructions to CPSU organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, approved by the CPSU Central Committee in 1973, are fundamentally

* Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, Moscow 1970, p 51.

** See "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuz. Dokumenty 1917-1968" [The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents of 1917-1968], Moscow, 1969, pp 414-418.

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important to reinforcement of the party's guiding role in the Soviet Armed Forces, to improving party development, to expanding the sphere of party influence upon all aspects of the activities of the troops and naval forces, and to strengthening their battleworthiness. These documents deeply analyze the state of party-political work, give a scientific definition of the concrete steps to be taken to improve this work, spell out the tasks of military councils, commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations today, and recommend the most suitable forms and methods of completing these tasks.

The general orientation of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces in the next few years is defined by documents of the 25th CPSU Congress. The party's course aimed at raising the effectiveness and quality of its influence in all spheres of activity, the high evaluation given to the army's educational role by the congress, the justification given for the need for taking an integrated approach to all matters having to do with indoctrination, and the tasks associated with developing, in every Soviet individual, an active life position and a set toward further improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces and augmentation of their combat readiness are the fundamental factors associated with the planning and organization of party-political work at all army and navy levels.

To conduct party-political work in the spirit of the requirements of the 25th CPSU Congress means to organize it on a scientific basis and account for the military-political situation, the nature of modern warfare, the tasks associated with improving the quality of the armed forces and insuring its constant combat readiness, and satisfaction of the high requirements imposed on the combat skills, discipline, and moral, political, and psychological training of the personnel, associated with the appearance of fundamentally new types of weapons. This also means persistently improving the style and methods of the work done by commanders, political organs, political workers, military engineers, and party and Komsomol organizations, insuring an integrated approach to troop training and indoctrination, and attaining high effectiveness in the measures implemented.

The main tasks of party-political work are: deep analysis and implementation of the 25th CPSU Congress's decision and the party's directives on strengthening the country's defense capabilities and improving the armed forces; instilling, in the personnel, high political awareness, and unifying the personnel about the Communist Party; fighting to complete the plans of combat and political training, to attain a high level of field, aerial, naval, and special skills, and to master, in short time, new combat equipment entering the services; maintaining exemplary order, organization, and military discipline in all units and subunits and aboard all ships; shaping excellent moral, political, and combat qualities in the soldiers, and raising the unity of military collectives; reinforcing party influence upon all aspects of the life and activities of troops and naval forces, and insuring the unity of ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination. If we fail to arm the commanders, political workers,

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engineers, and technicians with the necessary theoretical knowledge and advanced skills in personnel indoctrination and in developing their practical habits, successful completion of these tasks would be unimaginable.

No matter what sort of officer is involved--be he a commander or political worker, engineer or a technician--party-political work is an inseparable component of his official duties. This is why all military training institutions and civilian VUZ's offer courses in the reserve officer training program and why in addition to other social, special, and military sciences, the course "Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces" is studied. The goal of this training discipline is to arm future officers with a deep knowledge of the premises of Lenin's teaching on the party, the principles of party leadership of the armed forces, the content and tasks of party-political work in the army and navy, and the methods of its conduct in the units, aboard ships, and in the subunits; to develop habits and abilities the officers would need in organizing practical functions associated with political, military, and moral indoctrination of the personnel; to teach them to conduct party-political work aimed at completing concrete training and combat missions in peacetime and in wartime; to rely in their activity on party and Komsomol organizations, and on the military collective.

As with any scientific discipline, the party-political work course has its own object. The object of study includes one of the aspects of the Communist Party's activity--organizational, party, and ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces. The course reveals the scientific fundamentals, the principles of organization, and the method followed in the practical activities of commanders, political organs, party-political machinery, and party and Komsomol organizations in peacetime and wartime, aimed at successfully implementing party policy in the army and navy, and insuring the battleworthiness and combat readiness of troops, and attainment of victory in combat. The course devotes a significant amount of room to concrete experience of party-political work, to scientific generalization of the experience of the best commanders, political workers, military engineers, and technicians, and to development of a creative approach to communist indoctrination and military training of Soviet soldiers.

The problems contained within the course on party-political work are presented with a consideration for the premises and conclusions of military science, military psychology, and pedagogics. A knowledge of military psychology and reliance upon its premises help commanders, political workers, military engineers, and technicians to deeply understand the personality of the Soviet soldier, his internal life, and the motives of his behavior, and on this basis to organize political indoctrination of the personnel more concretely and fruitfully, to shape exemplary mutual relationships within military collectives, and to instill high moral, political, and combat qualities in subordinates. Military pedagogics arms officers with a knowledge of the principles of military training and indoctrination, and it teaches them how to best influence development of combat proficiency and political awareness in the soldiers.

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The principal literary sources associated with the course on party-political work include the work of the founders of scientific communism--Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the CPSU Program and Charter, decisions of party congresses, party conferences, and CPSU Central Committee plenums, CPSU Central Committee decrees, the Statute on Political Organs, the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, and the military regulations. The experience of party-political work accumulated in the troops and the conclusions arrived at in a scientific analysis of this experience are contained in directives of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. It is important for the future specialist to know these documents as well, and to use them creatively in his practical activities. As is the case with other disciplines, the training offered in this course involves a diversity of forms and methods. Broad use is made of lectures, seminars, practical drills, consultations, discussions, course projects, and essays. But the main method used in the course work is independent work, coupled with active student participation in sociopolitical activities. It is only through independent work that students acquire deep and sound knowledge.

Party-political work is undergoing improvement constantly. Its content is growing richer, and the tasks are growing more complex. Constant improvements are being made in the organizational structure, forms, and methods of the work of political organs, the party-political machinery, and the party and Komsomol organizations. Thus if the serviceman is to master the methods of organizing party-political work, it would be important for him to deeply understand its scientific grounds and the objective laws governing development of the processes occurring within it under the influence of changes in the international and domestic situation of the country, and qualitative improvement in the troops and naval forces.

This training manual has the purpose of helping students of institutions of higher education to acquire the necessary knowledge and recommendations associated with party-political work with personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Chapter XI. Party-Political Work Aimed at Strengthening Combat Cooperation With Soldiers of the Armies of Socialist Countries

The positions of the socialist system, which is having a tremendous influence upon the course of world development, are growing stronger with every year. To progressive mankind, the mighty strides being made by the countries of socialism in their confident movement toward a developed socialist society, toward communism, is clear evidence of the limitless possibilities offered by the new socioeconomic formation, and of its historical superiority over capitalism. Besides the constant growth we witness in every socialist country, the mutual relations among them are becoming ever closer, and their unity, solidarity, and multifaceted cooperation are growing stronger. This premise is documented by Article 30 of the

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Soviet Constitution. "The USSR," it states, "being an inherent part of the world socialist system, of the socialist fraternity, is developing and strengthening friendship, cooperation, and comradely mutual assistance among socialist countries, on the basis of the principle of socialist internationalism, and it is actively participating in economic integration, and in international socialist division of labor."

The CPSU devotes constant attention to strengthening the unity and developing cooperation among fraternal countries, and to strengthening the general international positions of socialist states in the world arena. This cooperation is being achieved successfully in all areas--in economics, politics, and ideology. The interests of peace and socialism, of dependable protection of the security of fraternal countries against the aggressive intrigues of imperialist reaction are served by the Warsaw Pact Organization. "We are resolute opponents of both division of the world into opposing warring blocs, and the arms race..." noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th party congress. "However, I must make it quite clear that as long as the NATO bloc persists, as long as militarist circles promote the arms race, our country and other participants of the Warsaw Pact will strengthen its military-political union."*

1. Essence and Fundamentals of Combat Cooperation Among Armies of the Socialist Countries

Military cooperation among the fraternal countries is one of the important areas of their multifaceted and constantly growing ties. As with all other areas of joint effort, military cooperation is based on the inviolable combat union of the communist parties of the socialist countries. The socialist means of production, dominance of public ownership of the resources of production, and socialist production relations are the economic foundation of the unity of countries in the socialist fraternity. The uniformity of state and social structure, the commonness of social structure, and rule by laborers led by the working class make up the sociopolitical foundations of the fraternal union of these countries. Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism make up the ideological foundation of cooperation among the fraternal nations and armies.

V. I. Lenin pointed out many times that people who have assumed a course of socialist development "mandatorily require a close military and economic union, since otherwise capitalists..would crush and strangle us one at a time."** Resolutely criticizing those who during the Civil War, when the Soviet republics had still not formed into a single state, attempted to violate their military union, he gave the justifications for the need of

* "Matesialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 8.

** Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, ..

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collective protection of revolutionary achievements. "...standing in the face of the tremendous front of imperialist powers," said V. I. Lenin, "we, fighting against imperialism, are a union requiring close military cohesion, and we view all attempts at violating this cohesion as totally impermissible phenomena, as violation of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism... We say that we need unity in the armed forces, and that deviation from this unity is impermissible."*

Following these directives, the communist and workers parties of the socialist countries are closely coordinating their political, economic, and military effort in behalf of further reinforcement of the defense capabilities of each socialist state individually, and the entire fraternity as a whole. "The Soviet Union," states the CPSU Program, "believes it to be its international obligation to insure, together with other socialist countries, dependable protection and security of the entire socialist camp."**

Military cooperation among the socialist countries and cooperation of their armies in combat are important inherent components of the international solidarity of the fraternal nations, and a clear embodiment of Lenin's ideas about proletarian internationalism, and about the need for unity and cohesion among the forces of socialism in their struggle against imperialist reaction and aggression. The combat union of the fraternal nations and armies reflects common understanding, by the civilians of countries in the socialist fraternity, of their national and international tasks.

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed in May 1955 in an effort to oppose the aggressive imperialist blocs, and the Warsaw Pact Organization created on its basis have no purpose other than to provide collective protection to socialist achievements and peace. Prior to this, there never had been such a military-political union which was aimed at maintaining and strengthening international security, and insuring favorable foreign political conditions for peaceful development of socialism and communism. The fundamental difference between the socialist military union and the aggressive military blocs of the imperialist states stems from the nature of socialism and its armed forces, from the goals and tasks of military cooperation among fraternal nations and armies, and from the progressive role of cooperation among socialist countries in the world revolutionary process.

Military friendship among the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries has its origins back in the Civil War, when many foreign civilians, who for one reason or another found themselves on Russian territory at that time, took an active part in the fight against the interventionists and the White Guards on the Red Army's side. This friendship developed and grew

* Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, pp 98-99.

** "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p 111.

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stronger in joint battles against fascism and imperialist aggression. Thirty-five thousand internationalist soldiers from fifty-four countries of the world, including the Soviet Union and other countries presently in the socialist fraternity, fought heroically in 1936-1939 under the banner of the Spanish Republic. Defeat of Japanese aggressors in 1939 at the Khalkhin-Gol River was a clear example of cooperation in combat between the peoples and armies of the USSR and Mongolia.

The Great Patriotic War became an important stage in the development and improvement of combat cooperation among fraternal nations and armies. The Soviet people and their armed forces made the decisive contribution to the defeat of Hitler's Germany and militarist Japan. Patriots of Yugoslavia, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary, and German anti-fascist patriots fought together with the Soviet people against fascism. The total strength of foreign units and subunits armed and trained by the Soviet Union was more than 55,000 men by the end of the war. Soldiers of the Polish Army, the Czechoslovak Army Corps, the Bulgarian 1st Army, the Romanian T. Vladimiresku Division, and Hungarian formations fought the enemy courageously on the Soviet-German front. The Mongolian Peoples Army took an active part in the defeat of the Japanese invaders in Manchuria. The Soviet Armed Forces proved themselves in joint battles during the war as faithful comrades in arms, forever ready to come to the aid of their friends.

After the socialist system was formed, military cooperation among the fraternal peoples and armies entered a qualitatively new phase. Its development traveled a path from bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance to multilateral agreements, and in the end led to close military unity within the framework of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

During the time of the Warsaw Pact's existence, its participants did a great deal to oppose the aggressive plans of imperialism. States of the socialist fraternity provided effective help to the peoples of Vietnam and other countries of Southeast Asia in the struggle against aggression. They assumed a fundamental position of supporting the just struggle of liberation of the Angolan people against foreign interventionists and their accomplices; they have been and continue to be proponents of a sound and just peace in the Near East.

The present members of the Warsaw Pact include Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia. The treaty mutual relationships between them and the entire system of the pact are structured upon the principles of totally voluntary membership, equal rights, and fraternal friendship.

The Warsaw Pact Organization is headed by the Political Consultative Committee (PKK), in which all countries in the organization are represented equitably. The most important problems associated with strengthening the defense capabilities of pact countries and fulfilling the responsibilities

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associated with joint defense are examined and collective decisions on international problems are worked out at meetings of the PKK. As was noted in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, many initiatives which the Political Consultative Committee forwarded in recent years were placed at the basis of decisions made by major international forums, or they were reflected in a number of important bilateral interstate acts.* The Committee of Ministers of Defense, which produces joint recommendations and proposals concerning improvement of the defense capabilities of the allied countries and augmentation of the combat readiness of their armies, also plays an important role in the Warsaw Pact.

The Warsaw Pact member countries created the Combined Armed Forces with the purpose of insuring an effective defense; these forces include the ground troops, air and naval forces, and air defense troops. Their composition consists of troop formation and units, control organs, and rear services contributed by decision of the government of each country. The Combined Armed Forces are led and their activities are coordinated by the commander in chief and by the military control organs of the Warsaw Pact Organization--the Combined Command, the Military Council, and the Headquarters. A convention signed by the governments of all Warsaw Pact countries established that Moscow is to be the seat of the Combined Armed Forces Headquarters.

Common principles and methods of training and indoctrination underlie the combat and political training of personnel in the Combined Armed Forces. A proper level of combat capability is insured in these forces mainly by the high political awareness of the soldiers, who are indoctrinated in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, socialist patriotism, and internationalism.

Troops assigned to the Combined Armed Forces, and all personnel of the fraternal armies, engage in combat and political training every day in accordance with the plans of the national commands. In addition to this, much significance is attached to practicing joint actions in accordance with plans of the Combined Command. An important role belongs in this to troop and naval exercises, as well as special and command-and-staff exercises. In these exercises, problems concerning control and combat coordination are worked out, the abilities and habits of joint work of the commanders, staffs, and political organs are improved, and the military proficiency of the personnel is raised.

Joint exercises are in addition a good school of international combat comradeship, of strong fraternal friendship among soldiers of the socialist countries. This is precisely the nature of the exercises Shumava (1968), Odra-Nisa (1969), Brotherhood in Arms (1970), Shchit-72 (1972), Shchit-76 (1976), and some others.

* See "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 8.

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During the years of the Warsaw Pact's existence, owing to the untiring concern of the communist and workers parties and the governments of the socialist countries, the defense capabilities of the allied states grew significantly stronger. The quality of combat skills and the level of ideological maturity of the personnel of both units and formations in the Combined Armed Forces and in each fraternal army as a whole improved. Today they are outfitted with top-class armament and combat equipment: rocket weapons, tanks, artillery, air defense resources, modern airplanes, surface and submarine warships, and the latest electronic equipment. The armies of the socialist countries, including troops within the composition of the Combined Armed Forces, possess everything necessary to dependably protect the peaceful labor of the peoples of the socialist fraternity.

Military cooperation among Warsaw Pact countries enjoyed further development, and the forms and methods of this cooperation broadened and grew richer. This development is directed at raising the combat readiness of the allied armies, and providing mutual assistance in outfitting them with the latest military equipment, at unifying efforts to develop military theory, at developing and introducing the most sophisticated methods of troop training and indoctrination.

The coordinated activities of all military organs of the Warsaw Pact Organization is one of the manifestations of the growing strength of military cooperation. Representatives from all fraternal allied armies are working together in the Committee of the Ministers of Defense, the Military Council, the Headquarters and other organs of the Combined Armed Forces. Their efforts are aimed at solving long-range and current problems, and at developing the most effective forms of cooperation in military affairs. They organize research on and generalization and dissemination of advanced skills in troop training and indoctrination, they prepare joint exercises, rallies, and scientific conferences, and they perform other functions.

Party-political work is a powerful resource through which the communist and workers parties exert their daily influence upon the life and activities of the armed forces of the allied states. Party-political work in fraternal armies does not differ significantly in terms of its content and orientation from that conducted in the Soviet Armed Forces. The unity of its ideological content is a product of the common ideologies and policies of the Marxist-Leninist parties, and the common goals and tasks of the peoples of socialist countries, and their armed forces. Differences mainly involve the organizational aspect, particularly the structure of political organs and party organizations, as well as the forms and methods of personnel political and military indoctrination.

The system of ideological and political training for servicemen is basically the same in all allied armies. Officer training is organized as a rule as Marxist-Leninist training groups, theoretical seminars, study circles, and party schools and evening universities of Marxism-Leninism. Political lessons are regularly held for enlisted men and sergeants.

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At the same time in addition to forms and methods common to all Warsaw Pact armies, those inherent to just the given army alone are employed in mass agitation. Thus the Bulgarian Peoples Army holds 15-minute political briefings every day, and once a week it organizes more-substantial reviews of political information lasting an hour. Moreover the "Dawn of Triumph", dedicated to the memory of patriots who had given their lives in the struggle against fascism and reaction, held 1 July of each year, has now become a tradition among our Bulgarian friends. On this day, while the soldiers are in morning formation, the names of fallen communists, underground antifascists, and soldiers of the Bulgarian Peoples Army are announced. After each name is announced, the personnel respond in unison: "Died heroically in combat" or "Tortured by fascists in prison." Then a salute is offered. After this the soldiers take part in a torchlight parade to the cemeteries of the heroes, and place flowers and wreaths on their graves.

Each May the Hungarian Peoples Army holds Mother's Day. On this day the mothers of the outstanding soldiers of combat and political training are invited to the military units by the command. In a solemn meeting, commanders and political workers extend words of gratefulness to them for bringing their sons up so well. The guests are acquainted with the life of the soldiers. Outstanding soldiers are permitted to travel to the city and spend this day there together with their mothers.

Primary party organizations in units of the GDR National Peoples Army create agitation-propaganda groups. Their composition usually includes politically trained officers, sergeants, and enlisted men--members of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Union of Free German Youth. Under the guidance of party organizations, these groups organize lectures and reports for the personnel, and they conduct various functions devoted to the pressing problems of international and domestic life, as well as to problems in the training and life of the soldiers. Reviews of the work of agitation-propaganda groups are periodically held in the formations.

"Victory Patrols"--a unique form of indoctrination--have gained a firm foothold in the Polish Army. This is the title given to functions conducted by groups of servicemen involved in study of and publicity on combat traditions. They visit veterans of the antifascist struggle and record their memoirs, which are subsequently utilized in the press, in political lessons, and in discussions.

Units of the Czechoslovak Peoples Army have made it the rule to have the unit commander and his deputies hold monthly meetings for young officers.

A broad network of cultural education institutions--from the central army cultural education homes to regimental homes and, in the Polish Army and the Hungarian Peoples Army, battalion clubs--has been created and is now operating in all fraternal armies of the socialist states. Cultural education is conducted at company level in specially outfitted rooms called Dimitrovsky rooms in the Bulgarian Peoples Army, company clubs in the GDR National Peoples

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Army, company day-rooms in the Polish Army, cultural education rooms in the Romanian Peoples Army, and company clubs in the Czechoslovak Peoples Army. In the Hungarian Peoples Army, Komsomol clubs operate in the battalions and separate companies.

2. Fundamental Directions of Work Aimed at Reinforcing Combat Cooperation

Friendly ties are constantly developing and growing stronger among the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. This is promoted in many ways by purposeful political indoctrination, conducted in all armies in the interests of reinforcing combat cooperation. Such work follows these basic directions for personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy:

study of V. I. Lenin's commandments concerning the need for dependably protecting socialist achievements, and explanation of the international missions of the Soviet Armed Forces;

indoctrination of the soldiers in the ideals of proletarian internationalism, in the spirit of unity, solidarity, and mutual assistance, and in a readiness to perform their international duties;

explanation of the sources and essence of the solidarity of the peoples of socialist countries in the struggle for the triumph of communism, the commonness of their ideologies and socioeconomic systems, and the unity of goals and tasks;

development of high alertness and class hatred of imperialists and all enemies of communism, and revelation of the aggressive reactionary policy and ideology of imperialism, and its provocative actions against the USSR and other socialist countries;

publicity on revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the communist and workers parties, peoples, and armies of the socialist states;

illumination of their successes in the development of socialism;

publicity on examples of joint efforts in the struggle against a common enemy, of cooperation between fraternal parties and countries in economics and foreign policy, decisions of party congresses, and documents written by conferences of communist and workers parties;

exchange of experience in organizing combat and political training, the work of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations, and mass agitation and cultural education conducted for soldiers of the fraternal armies.

These and other directions of party-political work aimed at reinforcing combat cooperation with armies of the socialist countries are being realized with the help of various forms, resources, and methods. The officer Marxist-

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Leninist training plans and the programs of Marxism-Leninism universities and evening party schools foresee the study of Lenin's teaching on protection of the socialist fatherland, the essence of proletarian internationalism, and comprehensive cooperation among communist and workers parties and the peoples of the fraternal socialist states. These problems as well as topics concerning the history of fraternal armies, their organizational structure, and the daily lives of comrades in arms are studied in political lessons held for enlisted men and sergeants, and in the warrant officer political training system.

Numerous forms of propaganda and mass agitation are employed for the purposes of international indoctrination of the personnel. Problems of close combat cooperation with soldiers in the armies of fraternal countries are regularly raised in lectures, reports, and discussions organized for the personnel by commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations. Theoretical conferences on topics such as, for example, "V. I. Lenin on Protection of Socialism as the Highest International Duty", "The 25th CPSU Congress on Further Reinforcement of Friendship and Cooperation With Socialist Countries", and "Proletarian Internationalism and Its Development by Fraternal Parties" are a broadly accepted practice of subunits and units of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Lecture courses, evening discussions on particular topics, and evening film-lectures devoted to the socialist countries and their armies are highly popular among the soldiers. As a rule they are scheduled to fall upon the anniversaries of the creation of fraternal countries or their armed forces, and they include a series of lectures on the given country and its army; films or film clips on these subjects are shown. In addition to commanders and political workers, participants of battles for liberation of fraternal peoples from Hitler's invaders, and officers who had served abroad in the groups of Soviet forces speak to the personnel.

Art film festivals, in which the films made in the movie studios of the socialist countries are shown, have recommended themselves well. During such a festival commanders and political workers usually give talks on the country in which the particular film was made, and on the successes it was enjoying in development of socialism, culture, and national customs. This helps the soldiers to penetrate more deeply, with a sense of friendship, into the ways of the fraternal peoples of the socialist countries.

As a rule the clubs and the Lenin rooms and compartments set up showcases and displays devoted to the armies of socialist countries. The libraries of the military units collect books and articles devoted to the achievements of the laborers of socialist countries, and to the life and combat training of soldiers in the allied armies.

Military training institutions in which servicemen from armies of the socialist countries study together with Soviet students have made it a rule to organize, on their revolutionary and national holidays, joint solemn

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meetings and evenings, photographic exhibitions, and displays of political and art literature devoted to these events. The frontier military districts have made it a tradition to meet with soldiers of the allied armies of neighboring states on Victory Day.

Personnel of Soviet forces deployed on the territory of socialist countries are doing an especially great amount of work to reinforce friendship and combat cooperation with the laborers of these socialist countries. In addition to holding lessons on the appropriate topics within the system of Marxist-Leninist training and political lessons for officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and enlisted men, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Southern, Central, and Northern groups of forces organize many other functions associated with international indoctrination, to include ones sponsored jointly with laborers and soldiers of the fraternal countries. Many of these functions are conducted right at the enterprises, in the agricultural collectives, schools, and scientific and cultural institutions, as well as in military units of the friendly armies.

The birthdays of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and prominent officials of world communism and the workers movement, revolutionary and national holidays and jubilees, holidays dedicated to workers of different sectors of the national economy, and other notable dates are used extensively for the purposes of publicizing Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the theory and policy of communist and workers parties, their program documents, and the revolutionary traditions and labor successes of laborers in the fraternal countries.

Garrison councils established for the purposes of reinforcing Soviet-German, Soviet-Polish, Soviet-Hungarian, and Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship are doing useful work aimed at international indoctrination and at reinforcing friendship and combat cooperation. Working jointly with the command and the political organs of the friendly armies, and with local party and state organs, they organize interesting and instructive functions for personnel of the Soviet Army garrisons. Soviet servicemen often visit laborers and soldiers of the fraternal countries as guests, and they describe our successes in development of communism to them.

In turn, the laborers and soldiers of the fraternal armies visit Soviet military units and acquaint themselves with the life and combat training of our soldiers. The experience is regularly exchanged on personnel training and indoctrination, party-political work, and combat equipment maintenance and operation. Lectures, reports, and discussions on the rules of behavior abroad and on the local laws and customs are organized for Soviet soldiers and their families. All of this promotes growth in friendship between the armies and peoples of the USSR and the allied countries.

The Volga Radio Station of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany broadly publicizes the ideals of proletarian internationalism and friendship among the peoples and soldiers of the fraternal states. The group's units and subunits organize collective attendance of radio broadcasts on countries

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of the socialist fraternity, on their joint foreign political activities, on successes in economics, science, and culture, and on problems associated with cooperation within the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance. Radio broadcasts devoted to combat cooperation among fraternal armies, to their daily military life, and to the friendship of Soviet enlisted men, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers with soldiers of the GDR National Peoples Army are highly popular among personnel of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

The army press is broadly employed as a means for indoctrinating the personnel in the spirit of brotherhood and friendship with peoples and armies of the socialist countries. The newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the district and fleet newspapers, and the newspapers of the groups of Soviet forces regularly publish material on the achievements enjoyed by fraternal countries in development of socialism, on combat cooperation of allied armies, on their growing unity, on the international traditions of the peoples, on the advanced skills of the units and subunits of socialist armies, and on the noble deeds of Soviet soldiers who have rendered aid to the local public.

Joint rallies and conferences of executive officers promote reinforcement of combat cooperation among armies of the socialist countries. In these conferences the results of troop and staff combat operational training are summarized, and experience in military development, training, and troop political and military indoctrination is generalized. Specialists attend mutual consultation sessions on problems associated with assimilating new types of weapons and combat equipment. Mutual briefings on military-political and military-technical problems are organized as well.

Close cooperation among political organs of Warsaw Pact armies is an inherent part of friendly relations among the armed forces of the socialist countries. The political organs of the fraternal armies exchange delegations, lecturers, reporters, military-political literature and periodicals, films, photographic exhibitions, and visual aids. As an example film contests on military topics are conducted and meetings of army film-makers from the fraternal countries are organized regularly.

Sports competitions promote reinforcement of combat cooperation among the peoples and armies of the socialist countries. The sports committee of the friendly armies (the SKDA) organizes spartacades and championships in various forms of sports, in which sportsmen representing the fraternal armies participate, and it publishes the journal SKDA--SPORTIVNOYE OBOZRENIYE.

The friendship and brotherhood of comrades in arms develops and grows stronger in the course of joint tactical exercises. Interaction among the armies and navies is improved at the training grounds and ranges, in the air, and at sea. During preparations for and the conduct of joint exercises, close coordination is achieved among the commanders and political organs of the allied

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forces. This cooperation takes the form of creation of joint operational groups of representatives from the main political directorates of the allied armies, joint editorial boards for field newspapers and radio broadcasting stations, a press center, and a filming group; joint organization of various functions aimed at reinforcing combat comradeship among soldiers of the fraternal armies and their friendship with the local public; coordination of plans for and joint conduct of agitation-propaganda and cultural education.

After the allied troops reach their concentration areas and the units and formations of the fraternal armies settle themselves down as neighbors, meetings among representatives of the allied forces and meetings devoted to the preparations for the joint exercise are organized. During major exercises such meetings are attended by executives of communist and workers parties, the governments and supreme military leadership of the armies of fraternal countries, and the Combined Command of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces. Military units and subunits of the allied armies are visited by delegations of laborers from industrial and agricultural enterprises, by young people, and by the local public.

Experience exchange among soldiers of fraternal armies with the same specialties is broadly practiced in joint exercises. Experience is exchanged on the problems of combat and political training, and on assimilation of combat equipment and weapons. Commanders, political workers, and active party and Komsomol members share their experience in encouraging communists and members of youth organizations to serve as the example in the socialist competition for outstanding performance of every phase of the tactical exercise, in troop ideological and political indoctrination, and in other problems.

Evening meetings of combat friendship, evening meetings between soldiers of the allied forces and the local public, and trips to industrial and agricultural enterprises, to the fields of former engagements against Hitler's invaders, and to points of historical interest associated with revolutionary battles of the working class of the Warsaw Pact countries have recommended themselves well as functions conducted during strategic lulls.

These and other mass political functions are typified by special warmth, sincerity, and an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding.

When the situation allows, political organs of the fraternal armies organize joint discussions and seminars on military-political and theoretical topics, speeches by propagandists, and exchange amateur concerts. Movies about the Warsaw Pact countries are shown and shows are put on by art collectives for exercise participants and the local public.

As was mentioned earlier, a combined field newspaper editorial board is usually created during preparations for and the conduct of exercises. Such a newspaper is published in the languages of all of the fraternal armies participating in the exercises, and it is one of the important centers of

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joint information and propaganda. Moreover a combined field radio broadcasting center is created, and it organizes broadcasts in different languages as well. Representatives of each army prepare the materials for the combined field newspaper and for transmissions of the field radio center.

Press centers play an important role at exercises in reinforcing combat cooperation. They keep the press, radio, and television of the allied socialist countries well informed of the course of the exercise. The combined filming group takes films of the most important events, and of interesting combat training activities. Films made by this group are later shown in all allied armies.

In the concluding phase of the exercise or following its conclusion meetings are held, awards and honors are presented to units, subunits, and individual servicemen who have distinguished themselves, wreaths are placed jointly at monuments to soldiers of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries who have fallen in the struggle against Hitler's invaders, and at the graves of the sacrifices of fascism, and meetings with the local public are organized. An exercise ends as a rule with a parade of all the troops that had participated in the exercise.

Today, the CPSU and other fraternal parties of the socialist countries believe that one of their main tasks is to reinforce the unity and develop cooperation among fraternal peoples of the socialist countries--an international union of a new type. "By reinforcing the cohesion of socialist countries and deepening brotherly friendship among their Marxist-Leninist parties," states the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution", "we can significantly increase the joint power and influence of socialism upon the course of international events."*

Consistently implementing a coordinated foreign policy aimed at strengthening peace, the communist and workers parties and governments of countries of the socialist fraternity are proceeding on the principle that as long as the forces of war and aggression exist, the security of nations will continue to be threatened. This is why their policy invariably combines a firm resolve for peace with a constant readiness to decisively repel any aggressor. Party-political work plays a great role in strengthening the defensive power of the socialist countries, and the fighting power of fraternal armies in the Combined Warsaw Pact Armed Forces. Party-political work has the objective of indoctrinating soldiers in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, socialist patriotism, proletarian internationalism, and combat cooperation with comrades in arms.

* "O 60-y godovshchine Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 31 yanvarya 1977," p 17.
[142-11004]

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BOOK EXCERPTS: INDIVIDUAL APPROACH TO INDOCTRINATION

Moscow INDIVIDUAL'NYI PODKHOD V VOSPITANII VOINOV (Individual Approach to the Indoctrination of Servicemen) in Russian 1978 signed to press 25 Apr 78 pp 1-9, 158-160

[Annotation, table of contents, introduction and conclusion of book by Col V. V. Strezhnev, Voennoye izdatel'stvo, 45,000 copies, 160 pages]

[Excerpts] An individual approach is an important condition for achieving success in training and indoctrinating servicemen. The most important things in an individual approach are the study of people and a scientifically valid selection of ways and means of influencing them.

How do officers study the individual traits of servicemen? How do they use these traits in their job of indoctrination? What methods are used to effectively influence subordinates and to strengthen their will? The author tries to answer these questions.

This book is intended for a broad group of readers--officers, warrant officers, sergeants, petty officers and unit and ship party and Komsomol activists.

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Introduction

The indoctrination and training of people is one of the most difficult areas of social activity. "Indoctrination is a long and difficult process," stated V. I. Lenin. "It cannot be evaded with a decree; it must be approached patiently and skillfully; we are doing this and we will continue to do it."¹

People are endlessly diverse. There are no two completely similar people on earth. Now and then twins are encountered who are practically indistinguishable in external appearance. But, even these rare exceptions do not exist for character. Each personality is unique and individual; it has its own special features of thinking, showing feelings, acting and in its attitudes towards its environment and even towards itself. Success in the job of indoctrination is greatly dependent upon whether the leader will be able to select means of influencing the individual with consideration for his inherent traits.

The prominent Russian educator, K. D. Ushinskiy, pointed out that if the science of education wants to develop all aspects of the individual, it must first learn about all his aspects. This "learn about him" expresses the primary requirement for the individual indoctrination of the Soviet people, including of course, the servicemen of the army and navy. Therefore, experienced commanders and political officers organize the training and indoctrination process for soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers, warrant officers and officers at all echelons by considering their psychological features, personal qualities, life experience, general education and military training.

The CPSU Central Committee decree on "The Job of Selecting and Indoctrinating Ideological Personnel within the Belorussian Party Organization" directs the attention of managers and of everybody who works with people to the requirement to improve their study of psychology and the science of teaching. A knowledge of psychology and teaching methods make it possible to analyze people's special features quicker and to take an individual approach in the job of indoctrinating them.

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The importance of the individual approach as a major teaching principle in training and indoctrinating servicemen continues to increase. This reflects a humane attitude toward the individual and the party's concern for developing the whole-man in the society which is building communism. In the CPSU Central Committee report to the 25th party congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated: "in all areas, the manager must consider the socio-political and developmental aspects; he must be sensitive to people and to their needs and wants...."²

The 25th CPSU Congress documents pointed out the social improvements which have taken place in our country during recent years in the process of building a communist society. "The moral and political unity of Soviet society and the fraternal friendship between all our country's ethnic groups have become even stronger. There has been a further evolution in our socialist democracy and all our public affairs have become stronger and have begun to sparkle with new color. There has been an increase in the Soviet people's level of activity at work, in production management, in the accomplishment of public and governmental affairs...."³

It is completely natural that these changes in our society have been reflected in the USSR Armed Forces. The modern scientific and technological revolution leads to the appearance of new vocations and to an increase in the qualifications of all workers. During recent years, there has been a significant increase in the network of vocational-technical schools in the country. During the Ninth Five-Year Plan, the transition to universal secondary education was basically completed; over nine million specialists were trained with a specialized secondary education or a higher education. The national economy received 9.3 million graduates of vocational-technical schools.

In his report on "The Draft Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and The Results of the National Discussion of It" at the Extraordinary Seventh USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, while talking about the Soviet people's intellectual growth, noted that "at present, 73.2 percent of the workers have a higher or secondary (complete or partial) education while 40 years ago less than 8 percent did. During this same time, there has been a 34-fold increase in specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education in industry and a 47-fold increase in agriculture."⁴

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As a result, the army and navy are receiving skilled replacements. Young people with a higher level of general education and specialized training are entering military service; this means they have more diverse interests, proclivities, needs and wants. These must be taken into account to achieve success in the job of training and indoctrination.

The requirement to consider each person's psychology while training and indoctrinating servicemen of the army and navy is dictated by the nature and special features of modern combat. The individual's activity in modern combat and his military job will be linked to overcoming difficulties and obstacles which exert a great deal of influence on people's morale, physical condition, awareness and will.

M. V. Frunze wrote that the extent of psychological damage to the troops when they run up against the enemy's employment of a new, more effective weapon on the battlefield cannot be calculated and, under certain conditions, it may greatly exceed the physical loss caused by the weapon.

Mar SU D.F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, reminds our leaders of this. He points out that it is mandatory to consider the nature of modern warfare when organizing party political work. It is necessary to achieve a situation where each commander and political worker who organizes personnel training and indoctrination has a clear-cut understanding of the novel moral, physical and psychological trials our servicemen will encounter and of the margin of endurance--combat, ideological and ethical--with which it is necessary to prepare defenders of the motherland.⁵

Under these conditions, a perfectly obvious conclusion suggests itself to our commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations--persistently improve the men's moral, fighting and psychological traits, take an individual approach to people when conducting ethical and psychological training and consider the men's personalities and capabilities.

The introduction of nuclear weapons, missiles and the other, latest combat equipment has made radical changes in the organizational structure of all the services and branch arms of the Armed Forces. There has been a significant increase in the number of units where the officer does not have hundreds of men under his supervision but only a small number of men with various specialties. Under these conditions, the individual approach is more suitable to the training and indoctrination process. The USSR Armed Forces Manual of Customs and Courtesies gives special emphasis to the problem of an individual approach.

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Commanders and officers in charge are required to know each one of their subordinates. But, this requirement is especially true for company and platoon officers. Thus, for example, the duties of the company political officer state that he will concentrate his primary attention in indoctrinating personnel on individual work with each serviceman. For this purpose, he must know each EM, NCO, WO and officer in the company; he must know their work traits, political traits and moral qualities, their needs, attitudes and family status.

The complexity of combat equipment and weapons in the army and navy requires detailed management of professional selection for military specialties and constant consideration of the men's capabilities to master a particular military career field quickly and proficiently. The success of combat training and ship and unit combat readiness posture depend upon this.

M. V. Frunze wrote: "If we provide the Navy, the specialized technical branches and the Air Force with recruits whose physique and psychological make-up are not suitable for service in these branch arms, we will be doing an extremely great disservice to their fighting strength."⁶ This means that it is necessary to analyze the serviceman's psychological traits ahead of time when determining his military specialty. Commanders and political officers analyze these traits. They are provided a great deal of assistance in this by unit party and Komsomol organizations.

While leading a unit, an officer constantly has to select subordinates to accomplish various service missions. To be successful at this, it is not enough to know their level of training. He must also predict their behavior as individual servicemen and in small groups under diverse conditions for accomplishing assignments. This requires an in-depth knowledge of subordinates, their special psychological features, the motivation for their conduct and other psychological principles which determine people's behavior and actions.

The Armed Forces are now receiving young adults who stand head and shoulders above their predecessors in the level of their development, education and diversity, said Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense. A significant portion of these young men are drafted into the army straight from school and it is not easy for them to bear the burden of the military. Moreover, military service itself has become a great deal more difficult than before. Naturally, the military indoctrination of these young adults requires a higher level of skill from commanders and political officers.⁷

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Consequently, the complexity of the missions being accomplished by the Armed Forces under contemporary conditions levies an urgent requirement on commanders and officers in charge to creatively employ various forms and methods for training and indoctrination, especially, consideration for the servicemen's individual characteristics.

It is well known that an individual approach is not an isolated form, method or means of indoctrination. It is a principle of tutorial influence, a principle which penetrates the entire process of indoctrination and training. It commits the officer to knowing the special features of each man and, on this basis, it commits him to take an individual approach in indoctrinating and training his subordinates.

In his work with subordinates, the young commander or political officer frequently encounters questions. What should I analyze in the diversity of personal traits? What should I direct special attention to so that I am not mistaken in my evaluation of the individual and his behavior?

Recalling his work with unit personnel, USSR Pilot-Astronaut G. S. Titov wrote: "Analyzing people.... What does this mean? Who can tell me where and how to begin such an analysis?"

"For example, I can study a jet aircraft piece by piece: the air frame by itself, the engine by itself, the gear, the control elements, the radio and specialized equipment etc. Once I have studied it, I can say that I know the aircraft.

"But, what about a man? For example, my political lesson group has almost 20 people in it--career EM and NCO's. How should I analyze them and get to know their personalities in order to conduct political lessons for them in a lively and interesting manner?"⁸

A knowledge of subordinates' special traits helps commanders improve combat and political training results, helps them organize the job of ethical and moral indoctrination for personnel on a more substantive basis and helps them organize more activities for the units. There is a common psychological principle for accomplishing the numerous missions facing the commander. It consists of the substance and methods for analyzing the men's individual psychological features and the selection of psychologically valid ways and means of influencing them through training and indoctrination.

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Moreover, a knowledge of the men's traits forms the foundation for success not only in indoctrinating and training subordinates but also in solving such problems as "the individual and combat equipment," "the individual and modern combat," "the individual and the group" and a number of others. This book devotes primary attention to the problems of the substance and methods for analyzing the men's psychological traits as the basis for solving a number of other problems.

At first glance, an analysis of subordinates and of their work traits, moral qualities and psychological traits seems easy. In practice, the analysis of an individual is a complex process which requires the skills of a teacher from the commander and political officer. It is not only necessary to have a good knowledge of the subordinate, it is also necessary to skillfully influence him by selecting means and methods for influencing the men's awareness, feelings and will.

For this purpose, it is important for leaders to constantly improve their psychological and teaching knowledge and skills. "A mastery of this knowledge and these skills is an urgent requirement for each officer since it is not possible to solve the numerous, difficult problems of troop combat, political and psychological training without them now."⁹

This book attempts to show how leading army and navy officers use an individual approach in their work with people and how they achieve the greatest effectiveness on the job by using their knowledge of psychology and teaching methods in indoctrinating and training subordinates.

Conclusion

"Our army," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "has been indoctrinated in a spirit of profound devotion to the socialist motherland, to the ideas of peace and internationalism and to the ideas of friendship among ethnic groups."¹⁰ To a great extent, this is achieved by the skillful ideological indoctrination by unit commanders and political officers. But, as in any other field, we cannot stand still in indoctrination. "It is necessary to further analyze the problems of the evolution of our state system," stated L. I. Brezhnev, "and the forms and methods of indoctrination and ideological work."¹¹ One of the means for further improvement in the job of training and indoctrination within the Armed Forces is the officer's mastery of the psychological and pedagogical principles for an individual approach to his subordinates.

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The individual approach is not a method or form of training and indoctrination but the most important principle for indoctrination, the cornerstone of the officer's activities. Experience shows that no matter what method of influencing his men the commander, political officer or other officer uses (persuasion, example, reward or punishment), all of them can be successful if the man's individual characteristics, his psychology, is taken into account. If he wants to, every officer can master the methods of an individual approach to indoctrinating and training servicemen. In accomplishing this, the leading officers first continually analyze their subordinates, their personal traits, their strong and weak points and the special features of their activities and they dig deeply into the men's training and affairs; they constantly monitor their ideological and political growth, their physical condition, the formation of character traits and individual improvement. Second, they strive for an in-depth psychological understanding of the man's inner world they separate the significant from the insignificant, clarify the true motives and incentives for particular behaviors and, based on them, select and employ concrete measures for exerting influence and they systematically analyze the results of indoctrination for each serviceman. Third, they note and support the good things in an individual in a timely manner, develop them, anticipate mistakes and frustrations and select and modify their procedures for influencing him.

The individual approach does not at all mean lowering people's standards. To the contrary, it makes it possible for the officer to make the standards for his subordinates more concrete, logical and purposeful and therefore, more effective.

The individual approach does not at all mean working with just an isolated individual. It is accomplished in the group, by the group, for the group in order to develop a group with high principles and standards. Under the leadership of its commander, the military group analyzes the resources and special features of each of its members and, in accordance with this, it exerts a continuing influence on him.

The individual approach is implemented by the goal-directed, creative work of commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations using various forms to influence the serviceman considering the special features of his personality and to develop superior morale, fighting efficiency and political qualities in him. The individual approach to the serviceman consists of making him a comprehensively trained,

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staunch defender of our motherland by making use of his individual traits.

Mastering the skill of an individual approach means mastering an art which is no less important than the art of waging combat; moreover, the success of the latter is preordained to a great extent by the indoctrination and training of personnel. Soviet officers are skillfully training and indoctrinating their subordinates; they are making widespread use of the individual approach to instill superior morale and fighting efficiency in servicemen, to improve their military expertise and to mold their psychological conditioning.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V. I. "Poln. sobr. soch." (Complete Collected Works), vol 40, p 267.
2. "Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1976, p 70.
3. Ibid., p 4.
4. Brezhnev, L. I. "The Draft Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Results of the National Discussion of It," Moscow, 1977, p 21.
5. See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 July 1976.
6. Frunze, M. V. "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" (Selected Works), vol 2 Moscow, 1957, pp 352-353.
7. See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 July 1976.
8. Titov, G. S. "Aviatsiya i kosmos" (Aviation and Space), Moscow, 1963, p 83.
9. Yepishev, A. A. "Moguchee oruzhiye partii" (The Party's Mighty Weapon), Moscow, 1973, p 120.
10. "Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," p 76.
11. Ibid., pp 72-73.

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BOOK EXCERPTS: LEGAL INDOCTRINATION IN MILITARY UNITS

Moscow ORGANIZATSIYA PRAVOGO VOSPITANIYA V VOINSKOY CHASTI; V POMOSHCH' KOMANDIRAM I POLITRABOTNIKAM (The Organization of Legal Indoctrination in a Military Unit; Aid for Commanders and Political Workers) in Russian, 1979 signed to press 24 May 79 pp 1, 2, 3-8, 145-171, 175-176

[Author information, Annotation, Introduction, Chapter 5 and Table of Contents from book edited by Lt Gen Just S. S. Maksimov, candidate of legal sciences, Voenizdat, 40,000 copies, 176 pages]

[Text] The given book has been prepared by a group of authors with the following membership: Lt Gen Just S. S. Maksimov, candidate of legal sciences and honored jurist of the RSFSR (Introduction and §1 of Chapter 1); Col Just V. I. Shanin, candidate of legal sciences, docent, and honored jurist of the RSFSR (§2 and §3 of Chapter 1; §1 of Chapter 5); Col Just A. M. Medvedev, candidate of legal sciences and honored jurist of the RSFSR (§2 and §3 of Chapter 5); Col Just G. I. Kucher, candidate of legal sciences (Chapter 3); Col Just V. V. Temerov, honored jurist of the RSFSR, and leader of the author collective (§1 of Chapter 2 together with V. D. Yermachenkov, and §4 of Chapter 5); Col Just N. I. Burobin (§2 of Chapter 2); Col V. D. Yermachenkov (§1 of Chapter 2 together with V. V. Temerov and Chapter 4 together with A. I. Khalin); Col Just Ye. A. Zaytsev (§3 of Chapter 2); Lt Col Just A. I. Khalin (Chapter 4 together with V. D. Yermachenkov). Maj Gen Just (Res) N. A. Ladik also participated in preparing the text.

[Annotation] The text gives the Leninist principles of legal indoctrination of the workers, and the content, tasks and particular features of legal indoctrination in the Armed Forces. On the basis of the experience acquired in the troops and naval forces, the authors bring out the forms and methods of the work with the servicemen, and the means of agitation used in it. A special chapter has been devoted to the procedures for carrying out specific measures in the area of legal propaganda.

The text is designed for commanders, political workers, the party, Komsomol and legal activists of the units, ships and subunits.

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Introduction

A high cultural level, social awareness and ideological conviction, readiness, will and the ability to build and defend communism are inseparable traits of a person in a developed socialist society. These moral-political qualities of the Soviet people are shaped by the entire socialist way of our life, by the entire course of affairs in society, but above all by the purposeful, constant ideological indoctrination. For this reason the questions of the ideological and political indoctrination of people and the shaping of the new man as the active builder of communism constantly have held a prominent place in the activities of the Communist party and the Soviet state.

The documents of the 25th CPSU Congress have provided a profound analysis of the state and ways of improving ideological indoctrination. Having noted that contemporary conditions have created new responsible tasks in the area of the party's ideological activities, the congress pointed out that a comprehensive approach to the organizing of all indoctrination is the path by which a further rise in its effectiveness can be achieved. The 1979 Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" again has pointed to the significance of a comprehensive approach for raising the effective work of the party organizations in the area of the communist indoctrination of the Soviet people.

From these fundamental instructions it follows that the tasks of ideological indoctrination cannot be resolved without the legal indoctrination of the workers, and this is one of its important areas and pursues the aim of forming a socialist awareness of the law in the people, and developing in them a profound understanding of the necessity of the strict and unswerving execution of the legal standards established by the Soviet state, as well as the turning of such execution into a customary and natural question for each person.

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With the development of our society, the role of legal indoctrination has continuously grown. This is explained mainly by the fact that the present stage of communist construction is characterized by a further democratization of state and social life, and by the consistent carrying out of a policy of achieving clarity and coordination in all elements of the state and economic apparatus, and at strictly observing the laws and standards of the socialist community. Under these conditions, the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Improve Legal Indoctrination of the Workers" (September 1970) stresses, "discipline and organization of all members of society and the indoctrination of high legal awareness and a feeling of civil duty in each Soviet person assume primary significance."¹

The ratification in October 1977 of the new Soviet Constitution was an important step along the path of the further development of socialist democracy and Soviet statdom. The articles of the Constitution have reflected the most important traits of mature socialism. Being an ideological-theoretical, political and legal document of the highest legal force, it marks a new stage in the life of our society and a corresponding higher degree of development in socialist state and law. The USSR Constitution is a firm foundation for a further improvement of Soviet legislation. The constitutions of the Union and autonomous republics have already been prepared and approved, as well as a number of other legal enactments the ratification of which is directly provided for by the new Basic Law or derives from it.

A profound study and carrying out of the provisions of the USSR Constitution are one of the main tasks in the legal indoctrination of the workers and the basis for developing a high socialist awareness of the law in them. This also helps to elucidate the significance and essence of the other Soviet laws, and develops in the people a desire to conscientiously and voluntarily carry out their prescripts, and to actively use the rights granted by these laws. "We want," stressed the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in a speech at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 7 October 1977, "that the USSR citizens have a good knowledge of their rights and liberties, the ways and methods of realizing them, that they be able to apply these rights and liberties in the interests of building communism, and clearly understand their inseparable link with the conscientious fulfillment of their civil duties."²

The Armed Forces play a major role in the question of the legal indoctrination of the younger generation. "The young men," the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress emphasizes, "arrive in the military family without having schooling in life. But they return from the army as men who have undergone schooling in endurance and discipline and who have gained technical, professional knowledge and political training."³

However, the significance of the legal indoctrination carried out in the Army and Navy does not end with the carrying out of general civil indoctrinational tasks. The observance of the state-set legal standards by the

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servicemen is organically linked to their execution of military duty deriving from the constitutional duties of the USSR citizen, and the freedom and independence of our motherland, the life of millions of Soviet people, and the lastingness of the social victories achieved by us depend largely on how these standards are observed.

At present the unswerving observance of military law and order plays a particularly important role in line with the equipping of the troops and naval forces with complicated types of military equipment and with the necessity of maintaining constant combat readiness which is caused by the presence of weapons of mass destruction among the aggressive forces. It is not difficult to imagine what could occur if even one specialist, for example, at a missile complex violated the established order of combat duty or deviated from the technical standards.

These essential circumstances determine the necessity of a specific focus in the legal indoctrination of the servicemen, and here the basic content is the developing among the personnel of profound conviction in the rightness, reasonability and advisability of military law and order based upon the strictest observance of the Soviet laws and military regulations, in realizing that the standards of Soviet law express the interests of all the Soviet people, and their observance is a necessary condition for maintaining the proper level of military readiness.

Legal indoctrination of the personnel in the Armed Forces represents a range of political, organizational and agitation-political measures. It is carried out both by the propagandizing of legal knowledge, as well as by the influencing of the awareness of the men by the actual implementing of the standards of military legislation in the process of the life and activities of the troops and naval forces, and by the maintaining of firm military law and order. Here success in legal indoctrination can be achieved only in the instance that both these methods are employed in a close unity and are coordinated with the other areas of indoctrinational work, and primarily with the ideological-political, labor, moral and military indoctrination.

In the Armed Forces particularly great attention is given to the legal indoctrination of command personnel. This is understandable. Certainly no area of social relations is regulated so thoroughly and in detail by law as occurs in the army and navy. The laws and decrees of the government, the troop regulations, the orders of the minister of defense, the orders, manuals, statutes and instructions define all aspects of army and navy life. Thus, the commander cannot carry out a single mission or solve a single question in daily troop practices without employing law and without relying on the law. For this reason, a firm knowledge of the principles of Soviet legislation is an essential condition for him to clearly organize his service activities, to successfully carry out functional duties, and to achieve high indicators in the training and indoctrination of subordinates, including in their legal indoctrination.

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In recent years in the army and navy, an ordered system of legal indoctrination has come into being and this covers all categories of servicemen. Legal indoctrination work is carried out with them both during nontraining hours as well as in the process of the planned exercises such as the Marxist-Leninist and all officer command training, the political training of warrant officers, and the military and political training of soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers. The foundations of Soviet law are studied in military schools, the universities of Marxism-Leninism, in the evening party schools, the 2-year schools and the lecture cycles for legal knowledge.

The minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy have obliged the commanders and the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations to convincingly and intelligently propagandize Lenin's legacy on military discipline, the standards of communist morality, and to explain the requirements of the laws, the military oath and military regulations, in making every possible use for this of the system of political training and agitation-propaganda work, the activities of the cultural educational institutions and the military press. This work should be directed at developing a high socialist awareness of the law in the servicemen, and arouse in them a desire to make the greatest contribution to strengthening the military might of the Armed Forces and provide reliable defense of the socialist fatherland.

The units and ships have acquired a good deal of experience in organizing and carrying out legal indoctrination, and its forms and methods have become more diverse. The commanders, political workers and the members of the legal aktiv have shown more interest in it. After the 1975 Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces made legal indoctrination an independent service activity of the commanders and political workers, its effectiveness has noticeably increased.

At present, when the work in the area of the legal indoctrination of subordinates is no longer viewed as a beneficial initiative, the well thought out organization and effective execution of this work are the official duty of each commander and political worker. At the same time, as experience shows, not all the officers have sufficiently assimilated the basic principles of legal indoctrination and have mastered its forms and methods. Many of the shortcomings noted in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological, Political-Indoctrination Work" relate to legal indoctrination carried out in the Armed Forces. In order to eliminate these shortcomings and to raise legal indoctrination of the men to a higher qualitative level meeting the demands placed upon it at present, it is essential to focus efforts on the following tasks stemming from the decree:

- 1) Provide a high scientific level of this work;
- 2) Strengthen its professionalism and concreteness and its link with the life of the troops and naval forces;

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- 3) Develop the offensive nature of legal propaganda and agitation.

The authors of the present text have set for themselves the task of helping the commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations and the legal activists in carrying out these tasks. The book examines the Leninist principles of legal indoctrination, its particular features under the conditions of the Armed Forces, the content, organization and methods of legal indoctrination in a troop unit (on a ship). Particular attention is given to the question of the legal indoctrination of the personnel in the process of the actual realization of the requirements of the laws and military regulations by the commanders and the political workers, and the maintaining of firm military law and order. On the basis of generalizing the experience acquired in the troops, the authors have attempted to bring out the particular features of legal indoctrination in terms of the various service categories of servicemen and provide practical recommendations on the most advisable and effective forms and methods of this work.

The recommendations and procedural advice voiced in the book of course are not a pat formula applicable to all instances of life, and do not exhaust the entire content of work in the area of legal indoctrination of the personnel. The authors are hopeful that the commanders and the political workers and the propagandists of legal knowledge, in relying on their own experience, will be able to make the necessary corrections here considering the specific conditions of their troop unit, the nature of the missions carried out by it, and other factors.

FOOTNOTES

¹"Voprosy Ideologicheskoy Raboty KPSS. Sbornik Vazhneyshikh Resheniy KPSS (1965-1972 gg.)" [Questions of Ideological Work of the CPSU. A Collection of the Most Important CPSU Decisions (1965-1972)], Moscow, 1972, p 284.

²L. I. Brezhnev, "O Konstitutsii SSSR" [On the USSR Constitution], Moscow, 1977, p 58.

³"Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, pp 75-76.

Chapter 5: Legality and Proper Order as Factors in the Legal Indoctrination of Servicemen

51. The Influence of the Practical Implementation of the Requirements of the Laws and Regulations on the Legal Indoctrination of the Military

An important factor in the legal indoctrination of the Armed Forces personnel is the actual realization of the requirements of the legislation and provisions of the regulations in the daily life of the troop units, ships and subunits. The activities of the commanders and political workers, the

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military justice bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations in maintaining high military discipline and legality, the active participation of all the personnel in these activities, the strict observance of the laws and requirements of the regulations in the work of military officials, the effective combating of legal infractions, and the vital example of the commanders, political workers and senior comrades in the unswerving carrying out of the legal and moral standards--all of this is not only an indispensable condition for maintaining the combat readiness of the units, ships and subunits, but also an irreplaceable factor in the indoctrination of the Soviet military, and developing in them the habits of disciplined conduct and the custom to follow the legal precepts always and in every matter.

A soldier is thoroughly indoctrinated, as M. I. Kalinin rightly emphasized in one of his speeches, primarily by those relations which exist between people in military life.¹ And these relations in the Armed Forces are formed and regulated mainly on the basis and under the effect of the actual application of the standards of legislation. Experience has shown that legal indoctrination measures are most effective and bring beneficial results under conditions when firm military order is maintained in the unit and on the ship. And conversely, any efforts in the area of legal propaganda can be ineffective if in the given military collective the explanation and study of the laws and regulations are not coordinated with a decisive and consistent struggle for their unswerving fulfillment, and if a unity of word and deed has not been achieved in the legal sphere of the activities of the personnel of a unit or ship.

In what manner do the practices of applying legislation and the maintaining of proper order and legality influence the formation and development of the best qualities of conscientious defenders of the motherland in the men? In order to answer this question, it is essential first of all to disclose the sociopsychological mechanism of the impact of legal means on the conduct of servicemen.

First of all, the awareness, will and feelings of the men are directly influenced by the very standards of the law expressed in the laws, military regulations and in the normative orders issued on their basis. The legal means must direct their actions in such a manner that the most effective variation of conduct is selected from the viewpoint of the interests of military service and the carrying out of a combat mission. This is achieved by the methods characteristic for law, mainly by the entrusting of certain state duties to the servicemen, the granting of rights to them, and the determining of the competence and powers of the officials from the various service categories. In other words, the standards of the law prescribe what actions are to be performed, they formulate prohibitions and permissions, they define the possible and proper conduct, that is, they point out what actions are in accord with the law and approved by the state, which ones are necessary for the interests of military service, and which ones are harmful, nondesirable and for that reason condemned by society and involving the application of measures of state liability. Thus, socialist law encourages the conscious and volitional behavior of the servicemen,

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and directs their actions at the exemplary standing of military service and the successful carrying out of combat missions.

In acting by the designated means, the standards of military legislation, on the one hand, provide firm military order and proper conduct of the servicemen, and on the other, they actively contribute to developing in the personnel those qualities needed for exemplary service and the attaining of victory over the enemy. Under the influence of legal means, in the awareness of the military motives of conduct are formed and these encourage positive actions and restrain undesirable deeds, and they produce useful habits, customs, character traits and needs corresponding to the pre-scripts of Soviet military legislation, and consequently, to the interests of military service and to the aims of defending the socialist fatherland.

For example, in granting the necessary rights to the subunit commander and defining the limits of his authority, the laws and military regulations thereby encourage his activities as the solely responsible commander, and they create the state-guaranteed possibility of successfully carrying out these activities in the interests of defending the motherland. Precisely due to the reinforcing of the authority of the solely responsible commander in legislation, our troops perceive his order as a law, as a command of the motherland, the people and the state. In entrusting definite state duties to the commander as well as personal responsibility to the party and the government for the state of the subunit assigned to him, the legislation encourages him to carry out the actions necessary for service or restrain the conduct which does not correspond to the interests of the question, and it helps to shape prohibitory motives and a clear understanding of the limits of conduct.

The activities of the commanders and other superiors in the area of the practical application of legal standards also have a strong impact on the awareness and conduct of the serviceman. The solely responsible commander carries out his official functions within the powers granted him independently, but his commands, orders and instructions are fully based upon the laws, the military regulations and the standards of the law, and for this reason are acts of applying legal standards. In this quality, they are related to the category of legal enactments. The orders of commanders (chiefs), as acts of applying the standards of the law, concretize the general pre-scripts of legislation, they individualize the rights and duties in relation to his subordinates, and they settle legal questions in relation to specific circumstances. Thus, the influence of orders is more immediate and for this reason more tangible than the general standards of legislation. In many instances, precisely through the individual acts of applying the standards of the law (an order, instruction, reply to a complaint, the sentence of a military tribunal, and so forth), the servicemen in a real way perceive the sense of one or another general provision of a law or regulation.

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The nature and force of the ideological and psychological impact of the acts of applying legal standards depend primarily upon their legality, their soundness, as well as upon the subjective perception of them by people and upon how they are carried out in practice. Any decision or other actions of a chief in carrying out the requirements of legislation, in addition to their direct purpose, have a certain impact upon the formation of the soldier's personality, in being reflected in his awareness. And if in the practice of carrying out various provisions, deviations are permitted from the requirements of the legislation (the application of improper measures, instances of impoliteness in dealing with subordinates, an indifferent attitude toward a legitimate request of a soldier, and likewise conniving with persons who violate the legal prescripts, the nonfulfillment of the demand for inevitable punishment for infractions and crimes, and so forth), this can leave an undesirable impression in the awareness of the servicemen, give rise to incorrect notions, and tell negatively in the standing of service and in the conduct of individuals.

In being guided by the instructions of the Communist Party on the organic link between organizational and indoctrinational work and on the necessity of always considering the indoctrinational aspects of the decisions being taken,² the commanders and political workers, as a rule, are constantly concerned for the legitimacy and soundness of the orders and acts of military administration to be issued, and for ensuring their positive ideological and psychological influence on the personnel. In giving orders (on assignment to combat duty, to a patrol, to a detail guarding the state frontier, for conducting exercises, the taking of the military oath by young soldiers and sailors, and so forth), they with the help of the party and Komsomol organizations and the community of the unit and ship, at the same time carry out the necessary political indoctrination, including measures on legal propaganda, and studying the corresponding provisions of the laws and military regulations. As a result, the successful fulfillment of the given orders and a tangible indoctrinational effect are achieved.

An effective factor in forming high legal awareness among the personnel is the maintaining of firm proper order in the unit and on the ship, as well as the unswerving observance of the prescripts of the legislation and the orders of the commanders by all servicemen. The strict and precise fulfillment of the order of the day, the schedule of exercises, and proper relationships between the servicemen, and the flawless organization of combat duty, the guard, watch and interior services--all of this actively influences the awareness of the man, it helps to develop respect for military law and order, and aids in developing firm habits of acting in strict accord with the law, the military oath and the regulations.

Particularly great is the indoctrinational affect of legal practices on the young soldier who has just been called up for military service. With what interest he absorbs all that surrounds him in the new situation. In carrying out the service duties which have been entrusted to him by the law, in exercising the rights granted him or in merely observing how the standards of legislation are carried out, he continuously draws definite conclusions

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for himself. The notions of a young soldier about the permissible, the obligatory and the prohibited become more and more precise. From his own experience and by all that he has seen, experienced and lived through, he gradually becomes convinced of the reasonability and necessity of firm military law and order for assuring the combat readiness of the unit or ship.

The systematic and repeated repetition of actions in carrying out the legal precepts (be this the duty in the regulations for servicemen to salute each other or the procedure for executing definite commands, the rules for the changing of sentries in standing guard duty, and so forth) contributes to the working out of the habits and skills which are needed for the precise standing of military service. Precisely in the process of the practical execution of the requirements of the laws, regulations, instructions and orders, such qualities as efficiency, vigilance, conscious obedience of a chief, and a feeling of responsibility for carrying out one's military duty are honed and assume the necessary degree of maturity. If at the outset of service, certain military duties may seem burdensome to a soldier or sailor, in time their fulfillment becomes not only customary, but in certain instances also is brought to the point of being automatic.

Thus, the standards of military legislation and the daily practices of carrying them out, in operating as a sort of external stimulus of conduct, have a profound influence on the shaping and reinforcing of important qualities in the personality of a soldier, that is, the convictions, motives, habits, needs and skills needed by him for successful military service in peacetime and in a combat situation.

Furthermore, an essential role in the legal indoctrination of servicemen is played by their involvement in the combating of infractions of the law. In the Soviet Armed Forces, great significance is given to involving the men and the community of the unit, ship or subunit in activities to disclose the causes and prevent infractions, and to reindoctrinate the violators. This helps to carry out a basic task, that is, to provide high military discipline, firm law and order and to develop in the personnel high moral-political and psychological qualities. In participating in a discussion of the misdeed of a fellow serviceman at a meeting, or in performing the duties of the people's chairman, a military investigator, a people's inspector or merely attending a court session of a military tribunal in the unit, a serviceman from specific examples is convinced of the harm caused by deviations from the requirements of the law, the military oath and the regulations, and he gains a feeling of intolerance for violations of the law and a desire to prevent or not allow them in the future. This contributes to the development of his social activeness, his civil maturity and socialist awareness of the law.

Finally, an important, if not the primary, role in the complex of conditions which ensure the high effectiveness of the indoctrinational influence from carrying out the legislation is played by the personal example of the commanders and other chiefs in observing the legal and moral standards. As is

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known, V. I. Lenin, in raising the overall demand to sacredly observe the laws and precepts of Soviet power and to see to their fulfillment by everyone, gave particular attention to the fact that the leaders be the first to set the example of this.³ M. I. Kalinin repeatedly spoke of this, in emphasizing that the indoctrinator influences those being indoctrinated not only by the fact that he gives them definite knowledge, but also by his behavior and way of life, and by his attitude toward ordinary phenomena.⁴ The party constantly remembers this Leninist legacy and steadfastly carries it out. The present-day leader, as was pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, in any area must consider the sociopolitical and indoctrinational aspects, he must be sensitive to people, to their needs and requests, and serve as an example in work and everyday life.⁵

Under the conditions of the Armed Forces, the personal example of the commanders and other chiefs in the unswerving fulfillment of the laws, the requirements of the military oath and the regulations is not merely a pedagogical procedure, but also a state duty reinforced in the general military regulations.⁶ The observance of the laws and regulations by superiors and their personal example here are an indispensable condition for indoctrinating the necessary military qualities in subordinates, and in particular the conscientious and unswerving obedience of superiors, unflinching efficiency, initiative and the unstinting execution of military duty, and the readiness to protect the commander in combat.

These are the basic provisions concerning the indoctrinational aspects of realizing the standards of Soviet legislation in the troops and naval forces. They again emphasize that legal indoctrination can be effective only under the condition of an organic unity in the propagandizing, explanation and studying of legislation and the unswerving fulfillment of its requirements in real activities.

§2. The Role of Disciplinary Practices and the Activities of Commanders in Reviewing Letters, Requests and Complaints

Among the other factors which influence the process of the legal indoctrination of servicemen, an important place is held by disciplinary practices which represent the realization by the commanders and other chiefs of the rights and duties granted them by the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces. This influence is carried out in two ways. In the first place, disciplinary practices help to strengthen military discipline and to maintain firm proper order according to the regulations in the unit, on the ship and in the subunit, and this proper order, as we already know from the preceding section, in turn is an important factor of legal indoctrination. Secondly, it directly influences the development of discipline in the men, that is, the inner need to always act in accord with the legal precepts.

The degree of discipline in a serviceman is determined primarily by his ideology and communist awareness and these are developed chiefly in the process of ideological-political and moral indoctrination. At the same

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time this is also instilled by the daily exactingness of the commanders and other chiefs upon their subordinates, and by a skillful combination and correct application of measures of persuasion and coercion, including, respectively, measures of commendation and disciplinary reprimands.

The Disciplinary Regulations oblige each commander (chief) to commend his subordinates for reasonable initiative, industry, feats and distinguished service, as well as reprimand the negligent. In being guided by the party's instructions on the need to constantly consider sociopolitical and indoctrinational aspects in their activities, the commander and other chiefs should approach each area of their work from fundamental party positions, with a knowledge of the question, creatively, they should have a clear notion of the indoctrinational goals and possible consequences of their actions, and anticipate the nature of their influence both on the awareness and conduct of subordinates with whom they are in immediate contact, as well as on all the military collective.

The indoctrinational significance of commendation consists primarily in the fact that the positive evaluation expressed in it for the zeal of a soldier in service, his successes in political and military training develops and strengthens in the soldier an awareness of the value of his military labor, it strengthens the conviction of the need for the active and enterprising performance of military duties, and encourages conscientious military service in the future. At the same time a commendation strengthens a soldier's confidence in his own forces, it develops in him a feeling of military honor and personal responsibility for defending his socialist motherland, and helps to develop such moral-political and military qualities as boldness, decisiveness, honesty, justice and a readiness to steadfastly endure the hardships and deprivations of military service and to make personal sacrifices for the sake of the common cause. Since all these qualities are a necessary condition for the disciplined conduct of a serviceman, we with every justification can feel that a commendation is an important means not only for the political and moral but also the legal indoctrination of the personnel.

The use of commendatory measures also has a direct influence upon the legal awareness of the personnel. It helps to raise the feeling of responsibility among the military for carrying out such demands of military discipline as the strict observance of Soviet laws, the military oath and the military regulations, the unquestioned fulfillment of the orders and instructions of commanders and other chiefs, and it helps to develop in them a profound respect for the standards of the law and the habit of constantly following these standards in service and in public places.

Life and the combat activities of the military units and ships are rich in examples of the exemplary and often self-sacrificing fulfillment of the orders of a commander by the servicemen. The measures of commendation employed in such instances serve as an important means for indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of conscious obedience of their chiefs, and this, as is known, is the foundation of military discipline. A commendation also

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has a positive effect in other spheres of the awareness of the men. For example, it helps in more profoundly understanding the need to constantly observe the provisions of the regulations which oblige each serviceman to protect the weapons, military equipment, military and public property assigned to him in every possible way. The commending of persons who have distinguished themselves in protecting the honor and dignity of citizens against violators of public order, in apprehending criminals, and in rescuing persons in a fire or during a natural disaster, helps also to establish and develop an awareness of civil duty in the personnel, and so forth.

The practice of employing commendations can produce the desired results and become an effective means of indoctrination only under the condition that it meets definite requirements the content of which is examined in detail in the special literature.⁷ We will limit ourselves to a brief description of the basic ones.

First of all, the provisions of the regulations should be strictly observed concerning the grounds and procedure for employing commendations, as well as the limits of the rights and powers of the commanders in this area. Measures not provided for by the regulations must not be employed as incentives (for example, promising remuneration for the early execution of a certain job), as well as the exceeding of rights in applying commendations.

In order that a commendation has a proper indoctrinational impact upon the subordinate and the entire collective, in each specific instance it is essential to consider the individual features of the serviceman to be commended, the psychological mood and situation in the given military collective, and the possible response of the collective to the announced commendation. The type of commendation is determined, as the regulations require, considering the nature of the services or the distinguished actions of the serviceman, and also his former attitude toward service. Any commendation should be sound, just and merited under the law. If a commendation is granted without grounds, then it is incapable of having an indoctrinational effect. It is also important to observe such requirements as the promptness of granting a commendation and the skillful combining of their various types.

Particular attention must be paid to ensuring the publicizing of commendations. A commendation is granted in such a manner that it has an indoctrinational effect not only upon the serviceman being commended, but also on his comrades in arms. For this reason the collective should always know who is being commended and for what. This, on the one hand, raises the authority of the man who has distinguished himself in the eyes of his fellow servicemen as well as his responsibility to the collective, and on the other, increases the significance of the actions or deed carried out by him, and encourages the other servicemen to follow his example. An effective measure which ensures the publicizing of a commendation is the announcing of it before the formed-up personnel of the subunit, unit or ship.

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Along with measures of commendation and combined with them, the commanders for the purposes of strengthening military discipline and indoctrinating the personnel, also employs measures of coercion. The regulations oblige each commander (chief) to demand decisively and firmly the observance of military discipline and order, and not to leave a single infraction by a subordinate unpunished. With the violation of military discipline or public order by a serviceman, the commander (chief) should remind him of his service duties, and when necessary subject him to a disciplinary punishment. Although the measures of disciplinary responsibility of servicemen do not play in our armed forces the main role in achieving the above-indicated goals (the persuasion method plays this role), nevertheless their application is essential in the proper instances. They are indispensable in combating violations of the law.

Disciplinary punishments are not only a measure of punishment or coercion of the violator to observe the established rules of conduct, but are also a means of his rehabilitation and reindoctrination, and a way of preventing new infractions by him. A punishment causes the soldier who has committed the infraction to profoundly feel his guilt and to critically evaluate his conduct, and it causes a desire to mend one's way and in the future to carry out the requirements, the military oath and the military regulations honestly and conscientiously.

Since the application of penalties involves unfavorable consequences for the person guilty of this (moral condemnation by the commander and comrades in arms, deprivation of various benefits, and so forth), it should cause definite moral experiences in the men subjected to the punishment. With a correct attitude of the collective toward the violators and with acute, fundamental and at the same time strictly comradely criticism of their conduct, such experiences help to temper the character of these soldiers. "A reasonable system of punishments," wrote A. S. Makarenko on this question, "is not only legitimate, but also necessary. It helps to shape a strong human character, it instills a feeling of responsibility, and it trains the will, human dignity, and the ability to resist enticements and surmount them."⁸

The skillful use of punishments has a preventive indoctrinational affect also on the other servicemen, and it helps to develop in them respect for the standards of the law, and to raise their sense of responsibility for carrying out military duty. It is one of the means for creating in the military collective a situation of intolerance for infractions of the law and for their universal condemnation, and at the same time instills in the personnel an awareness of the inevitability of responsibility for each committed infraction. This aspect of disciplinary practice also plays an active role in the legal indoctrination of the personnel.

In order to provide proper effectiveness from the employed measures of punishment, it is essential to observe definite principles of disciplinary practices, and above all such ones as the legality and soundness of the punishment, the individualization of responsibility, the promptness of

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imposing the punishments, and publicity.⁹ Inacceptable and harmful are the imposing by the chief of punitive measures not provided for in the Disciplinary Regulations, the abusing of his disciplinary power, or the exceeding of his disciplinary rights.

Disciplinary punishments should be imposed in all instances when this is dictated by the interests of service. Leaving unpunished the guilty, particularly those malicious violators of the law, leads to a weakening of responsibility of subordinates to carry out the requirements of military discipline and proper order, and to an undermining of the commander's authority.

Within the authority granted him, the commander has the right to impose any punishment which, in his opinion, will have the greatest indoctrinational effect on the serviceman who has committed the infraction. At the same time, the commander should proceed in such a manner that any disciplinary penalty be just and correspond to the severity of the infraction and the degree of blame. An indispensable condition for the effectiveness of punishments is their individualization. In determining the type and measure of punishment, consideration should be given to the following: The nature of the infraction; the previous conduct of the guilty party; the causes of the infraction; whether it was carried out intentionally, maliciously or out of negligence, flippancy or a lack of caution; the consequences of the infraction as well as other circumstances which mitigate or aggravate responsibility. Here arrest, being one of the extreme measures, should be employed, as a rule, only in those instances when the other measures adopted by the commander were unsuccessful.

In imposing punishments, the commander should not show hurry in selecting the type or measure of punishment, he should not deprecate the personal dignity of his subordinate or allow coarseness. A penalty has a strictly personal nature. For this reason, it is prohibited to impose a penalty on the entire personnel of a subunit instead of the direct guilty parties. There should also be strict observance of the requirements of the Disciplinary Regulations on consideration of the circumstances which would increase the severity of the penalty (Article 92), on the promptness of imposing the penalty and investigating the committed infraction (Article 96), on imposing a punishment on the guilty party who was in an inebriated state (Article 98), on the procedure for announcing and carrying out punishments (Articles 99-102), and so forth.

Only in observing all the provisions of the regulations can one ensure high effectiveness of disciplinary practices and their positive influence on the process of the moral and legal indoctrination of the servicemen. For this reason, each chief should constantly analyze his disciplinary practices and the practices of subordinate commanders, he should promptly detect and eliminate shortcomings in this work, and take the proper measures to raise its effectiveness.

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The reviewing of proposals, petitions and complaints of servicemen and other citizens is an important area of the service activities of the commanders and other chiefs having a substantial impact on the process of the legal indoctrination of the personnel. In accord with the instructions of V. I. Lenin, the Communist Party views the letters, proposals and petitions from Soviet citizens as one of the effective forms of worker participation in the running of state affairs, and a manifestation of their political awareness and activeness. "One of the important forms of the link of our party and its Central Committee with the masses," notes the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress, "is letters from the workers. Their number is constantly increasing, reflecting the growing social activeness of the Soviet people. They express the support for the party's policy, and they voice opinions on many fundamental questions of party and state life."¹⁰

The party and its Central Committee have shown constant concern for carrying out and developing the Leninist principles of working with letters from the workers, they teach us to see the living person behind each letter and each complaint, and demand that a responsive and attentive attitude be shown to them, that they are promptly reviewed and measures taken to unswervingly satisfy the legitimate requests of the petitioners. This is convincingly shown by the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee "On Improving Work in the Area of Reviewing Letters and Organizing the Receiving of Workers" (1967) and "On Further Improving Work with Workers Letters in Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" (1976).

The profound concern of the party and state for the democratic rights of the Soviet person permeates the provisions of Article 58 of the USSR Constitution that the USSR citizens have the right to contest the actions of officials, state and public bodies, and these complaints should be reviewed in the legally established procedure and time.

The above-named party decisions and constitutional provisions underlie the activities of the commanders and political bodies in reviewing the proposals, letters, petitions and complaints from servicemen, the members of their families and other Soviet citizens. This work is organized in accord with the requirements of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 12 April 1968 "On the Procedure for Reviewing Proposals, Petitions and Complaints of Citizens," the Disciplinary Regulations and Internal Service Regulations, the corresponding order of the USSR minister of defense, and the instructions approved by him on the given question.

The work of the commanders and political bodies in reviewing the letters, petitions and complaints is of important political and state significance. It helps to raise the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, to strengthen military and labor discipline, law and order and legality in the troops and naval forces, and at the same time serves as an important means for the political, moral and legal affect on the awareness, views, and conduct of the servicemen and other citizens.

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The letters and proposals from the fathers and mothers of servicemen and from other Soviet citizens received by the troop units and facilities, as a rule, are permeated with a profound concern for the Armed Forces. The skillful use of such letters in agitation and propaganda work has a great indoctrinational influence on the men. The parents of the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers often turn to the commanders with a request to describe how their son is serving and how he is behaving. The replies to such letters, like messages to the homeland or to the place of previous employment of a serviceman about his exemplary fulfillment of service duty, helps to indoctrinate the personnel in a spirit of a responsible attitude toward the duties of military service, as well as strict observance of the procedures and rules established by the laws and military regulations.

Of equal indoctrinational significance is the work of the commanders and deputy commanders for political affairs with the letters, proposals and petitions from the servicemen. What a feeling of moral satisfaction a serviceman feels in receiving a reply from the commander that his proposal has been accepted, his request satisfied, or his initiative approved, or that because of his message or petition sent in accord with Article 110 of the Disciplinary Regulations to a senior chief, measures have been taken to eliminate the shortcomings detected by him in service or other infractions of the legislation. This encourages him to serve even more zealously.

The complaints addressed to the command merit the most serious attention. V. I. Lenin demanded that the leaders "without fail accustom the population to the view that proper complaints are of serious significance and lead to serious results."¹¹ In following these instructions of Lenin's, the commanders and political workers strictly see to it that no submitted complaint remains unreviewed. The servicemen, the members of their families and other Soviet citizens, in learning that their rights and legitimate interests have been restored as a result of the measures undertaken by the commander, again are convinced of the inexorability of Soviet laws. And the shaping of such a conviction, as is known, is one of the most important goals of legal indoctrination.

An explanation to the servicemen and other citizens of the questions raised in their letters or asked orally and well reasoned replies to complaints in and of themselves are an effective means of propagandizing the laws. Even a refusal to satisfy a request, if its incorrectness or unsoundness is convincingly explained, helps to instill a respect for the law. Moreover, a study of the letters, petitions and complaints, and also the reasons giving rise to the complaints makes it possible to determine more specifically the questions which require a more complete and profound elucidation in legal propaganda, and this helps to work out measures aimed at preventing infractions of the laws and troop regulations.

An essential condition for ensuring an effective indoctrinational impact on the personnel from the work of the commanders and political bodies in reviewing the proposals, letters, petitions and complaints is the strict

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observance of the legal standards which determine the procedure of this work, as well as the times for reviewing and settling the requests of the petitioners. The failure to observe this procedure, the untimely review and settling of the letters and complaints, the sending off of unreasoned or hurriedly and negligently compiled replies to the petitioners, or a formal attitude toward the receiving of visitors--all this helps to evoke dissatisfaction, and in addition, to weaken trust in the law, and to sow the doubt of the possibility of achieving justice among a portion of the men. The interests of the legal indoctrination of the servicemen and indoctrinational work as a whole require the complete exclusion of the possibility of the appearance of such facts from practice.

§3. The Use of the Results of Prosecutor Reviews and Investigation of Criminal Cases in the Process of Legal Indoctrination

In the legal indoctrination of the personnel an important role is played by the military prosecutors [judge advocates] and the tribunals, as well as by the investigatory bodies the functions of which in the USSR Armed Forces are performed by the commanders of the troop units, formations and the chiefs of military facilities. A scientific basis for the indoctrinational role of the bodies of the Soviet state which defend the law has been given in the works of V. I. Lenin and the corresponding party decisions. V. I. Lenin pointed out that the courts are entrusted with the important task of ensuring the strictest discipline and self-discipline of the workers. "Without coercion," he wrote, "such a task is completely unfeasible.... The Soviet courts should be the body of the proletarian state which carries out such coercion. And on them rests the enormous task of indoctrinating the population in labor discipline."¹² V. I. Lenin taught that lessons "of social morality and practical policy" should be drawn from each court case,¹³ and he demanded that the legal awareness of the Soviet people be raised, that they be taught in a cultivated manner to fight for legality,¹⁴ and saw this as one of the tasks of the Soviet prosecutor's office.

In accord with Lenin's ideas, the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 15 September 1970 "On Measures to Improve the Legal Indoctrination of the Workers" formulated the thesis that the prosecutor's office, the courts and the other legal bodies by all their practical activities should instill in the citizens a profound respect for the laws, and should help to raise the legal knowledge of the population, while participation in legal propaganda was to be viewed as a professional duty and the most important official duty of each Soviet jurist.¹⁵

The instructions of V. I. Lenin and the decisions of the CPSU on the designated question have gained legal expression in the laws regulating the activities of the organs of justice. According to the law, criminal court proceedings--and its tasks within the limits of their competence are carried out by the bodies of the prosecutor's office, investigation and the courts--should help to prevent crimes and indoctrinate the citizens in a spirit of the unswerving fulfillment of the Soviet laws and respect for the

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rules of the socialist community. In carrying out these tasks, the military justice and investigation bodies organize their practical activities to strengthen legality and military law and order in such a manner that it to a maximum degree influences the awareness and conduct of the servicemen and helps to develop in them a socialist awareness in the law, as well as a profound respect for the standards of the law and communist morality.

According to Article 164 of the USSR Constitution and the Regulation Governing the Military Prosecutor's Office, the USSR Prosecutor General and the military prosecutors under him are responsible for superior supervision over the precise and uniform fulfillment of the laws in the USSR Armed Forces. This is one of the main functions of the military prosecutor's office. In carrying it out, the military prosecutors, with the aid of the forms and methods of work inherent to them, supervise the correct application of the laws, and apply the corresponding measures to eliminate their violations and whatever caused these violations. The military prosecutors and investigators combat encroachments against the combat capability of the Armed Forces, military discipline and the procedures of military service, and they protect the rights and legitimate interests of the servicemen, the members of their families, the employees of the Armed Forces, as well as the troop units, facilities, institutions, enterprises and organizations. At the same time, the bodies of the military prosecutor's office carry out measures to prevent infractions of the law and to establish the reasons giving rise to them, they carry out legal propaganda, in helping by all their activities to strengthen socialist legality in the Armed Forces and to indoctrinate the servicemen in a spirit of the unswerving fulfillment of the Soviet laws, the military oath, the troop regulations, and the orders of commanders and chiefs.

The military prosecutor's office carries out its functions in the area of strengthening socialist legality in the Armed Forces independently of any local and military bodies whatsoever, but at the same time works in close cooperation with the command, the political bodies, the army and navy community of the troop units, ships and formations. The realization of these important principles makes it possible for the bodies of the military prosecutor's office, on the one hand, to properly utilize the strength of the law the the measures of state coercion in combating violations of the law, and on the other, due to the close contact with the command, the political bodies and the community, to ensure maximum effectiveness of the preventive indoctrinational measures.

Since the solely responsible commanders and the political bodies play the leading role in organizing the indoctrination of the personnel, it is very important that in their work they consider and actively utilize the indoctrinational possibilities of the military justice bodies, and create the necessary conditions so that these possibilities are successfully realized. The reciprocal contacts between the commanders, the political workers and the military lawyers in the legal indoctrination of personnel are one of the most reliable ways for achieving high effectiveness of this work.

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One of the most effective factors in the legal indoctrination of the personnel of a troop unit or ship is, as was already mentioned at the outset of the chapter, the maintaining of high discipline and conditions of strict legality and firm proper order. The indoctrinational influence of a law is manifested fully when it is carried out precisely and unswervingly. The nonobservance or the incorrect application of legal standards leads to a disorienting of people, it gives rise to an incorrect notion of the law, and weakens the confidence in its justice and inexorability. The practical activities of the bodies of the military prosecutor's offices are directed chiefly at preventing such negative phenomena.

In carrying out supervision, the military prosecutors conduct reviews on the conformity of orders, instructions, regulations and other acts issued by the military administrative bodies to the law. They also check the fulfillment of the laws by all the servicemen, the observance of legality in holding arrested persons at guardhouses, and so forth. Particular attention is given to reviewing the fulfillment of the USSR Law Governing Universal Military Service, the laws governing the protection of socialist property, and the other laws and combined-arms regulations which regulate the life and activities of the Armed Forces. In the event of detecting violations of the laws and military regulations, immediate measures are taken to eliminate them and to institute proceedings against the guilty parties.

In carrying out this work, the military prosecutors do not limit themselves to disclosing violations of the law and their causes, but also explain the requirements of the laws to the appropriate officials, they give advice and recommendations to the commanders on how the various provisions of the law should be applied, and what measures should be undertaken for eliminating and preventing the specific infractions and the causes of them. There have been beneficial results from the practice where the results of prosecutor reviews are analyzed at official meetings organized by the commanders for officers, warrant officers, petty officers and sergeants, and sometimes at meetings of the entire personnel. This serves as an important means for improving the legal knowledge of the various categories of servicemen.

Of great indoctrinational significance are the protests by the military prosecutors of acts by the military administrative bodies which are contradictory of the law and their moves to eliminate violations of the law, the factors and conditions contributing to the violations, as well as to take measures to strengthen legality and combat violations of the law. These prosecutor-initiated acts directed at the appropriate commanders and chiefs, on behalf of the state, express the demand for the unswerving observance of the laws and military regulations, and they explain definite legal standards. This helps to raise the legal intelligence of military officials and their responsibility for the correct application and strict fulfillment of the laws. The official actions by the military investigators on the criminal cases investigated by them serve the same purpose. Over the question of the protests and moves by commanders and political bodies, often an

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entire complex of measures is carried out aimed at eliminating the disclosed violations of the laws and at improving the legal indoctrination of the servicemen.

The work done by the military prosecutors in reviewing the letters, petitions and complaints of servicemen, the members of their families and other citizens is also of great indoctrinational significance. This work helps to raise the legal awareness and to broaden the legal informativeness of the servicemen, and it creates in them a conviction of the inexorability of the rights and legitimate interests of the Soviet people, that the violations of these rights and interests in each specific interest will be eliminated without fail, that justice will triumph, and the guilty parties will suffer just punishment. Moreover, supervision by the military prosecutors over the observance of the law governing the procedure for reviewing proposals, petitions and complaints of citizens in the military units and ships helps in the legal indoctrination of the officials and teaches them to correctly understand and apply the standards of the law.

Also of important preventive and indoctrinational significance is the work done by the military prosecutor and investigatory bodies to disclose crimes and bring the guilty parties to justice. "...The preventive significance of punishment," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "is determined not at all by its severity but by its inevitability. The important thing is not that a severe punishment be handed down for a certain crime, but rather that no instance of a crime go undisclosed."¹⁶

The unswerving fulfillment on the part of the military prosecutors, the investigators and the investigatory bodies of the requirements of the law concerning the rapid and complete disclosure of crimes, the unmasking of the guilty parties and the instituting of criminal proceedings against them show the servicemen by their own eyes that in our country the interests of society, the state and the rights of the citizens are properly defended and protected, that a decisive struggle is waged against criminal encroachments, and that the guilty parties inevitably will bear the legally established responsibility. This helps to create a situation in the military collectives of universal condemnation of criminal actions and the inevitability of punishment for them, and it helps the personnel more profoundly realize the necessity of a consistent struggle against any deviations from the laws and military regulations.

At the same time, it must be said that the nonobservance of the above-indicated requirements of the laws or any instances of the concealment of crimes or their incomplete investigation, when the guilty parties are not held liable under the law, inevitably lead to a reduction in the level of the legal awareness of the servicemen, to a weakening of their personal responsibility for the unswerving fulfillment of the laws, the requirements of the military oath and the military regulations, and, as a consequence of this, to the rise of new infractions of the law. All of this shows the inacceptability of such facts and the necessity of a decisive struggle for their complete eradication.

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It is hard to overestimate the indoctrinational significance of the strict fulfillment of the standards of the law which require a thorough, complete and objective examination of all circumstances in each criminal case, the establishing of both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the legal and sound resolution to the question of the arrest and instituting of criminal proceedings against the guilty parties, and the observance of the established procedure for conducting criminal cases. The correct application of the corresponding provisions of the law strengthens the legal awareness of people and also their confidence that the constitutional provision on the inviolability of the individual in Soviet society is unwaveringly observed in practice, and that no innocent party in our nation will have proceedings instituted against him, and the person who has violated the law and committed a crime inevitably will receive a just punishment.

The rehabilitation and reindoctrination of a person guilty of committing a crime starts, as is rightly said, in the office of the investigator. In questioning the accused, in explaining his rights to him, the legal prohibitions and the provisions of the law on mitigating circumstances, and in convincing him of the necessity of confessing, the military investigator thereby influences his legal awareness, and helps him become aware of the perniciousness of his criminal conduct and the necessity of exculpating his guilt and to take up the path of rehabilitation and a respectful attitude toward the law, the collective, the members of society whose interests he violated by his crime.

And it is also beyond a doubt that a military investigator or examiner, by explaining to witnesses and victims their responsibility for a refusal to give evidence or for giving false evidence, by the entire situation of the questioning, as well as by the unmasking of false evidence, helps to develop in the persons being questioned a correct understanding of their civil duty and their responsibility to the law. And not only for them, but also for everyone to whom the actions of the investigator become known. All of this also helps to maintain a healthy public opinion on legal questions in the given military collective.

One of the effective forms of legal indoctrination of servicemen is speeches by the military prosecutors, the investigators or examiners in the army and navy collectives on the results of the investigation of specific cases with an analysis of the causes and conditions which contributed to the commission of the crimes. A precise and clear exposition by the speaker of the essence of the case, the social danger of the committed crime, and the causes and conditions as a consequence of which it became possible helps to instill in the men a respect for the proper standards of troop comradeship, an awareness of the high responsibility for flawless personal conduct and the restraining of fellow servicemen from improper actions, as well as irreconcilability against violations of the law, elements of covering up and indifference.

In the indoctrination of servicemen a significant role is also played by the accusatorial speeches of the military prosecutors, particularly in

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those instances when the case is heard in the military unit in the presence of the personnel. V. I. Lenin pointed to the enormous indoctrinational significance of the courts,¹⁷ particularly emphasizing the indoctrinational affect of an ably constructed accusation. He felt that an able accuser or prosecutor "could in front of everyone lay out, mock or defame" one or another negative phenomenon, having conducted the accusation reasonably, correctly and in proper measure.¹⁸ And consequently, the active involvement of the military prosecutor as a state accuser in a court investigation of criminal cases and his well reasoned accusatorial speech, as a rule, leave an indelible trace in the memory of the servicemen attending the court, helping them draw definite lessons from the court trial in the area of law and public morality.

The military prosecutors and investigators in the process of their work are involved not only with violators of laws but also conscientious people. In line with the application of the legal provisions concerning the most diverse spheres of state, public and military life, they must constantly come into contact with officials entrusted with the carrying out of the laws and with many other categories of servicemen. Due to this they possess great opportunities for explaining the laws to a broad range of servicemen and other citizens. The skillful use of such opportunities increases the range of the indoctrinational effect of investigatory and procurator practices. Moreover, the military prosecutors possess generalized data making it possible to correctly define the subject of legal propaganda, its goal, and the ways of a differentiated approach to the various categories of servicemen. One of the indispensable conditions for improving the effectiveness of legal indoctrination work is the comprehensive use of all these forms and methods of indoctrinational effect.

These are the general outlines of the indoctrinational aspects of the practical activities carried out by the military prosecutor and investigatory bodies and which should be constantly considered by the commanders and political workers in organizing and carrying out the legal indoctrination of the personnel.

§4. Legal Indoctrination in Relation to the Court Trial of Criminal Cases

One of the effective forms of legal indoctrination is the holding of open court trials of a military tribunal in the military units in the presence of the personnel. The review of the most urgent and instructive cases directly in the troop unit makes it possible to enlarge the court audience, to provide a more effective influence on the process of instilling in the servicemen a respect for the law, an irreconcilability for legal violations and deviations from the requirements of the military oath and military regulations, and thereby to aid more effectively in preventing crimes and eliminating the factors and conditions giving rise to them.

V. I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized the important indoctrinational significance of open court trials. He recommended that the cases be brought up before the public court "for the sake of publicizing and destroying the

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universal notion of the impunity of guilty parties,"¹⁹ so that it would be possible to disclose and publically show all the threads of the crimes and "derive from the court lessons of public morality and practical policy."²⁰

The commander and his deputy for political affairs bear responsibility for organizing and conducting a court trial in the unit in the presence of the personnel. The preparations for such a court trial are based upon a comprehensive plan compiled by the command together with the military lawyers. The plan provides measures for the organizational and political support for the preparation and holding of the court session, as well as the measures which should be carried out with the personnel of the unit upon the end of the trial.

During the period of preparing for a court session, ordinarily the following are planned: Measures which ensure the personnel is notified of the date and place for holding the trial, the essence of the accusation made against the accused, as well as an explanation for the servicemen of the laws and requirements of the military regulations which were violated by the accused, the social danger of the violations committed by him; talks on the role of the army and navy community in preventing violations of the law; the holding of a meeting to choose the representatives of the community for participating in the court trial. During this same period, the category of servicemen which must attend the court trial is determined.

The section of the plan which provides for the course of the court trial indicates the measures which encompass such questions as the preparation of the people's chairman and the representatives of the community for the court trial; providing for the prompt reporting of victims, witnesses and the accused (if he is under the supervision of the command) for the court session; the organizing of a commandant service for the period of the trial; the assigning of an escort and transport in the necessary instances. Here responsibility is also determined for preparing the quarters assigned for the court session.

After the court trial, political indoctrination measures are carried out aimed at mobilizing the military collective to further struggle against legal violations and their causes, and for creating in the unit or on the ship a situation of hostility toward any violations of military discipline and public order. Such measures ordinarily include: the announcing of the sentence to all the personnel; an analysis of the factors leading to violations of the law in the official meetings, assemblies of the personnel and party and Komsomol meetings; individual and collective talks with the men, lectures, movie-and-lecture and special subject evenings on legal indoctrination subjects.

Along with the commanders, the political workers and the legal - tiv of the unit or ship, the military lawyers (the workers from the military prosecutor's offices and military tribunals) also participate in the work of carrying out the measures outlined in the plan.

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To a significant degree the indoctrinational and preventive action of a court trial depends upon the prompt announcing of the sentence of the military tribunal to the servicemen. One of the most effective forms of informing the personnel of court rulings is the announcing of them in the orders of the command. A draft of such an order, as a rule, is worked out by the staff of the military unit upon instructions of its commander. In the statement (descriptive) part of the order, usually a brief description is given of the criminal actions for which the serviceman has been condemned, and, if necessary, an analysis of the reasons and conditions which contributed to the commission of the crime; a legal evaluation of the committed crime is given as well as the ruling of the court on the sentence. The order part gives the categories of servicemen to which the order should be announced, and measures are defined to prevent violations of the law with the stipulating of the dates for holding them and the executors.

It is not recommended that several sentences be announced in one order or the sentence be announced late, that is, when much time has elapsed since it was received in the troop unit. The sentence can be announced in an order or an explanation of the sentence can be made in the press or over the radio only after the sentence has gone into legal force, and as a consequence of this these measures must be first coordinated with the chairman of the military tribunal.

Most effective is the following procedure for issuing orders containing an announcement of sentences:

- 1) At official meetings or in front of a formation of the proper servicemen for the condemnation of officers, warrant officers and reenlisted servicemen;
- 2) At meetings or in front of the formation of sergeants and petty officers of the subunit or unit for condemning sergeants and petty officers in regular service, and in individual instances, when indicated in the order itself, in front of the formation of all the personnel;
- 3) In front of the formation of the subunit personnel in the condemning of privates.

The orders with the announcing of sentences are issued to the servicemen by the commander of the unit (subunit) or by his deputy. Persons not present for any reasons in the announcing of such orders are counted, and additional work is done with them subsequently. Certain orders with the announcing of sentences at times should be reannounced to the personnel. Ordinarily this is done on the occasion of the arrival of young soldiers or with the appearance of the possibility of the commission of various infractions.

The well organized and skillfully carried out trial of a military tribunal in the presence of the personnel, combined with proper legal indoctrinational

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work, is an effective means for strengthening legality and law and order. The task of the commanders and the political workers is to make maximum use of the indoctrinational opportunities of each such trial for the further strengthening of military discipline.

The social progress achieved by our nation in the course of socialist construction, and the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for strengthening its defense capability have created all the necessary conditions for reducing and then fully eradicating violations of the law in the army and navy. One of the important factors contributing to the successful solution of this problem is effective, continuous, strictly coordinated and scientifically based work in the area of the legal indoctrination of the personnel of the Armed Forces.

On each ship and in each military unit it is essential to maintain a level of legal indoctrinational work which would completely exclude instances of violations of military law and order. To a significant degree the combat readiness and battleworthiness of the troops and naval forces depend upon the effectiveness of the struggle against violations of the law. For this reason, the commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations, and the military justice bodies, in being guided by the party's decisions as well as by the orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, must in the future work actively to raise the level of the legal awareness of the Soviet military, in closely coordinating this with the life of the troops and with the ideological-political, moral and military indoctrination of the personnel.

FOOTNOTES

¹See: M. I. Kalinin, "O Kommunisticheskom Vospitani i Voinskoi Dolge" [On Communist Indoctrination and Military Duty], p 625.

²See: "Materialy XXIV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1971, p 100; "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," p 70.

³See: V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 50, p 63.

⁴See: M. I. Kalinin, op. cit., p 415.

⁵See: "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," p 70.

⁶See: "Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces," Article 5; "Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces," Article 48.

⁷See: "Voyennaya Pedagogika" [Military Pedagogics], Moscow, 1966; "Osnovy Pravovykh Znaniy" [Principles of Legal Knowledge], Moscow, 1973; V. D. Kulakov, "Vospitaniye Distiplinirovannosti u Sovetskikh Voinov" [The Indoctrination of Discipline in Soviet Military], Moscow, 1977, and so forth.

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⁸A. S. Makarenko, "Soch." [Works], vol 5, Moscow, 1958, p 399.

⁹For more detail on this see the book: "Osnovy Sovetskogo Voyennogo Zakonodatel'stva" [Principles of Soviet Military Legislation], Moscow, 1978, as well as the literature given in footnote 7.

¹⁰"Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," pp 66-67.

¹¹V. I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 50, p 224.

¹²Ibid., vol 36, p 163.

¹³Ibid., vol 4, pp 407-408.

¹⁴See: Ibid., vol 44, p 465.

¹⁵See: "Voprosy Ideologicheskoy Raboty KPSS" [Questions of Ideological Work of the CPSU], p 286.

¹⁶V. I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 4, p 412.

¹⁷See: Ibid., vol 44, p 397.

¹⁸See: "Leninskiy Sbornik" [The Lenin Collection], VIII, p 56.

¹⁹V. I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 54, p 71.

²⁰Ibid., vol 4, pp 407-408.

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BOOK EXCERPTS: ARMY STAFF OFFICER'S MEMOIRS

Moscow SLUZHILI MY V SHTABE ARMEYSKOM ("We Served on the Army Staff") in Russian 1979 signed to press 14 Apr 79 pp 2, 208, 3-5

[Annotation, editors' preface, table of contents and author's foreword from book by Col Gen I. S. Katyshkin, Voenizdat Publishers, 65,000 copies, 208 pages]

[Text] During the war the author served on the staff of the 59th Army, which was attached first to the Volkhov and then to the Leningrad and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. Units and formations of this army participated in such operations as the Novgorod-Luzhskiy, the assault landing operation to liberate the islands of the Bay of Vyborg, the Vistula-Oder operation, and in the Soviet offensive against Prague through the Sudeten Mountains.

The subject of this book, intended for general readership, is the development and implementation of the plans for these operations and the heroism of Soviet soldiers.

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Author's Foreword

In this book I would like to discuss the work of the staff of the 59th Army during the Great Patriotic War. It was in its ranks that I fought through 4 long, fiery years, beginning the campaign on the banks of the Volkhov River and finishing it in the Sudeten Mountains in Czechoslovakia.

Our army fought on three fronts--the Volkhov, Leningrad and 1st Ukrainian. Its soldiers and commanders liberated one of the oldest of Russian cities--Novgorod, participated together with other formations in the defeat of the enemy's army group "North," and lifted the blockade around Leningrad. Later the 59th Army bravely fought the fascists at the Narva River and made an assault crossing of the Bay of Vyborg. Its units and formations were the first to enter the ancient Polish capital, Krakow, liberated the Silesia industrial region from the Hitler aggressors and ended the war just short of Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia.

The army staff, the primary organ for troop control, naturally played an enormous role in the planning, preparation and execution of all of these operations. We, its members, had to plan and then to assist the army's troops in implementing the offensive and defensive operations under the most difficult conditions of combat--in swampy-forested terrain, as was the case near Novgorod; in the assault crossing of the Bay of Vyborg, when the fascists had to be knocked out on its numerous islands. Incidentally, in this case our army operated in close coordination with the sailors of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet. Later the 59th Army staff had to plan and execute the offensive operation which began with the committing of its units and formations into the breakthrough from the second echelon of the 1st Ukrainian Front, as was the case, for example, in the Vistula-Oder operation as well as to perform complex tasks in the battles in the Sudeten Mountains.

In the memoir literature of recent years there have appeared a large number of books whose authors study many of the most important defensive and offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. These authors speak warmly and interestingly about our prominent military leaders who originated these operations, about the heroism of Soviet soldiers and commanders. But, unfortunately, with few exceptions these memoirs contain very little about the activities of the staffs, their members, who naturally are not always seen on the field of battle, but who nonetheless perform very important tasks. This is why in this book I would like to right, if I may say so, this injustice and tell about the multifaceted activities of the army staff, about the people whose labor and intelligence laid the foundation for success in the many offensive and defensive operations of our troops.

This book is based on many documents from the staffs of the Volkhov, Leningrad and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, the Military Council, army staff and political section of the 59th Army, their constituent formations,

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documents currently on file at the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In my work I have used the stories and letters of my fellow soldiers whom I had occasion to meet during as well as after the war and the statements of prominent military leaders relative to the combat activities of our 59th Army.

The reader will quickly notice that in describing the multifaceted activities of an army staff in this book, I nonetheless place primary emphasis on the work of its operations section. And this is fully understandable. It was in this section that I worked throughout the war, initially as a simple operations officer, and later as the section's deputy chief.

In conclusion I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the veterans of the 59th Army who sent me letters and even their memoirs. This is particularly true of the former members of the Military Council retired Major-Generals P. S. Lebedev and Ya. G. Polyakov, the former chief of the operations section retired Major-General of the Army L. M. Krylov. Much valuable advice during work on this book was provided me by the now deceased retired Colonel-General I. T. Korovnikov, former 59th Army commander.

I express my thanks to the associates of the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense for their assistance in the selection of needed materials and also reserve Colonel A. F. Kireyev, who recorded the material in literary form and personally contributed much effort in the preparation of this book.

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