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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

DEVELOPMENT OF UMOA EXAMINED BY JEAN-LOUIS BUCHET

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Dec 79 pp 24-25

[Article by Sophie Bessis: "Strong Currency or Development"]

[Text] A Ghanaian can do nothing with his cedis outside his country. A citizen of the Ivory Coast or a Senegalese, conversely, could make purchases without any preliminary steps in most French speaking countries in Africa. Even better, like the Voltan or the Nigerian, in principle, he could exchange his CFA francs in any bank throughout the world, even if he is forced to convert them first in French francs to be able to buy dollars, yens, marks, or Swiss francs. Many Latin Americans or Asians do not enjoy this facility. Before going abroad, they must purchase foreign currency and lose in the exchange. To them the black market is a daily reality. In order to fight any depreciation of their national currencies they buy dollars. Even though the value of the American currency may be dropping, this is their only means for losing as little as possible.

In Africa this role is played by the . . . CFA franc. Whereas the official rate of exchange of a sily is 10 CFA francs, the Ghanaian must pay 50 sily on the black market per CFA franc. Obviously, in the black continent the CFA franc enjoys the reputation of hard currency. It is internationally acknowledged and its value is reduced only at the rate of the depreciation of the . . . French franc with which it is tied in a state of fixed parity (1 CFA franc = 0.02 French francs).

What makes this franc of the "French African coasts" which, after 1960, became the franc of the "African financial community," is, first of all, the guarantee of the French treasury for the two systems rallying the African countries within the franc zone: UMOA (West African Monetary Union; Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo, and Senegal), and OMEAC (Monetary Organization of the Central African States; Cameroon, Central Africa, Congo, Chad, and Gabon). As the main element of the cooperation agreements which link these groups to France this guarantee must meet certain conditions such as, for example, that of depositing most of the currencies of the two emission institutions--the BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States) and BEAC (Banks of the Central States), in an operational account with the French treasury. Furthermore,

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representatives of the French treasury are members of the administrative councils of both banks. This has led to claims that Paris had given itself the right to supervise the monetary policies of African states, and even go beyond that. It is clear that the CFA franc means, first of all, France.

Actually, for quite some time charges of neocolonialism have been frequently made toward the franc zone. The member-countries were blamed for not being truly independent. Thus, among the French-speaking countries, Guinea has never been a member. Mali withdrew in 1962 and established the Mali franc. In 1968, however, without joining UMOA, the Bamako authorities rejoined the franc zone. As to Mauritania, it withdrew in 1973 and established its national currency, the ouguiya.

How to explain that today the opposite is taking place? More or less timidly, in 1979, Guinea, Mali and Mauritania attempted to make approaches toward UMOA. Eventually, Mali's return to the union is not unlikely. Mauritania could regain a situation similar to that of today's Mali (reintegration within the franc zone without UMOA membership). As to Sekou Toure's Guinea, which is resuming its ties with France, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal, it would eventually join, taking its time. The attraction of UMOA goes beyond the French-speaking framework: English-speaking Liberia, whose currency is tied, on a parity basis, to the American dollar, is interested on the basis of practical experience!

The origins of such requests may be traced, first of all, to a relatively strong political current which favors West African economic integration. Actually, this explains the fact that the movement is limited only to UMOA. Mali and Mauritania, for example, are members of CEAO (West African Economic Community), together with the Ivory Coast, Togo, Senegal, and Niger. A common currency makes a number of things easier should one wish to develop trade and create multinational institutions. It also offers the advantage of stability, which is becoming even more precious in the present period of economic crisis. There is also, and above all, UMOA's mutation, in which France is acting more discreetly than in the past.

Since 1973 the French vote has become less powerful within the administrative council of the BCEAO (one member out of seven, as compared with one out of three previously). It becomes decisive only in making a majority, i.e., in the rare cases of "strategic" operations. Furthermore, today the bank is free to handle 35 percent of its assets in foreign currency, reducing to 65 percent (as compared with 100 percent previously) the share which must be kept in its account with the French treasury. Today it is the conference of the member chiefs of state which acts as the supreme authority of the UMOA. It decides on all matters which the council of ministers, which must pass unanimous decisions, cannot. Finally, in accordance with the factual and successful Africanizing of the personnel, the seat of the BCEAO was moved from Paris to Dakar. It

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was opened on 29 May 1979 by the chiefs of state who met in the Senegalese capital for their annual meeting.

Thus, UMOA is still France (the guarantee of the CFA franc and its stipulations), but it is not entirely France. The transaction of deals with neighboring countries also reflect the honoring of a certain French policy for its ability to have adapted and maintained (and broadened) the French presence while keeping a lower profile. This applies to all other than critical situations. This allows France to go beyond its traditional area of influence.

Does this mean that, as the crowning of this policy within the framework of monetary relations most Western countries will progressively join the UMOA? Some caution becomes necessary here. If the UMOA may today be described as a relative success it is because it has few members. It operates like an association offering mutual benefits: influence (French) versus stability (of the CFA franc). Would this apply to 8 or 10 members? Nothing could be less certain. The union would become more difficult to manage, as it requires a convergence of budget policies and a certain financial strictness. To achieve this, eventual candidates would have to impose upon themselves a new kind of discipline.

Within the UMOA, with six members, the question has already been raised on the effects of the divergent economic evolution of the richest countries and the others. Would a broader association not lead to the risk of increased differences and to lose the advantages of today's UMOA? This would be serious, for the only thing left in such a case would be the interest of France.

Some young cadres of the BCEAO would like to strengthen the union of the six in order to be ready to break its last links with France. This had been asserted as technically possible. Stability would be lost but autonomy would make it possible to implement more ambitious and more "developing" monetary policies compared with the present. Is it worth it? Both political and fiscal authorities would rather maintain the current status. Is this obsolete caution or justified realism? The argument cannot be resolved without, at least, giving it a try.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL STATUS OF UMOA REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 pp 3317-18

/Article: "Economic and Financial Status of the UMOA /West African Monetary Union/"

/Text/ At the last meeting of the ministers of economic affairs and of finance of the member nations of the free zone (Paris, 27 September 1979), the Central Bank of West African States submitted to those attending the said meeting a document of the economic and financial status of the UMOA, a body that encompasses Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Senegal, and Togo.

Agriculture

The issuing institution considers that, since the beginning of 1979 the flow of export products from the UMOA has taken place under more favorable conditions than in 1978.

The Union's cocoa production for the 1978-1979 season was estimated at 327,000 tons, against 324,000 tons for the preceding season, most of it being supplied by Ivory Coast (317,000 tons, +11,000 tons).

The coffee harvest, severely affected by the drought of 1977, should be approximately 280,000 tons, against 201,000 tons in 1977-1978, the improvement being mostly attributable to Ivory Coast.

In the six member-states, the marketing of cottonseed should reach 242,000 tons (+21 percent over the 1977-78 season); this harvest should supply approximately 94,000 tons (+18,000 tons) of cotton fiber for ginning. With 115,000 tons of cottonseed, Ivory Coast ranks first among the Union's producers; Senegal, with 37,000 tons, showed a reduction of close to 5 percent.

The improvement in climactic conditions, especially in Senegal, allowed for the reestablishment of the marketing of peanut oil. The total for the 1978-1979 season should amount to 930,000 tons in the shell, against 475,000 tons for the preceding season, with Senegal contributing 912,000 tons against 436,300 tons.

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The abundant rainfall in 1978-1979 encouraged the development of food crops in all the countries of the monetary union, allowing for the establishment of plans for forming emergency stocks by organizations in charge of marketing, particularly in Ivory Coast.

The lumber industry slowed down in 1978 because of measures to preserve the forestry resources. The expected production for 1979 is placed at 4.4 million cubic meters of undressed timber, against 4.5 million in 1978 and 5.2 million in 1977.

In the area of stock farming, major efforts have been undertaken to replenish the livestock following losses brought about by the drought during the period 1974 to 1977; the actions taken were mainly concerned with diversifying the species and developing intensive stock farming.

Mines

In 1978, phosphate production showed a slight decline; exports of calcium phosphate totaled 4.4 million tons, of which 2.8 million tons came from Togo.

In Niger, the production of uranium (2,109 tons) benefited from the fact that the Mining Company of Akouta began operating.

Industry

In contrast to the situation that prevailed in 1978, industrial activity in 1979 should profit from the good level of agricultural production, which supports the local market.

Nevertheless, the textile sector suffered from difficulties in selling, both because of fraudulent imports of articles at low prices and because of the adoption of protectionist measures in the industrialized nations.

The oil mills are running well in Senegal and Benin. On the other hand, the oil mills of Niger remain insufficiently supplied.

Prices

Since March 1979, there has been an upward thrust in the prices of food products, except in Senegal. Wage increases occurred during the first 6 months in Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Niger.

Finance and Money

With regard to public finance, the rate of increase in the overall budgets slowed down: +8.6 percent for 1979 against +11.1 percent for 1978, in the Union as a whole. The accrued budgets of the six states, balanced in receipts and expenditures, total 856.3 billion CFA francs for fiscal 1979.

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The current receipts represent 65.7 percent of the total resources (+12.4 percent over 1978) and receipts devoted to equipment (293.5 billion CFA) are up by 1.8 percent. For the six states, operating expenses were 12.6 percent heavier than in fiscal 1978.

The year 1979 marks a pause in the increase of the UMOA's foreign national debt, both because of the high volume of prior commitments and because of the increasingly heavy cost of the interest on the debt.

The overall economic situation has, on the level of currency aggregates, resulted in a drying up of net foreign assets, an acceleration in the growth rate of credits in the economy and a deceleration in the issuing of money. The total amount of currency had increased by 16.7 percent as of 31 May 1979 against 20.5 percent as of 31 May 1978. This deceleration is a result solely of the drying up of foreign currency. This slowing down is also only to be found in Ivory Coast: in Benin and Senegal, on the contrary, a sharp acceleration in the rate of increase was shown, and a weak increase in Togo, Upper Volta, and Niger.

As of 31 May 1979, the increase in the fiduciary currency was established at 18 percent, against 14 percent for the period ending 31 May 1978. This increase was true for all states in the union except Benin, where a decrease of 6 percent was recorded.

The growth rate of bank deposits was slower than that of the fiduciary currency: +16.2 percent (against +18 percent over the preceding period). Deposits by individuals and companies contributed 112.1 billion CFA francs toward expending the total amount of money, while deposits by public bodies decreased by 10.1 billion CFA francs.

Between 31 May 1978 and 31 May 1979, the domestic credit increased by 261.7 billion, or 31.1 percent. This increase is a result of an additional demand for loans from individuals and companies and from a diminishing of the net credit position of the governments with regard to monetary institutions. This position has in fact amounted to 78.7 billion CFA compared to 84.8 billion a year earlier; the decrease shows the tightening of public treasuries. In Benin, on the other hand, the improvement of the government's credit position seems to come from drawings on foreign loans.

The liability on economic loans increased by 255.6 billion CFA, or 27.8 percent, during the period under review compared to 24.7 percent a year earlier. The strength of these additional requests for loans varied from state to state. Strong in Senegal, Benin and Niger, it was noticeably weaker in the other states. As tonnages of marketed goods have increased, so have seasonal loans increased sharply in Senegal and Ivory Coast. In the category of medium-term credits, a sharp increase was shown in Benin, Senegal, and Niger. The banking sector is sharing more and more in the financing of investments.

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Foreign Relations

In the area of foreign relations, the year 1978 finally closed for the Union as a whole with a deficit in foreign transactions of approximately 22.5 billion CFA compared to an overall surplus of 21.1 billion in 1977. The very considerable deterioration in the balance of current operations, the negative balance of which went from 173.2 billion CFA one year to 319.9 billion the next, is at the origin of this trend reversal. In this category, the cumulative balance of foreign exchanges in the six states now has a deficit of 37.4 billion CFA, whereas an overall surplus of 60 billion had been cleared in 1977. The Union's export receipts amounted to 849.2 billion CFA in 1978 (+14.1 billion), but the cost of importing equipment materials and food products rose sharply. Only Ivory Coast showed a surplus in its trade balance for 1978 (142.8 billion CFA).

The financing of major equipment projects was largely realized with foreign resources and led to an increase of 103.1 billion CFA in net capital receipts.

This increased and widespread recourse to foreign capital, which was often negotiated under market conditions, nevertheless made for an appreciable increase in obligations linked to payment on the debt, which, in some states of the Union faced with bad trade performances, such as Senegal and Togo, fostered a situation that is incompatible with the foreign balance and the budgetary resources. This has resulted in 1979 in an appeal for the financial facilities of the International Monetary Fund and the setting up of short and medium-term programs aimed at achieving bases for stable, accelerated economic growth.

According to the cyclical development of the past months, one should expect to see in 1979 an improvement in the trade balances of most of the states in the Union. Indeed, the latest estimates foresee at the end of the year that these balances will show an overall surplus of 17.2 billion CFA instead of the overall deficit of 37.4 billion in 1978. The movement should be expanded even further in 1980 when the overall surplus of the trade balances should rise to 33.8 billion in spite of the growing burden of the oil bill.

Taking into account the deficit for services (295.9 billion CFA in 1978, 350 billion estimated for 1979, and 389.7 billion for 1980) and the slowdown in contributions of private foreign capital, the result should be a sharp reduction in the negative balances of current operations.

The strict surveillance on any recourse to foreign capital will aid in stabilizing the net imports of nonmonetary capital, which went from 297.4 billion CFA in 1975 to an estimated 311 billion in 1979 and 328.3 billion in 1980.

Finally, the development of the balance of payments resulting from all transactions will be seen in the Union as an increase in the total deficit,

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which will be 28.8 billion CFA in 1979 and 35.2 billion in 1980, compared to 22.5 billion in 1978.

The net foreign assets of the UMOA have been reduced from the equivalent of 190 billion CFA at the end of May 1978 to 141.4 billion at the end of 1979. The percentage of assets in French francs of the total amount of available foreign funds has weakened considerably: 66 percent against 75 percent a year ago.

In concluding its study, the Central Bank of the West African States considers that at the end of 1979 the level of foreign assets of the Union will truly be less than that at the end of 1978.

For 1980, an effort to replenish the UMOA's foreign assets risks being impeded by the worsening current situation. The slowdown in the growth of developed nations and the persistent inflation aggravated by successive oil price increases could lead to a worsening of the trade balance deficit in spite of the probable reduction in food product imports and the improvement likely to be shown in the area of receipts from raw material exports.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CONSTRUCTION OF OMVS DAM SCHEDULED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3458

[Report: "Diama: Foundation Stone Laid"]

[Text] The building of the Diama and Manantali dams, the two most important joint projects in the struggle against drought for Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, will be started in 1980, the AFP was told by Amadou Aw, high commissioner of the OMVS (Organization for the Development of the Senegal River), on 4 December. According to Aw, the final technical problems related to the building of these dams were settled at a meeting in Dakar between the OMVS and the financing sources.

These problems were related above all to the Diama dam which is to be built on Senegalese territory, not far from the mouth of the river. The project was reduced in size, as those attending the meeting kept for the future dam only its function of blocking the extension of the saline water and irrigation. The building of a 90 kilometer dike and of a reservoir with a capacity for 300 to 580 million cubic meters was postponed. The project will cost \$132 million and the laying of the foundation stone was to take place on 12 December in the presence of the chiefs of state of the three member countries.

The only problem related to the Manantali dam, located in Mali, was to determine the height (starting from the river bed). The moneylenders agreed with the OMVS on 208 meters. The Manantali dam will allow the irrigation of 250,000 hectares of land and the possibility to make the river navigable. The plan calls for the construction of a reservoir containing 11 billion cubic meters of water. Excluding the hydroelectric power plants which will be built later and will generate 800 million kilowatt hours, it will cost \$470 million (taking inflation into consideration).

Aw pointed out, furthermore, that the procedure for the acquisition of the necessary funds for the building of the dams (about \$600 million) had not been entirely established yet. For the time being, available funds total \$500 million and the sum of \$100 million remains to be found.

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Several countries and agencies are participating in the financing of the project: Saudi Arabia (\$100 million), the FRG (\$92 million), Kuwait (\$75 million), France (\$56 million), the group of the African Development Bank (\$52 million), Abou-Dhabi (\$50 million), Italy (\$24 million), the Islamic Development Bank (\$20 million), European Development Funds (\$19 million), Canada (\$8.5 million), and Iran (\$4 million).

The Diama project will be started in the first half of 1980, whereas the start of the Manantali project will be started at the end of that year.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

LIPTAKO-GOURMA BUDGET APPROVED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3397

[Report: "Liptako-Gourma; 1980 Budget: 103.7 Million CFA and Development Funds of 600 Million CFA"]

[Text] The 14th regular session of the Council of Ministers of the Integrated Development Authority of the Liptako-Gourma area (Upper Volta, Mali, and Niger), held from 8 to 12 November in Niamey, approved the 1980 authority budget totaling 103.7 million CFA, or a participation of 34.6 million per state.

The 14th session also adopted a modification to the statutes of the organization. Henceforth the conference of chiefs of state will be the supreme authority. It alone will define the general policy of the organization. This decision deprives the Council of Ministers of its rights in the matter. Henceforth it will be in charge of implementing the decisions reached by the chiefs of state. The conference of chiefs of state shall meet once every two years.

On the other hand, the session ratified the decision of the last organization summit meeting on the establishment of a development fund. The fund will become operational as of the 1980 fiscal year. It will amount to 600 million CFA (a contribution of 200 million per state).

Finally, a report on the activities of the director general described the progress made in the implementation of the projects or in their study. Specifically, it is a question of the Niamey-Tera-Dori road based on the mining project (currently at the stage of taking aerial photographs), of interest to Upper Volta and Niger; the plan for the establishment of telecommunications between Upper Volta, Mali, and Niger. This project is financed by the African Development Bank.

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The next ministerial session will be held in Niger, in April 1980, while the Conference of Chiefs of State will be held in 1981 in Mali.

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GREAT LAKES MEETING HELD

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3471

[Report: "Great Lakes--Third Community Summit Meeting"]

[Text] Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, the president of Burundi, succeeded Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko as president of the Great Lakes Economic Community which includes Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi, at the third summit meeting which was held in the Shaba capital on 8 and 9 December.

In addition to the adoption of the budget which totals 1 million 579,961 units of account for the ordinary budget, and 707,660 units of account for the extraordinary budget, three new agreements were concluded by the three partners: automobile insurance, sports exchanges, and finally, agronomy research.

A number of recommendations were also adopted on seating in Goma (in the Kivu) of the Development Bank of the Great Lakes States, the opening of border posts among the three countries from 0600 to 2400 hours, production of methane gas from Kivu Lake, security, health (establishment of a mixed committee for epidemiological control), the social area (social security general convention), trade and, finally, information and the press.

Some of the decisions adopted in the course of the summit include the nomination of the Rwanda minister of foreign affairs as president of the Council of Ministers of the member states of the community for 1979-1980, and the acceptance of Burundi as the host of the next summit meeting at a date not as yet determined.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ALLEGED ESCAPE OF OFFICIALS--Castro Lopo, chief of the Mozambican political police, traveled to Johannesburg in November and December 1979 to inquire about the disappearance of two light planes belonging to the COMAG state company. The aircraft, which had left Maputo illegally on 9 September, reportedly took to South Africa four high Mozambican officials accused of "splittism" and "fraud." According to certain sources, the flight of these officials was organized by...the South African secret services. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 990-991 26 Dec 79 and 2 Jan 80 p 60]

FORTHCOMING LUSOPHONE SUMMIT--The conference of the chiefs of state of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe will take place in Maputo next February. It will continue the discussion of various problems initiated at the beginning of this year in Luanda concerning the consolidation of their relations. The Maputo summit will be preceded by a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of these countries. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 p 24]

EAST GERMAN TRUCKS--Starting with 1976 the automotive industry of the GDR has supplied five African countries with some 10,000 trucks of medium capacity (5 tons), the East Berlin foreign trade services reported. Angola (7,000 units) and Mozambique (1,500) were the recipients of the biggest shipments. Ethiopia, Cameroon and Tanzania are among the other GDR customers which have been joined by Zambia, it was reported. The trucks are of the M-50 model. They were assembled in Ludwigsfelde (IFA) and Zittau (Robur). The GDR imported African craft and agricultural goods. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3316] 5157

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

MILITARY EXERCISES WITH CUBA--Luanda--"Iko" Carreira, Angolan minister of defense, presided on 7 December at the closing ceremony for the joint Cuban-Angolan military exercises. The ceremony was attended by high Angolan and Cuban military officials. These maneuvers took place on the occasion of the joint celebration, on 10 December, of the 23rd anniversary of the founding of the MPLA, the second anniversary of the establishment of the MPLA-Labor Party and the landing (in December 1956) of the "Granma" in Cuba. Two Angolan artillery groups equipped with BM-21 and 130 mm cannons, a paratrooper company and tanks participated in the exercises. The Cubans fielded combat and transport planes, as well as helicopters and an infantry brigade. In his speech, "Iko" Carreira stressed the degree of cooperation achieved by the Cuban and Angolan armed forces. "We were able to observe for ourselves the efficiency and technical perfection, with 300 combat vehicles of different types and the 2,000 officers and soldiers." These military maneuvers, planned under the name "Combat friendship-23rd anniversary," were held about 30 kms from Luanda. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 p 11]

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CAMEROON

FRENCH LOAN TO EXTEND RUBBER PLANTATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3338

[Article: "HEVECAM: a 4 Billion Franc CFA Loan From the Central Fund"]

[Text] A financing agreement for 4 billion francs CFA [African Financial Community] (Fr 80 million) intended for the development of Hevea-Cameroon was signed in Yaounde on 23 November by the Cameroonian Economy minister, Mr Youssoufa Daouda, and the general director of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE), Mr Roland Billecart.

This loan is intended to finance in part the second phase of the plan to expand the HEVECAM plantations. It involves building a latex treatment unit with a capacity of 20 metric tons a day and starting up support operations, especially a village plantations pilot operation, the creation of an agricultural perimeter, and experimentation with the action of vegetable matter, cultivation methods, and the application of new techniques.

By the end of this second phase, the area of industrial plantation will have grown in 4 years from 5,800 to 13,500 hectares, and the construction of non-industrial buildings (infirmaries, dispensaries, schools) will continue.

The cost of completing the program is estimated at nearly 20 billion francs CFA. In addition to contributions from the United Republic of Cameroon and the CCCE, loans are expected from the World Bank and the Commonwealth Development Corporation.

This new agreement brings to 28.815 billion francs CFA the total amount of loans made with the CCCE since the beginning of 1979.

The various forms of aid extended to Cameroon by the CCCE involve the rural development sectors, support structures and industry, especially with financing the expansion of Alucam in Edea and the Victoria oil refinery.

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CAMEROON

BRIEFS

BERTONA AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION--The office of the president of the Cameroon United Republic has called for bids to construct an airport at Bertona. The job includes upgrading the present runway, erecting buildings, and supplying and installing navigation aids. Specifications may be obtained from the office of the President of the Republic, general secretary, Central Governing Board of Markets in Yaounde for 100,000 francs CFA [African Financial Community]. Deadline is 25 January 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3338] 8782

SHIPLINE ON MEDITERRANEAN--Cameroon Shipping Lines (CAMSHIP, the Cameroonian national navy) recently started a new service in the Mediterranean. Hence the National Loaders Council of Cameroon (CNCC) will no longer make quarterly allowances for any imports that can be delivered by the national fleet from the ports of Leghorn, Italy; Marseilles, France; and Valencia, Spain. However, prompt allowances will be made by the agents named jointly by CAMSHIP and the CNCC: Teeschi and Capanna, Leghorn; Roneu and Co., Valencia; and Worms Maritime Service, Marseilles. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3338] 8782

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CONGO

INFORMATION ON CONGOLESE CHILDREN SENT TO CUBAN SCHOOLS

Economic Realities

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 pp 27-31

[Text] The fact that Congolese children were sent to Cuba deeply shocked European and American public opinion. Oddly enough, at the end of October, at the very time when President Denis Sassou Nguesso was visiting France, the whole campaign by the press was actually based on erroneous information: that 600 Congolese children were supposedly "deported," without their parents' consent. Sophie Bessis, on behalf of JEUNE AFRIQUE, investigated the matter in the Congo. Francois Soudan, back from Cuba, reveals that the Congolese are not the only Africans being educated in Cuba. Mohammed Maiga remembers that prior to the Cuban experiment other African children have experienced voluntary "deportation." Without making any waves.

"It will do my son a lot of good, he is stbborn, the Cubans will straighten him out"; "My son to Cuba? Never, I want him to remain a child of this country"; "Cuban education has a very good reputation, why not take advantage of it?" These are some of the comments taken from many different and contradictory ones that we got on the spot.

Of course there is talk, in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire, about the 601 young Congolese sent to Cuba, but much less than in the Western editorial offices. The majority of the citizens are much more concerned with "VDA," an abbreviation for "difficult life today." In any case, one thing seems certain: the authorities had no trouble in finding 600 families in the country, who were ready to send their children to get a secondary education in Havana. Even if all were not guided by enthusiasm, the prospect of having one less mouth to feed, the attraction that an education in a foreign country has for people, the certainty that these young people will easily get work when they return home and that they will be favored by those in power, have inspired many vocations. Hence, many families

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accepted the offer, and some even tried to "intervene," in other words to pull strings, when their children did not have all the necessary requirements, in order to send them to the home of Marxism in the tropics. Out of dozens of people questioned, only one told us that there had been pressure applied, and he was not Congolese.

How did the process develop? Everything starts with a Cuban proposal, no doubt with ulterior motives: Havana offers, as it has done for other "friendly" African nations, to take care of the secondary education, in Cuba, of 600 Congolese children. Brazzaville's answer is immediately positive: the people in charge, hard pressed financially and economically, are only too happy to get this aid which corresponds to the financing of a whole college, considering the importance of the numbers involved. As for the ideological aspect of this education, it does not bother them at all, quite to the contrary. "After all," declares one of the people in charge, "we completely share the same ideas with Cuba, and we see only advantages if our children acquire them;" another one brags about "the sound moral and political education" awaiting them. One understands them: if all goes well, they are the future support of the regime, which is not meant to displease the rulers....

But, beyond the immediate political preoccupation, many Congolese believe that the Cuban education is especially well suited to the realities of their country: "the school in the fields," is learning agriculture starting in high school; it is an intellectual education that is not cut off from practice, hence, it is an excellent thing. Of course, 10 years are a long time, but the rulers maintain that they will do their best to find the necessary funds to finance a visit home, every 3 years, during vacation.

Thus it is only a matter of finding the 600 chosen ones. It is decided that only those can be candidates who have an elementary school diploma and who have not started secondary school. The best among them will be chosen, respecting the regional equilibrium, and in principle without favoring any segment of the population. A real "invitation to tender" is launched, and a committee, formed by including leaders in education, people in charge of the youth, as well as a Cuban representative, is responsible for making the selections from among the thousands of applications received. One doubts, however, that reality corresponds completely to this ideal outline. Many parents refused to be separated from their children and did not seem to have worried about it. Others, on the contrary, moved heaven and earth to have them go.

In Brazzaville we questioned several parents. One of them, an employee in a ministry, father of nine children, succeeded in having his 13-year-old gone go to Cuba, who, he thought, had been lost to the world of education. For this boy it was the only chance to finish his schooling; the dunce in question evidently did not have his elementary school diploma, but daddy managed....

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Another one, a municipal employee, has a 15-year-old son who does not want to go to school anymore and who smokes hemp: he is off to Cuba now, to his father's joy. The father hopes that his son will be curbed by the Cubans! On the other hand, the chauffeur of a minister had hoped that his son would go too, but the attempts of his boss to pull strings failed. However, one should not think that Cuba is the place used for deporting problem children. Many party members have sent their offspring because of political conviction, to set an example, or...to facilitate their access to responsible positions later on. One of them expressed his pleasure at the idea that Cuba will educate "Red officials," who are capable of running the true revolution. But, a little over a month after his son's departure, he has still no news from him and regrets his decision a little bit: now he believes that a "true revolutionary" should be educated in his own country. In fact, the parents have not yet had any news from their children since their departure for Cuba, and they are beginning to find the waiting long....

But who was a part of the draft? Many were the children of political leaders and of high-ranking officials. There is almost total agreement in Bakongo: it is always the same people who take advantage of systems. An illegitimate son of President Sassou Nguesso is supposed to be part of a group, as well as the children of the ministers of health and of labor. But others have also been chosen. The head of state himself is supposed to have reviewed the final list in order to avoid too much favoritism. Yet, malicious gossip has it that the proportion of "northerners" is considerable.... We were not able to verify this. In any event, there are no children cruelly wrenched from their mothers, or families in despair because their offspring were sacrificed to the "higher interests of the revolution."

Actually, complications and poor organization caused the anxiety and gave rise to certain rumors. The children were supposed to leave at the beginning of September; they were duly vaccinated, their good outfits ready (the parents received 35,000 CFA [African Financial Community] francs per child in order to buy the necessary items), they regrouped at the Liberation High School in Brazzaville, waiting for Air Africa to fly them to Havana. This is when some unexpected things come up: for several days Havana Airport is closed because hurricane Frederic is passing through the region; hence, departure is delayed and the children are confined for a longer period of time than anticipated, from whence stems the dissatisfaction of certain families. Another complication: no allowance was made for the fact that the planes of Air Africa were booked solid by people coming back from vacation. To honor its agreements, the airline hired the services of a Dutch airline; this explains why the first reports about this affair came from the Netherlands. The students finally left Brazzaville with six Congolese teachers who will teach them French and the history of their country.

Does this mean that everyone in the Congo agrees to this mini-exodus? Far from it. Many are scandalized by the "irresponsibility" of the

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authorities: "The young people will be cut off from their country; they will be brainwashed," states a young engineer from Pointe Noire. "I will never send my children at such a young age; kids should not be separated from their families," confides a young official, though a member of the Party. Many Congolese are aware of the "political side" of this affair, and they do not hesitate to criticize their rulers in no uncertain terms. For the basic problem is this: the Cubans know that, in the long run, their presence in Africa is not popular. Who will be better replacements than the children educated by them and of their own free will? Thus, they will assure the long-lasting effect of their influence through Congolese intermediaries, especially since they are ready to renew their proposal for a new contingent of students next year. Unless the situation changes, ten years is a long time....

Other Africans in Cuba

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 pp 28-29

[Text] Jose Marti Airport, Havana. Sunday 19 August, 1979. Two Boeing 737 from Taag, the Angolan airline, gently land on the runway, wet from the night's rain. Looking apprehensive, dazzled by the sun, dozens of children wearing red scarves come down the gangway in an orderly fashion. All are Angolan. None is over 15 years of age.

The Cuban journalist accompanying us smiles at our surprise; for him it is occurrence: "Not a week passes by without the arrival, or the departure once their education is completed, of a plane-load of African kids." A month later, 14 September, 600 Congolese kids, of the same age, step off two DC 10 planes belonging to Air Africa, rented for this occasion by the authorities in Brazzaville. In the meantime, hundreds of children from Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Guinea-Bissau arrive to and leave the Jose Marti Airport.

Today there are 10,000 young Africans, 10 to 25 years of age, from high school to university level, who study in Cuba according to the agreements of cultural cooperation. The Congo of Massemba-Debat was the first one in black Africa to sign these agreements in 1964. But the Portuguese decolonization and the Cuban intervention in Africa, in creating "specific and internationalist ties" between certain states and Fidel Castro's island, have increased considerably this special form of cooperation: 3,500 Angolans, 2,000 Ethiopians, 1,500 Mozambicans, 800 Guineans (plus 700 Congolese and about 100 from Benin and Tanzania) follow a "Cuban educational program" today.

In a way, one can understand the motives that drove the leaders of these young socialist states, the former Portuguese colonies, to send the elite of their youth--for it is the most gifted who go, chosen on the spot by Cuban educators--to be educated 10,000 km away from home. The kind of education in effect in Cuba, which mixes an especially strong scientific

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education and a practical study of modern methods in tropical agriculture, is geared to the economic needs of these countries. And, no doubt, also to the political needs of their leaders.

Besides, every group has its own national training, which insures that a number of courses are taught in the mother tongue (namely history and geography).

If for Angola, Mozambique, or Guinea-Bissau, independent for less than 5 years and with practically no managerial staff or the means to train any themselves, and who want to get their economies going as quickly as possible, this "exportation" of children is, all in all, a logical process, the same cannot be said for all countries. The Congo and even more Ethiopia have been independent for a much longer time.

How do these thousands of African children live in the middle of the Caribbean? Much like the young Cubans, though, it is true, without a family. Besides, some do not tolerate the emotional isolation during such a long exile--as is the case of some of the older students in Europe--and they are then repatriated. I was able to visit one of these "schools in the country" on the Island of Youth (ex-Island of the Pines), not far from Nueva Gerona, where 600 Congolese students were recently settled. Four prefabricated buildings lost in the middle of sugar cane fields, three sports grounds, thirty dormitories with 20 beds in each. Eight-hour days: four for courses and four for "productive work" on the plantations run by the school. About 10 Angolan kids of the "Practice Lumumba Brigade" who enumerated, for 3 hours, the distressing recollections of the civil war that ravaged their country and which they remember a little, were not, it is true, in a mood for jokes.

But they would certainly have laughed heartily at the statement made in New York, last 6 November, by another Angolan, Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA, who stated that "the African children in Cuba are used as labor in the fields where they toil night and day under inhuman conditions."

Cubans Prepare Their Successors

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 p 30

[Text] Ethiopians, Mozambicans, Angolans, Namibians, and recently some Congolese.... The exodus of African students to Cuban secondary schools seems to be accelerating to a point where the West is getting worried: a campaign by the press in France asks for explanations from the Dutch parliament to the government of the Netherlands; alarmist rumors from the American State Department, according to whom the children receive military training in Cuba. Nothing is omitted that could inform the public about this new kind of "cooperation."

However, on taking a closer look, only the destination of these thousands of students is really new. The Congolese and the Cubans are hardly

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innovators. During the whole colonial period, and especially since 1945, the home countries--France, Great Britain in the lead, and Portugal to lesser degree--took tens of thousands of the citizens of their empire into their own schools. Far from stopping the flow, independence only confirmed it: Paris and London continue to take in a great number of African students. As for the French, British, or American schools or military academies, they are wide open to the future officers of the Third World.

Besides, everyone is aware that this western education of the African elite constitutes the best means for the former home countries to perpetuate their influence. Hence, Western anxiety over this matter seems to be at least hypocritical if not exaggerated. However, this time there is something original in the sending of young Africans to Cuba: it is actually the first time that outside of Africa children of this age are taken in charge in such a systematic fashion, that their education is planned up to the smallest detail, and that their ideological education is so precisely prepared. Whatever the quality of a Cuban education may be, the students there will hardly have the opportunity to learn about different opinions: in Havana one does not trifle with orthodoxy, and pluralism is rather frowned upon. Besides, it is the objective: theoretically, the school must serve to form good militants as well as to turn out future managers. Reality is, in fact, much less monolithic....

But why Cuba? For several years now, Fidel Castro's country has been a real godsend for the Soviet leaders: the Cuban soldiers "do better" than their counterparts from the shores of the Volga. Same observation in the field of education: the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, reserved for African students, turned out to be a failure: the students who went there did not become perfect communists, Moscow style, far from it, and the USSR ended up thinking that because they did not come when they were young enough, they were already beyond redemption. At the same time, the Soviets are not much loved in Africa: according to almost total consensus, their people in service are often racist and know little about the problems of the continent. Cuban socialism, though strictly orthodox, has the advantage of being mixed with black blood, of having a tropical climate, and the samba; for this reason it is less forbidding for Africa.

The result: Cuba is the country to which about 10,000 future officials from different African nations will go, and where they will stay for about 10 years. In Havana it is hoped that within the required time they will become useful replacements for Cuban advisors who cannot stay indefinitely in friendly countries. After all, the Eastern countries, following a technique that was duly tried by the West, have understood that they must rely on the future generations. Will East-West rivalry take place at the children's level from now on? East-West south of the Sahara? Recent arguments seem to point in that direction. The points will be counted a few years from now, when they return--with what qualifications--to their country. In fact, past experience shows that many similar efforts have failed.

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One can be happy about or deplore the present situation, but it is useless to dramatize it too soon. Is not this new type of migrations actually the responsibility of the new African elite itself, which has shown that it is incapable of forging its own values in the face of ideological and cultural imperialisms of all kinds.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

PRO-OPANGO OFFICERS DISMISSED--The Congolese Government supposedly displeased the Soviets by dismissing and assigning to forced residence several officers who were favored by ex-President Yhombi Opango, and who had been trained in the USSR. Hence "without security" in Moscow's opinion. [Text] [Paris JUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 p 45] 9465

PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CONTRACT--A contract of partnership between the national Congolese society Hydro Congo and Coastal State Occidental. The American company will play the role of operator in the search for oil. One of the conditions stipulated by Brazzaville at the signing of the contract would be that Coastal State Occidental participate in starting to operate the refinery in Pointe Noire, which could not function since its construction. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 p 46] 9465

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

D'ESTAING VISIT--President Giscard d'Estaing is planning to visit a number of African countries during the first quarter of 1980. Bissau will welcome the French chief of state, who had been invited last year by President Luiz Cabral. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 p 24]

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IVORY COAST

UN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AID

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3333

[Report: "UNIDO Aid to Ivory Coast Industrial Development"]

[Text] On the occasion of United Nations Day, celebrated last 24 October, Latortue, chief technical adviser and co-director of the UNIDO Project for Aid to Ivory Coast Industrial Development, spoke on the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), created in November 1966, and its main targets and activities: industrial development planning; promotion of industrial investments essentially in small and medium-sized national industries; industrial decentralization and creation of industrial sectors; development and promotion of suitable technologies; industrial standardization and quality control; industrial management training; and industrial information and documentation.

Latortue emphasized most of all the UNIDO activities in the Ivory Coast where it has been in operation for about 10 years and has contributed to the government's efforts in the field of industrial development. This cooperation follows six major directions:

1. Promotion of Ivory Coast Enterprises. This consists essentially of helping in the creation of small and medium-sized industrial enterprises belonging to Ivory Coast citizens. The help provided by the UNIDO consists of the study of the viability of projects, looking for financing, management training, and technical follow-up of established projects until they reach normal development.
2. Industrial Decentralization. This activity is within the framework of the governmental effort to set up a number of development centers in the country and avoid rural exodus. A program is under study for the creation of industrial areas in the various economic regions in the country. The building of the first centers will be undertaken next year within the framework of the regional action program of OPEI (Office for the Promotion of Ivory Coast Enterprises).

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The UNIDO also carries out for the government industrial surveys in some parts of the country (North and Center) in order to determine these areas' potential for industrial development.

3. Industrial Standardization. In its current relatively advanced industrial development stage, it is indispensable for the Ivory Coast to concentrate on problems of industrial standardization and quality control of manufactured goods. The UNIDO is cooperating with the Ivory Coast Standardization Bureau (BIN) for the development of Ivory Coast standards and of a system for controlling their application.

4. Promotion of Industrial Exports. Within the General Office for Industrial Activity (DGAI), the UNIDO is closely cooperating in the development of structures which could facilitate, on the one hand, inter-industrial trade in the Ivory Coast and, on the other, encourage the export of Ivory Coast industrial goods to the CEAO [West African Economic Community] and the CEDEAO [West African States Economic Community].

5. Promotion of Industrial Investments. The UNIDO is also participating in the government's effort, within the framework of the Industrial Development Bureau (BDI) in the promotion of investments, facilitating the participation of the Ivory Coast in fairs and meetings especially organized to promote the meeting between potential investors and promoters of industrial projects. Occasionally the UNIDO puts at the disposal of the government high level specialists and consultants to help in the objective assessment of industrial projects submitted by foreign investors.

6. Industrial Training. The cooperation of the UNIDO in this area is limited essentially to the training of cadres for the various industrial institutions in the fields of technical studies, drafting and assessment of industrial projects, and advancement of Ivory Coast heads of enterprises in managing the production of industrial goods. In the future, based on the needs formulated by the government, such cooperation, naturally, could assume other aspects, meeting the requirements of the government's policy of the training of domestic cadres for enterprises located in the Ivory Coast.

Finally, the UNIDO is a dynamic institution serving the industrialization of the Third World. Latortue recalled that since the 1975 declaration and Lima Action Plan, it has undertaken the implementation of measures as the result of which, by the year 2000, industrial output in Third World countries will be raised from 7 to 20 percent of the world's industrial output. This is a Herculean task which requires substantial material and

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financial means but which also shows very great faith in the capability of the people to change and adapt themselves to the new requirements governing international cooperation among equal partners.

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IVORY COAST

COOPERATION WITH BELGIUM REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3332

[Report: "Belgium Sovereigns Pay Official Visit; Cooperation and Trade Between Belgium and the Ivory Coast"]

[Text] King Baudouin and Queen Fabiola of Belgium were official guests of the Ivory Coast from 21 to 24 November. In both Abidjan and Yamoussoukro they received a particularly warm welcome.

In a speech delivered on 21 November at the dinner he gave in honor of the royal couple, President Houphouet-Boigny emphasized the richness and diversity of bilateral relations between Belgium and the Ivory Coast, promising "numerous and rich" future prospects.

In turn, King Baudouin took up the idea close to the heart of President Giscard d'Estaing of a European-African community within which Europe would contribute its technology for the development of the abundant raw materials of the black continent.

Economic Relations

On the occasion of the visit paid by the royal couple, let us recall that cooperation between Belgium and the Ivory Coast is governed by a general cooperation convention, signed on 7 June 1968, subsequently enlarged by specific agreements. Within this framework three mixed commissions met in 1974, 1975, and 1978. On the other hand, the number of Belgium citizens living in the Ivory Coast is estimated at 1,200, about 100 of whom are cooperative workers, whereas some 500 Ivory Coast citizens, mostly students, live in Belgium.

In the area of trade, in 1978 Belgium sold the Ivory Coast goods worth 17.45 billion CFA (the seventh biggest supplier) and bought from it products worth 7.4 billion CFA (12th biggest customer), including pineapples (810 million CFA), cocoa beans and derivatives (1 billion 975 million), coffee (838 million), timber (1 billion 708 million), as well as cotton and cotton staples (128 million) and clothing (465 million).

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Belgium investments in the Ivory Coast are in food production, chemicals, construction, and agriculture: Solibra, Chimie Afrique, Entreprises Francois et fils Afrique (currently assigned the construction of the new international trade center in Abidjan), Codetaf, and Sofalca, not to forget the participation of big Belgian bank groups such as Societe generale de banque de Belgique and Banque Bruxelles-Lambert, within the Societe generale de banques en Cote d'Ivoire (SGBCI) and within the Banque internationale pour le commerce et l'industrie de la Cote d'Ivoire (Bicici). Belgian study offices are also working in the Ivory Coast, Traktionel and Sybeta in particular.

Belgian cooperation with the Ivory Coast also involves the merchant marine (personnel training, Academy of Marine Sciences. . .), ship repairs (a preliminary study for the building of a repair dock in Abidjan was financed by Belgium) and, naturally, teaching, particularly on the university level and through television, and health care.

Let us also point out that Belgium is helping to develop the department of zootechnology of the Ecole Nationale superieure agronomique in Abidjan. This represents additional Belgian assistance to the development of cattle breeding in the north.

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FRENCH AID TO REFINERY REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3333

[Report: Petroleum: 1.4 Billion French Francs for the Expansion of the Abidjan Refinery"]

[Text] Two loans will be granted to the Societe ivoirienne de raffinage to finance the expansion of the Abidjan petroleum refinery.

The first will be a cash loan totaling 500 million French francs, some of which to be repaid within 10 and some within 13 years. The breakdown is the following: A loan of 400 million francs related to export activities with an interest rate of 1.25 percent higher than the average bank interest rate and the interest rate charged on the French money market, covering a six-month period; and a loan of 100 million francs with an interest rate higher than that same average by 1.5 percent for the 10 year repayment share and 1.75 percent for the 13 year repayment share.

The second loan is an export credit for about 900 million francs, guaranteed by the compagnie francaise d'assurance pour le commerce exterieur (Coface).

Both operations will be managed by the Societe generale and the Bank of America.

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IVORY COAST

COMPUTERIZATION OF COCOA-COFFEE MARKETING REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 30 Nov 79 p 3332

[Report: "Coffee and Cocoa Trade Controlled Through Computerization"]

[Text] Computerization is being developed to assist in the marketing of coffee and cocoa in the Ivory Coast. The Ivory Coast government has, in fact, set up the Coginfor company in charge of developing a network of terminals in shelling enterprises, port plants, and main collection centers, linked with a major computer center installed in the building of the Caisse de stabilisation. This will enable the officials to follow the development of the campaign on a daily basis.

In order to make it possible for this network to do its work, customers will mandatorily submit to planters purchase information as the goods are shipped out. Such purchase bulletins, in four copies, will be kept by the Coginfor agencies for accepted customers in the shelling enterprises.

The original of the bulletin will be given to the planters. The second copy will be sent with the goods to the shelling enterprise and the plants; an entry stub will go with it which will be submitted to the terminal. The third copy will be collected weekly by the subprefecture of the purchasers and put at the disposal of the computer. Finally, the fourth copy will be kept by the purchaser.

Since the computerized system will be based on the classification of the purchase bulletins, any customer who has purchased a product from a planter without immediately giving him the purchase bulletin may be subject to penalties which may even include loss of purchase rights.

Futhermore, to facilitate the repayment of transportation costs to exporters and shellers, the computerized system will submit periodically to the Caisse de stabilisation information on billing data.

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- Exporters and shellers have also been asked to see to it that all the necessary documents are submitted to the terminal immediately after receiving the product.

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IVORY COAST

COCOA STORAGE PROBLEM REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3395

[Report: "Cocoa: A Serious Storage Problem Facing the New Crop"]

[Text] The first cocoa beans of the 1979-1980 crop began to reach Abidjan the last days of November, after over six weeks of delay caused by the rains.

The stock which was to increase at the pace of 25,000 tons per week until the beginning of next year totaled 20,000 tons several days ago. The Ivory Coast, which withdrew from the market at the beginning of October, will, therefore, quickly find itself, in the opinion of a number of experts, facing difficult storage problems, since its storage capacity is for about 100,000 tons. Some experts have pointed out that the Fund for the Stabilization and Price Support of Agricultural Goods will not only have to pay the price for renting about 100,000 square meters of storage space (it takes about one square meter of storage space per ton of cocoa), but that it also risks the freezing of substantial funds in this operation. According to the experts, in addition to the leasing of storage space, insurance, the purchase of a substantial amount of insecticides, depreciation of the quality of the cocoa by virtue of its storage, and loss of weight, as well as the consequent freezing of funds could, according to the AFP, cost the Fund about 50 billion francs CFA.

For a while the Stabilization Fund could supply about 15,000 to 20,000 tons of cocoa to the local plants whose annual capacity totals 80,000 tons. However, cocoa dealers in the Ivory Coast capital have pointed out that this would require the resolution of the conflict which pits these plants, in which foreign capital controls the majority, against the Fund. For the time being, two of the four plants, accounting for one-half of the cocoa processing capacity of the country, have preferred to stop their output, arguing that the conditions imposed by the Stabilization Fund were clearly inadequate "and no longer made it possible to face foreign competition," as stated by the director of one of them.

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A renegotiation of the status of this processing industry is in progress. However, there is no indication that a solution will be immediately found and accepted by the Stabilization Fund. The same circles have let it be known that the government may be forced to requisition the plants should the involved parties be unable to reach an agreement, even though emphasizing that the government would take such a decision only after having exhausted "all other means for reaching a quick solution."

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IVORY COAST

POSSIBILITY OF SUGAR EXPORTS SEEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3395

[Report: "Sugar: Possible Exports in the 1979-1980 Campaign"]

[Text] The Ivory Coast will be able to meet its sugar needs as of the beginning of 1980 and would be able to export 30,000 to 40,000 tons in the course of the 1979-1980 campaign.

Thanks to six refineries, two of which are nearing completion in the northern part of the country, in the Zuenoula and Katiola, Ivory Coast sugar production should reach about 320,000 tons in three years, whereas domestic consumption needs are currently in the vicinity of 80,000 tons.

Some ten years ago the Ivory Coast had undertaken sugar production and was planning to produce about 600,000 tons of sugar at the beginning of the 1980's. However, in recent years the program was considerably hindered by the low sugar prices on the world market and the high production costs per ton. Production costs in the Ivory Coast are currently \$800, or twice the world price.

For this reason the international experts are rather skeptical as to the possibility to export Ivory Coast sugar. "The government would have to pay about \$400 per ton of exported sugar, unless the price of sugar rises rapidly on the world market," specified a technician asked by the AFP.

According to the specialists, the Ivory Coast has extremely high production costs, as the sugarcane fields are all located in the northern part of the country, away from export centers. On the other hand, the building of a sugar production system has not been completed and a sugar terminal is still not to be found in Abidjan. Even though planned, its precise location has not yet been decided and, according to the experts, it would take at least two years to build it.

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Let us recall, as we pointed out in our 30 November issue (page 3358), that the International Sugar Council invited the Ivory Coast to join the international sugar agreement and offered it an annual export contingent of 70,000 tons.

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IVORY COAST

NEW HIGHWAYS OPENED; FURTHER STUDIES MADE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3395

[Report: "Opening of the Northern Highway"]

[Text] On 28 November Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny opened the first section of the northern highway, which was started in December 1974.

The highway has four lanes, two in each direction, with 2.25 meter wide shoulders each. The central divide averages seven meters in width.

The first section of the highway starts at kilometer 12 of the Dabou route and stops at Sikensi. It is 60 kilometers long and has a nine kilometer long connection with Sikensi.

The predicted 1980 average daily circulation will be 4,800 vehicles or 1,900 passengers and 800,000 tons of freight.

The cost of the northern highway will be 22.5 billion CFA, 75 percent of which financed by a consortium of Swiss banks (Union des Banques suisses, Banque populaire suisse, and Credit suisse); the remaining 25 percent will be financed by the Ivory Coast.

The highway studies were conducted by Setec (Societe d'etudes techniques). The construction was carried out by Gesco, the Group of Swiss Construction Enterprises, consisting of the following companies: Schmalz, in Bern; Conrad Zschokke, in Geneva; and Bless GA in Zurich. The building of the highway involved about 100 Gesco engineers and the work of some 1,700 Africans.

The project requires 160,000 tons of crushed rock per month. Two granite deposits were discovered in the immediate vicinity of the highway and were developed: Therefore, there are two quarries producing granite materials: the first is at Kilometer 21, near the Attingue Village, with a 200 ton daily output which, therefore, can produce 60,000 tons of crushed rock per month.

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The second quarry, not far from Sahuye Village, is at kilometer 70. It has a capacity for 360 tons per hour and is able to deliver some 100,000 tons per month.

The northern highway includes two other segments. The first, between Sikensi and N'Douci is 35 kilometers long, to which will be added a 12 kilometer long connection to N'Douci, scheduled for completion at the beginning of 1981. The second is between N'Douci and the bridges on the N'zi (19 kilometers), to be completed at the end of 1981.

Furthermore, Gesco is studying a plan for a junction with Yamoussoukro and financing possibilities for these 130 additional kilometers.

Started in September 1976, the east-west highway was commissioned on 26 November. This urban highway, 70 meters wide, consists of three lanes in each direction and should relieve traffic north of Abidjan.

The east-west highway represents an investment of 24 billion CFA. It is 7.7 kilometers long and was completed in three years by a group of enterprises (Dredging and Public Works, the Jean Lefebvre Enterprise, and the Colas Company).

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SENEGAL

PRESS SAID TO BE STIFLED BY ECONOMIC FACTORS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 p 11

[Article by Mam Less Dia: "The Senegalese Press Is Stifled"]

[Text] The main corollary to the introduction of democracy in Senegal was the appearance of a rash of new names in the press which had remained, until then, as though it were a domain reserved for the state and a few Frenchmen acting in a private capacity.

In 1977, barely 3 years after the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] was created, and 1 year after the return of the PAI [African Independence Party] as a legal party, about eight papers reappeared. Five of them [LE DEMOCRATE, L'UNITE AFRICAINE, SIGGI, ANDE SOPI, and MONSAREW] raised high the banner of political struggle, each one being the propaganda tool of a party.

In 1978, three other papers, including a "satirical" newspaper published by the youth in the PS [Socialist Party] in power, were added to this collection, which was already quite appreciable for a country where the illiteracy rate exceeds 70 percent.

In 1979 five publications practically disappeared. Of the remaining 7, 2 are controlled by the party in power, and 3 others by political groups of which only 1 is legal, leaving only three newspapers: AFRIQUE NOUVELLE, AFRIQUE TRIBUNE, and LE POLITICIEN. All three are also in danger of being stifled, indeed of disappearing, because they are not backed by any financial power.

The independent Senegalese publishers do not have the advantage of any protection, either regarding printing or regarding distribution. They are forced to submit to the law of the "go-between" who controls distribution and whose only interest, by definition, is to make a profit. Between 1977 and 1979 the price of printing has risen by 20 percent. The expense for distribution, fixed at 40 percent of the returns from sales by a subsidiary of the French firm Hachette, is all the more unbearable since the publisher is not in a position to control the actual sales.

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During a conversation with the prime minister, I pointed out the significance of these questions. I believe Mr Abdou Diouf had considered the possibility of the state's being a distributor for the press, and even helping in the stabilization of the price of paper, with the intention of helping the press through a system of adjustments. So far nothing has been done. Instead of stabilization, the printers raise prices that cannot be justified in any way. And, in the long run, the "death" of all independent papers will crown the beginning of democracy which had raised so much hope.

One asks why, at the beginning of the year, did the government take so much trouble to get a vote on its precious law on "limiting the freedom of the press," since it had at its disposal an equally efficient method: economic asphyxiation.

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UGANDA

BRIEFS

ELECTIONS IN 1981--The former minister of Regional Cooperation, Mr Ateker Ejala, announced in mid-November that the next elections will be held on 3 June 1981. The elections will be preceded by a regional census, which is planned for the beginning of next year. A commission is also to be set up to fix election district boundaries and prepare the voter registration rolls. The 1981 Ugandan elections will be the first in Uganda in 10 years. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3281] 8782

NEW CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT--Tracts circulating in Kampala attest to the formation of a new clandestine opposition movement, the Clandestine Democratic Movement of Uganda, favoring former President Yusuf Lule. This movement calls for Mr Lule's return to power. He was pushed out last June by Mr Godfrey Binaisa. The movement's tracts also call for the reestablishment of the 1962 constitution, which was abrogated by former President Milton Obote in 1967. The movement is led by General Dayana. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3281] 8782

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ZAIRE

REPORT ON ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ZAIRE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79
pp 3105, 3107

Text Since 1976, when substantial measures were taken to stimulate the economy, Zaire has had a difficult time. The linking of the currency with SDR Special Drawing Rights, the return to former owners of zairianized enterprises with 60 percent of nationalized capital, the moratorium and adjustment of the service of the foreign public debt, have not prevented 1977 from being a very hard year and in November 1977, the chief of state had to promulgate an emergency plan, giving priority to the reorganization of transportation, agricultural development, the development of the mining industry in the minimum time and an overhaul of the state apparatus. The trade balance again became positive in 1976 and had a surplus of 284.9 MZ million zaires in 1977.

The agricultural branch is unable to meet the domestic demand for foodstuffs. The mining branch suffered from the low prices for copper; it needs many investments. The industrial sector showed progress in some fields (food, sugar), but a decline in textiles, cement and chemical industries. The large scale reduction of imports has not always allowed a satisfactory supply level for industry.

Net foreign credits at the end of December 1977 showed a negative balance of 201.7 MZ. Since 1974, the country has not been able to guarantee the service of its foreign debt, which an administrative office has been managing since 1976. At the end of 1976, total liabilities amounted to 2.7 MZ, including 1,283 MZ of credits to the state and 1,422 MZ of credits to enterprises.

The 1977 budget included an allowance of 249 MZ for debt service: It had an estimated deficit of 293 MZ. The deficit in

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public finances reached, even at the end of 1978, 223.2 MZ financed by loans.

The gross national product dropped slightly from 1056.6 MZ in 1976 to 1037.1 million in 1977.

From June 1977 to June 1978, total currency in circulation increased from 881.9 MZ to 1,262 MZ or an increase of 43.1 percent. This increase is made up mainly of net credits to the state (+351.9 MZ) and credit to the economy (+48.9 MZ), while net foreign credits declined by 21.7 MZ.

In 1978, the economy continued to be disturbed by the continuance of imbalances, both domestic as well as foreign, in spite of some indices which indicate a certain stabilization of activity.

According to the Bank of Zaire, the imbalance of domestic prices is not the result alone of the reduction of supply from local and foreign sources, but also of the expansion of demand, supported by the ill-advised creation of monetary liquidities indirectly by treasury monetary financing.

The impact of the foreign deficit has only partially affected the process of creation of monetary liquidities, for the payments in foreign exchange by the government had as their counterpart in local currency a treasury debit at the central bank.

Although the first three quarters of 1978 resulted in a trade surplus of about 100 MZ, the country's foreign transactions showed a deficit of 22 MZ. An economic recovery plan was drawn up on the level of the chief of state, and the signs of a pickup in 1979 are already noticeable.

A law of 14 July 1978 authorizes the conclusion of development agreements between the executive council and commercial and industrial enterprises. The latter are creating an economic recovery fund, supported by the collection of a percentage less than 10 percent of the value of each unit produced and/or sold, over and above the sale price. This levy is tax free. It is deposited each month in an account opened at the Bank of Zaire, to finance the completion of projects delayed by agreement. Each enterprise manages its fund, which is state property and is overseen by officials. It is a matter of guaranteeing to the producer the sale of his products, encouraging the cultivation of new exportable products, organizing livestock raising and providing a technical cadre. The

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enterprises will have to build or maintain roads, schools and clinics in the framework of their projects for the benefit of the people involved.

The Banking System

The banking system includes: The People's Bank, the Kinshasha Bank, the Commercial Bank of Zaire, the Zairian Bank Association, the Bank of Zaire, the African International Bank in Zaire, Barclay's Bank and City Bank. Zaire also has a very important development finance company, SOFIDE /Finance Company for Development/.

In September 1978 all the savings banks had 112.2 MZ in foreign credits and 257 million in reserves, 115 million in credits to the state and 555 million in credits in the private sector. Demand deposits amounted to 733.3 million and time deposits to 198 million.

The Commercial Bank of Zaire with a capital of 4 MZ, had 207.9 MZ in demand deposits and 61.9 MZ in time deposits at the end of 1977. Its investments on hand were made up of 22.5 MZ in government and semipublic securities (6 months and 1 year treasury bonds), 82.7 MZ in commercial paper and 1.8 MZ in securities. Its profit for the 1977 fiscal year was 2.5 MZ.

The People's Bank has a capital of 4.5 MZ completely subscribed by the state.

Credits Granted in 1977 by the People's Bank (million zaires)

	31/3/77	30/9/77
Short term	68.33	96.29
Long term	24.90	22.74
Agriculture	19.57	32.78
Industry	30.15	43.90
Trade and services	42.63	40.47
Real estate loans	0.50	0.68
Personal loans	0.36	1.17
Construction	0.62	0.68
Stockpiling	1.01	2.86
Raw material purchase loans	14.84	22.02
Documentary credits	50.56	44.20
Enterprise treasury offices	1.74	2.03

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SOFIDE, whose capital was increased in 1977 to 4 MZ, has doubled the volume of its operations, which rose from 10.1 MZ in 1976 to 22.01 MZ in 1977. For the first 3 quarters of 1978 the amount of transactions was 13.91 MZ. The value of transactions increased, along with their amount, from 31.21 percent in 1976 to 47.41 percent in 1977 and 54 percent in 1978.

The share of the agricultural sector continues to increase since it was 3.20 percent in 1975, 22.3 percent in 1976, 33.46 percent in 1977 and reached almost 50 percent for the first 3 quarters of 1978.

Manufacturing industry rose from 35.60 percent in 1976 to 57.64 percent in 1977. In 1977 construction recorded 4.54 percent, transportation 1.57 percent, extractive industry 0.68 percent and other services 2.11 percent.

Assistance in 1977 benefited especially enterprises with a foreign majority (71.67 percent) and the interior of the country enjoyed 61 percent of the projects and 66 percent of their value.

In 1977, SOFIDE had a fund of its own which rose to 10 MZ and a special fund of 13 MZ for financing small and medium agricultural enterprises. It also was aided by foreign credits (IDA [International Development Association] and CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation]). The debt collections are satisfactory. Unpaid debts were hardly 1 percent of outstanding business on 31 December 1977. The profit for the fiscal year 1977 amounted to 606,577 zaires.

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ZAIRE

BELGIAN FINOUTREMER'S ACTIVITIES IN ZAIRE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3220

[Article: "Zairian Activities by the Belgian Group FINOUTREMER"]

[Text] The administrative council of the European and Overseas Financial Company (FINOUTREMER), a Belgian company, has filed its report for the 1978-79 fiscal year. It is to be presented at a general meeting on 19 November 1979 and indicates the following activities by its Zairian subsidiaries in the context of the present economic situation in Zaire.

"The activities and financial results of our Zairian branches and subsidiaries are subject to the general condition of the economy of the Republic of Zaire. The country is particularly sensitive to a continuing international depression that recently caused several monetary adaptations. The authorities are striving, with the aid of international organizations, to remedy the situation. Their efforts are directed to both balancing the budget and reorganizing the administration. The necessary measures have now been put into action, which gives Zaire a new chance to strengthen its economy.

"As for our agroindustrial companies, the difficulties inherent in the general situation have often been worsened by unfavorable climatic conditions, especially in Lower Zaire, where there has been an unusual drought.

"Our companies have generally striven to maintain and increase, if possible, their productive capacity. The measures that have been taken should enable them to fulfill their social and economic function as the recovery plan is put into effect. Most of them have adapted their financial structure to reflect a 60-40 percent balance of interest with the government or private parties in Zaire. In the direction set on several occasions by the administrative council and communicated to our stockholders, our company has attempted systematically to reduce administrative services and has proceeded to make various changes in its portfolio."

FINOUTREMER has increased some of its activities in an attempt to concentrate its interests. It has thus acquired capital stock in certain subsidiaries, such as the Society for Managing and Financing Agricultural, Industrial and Commercial Enterprises (AGRICOM-AGRIGES), the Society for the Study and Management of Cement Works (EGECIM), Intertropical Comfima, and Frozen Foods and Products (PROFRIGO). It has also had the opportunity to acquire 10 percent

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of the capital of La Pastorale Finance Company, of which PROFRIGO already held 9 percent, as their interests in Zaire are interrelated. It also bought stock in Olfica, a company whose activities are in some ways similar to those of the SCA [expansion unknown]. The SCA has undertaken a financial reorganization involving capital reduction followed by two concomitant increases. On this occasion, FINOUTREMER underwrote for cash 47,052 shares of preferred stock and received 60,000 on credit.

In addition, the Union for the Creation of the Gbadolite Soya Project resulted in the constitution of the Gbadolite Agricultural Society (AGRIG-BADO). In exchange for its share in the Union, FINOUTREMER has received 568 shares in the new company, in which it holds a total of 815 shares after an additional subscription.

In accordance with the agreements concluded, the company has ceded a second part of its holdings in General Western, a French law firm. It has also sold its interest in AGRIDUS, a company that is being liquidated.

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ZAIRE

KINSHASA-NDJILI AIRPORT REPORTED DANGEROUS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3344

[Article: "The Kinshasa-Ndjili Airport Is Said To Be Dangerous"]

[Text] The FRENCH PRESS AGENCY correspondent in Kinshasa echoed the cry of alarm that has been sent up for the past several weeks by airlines serving Zaire. They report the increasingly unsafe conditions at the Kinshasa-Ndjili airport.

Several reports made by the companies involved and officials of the Airways Board report that a constant risk of collision exists due to extremely precarious security conditions that are well below the norms accepted by the IATA [International Air Travelers Association]. The authors of the report emphasize the bad general condition of the installations, the total lack of weather forecasting, the inadequacy of navigation aids, the undependability of radio navigation (mixed frequencies), and the defective quality of the control tower, all of which constitute a real danger to the people using them.

People in Kinshasa aeronautical circles note that the airlines are especially worried because fire control is practically nonexistent and there is no ambulance service to city hospitals. Insufficient equipment and personnel add to these unsafe conditions.

Finally, the anarchic management of the airport has led some companies, notably Air Zaire, Sabena, UTA [Air Transportation Union], and Alitalia, to advocate that the airport be privately operated so that it will be autonomous, as it is in European capitals.

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ZAIRI:

BRIEFS

FRG COOPERATION--The German-Zairian joint commission met in Kinshasa on 5-8 November. Zairian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mr Bolela Wa Boende and a West German delegation led by FRG Ambassador to Zaire Mr Werner Schattman were in attendance. A communique published at the close of the meeting on 9 November indicates that the FRG has decided to make DM 70.25 million available to Zaire in 1979 in the form of financial and technical cooperation between the two countries. DM 28.3 million not yet used are to be added to this sum. DM 50 million are for financial cooperation and DM 20.25 million are for technical cooperation. These credits are mainly intended to finance the investment programs of ONATRA [National Transport Office] and the SNCZ [Zairian National Railways] and the construction of a road between Kisangani and Bukavu. According to the communique, both countries plan to "strengthen trade" and cultural cooperation. The communique also states that "Zaire's mineral wealth, which the FRG urgently needs, ranks Zaire as a complementary country." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3220] 8782

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ZAMBIA

KAUNDA HOPES FOR END TO RHODESIAN CONFLICT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Dec 79 pp 34-35

[Article by Francois Soudan: "A Raped Country"]

[Text] At 55, Kenneth Kaunda has not changed: a pinch of Biblical humanism, a little of the Boy Scout spirit, a zest for utopian socialism and a dose of obliviousness. This is how his friends see the man who on Sunday, 28 October, celebrated the anniversary of 15 years in power, 15 years during which he has been the embodiment of Zambia. Along with Tanzanian Julius Nyerere, the sole survivor of the generation of the great leaders of English-speaking Africa, "KK," as he is called by those close to him, is not a man to arouse passion. He would more readily be taken for a modest pastor, who leads his country as one does a parish, rather than an omnipotent guide. Consequently, the few festivities in Lusaka marking the 15th anniversary of independence were an example of discretion.

The discretion was undoubtedly wise, inasmuch as a week previously, from 20 to 22 October, two Rhodesian commando raids destroyed a fortified camp of the ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) of Joshua Nkomo, 40 kilometers inside Zambia. Furthermore, it is scarcely the time in Zambia -- now less than ever -- for sumptuous expenditures. Perhaps Kaunda's political fuzziness and dilettantism, joined with a sharp sense of maneuvering and pragmatism, explain his presidential longevity. But they also explain, partially at least, the country's obscurity, its situation as the "Lebanon of Southern Africa."

For a dozen years, observers have regularly predicted Kaunda's fall and emphasized the collapse of the Zambian economy. To date, KK has always found pleasure in contradicting these predictions, but at the end of this year, it seemed that he was in a more delicate position than ever before.

What are the reasons? They have to do with two things: security and the economy. Zambia is a raped country and it is also occupied, to a certain extent. The rape is perpetrated nearly every week by the Rhodesian troops. Like the Israelis in Lebanon, Salisbury's men penetrate Zambia whenever and however they wish. Their target is the camps and leaders of the ZAPU,

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one of the two Zimbabwe nationalist movements which Kaunda "shelters" -- rather symbolically -- on his soil. The Rhodesian bombers calmly fly over the Zambian air space on their way to strafe the guerrilla camps 2,000 kilometers from their base along the Angolan border. General Walls' helicopter-borne commandos can go to downtown Lusaka to dynamite the general headquarters of Joshua Nkomo (April 1979). Teams of assassins murder ZAPU military leaders such as Alfred "Nikita" Mangena (killed in June 1978) or Lameck "Lookout" Mafela (seriously wounded in January 1979). This "work" is considerably facilitated by the likely presence of Rhodesian agents in high spheres of the Zambian Government. In November, Rhodesian commandos destroyed several important bridges, practically cutting off any Zambian opening to "independent" Africa.

Raped, Zambia is also an occupied country, somewhat like Lebanon. With its 15,000 men trained by Soviet and East German advisers, the ZAPU has an excessive tendency to act like a state within a state and an entire portion of southwestern Zambia is in fact controlled by the Namibian SWAPO guerrilla soldiers who have set up some of their rear bases there.

Within such a context, it is not at all surprising that the most dangerous dissent for Kaunda is that emanating from his own army. Made up of only 7,000 men and poorly equipped, it sees itself as humiliated, both by the insolent arrogance of the Rhodesians and by the fact that it is not the army but the ZAPU which in fact provides the altogether relative security of the country. The Zambian soldiers are demanding weapons -- whether Soviet or Western, they do not care -- which a cautious Kaunda refuses to give them. In May, this climate of tension led to the removal of Commander in Chief Peter Zuze and the resignation, as a sign of protest, of Kaunda's own son Panji. The two men were the leaders of the malcontents. But it would appear that this minipurge had scarcely any effects. The grumbling continues and it is said in Lusaka that the current commander in chief, Gen Benjamin Mibenge, a loyalist, has little authority over his men. The general mobilization ordered on 20 November to meet the "Rhodesian aggression" is not likely to calm them.

In addition, the omnipotence of the ZAPU has had an effect on Zambia's second current hot point: its economy. Most of the exports of Zambian copper (90 percent of the country's foreign exchange) take the tortuous railroad route in the south, through Rhodesia to the South African ports of Durban or Port Elizabeth. However, the line crosses certain areas of territory in Rhodesia that are controlled by the ZAPU, which, as soon as the Lusaka government shows any sign of impatience, threatens to sabotage it.

It is by this vital artery that the thousands of tons of corn and fertilizer regularly imported from South Africa come to relieve the constant hunger raging in western Zambia. A striking illustration of the state of near Bantustan in which the country finds itself is that these South African commodities have become a prime weapon in the hands of the government in Salisbury. Consequently, on 5 November, Abel Muzorewa decided to block

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200,000 tons of corn headed for Lusaka because Kaunda did not "prevent the Nkomo guerrillas from infiltrating into Zimbabwe." However, as we know, Kaunda can do little about it. Two months of such treatment would put Zambia in a situation of widespread famine.

The opposition, which has no official status -- all members of Parliament belong to the single party: the UNIP (United National Independence Party) -- is mainly a conservative and bourgeois force, something quite rare in Africa. But given the uncertain -- to say the least -- performances of a nationalized sector paralyzed by corruption and red tape, the anomaly is understandable. The leaders of this opposition, former Prime Minister Simon Kapwepwe and former Minister of Finance Arthur Wina, are demanding, in the name of pragmatism, a return to the private sector of hundreds of enterprises gathered together in INDECO [Industrial Development Corporation], a broader opening to South Africa, control of the ZAPU camps and recognition of the Muzorewa regime in Zimbabwe.

Above all, Kaunda fears that the discontent of the bourgeoisie will be combined with that of the army. Naturally, KK does still have a few cards left to play, particularly his personal prestige with the farmers and the copper miners. But what he mainly needs is an end to the interminable Rhodesian conflict. For him as for Zambia, peace in Zimbabwe would mean the end of many nightmares.

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