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1980

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JPRS L/8923

13 February 1980

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 8/80)

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CANDIDATE TO SUCCEED LABOR UNION CHIEF PROFILED

Hamburg STERN in German 10 Jan 80 p 102

[Article by Heiko Tornow: "Career With a Full Mouth"]

[Text] In 2 years the chairman of the German Labor Union Federation [DGB], Heinz-Oskar Vetter, will go into retirement. The jockeying for his succession has already begun.

"Those who let themselves be discussed as candidates for higher positions too early are already out of the picture." Guenter Doeding, federal chairman of the Union for Food, Luxury Items and Restaurants (NGG), defends this old wisdom of officials with convictions. For this reason he has been denying for months all rumors that in 2 years he himself wants to become the successor of DGB Chairman Heinz-Oskar Vetter, who is leaving office because of age.

In a small session over beer, however, the usually so clever tactician could not keep his mouth shut. To his colleague Erich Frister of the Education and Science Trade Union for teachers, Doeding revealed that the Vetter succession is practically solved. He indicated that he regards himself as the suitable man at the head of the umbrella organization of the 17 FRG DGB trade unions.

Doeding is not the only one who is after the Vetter job. The group of office candidates also includes Erich Frister, his colleague Ernst Breit of the Postal Workers Trade Union, Vetter's deputy Gerd Muhr, and Alois Pfeiffer, who is responsible for economic policy on the DGB board of directors. Up to now, however, only Doeding has been dumb enough to get himself talked about.

Customarily only officials of the second rank push themselves forward. For the chairmen of the large and powerful trade unions such as Eugen Loderer (Metalworkers Union) or Heinz Kluncker (Public Services, Transportation and Communications Trade Union), the change to the rather powerless and financially weak DGB would mean a career setback. It is in their interest to keep the influence of the umbrella organization small. It is to this

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endeavor that Heinz-Oskar Vetter also owed his election 10 years ago. The second man in the Industrial Labor Union for Mineworkers (IG Bergbau), who was completely unknown at that time, appeared to the kingmakers in the individual trade unions to be a guarantee that the Duesseldorf center would continue to dance to their tune. Contrary to expectations, however, the "grey mouse" Vetter acquired political profile and public esteem.

Guenter Doeding, at least, firmly believes that with Vetter's position it would be possible to raise its prestige. The skilled cigar grader from Eastern Westphalia derives this high opinion of himself not only from his solid self-confidence. When the 49-year-old just a year ago, after a "disgustingly normal trade union career" (Doeding on Doeding), took over the NGG chairmanship, Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his capacity as guest speaker showered him with words of praise.

Even the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, usually by no means friendly to the trade unions, expressed extravagant praise: "Here we have a modern trade union leader with ideas, for whom success, not ideology is important, entering the first rank." And the DGB-newspaper WELT DER ARBEIT proclaimed: "An important man."

Guenter Doeding earned such praise primarily through his successful wage rate policy. He made a name for himself above all through initiatives with regard to the reduction of working hours and the improvement of the position of older workers. Incidentally the top official of the NGG--which bears the nickname of "sausage union"--also gained the goodwill of the employers through his brave intercession on behalf of the interests of the consumption branch. Whenever physicians or other health apostles made alcohol and nicotine into the devil, beer drinker and cigar smoker Guenter Doeding imagined people at work who were out to change the system. In the interest of job positions in the brewery and distillery, in tavern and kiosk, he suggested, the Federal Government, too, should kindly abstain from the crusade against liquor and tobacco. When Federal Minister of Health Antje Huber not long ago warned against the tooth-killing dangers of eating sweets, Doeding's NGG faced the choice between tooth decay and sugar candy and created the impression that toothless children are easier to cope with than unemployed sugar workers.

Manfred Hoenig, press spokesman for the NGG, has no trouble in setting forth the political position of his boss: "Practical center or something like that." Whether Guenter Doeding is sufficiently qualified with these implements to be the representative of 7.8 million employees is being doubted by top trade union members. They are therefore thinking about a way out from this personnel misery: Vetter, who will be 63 years old at the next election, they feel, should once more be a candidate for a new 3-year long term of office.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF DISSIDENT ANTOINE SPIRE VIEWS INTERNAL PARTY DISSENT

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 31 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 pp 21-22

[Interview with Antoine Spire: "Communist Party: The Problem of the 'Paid Employees'" by Thierry Pfister]

[Text] Antoine Spire, the sales manager of SOCIAL EDITIONS, was led to leave his post at the end of 1978. Justified by the reorganization of the PCF publishing office, this separation in addition represented a confirmation of the political disagreements between Antoine Spire and his party's leadership. Now in charge, at Seuil publishers, of a collection entitled, "Liberty, I Spell Your Name," in conjunction with which several communist critics have already expressed their thoughts, Antoine Spire is publishing there the account of his own itinerary under the title, "Profession: Paid Employee." He expresses his thoughts on it here.



Antoine Spire  
"Basically all institutions are somewhat interdependent."

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[Question] The crisis jolting the Communist Party seems to have stirred up profound turmoil in the party's salaried apparatus.

[Answer] That is so. And the issue here is an unusual and important phenomenon. The paid employees, merely by virtue of the structure of their schedules, are the organization's key persons. When they became paid employees, it was because they were deeply motivated, ready to mould themselves in the party's national policy, with which they are generally identified.

[Question] Isn't there a certain sclerosis among them?

[Answer] Yes and no. The possibilities for significant changes only appear at the time of departures. In the meantime, paid employees can only transmit opinions to the leadership without knowing what use will be made of them. From this point of view, the paid employees are different from other communists and at the same time similar to them. Different: Ready to give everything, they are affected to the greatest depth by the crisis. Similar: They see their intellectual curiosity stimulated by the party but also restrained, the raising of certain issues being tabooed. Generally they see their role as that of intermediaries between the leadership and the communists. In the long run, some grow tired; others become bureaucrats.

[Question] Wasn't it to combat such bureaucratization that a transfer and rejuvenation of the paid employees was undertaken in 1975?

[Answer] The purpose was, indeed, to "elevate" young salaried staff, and this since the analysis of the events of 1968. To rely on them "in the boldest manner," to borrow the official formula. Hence, we saw a noticeable rejuvenation of the paid employees. There were more young intellectuals and fewer workers, which paradoxically once in a while produced young, newly converted, dynamic, and sectarian salaried employees. Between the 22d and 23d Congresses, Marcel Zaidner, who was in charge of the promotion of the salaried staff, wrote an article which represented a real curbing of this policy. In FRANCE NOUVELLE, he said that we had gone too far, that we needed to depend on more experienced comrades, the foundation of the party. Indeed, the leadership had noted that some promotions had been hasty. The neophytes did not always remain neophytes and once in a while became insufficiently malleable.

[Question] It is the function of paid employee itself that is, at this point, being brought into question.

[Answer] The function of paid employee is an essential and practical institution. It is the only resource that enables workers to lead a high level political campaign. Because now executives--who were compelled to recognize the labor organization right--do not recognize the political right in the companies. On the other hand, there are paid employees who have practically never performed another job. They have always been salaried staff of the party, directly or indirectly. Such a situation is, of course, regrettable....

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[Question] When you speak of indirectly salaried employees, that means that they are not included among the 550 paid employees counted and reported to the central committee in May 1972 by Georges Gosnat. A figure that, in addition, included members of Parliament.

[Answer] The paid employee concept cannot be limited to this small figure, which includes only the employees of the central committee and the departmental federations. To get an accurate idea of the number of paid employees, one has to at least multiply the figure given by Gosnat by 10. There are at least one or two paid employees in each departmental federation. Some are also found in certain big sections. At Ivry, for example, we have five. The municipal assistants, the general counsels, all of whom are paid by the party, also have to be counted, to whom, however, they turn over their fees. They are also political heads. Finally there are the enterprises controlled by the party, in which the salaried staff don't have just administrative duties. At SOCIAL EDITIONS, at the time of each electoral campaign, for example, they used to ask us to assign some comrades to the provinces, which moreover was not always without posing a few operating problems in the office. There are political paid employees there who don't appear in the party's official statistics.

[Question] This is the corps of "political professionals" Lenin hoped for.

[Answer] Lenin also talked of their necessary rotation, of the essential nature of their returning to production, to limit the danger of bureaucratization. Unfortunately the capitalist system makes such a return to production virtually impossible. Because, if a paid employee gives up his job for one reason or another, it will not be easy for him to get hired again. It is not a good reference in a company to have spent 5, 10, or 15 years as a paid employee in the PCF. At best, a subordinate, manual job that doesn't correspond to the intellectual capacities he's acquired will be suggested to a former worker. Andre Wurmser, while he was at "Apostrophes," thought he could say that they were making great pecuniary concessions to communists or communist critics. This is not true. At most they receive publicity, often suspect, when they appear for the first time. They are very quickly rejected and ignored. If only because basically all institutions are somewhat interdependent. In their eyes, they will never be anything but incorrigible hagglers. The dissent that has surfaced within the party since Spring 1978 has put certain comrades in tragic situations, whether it be, for example, journalists having left FRANCE NOUVELLE or certain secretaries in the Paris federation who resigned who are involved.

[Question] Hence this threat of unemployment is a burden on the freedom of paid employees.

[Answer] A terrible one. In addition, it is extraordinary to note that returning to production, although magnified in speeches, is branded as punishment. Such double language is becoming generalized among numerous communists. On the outside, the policy of the party is defended but it is

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ridiculed privately; "among themselves" people talk about the limitations. The latter attitude typifies numerous communist journalists. People also refuse to investigate certain ideas thoroughly so as not to risk raising issues about our collective vision of party policy. I speak all the more readily because this was my attitude for a long time.

[Question] What is the reason some of them have suddenly risked speaking?

[Answer] Everything has changed because the party is in a crisis. Furthermore, how could it hope to remain the only institution spared in a social body itself in deep crisis? One of the manifestations of this crisis in the party is precisely that we are daring to speak out, that we are rejecting a narrow concept of "party patriotism." There is nothing more difficult than tearing oneself away from the emotional cocoon that the party forms.

[Question] Is that what accounts for the fact that dissidents seem isolated and few in number?

[Answer] The "dissent-leadership" picture is reductive. The Fiszbin affair reveals the depth of this crisis. In Paris, the entire party has been jolted. An arrondissement public discussion in the 17th arrondissement even demanded in a majority more information from the national leadership. The communist critics are only the tip of an iceberg. Even among the paid employees within the organization, the debates have an animation that people don't even begin to conceive of on the outside. Internal wars go on once in a while.

[Question] Why raise the problem of the paid employees now?

[Answer] It's a taboo subject. But in speaking out myself as I am doing, I believe I'm in the direction of the 22d Congress, which said that the party should be the image of the "glass house" that serves as its headquarters. It would be good to scrupulously respect the congress' texts. For example, the one that says that communists have a right to all information. Hence they have the right to know the contents of the letter written by Henri Fiszbin at the time of his resignation from the Central Committee.

[Question] Regarding the texts, what do you think of the one that has just been published by the PCF with a view to the national conference on intellectuals?

[Answer] I find it very positive that the text was submitted to debate by the party. Moreover I hope to be able to speak on the discussion platform. In its style, the document seems to me heterogeneous, as if it had been written by different authors. In its substance, it appears to me not to draw on all the party's progressives in the area of culture. Georges Marchais, at Mutuality for example, said that there were not only communists who develop Marxist research. This view is not present in the leadership's text. It's a pity. The article is, on the other hand, centered

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entirely around the idea of ideological strife between the PCF and the rightwing, with its socialist appendage at its side. This Manichean vision seems false and caricatural to me. It deters numerous intellectuals and not just them alone. To be a communist is to make a concrete assessment of concrete facts.

[Question] Is this true for the proposal for a joint campaign against NATO missiles?

[Answer] Yes. And I am happy to be able to approve without reservations this proposal by the party. As moreover I approve of the constitution of the new Marxist Research Institute. I don't want to oppose the whole party policy even if I do criticize certain aspects of it. I only want each activist to get his freedom of expression and political maturity. The party needs it even if it is not yet able to accept it. After all, it's its enrichment it could reject.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF REMAINS SILENT ON DISSIDENT JEAN GAJER'S CRITICISM

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 31 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 pp 21-22

[Article by Thierry Pfister: "HUMANITE's Silence"]

[Text] By failing to answer, the newspaper is acting as if the issues had not been raised.

One of the criteria that makes it possible to analyze the Communist Party's policy remains unaltered: We are talking about HUMANITE's silence. The communist daily has not breathed a word about the letter written to Georges Marchais by Jean Gajer, the counsel of Paris and a former member of the capital's communist federation secretariat. The contents of this letter were disclosed by Jean Elleinstein on 23 December during "Press Club" on Europe 1. Jack Railite, the deputy from Seine-St Denis and a member of the Central Committee, who was given the responsibility of answering the dissident historian in HUMANITE, tried to characterize him as "an isolated person unfolding a desperate attempt to prevent the implementation of the policy of the 22d and 23d Congresses." Hence he had to see that Jean Elleinstein appeared not to be expressing only his own opinion. Especially since, while the historian's audience is genuine within the left as a whole, it remains limited to the PCF center. He often makes people angry, including several communist critics who share the basic points of his analyses. Within the party--all sensitivities blurred--he is upbraided for his hesitation waltz during the 23d Congress, his reconciliation of short-lived consequences with the PCF leadership, and his systematic use of big media, indeed his letting himself be manipulated by them. When an appeal for a "unity in the struggle" was prepared by socialist and communist militants, one of the conditions imposed by PCF members was that the first 100 subscribers not include Jean Elleinstein. This led the historian to regret that the petition had not been "more inclusive." This demand by the communist militants cannot be explained merely by the fact that the majority of them are situated instead in the Louis Althusser trend. It is still true nonetheless that this appeal is experiencing genuine success and that it has already gotten almost a million subscribers. Among other things, it has obtained a sizable reception in the ranks of the CGT, even among the higher echelons. This furnishes additional corroboration of the fact that

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the leadership of the labor union's central office is subject to strong, unified pressure and is experiencing as a result major difficulties in remaining in the PCF's political track. The dissent among communists, within the CGT or between communist union executives and leaders of the PCF, has been extensive in the last several months. The campaign against "Euro-missiles" presents another example since HUMANITE's management saw itself upbraided for having censured the CGT by not reporting at the outset that the central office is still in favor of a simultaneous dissolution of the military blocks.

Although it is not possible for the PCF's leadership to "block out" this kind of text forever, on the other hand, can it keep silent not only on the true positions of the other so-called Eurocommunist parties but also on the issues that some of its own executives are raising? Is this not admitting that it is choosing to be quiet because it has no answer? For the argument that Jean Elleinstein represents no one but himself cannot be defended forever. Despite the reservations that this raises, he is still an irreplaceable spokesman in the PCF's critical current. To prepare for his appearance on "Press Club," moreover, he spoke with other protagonists in the dissension current, including Antoine Spire, who speaks out above. The fact that Jean Gajer in addition allowed him to make his letter to the secretary general public shows that he expresses the concerns of a major fringe of the PCF.

"A Second Truth"

Jean Gajer is, indeed, an especially exemplary communist professional, who has always zealously supported his party's policy and interests and who enjoys genuine popularity among Parisian communists and in the PCF's apparatus. But here he is, after 30 years of activism, refusing to submit to the leadership's traditional methods because he went through the Stalin period and knows its techniques. He has been accused, along with Henri Fiszbin and the other leaders of the Paris federation of "opportunism." Georges Marchais himself, he writes, made this accusation "with such vigor and certainty that it was as good as a permanent condemnation." Like his peers, he agreed to hold his tongue. Now the PCF's administration is denying having made this accusation and means, Jean Gajer notes, "to manufacture a second truth." So he feels that he can no longer keep silent and is asking: "What are you driving at? This is throwing discredit on the party and its leaders."

Entangled in its half-truths and its complete lies, the PCF's leadership finds nothing to answer. And, in order to remain speechless, it is trying to lead people to think that the issue was not raised.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE, BASE PROTECTION MEASURES DESCRIBED

Program To Equip Air Force

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 22 Dec 79 pp 33, 35, 37, 39

[Article by Jean de Galard: "Anti-aircraft Defense and Base Protection"]

[Text] Protection of air bases against any attack, whether by land or aerial, has always been a major consideration of every country's armed forces. To fill many air forces' specific needs in this area, industry conducts research, proposes, and often manufactures materiel, of which the technology and performance levels depend on the specifications required by the future user.

It is known that the French Air Force, for its part, on one hand has chosen the Crotale [Cactus] short range surface to air missile system to defend its bases against low altitude aerial attacks. Thomson-CSF was given the project management, with Matra being responsible for the "missile" part. Another French choice is the Cerbere 76T2 bitube cannon, produced by the Bourges Establishment for Weapons Research and Manufacture, which itself depends upon GIAT (Industrial Group for Ground Weapons). As for the protection of Air Force positions and areas sensitive to ground action, until now its been ensured by specially trained fusiliers-commandos using those valuable dogs as helpers.

In the following pages we successively treat the program to equip Air Force bases with Crotale and Cerbere, the creation of the Air fusiliers-commandos, and an anti-intrusion system with an entirely new concept. The system was conceived by two French companies within GERSA (Research and Development Group for Anti-intrusion systems), and in the coming months they intend to make full scale experiments followed by proposals to every civil and military service for whom the rejection and sometimes the destruction of any intruder is necessary.

Crotales, Gerberes Installed

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 22 Dec 79 pp 33, 35, 37, 39

[Text] A ministerial decision dated 12 March 1973 made the Air Force responsible, the same as the other armed forces, for their own defense of

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their own installations (air bases and sensitive positions) against all aerial attacks. This short-range defense is today ensured by the Crotale system, by 20 mm bitube cannons, and as well by 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns. Ultimately, in the 1980's, very short-range missiles will complete the present defenses.

The Air Force had ordered 16 Crotale sections before 1978, four have been ordered from the 1979 budget, and the 1980 budget projects a second order of four sections. Each section includes an acquisition unit and two firing units with four missiles each, plus a transport vehicle, a support group, and a liaison vehicle. Each squadron includes two sections; that is, 16 missiles. At the end of this year, the Air Force will have taken delivery on 11 sections and six squadrons will have been organized. Thomson-CSF, Coroale system project manager, is delivering regularly, according to the established calendar, which projects eight Crotale squadrons within the Air Force by the end of 1980.

Concerning the 20 mm bitube cannons, remember that the first 40 gun mounts (each mount holds two cannons) have been ordered from the 1979 budget; eight had been delivered to the Air Force by the end of 1978, the 1979 budget included an order for 56 mounts, and the last 56 (the programming law has provided for a financial effort covering 152 anti-aircraft bitube mounts) will be financed by the 1980 budget. The Air Force bases are being progressively outfitted with Cerbere bitube cannons.

As for ground protection of the Air Force's vital installations and sensitive positions, since July 1978 it has been entrusted to the Air fusiliers-commandos. Remember that GFCA (Fusiliers-Commandos Air Group), created last 1 August, includes about 4,300 men, of whom 160 are officers and 800 are non commissioned officers, spread over about 20 Air Force bases.

GFCA decides how the security personnel are to be employed, is responsible for the specialized instruction, and controls the training of all the Air Force fusiliers-commandos and dog handlers.

The dogs are indispensable assistants in surveillance and defense of sensitive positions, especially at night. They create a deterrent effect on outside elements who have notions of infiltration.

GFCA is also responsible for experimenting with the equipment and specific materiel to be used by the protection units.

Because GFCA instructs almost 3,000 people to various degrees each year at Nimes, its instruction mission assumes a vital importance. This number is almost all those whom the Air Force uses for installation protection; about 7,000 people.

GFCA also acts as an expert and adviser on protection matters, but does not assume direct responsibility for air base protection; that remains the prerogative of the regional commanding generals. On the other hand, GFCS is a main striking force, at the Air Force chief of staff's disposal, to reinforce the protection of one or several sensitive positions.



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Outfitting with Crotale Continues

There are some Crotale squadrons in existence on the Istres, Apt, Avord, Lexeuil, Daint-Dizier, and Mont-de-Marsan bases, although in the last case it is not a matter of a final installation and the units which were stationed there had been used primarily for the formation of the first gun crews. Conforming to the programming law, the Air Force will continue to outfit some of its bases during the next year and beyond. Twenty-four sections have been projected, the last to be delivered in 1982.

During the Datex exercises, the operational level of the crews responsible for operating the Crotale system was verified; the behavior of the radar acquisition and firing units gave rise to various controls, which have been successful on the whole. Some missiles were successfully fired in 1979 at CEL [Landes Testing Center].

The combined behavior of all the equipment forming the Crotale sections also gave rise to some periodic and/or occasional verifications; the results have been judged satisfactory.

Keep in mind that the Crotale was designed to combat and neutralize, with tactical support and multirole assault, helicopters, radio controlled devices (Remotely Piloted Vehicles), and fighter planes now in service or to be put into service from now until 1992, under any weather conditions, day or night. "Crotale" is an automatic weapons system with instantaneous reaction and a high capability of coordination and shot control, which allows the simultaneous treatment of several objectives with a high probability of destruction. It is especially suited to oppose saturating attacks by apparatus flying between 50 and 4,000 m in altitude, and at velocities up to Mach 1.2.

On the bases which have Crotale each section is in radio contact with the squadron's operations room. During a crisis or an exercise, a so-called tactical unit is activated within each squadron. One of its tasks is to solve the coordination problems of the firing sections; this can be easily done with the liaison facilities and suitable transmissions.

The First "Cerbere" Bitubes

All those who were at Cambrai last Tuesday to see the first Matra Super 530 series air to air missiles outfit the Mirage F-1 of the Twelfth Fighter Division were also able to see on Rene Mouchotte Base their first delivery of 76T2 20 mm bitubes. Other bases besides 103 have also been supplied.

The last October issue of the review AIR ACTUALITIES carried an article on bitubes, from which it seemed worthwhile for us to excerpt the following. The high quality Cerbere materiel consists of three main assemblies: the 20 mm F2 weapons built by MAT (Tulle Manufacturing); the firing tube, which is built in Italy by Officine Galileo; and the Rheinmetall mount, which furnishes the opportunity for a Franco-German manufacture. The 20 mm F2 weapons with double feed fire at a rate of 850-900 shots per minute per weapon.

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The 20 mm 76 T2 bitube was designed and built to respond with high velocity to aircraft attacks at low and very low altitudes. This cannon may be used alone or in conjunction with the Crotale weapons system.

Its great firing rate gives it destructive capabilities which add greatly to the deterrent nature of its mission.

Its manageability gives it less visibility during aerial observations, which increases its effectiveness because of the surprise element.

To fill these operational specifications, the weapons system was developed with the following technical options: visual or assisted detection (option); a control lever is used to pilot the mount for acquisition and pursuit; the weapons are slaved to the aimer, allowing the weapons to be pointed toward the future target while the aimer remains pointed at the present target; the two 20 mm F2 weapons fire explosive incendiary shells at an increased rate.

What comes out of all that has just been said is that the quality of the shot directly depends upon the quality of the aim at the actual bullseye.

Training for aiming would be expensive if it necessitated real flights. For this reason each base will be equipped with a simulator (simulator S 11) which allows pursuit, with the help of a cathode tube generated luminous spot injected into the aimer's optical field.

The movements of this luminous spot are programmed according to sequences set by the instructor, and are representative of a plane flying at low altitude with a subsonic velocity.

Outfitting the air Force bases began in 1978 with Mont-de-Marsan, where CEAM [Military Air Experimentation Center] experimented with the equipment.

The obtained results demonstrated that the hopes for this system had been realized.

#### GERSA Perfects an All New Anti-intrusion System

In some regions of the national territory the protection of many sensitive civil or military areas, considered to be vitally essential positions for the functioning of the economy or for the territory's defense, necessitates that all attempts at human intrusion into these zones or sensitive areas be successively but quickly revealed and deterred.

GERSA was formed last summer by two companies with the goal of most effectively solving the security problems of these protected sites. The companies, CEE (Signals and Electric Enterprises Company) and Promocab (Modern Cabling Procedures), are competent and well experienced in electronic, electric, and information research, development, and application.

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A New Concept

A detection system for intruders has the goal of detecting the crossing of a geographical zone by a stranger already warned and deterred by conventional methods: fences, walls, barbed wire.

There exist some detection methods with only one barrier. They consist of shock sensitive wires, infrared light beams, and hyperfrequency barriers, of which the sensitivity arrangement has such a generally unsatisfactory rate of false alarms, that the apparatus is frequently scrapped.

The new concept that GERSA is proposing and will very soon establish on a full scale at an Air Force base, results from research using new techniques.

The basic equation of security against intrusion rests on two imperatives: the interception time must be shorter than the intrusion time; consequently it is necessary to be alerted as soon as possible.

In fact the practical problem to be solved is three fold: the system must detect all forms of intrusion; it must be workable; false alarms must be avoided.

Moreover, there exist two ways to detect: for example, the aggressor's movement energy can be detected (seismic collectors, for example); also extrinsic energies can be provoked and when aggressors pass by, the energy transfer anomalies examined.

The lie of the land, installation possibilities, passage zones, safety or utilization constraints, and the nature of the soil are so many determining factors in the choice of detection barriers. This choice is not limiting and can change with the technology changes in the collectors available. The excellent workability of seismic collectors is noted on this subject, but there are also others.

Some New Systems

As a general rule, detection must integrate two or more parameters, of which the first is never the determiner.

What is to be done with the information supplied by the barriers? It must slow, or even reject, the professional aggressor. Some new systems are under study which intervene by playing on the "psyche" of the individuals.

Such systems are obviously more expensive than some products; if one wants to "make security" the system is one thing, the environment is another. But these systems have some great advantages. They are programable and they can be built within the time (up to n parameters); thus one can start with an existing installation and integrate it with the parameter suitable to all the circumstances.

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One of the originalities of GERSA's perimetric protection system lies in putting several detection barriers in parallel. The relative positions of these barriers is such that, if an intruder activates and crosses the first, he automatically activates the others.

Moreover, these barriers are sensitive to physical parameters of a different nature: optical crossing, fence vibrations, or ground shocks.

The activation of the first barrier releases a prealarm signal, which involves: the intrusion or tentative intrusion signal, usable for a deterrent action; changing the status of the other barriers for a limited time, so the other alarms will activate much more quickly if there is a crossing.

GERSA's proposed system uses as parameters collectors or active systems which are highly workable and perfectly suited to external usage.

Protection of a large site can be done by several "surveillance units," depending upon the perimeter of the protected area; each surveillance unit is designed to protect a perimeter of about 2,000 m. Such an installation includes several detection barriers, a surveillance center, cables which carry the information from the barriers to the center, an overview of the operation, and a device for access control.

They system has a modular type structure. The overview particularly ensures that technical or intrusion caused general alarms will signal. It can be placed in the same area as the surveillance center or installed otherwise; at a guard post, for example.

The system monitors all alarm signals, with a maximum of five facts per monitoring band.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MIRAGE F-1 AIR DEFENSE MISSIONS REVIEWED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 22 Dec 79 p 39

[Text] At the occasion of the Air Force Twelfth Fighter Division's taking delivery of the first Matra Super 530 air to air missiles designed for the Mirage F-1C (Dassault-Breguet), which has an Atar 9K50 turboreactor (SNECMA), the Air Defense Commandant disclosed that CAFDA [Air Command Air Defense Forces] Mirage F-1's had flown more than 100,000 hours. The total divided among the three F-1 fighter divisions is: Thirtieth Division (Reims), 45,000 h since 1973; Fifth Division, (Orange), 30,000 h since 1974; Twelfth Division (Cambrai), 22,000 h since 1976.

The communique published at this time takes into account the Marage F-1's intrinsic qualities and announces the creation of new units and the use of various new formulas. We quote some passages here.

"Well adapted to air defense missions, the Mirage F-1 in association with Matra 530, Magic, and now Super 530 air to air missiles has undeniable qualities as an inteceptor."

"A result of information gathered from the more than 1,200 Mirage III's in service, the Mirage F-1 is also the result of technical advancement. Its operation and maintenance, as well as that of its operational equipment, are done very largely by means of automatic tests."

"Its reserves, as observed in use, are among the best ever recorded on a fighter plane. The prograded maintenance evolved very quickly, and is now among the most economical. The Mirage F-1 benefits in this area from proven analysis methods used for civil transport plane maintenance. The number of modifications since the Mirage F-1 was put into service is small, compared to other similar fighter planes."

"However, the plane is not rooted to its original design. Some very important modifications to increase the operational capability of the weapons system have been approved. These are some of the most remarkable of them: automatic tips and hyperstabilizing flaps which improve combat and low velocity maneuverability; the in flight refueling boom, which greatly increases the

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flexibility of use; renovation of the navigation and weapons systems, which increases the performance of the interception function in particular, and allows it to take advantage of the qualities of the new Matra Super 530 missile."

"Finally, CAFDA's in service fleet will improve still further with the arrival of the Mirage F-1 two seater at the end of 1980. Possessing all the operational equipment of the one seater, it will improve pilot training at all qualification stages."

"There is no doubt that the Mirage F-1 will satisfactorily contribute to Air Force fighter plane needs for some years to come."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

UPDATE PRESENTED ON ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES DEVELOPMENT

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 29 Dec 79 pp 49-50

[Article by Gerard Collin: "Electronic Countermeasures Being Rapidly Developed"]

[Text] The term electronic countermeasures (ECM) is used to designate all electronic devices that permit the jamming or deception of enemy detection, localization or communication systems. For an engineer trained to design systems offering the best signal-noise ratio, the ECM's are on the contrary the employment of noise signals "crushing" the useful signal or duping the receiver.

But the ECM's in turn evoke the use of "counter ECM's" and then "counter-counter ECM's," thereby forming a spiral of mathematics and technology.

Ruses have always been part of the arsenal of means for defense or attack. It is generally agreed that the practice of resorting to electronics may be said to date back to World War II, with the employment of radio jamming. But even more than that, it was the Vietnam and Yom Kippur wars around 1972-73 that definitively proved the usefulness of ECM's.

In Vietnam, the Americans at first had severe aircraft losses due to the Soviet SA-2 missiles. They then launched a crash program to produce ECM equipment, especially for the B-52's and Phantoms. The losses were then appreciably cut down, with local radars being paralyzed.

At the start of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Israeli Air Force, still wearing a halo due to its lightning successes in the Six-Day War, suffered important reverses, this time due to the Soviet SA-6 missiles. Those losses practically paralyzed the air force, and the war then proceeded essentially on the ground. It seemed evident then that countermeasures would have to be deployed against the ground-based radars.

Thus, within a few years the ECM's had proven themselves in very different but nonetheless indisputable ways.

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There is no longer any modern air force today that does not have countermeasures. In this regard, every modern combat plane is equipped with ECM's the complexity of which is steadily growing. Even pilots, formerly unwilling, now prefer to sacrifice a drum of kerosene for an electronic warfare pod.

In France in the Fifties

One prerequisite for designing ECM equipment is a knowledge of the technical characteristics of the (potentially) enemy equipment. That knowledge may be acquired in very diverse ways. One of these, used in France since the end of the Sixties, involves analysis of the radars and radio sets, using ground-based or airborne listening devices designed for that purpose. The analysis permits the determination as to which self-protection equipment is to be used on each aircraft.

Offensive or Defensive ECM's

Two types of countermeasures are generally defined, termed offensive or defensive.

Offensive jamming emits very powerful signals in advance over a wide range of frequencies. These signals are intended to saturate the local radar receivers, "crushing" the useful echoes. This method makes no distinction between radars actually being used on the ground. It is therefore overpowering, intended above all to jam the search and long-range-detection radars. That is the method used, for example, when a raiding force reaches a theatre of operations. Each plane then attempts to protect itself, depending on the threat that it actually is facing. That is when it resorts to defensive jammings, by means of "self-protection jammers." The methods and devices employed at that time are exceedingly complex.

Thus, the aim of the system is to detect a radar that has locked onto the plane, and in short to decide which means are appropriate to deal with the related threat (cannon, missiles, evasion, etc).

In simple terms, such a jammer consists of receiving antennas, a receiver, a signal analyzer, a transmitter, and transmitting antennas. The planes are generally equipped with two low-gain receiving horn antennas; the opening of the pattern is about 120°. One of the antennas is oriented forward and the other toward the rear. That arrangement leaves the plane's sides exposed, but it is generally accepted that these sectors are less vulnerable. That being the case, the plane can be given an omnidirectional covering (by four antennas, for example), with that configuration permitting the radar source to be localized through the composition of the patterns.

The transmission antennas may be separate from or associated with the receiving antennas. In the latter case, a circulator ensures the proper orientation of the signals.



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Like the antennas, the receiver covers a wide range of radar frequencies. In certain propagation "windows," moreover, the range has been noted to extend toward about 100 Gigahertz.

The signal analysis system is a digital computer that measures the frequency, the pulse reception rate and the level received, and determines whether the signal involves a tracking radar locked onto the plane, a situation that is immediately more dangerous. This system compares these parameters to stored reference data acquired by the above cited means. If the threat is not formally identified, the system will activate a countermeasure of general range.

The UHF transmitter is connect to an amplifier, generally one with a travelling-wave tube.

The Cat and the Mouse

Depending on the parameters recorded, the system will then decide on an appropriate action: electronic countermeasure, decoys, attack or evasive maneuver.

In the case of a countermeasure, the system will emit a signal to jam the radar, and thereby uncouple the slaving of the radar's antenna. Actually, a deception in terms of the distance involved in less effective because the cannon or missiles are initially guided angularly. Offhand, one may think that the jammer is winning out every time. In fact, the radar signal is attenuated by  $d^4$  (the forward-and-return distance, to the fourth power) whereas the jammer undergoes attenuation by only  $d^2$  (just the return distance). Thus, the few hundred watts emitted by the plane would win out over the kilowatts emitted by the radar. But this is not enough to make the antenna slaving uncouple. The pattern of that antenna is directional, and the plane is still responding during the passage of that pattern. To be convinced of this, one merely has to imagine that the ground station can still operate in azimuth, by direction-finding.

A technique then used is that of "deception." The jammer re-emits each of the pulses received, doing so at a much higher level, which up to then has been very favorable to the ground receiving station, and thus to the enemy. But the jammer then gradually shifts those responses. The radar remains locked onto the decoy pulses. All that is then necessary is to cease those responses, and the radar finds itself lost. It must search anew, and the hide-and-seek game begins all over again.

The same technique can be used with Doppler radars, by transposing the time axis to the frequency axis, to within one variant: the frequency received in the two directions can then be shifted, whereas the pulses can only be slowed down.

With modern "pulse Doppler" radars (mixed time, plus frequency), it will be deduced that the two methods can be envisaged.

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It goes without saying that the scenario just described is rather simplistic. The range of devices available can be considerably increased, both on the ground and on board the plane, by the diversity of frequency, space considerations, etc.

It should be noted that planes are still equipped as well with electromagnetic decoys which, when scattered in the atmosphere, create a multitude of parasitic echoes. These echoes engulf the useful ones. The decoys are plated nylon strips, ideally of a length equal to half the wavelength of the radar to be neutralized. These strips act like  $\lambda/2$  dipoles. However, their effectiveness tends to diminish, because there too the countermeasure has already been found by extracting the Doppler speeds. The latter readily permit the plane's echoes to be distinguished from those of the strips, which are moving at slow speeds (a few meters per second).

Thomson-CSF and EMD

In France, it is the Technical Service for Air Telecommunications (STTA) that is responsible for the design, development and follow-on production of the airborne ECM equipment. The two main firms involved are Thomson-CSF and Electronique Marcel Dassault (EMD). The cost of the ECM equipment can be several percent of the cost of the plane carrying it, which is a considerable amount, but let us repeat that the electronic countermeasures are scarcely opposed any more, inasmuch as they constitute a considerable factor in increasing the probability of success of missions, if not a prerequisite for that success. Moreover, the studies on both sides of the Atlantic are increasing in number: the Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) program begun in the United States entails billions of dollars.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FUTURE ANTITANK MISSILES STUDIED BY EUROMISSILE GROUP

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Jan 80 p 37

[Text] The French firm Aerospatiale, the British Aerospace Dynamic Group and the German firm Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm have set up, on an equal partnership basis, a new GIE under French law, called the Euromissile Dynamics Group (EMDG). Its first objective will be the design, development, production and marketing of third-generation medium- and long-range anti-tank missiles. The EMDG's statutes were signed on 20 December 1979 by Michel Allier, director of Aerospatiale's Tactical Missile Division, G.-R. Jefferson, president of the British Aerospace Dynamics Group, and Gunther Kuhlo, director of the Missiles Division of MBB. They will comprise the council to supervise the new GIE, whose administrator will be Mr Striegel of the MBB. In time, the EMDG will absorb the French GIE called the Anti-Surface Euromissile group (ASEM), which was previously established by the same three firms to German GIE called Euromissile, responsible for the Milan, Hot and Roland missiles, will remain a separate entity.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

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Paris LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE in French Dec 79 p 42

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

NEW BOOK ON DISSIDENT INTELLECTUAL LOUIS ALTHUSSER

Paris LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE in French Nov 79 pp 7, 8

[Review by Monique Florenzano of the book "La Pensee de Louis Althusser" (The Thought of Louis Althusser), by Jean-Pierre Cotten, Privat, 1979]

[Text] "What were, what are, the place, the role and the historic 'function' of Louis Althusser, French Communist theoretician, within the framework of the activity and of the ideological and political responsibilities of the PCF in the France of the 1960's?" More generally, what is the status of theory, what is its specific contribution, what are the specific problems that its development poses, how is its relation to effective practice to be conceived, what is the party's authority in theoretical debates, and what are the rights of scientific analysis in the militant practice of Marxism? These are the questions posed in Jean-Pierre Cotten's book devoted to the thought of Louis Althusser. "1960-1967" should be added as a subtitle, for in this book, obviously written around March 1978--just before then, Jean-Pierre Cotten tells us--on problems raised in the period that preceded 1968 but which "are still before us," Jean-Pierre Cotten limits his study to the period from the advent of Gaullism to the explosion of May 1968--more precisely, from the publication, by LA PENSEE in March-April 1961, of the article "On the Young Marx" to the first "rectifications" at the beginning of 1968 in the Foreword to the second edition of "Lire le Capital" [Reading "Das Kapital"].

In the first part, Jean-Pierre Cotten defines to some extent the context of Althusser's thought--that is, both the history that he lived through and the political, ideological and theoretical situation in which he did his work. A little in the way that Althusser said it would be necessary, for the young Marx, to be able to account, chronologically and dialectically, for the union, in a single individuality, of a man's own psychology and the history of the world, Jean-Pierre Cotten, always concerned to have a theoretical foundation for his quest for a benchmark, tries, by successive approaches--and by putting them in relation to one another--to his intellectual training and his political experience, to locate the place from which Althusser speaks and the significance of his undertaking. Thus, the years of apprenticeship are evoked, marked by the war and deportation and ending in 1948 with the winning of his teaching degree in philosophy and his joining the French Communist

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Party. Then the years of militancy, of university work as such also, despite what Althusser said about the difficulty that Communist intellectuals experienced at that time in getting their right and their duty recognized "to know and simply to study to produce." For these years dominated by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Jean-Pierre Cotten strives to show a certain complexity in Althusser's attitude toward Stalin's theoretical and practical work, at the same time that the necessity of scientific method is declared and the question is stated on the basis of which Jean-Pierre Cotten proposes to "comprehend" the problematics of Althusser: can one, being clearly aware of the historical and political stakes, advance the theoretical analysis of real history?

In taking an overview of the events that serve for reference in the lacunary history "of what a Communist intellectual at least publishes, if not understands," in the spotting of the elements (schism in the international Communist movement, evolution of the USSR after the 20th Congress, end of the war in Algeria and the installation of Gaullism in France) which define the national and international political context of the 1960's, the risk is great--and Jean-Pierre Cotten is aware of it--of adopting agreed-on analyses without criticizing them. One might think, for example, that the French situation in 1965, when "history seems to have come to a stop in France," to the point that one can then "chew Marxism over again in interminable 'lectures'," is described a bit too much from the point of view--which was Cotten's at the time--of the student movement after the end of the war in Algeria. A criticism of the book on these grounds would require research beyond the scope of a lecture note. Let us say that its most indisputable contribution is to lay the bases for a debate and the principles for further research.

The second part is a systematic statement of the problematics at work in "Pour Marx" [For Marx] and "Lire le Capital," the word "problematics" being understood in the sense given it by Althusser of a bundle of questions whose unity is not related to the subject that raises them and whose internal articulation makes possible a differentiated multiplicity of the expressions of a theory.

In this statement, Jean-Pierre Cotten distinguishes by the term "method" a set of theses of which certain ones obviously have methodological consequences, articulated around notions of "theoretical practice," of "problematics," and of the problem of the way in which the "history" of "theoretical practice" is to be thought of--theses for a moment detached from the grounds on which their intervention occurs: confrontation between Marx and Hegel, on the one hand; confrontation between the youthful works of Marx and "Das Kapital," on the other hand; and positive determination of the object of "Das Kapital."

Jean-Pierre Cotten's constant thesis is that at that time, Althusser's thought unbalances the logic of the appearance of Marxism, underestimates the effects in Marxist theory of French socialism conceived as a "source and constituent part" of Marxism, and has no theory of the link between revolution

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in theory and class position. All this would obviously require far more than allusions. Furthermore, the most obvious question raised by this second part is that of the legitimacy of the closing of the study with the three volumes published in 1965, about which Jean-Pierre Cotten is correct in saying that they constitute the true starting-point of Althusser's work, but the theses of which have constantly been taken up again since then, reworked, corrected. Which in a way brings one back to the legitimacy of the distinction between method and applications.

The third part, entitled "Louis Althusser in His Time (1960-1967)," is the most interesting, although it is affected by a double limitation: a temporal limitation first of all, since here again, the discussion is considered as not going beyond the year 1967; and a limitation in purpose and ambition also, since Althusser's audience and influence are envisioned only from the angle of the reactions to his works and the debates which they aroused in the milieu of Communist intellectuals and intellectuals close to the party first of all, and then within the party as a whole. Nothing is said about the Althusser school, the team of students and colleagues organized around "Lire le Capital," about the evolutions of its members and the place taken by its various ramifications in French intellectual life today. Nor does Jean-Pierre Cotten try to specify what the works of Althusser have changed or what shifts they have brought about in the ideological and theoretical situation. He limits his investigations to analysis of materials composed essentially of the proceedings of the Central Committee of Argenteuil and of two debates--one on the concept of dialectics, carried on in LA PENSEE in 1963, and the other on humanism, conducted in LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE from March 1963 to February 1966. With its study, in chronological order, of the content of the two debates, Cotten's book teems with valuable information about what the reference points of the Communist philosophers were in the 1960's, what they debated, what they invested in their discussions, beyond the problems posed and the concepts set forth, and what the real and declared stakes of them were. He shows how the questions raised by Althusser fit into the preoccupations of a milieu and of an era, but also, inversely, how they circumscribed these preoccupations, fashioned their formulation, to the point that one is sometimes struck by the way in which certain statements, in the discussions reported by Cotten, fit into Althusser's problematic, even when they show only a very limited agreement with it. But doesn't this amount to having influence? Not rallying the others to one's positions, but rather, by shifting the problems, changing both those who are for and those who are against.

With the Argenteuil Central Committee meeting, through the statements criticizing one theoretical position or another of Althusser's and in what is said about the legitimacy of his undertaking, there is another question raised: that of the responsibility of the intellectuals in development of the theory that underlies the practice of a Communist party, or correlatively, the question of the rights of scientific analysis in militant practice. In analyzing the elements of response found in the Central Committee's debates and noting their insufficiencies--it also would doubtlessly have been interesting to analyze the party's later debates and statements of position on these ques-

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tions--Jean-Pierre Cotten is led to his starting hypothesis: "The question of a theoretician's contribution is (perhaps) identical with the working-out of adequate concepts for thinking out the effective practice of a Communist party"--a hypothesis which supplies the problematic for all his research. In order to think out this practice--more precisely, to account for the moments when things change in the theoretical whole, which ideally is coherent but whose unity always remains problematical and which subtends and justifies (or should justify) the party's line--Jean-Pierre Cotten proposes several formulations, all of which turn on the idea that theoretical practice is only one aspect of a process, "the 'process' during which the new is worked out, with all the changes among political leadership, mass movement, experience mastered and theorized at various levels, 'independent' theoretical elaboration more or less linked to social practice." In this process, which according to him cannot be harnessed, what are the rights and the duties of research, what does research affect that is close to or very far from what political practice deals with? But also, how can the party stimulate it, encourage the diffusion of its results and remain capable of analyzing all its implications, of criticizing and dissecting them but also of integrating them, of transforming them, of using them?

It is because he gets us to ask these questions--which are of such very current interest--that Jean-Pierre Cotten's book, beyond the information which he furnishes on an era and a historical situation, affects us and is important to us.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

MARCHAIS WORRIES--Georges Marchais has gotten together with the most important federal secretaries of the PCF to tell them to expect difficulties during the elections, and a solitude [i.e., isolation] "perhaps much more pronounced than ever before." [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 1 Feb 80 p 70]

NEW SDECE EMPLOYEES--The SDECE has just hired as fulltime employees a number of economists and specialists in petroleum problems. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 1 Feb 80 p 70]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PROFILES OF EMERGING POLITICAL, GOVERNMENT VIPS

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 17 Dec 79 pp 73-84

[Article by Gianni Farneti: "Oh, the Emerging Ones!"]

[Text] They understood that the people want new, clean faces, real competence, specific initiatives. They prepared themselves. Now they are laying their hands on the power levers. What are the new ones like? But, above all, who are they?

The second generation has already emerged, and is well known. Overcoming, or completely brushing aside, the resistance of a political class that was entrenched for decades in its positions of power, new men seized the opportunity to handle the need for change that was expressed by the country and, above all at the end of the 70's, they made themselves available for the main administrative posts in the government and in all the parties. More or less young, they thoroughly exploited, along with patiently woven alliances, their fresher appearance and their competence in specific fields. Thus important men like Francesco Cossiga, Guido Bodrato, Giovanni Galloni, Franco Mazzola, and experts such as Nino Andreatta and Filippo Maria Pandolfi in the DC [Christian Democratic Party], men in their 40's like Fabrizio Cichitto in the PSI [Italian Socialist Party], Pietro Longo in the PSDI [Independent Social Democratic Party], Valerio Zanone and Renato Altissimo among the liberals, have won party secretaryships, ministries, undersecretaryships, or party key positions. They are the men who have been most prominent in politics in 1979 and who certainly will be spoken of even more in 1980.

But the thrust to generation replacement has not been exhausted with these personages. In the shadow of the new influential men, still younger men have understood the growing need for clean faces, specific struggles, competence. They prepared themselves, and now are looking upward. This is the third generation, climbing toward their share of influence and power, still almost completely unknown to the general public. PANORAMA anticipates their names, their ambitions, the struggles by means of which they will try to win a place on the political scene of the 80's.

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Franco Bassani. He is from Milan; is 39 years old; and is in charge of the PSI legislative office. He is one of the rising stars of Bettino Craxi's party. Even though his election as deputy was very recent (it was one of the June 1979 surprises), there already is talk of his being one of the probable candidates for an appointment as minister in the event of a return of the socialists to the government. A practicing Catholic and one of the founders, together with Piero Pratesi and Ruggero Orfei, of the periodical of the Catholic left, RELAZIONI SOCIALI [SOCIAL RELATIONS] (later changed to SETTE GIORNI) [SEVEN DAYS], he belongs to the generation of Catholic militants, like Luigi Covatta, Luciano Benadusi, Gennaro Acquaviva, who joined the PSI after tough conflicts with the clerical hierarchy. He was president of the Milan Catholic University undergraduates; and was dismissed by the then Cardinal Giovan Battista Montini. His present success is explained by the competence he acquired in the field of public administration and in the administration of local agencies.

Antonio Bassolino. At 32 years of age and as regional secretary of the PCI [Italian Communist Party] in Campania, he is the youngest member of the communist leadership. And he is above all the spearhead of the new generation of the pro-Berlinguer leaders. A student of medicine, he was not yet 20 when he was elected PCI section secretary of Afragola (large center near Naples). Since then, his one main interest has been politics. In 1968 he was one of the protagonists in the struggle for revival within the Neapolitan communist federation, against the old leadership group that was bound to Giorgio Amendola. In 1970, contrary to all expectation, he was elected as regional counselor. He resigned, and became secretary of the Avellino federation. This was the springboard. He joined the Central Committee and became regional secretary. At the last congress, he became a member of the leadership. Persevering, fearless, imaginative, he has an awesome task for 1980: to guide the PCI through the test of regional elections in the region and in the most difficult cities.

Enzo Bianco. In 1974, at 24 years of age, he almost obliged the deliberate Giovanni Spadolini to put the big, black bordered, red scarf, emblem of the historic republicans, around his neck. Two years later, at 26, during the height of the electoral campaign, he accompanied Ugo La Malfa when he canvassed all of Sicily: "a fundamental experience." Bianco, a native of Catania, an assistant professor, a former secretary of the FGR [Republican Youth Federation], is now 29 years old. He works in the research office of the ICIPU [Credit Institute for Public Utility Concerns] and is officially recognized as the most important representative of the third generation of the PRI [Italian Republican Party], that of the "almost 30-year olds." This year, as chief of the office in charge of emigration, he travelled a great deal. And the result is seven republican sections opened up outside of Italy. At the next congress, expected to take place in the autumn of 1980, in all probability he will become a member of the leadership and will be given an assignment of authority.

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Rocco Buttiglione. He is a native of Turin and is about 30 years old. He teaches philosophy at the University of Rome after having been the favorite pupil of the Catholic scholar, Augusto Del Noce. But above all today he is the "thinking brain" of Christian communion and liberation, the man who succeeds in translating into policy the "clerical" themes that germinate in the most earnest sectors of the Catholic world. His speeches at meetings and his articles do not go unnoticed in Piazza del Gesu. But he prefers to stand aside and continues to consider himself more as an ideologist than a future leader. However, he has solid ties with the forzanovista [member of leftwing faction of DC] Vittorino Colombo and with Amintore Fanfani, who often asked him to contribute to his periodical. Now he is trying to establish close relations between the CL [expansion unknown] and the ACLI [Christian Associations of Italian Workers]. He is tall and big; smokes a pipe; and is very cordial in the company of friends. Even during meetings he does not lose an opportunity to play a game of scopone [card game].

Francesco Demitry. He knows what occurs in the Vatican and in the Italian Catholic world. As head of a new "information office," he will have a delicate responsibility at the Botteghe Oscure: to inform the PCI of Church news and the Church of PCI news. He is a former Jesuit; is married; and has three children. He has accumulated unique experience in the field of Catholic information: 5 years with the Vatican Radio, 8 years with TV as head of religious matters; then involvement with dissenting groups. He has been enrolled in the PCI since 1973. And he is also a member of the "Italian Theological Association for the Study of Ethics," the official theologians' organization.

Sandro Di Pietro. "We rightists are against nuclear stations..." Three years ago, in the spring, on the Montalto plain, thousands of autonomists were astonished. Not only was there a neofascist in their demonstration, but he spoke with a microphone. Perhaps because of the astonishment, no incidents occurred. Since then, 34-year old Sandro Di Pietro, a firm, sturdy man, a researcher for the CNR [National Research Council] and the right arm of Pino Rauti, has been fighting his battle against the atom, and has begun to make his way in the MIS [Italian Social Movement]. Many of the top level people, from the president, Pino Romualdi, to the head of the Youth Front, Franco Fini, are pro-nuclear. But a few days ago an internal referendum carried out by the official newspaper of the Youth Front sided with Di Pietro: 63 percent of the neofascist young people are against the stations. They will be given consideration in January at a rightist conference on energy, organized by Di Pietro.

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Francesco D'Onofrio. If on 3 June he had been 40 years old, Benigno Zaccagnini certainly would have reserved a definite constituency for him in the senate. He lacked a few months, but already there are those who visualize him as a possible "expert," to receive an assignment soon in the government. He is the official constitutionalist of the Christian shield, with a great deal of specialization at Harvard, a professorship at Naples, contacts abroad, and even relations with the very influential Opus Dei. He is a highly trained scholar, but he also is very familiar with power and knows how to protect it in politics. He is quiet and an extrovert. He coordinated the work for the drafting of the new Christian Democratic constitution.

Mauro Dutto. He is a political journalist of the Tg2 [expansion unknown]; is 38 years old; and a new PRI deputy. He probably owes his success also to the public image of "the good guy," idolized by television. In first place among the nonelected in Rome, he replaced Emanuele Terrana, who died the day after the election. In 3 years, as secretary of the PRI in Rome, he transformed the party organization and succeeded in rejuvenating the political activity of the PRI in the city. He is well liked both by the rank and file (in particular, women) and the new leaders on Via dei Capprettari, who have appointed him to the School Board in the Chamber of Deputies, one of the traditional PRI spearheads.

Publio Fiori. In Rome he is "second after Giulio." He was a candidate for the first time in the political elections and won 102,000 votes for the DC. Until 2 years ago, his hobby was running. Then the BR [Red Brigades] shot 11 bullets into his body and he had to replace running competitions with long walks through the historical center of the capital. He no longer carries a weapon ("after all, it's of no use"). He is a former state counselor, has had a great deal of experience in the municipal council and in the province, and was the first to realize the propaganda potential of private television. His image of efficiency, elegance, and gentlemanly bearing have helped him. At the national level, he is a follower of Emilio Colombo. In the city he operates on autonomous positions, but above all he is the standard bearer for revival of the party in implacable polemics with the so-called "Ave Maria group," that unites Giulio Andreotti, Amerigo Petrucci, and Clelio Darida in the defense of decennial balances of power. Having now become an influential person, he is convinced of being able to succeed in breaking down any isolation.

Giuseppe La Ganga is Giusy to his companions. He accomplished his big leap on 3 June, when with 25,000 votes in his favor he caught the party by surprise. The party did not think that it would have in him, at only 31 years of age, the socialist candidate with the most votes in Turin. Decisive help came to him from Norberto Bobbio who, with Antonio Giolitti, Giorgio Bocca, and Francesco Forte, signed 100,000 letters of recommendation, that were sent to the big constituency of Piedmont. But La Ganga

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had already tried to help himself. For 10 years (first as secretary of the FGSI [Italian Socialist Youth Federation], then of the Turati Club, then of the Turin Socialist Federation), he spent 16 hours a day in PSI headquarters. For months and months he listed the merits, shortcomings, weaknesses, and strengths of comrades and adversaries in a notebook. For 3 months he underwent autogenous training (guided by his wife, a psychologist) to overcome the stress of the electoral campaign. Today he is one of Craxi's pupils. As his deputy in Piedmont, he eats and sleeps at the Raphael, the Roman hotel where the staunch followers of the PSI secretary stay. He is already a member of the parliamentary leadership group, has been welcomed to work in Claudio Martelli's office on Via Tomacelli, and at the next shuffle will advance from the central committee to the PSI party leadership. In the meantime he cultivates personal relations with Minister Reviglio, whom he assists at the University of Turin, with Sergio Pininfarina, president of the Industrial Union, with Jiri Pelikan, who guided him through the Piedmont meetings. When he has a little free time, he adds to his collection of more than 400 bottles of high quality wines, a collection that not only fills his wine cellar, but also invades his apartment.

Luigi Manconi. He is the rising star in the extraparliamentary area; "the leader of the right wing," say his enemies. A 32-year old Sardinian, he was founder of LOTTA CONTINUA [CONTINUOUS STRUGGLE] (he was also head of order services); had brief experience at the Savelli publishing house; is the director of OMBRE ROSSE [RED SHADOWS], a periodical that has been able to unite what remained of 1968 with the new political-cultural magma of the middle 70's (music, feminism, ideological crises). But above all he is thought of as the inspirer of the new course for LOTTA CONTINUA, with his criticism of terrorism and his clear difference of opinion with the autonomists; the most recent polemic: with Franco Piperno, himself, on Red Brigades and terrorism.

Clemente Mastella. In the 3 June elections he obtained 100,000 votes. His most recent political remark dumbfounded the old DC [Christian Democratic Party] leaders: "Government with the communists may be possible even in 1980." Leader of Catholic Action, then journalist in the RAI [Italian Radio Broadcasting Company] of Naples, he was discovered by the leader of the rank and file current, Ciriaco De Mita. Since then he has become the young spearhead of the christian democratic left. At 32 years of age, he is already considered a certain undersecretary. "Perhaps in the first government with the communists," say his enemies with malice.

Gianluigi Melega. In only 2 hours, on Tuesday, 10 November, he received more insults and threats than any other deputy in the Eighth Legislature. But he doesn't let go. On the contrary, he has decided to bring his detailed, formal charge of association with a "criminal gang" against the DC from parliament to all the main cities in Italy, inviting radical

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militants to find at local levels other proof of the misdeeds of the Christian shield, to be collected in a book to be sold at newsstands, but also to be distributed to the magistracy. He is 44 years old, was a journalist first with PANORAMA and now with L'ESPRESSO. He was elected deputy by a narrow margin by the Radical Party (but he is not an enrolled member: he considers himself a representative of the thousands of radical voters who do not have a membership card) as a consequence of the articles that contributed decisively to the downfall of Giovanni Leone, president of the Republic.

Giovanni Moro. At a little over 20 years of age, he is one of the best known Catholics in Italy. He has benefitted from the reflected fame of his father, Aldo, and from his assassination, but also from a political militancy that started when he was still in shorts, first in the leftist Catholic movement in February 1974, then in an analogous "Federative Movement," and now as head of the Moro Foundation, that was formed to perpetuate the thinking of the deceased statesman, but which during the past several weeks has been at the center of complex Christian Democratic political maneuvers. On bad terms with the rest of his family because of his stands against some Christian Democrats, former colleagues of his father, courted by both communists and socialists as a possible electoral candidate because of his name and his substantially leftist positions, Giovanni Moro has not yet chosen a party in which to militate. But it is probable that he will do so in 1980.

Fabio Mussi. He is not a bureaucrat; he did not go through the usual steps taken by leaders. But he was the one, as deputy chief of press and propaganda, who was entrusted with the assignment of presenting the countenance of the PCI in 1980. He is 31 years old, from Piombino. He received a degree from the Normal College of Pisa after writing his thesis on the "Frankfurt School." He was already enrolled in the PCI (since 1965) when he became one of the leaders of the student movement. In order to make it possible for him to become a member of the central committee in 1969, they had to change a constitutional rule; they lowered the necessary amount of seniority for membership. But in 1969 he voted against the expulsion of the Manifesto group. This was an action that he then had to pay for with exclusion from the CC [central committee]. He was rescued by Giorgio Napolitano and came to Rome to devote himself to school. Then since 1975 came his most interesting experience, as deputy director of RINASCITA. At the most recent congress, the PCI leaders clashed again over whether to allow him to return to the central committee. In the end he succeeded. Six months later, he had the assignment of thoroughly reorganizing PCI propaganda.

Antonio Patuelli. He is the liberal who more than any other embodies the "new course" that was energetically undertaken by Valerio Zanone in the

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PLI [Italian Liberal Party]. Twenty-nine year old Patuelli, a native of Ravenna, Romagna, "a rigorous Zanone follower" according to his own definition, has experienced all kinds of leftist conflicts within the PLI: terrible rows with the followers of Edoardo Sogno; fierce polemics with the staunch followers of Giovanni Malagodi; defense with all his might of the referendums; anti-conciliatory initiatives; policy of support of PLI participation in the majority of abstentions with the communists. In addition there is his own personal involvement in the recovery of the cultural roots of liberalism: meetings on Piero Gobetti, Giovanni Amendola, Benedetto Croce, Giovanni Giolitti. Indefatigable more than dependable, by now a very great party expert, in January 1979 Patuelli seemed to Zanone to be a good possibility for deputy secretary. Immediate appointment. In 1980 he will have to study and in practice reconstitute from the bottom up the new organizational structure of the PLI.

Giuseppe Rippa. In the hotel, he had begun to fall asleep at 0800 hours on 5 November after a sleepless night spent in the infernal pit of the Palasport of Genoa, to vote on the radical congress's motions and counter-motions. He was tired but satisfied that he had been elected secretary of the Radical Party. At 0950 hours the telephone rang: "It was Marco Pannella. He wanted to congratulate me." Giuseppe Rippa, known as Geppi, a 30-year old Neapolitan with a degree in law, an absolute objector, has been held provisionally at police headquarters a couple of times and was clubbed by the PS some 10 times in recent years. He is the first secretary of the PR [Radical Party] to be elected against the wishes of Pannella. Even his adversaries acknowledge his gifts of astuteness, human warmth, diplomacy--gifts that help to win over a congress. In Genoa he advanced very well: he neutralized the Pannella tor-  
 -p- does without breaking irremediably with anyone. He is lanky (very thin and 1.84 meters tall), has the look of an Edwardian actor, and a completely Neapolitan sense of humor. In his youth Rippa was also a good volleyball player. Difficult assignments await him.

Alessandro Roncaglia. He is a PSI rising economist and politician. He is married and has a 9-year old daughter. Classical music is his hobby. He was a favorite pupil of Paolo Sylos Labini, the founder of socialist economists, and is now his close friend. After receiving a degree in economics in Rome, he specialized in Cambridge, England. He studied under the guidance of Piero Sraffa, the most authoritative economist of the Marxist school who has taught in the universities of Western countries. One of his books, "Sraffa e la teoria dei prezzi" ["Sraffa and the Price Theory"], was translated into English and Japanese; a Spanish translation is about to come out. A follower of Riccardo Lombardi since joining the PSI, he is an editor of MONDOPERAIO [WORKER'S WORLD], the PSI ideological periodical, and, together with economists Antonio Pedone and Sylos Labini, is the chief animator of the CEPEC, PSI Economic Policy Research Center.

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Valdo Spini. He is the leading representative, along with 30-year old Mario Raffaelli, of the last generation of the socialist left. He is 33 years old, is the son of historian Giorgio Spini, was the PSI group leader in the municipal council of Florence. His rise began with a hard political struggle against Luigi Mariotti's socialist right. Elected deputy on 3 June, he has a difficult goal: that of becoming the "anti-Martelli" of the PSI left.

Mario Segni is Mariotto to his friends. A native of Sassari, class of 1939, he received a solid education from the Jesuits. A purebred Christian Democrat (son of Antonio, former president of the Republic), he is the founder and leader of the CENTO [100] group, the new technocratic right of the Christian shield. Americans like him; also the dynamic Lombard businessmen like Silvio Berlusconi who wished him a bright future: "On the Christian Democratic team he is like Paolo Rossi; a center forward who makes the goal." His excellent legal preparation (he is a lawyer and university professor) made it possible to administer with fairly good success the justice sector of the DC for a couple of years. Having been born and having lived in the heart of the Palace has almost completely kept him from inferiority complexes with respect to both the historical leaders and the present leaders. Very uncompromising, he has also been able to say no to whoever tried to entice him with promises of governmental assignments. His Sardinian voters rewarded him with almost 70,000 votes. And now he is preparing for the DC congress, determined to win a place that will make it possible for him to deal as an equal with all of the leaders.

Carlo Vizzini. He is 32 years old, is from Palermo, and is the social democratic deputy at state meetings. He entered Montecitorio when very young, in 1976, precisely when his party, upset by the Lockheed cyclone, reached its lowest electoral levels. In Rome, as a deputy, he kept himself carefully away from the intrigues and sanguinary plots that were prevalent in the PSDI in the post-Tanassi years. He has preferred to work quietly in committees, earned the esteem of other parties, and waited for the waters to subside. One eye on Sicily, another on the party's economic committee, once the storm had subsided, he entered the heart of the new secretary, Pietro Longo.

Luciano Violante. He is from Turin (even though he was born in Dire Dava, Ethiopia, in 1941). He is a magistrate; for 3 years was a collaborator of Francesco Paolo Bonifacio in the Ministry of Justice; was elected deputy on 3 June. He will be the "public scandals man" for the PCI. The Catanzaro trial, the Moro investigation, the Sindona scandal: the big cases that will go to parliament will all go through his hands. He has just been entrusted also with responsibility for the PCI justice sector. Almost a minister. He has only one regret: he will have little time to devote to his favorite hobby, mountain climbing.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

TRADITIONALISTS, PROGRESSIVES VIE FOR CONTROL OF PNV

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Dec 79 pp 33, 35, 37

[Article: "Struggle for the Triple B"]

[Text] An extremely serious crisis has erupted inside the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and threatens it with an irreconcilable division. At the end of 43 years of exile, President Leizaola is facing is not exactly a peaceful one.

An underground war of unprecedented virulence is devastating the PNV. One week before the election of the party's regional leaders, the traditionalists or "Sabinianos" headed by Anton Ormaza, the Bermeo canner who still presides over the party organization in Vizcaya, and the "progressives" or "parliamentarians" under the leadership of Xavier Arzallus, the argumentative parliamentarian, are in the midst of a merciless battle.

Ormaza's people suspect that there may be Marxist infiltration in the ranks of the enemy. Arzallus' people accuse the Sabinianos of being infiltrated by Madrid through a splinter faction of the old ELA-STV [Solidarity of Basque Workers], a faction they consider to be "yellow" and employer-oriented.

Weapons Being Sharpened

The crisis, wrapped in fierce language including expressions like "night of the long knives," "attack on the government," "integrationism," "Rasputins" and "bureaucrats," comes at a time that was once expected would be a time of reconciliation: the return to Bilbao after 43 years of exile of President Leizaola who has now given his final blessing to the whole autonomy process.

Not even during the 1920's, when blackmail, infiltration, insults, threats and bad manners were a daily occurrence, was the PNV subjected to such furious debates. On the eve of the 22 December convention, the threat of a schism is obvious. There is already talk of a "historic meeting." Dramatic developments are taking place in the party municipal committees.

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No one can visualize any chance of a compromise. Having assumed their positions, far from striving for agreement, they are sharpening their weapons.

The PNV crisis is not a new one. Actually, it goes back to the death of the great leader, Juan de Ajuriaguerra, who in life served as a unifying force for all factions thanks to his indisputable personal prestige. Firm and authoritarian, Ajuriaguerra knew how to keep the party reins in his hands and permitted no one to deviate from Sabiniano, or orthodox, directives.

But as soon as Ajuriaguerra was buried, the grudges and antagonisms dormant in the PNV party machine emerged into full view of the public. The 1979 parliamentary elections played the role of setting off the whole noisy wrangle.

While one faction of the party considers consolidation of the old machine to be basic, strengthening the organizations of the 1930's, a new, "reform" wave, encouraged to assume the role of protagonist by the Basque parliamentarians, has not concealed its vehement desire to almost entirely transform that old machine. "There are two concepts, rather than two ideologies, as some would have us believe," says an old militant.

The Bizkaia Buru Batzar [Vizcaya Executive Committee of the PNV], (BBB), the highest organization in Vizcaya and genuine lord and master of PNV decisions while Ajuriaguerra was alive, has begun to receive implacable attacks from the "dissenters" who have been trying to put an end to the more or less "pre-dominant" provincial organization's "ankylosis" and lack of effectiveness.

"The Sabiniano-progressive dichotomy is inexact," asserts Xavier Arzallus, the head of the parliamentary or progressive group. "It is not an ideological struggle. We too consider ourselves to be the heirs and disciples of the master, Sabino Arana. It so happens that we believe the party should change its bylaws and modernize them. What we will never admit are infiltrations by groups which, defending interests alien to our cause, attempt to use old and respectable party leaders for purposes not very clear to us."

#### Power Struggle

Something more than a power struggle? Possibly. In any event, the issue of "infiltration" into the PNV had already been dragged out into the open at Durango a year ago during a marathon meeting that lasted 16 hours, all of them full of heated debate. At that time Arzallus engaged in a dramatic confrontation with the current chairman of the BBB, Anton Ormaza. Elections were being held to replace the party's regional leaders and Ormaza and his followers, called "traditionalists," won the race by cornering 11 or the 15 authenticated seats. Shortly after the "battle of Durango," however, Arzallus, momentarily defeated, launched a thundering counter-attack which enabled him to recover positions. Arzallus had pulled the

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plug on a powder keg. The supreme leader of the progressives imputed his defeat to a "conspiracy" on the part of ELA union members who had split off from the old ELA-STV and who had been dubbed "eladios" by their enemies.

Then the confrontation between the two nationalist factions got worse, just as if Arzallus had really poked his finger into the wound that was most painful for those loyal to Ormaza. A confrontation between Deputy Kepa Sodupe and Ormaza himself, due to the latter's presentation of an economic position paper cost Sodupe his candidacy in the Parliamentary elections last March.

During the debate on the Constitution there had already been hints of serious confrontations. The parliamentarians had seriously questioned the BBB's position on the constitutional referendum — not all of them favored abstention — and only the success of the campaign put an end to the tension.

#### The Sondica Embrace, Forgotten

The truce lasted for a very short time. Shortly after the "Sondica embrace" between Deputy Marcos Vizcaya and Anton Ormaza, the underground war was resumed. The negotiation of the statute of autonomy was over and the PNV regional assemblies began to demand a new election for the BBB, whose policy line had been seriously questioned at the Galdacano, Durango and Portugaleta assemblies.

It was precisely at the Portugaleta assembly that it was decided not to terminate the BBB's mandate because due to the circumstances it was advisable to reform the party statutes on which the dust of 40 years weighed heavily. By 96 to 76 votes, it was decided that PNV Vizcaya leaders would remain in office for 90 days more, a term to be viewed as provisional.

#### Arzallus Wins

Actually, 185 days went by. And finally on 17 November last the traditionalists suffered their first defeat, in Castillo-Elejabeitia (see CAMBIO 16, No 417). By 52 to 48 votes, it was decided to reform the BBB and the resignation of the Ormaza group was demanded. This was Arzallus' first great victory. The struggle between Arzallus and Ormaza has reached its highpoint of violence during these very days when Leizaola is returning from exile.

The war has been stepped up since Josu Arenaza, a BBB member, has entered the debate. Inside the party, viewed as hardline and traditional, Arenaza is the author of a "Report to the Party Rank and File" which the integrationist Bilbao daily LA GACETA DEL NORTE published last week in a six-part serial.

#### Dirty War

For 30 pages Arenaza severely attacks the party's "progressive" line, denounces Marxist "infiltration of the EIA [Party for the Basque Revolution]

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or ESEI," questions the appointments made at the last Basque General Council, alerts us to the party's economic situation, criticizes the line followed by the daily DEIA and its directors and aggressively alludes to an "employers pressure group" headed by a member of the CGV [Basque General Council] and the chairman of the Bilbao Chamber of Commerce, Anton Madariaga. Arenaza's article was a bomb. But not at all a surprise.

At the latest regional assemblies his voice has already made itself forcefully heard. "No one nor anything can keep the rank and file from being informed as to what goes on in the party and I personally will not stop presenting that information by whatever means is most opportune. I will not be responsible for the fact that this detracts from the party image, rather those who have brought about this situation," Arenaza said in his accusatory report.

CAMBIO 16 was able to confirm the fact that the report was not "leaked" to the editors of LA GACETA DEL NORTE through direct action of the party's traditional faction. The "dirty war" was in fact provoked by certain PNV members of the eladios faction who, in Madrid as well as in the Basque Country, stepped up their "dossiers," reports and interviews in support of the Sabinianos such that, if the latter were to win the big race to be held the following day, the 22 December, they could create a power role for themselves inside the party.

According to observers, the eladios are playing a fundamental role in the current PNV crisis. Without their intervention, it is possible that the conflict might not have gone beyond a mere dispute between old and young.

After the split within the ELA-STV union that took place in the 1960's, the eladios held their first congress in Lejona in 1976. The Madrid daily EL PAIS at that time wrote: "In some circles it has gotten to the point where they are talking of an employers' maneuver to divide Basque workers in terms of their demands. The fact that representatives of the four Basque chambers of commerce were invited to attend the congress is considered revealing. The means of presenting their case to the public are indicative of resources which cannot be justified for an underground organization with a small number of members."

At that time many were the voices that condemned the "usurpation" of the historic acronym, ELA-STV, the "yellow" nature of the union and the obscure way in which the organization was financed. In those days leaders of the historic ELA asserted that the industrialist, Olarra, had served as intermediary in obtaining 20 million pesetas.

A few months before the debate-filled Lejona congress the international labor organizations with a court injunction approached Juan Beitia -- then leader of the union -- enjoining him to refrain from using a union acronym recognized as belonging only to the legitimate or historic ELA.

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The new ELA's successes in the field of union activity were rare. But only 2 years ago some of its leaders joined the PNV. "The Lejona ELA has never been a union problem, rather a political problem," is the judgment of Jose Elorrieta, a member of the historic union's executive committee.

Relations between Juan Beitia, Javier Fresnedo, the two visible heads of the Lejona ELA, and Daniel Busturia, advisor to Minister Calvo Sotelo and the "eladios" man in Madrid, go back to 1962. Recently graduated from the seminary, the three of them went to Paris to study at the Catholic Center, financed by ELA-STV scholarships. With degrees in philosophy, letters and sociology, Juan Beitia returned to the Basque Country at the end of a few years. First, he was a professor at Guecho Institute and later at the University of Lejona. In 1976 he and Juan Luis Barandiaran formed a company, called Baratz, dedicated to marketing, public relations and publicity campaigns. With the French advertising company, Christine Chauvert, Baratz prepared the Popular Alliance's presentation in Paris, managed Luis Olarra's election campaign for the Senate and received 17 million from the PNV for organizing part of its campaign for the autonomy statute.

His friendship with Daniel Busturia has permitted Juan Beitia to count on a direct link with Madrid. Thus the "eladios" can spread false reports in high government circles and through some press sources. These reports are usually signed by the firm, "D.B." A recent report that has reached the Press Secretariat reads as follows: "The parvenus (parliamentarians) have no economic power in the Viscaya PNV and the big employers back the JEL [expansion unknown] (traditional) line, which is crystallized in Beitia, Irala and Ormaztegui."

Enter Pedro J.

In PNV circles, the sources used by Madrid ABC political commentator Pedro J. Ramirez for the composition of a polemical article on the PNV crisis — reproduced by the Bilbao EL CORREO ESPAÑOL — were nothing more than confidences supplied by Juan Beitia himself.

According to its detractors, Ramirez' article, which provoked a most violent response from Deputy Marcos Viscaya in DEIA — so violent that some members of the PNV who sympathize with Marcos Viscaya's views consider it to be unfortunate — merely assembles arguments favoring the "eladios."

In another recent confidential report written by Busturia, he notes that inside the PNV Beitia heads the statute, not the independence, faction and that they could negotiate with him from "realistic" positions without having to "change their colors as the parliamentarians do." The article adds that the eladios' alternative is to succeed in governing the PNV because that would be "a good alternative for Spain."

In the face of this paper war, a PNV leader who has asked CAMBIO 16 to conceal his name said: "It is incredible that these boys in Madrid are using arguments that are the opposite of what is maintained inside the party."

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On the one hand, they talk of a statute and, on the other, they support the most traditional postures of nationalism and the Sabiniano line. They have exploited poor old Anton Ormaza." Many interpret this latest power struggle as the old majority faction's last attempt to force negotiations and a compromise in the face of the possible overthrow of the faction that follows Ormaza.

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