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(FOUO 13/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

SCENARIOS FOR U.S. - USSR EUROPEAN THEATER NUCLEAR CONFLICT

East, West Nuclear Capabilities

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 10-16 Dec 79 pp 63-69

[Article by Francois Schlosser: "Scenarios for a Third World War"]

[Text] The most recent nuclear war lasted 10 minutes. It began Friday 9 November 1979 when the American military mistakenly initiated the first steps in the procedure leading to the nuclear holocaust.

At 1050 on that day, countless small lights began flashing throughout North America in all operations centers of the strategic forces. Computer terminals had reported--with a neutral and quiet murmur--an incoming sheaf of nuclear missiles launched from a submarine somewhere in the northern Pacific. Reconnaissance aircraft took off at a minute's notice from several air bases thousands of kilometers apart. From the Caribbean to Alaska, from Greenland to the Philippines, in submarines scattered throughout the oceans of the world, and in space communications relays circling the globe round the clock, the immense American military machine bristled with intense electronic buzzing. Complying with standing operating procedures, thousands of silent technicians initiated the big countdown with limited and precise movements. From Montana to Arkansas, in the Dakotas and Wyoming, locking devices were released on heavy, armored protective covers over the deep underground silos housing the ICBM's. Operators were ready to broadcast orders grounding all civil air traffic in North America. The time had come to notify the President of the United States that the country was under nuclear attack. The 110 B-52 bombers, on continuous ground alert and with some 1,500 megatons in their bomb bays, were scheduled to be airborne 4 minutes later. But everything was cancelled at the 10th minute after preliminary checks revealed that a Colorado Springs computer had played this nasty trick on "the end-of-the-world headquarters" by inserting into warning circuits a test tape intended solely for routine exercises.

Technically, the war had started by itself. And the men who had no intention whatever of starting it were at least able to stop it, this time.

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American public opinion attached no importance whatever to the incident, in fact, no more than did European opinion. Yet, for many months now, that same public in its replies given to all polls and surveys, has indicated, at times by an overwhelming majority, that it is once again afraid of war. And more and more frequently, authoritative voices--politicians who are not among the most excitable, or responsible leaders in important sectors of the economy--are expressing the same fear. What exactly is this fear?

One initial observation: it is not a fear of wars in which black or yellow people are dying. Such wars have been going on too long, and the West's anxiety is recent. At this very moment, there are five open wars in Africa and just as many latent conflicts. There are also four or five major wars and seven current massacres in Asia. Not to mention the refugees, whose number can no longer even be estimated to the nearest million. And not to mention either those entire populations who are victims of deadly famine or just simply dying of destitution. Sheltered behind its hoarded wealth, Europe is not really affected by these upheavals, even when it is technically involved in them. Travel agencies are rushing to the Cambodian border in Rosalynn Carter's footsteps. They expect to send a flood of tourists to the very gates of hell so that they can witness the mortal agony of human beings who have come there to die of disease, starvation, and exhaustion, lying in the muddy puddles of the Thai monsoon season. Yet before such scenes, filmed with compassion, can also arouse apprehension, there must first be the fearsome noise of marching men inside China's borders.

The truth is that Westerners are frightened primarily by images of crisis. Our history books explain that unemployment and inflation produced Hitler. They trace the war of 1939 back to the depression of 1929: recession, trade war, and monetary collapses, are all so many words that bring bad luck. The fear of being penniless, rumors of shortages, and uncertainty about the future are what have recently revised latent anxieties.

There are 15 million unemployed in Western countries today compared with 5 million some 10 years ago. We no longer feel we can promise our children a better world. Fear of the atom looms large. The price of gold has reached record levels, and silver, that old forsaken metal, is now also joining the ranks of safe, sheltered investments. The always pragmatic Lloyd's of London has raised shipping insurance rates a peg or two: one never knows in this topsy-turvy world where Third World countries, tired of being exploited, are demanding better treatment in the international distribution of work. And this at a time when the whole world recognizes that development models have failed: the gap between rich and poor countries is widening after 20 years of aid, of speeches and theories on development. The poor are more numerous and their poverty greater. The despair of billions of human beings is "programmed" for several centuries to come. The World Bank reports: "Among the most rapidly growing developing countries, there are seven that can hope to catch up to the industrial countries in a century, and about nine in 1,000 years."

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This is a terrifying verdict that destroys for good the myth of the West's civilizing role. Yet no other model has, up to now, convincingly proved itself to be any more effective. If the World Bank's economists are right, the time has come for the rich to withdraw into their fortified tower and hope that its foundations are not too quickly shaken by the convulsions of the deprived continents.

Since the Vietnam War, followed by America's long decline, OPEC's hypocritical officials and the fanatic mobs in the streets of Iran have carried the impact of the same impassioned message into contemporary history. It is the sudden revelation of a Third World chasing the policemen and shouting "stop thief." These developments are shaking the West in some of its oldest convictions. The West is suddenly starting to fear for its oil, its phosphates, its uranium, and its privileges.

Is this a rich man's anxiety or is it fear of war? Everyone knows that the only possible war in Europe would be an East-West conflict, in other words, world war. Consequently the Soviet ogre has rapidly regained the spotlight in the past few months. To such a point that it has now become possible to blame the USSR for all disturbing factors originating elsewhere and thus create a monumental threat out of nothing. From this there has emerged real fear which, at least for its part, is not lacking in profitability. The great strategic debate on the SALT agreement, heightened by the approach of a presidential election, and the Pentagon's fixed desire to deploy a new generation of new weapons in Europe, are furnishing the media an ample supply of irrefutable arguments, alarming assumptions, and catastrophic scenarios. All of these prove with force and conviction that military expenditures must be increased immensely, that it is an urgent necessity to produce the new ground, air, and naval weapons invented and developed by the world's best scientists. We are told that these new generations of missiles are the only ones commensurate with the end-of-century pattern of the apocalypse. Is it really wrong if, in a good cause, fears are slightly manipulated by considerably juggling the figures? In any case, that is exactly what the most brilliant advocates of a return to the cold war have been doing in the United States and Europe for months. Why?

We can, of course, no longer simply heap the blame for this on the "military-industrial complex." Because that complex is now much more than military and industrial (and the same can be said about all of those processes currently leading the world into irreversible militarization at a dizzy pace). This complex is also an academic, administrative, bureaucratic, banking, and, in certain aspects, transnational complex. And as John Kenneth Galbraith recently explained: "The greatest source of opposition to detente are the economic interests." Huge sections of the American administrative bureaucracy literally live on the proceeds of tension with the USSR. According to Galbraith, this bureaucracy and this industry are once again attracting the best brains. In addition, the arms race is good for employment, revenues, innovation, and the gross national product. No one ever says this aloud, but it is what everyone privately thinks. And Galbraith concluded: "It would be much more sensible

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if those who have an economic interest in the arms race stopped shielding themselves behind words like peace, freedom, or national security" and openly discussed these interests.

The military-industrial complex ingenuously denounced by President Eisenhower is really no longer what it once was. It is now much more extensive, varied, and powerful than it ever was in the past. To get an idea of its tremendous power over people and their way of thinking, we need only look at what is happening in the United States at the present time.

One of the best observers of the American scene wrote in THE GUARDIAN recently that the debate in the United States on the East-West balance has now reached an irrational level and that certain statements by senators or political candidates border on hysteria: "Facts about the military balance are being distorted day after day." Discussions between experts or experienced politicians very quickly shift from arguments supported by figures and from assessments of the real capabilities of the United States and the USSR and become bogged down in the most rudimentary psychological swamps of discussion on levels of virility and differences between those who have some and those who do not.

Nobody disputes the military progress the USSR has made over the past 10 years. Soviet generals have boasted about it enough in Red Army publications and to their allies--and clients--in the Third World. And there is no press in the Soviet Union capable of denouncing the misdeeds of the local military-industrial complex. The most visible result is that the USSR is becoming economically stagnant while continuing to give its military establishment absolute priority over civilian sectors.

But is this being done to gain superiority over Western countries, or to remain even with them or just simply to try to catch up with them in a constantly renewed effort that has thus far never been crowned with success?

The importance of the stakes involved demands that we focus on the figures for a moment. This is necessary because the most widely-held opinion in the Western media is the following: the USSR is constantly spending more money on its military forces than the United States. It is acquiring the means of destroying the American arsenal in an unanswerable first strike. Thanks to this superiority, it will be able to exert any kind of political pressure on the West. In addition, it has Europe at its mercy, and thanks to its new naval power, it already surpasses the West in its capability to project its power in all areas of the world.

What is the real situation?

Since 1945, all innovations that have successively destabilized the world military balance have first appeared in the inventories of the American generals. At each turning point, the revival of the arms race has occurred in the United States following secret reports released to the general public in small increments through deliberate leaks. In the early 1950's, it was

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the alarm over the "bomber gap" which enabled the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to obtain a gigantic fleet of B-47's, and then the B-52's with an inter-continental operating range. After this had been done, it was determined that the Soviets actually had no offensive capability necessitating such a response. In 1957, a secret report uncovered "the missile gap" by announcing that the Soviet Union would pose a "critical danger" to the United States by 1959 or 1960. Knowing nothing of the falseness of the report, Kennedy rushed the United States into a "crash" program of inter-continental ground-launched and submarine-launched missiles, a program General Gallois called "Pharaonic." Now the "missile gap" did exist, but in favor of the United States and to the detriment of the Soviets. What followed is well-known: the Americans introduced the MIRV system to cope with an alleged Soviet antimissile defense system that was soon acknowledged to be merely the most conventional type of anti-aircraft defense. The USSR was still lagging behind when the United States, after the SALT I agreement, doubled its number of nuclear warheads, the Pentagon having rejected any moratorium on the deployment of multiple warheads.

And since 1976 it has been the big revival: a secret report prepared by a group formed by President Ford developed all the arguments that have fueled the new debate on Soviet "superiority" to this day. The report's leit-motif: under cover of detente, the USSR is methodically preparing to wage and win a nuclear war. The critical moment for America will come between 1983 and 1986. This is what is known as the "window of opportunity," namely the interval during which the Soviets will have deployed enough heavy missiles capable of destroying in one fell swoop the land-based component of the American nuclear forces before it becomes mobile.

Yet it is impossible to unerringly destroy all American land-based missiles, regardless of the intensity of the attack. The Soviets do not even know how many of their missiles would leave their silos, or how many would remain wedged therein because of technical difficulties, or how many of the missiles actually launched would wander off course above the North Pole or lose themselves somewhere along the way.

And even if such a blow were feasible, the U.S. president would still have the major part of his forces after the first strike, namely several thousand warheads in submerged submarines and on SAC aircraft that would have been airborne after the initial alert. He could use these aircraft against nonhardened Soviet military objectives: munitions plants, airports, key road and rail junctions, oil refineries, communications facilities, ports, etc. The United States could also retaliate for days on end by piecemeal firing of its 3,000 submarine-launched warheads.

The obvious conclusion is that the "window of opportunity" scenario is a farce. Especially since the "huge" SS-18 and SS-19 missiles expected--according to the theorists of Soviet superiority--to do all the "work" against American land-based missiles are much less powerful than had been imagined. Here again, exaggeration had worked to the full. A report that went almost unnoticed in the American press recently revealed that previous estimates of the power of these Soviet "monsters" had to be reduced 50 percent.

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There had been claims of 1.2 megatons per reentry vehicle. The latest information is that this yield is no more than 600 kilotons. Given the higher accuracy of American missiles, the warheads of the Soviet "super-rockets" are, in the final analysis, no more formidable than the Mk. 12A reentry vehicle currently being installed in American Minuteman missiles. Yet the immense majority of Westerners continues to believe the Soviets have more dangerous "super-rockets" than the Americans and that the USSR is capable of starting a nuclear war, if their bluff is called.

Galbraith believes "the Soviets are as aware as we are of the realities of nuclear war. They have had much more horrible experiences with war than we have had. All persons who have had occasion to discuss this subject with Soviet officials have no doubts about the depth of their distress at the idea of a nuclear war. They know that after such a conflict the ashes of communism would no longer be distinguishable from the ashes of capitalism."

The most convinced believers in imminent danger will rebut: "Yes, but why then are they spending much more money than we are in preparing for nuclear war?" Actually it is assumed to be an established fact that the USSR spends at least one third more than the U.S.A. on its armed forces. According to SIPRI* [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] experts, this issue has been the subject of "a highly successful propaganda campaign" conducted in the media of Western countries. How did the CIA and the Pentagon manage to get everyone to accept "known facts" that are either questionable or false? Here is how the SIPRI Yearbook describes the procedure American experts follow in making their calculations: they compile a list of all the components of Soviet military strength--weapons, equipment, imports, personnel, etc.--and simply estimate what these would cost in dollars. The United States has all-volunteer armed forces, each member of which is paid. The USSR has armed forces comprised of draftees that cost it almost nothing and which it uses superabundantly. Costing each Ukrainian, Russian, and Uzbek private the same as an infantryman from Little Rock or Seattle already inflates the Soviet defense budget like a balloon. For example, the United States has only some 75,000 men in its strategic capability whereas the USSR has at least five times more than that for a barely equivalent capability. Consequently comparison of the sums spent produces some fanciful results.

Better still, the CIA recently suddenly increased its estimate of Moscow's defense spending by more than one-third. The CIA's reasoning: it had previously overestimated the military industrial sector's productivity in comparison with the civilian sector's productivity. The new assumption is that inefficiency, waste, and incompetency are just as great in the industrial sector as in the civilian sector. Consequently the military industry's products cost much more than had heretofore been imagined. This is merely a change in costing procedure. It is more an indication of greater weakness on the Soviet side, and has nothing to do with a real increase in the USSR's military effort. Yet that is how most commentators have depicted it.

*"SIPRI Yearbook 1979: World Armament and Disarmament"

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Another idea generally accepted as an established fact reinforces the CIA's analysis: for some 10 years now, the USSR has steadily increased its strategic arsenal to a terrifying extent while the United States reportedly has been practically at a standstill. This American "restraint" was not reciprocated by any similar reserve on the part of the other side. On the contrary, the Soviets are said to have taken advantage of it to gain a lead. Congressman Lee Aspin, a former Pentagon analyst and an expert in East-West comparisons, has furnished the following enlightening details on the subject.

The number of Soviet missiles has risen from 1,514 to 2,504 since 1969, that is true, while the United States has reduced its number of missiles from 2,270 to 2,058. But the number of American nuclear reentry vehicles capable of striking the USSR has climbed from 3,950 to 9,200 during the same period while the USSR still has only 5,100. In other words, the number of weapons added to the American arsenal during this period is almost as great as the entire existing Soviet arsenal. As seen from Moscow, the American "restraint" is, therefore, not very convincing. The same is true about development of new weapons. Admittedly, unlike the USSR, the United States did not develop any new type of missile during this period. But thanks to its technological lead, it did introduce such spectacular improvements in the accuracy and miniaturization of its warheads that these have largely offset the quantitative enhancement of the Soviet arsenal, and at a lower cost, approximately five times lower. Lee Aspin's report submitted to the U.S. Congress on 7 July evoked no echo in the press.

Then there are those favorite subjects for hyperbole when discussing the East-West balance of forces, namely Admiral Gorchkov's navy and the USSR's conventional and nuclear superiority in Europe.

First, the admiral's ships. Between 1955 and 1975, Gorchkov quickly built a great many ships so as to give the USSR a navy, because it had none. The trouble, however, is that in leaving their shelters, these ships have to pass within range of the guns or missiles of American and allied bases, whether it be the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Black Sea and Mediterranean Fleet, or even the Baltic Fleet. The only place Soviet ships can reach the ocean under non-hazardous security conditions is the Arctic. Yet Soviet ports in that region are icebound 6 months of the year. Is this the reason the Soviets never dispatch more than 15 percent of their strategic nuclear submarines on patrol while the Americans maintain 55 percent of theirs on permanent alert in all the oceans? What is certain is that the Soviet Navy's situation is by no means enviable. In fact, some Western experts even think that in the event of war the first thing the USSR would have to do is, for example, withdraw all its ships from the Mediterranean if it does not want to see them at the bottom of the sea some 45 minutes after the opening of hostilities. Because all experts nearly agree on one point, namely that Western naval forces have unquestionable superiority in almost every corner of the globe. But commentators generally keep this opinion to themselves.

Hence the following details are quite significant. They were compiled by Dieter Lutz, assistant director of the Institute for Research on Peace and Security

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in Hamburg. One-sixth of the Soviet fleet is currently "obsolete," fit to be scrapped. In 1976, half of Admiral Gorchkov's surface ships of over 1,000 tons were already over 15 years old. The greater part of the Soviet fleet is assigned to antisubmarine warfare (ASW) tasks. It is quantitatively and qualitatively declining, whereas NATO fleets are rapidly growing in size and installing new generations of weapons--Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles, the Aegis [air defense] system, etc.--based on microtechnology and surrounded by electronic software the equivalent of which the Soviets do not yet have on their drawing boards.

Contrary to the most current opinion, the Soviet fleet has no offensive capability. It cannot possibly conduct long-range military operations in a hostile environment, because it lacks air defense and amphibious forces and equipment. While American aircraft carriers are gigantic assault platforms transporting up to 90 fighter bombers and numerous helicopters, the Soviet carriers have one-half the tonnage and transport mainly ASW helicopters and only some 15 small vertical take-off aircraft of the Yak-36 type. As in the case of Admiral Gorchkov's "supernavy," there is also another side to the USSR's alleged conventional and nuclear superiority in Europe. To be sure, the USSR has considerably increased its forces in Europe. But why has the magnitude of this challenge been constantly exaggerated?

In a rarely quoted book--"Tactical Nuclear Weapons-European Perspectives," published by the SIPRI in 1978--we learn that in 1961 and 1962, the U. S. Department of Defense, then headed by McNamara, made an exhaustive analysis of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. This study concluded in favor not of the Warsaw Pact's superiority, but of NATO's. This analysis and subsequent others were never published. They were too contrary to official American arguments aimed at cramming Europe with tactical nuclear weapons to offset the Warsaw Pact's conventional "superiority," and at convincing European countries to build up their own conventional forces.

It is impossible to summarize all the literature on the number of Soviet tanks, divisions, aircraft, and artillery pieces in Europe, so as to point out the distortions caused by these analyses and estimates. For 15 years, Europe was made to believe that the Warsaw Pact had a tremendous tactical air superiority, whereas the opposite was true until recently. Public opinion was likewise frightened with a breakdown of Soviet divisions that completely distorted any estimate of the real ratio of forces.

The myth of the superiority of Soviet tanks was largely debunked by the [Arab-Israeli] war of 1973. If the 1,200 tanks thrown by the Syrians into the attack on the Golan Heights were often stopped less than 10 kilometers from their point of departure instead of reaching Haifa--only some 60 kilometers away--within a few hours, it was not because Israeli soldiers had imbibed some magic potion. It was because they had not only the same tanks but also the same antitank missiles as NATO, which has invested mainly in this weaponry, whereas the USSR continued to deploy thousands of armored vehicles of increasingly greater vulnerability. Of course, the Soviets are also producing an ultramodern tank, the T-72. But it is inferior to the latest series of Western tanks, such as the American XM-1 and the German Leopard.

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Most of the East's 40,000 armored vehicles are still old-timers, at best T-60's that cannot hold out against modern antitank warfare methods. Among these tanks there are a large number of old unserviceable vehicles still kept in depots because inventories are so sacred to Soviet bureaucrats, and because Western experts find it to their benefit to include them among the serviceable items of Soviet equipment so as to make their estimates more impressive.

Even the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies has now abandoned strict man for man and weapon for weapon comparison because such comparisons no longer have any meaning in the light of technological developments. Besides, NATO as a whole has always had more men under arms than the Warsaw Pact and Western defense budgets have always topped Eastern budgets, even when compared with the inflated figures attributed to the latter. And now for more than a year there have been new alarming reports of another "missile gap" and of Soviet superiority in "theater nuclear weapons" in Europe.

We are even being told that NATO will be obliged to deploy new-generation missiles in Europe to "catch up with the lead taken" by the Soviets and the Backfire bombers and SS-20 missiles.

The SS-20 was quite recently added to the Soviet arsenal and the Americans do not have, based in Europe, a missile corresponding exactly to its description. Just as they do not have the exact equivalent of the 400 to 500 old intermediate-range missiles the USSR has had pointed in Europe's direction for the past two decades, and which are currently being replaced by SS-20's. Is this enough to constitute a dangerous "missile gap?"

For the past 20 years, NATO has had many more nuclear warheads in Europe than it could possibly use in case of war. To strike at targets in Soviet territory, the Atlantic Alliance has medium-range F-111, F-4, A-6, and A-7 fighter-bombers based in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and on carriers in the Mediterranean. Above all, it has the Poseidon submarine assigned to NATO's Allied Command Europe. The fact that the number of these submarines is arbitrarily set at three--though that number can be changed at any time--permits getting people to believe the myth of NATO nuclear weapons "inferiority" in Europe.

It would certainly be absurd to minimize the threat of the SS-20 missiles. Hence any negotiations capable of obtaining a reduction in their number or even their withdrawal could not help but enhance European security. On the other hand, many experts doubt that the proper reaction is to deploy even more sophisticated land-based weapons in NATO countries that already have ample nuclear forces. The real question raised at this juncture is that of the American nuclear guarantee for Europe at the very moment that the two superpowers have acknowledged, by the SALT II treaty, the parity of their central systems. This is a political question which is not answered by amassing in Europe new missiles under American control.

In any case, the big threat of the Soviet SS-20 seems to have come at just the right moment to justify deploying in Europe two new fully developed American systems, the cruise missile and the mobile Pershing 2 missile.

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Actually, this NATO modernization process has been under discussion since 1973. According to Dieter Lutz of the University of Hamburg, it was in late 1975 that Westerners first discovered, thanks to the Big Bird reconnaissance satellite, that the Soviets were testing the SS-20 missile. American tests of the Pershing 2 missile had begun 1 year earlier in 1974. As for the Tomahawk cruise missile, the second pillar of the NATO nuclear modernization program, its conclusive tests were conducted as early as 1976. Considering the necessary years of research and development, production of this cruise missile was planned much before and apart from any similar development effort by the Soviets.

It is difficult, therefore, to speak of a Western "response" or "reaction" to a Soviet innovation, and even less of "catching up" with the Soviets.

General M. Ellis, a former SAC commander, stated "that if the American F-111 should have to be exchanged for the Soviet Backfire, the United States would be making a bad deal." Speaking in more general terms, Marshall D. Shulmann, one of Cyrus Vance's chief advisers, recently said that, given the United States' military lead over the USSR, "there is not a single American military official who would like to find himself in a Soviet general's shoes." Vadim Sagladin, a member of the USSR's central committee, implicitly confirmed this viewpoint in a recent interview granted the German weekly magazine DER SPIEGEL: "We would not object if we were able to put ourselves in America's geographical position and put the Americans in our place between China and NATO."

An uncomfortable position indeed, and one that explains to a great extent the continuous effort the Soviets are voluntarily making, to the detriment of their economy, in an attempt to attain the highest possible level of military readiness. For the past 3 decades, the USSR has been in a position of strategic inferiority. Since the early 1950's, it has been surrounded by an unbroken chain of American bases. It is now faced with what its leaders consider to be the greatest threat in their history, namely a quadruple alliance of the United States, Western Europe, China, and Japan.

Has the USSR moved too quickly and gone too far in its reaction to a threat it tends to exaggerate? In other words, by lining up its ICBM's on diplomatic conference tables, with occasionally annoying gestures of self-satisfaction, and by making a show of global military power in "friendly" African and Asiatic countries, a power that is still far from corresponding to reality, hasn't the USSR largely contributed to the panic being spread in the West by the apostles of excessive armament? That is what some high-level Soviet officials seem to fear today.

What is certain is that the arms race of the year 2000 has largely begun. General George M. Seignious, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, recently stated with frank satisfaction: "The USSR does not have strategic superiority and will not obtain it in the future...On the contrary, our military strength is increasing, and the SALT agreements leave open to us all options we may deem useful to our security: cruise missiles launched by B-52 bombers, Trident submarines, Trident 1 and Trident 2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the MX mobile missile, indeed even a new heavy bomber."

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When we realize:

1. That the new MX and Trident 2 missiles are by capability, if not by intended purpose, "counterforce" weapons, in other words, weapons for an offensive first strike and preventive war;
2. That to cope solely with the threat of thousands of cruise missiles launched from B-52's, the USSR would have to build an air defense system costing it more than 50 billion dollars;
3. That the United States has invested huge sums in militarizing the oceans and is making rapid progress in developing a capability for the detection, tracking and destruction of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet;
4. That the two superpowers have extended the arms race to extraterrestrial space and are hard at work developing means of waging space warfare: laser beams, satellite-killer satellites, antisatellite-killer satellites, etc.; when we realize all this, the prospects for life on earth by the end of this century appear dismal.

As counterforce weapons become fully developed and are introduced into the arsenals of both the USSR and the United States, strategic doctrines are being modified and adapted. The idea of "waging a nuclear war to win it" tends to assert itself everywhere at the expense of old theories on deterrence. This is the most incredible change that has taken place in the past 20 years. This idea is slowly penetrating the most sophisticated circles of military study and research. It is accompanied on the world level by accelerated militarization of social and international life and by proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons. A million dollars per minute are currently being spent for military purposes. Total world arms sales amount to 20-30 billion dollars. Some 75 to 80 million men and women, military and civilian, are either waging war or preparing to do so somewhere in the world.

The SALT II agreement will in no way decelerate the arms race which will attain such a tempo and sophistication by the late 1980's that it will definitely be impossible to determine the level of declared balances. Most researchers and scientists throughout the world who, in different institutes, are engaged in studying "the science of peace" and the problems of disarmament are becoming more and more convinced that the dangers of a nuclear confrontation are increasing much more rapidly than in the past. "Fear of the other side" is a prime mover in this arms race and the military in all countries of the world find themselves in a privileged position to win their case when competing for public funds with other social groups. The most serious danger to peace is this arms race per se, a race which is being imposed on modern societies by bureaucratic, military, and industrial establishments that have means powerful enough to "jam" the channels of information and often to paralyze the judgment of politicians.

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Possible Sources of Conflict

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17-23 Dec 79 pp 56-57

[Interview with East-West relations specialist Pierre Hassner, Center for International Studies and Research of the (French) National Political Science Foundation, by Francois Schlosser; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] The international situation is marked by the oil crisis, the accelerated East-West arms race, the West's economic and financial difficulties, and the unforeseeable outcome of the Iranian crisis. In your opinion, does this situation justify fear of a new world war?

[Answer] Up to now, I had been rather inclined, instinctively, to believe the opposite. Today, I am somewhat less certain. I have the impression that on all sides there are new factors which no longer permit us to rule out the possibility of a conflict. I do not mean a big, all-out war that would destroy mankind. But there are signs that justify misgivings.

[Question] A "big, all-out war" has been avoided for 30 years. What, therefore, are those signs?

[Answer] Since World War II, there have been many wars throughout the world but there has been no "big, all-out" war. Why? I see three reasons:

1. Nuclear weapons have created protected areas. Without going so far as to support the simplistic view which holds that those parts of the world in which there are nuclear weapons are deemed definitively protected while all other parts are exposed to conflicts, we must, however, admit the fact that there has been a war between the two Koreas, a war between the two Vietnams, but no war between the two Germanys. That is clearly because such a war would have brought on the total destruction of Europe and a general nuclear conflict.
2. The primacy of economics: between highly developed countries, wars of conquest to acquire territory are very destructive with modern weapons and, therefore, no longer have any sense, especially for countries that are centering their efforts mainly on enhancing their productivity, standare of living, etc.
3. Mental and cultural attitudes which these days make the idea that France and Germany could again fight over Alsace-Lorraine seem absurd. In certain regions of the world, particularly in Europe and North America, there has been a kind of historic change in what were formerly warlike attitudes. For example--even though there are other reasons for the phenomenon--it must be noted, nevertheless, that Hungary and especially Czechoslovakia offered almost no resistance to the Soviet invasions of 1956 and 1968. Everything seems to be happening as if, in the world's urban, industrialized, and so-called "embourgeoisied" areas, there is a sort of reluctance to accept the idea of going to war, a reluctance reflecting a change in cultural values. Even direct East-West relations in nuclear matters seem to be in keeping with a kind of peace in which both sides argue about SALT II or the SS-20's, but in which nobody really expects war.

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This serves to further heighten the distressing character of warlike developments throughout the Third World, and even between communist powers. Such phenomena as the irruption of religion--in Iran, for example, but also in other countries--alter the perception people have of international relations. Some taboos are disappearing, and forms of reasoning are emerging that are not those of the industrialized and developed regions, and these create new uncertainty about the possibility of war breaking out.

Wars between communist powers--China and Vietnam last March--have only added to this confusion. We did not know what the rules of the game were for this new type of conflict, or where these conflicts were going to stop. Between the United States and the USSR, even when they fight each other through allied countries, there are always certain taboos that are respected: they do not attack each other, directly, they do not use nuclear weapons, etc. In the end, the Chinese did not go very far and the Soviets did not intervene. It seems, therefore, that, in that case too, there was a desire to be moderate and not go beyond certain thresholds. Nevertheless, great uncertainty persists about the rules of the game.

[Question] Are there other perturbing signs that make you fear an increasingly dangerous phase in international relations?

[Answer] There is, first of all, the uncertainty about the reaction of the two superpowers--tightly linked as they are by extremely complex agreements like SALT--to a world that would be "Khomeynized" as it were, a world in which certain leaders "break the rules of the game." Neither of the two superpowers can any longer know how the other will react in such a situation. Despite a certain degree of anarchy, international relations had become relatively "regularized" so that, for example, the "small powers" knew that they had better not do certain things in the proximity of a superpower: that is the explanation for a certain "Finlandization," and also the reason for the conspicuous restraint displayed by the new leaders of Nicaragua. But when a leader suddenly renounces these unwritten conventions and directly affronts a superpower, how can the latter be expected to react? And to what extent will its response be influenced by the fear that the other superpower may exploit the incident for its own benefit? As a result, we are reduced to a "blow by blow" world in which coexistence has to be constantly reinvented, a world in which we set something going and do not know what the outcome will be.

[Question] Yet the two superpowers have acquired experience in exercising a condominium and this ought to enable them to avoid collisions, even in situations as unforeseen as the one in Iran, for example.

[Answer] The two superpowers are each at a turning point, and this is also a factor of uncertainty and increased danger. America is uneasy. It is nearly out of the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate period. There is public pressure not to "allow itself to be stepped upon" any longer. We are entering a period in which we are no longer sure whether America will move toward neoisolationism, or neointerventionism, or a combination of both. After the Iranian crisis--assuming that an armed clash is avoided in that situation--the United States is perhaps likely to seek to make a show of force or reaffirm its "virility" at the first opportunity.

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A turning point likewise in the USSR which is steadily increasing its military power. Who will succeed Brezhnev? The gerontocracy can last another 10 years with the old men currently in power. But there may possibly be a new generation of younger and tougher leaders. Sovietologists are divided. Some are of the opinion that Brezhnev's policy based on a desire for peace and detente--but also on power and expansion supported by a most unmistakable position of military force--will survive. Others believe there is polarization between the "successors" who are 50 years old, between those who are basically managers desiring to take into account the USSR's increasing economic interdependence with the capitalist world, and those who are hardliners, neo-Stalinists, neo-Slavs, neonationalists more disposed toward military adventure to compensate for domestic failures. In short, as things now stand in the world, the occasions of conflict are here, there, and everywhere.

[Question] What conflicts do you mean?

[Answer] A few years ago, it was still possible to designate, on a map of the world, the "extreme regions" such as Europe and Africa where the risk of a superpower confrontation appeared very small or excluded, and the "ambiguous regions" like Southeast Asia and the Middle East where that risk was present. Peace in Europe was assured by the nuclear threat. In Africa, after having gotten their feet slightly "wet" in the Congo, the superpowers had assumed a very low profile. African wars and genocides had stopped worrying the world because they no longer, for the moment, involved the risk of confrontation between the two superpowers. On the other hand, this risk continued to exist in the ambiguous areas of the Middle East and Southeast Asia where escalation was never ruled out, even if, from time to time, the two superpowers did agree to reestablish some rules for the game. But the risks were never completely eliminated.

Now, however, it seems to me that the present situation throughout the world is getting to look more and more like the situation in these "ambiguous" areas. This is especially true in Africa where the Soviets are making extensive use of their new long-range military capabilities. As a result, the occasions of intervention in the Third World are becoming more numerous, along with mounting risks of escalation.

[Question] In your view, can this new international configuration jeopardize detente?

[Answer] I believe we are in a phase which, without resembling the old cold war, is not altogether a phase of detente. I will call it "hot peace." Detente is still the basic principle, but there is a greater number of external conflicts that can degenerate and bring us closer to hot war more easily than during the cold war era.

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East European, Soviet Instability

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 10-16 Dec 79 p 69

[Interview with Dr. Christoph Bertram, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] In your view, are the risks of war in Europe or of general war greater at the present time, and for the next 5 or 10 years, than they have been these past few years?

[Answer] It is difficult for me to imagine that a planned and intentional war will break out in Europe in the next 5 or 10 years. Statements, like those made by Henry Kissinger, indicating that doubts could be cast on deterrence, are highly premature, in my view. According to all the information we have, the USSR remains convinced that if it were to start a war in Europe it would have to reckon with retaliation by the strategic systems of the United States.

Besides, we can't see what benefit the USSR would derive from a war against Western Europe. It already has enough problems in Eastern Europe with its own allies whose attitude and behavior are far from reliable. We must not overlook the fact that the Red Army does not have the monopoly of arms modernization. Extensive military efforts have been made or are underway on the Western side. The modernization program established by NATO shows that Soviet military progress, far from triggering a reflex of "Finlandization" in Western Europe, has, on the contrary, stimulated increased defense efforts.

[Question] In any case, you do rule out any risk of war for the moment. Is that right?

[Answer] Yes, I do rule out the risk of a war started intentionally. But we may be drawn into a situation, in Europe, that would get out of control in the wake of local developments involving military actions.

[Question] Can you describe the situation you have in mind?

[Answer] I am disturbed by developments in Eastern Europe. The present regimes there and the USSR can no longer rely on either ideological belief or economic successes. "Goulash communism's" days are numbered. Economic difficulties will soon be such that the present governments will no longer be able to "buy" the population's support through steady improvement in its material welfare as they have been able to do these past 10 years. This ultimately produces an explosive mixture. We must not forget that the USSR intervened militarily in these countries several times in the 1950's and 1960's. Such interventions can happen again. These past few years, Brezhnev's government has displayed a sort of placidity and even a certain resignation about internal developments in the satellite countries. Just imagine that its successors are less placid, less disposed to live with a certain pluralism inside the socialist camp, less experienced, more nervous about the ideological softening of some of their partners, and consequently they do decide upon another military intervention someday.

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It is plausible that in such a case the USSR would meet sharper resistance than during its previous interventions. There could be mass demonstrations that would spread to neighboring countries. There could be large-scale attempts to flee the country, mass movements, with opposition and clashes at the borders. Then the military machinery could begin "rolling" and the situation get out of control. This is especially likely because changes in the conventional weaponry with which forces are being equipped, in the East as well as the West, tends to reduce reaction time more and more and provide an increasingly more rapid retaliation capability.

Soviet Aggression Against West Europe

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 10 Dec 79 p 66

[Interview with General Pierre Gallois, French Air Force retired; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Do you believe war between the USSR and the United States is a possibility?

[Answer] Such a conflict appears to be ruled out, and for a long time to come. Before saying why, I would like to make an excursion into the realm of weapons technology. Actually there is a twofold revolution in progress within that field and it is adding to the dangers. First, the multiple warhead technique is being brought into general use, thereby increasing the destructive power of a single launcher as much as 10 or 15 times. For instance, these past few years the United States has increased its number of warheads from 3,000 to 12,000, and the USSR is following the same pattern with a certain time lag.

Furthermore, and this is even more important, accuracy has been greatly improved. Some 10 years ago, ballistic missiles could strike 3 or even 5 kilometers away from their target. This lack of accuracy was offset by using high-yield warheads. Today, accuracies of some 200 meters are being obtained--before 1985 they will have been refined to 100 meters--and the yield required to destroy the same target is reduced accordingly. The radius of total destruction around the target, which formerly was 5, 10, or even 15 kilometers, can now be reduced to 1,500 or even 800 meters.

If this present pattern of improvement continues, both superpowers will each have weapons capable of disarming each other at long range, a situation that would obviously benefit the one striking first. The only way to avoid this disarmament is to have mobile weapons permanently deployed, weapons whose movements remain secret, thus making their simultaneous destruction impossible. This is what the United States is preparing to do. With 5,400 warheads carried by its bombers and 4,960 warheads on its submarine-launched missiles, the United States already has the bulk of its arsenal on mobile launchers. When the new MX missile was replaced most of the existing fixed missiles (1,054), its arsenal will be 100 percent mobile. The USSR, on the other hand, has only a small part of its strategic weapons on mobile platforms. Even its new generation SS-18 and SS-19 missiles are positioned in fixed silos. Only 1,000 of the some 5,000 Soviet warheads are on submarines.

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In the event of a first strike, the United States would, therefore, lose only a small part--i.e. the static component--of its intercontinental force. It would still have the bulk of its mobile arsenal available for retaliation. That is why I view the conflict as impossible, despite all the technological advances.

[Question] And what about war in Europe?

[Answer] In Europe, the situation is becoming delicate. To command respect in Eurasia, from NATO and China, and to overtake the United States and make itself respected by that country also, the Soviet Union has armed itself with considerable military might. This intercontinental rivalry has placed the Old World in a position of complete imbalance. A military giant now towers over that Old World, a giant that worries both the East--China--and the West--Europe.

I do not believe in a Soviet armed aggression against Western Europe. The Soviets have a more prudent, a more discerning foreign policy. But if, for reasons difficult to imagine at the present time, they were induced to go to war against Europe, they would do so by making intelligent use of the weapons in their possession. Now then, in Europe and for the NATO countries, one of the types of action modern technology makes possible is the disarming of an adversary from a distance, at long range, by destroying its conventional military force whose vulnerability increases the more it is static. With SS-20 missiles that can be armed with low-yield warheads because of their very great accuracy, the selective destruction of critical targets can no longer be excluded. It is conceivable, for example, that the Soviets could destroy at long range, and without inflicting too much danger on urban centers, all military targets that constitute the Bundeswehr's armament and infrastructure--airfields, radars, tank parks, headquarters, etc.--and also without hitting the American forces in Germany. The Soviets could then turn to the Americans and say: "We have disarmed your allies. What are you going to do?" And in that case, what could the United States do? Start a war in Europe, a war lost even before it starts? Risk its own survival by employing its strategic weapons? I do not think, I repeat, that the USSR would initiate such action which would still be risky in spite of everything. But doesn't the mere fact that it has the means to do this, change the whole equation of the political and diplomatic balance in Europe?

European Defense Posture

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17 Dec 79 pp 54-55

[Article by General Georges Buis: "The Status Quo's Chances"]

[Text] A poll conducted in 1974 by the [French] Foundation for National Defense Studies showed that Frenchmen perceived the main threats at that time to be terrorism first of all, followed by highway accidents, delinquency, declining moral values, etc. The military threat ranked ninth, reflecting the almost zero probability of war and the mild public interest in such matters.

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In 1977, a lean year, anxiety--that other luxury of modern times--made its appearance. Suddenly, Frenchmen began talking about what they had wanted to ignore. Along with zero growth, nuclear firepower made its majestic entrance into the public consciousness. Such mysterious acronyms as SALT, ICBM, and MAD [Mutual Assured Destruction] became household words. Into this new climate, there erupted, dramatized to perfection, the issue of Soviet "Eurostrategic" weapons. Europeans discovered they were liable to receive blows they could not return. What then had become of the American "parasol" under which we had so comfortably siestaed? Were we going to have war?

This was a belated awakening. Yet there has been no lack of bloodshed in the four corners of the world since 1945, even streams of blood. But since it was not their blood, Europeans refused to see it. Nuclear firepower temporarily prohibited the "big war," so major powers fought each other through poor benighted third parties. War had become crisis management. Then suddenly these crises began blowing up in your hands: "Ah, how easy it was to settle the Cuban crisis," Kissinger sighed some 15 years later when faced with other far more complicated crises which have steadily become worse since then. Such perhaps "unmanageable" crises leading, therefore, to the apocalypse, are what the French public dimly sees coming. How fearful should we be of Brezhnev's succession and of the growing importance, in the USSR, of the self-confident generation of young generals and admirals? What can be expected from post-Tito Yugoslavia and from the temptation of access to "warm waters" for the Soviet Navy, in the Adriatic, of course, but elsewhere, too, in the Gulf of Thailand, for example, via a Vietnamized Cambodia, and in the Persian Gulf via a Sovietized Pakistan and a torn Baluchistan? What would Moscow's reaction be if the August 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty were to create an intolerable imbalance of forces in eastern Asia? What chain reaction would be produced by an American, indeed even Western, expedition into the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf in the event of a disruption of oil supplies?

Frenchmen know that if there is a war, they will not win "because they are the strongest," for they realize there is no--I emphasize "no"--real solidarity in the Western camp between large-size and medium-size powers. Who still believes in the "American nuclear umbrella?" Henry Kissinger, in Brussels in early September, and then General Haig, in Paris on 17 November, opened the eyes of the last of the blind. As for Europe, it was recently dealt a severe blow when the British and Norwegians delivered a resounding "no" to recognition of a "European continental shelf" despite the fact that such a shelf does indeed exist. In that case, its defense...

In the little that is left of this year 1979--a year that will have given up SALT II ratification as lost--Europeans still have to decide whether to accept or refuse America's "modernization" of NATO "theater nuclear forces." In plain language this means deployment in Europe of weapons capable of striking Soviet territory. Europeans are apprehensive about entering, directly involved, into a decade that will no doubt become a historical benchmark. Because of a military disaster? But where? When? How?

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Where? For Europeans, there is absolutely no doubt that the danger lies to the East. For a rather considerable number of Frenchmen--many of them unwavering supporters of NATO and very close to the government--the Rhine as a symbol has been replaced by the Teutonic Knights standing guard in the East. This imagery of a defensive wall of armor bristling with spiked maces and swords, must have, after the armored divisions' brief--5 years, 1940-1945--hour of triumph, filled the eyes of our fathers who designed the Atlantic Alliance's military organization, NATO. The problem is that this image still fills the minds of their sons and grandsons.

That is why, some 30 years later, NATO's immutable organizational structures remind one of an attractive Edwardian era mantelpiece. In the center, instead of the Second Empire clock, there majestically sits CINCENT, Commander-in Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, who has been assigned more than the main part of the forces, namely the Central, Northern, and Southern Army Groups (CENTAG, NORTHAG, SOUTHAG). To the north and south--like Dresden china figurines left and right of the "Allegory of Time" which, for NATO, does not pass--there are two fragile secondary commands: CINCNORTH and CINCOSOUTH. They really ought to be called "flankers" because at least that name candidly means nothing. They are so little motivated, the men of the north by the famous "Hoffgap" so dear to Napoleon's light cavalry, and the men of the south by the Otranto Canal, that they are already discouraged. In the north, Denmark is a "pushover," Norway stands aloof, and Sweden is neutral. In the south: Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Italy's contribution to NATO is minimal, and the other two countries are more inclined to fight each other than to unite. This puts both of them in a strong position to negotiate their Atlantic contribution with the Americans who are still shamefaced about the Cypriot crisis.

As a matter of fact, in his so highly successful book "The Third World War" (published by Ed. Pierre Belfond), John Hackett, a British general, cannot avoid sealing Italy's fate in 48 hours and that of the Nordic countries in 4 or 5 days. Now Sir John Hackett is a remarkable man and a priori credible. He was a very high-level commander in NATO. Nevertheless, he draws the arrows indicating the enemy's movement across the northern plain and over Franconia's "gently rolling hills" the same way Moltke or Schlieffen would have drawn them, in their bygone days, had they been obliged to study this problem in 1870 and 1914 respectively.

This conventional battle--which General Hackett does not tell us is fought in an area teeming with contiguous cities--is, mirabile dictu, not lost by NATO against forces the author complacently depicts as being three to five times superior to NATO's! As if it can be assumed that this enemy would have launched into a war by accepting, at the start, the idea that it could possibly lose that war! At the same time, it is taken for granted that the enemy could wage that war without using all of its capabilities, without nailing NATO's small Europe to the cross with the atom at the very outset. Yet this is almost the exact military strategy which NATO attributes to the USSR. This is distinctly acknowledged by Paul-Marie de La Gorce in his dazzling tightrope-walker performance in his postscript to General Hackett's book.

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Another best seller, "L'Europe sans defense?" [Is Europe Defenseless?] (published by Ed. Gamma), by General Close, a Belgian, is also a most remarkable survey of European defense organization from the Treaty of Dunkerque up to NATO. For maximum dramatic effect, General Close not only employs a possible massive attack by the Warsaw Pact but also gives Pact forces the invaluable advantage of total surprise. Helicopters land in NATO barracks areas and neutralize the troops therein. Conventional forces follow and reach the Rhine within 48 hours. Chancellor Schmidt is reported to have asked: "Well then, what good is the Bundeswehr?"

Noteworthy is the fact that even though he is an unwavering Atlanticist, General Close lets the President of the United States "scratch his head" over possible use of nuclear weapons and make no decision throughout this entire blitzkrieg. Equally noteworthy is the fact that General Hackett, in his book, expresses satisfaction at the American president's refusal to authorize the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Lastly, it is no less remarkable that the Soviets do likewise and allow "France reflect," the latter being "sanctuarized" by its nuclear capability. Taking everything into account, the author believes the best defense is one conducted by the people and based on a tight network of forces and antitank weapons.

While, like Generals Hackett and Close, I too believe in "surprise" (there is always surprise), it is not on the tactical, operative level that I fear it. On the one hand, I see a direct strategy implemented indirectly by the Soviets in the Far East or, if the West blunders, in the Near or Middle East.

On the other hand, I fear a "creeping" strategy that would espouse the slow evolution of the FRG's Ostpolitik and be accompanied by disarmament measures in Central Europe. NATO's very essence would thus be threatened. By withdrawing from NATO and nuclearizing itself, France has given Europe a tremendous deterrent trump card. But if the nonnuclear FRG were to become merely somewhat cool toward NATO, without, however, separating itself completely therefrom, it would deal NATO a fatal blow.

Having said this, I do believe that where Europe is concerned, the Americans and Soviets are fully partners and firmly determined to retain the status quo. And Europeans, who no longer want to be the ones to die, are quite content with the status quo.

TNF, U. S. Strategic Coupling

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17 Dec 79 p 56

[Interview with Ambassador Francois de Rose, former French NATO permanent representative; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] There are some who believe Westerners are now tempted to abandon the doctrine of deterrence and are steeling themselves--like the Soviets--with the idea that it is possible to wage a nuclear war to win.

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[Answer] It is incorrect to say that the idea of "waging a nuclear war to win" is gaining acceptance to the detriment of deterrence. NATO concepts have never aimed at victory per se but solely at stopping the enemy by means of a flexible response with employment of tactical nuclear weapons at a level of power posing a constant threat of escalation. This is clearly a strategy of deterrence. Soviet writers are the ones who claim a nuclear victory is possible.

It would be paradoxical if Westerners, who did not believe in the possibility of such a victory when they had undisputed superiority in theater nuclear weapons, should take the opposite view now that the qualitative and quantitative balance of forces had shifted in favor of the USSR.

This mistaken conception undoubtedly comes from the fact that in Europe, and particularly in France, people confuse deterrence and an anticities attack. But it was some 20 years ago that the strategy of massive retaliation lost its credibility. Since then, deterrence has been based on a full range of forces with a coupling of conventional and tactical nuclear weapons and a coupling of the latter with strategic weapons.

[Question] From that standpoint, do you consider it now necessary to deploy in Europe missiles capable of striking targets in Soviet territory?

[Answer] Even if we do not believe SS-20 missiles can perform a "surgical operation" that would almost impeccably disarm the Atlantic Alliance--each SS-20 carries three 150-KT warheads and the firepower of 100 SS-20's would be the equivalent of more than 2,500 Hiroshimas--it is certain that NATO does not have an equivalent capacity because the penetration capability of its land-based and 6th Fleet aircraft is very reduced against Soviet anti-aircraft defenses.

This situation poses a dual problem. First, NATO must have mobile missiles so that they cannot be destroyed by a first counterforce strike. Secondly, and perhaps more than anything else, the coupling must be restored between theater nuclear weapons and the American central (strategic) system. But the assignment of a certain number of ballistic missiles from Poseidon submarines to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe does not fully meet this requirement. In fact, the employment in the defense of Europe of weapons based in Europe will always be more probable than the employment of weapons deployed in the United States or the Atlantic Ocean. It is not facetious to say that while a 10 percent credibility is enough to deter an adversary, such credibility undoubtedly has to be as high as 80 to 90 percent to reassure one's allies. The important point is that American weapons fired from Europe, in a battle for Europe, must be able to strike the enemy's territory. Because as far as that enemy is concerned, the place from which weapons striking its territory are fired makes no difference. Once its territory is hit, it will have to retaliate against American territory, unless it acknowledges that territory's "sanctuarization" without reciprocal acknowledgment of a similar status for its own territory. But by that time, violence would have escalated close to its highest possible level.

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By increasing the probability of coupling (or recoupling) theater nuclear forces and the American central system, the basing of these missiles in Europe--provided they meet the two requirements I mentioned earlier--thus constitutes a measure meant to bolster deterrence and not to prepare any strategy for nuclear victory.

Having said this, is war now more probable than at any time in the past 30 years? That is a very big question which involves more than simple military considerations. It does seem, however, that the change in the balance of forces does not necessarily and per se lead to an affirmative answer. What is at issue is the perception the antagonists have of that balance of forces in a serious crisis. The important thing is not to be the first one to blink in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. During the Cuban missile crisis, the men in the Kremlin were the first to blink. Soviet programs could cause the West to be the first some day. The deployment of mobile medium-range missiles is meant to preclude that from happening.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

U.S., FRENCH REACTIONS TO AGGRESSION CONTRASTED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 15 Feb 80 pp 52-53

[Article by Arthur Conte: "A New Yalta in 1980"]

[Text] Immediately Following His Re-Election, Carter Will Pick Up the Red Telephone

"Should Yugoslavia be attacked the United States would not intervene," Jimmy Carter proclaimed only a few months ago. Afghanistan may be in the process of paying the price of such a lightly made statement. In any case, no better statement could have been made to encourage the last big imperialists to take over other Angolas.

No free man in the world, therefore, would be sorry to see today the American people asked by their president to assume a more reasonable and realistic view of people and things. In both the Iranian crisis and the Afghan drama they would have at least lost some of their guilelessness or sleepwalking. This is relatively good news.

Yet, considering all current major events, must we absolutely and systematically accept Jimmy Carter's theses, assuming that he would have become firmly aware of the need for a crusade for freedom, and therefore become firmly resolved to insure by all means, facing the tanks of Soviet imperialism, the protection of the Persian Gulf?

At least five elements would advise the people of the European West to be very cautious and reserved in this regard.

The first has to do with the nature of the man who is in charge, presently and, perhaps, for yet another four years, of the American destiny. He is evidently not only an opportunist without real strategy, navigating without instruments, letting himself be pushed around by circumstances, surprising in terms of most of his analyses and thoughts, as multiple signs have confirmed ever since his advent, but he is also weak, as capable of committing fatal acts of rashness as excessive starts. Everything occurs as though he would begin by being afraid of himself or would suddenly lose his mind at the idea of being abandoned by his guiding star.

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This represents an incredible change from foursquare presidents such as Truman or effective strategists in the Nixon style. Yet it is a fact: Carter is not one of those on whom once could bet with a minimum of confidence.

The second element stems from the fact that America is in the midst of an electoral campaign. Therefore, all political tricks are to be used. This applies even more so to such an extraordinary demagog, who at least knows how to manage an electoral campaign. Sad though it may be, we must be aware of the following: The affairs of the hostages and of Afghanistan were right on time to reheat the mood which the incumbent president needed. He is not about to let the climate cool off or allow the excessive re-appearance of faintheartedness with which he is charged by his competitors and which is deplored by his entourage.

In a State of Alarm Until 4 November 1980

Until 4 November 1980 Carter must cultivate in the United States an atmosphere of alarm: we can be sure of remaining in this state of alarm until that date. However, a re-elected Carter could turn out to be entirely different from Carter the candidate. Today's warmonger could become the mildest pacifist, the most eager to accommodate himself to living in the neighborhood of the wolf or the bear. Naturally, I could be wrong. Nevertheless, it remains equally true that we would be rather incautious and daring to make a bet too soon. In this respect as well the greatest reservation becomes necessary. Consider the political savvy with which Mohammed Ali was chosen to explain the "New America" to Africa. No one should misjudge the real reasons for a choice which essentially reveals a courtesan of nations.

The third element is known as Yalta. Since 1945 the spirit of Yalta, with a Russian-American condominium, has survived all crises, even the most severe ones, even the cold war, and even the battle of the Berlin blockade. Let us rest assured that, this time again, sooner or later, the same will prevail. The two superpowers may appear on occasion to be on the verge of a violent clash: in truth, all they are waiting for, as of now, is for the proper time to find themselves in agreement and with agreements. Above all let us refuse to play the role of Candide and be carried away by the generosity of our most justifiable passions. At one point or another, following the American elections, nothing will prevent Washington and Moscow--the Western empire and the Eastern empire--from finding each other again and redefine the terms of a coexistence and of a gigantic complicity. Even before this year has ended, the "precious" red telephone, whose purpose is to secure contacts better, will have done its job. Too bad the Olympic Games have not taken place in full or have not taken place at all. Too bad for that unfortunate Iran if it is to be the main item in the great bargaining. Also too bad for suffering Afghanistan, should the bear keep it in its clutches. Once again "Yalta" will speak out, the America-Russia axis will be firmly restored; at a given time and place Russians and

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Americans will be able to find for the Middle East the same dividing formulas as for the Mediterranean, Europe and the Suez Canal. Too bad for the Europeans, who once again will have been unable to realize this. For at least 20 years I will never believe that Yalta has been renounced either by the Russians, whoever they may be, or by the Americans, whatever they may say or let others say. The fourth, on a major historical level, stems from the fact that, henceforth, the United States should be considered a country whose friendships are too uncertain. This is a cruel statement. However, truth, even though harsh, is better than the worst blindness or the hypocrisy of a false friend who knows only how to flatter you. Actually, many Americans themselves agree with this. Whereas the American people remain a magnificent people, prompt to do justice, generous, proud of all its liberties, and forever blessed by Lincoln's messages, we are all too forced to recognize that for the past 35 years it has hardly helped its friends in an exemplary fashion. In terms of friendship, the United States has been as unsteady as was France between the two world wars. We saw it abandon, in turn, Chiang Kai-shek in China, Diem and his successors in Vietnam, or their friends and allies in Cambodia, Lebanon, Angola, Ethiopia, Zaire, Somali or Iran. This is impressive. Worse: it applies such zeal and obstinacy, this time, actually, fully in agreement with the Soviet Union, in bringing down the old colonial empires of Western European nations, that it bears a heavy part of the responsibility for the clumsy and precipitous way in which decolonization was carried out. With terrible efficiency it contributed to pushes, to force us to leave alone countries too poorly equipped to administer themselves normally and immediately, thus left to the worse devils, anarchists or . . . worse temptations provided by the only imperialism spared, Soviet imperialism. To this day no serious and honest European would bet that should Western Europe be attacked from the East, free America would come to its aid.

In many ways, rather than rely on a dream shield, it would serve us better to cement, organize and arm, while there is still time, a firm Europe. This is the only certainty.

No Need to Worry the "Monster"

The fifth element is based on the reaction itself which the event triggered in Jimmy Carter. When we ourselves have to react, and when we have the means to do so, we react dryly, clearly and locally. Thus, in Kolwezi, we were able to prevent Zaire and the huge mining installation of Katanga from tumbling into the Soviet world through Angola. Several days ago, neither Bourguiba nor Nouira lacked our help in preventing a severe destabilization of eastern Maghreb. We avoid any action or reaction which could trigger a general crisis or destabilization. Conversely, Carter's error on Afghanistan was to react both globally and blunderingly. He immediately exposed himself to three disadvantages. On the one hand, he does not save Afghanistan. On the other, he assumes the risk of destabilizing areas such as Europe whose equilibrium has not as yet been threatened. Finally, since his allies proved unwilling to follow him or to support his reactions which

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they have judged either ridiculous, unsuitable or undurable, he even courts the danger of introducing sourness, mistrust and resentment in his relations with them: it is already clear that the Afghan crisis has led to "misunderstandings" between Carter and the French and the Germans. In a way, he excites himself or becomes uptight without really acting. He does not adequately look out for the protection of areas and friendships which he had no reason whatever to drag into this sandstorm. The man neither properly gaged nor "thought out" his reaction or long-term trumps.

Obviously, the purpose of saying all this is not to ascribe some kind of Machiavellian plan to the Afghanistan coup. Morally, politically and strategically, the occupation of Kabul by Soviet troops is highly condemnable. No free man in Western Europe could find it acceptable. It would be also highly desirable for the Russian Army to leave Afghan territory as soon as possible.

Yet let us note in passing that many people, some of them famous, who are currently sounding the alarm on the subject of Afghanistan would have had their indignation far more justified had they, with the same spirit and sense of justice, denounced at other times other horrors, such as the genocide of the Armenian people, the enslavement of the Georgian people, the servitude of all the Eastern European satellites, or, among others, the Gulags.

There is a strong quixotic element in all this current uproar. Let us not go so far as to say that the sanctions aimed at punishing Moscow could be totally inoperative. This would be as inaccurate as to ascribe them a total magic property. It is all too true that the Russian people would deeply resent the snub aimed at their leader for their failure to organize the Olympic Games and would find in this fact even better reasons to criticize them. The lack of grain may increase the concern of the managers of the Soviet economy even though they are no longer worried by yet one more failure. Above all, the embargo imposed on all highly specialized electronic equipment, providing that it is not temporary, could quite severely handicap some research projects or leading industries. Yet, let us be honest, there is no reason greatly to worry the monster. What? Are you saying that this bear is mad? Are you pointing out that it is killing and devouring your brother? You are calling for a mobilization of all available forces against it, yet all you find to neutralize or intimidate it is to deprive it of a toy, to reduce a little bit its ration, and to deprive it of its lollipop? Let us do something, for we should not be left without any reaction whatever but, for pity's sake, let us be serious and, above all, having done so little, let us avoid an epic posture which would quickly become comical.

"The Empire Which Must Not Blow Up"

In truth, this Afghan matter does not present any direct reason for excessive concern, even were we to really pity a population in its hour of trial and, in fact, pathetically abandoned to its own devices.

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What is the most worrisome remaining fact is the internal development of Russia and the trouble which it may incur, even though it may be too soon to gage it properly. That is the main thing. For there are three major reasons for explaining the military intervention of the Soviet Army in Kabul: defeat, precautionary measure, and confirmation.

The defeat is that of the Afghan communists. It was because the communists proved to be incapable of establishing a Marxist order that the Red Army had to be called on. It would not have had to intervene had the Afghan communists had a brilliant success. By this token the military intervention expresses and proves a severe political defeat.

The precaution has to do with the Muslim republics which the Kremlin is keeping under its thumb within the Soviet Union itself. It is all too evident that the storm which leads all Islam to a confrontation with the atheistic empire would inflame the Russian Muslim populations the moment Afghanistan would be lost. This is the entire problem of the "empire which must not blow up." Had Moscow displayed any weakness a commotion could have been felt throughout all subjugated countries, including Eastern Europe. This is confirmed by the tremendous importance acquired by the armed forces in Russia. The Red Army has indeed become a primary, if not major, element of global life for the rest of the century. It may have become, perhaps, the great czarina. As to Afghanistan, an overall analysis shows that the Kremlin was more condemned to carry out this operation than it wished. This is more a sign of major troubles at the top of the empire than proof of aggressiveness. Let us above all not confuse the effect with the cause. Let us, therefore, avoid all definitive and categorical judgments, since nothing happening in Moscow is simple.

All we have to do is look at the conflicting theses of the witnesses. We are told that Russia would like, essentially, to "keep" China within the limits of a solid waistbelt with tough mail and Afghanistan, together with Vietnam, Vietnamized Cambodia, and Vietnamized Laos and the Indian army would be one such link. We are also assured that Afghanistan is merely the first stage of the "march to the south," of a march toward petroleum deposits and warm seas, and that the Russian military leaders must have programmed a general offensive against the Near East. This is Hitler all over again, some claim. No, others say, it is rather the Russians who are taking pledges and important strategic positions for the time when they will become involved in the inevitable division of Iran and, subsequently, "the division of the oil." Actually, all this may be true. It could even be possible for all these explanations to be more-or-less valid at the same time. Other questions, however, remain even more important. Henceforth, what men, what forces will be commanding in Moscow? What kind of troubles do they have and have they already made major political decisions? Does the golden rule according to which "all convulsions of all kinds, social, economic, financial, military, religious, nationalistic and racial, which could weaken the capitalist world" are to be exploited remain the first law of Leninism? Providing, of course, that any one such convulsion would not

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worsen to the point of triggering a risk of general warfare and, therefore, directly threaten "the first socialist country in the world"? Or else, is the army demanding entirely different calculations and entirely different ambitions? What is precisely the situation with the relations between the army and the party? That is the essential factor. Yet all we have are bits of answers. We are barely capable of asking the pertinent questions. Which means, in this case as well, we, the French, must advance very cautiously. The fog is too thick in the East. Plunging too impulsively along one or another track, let us take care not to fall into most unpleasant shifting sands, into the most severe errors of interpretation. For example: participating in the boycott of the Olympic Games and convincing ourselves that this would embarrass the entire Soviet Government, we could, conversely, become part of the calculations of the clan which, in the Kremlin, can only think of how to abolish the games and which, for a number of years, has worried about all the problems they involve. Obviously, as an initial reflex it would be tempting to give them such a lesson. It would even be easy and would entail no immediate risks. After giving it a second thought, our reaction may finally be such as to meet our objectives. Let us learn how to be patient and to wait.

France's Arbitration Opportunities

To top it all, it so happens that we hold an ideal moral position between East and West. Neither side could accuse us of sectarianism, sordid ulterior motives or Machiavellian calculations. The entire universe knows that, while knowing how to insure its security, the new France has as its main ambition to serve the balance of the peace. It is of capital importance to retain this position. France is just about the only country in this all too nervous world to retain full self-control and retain great arbitration possibilities. In truth, the general situation is far less alarming than some actors or observers claim. There is no reason whatever for panicking. Let France, even though sailing against the tide, preserve its full serenity and clarity of view, and firm objectivity. The truth will belong to those remain the most calm. For, alas, those who, today, are most on edge will not necessarily be the most firm tomorrow.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

JOBERT VIEWS WEST'S REACTION TO EVENTS IN IRAN, AFGHANISTAN

LD101437 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Feb 80 pp 26, 27 LD

[Commentary by Michel Jobert: "Wicked Arabs: Frightful Soviets!"--passages between slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The period 1945-1980 bears witness to an unchanged world of Russo-American rivalry and its spirit of partition. However, Western and especially European public opinion, far from fleeing the double propaganda to which it is subjected, remains just as vain and blind.

For years the Arabs and Islam have been a subject of irritation and worry to Western public opinion. Without going back to far, Nasser, from his starving country in 1956, sowed anxiety by nationalizing the Suez Canal. Several Moslem countries are emerging from colonial struggles into rightful independence. This immense effort, and this transformation, place in question, at least externally, the West's positions, and spark off bitterness there rather than sympathy. Israel's struggles to protect and increase its territory in the Middle East give this trend a boost by providing it with a cause, a location, some champions. In the old land of the Philistines the pyres of passion catch light again easily, and from Los Angeles to Djakarta the clans mobilize. Undoubted anti-Semites become pro-Israel to reveal themselves as anti-Arab.

The oil "war," astutely spread across the front page by the U.S. media during U.S. negotiations since 1971 on a price increase with the main Arab producers, adds to the emotion of the Western communities: it questions habits of price, consumption, industrial development and trading channels. It introduces worry, if not scarcity into everyone's daily life. It will take time for reality to emerge from behind propaganda's thick curtain: most regimes of the oil-producing countries are bound up with the West, since the latter is the market for production, a bank to invest the profits, a guarantee against communist subversion. This objective complicity is ultimately translated very simply in politics. Has public opinion, which is hardly refined either in its reflections or its motivations, at last noticed that? When,

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in 1973, Georges Pompidou's finance minister spoke in favor of a plan, attributed to the Americans, to bomb the Middle East oil wells, Pompidou replied with a curt, cutting irony: "You do not bomb yourself!"

Western fury reached its peak with the fall of the shah of Iran which was due as much to his mistakes as to doggedness of an archaic religious leader who responded better to Iran's concept of liberty which had been captive for so long. What! This country wanted to be free. What! It refused to produce oil to nourish an evolution at home in which it could not get its bearings. What! It used methods long since rejected by the international community. What! Without force and feeding only on disorder it provoked everyone with a singular thoughtlessness! But this public fury hid the main point: Jimmy Carter and Khomeyni were "objective allies"--as the Marxists say. Thanks to the Iranian, this colorless, uncertain American became a resolute dispassionate statesman. Gallup polls turned in his favor. His rival, Kennedy, formerly so threatening, was collapsing. Khomeyni was promoted to the not inconsiderable role of Carter's "stooge."

At this point and "for better or for worse," the Soviets out of alarm at the Islamic unrest of their south-east border--an unrest so contagious for their own Moslem republics--out of a conviction that, in any case, the U.S. Senate would not ratify the SALT II treaty in the election year of 1980, and finally having become imbued with a precept of Frederick II--despite his being a Prussian!--"Take first, negotiate after," hurl themselves against Afghanistan.

"Enough is enough," U.S. citizens rage. They fly to the aid of Pakistan, only recently blacklisted for wanting to manufacture "the first Islamic atomic bomb," which justifiably worried Israel, among others. They trumpet about human rights in Afghanistan, having cared little for European rights at the Helsinki conference. Here they are discovering the virtues of Islam, that social and religious principle which has always been resistant to Sovietization. Now they wanted to become its prime defenders. And even Ayatollah Khomeyni, formerly destined to be excommunicated by honest people, is on the road to atonement, he who so haughtily rejected Brezhnev's self-interested advice and offers of support: "Carter-Khomeyni, the same fight!" for awhile this appeared on the placards of the delegations in front of the White House. The U.S. Tehran Embassy hostages have been somewhat forgotten, have they not? Like the snubs to UN Secretary General Waldheim. Also forgotten, those "wicked Arabs" who for so long fuelled popular imagery, as soon as the "frightful Soviets" stired up mobilization! After all, the Iranian are merely Moslem....

This is how propaganda runs to suit interests. Here, in France, an under-employed politician (Note--Mr Poniatowski) who without office gives voice to presidential thought, does not want to miss out on the future: "If, in this affairs, France officially seems to be dealing tactfully with the Russians," he more or less explains, "this is because the real danger is the Yellow Peril and because Russia is the best bulwark against it!" This brings to mind the line put forward by French rightists during 1936-1939, who preferred to make appeasing noises to Hitler who, it was believed, would protect them from communist. Oh, what thoughtlessness! "Wicked Arabs!"

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"Frightful Soviets!" do we have to add "Disturbing Yellow Peril" to the contemporary litany of popular whims?

Rather than wandering off searching in the sky of daily news for who is to play the role of the "Black Angel" of their misfortunes, the West, given that these misfortunes exist, would do better to "turn an inward eye" on itself, as the English poet said. It would notice fewer blank spaces than it thinks; it would realize the short-term relentlessness with which it clung, despite all reason, to positions of dominance, even when they threatened it with ruin; the egoism which finally paralyzed its adapting to a more populated, better informed and more susceptible world; the materialism which stripped it of the very sense of happiness; the terrifying weapons which it manufactured either to utilize or protect itself from the poverty of the others: the nuclear weapon and the so-called international monetary system; its inability to imagine a collective development which does not stem firstly from the abuse of positions of strength.

Above all Europe, which has been the cradle of so many brilliant if cruel civilizations, based on living languages and cultures Europe today, lacking imagination and will among each of its peoples, is failing /to be/. The Soviet aggression against Afghanistan aroused in it nothing but short-term tricks, timorous acquiescence to the Americans, compensated by counterassurances of comprehensive indulgence toward the Russians. Poor Europe! If the Soviets worry it at this point, may it loudly espouse the monetary U.S. crusade against its favorite Russian partner. But may it put forward its conditions in return: /The reform/ of a monetary system which is going to lead us all to disaster; /its freedom/ to be a partner for the whole world and no longer just a docile shadow; /its vocation/ to practice a real detente which will stem from its /nonalinement/ with either bloc. The defense of /human rights/ includes Afghanistan, naturally. But its success would be better assured if Europe took the trouble first to defend its own rights as free men instead of pretending to worry about those of others.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

RAYMOND ARON VIEWS WESTERN POST-AFGHANISTAN POLICY DECISIONS

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 2-8 Feb 80 p 68

[Article by Raymond Aron]

[Text] In several statements and interviews, Indira Gandhi has reiterated Leonid Brezhnev's version of the events in Afghanistan: The Soviet troops responded to the appeal of Hafizullah Amin. Sympathetic to Valery Giscard d'Estaing's arguments, she signed a joint French-Indian communique in which the occupation of Afghanistan, without being mentioned, is implicitly condemned. The Indian premier and the French president both consider it unacceptable.

On the other hand, the entire communique itself was inspired by the so-called doctrine of nonalignment, a doctrine that is not very compatible with French participation in the Atlantic Alliance. Giscard d'Estaing obtained from his counterpart a moral condemnation of the Soviet Union, provided that tension could be diffused as quickly as possible, in short to accept the unacceptable.

With the exception of Georges Marchais and communist leaders, French politicians have also condemned the entry of Soviet divisions into Afghanistan with more or less force. They have all added that the retaliatory measures taken by President Carter were ineffective, but none of them, not even Francois Mitterrand, has advised the press, radio or television of which other retaliatory measures the United States should take.

One of my friends, who also compares current French diplomacy to that of the thirties, does not approve of the boycott of the Olympic games. "A political act must be met," he wrote me, "with a strictly political act." Politics has become all-encompassing and the politicization of sport did not occur yesterday. What remains of the spirit of the Olympic games and Coubertin's ideal when the host country's government steps up repression before the arrival of foreigners and tries to separate its people from visitors who have come from all over the world?

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The partial embargo of grain sales has also not been spared by the critics. Either the shortage of cattle fodder will punish the people, who had no hand in the affair, or the Soviet Union will purchase elsewhere the equivalent of what the United States refuses to sell it. No one in Washington has any illusions about the short-term effectiveness of the so-called agricultural or green weapon. The President has nevertheless demonstrated that he would not hesitate, even during an election period, to estrange himself from voters in the name of the national interest.

More generally, what could the retaliatory measures affect, if not the various trade, scientific and technical relations with the Soviet Union?

Is trade a weapon of peace or a market of fools? Western countries have granted the Soviet Union favorable credit conditions, have sold it high-technology products, including turnkey plants (and the products from those plants sometimes compete with Western products). They have facilitated the Soviet program of excessive arms buildup. Commentators also point out that during a period of recession, Western businesses do not turn down contracts with Eastern Europe. France in particular, in return for the capital goods which it exports to the USSR, receives about 8 million tons of petroleum.

A break in trade between Western and Soviet countries is not conceivable, since it would affect the Soviet Union as well as Western countries. The Soviet world owes several tens of millions of dollars (about 50). If we refuse to honor the contracts, the Soviets will do likewise.

Thus we have not yet reached the point of all or nothing. Let us first dispel the illusion that Soviet diplomacy or society will change because the French have built a hotel in Moscow (providing all the materials and even workers). Let's also rule out the plan, neither feasible nor desirable, of a general embargo against the Soviet Union and Soviet countries. On the other hand, what would be desirable and perhaps feasible is an agreement between the Europeans and Americans on trading procedures with the Soviet Union. Rivalry between Europeans to grab Eastern contracts ultimately convinces the men in the Kremlin of the suicidal inclination of the capitalist system, thus confirming the old Leninist view.

Beyond the uncertainties concerning procedures lies the real question: What is the purpose? According to the president of the republic, above all it is a question of preserving detente and preventing war. These two goals are not the same. Of course, preventing total war between the two blocs or between the two great powers remains the most important requirement. But detente does not reduce the risks, no more than tension aggravates them. Further expansion of Soviet power toward the oil-producing areas, tolerated without anything more than verbal protest, would create a situation in which an armed confrontation would become more likely.

Perhaps the Europeans and Americans do not interpret the Afghan crisis in the same way: a single incident in the eyes of some, a stage of a

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large-scale plan for others. Whatever the interpretation, the USSR was not satisfied with the coup d'etat in Kabul and sent in a large army. President Carter was aware that Soviet troops were concentrated at the borders: did he advise Leonid Brezhnev of the extent to which he considered "unacceptable" the possible occupation of an independent country, a buffer between empires? Even if he didn't, he could not limit himself to protests. If Soviet troops occupy an independent country without the White House responding to the challenge and retaliating against the attack, the psychological balance between the two great powers, which is essential for peace, is seriously compromised.

What amazes me is the refusal to understand the stakes in this crisis, comparable to the Cuban crisis of 1962. The material stake, Afghanistan, is no less than the installation of Soviet missiles off the American coast. As for the moral stake, if it is not of the same scope, its nature is no different from that of 1962.

Does the United States have the will and the ability to protect its vital interests? After the Vienna conference and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Nikita Khrushchev tested the courage of the young American president, so to speak. This time, the Soviets no longer take seriously an American president who did not react to any of the Soviet or Cuban operations in Africa or Asia. But Carter's job of restoring credibility is more difficult than Kennedy's was in 1962. The latter had the means to send an ultimatum; Carter does not. In terms of nuclear weapons, the United States has lost its superiority. In the area of conflict, the Soviet Union enjoys every geostrategic advantage.

Although the retaliatory measures may not be enough to lead to the birth of a different Carter in the eyes of the world, they are better than the "concerns" of the French Government.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

COMMENTARY ON FACTIONALISM WITHIN PCF LEADERSHIP

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 28 Jan-3 Feb 80 p 29

[Article by Thierry Pfister: "A Party of Petitioners--While It Is Clear That Georges Marchais Has Understood Leonid Brejnev's Arguments, the Opposite Is Obviously Not True"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The PCF leaders have just silently completed a minor moral revolution which has legitimized the mode of expression used since the spring of 1978 by the communists contesting some of the party's orientations. First, the leaders themselves are now using petitions signed by intellectuals and they are also publishing one such petition as a full-page ad in LE MONDE. Just as each member of the socialist party is defined by his adhering to one trend or another, the communists are now achieving a comparable results. Subtle categories are being created, depending on whether one has signed this or that petition or even--the ultimate nuance--whether one belongs to those who do not associate themselves with the avowed dissidents without, however, putting their signatures on those petitions written by the leaders.

The case of the five authors of "L'URSS et Nous" ["The USSR and Us"], a book which had been officially endorsed by the political bureau at the time of its publication, is characteristic of this situation. Francis Cohen and Maurice Decailot, both official associates of the PCF, have signed the petition initiated by the party's leaders to denounce the anticommunist campaign. Leon Robel and Claude Frioux, professors of Russian, have refused to follow suit without, however, going as far as historian Alexandre Adler who did not hesitate to initial the declaration in which dissidents demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Claude Frioux, however, has taken advantage of the forum offered by L'HUMANITE in preparation for the national council of 9-10 February to express his concern in view of the upsurge of trade unionism which has become apparent within the PCF and which had already been called to attention by Henri Fiszbin, former first secretary of the Paris federation, and Francois Hincker, assistant editor of the future weekly REVOLUTION. As for Maurice Moissonnier who has been a member of the Rhone federation committee, he has chosen to warn his comrades against the resurgence of sectarianism.

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The Leader

Trade unionism and sectarianism, the traditional deviations during periods when the PCF falls back, have been illustrated, among others, by Georges Marchais' performance on the Channel 2 program "Cartes sur Table" ["Put Your Cards on the Table"]. /"To you, I may be only a worker,"/ exclaimed the general secretary of the PCF whose abrupt formulations have always resulted in blurring the nuances or the dialectic character of his party's positions. Who still remembers that in June 1974 the same Georges Marchais explained peremptorily to his party's central committee that socialism was not the question of the day and that they should not flinch, but play with confidence the card of alliance? Last year, Henri Fiszbin was accused of opportunism for much less than that. Wishing to show that he is the leader, Georges Marchais always rushes ahead of his troops, at the risk of sacrificing the coherence of his successive analyses. The general secretary, for instance, has stated on television that in 1939 the PCF, alone against all others, had been right. Thus, the German-Soviet alliance has been justified once more, and Nizan, who had been discreetly rehabilitated through cultural columns, is by the same token relegated to the limbos with the excluded.

Until now, Georges Marchais' style had the advantage of catching attention, of forcing curiosity. This is no longer true today. Too much is at stake for his performance as an actor to invite smiles. LIBERATION summarized this feeling quite well in its first page headline on the next morning: "Hey, Marchais, you are going too far!" A Louis-Harris-France poll published by LE MATIN has confirmed the lack of understanding between communists and the country which is again becoming apparent. Only 9 percent of those polled still believe that the PCF has changed a lot since the Stalin era, while 20 percent thought so in September 1977.

In addition, the time of fellow travelers is now gone for good. Only Pierre Bourgeade remains to explain in L'HUMANITE that /"without the communists, there is no nation; without the friendship of the USSR there is no security for France."/ Even the national bureau of the extremely understanding Movement for Peace has felt the necessity of taking its distances and of demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, in spite of the objurgations of its communist leaders.

On the other hand, the majority of communist voters do not stir. In this respect, the Louis-Harris-France poll published in LE MATIN is a revelation. And many party members breathed a sigh of relief when they read the report presented to the central committee by Maxime Gremetz on 21 January. A stable core of party members is pleased to find again its traditional view of a manichean world where strength on the socialist side is the only reliable means of escaping the intrigues of imperialism. This view is essentially in keeping with "third worldist" analyses a la Regis Debray which are not without influence on the youngest among party members, especially students. The PCF leaders, therefore, can align themselves on Soviet

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diplomacy. At most, cadre meetings will stress the fact that, for the first time, in the communique signed jointly with the PCF, the Soviets have acknowledged the existence of a right to disagree.

Net Result Nothing to Brag About

This is the "victory" which Georges Marchais was celebrating in Moscow when he waved in front of TFI cameras the PRAVDA issue in which the communique was published. It was a Pyrrhic victory, though, since the PCF delegation not only accepted in counterpart to leave out any mention of the intervention in Afghanistan, but also omitted in the communique any mention of its disagreement with the Soviets on the subject of democracy. However, if we are to believe Maxime Gremetz, Georges Marchais had been quite clear on this point in front of Leonid Brejnev, and had gone so far as to insist on the /"caricatural"/ character of socialism as it is interpreted in Czechoslovakia by the Husak team. Which prompted Guy Konopnicki, former secretary of the communist students to make the bitterly ironic comment: /"Back then, the great rabbi of France should have thought of complaining to Hitler about Petain!"/

Another reason why the net result of the reconciliation with the CPSU is nothing to brag about is that, while it is clear that Georges Marchais has understood Leonid Brejnev's arguments, the opposite is obviously not true. The measures taken against Andrei Sakharov have placed the PCF leaders in a particularly uncomfortable position. L'HUMANITE's disapproval and the respectful letter of protest addressed to Brejnev by a few "official" party intellectuals, from Rene Andrieu to Andre Wurmser, will not bother the Soviets much and hardly suffices to salvage the PCF's stakes.

After all, when Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch congratulates Georges Marchais on his /"two positive actions: an internationalist attitude in the Afghan affair and a renewal of relations with the CPSU which is the greatest force at work for peace in the world,"/ one may wonder. Which of the two has reconciled himself with the other? There is no indication that the widow of the former general secretary of the PCF has given up her (frozen) part as "statue of the Commander."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ESA'S 1980 BUDGET OUTLINED, CHANGES NOTED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Feb 80 pp 50-51

[Article by Pierre Langereux]

[Text] The ESA [European Space Agency] is off to a good start in 1980. Its 37th Council, which met in Paris 23-24 January, made several decisions of importance to the future of the Agency and of European space activities, especially in regard to the 1980 budget, the Earthnet program, the Spacelab program, and the future of the ARIANESPACE company.

For the first time in some years, the 11 member countries of the ESA agreed unanimously on the 1980 budget for mandatory European space activities! Thus, the entire ESA 1980 budget (mandatory and optional activities) is now approved. It totals 629.6 million Units of Account [UC]*, or 3,676.5 million francs (see chart).

This is the first time in about 3 years the annual mandatory activities budget has been approved at the beginning of the year, as, normally, it should be. This is also the first year the annual mandatory activities budget has had the unanimous approval that is required but that has not been achieved heretofore, owing to Italy's attitude of complaining that it is being penalized by the European monetary regulations (in view of Italy's high rate of inflation) and by application of the rules of "fair industrial returns," especially in the case of the Spacelab program.

Major Concessions to Italy

The situation is now completely changed. The "Italian matter" has been resolved through the efforts of the Agency, which has agreed to several major concessions to Italy from a financial standpoint. These have to do with Italy's contributions to the ESA and with the compensations to be paid to Italy to palliate the monetary policy's effects.

* 1 UC (1980) = 5.83943 francs.

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Comparison of ESA 1980 and 1979 Budgets (in million UC's*)

Activities	1979	1980
Total annual budget	591.9	629.6
Mandatory activities:		
General budget:	73.1	75.7
Basic activities		
Support to centers (ESTEC [European Space Technology Center], ESOC**, ESRIN**)		
Support to CSG [Guyana Space Center] (Kourou)		
Scientific program	79.4	88.9
Earthnet program	6.3	4.6
Programs in support of mandatory activities:	34.4	10.4
Extended operation of COS B		
Support to Ariane users		
Support to Exosat (rocket) program		
Total mandatory activities	193.2	179.6
Optional programs:		
Earth observation:	34.0	36.4
Meteosat 1 satellite	11.6	6.0
Meteosat 1 operation	8.7	7.7
Meteosat 2 satellite	4.0	7.0
Sirio 2 satellite	6.6	10.9
Remote-sensing preparatory program	3.1	4.8
Telecommunications:	89.55	125.3
Phase 2 (end of OTS operations)	14.6	10.8
ECS 1 and 2 satellites	36.0	43.7
Phase 3 of above (ECS 3, 4 and 5)	----	16.3
MARECS 1 satellite	17.8	9.3
MARECS 2 satellite	10.7	28.0
Technological program (ASTP)	7.8	6.7
Aerosat project (abandoned)	0.1	0.1
H-SAT project (Phase B)	2.1	---
L-SAT project (Phase B)	0.4	9.5
SPINE trial	0.05	0.9

[Optional programs continued next page]

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Comparison of ESA 1980 and 1979 Budgets (in million UC's*) [cont'd]

Activities	1979	1980
Optional programs: [cont'd]		
Space transport:	274.25	288.3
Spacelab program	118.4	119.8
First Spacelab trials (FSLP)	8.2	6.5
Ariane program	146.25	159.7
Supplemental Ariane development (FOD)	1.4	2.3
Total optional programs	404.1	450.0

* 1 UC 1980 = 5.83943 francs.

** [expansion unknown]

Contributions by Countries to ESA Activities (in percentages)

1979 - 1980

Germany	25.57
France	21.07
United Kingdom	15.35
Italy	12.19
Low Countries	5.60
Spain	4.73
Sweden	4.41
Belgium	4.29
Switzerland	3.96
Denmark	2.29
Ireland	0.54

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Italy's outstanding contributions (including its 1976-1978 arrears and the adjustments to its 1978 and 1979 contributions), which total 4.2 million UC's, are to be settled in three payments: 1 million UC's in 1981, 1.5 million UC's in 1982, and 1.7 million UC's in 1983.

As regards 1980 contributions, Italy will be favored as follows: Its contributions will not be increased (as, normally, they should be) if, at the time of payment, the rise in costs owing to inflation and to changes in monetary parities does not exceed 6 percent; otherwise, Italy will pay the difference.

Furthermore, Italy will receive significant financial compensations as follows:

--the participating countries in the Spacelab program have agreed to permit Italy to reduce from 18 percent to 1 percent its contribution to any cost-overruns to completion of the Spacelab development program (see AIR & COSMOS No 797);

--Italian industry will also receive additional contracts (totaling 8 million UC's) under the Spacelab development and production (FOP) programs;

--the ESA has agreed to reduce by 12 million UC's (2 million UC's in 1980 and 10 million UC's in 1981-1983) Italy's contribution to the Agency's general budget.

The latter measure is all the more significant in that it entails a real drop in the Agency's general budget resources, since the 12-million UC "rebate" granted to Italy will not be made up by raising the contributions of the other countries to these mandatory expenses.

This decision is being accompanied by reductions as well--minimum, of course--in the contributions of Sweden and Ireland, who do not want to bear the effects of the Italian position.

Thus, the ESA will have to reduce substantially its "manner of living" to absorb the effects of these measures on the general budget. It has just cancelled its participation in the Hanover Exposition.

Earthnet, a Mandatory Program

The ESA Council approved unanimously, subject to further consideration by Spain, the inclusion of the Earthnet program--to receive data from American remote-sensing satellites--among ESA's mandatory programs, effective 1 January 1980. This program, undertaken in February 1977, has until now been one of the Agency's optional programs; from now on, all member countries are required to participate (with contributions proportional to their respective GNP's).

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The aspects of the program approved--to the end of 1982--represent a cost of 18.05 million UC's (mid-1977 prices), of which 4.05 million UC's will be for program management by the Earthnet staff (installed at Frascati), including the development and operation of an automated satellite-data catalog using the RECON system, and 0.95 million UC's will be for processing of SAR [Synthetic-Aperture Radar] data from the Seasat 1 satellite (to December 1980). It is recalled that this satellite has operated only 90 days. The remaining credits will cover receiving station operating and data pre-processing costs at: Fucino, Italy (for the Landsat 1, 2 and 3 satellites), Kiruna, Sweden (Landsat 2 and 3), Oakhanger, Great Britain (Seasat 1), Lannion, France (HCMM, Nimbus G) and Maspalomas, Canary Islands (Seasat 1 and Nimbus G).

Arianespace Resolution

The member countries, except Germany, also passed a resolution to create the future Arianespace Company for the production, marketing and launching of European rockets. This four-point resolution covers: participation by the countries, negotiations to be conducted by the ESA, the placing of the ESA's Ariane installations at the disposal of Arianespace (including ownership rights to acquired know-how), and conditions pertaining to the use of Ariane for Agency programs.

This now makes it possible for the interested member countries to subscribe to the disclosure filed by France concerning the rights and obligations of the Arianespace Company toward the participating countries; the production and use of Ariane, and the schedule of rates to member countries for Ariane launchings: 175 million francs for the single launching of a satellite of the Ariane class; 150 million francs for the single launching of a satellite of the "half-Ariane" (or Delta) class; and 95 million francs for the double launching of satellites of the Delta class.

The countries have 3 months from the disclosure filing date (14 January 1980), that is, until mid-April, to sign the document attesting their participation in Arianespace.

One member country, however, requested the ESA to hold another informative meeting on Arianespace on 6 February.

The question of Germany's participation must also be settled. In view of this, France has meanwhile withheld its participation in the financing of the Spacelab cost overrun.

Interest in Supplemental Spacelab Development Program

The ESA Council has therefore not voted on the resolution concerning participation by the member states in the Spacelab developmental program cost overrun (140 percent). Nine of the 10 participating countries, however,

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are in favor of the resolution. France alone has withheld its vote, in view of the magnitude of pending financial commitments. It is, in fact, linking its positions on the two major ESA programs, Ariane and Spacelab, and awaits an equivalent commitment from Germany on Arianespace.

The definitive participation of all member countries in the Spacelab cost overrun is expected to be obtained at a special meeting of the Spacelab program's management committee on 19 February.

On the other hand, the member countries passed unanimously two other resolutions concerning production of the second Spacelab and further developmental work on the orbital laboratory (see AIR ET COSMOS No 797).

One of these resolutions authorizes the director general of the ESA to take immediate steps providing for "carry-forward funding" to October 1980 of the construction program on the second Spacelab, which is being built for NASA.

The order for the second Spacelab was signed by NASA on 28 January 1980. But since the American space agency does not have the necessary credits available this year, the ESA will advance the required funds through a bank loan (interest charges on which will of course be billed to NASA). This enabled the ESA to sign with ERNO [expansion unknown], on 30 January 1980, the contract to build the second Spacelab.

The other resolution--passed by all the member countries except Sweden, absent--marks "the interest of the member countries in a further supplemental Spacelab development program" (FOD), the "initial phase" of which will be implemented within the framework of the ESA. The Council then asked the interested countries to define in writing their proposed commitments to this initial phase of the supplemental Spacelab development program, which consists of a "program of studies and support," the cost of which is estimated at 1.6 million UC's (1978 prices) for 1980. The definitive contributions of the member countries have not yet been established; the proposed schedule is: Germany 32.5 percent, United Kingdom 21 percent, France 20 percent, Italy 14 percent, and other countries 12.5 percent.

The decision to undertake this initial phase of the supplemental Spacelab development program must be taken by 1 July 1980 at the latest to enable work to actually start by the end of 1980.

Preliminary work (1.6 million UC's) is to consist of studies on the initial phase (detailed definition, preliminary design, cost analysis, evaluation of Spacelab resources, and study on a small aiming medium) and preliminary studies on successive medium- and long-term phases. The latter are to be the object of decisions to be taken during the second half of 1982, that is, after the first Spacelab flight (April 1982).

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The object of the initial phase of the supplemental Spacelab development program (FOD) is first of all to increase the duration of its missions (to 30 days), its electric power and heat dissipation (to 4 kW), its operational flexibility (remote control, data management, short pallets, etc.), and the services that can be performed by its payload. The total cost of this initial phase, which will be completed toward the end of 1982, is estimated by the ESA to be 23.5 million UC's (1978 prices).

Its medium-term objective will be to achieve full compatibility with American means of increasing its power--PEP [Power Extension Package] and 25-kW Power Module--as well as greater endurance of Spacelab, leaving its equipment pallets in orbit, together with its power module, over longer periods.

The long-term intent is to achieve total independence of Spacelab (with respect to Shuttle), at that point leaving Spacelab's pressurized and manned module in orbit with its power module, thus achieving a true small orbital station.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

COST OF ARIANE VERSIONS 2 AND 3 NOW 560 MILLION FRANCS.

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Feb 80 p 53

[Article by Pierre Langereux]

[Text] New estimated cost studies for the first supplemental development phases of the European Ariane launcher were presented by the CNES [National Center for Space Studies] to the Ariane program executive committee, which met in Paris 29-30 January.

The new CNES proposal puts the cost of developing new Ariane 2 and 3 versions, that could place, respectively, 2 and 2.4 tons of payload (instead of 1.75 tons with Ariane 1) in geostationary transfer orbit toward mid-1983, at 96.018 million units of account [UC], that is, around 560.7 million francs.

This includes the development of powdered-fuel boosters, improvement of the three stages and of reliability, propellant ingredients, ground facilities, etc. (see AIR ET COSMOS No 795). This new estimate of 560 million francs greatly exceeds the previous estimate (360 million francs).

Development costs on recovery of the Ariane launcher's first stage will total 16.2 million UC's, or around 94.6 million francs, according to the new CNES proposal. This includes the feasibility and design studies (2.43 million UC's), and development of the recovery systems (13.357 million UC's).

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

GROUND FORCES' USE OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ASSESSED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jan-Feb 80 pp 24-25


[Article by Col Guy Collognat]

[Text] Col Collognat graduated from Saint-Cyr with the 1945-1947 "New School" graduating class, and was assigned to the metropolitan artillery. After a stay in the Far East, he obtained a technical diploma in operations research. A battery commander in Algeria, he then served with the Inter-Service Operational Research Center (CIRD), then commanded the Army Operational Research Section (SROAT). After completing his command assignment with the 16th R.A., he became head of the Action Methods and Techniques Section of the War College. Assigned to EMAT [expansion unknown] in 1976, he is presently head of the Organization-Methods-Automation Bureau.

"In short, we have to forge it into an instrument, a tool. Not the chiselled stone which is an extension of the arm, but the minute sparkle of components which complements the mind's efforts..." (Address by the President to the International Colloquium on Information Processing and Society, 28 September 1979).


Two years ago at this time, the GEMAT [expansion unknown] general inaugurated the Mont-Valerien National Information Processing Center. On this occasion, it was pointed out that the modernization effort of the army, already being applied to weapons and equipment systems, was now being directed toward the development of modern methods of decision-making, and in particular toward information processing. Emphasis was placed on the role of this indispensable means of analysis and action at all levels; on the need to put it into effect "to manage the immense peacetime enterprise which the army represents"; on its potential for providing efficient command assistance in wartime; and on the contribution to the enrichment of human beings who thus become more available for other pursuits.

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Information Processing

- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| 1. Equipment | 9. Command |
| 2. General | 10. Automation of administrative procedures |
| 3. Specific | 11. Decision-making aid |
| 4. Fixed | 12. Automation of industrial processes |
| 5. Mobile | 13. Example |
| 6. Weapons systems | 14. Situation |
| 7. Utilization | 15. Peace |
| 8. Management | 16. Crisis or war |



Remote Processing

- | |
|--|
| Key: 1. Number of terminals (national and regional levels) |
| 2. Heavy terminal |
| 3. Light terminal |

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Twenty-Year Balance: Irreversibility

Originally (1), the computer quite naturally took over from mechanical devices which were already easing the burden of repetitive functions, so conducive to human error.

With the help of technical development, computers are becoming increasingly effective and fast in handling and storing increasingly large amounts of data. New possibilities are emerging: as a help to management and supervision, and as a way to inform decision-makers.

The pioneers of that period then became fully engaged in the design and implementation of management applications, which were more or less well adapted to ill-defined needs of users, who were still reticent or unconvinced.

With the passing years, resistance diminished, needs became better defined, and requirements became more specific. The central administration gradually acquired a large selection of "products" in various areas: organization, personnel, equipment, infrastructures, and more recently, financing.

The system's designers soon felt the need to coherently organize the overall information system. But they encountered various difficulties: there were long-range problems whose coordination proved to be tricky; equipment was heterogeneous; and programs did not perform well enough. The army found itself penalized because it was using untried equipment.


In another context, it appears that this system, which at the beginning was legitimately instated for the benefit of the central hierarchy but to the exclusion of any other levels, was fed data originating at the base: the latter felt uninvolved, carried the burden, and derived no benefits whatsoever.

Information processing has been developing with renewed impetus in the last 5 years. First of all, there is a need for command to assess the foreseeable consequences of its decisions, particularly as regards financial resource allocations which are always inadequate -- and this need has led command to set a new objective: aid to planning and intermediate term decision-making.

At the same time, new technical possibilities of remote and distributed processing enable more users to have access to the information system, and make it possible to set up specialized systems for department managers; this makes it easier to retrieve information which is more up-to-date and more reliable, thus improving local management.

(1) Ground forces installed their first computer in 1960.

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Infra-Regional Systems
Number of Minicomputers

Key: 1. Schools

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At the beginning of the 1980's, the army has an information system which has gone much beyond the point of no return. The system can handle problems which are more complex each day, and whose solution cannot be postponed (facilities given to drafted personnel to indicate their choice as late as possible before induction, among other examples). The system has a large equipment pool which is being made compatible, and is interconnected by the beginnings of a data transmission network.

The recent establishment of an Action Methods and Techniques Division at EMAT should make it possible to incorporate modern methods to assist operations, facilitate control of technical development, and contribute to clearing imperfections in the present system, particularly difficulties encountered in personnel matters. (2)

Twenty-Year Perspective (!): What is Fated to Be

The Nora Mine report on society's trend toward computerization, and the President's recent statement, have amply described the information processing phenomenon in terms of the future, commenting on the foreseeable consequences. Circulation of information, decentralization of decision-making, and participation at all levels will benefit from widely and publicly available data banks using telephones or screens, from extension of services to even the most modest small and medium size businesses, and from planned "electronic mail" service. Starting in school, new generations will soon be familiar if not experienced in the use of information (as present generations are with the use of the telephone or the automobile.)


Transposition of this "information explosion" to the ground forces makes it possible to spell out new needs, and current studies contribute to the satisfaction of these needs in one way or another.

Decision-makers now have only a very limited time to react appropriately to events whose occurrence is learned almost instantaneously (the death of a recent Pope was known throughout the earth within the hour.) Military commanders must therefore have access to data summaries which are reliable, up-to-date, and permanently available in peacetime, and which withstand no discontinuity during wartime. The SACRA (Automated Frontline Command and Information System) project and the SINEMAT (EMAT Information system) study, made possible by the new high-performance computer programs, are designed to meet this type of need.

Aid to planning and scheduling must be extended to aid in decision-making. Operational logistics studies (automation of movement plans, automatic inventory of resources) constitute in this respect, privileged fields of activity. They reveal dangers to overcome, as well as the need to be able to revert to manual operation in case of systems failure.

(2) Ground forces use about 1500 operators for their information system (one-sixth officers, two-sixths non-commissioned officers, one-sixth rank and file, two-sixths civilian personnel, the majority of whom are of B and C grades.) One-third of them are operators and two-thirds are users.

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Present Data Transmission Network

- Key:
1. CTI (Information Processing Center)
 2. RITTER switching stations
 3. Data transmission terminals
 4. P & T connection
 5. RITTER connection (switched circuits)

Decentralization of the decision-making process, often indispensable in the complex environment of the army, implies the coherence of the process, itself subordinate to information autonomy, which should be adequate at each decision level under consideration. In addition, development of data transmission facilities based on the RITTER network, which interlinks the computers of data processing centers and also connects the minicomputers of department managers, will ensure satisfactory operational reliability.

Information processing must help perfect the military resource in peacetime.

In particular, pursuit of automation to the level of the troops -- "an enterprise involving thousands" -- will increase the availability of personnel and benefit their training, thanks to a genuine easing of management responsibilities. At the same time, support aid provided by department management systems will be extended by help in instruction and training.

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Widespread application of information processing to all military sectors -- as in all areas of public or private life -- therefore calls for active cadres to know its potential and its limitations. It is from the ranks of users of every kind that operators will first have to be recruited before being trained and assigned. The emergence of generations experienced or at least familiar with the use of this tool will facilitate the large effort which the ground forces must inevitably make.

The computerization of the army -- as well as of society -- will entail deep changes not only in its organization, operation, and methods, but also in its mental outlook. Even now, the availability of all sorts of data to increasing numbers of people, in at least apparent conflict with the "right to know", is raising delicate information security problems which are not yet well controlled, as well as problems with the individual right to privacy, protected by the Information and Freedom Law.

The army, as well as society, will have to devote itself to the elaboration of an "information processing deontology."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

SHOCK BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS--A shock brigade headquarters will be set up at Marseilles for the 31st demibrigade, to be formed this summer and trained for overseas missions. The demibrigade will be made up of three units provided with armored cars and vehicles: the 21st marine regiment, based at Frejus; the first Foreign Legion cavalry regiment at Orange; and the 2nd Foreign Legion infantry regiment in Corsica. This 31st demibrigade will have the same landing capability as the 9th marine division at Saint-Malo. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 25 Feb 80 p 16]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

DETAILS ON NAVAL VESSELS TO BE SUPPLIED TO IRAQ

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 5 Feb 80 p 9

[Article by G.F.B.: "A New Advantageous Contract for the Shipbuilding Industry--1,500 Billion Lire Worth of Naval Vessels Sold by Italy to Iraq"]

[Text] The conclusion of the agreement, which provides for the supplying of four missile-launching frigates, six corvettes and one squadron fueling ship, was announced upon the return of the "Ardito" and the "Lupo" from a round-the-world cruise.

Naples--Italian naval vessels are selling like hotcakes. Despite the seasoned competition from the French, the English and the Germans, the Italian shipbuilding industry has succeeded in obtaining construction of 11 ships for Iraq. This big order (a deal worth something like 1,500 billion lire) will, according to the specialists, ensure 3 to 4 years of work for the yards of Muggiano (La Spezia) and Riva Trigoso, both belonging to the Cantieri Navali Riuniti (IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute] group), which now specialize in building naval vessels.

The conclusion of the agreement (which has already been signed) was announced in the course of an official ceremony organized to celebrate the return of two of our fleet's most modern units (the "Ardito" and the "Lupo"), which have just made a round-the-world cruise. Having sailed from Livorno on 18 July, the two ships visited 19 countries (including Japan, India, China, and many nations of Latin America), traveling a total of more than 37,000 kilometers.

In the course of a stimulating press conference held on board the "Ardito," with the minister of defense and top military personnel present (honor guard, trumpet fanfares, squeals from the boatswain's whistle), it was explained that the cruise had three purposes: to train the sailors, to "show the flag" around the world, and to let it be seen what we can do in the naval-technology sector. One of the aims of the cruise was, in a word, promotional: we Italians do not know only how to make shoes, sweaters, household appliances, but also those very sophisticated contrivances that are the naval vessels of the latest "generation."

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The cruise itinerary was decided on in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, to enable the two ships to call at those countries most interested in Italian naval vessels. And at various ports touched by the two units, the representatives of the shipbuilding firms (joined in a kind of consortium, the so-called "Melara Club") were present to illustrate to potential customers the characteristics of "Made in Italy" ships. And interest was very lively, even in China.

According to the new defense chief of staff, Admiral Giuseppe Torrisi, the agreement with Iraq "confirms the good quality of Italian ships, conceived and designed by the Italian Navy." And Minister of Defense Adolfo Sarti says: "The round-the-world cruise by the two ships must have had a considerable influence on the conclusion of this deal with Iraq. From this point of view also, therefore, this mission by the Italian Navy had a strong promotional effect."

At the Cantieri Navali Riuniti (Genoa), there was absolute reticence: "As far as we know, the deal has not been finalized yet," a director said dryly. But the golden rule of the international armaments market is, as is known, silence.

The contract with Iraq is reported to be for the construction of four 2,500-ton missile-launching frigates of the "Lupo" class ("ready to sail" cost: 100 billion lire each), six 650-ton corvettes (30 to 40 billion lire each), and a "Stromboli"-type squadron fueling ship (30 to 35 billion lire.) The contract is also said to provide for training of personnel and construction of several infrastructures on land. The units for Iraq will be built in the shipyards of Riva Trigoso (2,000 employees) and Muggiano (La Spezia, 1,500 employees). The latest big orders obtained by the Cantieri Riuniti are the following: four "Lupo"-class frigates for the Italian Navy, six "Lupo" frigates for Venezuela, six "Maestrale"-type frigates for our Navy, two "Lupo" frigates for Peru, four corvettes for Libya, six corvettes for Ecuador.

The ships sold to Iraq will mount cannons from Oto Melara (of La Spezia) and will have electronic equipment from Selenia, Elsag, Elettronica and Elmer and propulsion systems from Grandi Motori (Trieste) and FIAT.

With this contract, Italy consolidates its position in the international armaments market, in which, according to reliable estimates, our country is in fourth place, coming right after the two superpowers and France, and is on a par with the FRG and Great Britain. In the latest issue of RIVISTA MILITARE, Col Luigi Trinchieri, chief of the research and studies office of the Army General Staff, writes that for the Italian arms industry, "the future is promising." And the big order from Iraq shows that he is right.

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