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JPRS L/8987

20 March 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 9/80)

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT  
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ATTEMPTED DEPORTATION--A Palestinian delegation composed of 'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad, Muhammad Zahdi al-Nashashibi, and Khalid al-Hasan made an unannounced visit to Kuwait to prevent implementation of the decision Kuwait had made to deport Arab Liberation Front representative Dr Ahmad al-'Akkah. The Palestinian delegation succeeded in its mission. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Jan 80 p 18]

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AFGHANISTAN

EYEWITNESS REPORT FROM KABUL

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 5 Jan 80 pp 69, 70, 71

[Article by Jacques Buob: "What I Saw in Kabul"]

[Text] After an initial landing in Kabul was refused and an unexpected stopover in Delhi before being turned back the next day, Jacques Buob was one of the very few French newsmen to see the Soviet tanks patrolling the streets of the Afghan capital. He told about it.

Christmas does not mean very much to the Afghans. That evening, the city was calm as it usually was. Curfew was about to begin at 2300 hours as it had every night, lasting until dawn for nearly 2 years now since Taraki overthrew Daoud. Already there were very few people still out in the streets. Europeans were at the homes of friends or in their own homes. At the Kabul Intercontinental, in spite of everything, a few Germans were having a midnight [Christmas] feast at the discotheque on the top floor of the building. The 200-room hotel was getting very few clients. Outside, the cold was very dry as it is in winter here. The sky was very clear. The moon entering upon its second quarter shone upon the high plateau (1,800 meters) on which the city is built completely surrounded by high mountains forming a perfect basin around the city.

At 2100 hours the first buzzing sound broke the silence. Soft at first, then louder and louder. Odd. Planes do not come into Kabul at night. The airport is not equipped for landings without visibility. Furthermore, it is surrounded by 4,000 meter peaks. Another sound, that of turboprops. Then yet another. In the sky the green and red specks of wingtip lights brightened the night. It was Christmas. The Soviet ballet had begun. It was not to stop until dawn with the lifting of the curfew.

Even Field Kitchens...

The following day, 25 December. In Chicken Street, the street for the Bazaar tourists where samovars and lapis lazuli are sold, curious tourists were walking about. Soviets were here, people have been accustomed to seeing some since 5,000 military advisers landed. Some merchants have even learned to

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give prices in Russian. But those tourists have nothing in common with the now customary silhouette of the Soviet adviser accompanied by his massive spouse, market basket in hand. No. Those were very young people in civilian clothes. It was not yet realized that they were the first soldiers to have come by the airlift which the Soviets launched from Tashkent to Kabul.

During the night of Tuesday, the 25th to Wednesday, the 26th, the rate of landings and take-offs reached its height. One witness calculated that these were occurring at 30 second intervals. Under cover of the night curfew, the Soviets were landing tons of materiel, hundreds of combat vehicles, fast gun carriers, heavy tanks, trucks brought out from the bellies of the Antonov 12's and 22's. Thousands of men and even field kitchens.

What was going on? President Hafizullah Amin had left the People's Palace, the former royal palace, a veritable city in the heart of the city, sheltered behind kilometers of walls. He preferred to take up his residence some 12 kilometers away in Darulaman's palace, also a former royal palace recently redone and in which the French Otis firm installed the elevators. The palace is also flanked by a small fortress. Hafizullah Amin chose this place sheltered from the frenzies of the city. Did he already suspect something? In any event he was still fulfilling the tasks of his position in the midst of the hullabaloo of the turboprops. He was seen in the Kabul TIMES receiving a bouquet of flowers from a little girl. But he felt the net tightening about him.

That Wednesday when from then on the Soviets were landing at the airport in broad daylight and blocking the road from the curious, Amin seemed to be attempting a final effort to escape from the Soviet pincers that were already crushing him. That day, in fact, he signed a decree condemning to death no less than 1,300 members of the Parcham (Flag), the other wing of the PPD [Afghan Democratic People's Party], which he knows to be Moscow's favorites. That order, of course, would never be carried out.

The Swiss Cook...

But in Kabul, as in the entire country, nothing indicated that Amin was soon to die. On the contrary, it was thought that it was he who sought Russian support to put an end to the Islamic rebellion then holding a large share of the country. The ambiguity was to be maintained for another 24 hours. Until Thursday, the 27th, at 1915 hours, the time at which all telephone and Telex communication were suddenly cut off. In the heart of the city a bomb went off. It was the signal for action. Endless lines of gun carriers with the red star were starting up. Violent fighting broke out in the vicinity of the People's Palace, the radio and television buildings, on the road to the airport, at the Ministry of Interior, and especially near Amin's residence.

Fighting ceased during the night. At dawn a column of smoke was rising from Darulaman Palace the approaches to which were closed from then on. It was officially announced that Amin had been judged and executed. But in everyone's view in Kabul, Amin died at the end of the fighting. Along with him a certain



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number of members of his family in accordance with a vendetta tradition well established here, not to mention his close collaborators, the "Aminis," as they are called here. Some ministers, it appeared, were held as prisoners, doubtless in the radio building to which the Intercontinental's Swiss cook was delivering about 200 meals on a daily basis.

On Friday, 28 December, Amin's regime was finished. The Russians got him. Kabul awoke that morning with a third president dead of a violent death in 20 months and a fourth leader whose name is Babrak Karmal. But if the shops opened their doors as usual, nothing in Kabul was the same: The Soviets had invested the city.

At the traffic circle of the major avenue leading from the People's Palace to the airport passing in front of the radio building and that of the United States Embassy, they had set up cannons. They occupied the president's house, the People's Palace, the radio and television [buildings], the main post office, the Ministry of Defense no doubt and certainly that of Interior where they themselves took the files in hand. The country closed its doors to newsmen who are systematically turned back. In Kabul snow began to fall on 30 December. The cold season, which will last 2 more months with temperatures going down to  $-20^{\circ}$  below zero Celsius, was beginning. In khaki uniforms and fur caps, the Soviets with impassive faces were completing their settling in.

They were mounting guard in the capital's strategic points. In front of the government buildings it was Afghan soldiers dressed in the style of a "people's democracy" like Tintin's Syldaves who were on guard duty; the Soviets behind the iron gates on the inside were overseeing the Afghans. In Kabul's basin there was a continuing shuttling back and forth of large and small cargo planes and Antonovs. Occasionally, MiG 19's, 21's and 23's briefly pierced the sky. Jet pursuit planes were based not far from the capital, at Bagram. At the foot of the mountain transport vehicles and tanks were jostling each other. The gun carriers were moving at top speed through the city's streets.

#### A Smell of Gasoline

In Kabul-Hotel, a yellow and decrepit building near the main post office bearing black traces of the explosion which set off the fighting on Thursday evening, Soviet civilians were bustling about. It is the KGB's general headquarters, mischief makers say. In any event, it is doubtless a question of a certain number of civilian experts who have partly taken over the Afghan people's destiny. At nightfall, long before curfew, Kabul becomes empty. Only the Russian gun carriers go by at an amazing speed given their massive size amidst the smell of gasoline which infects the whole city. Very low octane Soviet gasoline. The drivers closed the air locks on their gun carriers to protect themselves. For the Russian did not come here as Messiahs. Strolling in the bazaar has long since become very dangerous for them (as for any European of the more or less Slavic type. Just a few days ago, two military advisers and a woman were gunned down. In this country very faithful to Islam, Moscow is the archfiend. The Afghan garrisons of the Kargha, Richkor and Bala Hissar fort barracks rebelled last summer against the authority of the Soviet military advisers. Many soldiers took to the maquis and

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joined the rebellion. Recently, violent fighting took place in Kabul. It was on the night of Sunday, 30 December, to Monday, the 31st. Just after curfew at 2300 hours, violent gunfire broke out around the radio and People's Palace buildings. It ceased at about 0100 hours. For 2 hours, Kabul's inhabitants saw tracer bullets light up the city. Who takes up arms against the Russians? Troops that have remained loyal to Amin, deserters, rebels who have infiltrated? It is hard to know. Furthermore, more than anywhere else, the Russian Army is the army here. In the meanwhile, it does seem that the Afghan Army has now been disarmed so as to prevent such incidents from recurring in Kabul.

#### Service in East Germany

Some of the Red Army soldiers, however, do confide in the people, some of whom are seen peacefully surrounding patrols. This was how it was learned that these men (at least some of them) served until recently in East Germany. Would they be the ones Brezhnev decided, as a big peace gesture, to withdraw from the GDR a short time ago?

On Wednesday morning the Soviet presence in the streets of Kabul, according to witnesses, was less visible than on preceding days. The antitank gun at the traffic circle on the road to the airport had disappeared. The city showed hardly any trace of the fighting that took place in it. But one could not go to Darulaman, there where Amin was killed and where the fighting was doubtless the most violent. The night of Tuesday to Wednesday was calm for the first time in ages. It is hard to imagine who would attempt anything against that powerfully equipped and superorganized army which landed here and which is spreading very rapidly throughout the country. A Soviet colonel has apparently already taken up his duties at Jelalabad, east of Kabul, where regular Afghan forces reportedly rallied to the rebels to fight against the Red Army.

The Russians' man brought in an Antonov luggage compartment, like David Dacko in that of the French Transall to Bangui, made his first semi-public appearance on Afghan television on Tuesday evening. Until then there were doubts as to his physical presence in Kabul. Actually, he had very likely arrived just shortly before (the sophisticated electronic equipment of the American Embassy had in fact made it possible to learn that his first appeal, presumed to have been broadcast by Radio Kabul, had really been broadcast by a Soviet station, Radio Tashkent). Babrak Karmal suddenly appeared on the small screen surrounded by the members of the Revolutionary Council and of the government. An astonishing resemblance to the Romanian Ceausescu. His right index finger raised in a professorial manner. He who only wore shirts with the collar democratically open, that day put on a white shirt and a tie. He asserted that if it were necessary he would request even more help from Moscow. He attacked Carter whom he accused of supporting the Afghan rebellion. Along with him was the one considered to be his mistress Anahita Ratebzad, former minister of social affairs in the first Taraki government and now minister of education, with a Soviet style lace collar, appeared on the platform and hammered out her words to the beat of her hatred for the old regime. They

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are the strong pair today in Kabul to whom must be added the minister of planning, a personal friend of Karmal, Ali Kishtmand, who only just came out of Amin's prisons.

"In the Name of Merciful God"

But the most astonishing part of that ceremony, cold as that of a people's democracy, was the reappearance of Taraki's portrait on the speakers' right and the complete rehabilitation of the former president. Here we have the former leader of the Khalq (People) wing promoted to the rank of father of the revolution. Anahita (that is how she is called here) requested a minute's silence in his memory and, better yet, a mullah prayed for his soul's eternal rest.

It was the hour of the great reconciliation. Karmal promised that all prisoners (it is said that there are 25,000 of them in the sinister Poule-Tchakri prison) would be released. Including the very reactionary Moslem Brothers. "It does appear," a UN official confided, "that repression is not very severe. The Khalqis whom I know are still where they were." Karmal did say that only Amin's officious policemen would be chastized.

Actually the Russians have every reason to see the various tendencies of the party stop tearing each other to pieces. The mullah's presence at the televised ceremony was itself intended to prove that the new regime was thoroughly religious (which makes observers here smile commenting that Karmal has always been a militant atheist). Furthermore, don't his communiques begin more or less like those of Ayatollah Khomeyni with these words: "In the name of gentle and merciful God"?

Entrenched behind the powerful Soviet buckler, Karmal may still hang on for a long time. In the arid mountains the rebels are waiting. The snow will soon fall and close the 3,000-meter high Salang col which opens the road to the USSR. Perhaps the snow will make the delivery of supplies difficult for the Soviets. But no one here dares bet one Afghani on the rebels' chances, at least for the moment, so impressive is the Red Army, seen on the job, because of its organization and the weight of its boot.

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ALGERIA

INTERNAL PROBLEMS, DIFFERENCES IN ALGERIA REVIEWED

War of Dossiers Within FLN

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Jan 80 pp 34, 35

[Article: "War of Posters Followed by War of Secret Dossiers in Back Rooms of FLN"]

[Text] The Central Committee of the National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria's highest party authority, holds its second session in delicate circumstances which denote that the regime is going through an important transitional period. It is a period punctuated by student disturbances which have been characterized by an intensification in the war of protest wall posters which demand an affirmation of Algeria's Arab character through complete Arabization. It is also a period characterized in part by a war of "doissers" among some of the power centers on the eve of the Central Committee's meetings.

The session coincides with the first anniversary of the death of President Houari Boumediene on 27 December. The celebrations marking this occasion amounted to a reaffirmation of the slogan of continuity.

It is known that the meetings of the second session of the FLN's Central Committee are officially held under the slogan of reaffirming loyalty to President Boumediene and renewing the adherence to the National Charter. They are also guided by the resolutions of the fourth congress which has produced the "new leadership organs" embodied in 199 members representing the central committee and the political command which holds responsibility because it directs the country's general policy, oversees the application of the principles prescribed in the National Charter, defines the major tasks to be accomplished in all fields and elects from among its members the party secretary general--also the president of the republic--whose election should be endorsed by the congress.

Thus, the "literature" of the party's bylaws defines the role and powers of the Central Committee. The question is: Who makes up the committee?

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Is it made up of productive forces or consumer, bureaucratic forces?  
What are the social strata from which the committee members derive?

Briefly, the forces within the Central Committee are almost a "realistic specimen of the dynamism of the Algerian society." Army personnel--both on active duty or retired--make up the majority of its membership, or 41 percent. About 23 percent of the members are from the bureaucracy and intelligentsia and some 26 percent from the various mass organizations which have merged into the party mainstream. Two conditions which are vital in Algerian political life have been observed in this makeup:

One--Attention has been paid to the "extreme sensitivity" of the power centers represented by the members of the former revolutionary council and the pillars of the economic and administrative bureaucracy who have eventually become members of the political bureau--the highest authority in the country. It was thus necessary to have representatives of this sphere of influence included in the Central Committee.

Two--The establishment of an FLN balance which is satisfactory to the various groups in Algeria as well as to the Algerian public opinion in general. For this very reason, the members of the political bureau ignore many of the studies and reports submitted by the various committees set up by the Central Committee. This leaves the committee at a loss between its political responsibilities and its relationships with the various spheres of power and influence which safely hold the reins of government. This is one of the difficulties encountered by the Central Committee in paving the way for the extraordinary congress of the party which will determine the political and economic lines for the next 5 years.

The political bureau feels that new vistas are opening up and new blood is running in the Algerian society. A standstill situation under the name of "continuity" might exhaust the people and feed the wave of protest, which would in turn bring on the frightening wave of strikes which is close to eruption nowadays. The strikes and violent quarrels which have taken--and are still taking--place in universities and high schools, and even some elementary schools, across the country from east to west up to the town of Biskra, at the feet of the Aures mountains, have had a potent impact on the Algerian masses.

The heat of argument pervaded the Palace of Nations where the second session was being held. According to informed sources, the energy minister Nabi Belkacem raised before the conferees the question of Algerian-American relations and severely criticized the Belaid Abdessalam group which had pawned Algeria's economic and political future for unfair contracts with a number of monopolistic American firms. The same source adds: The Algerian minister demanded an investigation of the era in which Belaid Abdessalam and Ahmed Ghozali presided over the ministries

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of industry and energy. The minister hinted to handsome commissions received by senior officials in return for inequitable deals.

Belkacem Nabi has previously spoken about this subject in statements he made to the Algerian Radio and Television Service, but those statements were more tempered and less candid. The statements at the time rankled Belaid Abdessalam and his successor as energy minister Ahmed Ghazali, so they wrote a report signed by Ghazali and waited for an audience with President Chadli Bendjedid to give him the report. Ghazali's patience, however, gave out as his adversary continued to "gossip" about him, so he distributed his secret report among some members of the Central Committee. In the report, he accuses his successor in the ministry of energy Belkacem Nabi of having "...cooperated with France at the expense of Algerian interests..." when he was a department head at SONATRACH, before he became governor of Tlemcen. The report provides a lot of evidence about the excesses that had been committed and important information about that period.

President Bendjedid equated the distribution of that report with the distribution of leaflets and rebuked his minister who was relieved of his post a few days later. The prime minister speeded up the decision to relieve Ghazali. From that day on, Belaid Abdessalam considered that he was meant by those measures, and the disagreement between him and prime minister Abdelghani deepened when the latter, at a meeting of the political bureau, asked the members of the economic committee to devote their time to party work and leave the responsibilities for heavy and light industries, petrochemicals and other industries to other cadres so that the responsibilities of planning, implementation and control are not jumbled together. However, Belaid Abdessalam, chairman of the FLN's economic committee, rejected this view, and the prime minister retorted: we have files against you. Belaid answered: And we too have files against you. And so the "war of the dossiers," as the Algerians call it, is now in full swing. The spillover of this war has involved Rabah Bitat, president of the People's National Assembly who is accused by adversaries of having pocketed tens of millions from the "treasure" of the FLN. The same charge involves Mohamed Boudiaf, an opponent of the Algerian regime who lives in exile.

In connection with the irrigation dossier, various charges were made against several senior Algerian officials including two members of the political bureau.

The second major topic at the meeting, beside the housing dossier, was the dossier on education, upbringing and the question of Arabization presented by (Bouallam Ben Hammouda), member of the political bureau and the secretary general of the presidency. The heated debate revealed that there was an opinion calling for a dual language system, whereby French would remain the medium of administration and economics. This

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position is represented by Col Ahmed Bencherif, Kasdi Merbah, Belaid Abdessalam, Rabah Bitat, Ahmed Abdelghani, Liassine and a number of technocrats. The alternative to this line of thinking is represented by the Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui group, which has declared that "its viewpoint coincides with the recent statements by the secretary general of the FLN, the President, at his recent meeting with deputies of the People's National Assembly, and supports legitimate demands in favor of complete and immediate Arabization and of speeding up the application of Arabization in the administrative, social, economic and cultural fields."

The group, which appeared cohesive at the meeting, depends on the unionist forces and the mass organizations represented in the party, but it is split into two wings--one which is progressive and Marxist and one which is nationalist and conservative. Both sides see in the executive coordinator of the party machinery the man who is in control of the tactical phase which will eventually lead to the haven of strategic clarity.

Col Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui is supported by Mohamed Cherif Kharroubi, minister of elementary and secondary education, Abdelhamid Mehri, minister of information and culture, Saleh Goudjil, minister of transportation, Lahcene Soufi, minister of justice, and the ambitious young minister of higher education and scientific research Abdelhak Bererhi whose main concern now is to "contain the circle of strikes and cordon off the conflict" which is taking place between students affiliated with the National Federation of Algerian Youth and the "Muslim Students," as they are called, who now control a large portion of the students in Algeria's universities, secondary schools and even preparatory schools.

Last week, violent clashes took place and several students were wounded. Reports circulating among students of the University of Algiers say that two students fell during clashes in Constantine.

In the meantime, the war of leaflets and wallposters goes on in Algerian universities and colleges. The leaflets and wallposters, however, carry conflicting information. Some warn against the idea of Arabization and accuse advocates of Arabization of being reactionary. Most of them, however, support full Arabization and declare: "We should either be Arab or not be."

It is clear that student circles are determined to continue the strike movement until demands are met, since no one has forgotten how the resolutions and projects of the 1975 Arabization conference were ignored. That conference had called for the "application of the Arabization process in all administrations and establishments..." and insisted on "complete and immediate Arabization." The late President Houari Boumedienne was in charge of that conference. Response to the desire of the conference came only from the party machinery, which Arabized most of its administration,

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the fully-Arabized justice ministry and a part of the Presidential Office. The other ministries maintained the dual system--that is, they remained a French hammer hanging over the people's head. The language used by the Algerian national companies for administrative and "human" purposes is still purely French.

The position of the Algerian bureaucratic machine is clear. Seventeen years after independence, the man in the street is still a stranger in his own national language and would need an interpreter when he calls on financial and industrial establishments--even when he visits the municipality of his town.

Some Algerian companies have already outgrown French and are now dealing in English, after the number of American cooperators has reached 5,000 experts over the last 5 years, which means that they have exceeded the number of French cooperators in Algeria. In the meantime, large numbers of Algerian cadres were graduating in Arabic but were being unable to find placement because the system of administrative guidance is based on foundations and interests that are against the use of Arabic.

Commenting on this situation, which requires the political leadership to assume its historical responsibility and take decisive stands, a senior aide to the Algerian president told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: "We are fully aware that decisions by the central committee will not change the nature of the existing problem. What is needed is a true intention to change in favor of Arabic. Without Arabic, we cannot maintain our cultural personality and Arab character. As scientific studies show, French is in decline, and those who want French to remain spoken in Algeria are deluded and blinded by transient interests."

In fact, the question of Arabization is of extreme importance to Algerians. Either French continues to prevail for some more years, and this would continue to hitch the Algerian society and Algerian interests to the West--linguistically, culturally and economically--for a long period of time. Or Algeria would become independent of the language, culture and economy of the West and would build an Arab Algerian personality and develop the structure of an alternative society imbued with distinct and intrinsic values, supporting an industry which would be the real springboard toward independence and the future. But can one perceive the prospects and possibilities of the new phase in the light of the conflicts and overlapping interests of the political forces in Algeria? Many knowing observers behind the scenes in Algeria say that a powerful storm is now assailing the political leadership and undermining its dynamism, namely, "the scandals of the dossiers." President Chadli Bendjedid now has a propitious opportunity to determine several basic issues, including the questions of Arabization, industrialization and replacing the economic team which is not in tune with the new phase. If decisive action is not taken, compromise will prevail, but it will entail various crises. It will again refer the Arabization question to the extraordinary congress of the FLN which is scheduled for March-April 1980.



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Housing, Agriculture Problems

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Jan 80 pp 28, 29

[Article: "At Conclusion of Meetings of Central Committee of FLN, Tranquilizing Pills To Deal with Agonies of Housing, Agriculture and Arabization; Algerians Forsake Virtue of Patience"]

[Text] By its continuous dissection of the situation in Algiers, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI does not seek to discredit the members of the regime. It acts only out of a concern to place all the facts before the Arab citizen and to perform its informational mission of urging the Algerian government and people to open up fully to the greater homeland, and rise up to the level of hopes and aspirations which the Arab nation had pinned on the Algerians in the years of their bitter, heroic struggle.

For the first time, the meetings of the Central Committee of the ruling FLN end amid a climate of official and popular upheaval never before experienced in the country since the early days of independence. This climate has actuated the Central Committee to adopt a series of quick decisions to defuse the explosive situation which is being stoked by current developments in the Middle East and central Asia which leave a clear impact on the Algerian man in the street.

The pacifying decisions, so to speak, basically involved three areas of life which directly affect the ordinary citizen: housing, agriculture and Arabization.

With regard to housing, which constitutes a severe problem of serious social implications in Algeria, the Central Committee has adopted a "housing charter" which reaffirms the state's control over the various real estate sectors and at the same time encourages families to own their houses. It has been decided to sell state-owned "old and future" houses to individual citizens, including houses which have been deserted or nationalized after the departure of their previous owners. This decision involves some 300,000 houses, half of them in the Algiers area.

The "housing charter" contains a long-term strategy dealing with the question of how to build and expand towns through specialized agencies in which local organizations in a particular region would play a basic role.

Those organizations, such as municipalities and so forth, would share in planning, funding and managing housing complexes.

Retgression in the Agricultural Sector

With regard to the agricultural sector, it undoubtedly receives special attention by the administration of President Chadli Bendjedid, not only because it affects the vast majority of the Algerian population, but because it has demonstrated an alarming retrogression too. Algeria, once

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agriculturally self-sufficient and still capable of securing such self-sufficiency, today buys from abroad one third of the food materials that it needs to the tune of 5.5 billion French francs or one fifth of its oil revenue. For example, wheat production fell by half over the past few years, from 30 to 17 million kantars.

This agricultural deterioration entails a series of serious repercussions in a developing country with one of the world's highest rates of population growth. Young Algerians are migrating from the countryside to the cities, adding to unemployment, overcrowdedness and social problems, in addition to problems created by emigration to foreign countries, especially France. To deal with this situation, Salim Saadi, minister of agriculture and agricultural revolution, announced the formation of new cadres for the municipal establishments involved in following up the various phases of the agricultural revolution. The new goal of this operation is "to make the agricultural sector develop through constant contact with the peasants."

From now on, the newly created organs will be responsible for all problems related to agriculture in all the stages of production. The steps taken in this regard fall within the context of the principles prescribed in the national charter which recommend decentralization, the independence of management and production and the reorganization of agricultural activities.

In Algeria today, there are about 1,250 engineers and technicians distributed among 704 municipalities to oversee the implementation of the new plan and participate in improving conditions in the countryside.

#### Arabization: The Biggest Problem

There is then the third thorny problem--Arabization. It is known that this problem touched off the tension which has been gripping Algeria for the past 2 months. The Arabized university students have been boycotting classes for several weeks, and their movement is receiving growing support from various sectors of the people. The movement is also spreading to embrace most of the educational establishments in the various parts of the country, despite the negative attitude taken by President Chadli toward this movement.

The statement issued by the Central Committee on 3 January in connection with the questions of Arabization and education includes a number of concessions which are supposed to satisfy the striking students, even if in principle. The statement, for example, dwells at length at the weak spots in the educational system, such as the existence of two educational sectors, one in Arabic, the other in French, in the various branches of knowledge, especially the scientific fields.

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It is quite clear that this linguistic differentiation in turn creates a class differentiation, which is the fact of the matter in Algeria. The Central Committee noted that "foreign languages"--of course, this means French--occupy all "the strategic positions in the state machinery and in society at the expense of the national and official language of the country."

As a way out of this predicament, the committee recommended that Arabic be made a basic language in order "to train instructors in all branches and on all levels." At a first transitional phase, an Arabic technical dictionary with all the basic terms will be used in higher technical education as well as in technical and university and secondary education levels.

The Central Committee also called for the use of various modern audio-visual means to facilitate the learning of Arabic by the new generations. More importantly, the Central Committee adopted the demands of the striking students in a number of points. It asked the competent authorities to speed up the complete Arabization of the educational agencies, both on the secondary and university levels, as well as in the rest of the sectors which are closely or remotely related to education and upbringing.

On the level of higher education especially, Arabic will be introduced into the curriculum as a basic subject. On the other hand, instruction in Arabic will be supported in the schools of the children of expatriate workers in France.

Islam a Compulsory Subject

The more important concession contained in the statement issued by the Central Committee--a concession which implies a political significance--is the introduction of religious instruction as a compulsory and basic subject on all levels of education and in all tests and examinations. It has also been announced that new classes called "Islamic studies" have been instituted in some secondary schools. It has been decided too to open Islamic institutes which would provide the ministry of religious affairs with cadres. One of the decisions too is the teaching of the Koran to young men in mosques and Koranic schools which will receive special support from now on.

The question which political circles in Algeria are now asking: can those fast decisions taken by the Central Committee control the situation and return things to normal? The answer most observers offer is no. Why?

Firstly, all the decisions taken, whether pertaining to housing, agriculture, Arabization or any of the other sensitive matters, are decisions whose effect will appear only in the long run. Things in Algeria a year after the death of President Houari Boumedienne cannot brook delay or

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postponement. The striking students, for example, recall that similar, and probably more radical, decisions have been taken several times since independence. Instead of gaining ascendancy, Arabic has been diminishing steadily to the point that all the Arabized students who have graduated from universities within the past 10 years today find themselves completely discarded by the state agencies and economic establishments. Because of this, it is very unlikely that the striking students will accept the hackneyed decisions taken by the extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee.

#### Struggles Within and Outside the Regime

The second reason which makes observers doubt that the situation will be stabilized is that the struggles among individuals and centers of power have become more public than ever before and now constitute the daily talk of citizens. It is no longer possible to indefinitely maintain the contradictions with which people have coexisted thus far.

Most of those conflicts are occurring within the regime, but some are taking place outside the regime. For example, the advisers of the president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, are at loggerheads. The former is trying hard to regain his lost glory by means of rearranging the ranks of his supporters (Draya, Taibi, Elarabi...), while the latter is trying to become the second man in the country with the support of the president himself. Although Ibrahimi depends on his family connections since he is the adopted son of a founder of the Moslem ulema movement in Algeria, he lacks, however, any popular base.

Within the regime, too, the struggle grows among the ministers in charge of oil and economic affairs. The way in which the former irrigation minister Ahmed Ghazali, a supporter of Belaid Abdessalam, was relieved of his post is still reverberating in the ruling circles. Ghazali learned about his removal from office from the doorman of the council of ministers when he came to attend a cabinet meeting.

The new energy minister Belkacem Nabi spares no opportunity to denigrate the oil policy of his two predecessors (Belaid and Ghazali). In so doing, he gets implicit support from Premier Abdelghani and President Chadli himself.

The most intense struggles, however, are those occurring outside the pale of the regime. There is first the Islamic current which is growing quickly as a reaction to the "westernization" of the country and to what is called "the ruling political and economic class which is dissociated from the language and needs of the people." Language in Algeria today plays the same role religion has played in Iran.

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Cardboard Organizations, Scandals and Accusations

There is also a wave of opposition to the "mass" organizations of the regime: UGTA, UNPA, UNFA and UNJA. This latter organization, for example, is controlled by groups whose primary language is French wrapped in the disguise of progressive slogans. Subsequently, this federation has failed to pay any serious attention to the question of Arabization, which is the main reason behind the Arabized students' withdrawal from and opposition to the federation. The federation is now going through an acute crisis because it has proved to be unrepresentative of the interests of the majority of students.

The same applies to the peasants federation, which has completely failed in defending the interests of its members etc. In addition to all that, there is the wave of scandals involving senior and low-level officials. The latest scandal involves information provided by the widow of Mohamed Khider claiming that funds from the "FLN treasure" have found their way to the pocket of Rabah Bitat. The "treasure," which had been deposited in a Swiss bank under the name of Khider, has been recently returned to Algeria.

The fact is that those scandals have become innumerable. This seems natural and understandable to all those who witness the boundless luxury in which the class of senior officials and officers lives. Luxury goods, which no longer are luxury goods such as refrigerators, washers and television sets which an Algerian citizen dreams of owning even after years, are pouring in, in quantities on members of the ruling class. But if you wanted to buy a car, you have to register your name, pay in advance, have a savings account in a bank and then wait for 5 or 6 years. Finally, you do not get the car which you wanted, but a car which the state has selected for you. Yet, American cars of the latest models roam the streets of Algeria. Their owners are all members of "the lucky elite." In the face of such conditions, can "palliative" decisions be adequate?

FLN 'Treasure' Scandal

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Jan 80 p 27

[Article: "Every Millionaire in a Socialist Country is a Scandal";  
FLN Treasure Disastrous for Khider and Auspicious for Bitat and Boudiaf]

[Text] The question of the FLN treasure is bubbling following the big scandal touched off by the widow of Mohamed Khider, one of the heroes of independence, who is believed to have paid in life for having opposed the return of the treasure to Algeria. His widow is today asking the new regime: Why was the treasure a disaster for my husband and milk and honey for some senior officials?

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"Every millionaire in a socialist country is a scandal." This is how a senior Algerian official commented on the wave of scandals which is sweeping the country since the death of President Boumedienne. To know that a class of more than 5,000 millionaires has emerged in Algeria within a record period of no more than 18 years--the age of independent Algeria, is to realize the number of scandals which are still under the surface waiting to burst out.

If Messaoud Zeghar, doyen of this new class, had not kidnapped his sister Delilah from Canada about a year ago to make sure she does not divulge his secrets, the Algerian citizen who is deprived of several consumer commodities, would not have known that Zeghar owns a wealth of more than \$1 billion, in addition to properties and possessions in several European countries, but especially in the United States and Canada.

The story, however, which is the paramount concern of the Algerian public opinion relates to what has come to be known as the "treasure of the FLN." What is then the story of the treasure, and what's behind it?

The story recaptured headlines in the Algerian press on 26 November when the Algerian Government signed an agreement with the Geneva-based Arab Commercial Bank under which it acquired ownership of the bank. On 11 December, the Algerian Government officially repossessed the "FLN treasure" after about 15 years of give and take.

#### Story of the Treasure

The treasure was deposited in the Arab Commercial Bank by the then FLN treasurer Mohamed Khider who was assassinated in Madrid on 3 January 1967 in circumstances which remain mysterious to this day.

Khider's widow took the opportunity of the 13th anniversary of her husband's death to demand of the Algerian Government to rehabilitate him now that the money has been returned to the government. Mrs Khider takes the main credit for the return of the money. Without the documents and papers provided by Mrs Khider, the government would not have been able to back its case and regain the treasure from the Swiss bank.

In July 1964, the government of President Ben Bella had accused Mohamed Khider of having diverted the FLN treasure from the purposes for which it had been raised in the first place, especially since Khider was entrusted with the treasure. When Houari Boumedienne took over power on 19 June 1965, he kept the charges against Khider standing. Khider had joined the opposition in July 1964, declaring that in his capacity as FLN secretary general and treasurer he places the money he controls "at the disposal of the anti-Ben Bella FLN." He had chosen the Geneva-based "Arab Commercial Bank" to deposit the funds. The bank manager at the time

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was a leading Syrian businessman called Zuhayr Mardam. Khider had bought the majority of shares in the bank's capital in 1963. First the Ben Bella government, then the Boumedienne government filed a complaint against the bank in an attempt to regain control of the money, but many legal provisions prevented Swiss justice from taking any action against Mr Mardam.

Khider's Widow Sides with the Government

In 1974, Mrs Khider sided with the Algerian Government and legally supported its case. She has recently described the motives which had led her to take this position. She said: "What concerns me more than anything else is the honor and memory of my husband. They have promised me that if I were to hand over all the relevant documents in my possession, the Algerian Government would make a public announcement recognizing my husband's integrity and admitting that the funds in question have been honorably managed by him." Mrs Khider added: "In 1970, I met with Boumedienne and personally handed him all of my husband's documents and accounts, including those which were kept in the bank. From that time on, Boumedienne became certain that the bank's ownership is actually Algerian..." She pauses and adds with regret: "The most serious thing is that Boumedienne has not kept his promise despite my full assistance in the search for truth... The Algerian Government's recourse and pleas to Swiss justice failed completely. It was I who pushed the challenge forward and personally intervened in this matter to clarify the truth."

Mrs Khider believes that her efforts to clear her husband's name of any blemish have enabled the Algerian Government to repossess the Swiss bank and the huge amounts of money deposited in it. She feels that it is natural for her today to demand "a clear and open recognition" of her husband's integrity.

The Widow Explodes the Scandal

Things soon grew complicated, however, and eventually turned into a new scandal preoccupying the Algerian public opinion when Mrs Khider declared that "all Ben Bella opponents who have obtained money from her husband, most particularly Mohamed Boudiaf and Rabah Bitat, the current president of the Algerian National Assembly, to disclose what they have done with those sums of money."

The Algerian Government strongly responded to those charges in a statement published by the Algerian news agency on 24 December. Said the statement: "The method in which this issue has been reopened at the press level, and particularly the insinuations involving an important Algerian personality, carries the mark of a well-planned political offensive designed by circles which are traditionally hostile to Algeria."

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In the face of this sudden attack which did not have a convincing answer to the charges made by Mrs Khider, she renewed her assertions that the Algerian Government had not kept its word: "In the statement I gave the newspaper, LA SUISSE, I brought back to mind the pledge made by the Algerian Government. If I had mentioned the names of two opposition personalities at the time, including Rabah Bitat, the current president of the National Assembly, its because I expected him to intercede in defense of my husband's reputation, since he was a friend of my husband. My concern today is to defend my husband's memory and clear up the circumstances which led to his death. At no time did I consider participating in an anti-Algeria campaign. No one can impugn my truthfulness because had it not been for my role, Algeria would not have regained its right to the Arab Commercial Bank."

Those are the outlines of the new scandal which is now rocking Algeria with spillover effects involving some senior officials and personalities. Will the comrades in arms continue to open old books in this fashion? Observers in Algiers are worried about the consequences of casting aspersions on those who have led the country over the past years, at a time when student disturbances are escalating and social crises are deteriorating.

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EGYPT

FORCED RETIREMENT OF FIELD GRADE OFFICERS

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Jan 80 p 16

[Article: "Egypt: Retirement of 172 Officers of Major and Brigadier General Rank on the Charge of Disloyalty to the Head of the Family"]

[Text] Before the end of 1979, the largest removal of senior officers in the history of the Egyptian army took place. President al-Sadat's orders were issued in accordance with lists provided by Vice President Husni Mubarak, who is in charge of the secret organization for security in the armed forces, and Minister of Defense General Kamal Hasan 'Ali, retiring 172 officers with the rank of major and brigadier general. This unprecedented step came as such a total surprise that personnel of the armed forces are now referring to it as "the officers' massacre."

Well informed sources say that there was not one reason for chopping off the heads of these officers except for "lack of total loyalty to the person of President al-Sadat." However, according to the lists of the massacre, disloyalty fell into various categories.

The first category, comprising about 50 percent of the names, involved all officers who, after having been placed under close surveillance of the secret organization, made statements or engaged in actions indicating that they opposed the Camp David agreements, the peace treaty with Israel and the normalization of relations.

The second category involves officers who had opposed the selection of General Kamal Hasan 'Ali, the commander in chief of the army and the minister of defense, for membership in the political bureau of the National Democratic Party which al-Sadat heads. The officers viewed this as an unconstitutional act that would drag the armed forces into the battleground of political quarrels on the side of the government party against the other opposition parties and forces.

The third category includes a number of officers who abstained from participating in the so-called military prosecution decree against General Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili, chief of staff of the armed forces during the October 1973 war. Their abstention was based on the inadequacy of the evidence, and the

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fact that what General al-Shadhili had published revealed no military secrets but only responded to charges directed against him publicly by the "supreme commander."

The fourth category includes a number of officers who, during the visit of Israeli Minister of War Ezer Weizman, refused to receive him in their units, although orders to that effect had been issued by President al-Sadat and the Egyptian minister of defense.

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PERSIAN GULF AREA

BRIEFS

JOINT ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY--Several countries on the Persian Gulf plan to establish, with the help of France, a joint armaments industry enabling the installation of an anti-aircraft defense system. It is estimated that it will cost 8 billion dollars and will involve local construction of Mirage aircraft and Crotale surface-to-air missiles. The plan will be submitted to President Giscard d'Estaing during his forthcoming visit to the Arab Emirates. Iraq will participate in financing the project. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 25 Feb 80 p 16]

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SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

PRC SEEKS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS--Diplomatic reports from Jiddah indicate that in light of developments in Iran, the People's Republic of China [PRC] has renewed its efforts to exchange diplomatic representation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which only recognizes Nationalist China (Taiwan). It appears that the Sultanate of Oman is acting as an intermediary in this regard. It is well known that the PRC has established full and official diplomatic relations with Oman. Oman had a part in arranging Foreign Minister Huang [Hua]'s tour of some Persian Gulf nations last year. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's information indicates that real mediation could come from Pakistan's Gen Zia ul-Haq, since the Pakistan-PRC discussions resulted in measures focused on strategic cooperation to stop Soviet expansion toward the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. Among the factors which led to the failure of the first Chinese attempt to engage in a dialogue with the Saudis was the PRC's position with regard to Sadat's negotiations [with Israel] and its support of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The PRC's shipments of spare parts and aircraft engines to Egypt are among various indications of this position. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 25-31 Jan 80 p 17]

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WESTERN SAHARA

MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO END SAHARAN WAR NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 pp 356-357

[Article: "Western Sahara Issue. War and Diplomacy"]

[Text] One year after the launching of the "Houari Boumediene offensive," Mohammed Abdelaziz, secretary of the Polisario Front, has released a report summarizing the successes he attributes to the Front's combat units: 700 operations and combat actions; 6,800 Moroccan troops killed or wounded and 1,500 taken prisoner; 400 artillery pieces, mortars and other heavy weapons, plus 550 armored and combat vehicles captured; 750 transport vehicles destroyed; and 10 aircraft shot down. The various exhibitions of military booty held for the benefit of the international press during the past year corroborate these figures to a large extent.

Furthermore, the Polisario's successes in 1979 were, for the first time, clearly scored in the field. There is no locality in southern Morocco and the former Spanish Sahara, with the exception of Tarfaya, that has not been shelled by Saharan heavy weapons several times. Saharan troops have temporarily seized several urban centers and military positions, and devastated their military installations. This has happened twice to Tan-Tan, once to Lebouirat, and partially to Smara. Lastly, Polisario forces have liberated and now permanently hold some 15 localities and posts in Saguia el Hamra, the northern portion of the former Spanish territory. Among these are: Mahbes, Jdiria, Tifariti, Bir Lahlou, and Amgala. The Saharan Arab Republic's "battle map" has thus considerably improved in the past 12 months.

Yet the Polisario's operations do appear to have declined in both number and intensity during the final quarter of 1979, and the losses sustained by its units seem, on the contrary, to be heavier and heavier. There is a distinct possibility, therefore, that the Saharans may soon face a manpower problem, even though they are drafting almost all young men as soon as they reach draft age. A low-key campaign to recruit volunteers already appears to be under way among the ethnic Saharan populations of Algeria, Libya, Niger, and Chad.

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In addition, the replacement of equipment and arms by those more or less well-equipped friendly countries necessitates lengthy transit and is plagued by many delays and difficulties.

"War of Attrition" Strategy

Moroccan military leaders no longer boast about breaking their adversary's will. They do hope, however, to wear him out and thus eventually have him at their mercy. They are organizing themselves for a long and costly "war of attrition," but are absolutely confident that its outcome will be favorable.

The Royal Armed Forces currently in the field in the Sahara are now organized into seven military sectors: Zak, Tan-Tan, and Tarfaya in southern Morocco; Aaiun, Smara, Bu Craa, and Dakhla in the new "Saharan provinces," that is to say in the former Spanish territory claimed as its territorial base by the Saharan Arab Republic. The chief town of each sector has a garrison force of at least two regiments and serves as base of operations for light, motorized and armored columns supported by combat aircraft and reinforced by helicopter-borne troops. Sector commanders seem to receive certain orders directly from King Hassan, although General Dlimi coordinates the services and their operations in the field and exercises disciplinary authority.

This new deployment of the Royal Armed Forces into powerful bases and flying columns and the very substantial increase in the number of troops operating in the Saharan enabled the Moroccan forces to conduct a series of local search-and-destroy campaigns, the first of which, "Ohoud," was very highly publicized. Admittedly, contrary to announced expectations, no decisive or striking results were obtained right away, but these new tactics were undoubtedly responsible for the reduced scope of Polisario operations last fall and the probable increase in Polisario losses.

Yet for this "war of attrition" to be really effective, Morocco must be able to sustain it for a long time. According to Moroccan officials, the nation's high morale indicates that a prolonged effort can be expected. Lawful opposition parties continue to strongly support the king's Saharan policy, and the clandestine opposition is, rightly or wrongly, said to be negligible.

Morocco's population is large enough to readily compensate numerically for the loss of life. Nevertheless, the best combat troops, traditionally drawn from Berber mountain tribesmen, have difficulty coping with combat conditions in the Sahara. They find them disconcerting. Draftees from Morocco's Saharan regions, and especially from the former Spanish Sahara, would be much better adapted to these operations, but they are apparently not very reliable. Generally speaking, the rank and file appear to have relatively little motivation, and the officers and noncommissioned officers are said to have become openly discouraged and passive on various occasions. But the augmentation of troops in the field is expected to allow

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units to be relieved more frequently and individuals to be granted more home leaves. Until a short time ago, such leaves were very few because of the illusive hope of a short war.

The unusual military equipment expenditures are placing a heavy burden on the Moroccan economy and finances. Furthermore, military leaders still consider the equipment and arms furnished them to be insufficient. President Carter had long refused Morocco's request for the sale to it of 24 Cobra helicopter gunships, 24 F-5 fighter bombers, and 6 OV-10 Bronco reconnaissance aircraft. But Congress was finally asked to approve this sale on 24 January when Harold Saunders, assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, indicated that such arms would enable King Hassan to negotiate from a position of strength. General Graves, speaking for the Department of Defense, added that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would be prepared to finance this Moroccan procurement for a total sum of 235 million dollars.

Saharan Arab Republic Recognized by 35 Countries.

In any case, Saharan troops took the offensive once again on 1 January 1980 by shelling the Moroccan military post at Bir Enzaran for 20 minutes. On 2 January, they penetrated northeast of Aaiun and attacked Haggounia. After a 2-1/2 hour battle, the Saharans withdrew, taking 10 prisoners and booty with them. Saharan military officials claim to have destroyed considerable equipment and killed more than 200 Moroccans. On 4 January, a 1,000-man column dispatched to reinforce the Haggounia garrison was ambushed. Saharans announced they had taken 24 prisoners, including a wounded officer, and captured 16 vehicles and 12 heavy weapons. Six Saharans, reported to have been forcibly enlisted in the Moroccan army, were able to join the Polisario on this occasion.

These strikes at opposite ends of the theater of operations illustrate the Polisario's ability to maneuver and take effective action. These attacks were not as large or long-lasting as the major combat operations conducted in 1979. The large urban centers held by Moroccan garrisons no longer seem to be seriously harassed. The sector deployment of reinforced Moroccan troops does appear, therefore, to have produced some favorable results.

January 1970 was also marked by an important diplomatic success achieved by the Saharan Arab Republic. The latter was recognized by Cuba. Admittedly, the fact that this recognition was so long in coming, may be somewhat surprising. Cuba had long maintained a large medical mission in the Saharan refugee camps. Back in 1977, it had sent an official delegation, led by a member of the Central Committee, to ceremonies celebrating the fourth anniversary of the outbreak of the Polisario's armed struggle. In addition, at the sixth summit conference of the movement of nonaligned countries held in Havana in 1979, Fidel Castro had officially endorsed the Saharan people's right of self-determination and had had a paragraph inserted in the Final Declaration deploring the fact that this region had not been decolonized in

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conformity with resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. But it is said that the Cuban Government hesitated a long while because it did not wish to jeopardize its favorable trade relations with Morocco.

As 1980 began, 35 countries, 20 of them African, had recognized the Saharan Arab Republic in the following chronological order: Madagascar, Burundi, Algeria, Benin, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, North Korea, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Yemen, Congo, Panama, Sao Tome, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Afghanistan, Cape Verde, Grenada, Ghana, Guyana, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Jamaica, Uganda, Nicaragua, Mexico, Lesotho, Zambia, and Cuba.

Morocco Launches Diplomatic Offensive in Africa

Morocco thoroughly discerned the gravity of this situation. When it launched operation "Ohoud" last fall, the logical assumption was that this military effort was meant in large part to obtain a favorable territorial position from which the kingdom could launch a diplomatic offensive. Thus all that would remain to be done would be for the Royal Armed Forces to regain control of the "Saharan quadrilateral" of eastern Saguia el Hamra.

But without waiting to be in possession of this additional trump card, King Hassan's government decided to wage a major diplomatic effort in the direction of Africa. On 14-15 January, four ministers were sent to 27 capitals of Africa and the islands of the Indian Ocean. These emissaries endeavored to regain for Morocco support and sympathy that had been given to the Saharans, and also confirm established friendships and make them more actively supportive of the Moroccan cause.

Ahmed Remzi, the minister of Islamic Affairs, visited Niger, Mali, Cameroon, Togo, Upper Volta, Congo, and Gabon. Abbes el Fassi, the minister of housing went to Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Nigeria. Haddou Chigueur, the minister in charge of relations with Parliament, has been to Djibouti, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, and Zambia. Abderrahmane Baddou, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, visited Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Comoros. As can be seen, Morocco did not hesitate to contact nine countries having already recognized the Saharan Arab Republic. It deemed it futile, however, to approach the most hardened governments, such as those of Benin or Tanzania, and probably useless to press the governments of Uganda and Equatorial Guinea which have radically changed since the day those countries recognized the Saharan Arab Republic.

If these diplomatic moves have some success, the OAU's next summit meeting could be less unfavorable to Morocco than the previous meeting. Yet the Saharan Arab Republic will not fail to counterattack. Should we, therefore,



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expect to see formulation of a compromise solution? Up to now, however, the opposing views--the intangibility of the currently attained Moroccan borders versus the exercise, under neutral supervision, of the Saharan people's right of self-determination--do not seem to lend themselves to a possible happy-medium arrangement.

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