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JPRS L/8872

18 January 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 3/80)

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

IRAQ-MAURITANIA AID -On 27 October at the close of Iraqi Vice Premier Taha Yasin Ramadan's visit to Nouakchott, it was announced that Iraq would grant Mauritania \$20 million in the form of a long-term loan as well as gifts. According to Radio Nouakchott 12 millions of Iraq's long-term loan will be used to back up Mauritania's balance of payments. In addition, Iraq will grant Mauritania \$5 million for the construction of a television station in Nouakchott and \$3 million to face the consequences of the drought. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 pp 3015-3016] 7993

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ALGERIA

GOVERNMENT EMPHASIZES PARTY RENEWAL, AGRICULTURE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 pp 3253, 3254

[Text] One may indeed be surprised when the president of a legislative assembly, in solemnly opening a session, begins by congratulating his colleagues on the work they have just done, an effort which they will continue within other organizations. That however was the case on 29 October at Algiers when Mr Rabah Bitat, president of the National People's Assembly, reviewed the activities of numerous deputies within the context of the subcommittees of the FLN [National Liberation Front] Central Committee. The representatives of the people thus--under the auspices of the party which they are members of--contributed to the drafting of the basic laws--tasks which one might have expected to be accomplished rather within the framework of their own assembly.

But that precisely is the originality of the current Algerian structure, designed with a view to upgrading the party and enabling it fully to accomplish this exclusive leadership role which it received from the National Charter [constitution].

Thus, as Mr Rabah Bitat put it, "The complementary nature of political and legislative functions is beginning to be expressed concretely and actively and that complementary nature springs from the very spirit of the Algerian institutional system."

But that does not mean--and the president of the assembly right away emphasized that point--that the deputies as such do not have to pursue a legislative effort as such. Thus they will examine the fundamental laws pertaining to the control organization, an institution to which the government attaches outstanding importance. They will also adopt the national plan.

Finally, the representatives of the people, in concert with the executive branch, will proceed to the "adaptation of legal standards to the guidelines of the party and to the profound changes experienced by the country in order better to make sure that the law will be the fundamental instrument of the state and of society." We note that this clever formulation once again

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confirms that primacy of the FLN which the Algerian government agencies are energetically resolved to turn into reality.

Important Role of National Organizations

The national organizations play an essential role toward this end and the president of the assembly did not fail to recall that most of the deputies are members of those national organizations.

One of those organizations has just had its national council meeting; that was the UNFA (National Union of Algerian Women) whose meetings were opened on 9 October by its secretary-general, Mme Djeghroud, under the chairmanship of the party coordinator Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui. The latter urged that the organization's political role be developed in depth. Without particularly emphasizing "the realization of the aspirations of Algerian women," the need for which he briefly touched on, Mr Yahiaoui vigorously urged self-criticism which is an indispensable "revolutionary step" suitable for "bringing out all negative aspects and insufficiencies that slowed down the organization's march"; the slight overtone of blame was quite evident.

Mr Yahiaoui then mentioned the case of the people's assemblies in the communities and the governorates; he did not conceal the fact that "in most cases, these organizations did not play their real role." The choice of men, he explained, was not always good and the party should make sure that this will be handled in a more rigorous fashion in the future; nobody is forced to join the party if he is not convinced as to its ideology but there is no shortage of sincere militants who can provide an infusion of new blood.

While looking forward to "an in-depth explanation and training effort," intended to increase the political sensitivities of the members, the UNFA Council was concerned with protection for children, education, the improvement of living conditions, particularly through rigorous price controls and the harmonization of wages in keeping with the rising cost of living.

The need for integrating Algerian women into modern society was vigorously underscored. The congress members talked about the future "family code" which, as we know, is still in the drafting stage, because conservative circles are heavily challenging the liberal guidelines of the project. They express the wish that this code "be inspired by revolutionary principles and that it reflect Algerian authenticity"; it should in particular "preserve the family cell and take into consideration its evolution in a society in the midst of change"; it would be a good idea to make it an object of "vast popular debate."

Need for Picking the Best People Among the Grass Roots

The election of the new people's assemblies in the communities and governorates, to be held this autumn, will constitute an excellent opportunity



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for the FLN to impose its position in practice. The deficiencies reported, as we saw earlier, by Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, were some of the major causes for the difficulties encountered in the agrarian revolution; while these assemblies--which were enlarged, where necessary--should be the essential instruments in constituting the socialist land sector, they made it possible, due to negligence and more often even due to complacency, for many landowners to hold on to their land which, under the provisions of the law, should have been nationalized.

Likewise "There can be no question of allowing the profiteers or those who displayed incompetence in the exercise of their responsibilities to try to run for any kind of office" (EL MOUDJAHID, editorial, 10 October 1979). The local and regional assemblies thus must present their activity reports and the candidates will be picked among their members in the light of those reports.

Even before the elections, it will be necessary to elect new party "grass-roots authorities," that is to say, the bureaus of its cells and its "kasmus." In this connection, the FLN hopes that there will also be a real replacement in terms of individual members.

These revitalization efforts, which have been underway for several weeks, are being watched in the field with great attention by Mr Djilali Affane Guezane, chairman of the party commission for elections and elected representatives.

During one of these trips to the provinces, Mr Affane Guezane denounced the "spirit of tribalism and despotism which still prevails among certain militants" and which entails the risk of undermining the very foundations of the party. Thus he stressed the need for broadening the party's base which "is not the special preserve of a minority of citizens but which must open its doors to all those who meet the criteria of integrity, competence and commitment stated in the constitution."

And Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui furthermore on 26 October, in addressing the Central Committee members who were called upon to keep tabs on and supervise these operations, stressed the decisive importance of personnel selection in this situation; in the final analysis, it is the quality of future regional development plans, in other words, the fight against regional inequalities and hardships, which will depend on these personnel selections.

Agriculture to Be Restored

Agriculture has been particularly challenged because of the agrarian revolution; according to criticisms currently expressed in Algeria, with repercussions abroad, the financing and organization effort made in support of agriculture was all the more insufficient since the failure of an agrarian revolution--entirely too ambitious and poorly implemented--caused tremendous waste.

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Algerian leaders or officials often take issue with these extreme statements and president Chadli Bendjedid himself, in his recent interview in LE MOINDE (2 November), had some specific comments to make on this point: "Contrary to what certain people said, agriculture was not sacrificed. But we had to make certain decisions. The agricultural sector at least had the merit of existing, something which was not true of industry." After having given priority to industry as well as education and health, "When the moment came, we launched the agrarian revolution, a revolution to which industry can now make its contribution."

This brief summary given by way of justification undoubtedly looks rather optimistic and this is especially so since it seems to infer that the agrarian revolution stimulated rural production. Looking at the overall results, the material balance sheet is rather negative: "Our agricultural output level," Mr Selim Saadi, minister of agriculture and the agrarian revolution, said on 12 October at Saïda, "dropped compared to what it was right after independence."

The press published some rather eloquent statistics along those same lines: Algerian imports of food products accounted for, respectively, 731, 925, and 4,049 million dinars during the first three-year plan and during the two first four-year plans. In 1978, cereal imports were 3.7 times higher than the annual average for the period of 1967-1969. Not only did the number of consumers go up but national cereal production declined; it dropped from an index of 100 in 1954-1967 to an index of 82.3 in 1974-1977 (according to the 18 October issue of EL MOUDJAHID).

On the other hand one might maintain that the output of certain sectors did increase, such as truck gardening whose output went up 23 percent and citrus fruits which went up 40 percent (same source). One might also stress the success of several major undertakings, such as, in the south, the creation of the Abadla irrigated area, which wrested 5,000 hectares from the desert. We must also consider the social and moral progress made in the rural areas where the living conditions of the peasants were improved in many ways. However, if we listen to the pessimists, this transformation was not enough to slow down the flight from the land.

Consequently, even though Algeria is making a great effort to contradict the critics, whose malevolence is often quite systematic, people are engaging in very deep thinking on the ways to restore a rural situation that constitutes cause for concern.

Addressing the self-management officials of a property near Tlemcen, on 8 October, Mr. Selim Saadi urged them "to go beyond the stage of simple complaints, to examine the problems within their proper context, to suggest measures suitable for putting an end to the current lethargy. This is not only the task of the technical cadres in this sector; it is also the task of the fellahs who are running into daily difficulties. Once all of the

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viewpoints have been gathered at the grass roots, it will be possible quickly to draft a farm policy which will fully play the role of spring-board in the economic area."

As a matter of fact, everybody readily agrees on the overall observations and the general ideas. A big meeting of agriculture cadres, held at the ministry of agriculture and agrarian revolution on 16 and 17 October, produced conclusions which are not at all unexpected. It is necessary to fight against negligence, against laxity, against the avoidance of responsibilities, against anything that harms group work, against the discouragement of too many producers, against the obstacles put up by the enemies of the revolution and their allies.

The officials involved declare that they are determined to pursue the effort aimed at the success of the agrarian revolution and they say that they are "mobilized" with a view to reorganizing agriculture, assuring the social and cultural advancement of the fellah, deconcentrating the technical support structures, recasting the supply and sales circuits, and, more generally, all procedures, eliminating waste and passivity, maintaining land and water resources, and finally launching a rural housing policy particularly based on self-help construction efforts.

Some Specific Projects

But out in the field, and we must emphasize this, Mr Selim Saadi talked plain language. In the course of a visit to the governorate of Saida, on 12 October, he said: "The fellah of the socialist sector must tie his future to his own output; that future depends on raising the output level"; government aid must not consist of outside support but must try to facilitate and increase the participation of the fellahs. In his analysis, the minister pointed out that the management of the production units has not been properly mastered, that the quality of manpower has deteriorated, and that the supply and sales structures are insufficient.

Some elements of solution have already been listed. The state farms, under the development institutes, will constitute the vanguard of production and will serve as examples. Farming establishments which are too big and too numerous in the socialist sector will be broken up. Rural housing will be renewed with the help of the construction of hamlets making it possible to house the peasant in the area of his activity, with a central village, midway inbetween, containing the social, administrative, and cultural facilities; in other words, the socialist village will become a kind of cluster.

The organizational setup of the cooperatives will be made more efficient so that they will not confine themselves to supplying equipment and selling products but so that they will provide institutes for local agriculture and so that they will support the growers.

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The offices and services dealing with the rural environment will be reorganized in the light of the search for efficiency; in each governorate there will be created certain structures consisting of all of the agricultural organizations, capable of meeting all needs; officials are envisaging the establishment of two regional subdirectorates, one of them to be charged with rural improvement and the other with agricultural supply. The organizations intended to handle public supply--with milk, for example--will be increased in number and will be moved closer to the consumer.

Finally, the third phase of the agrarian revolution, involving the prairie and animal husbandry, will receive new impetus, particularly due to the creation of a high commission for pasturage, endowed with extensive authority.

Imagination, a practical approach, and a determination to win thus seem necessary to characterize this period of revival of socialist rural health-management and of the agrarian revolution in line with the principles and objectives which must under no circumstances be renounced.

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ALGERIA

HOUSING CONSTRUCTION COOPERATION WITH HUNGARY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3261

[Text] A Hungarian housing engineering conference was held between 14 and 23 November in the exposition pavilion at Maritime Pines. Under the patronage of Mr Abdelmadjid Aouchiche, Algerian minister of urban development, construction, and housing, and Dr Abraham Kalman, Hungarian minister of construction and urban development, this event was designed, through an exposition of public works equipment, to permit the showing of films and lectures on planning, urban development, as well as training and technology in Hungary in the field of construction so as to present a precise idea of the possibilities for cooperation between Algeria and Hungary in the housing field.

In the address delivered after the opening of this technical conference, Mr Abdelmadjid Aouchiche, also speaking in his capacity as co-chairman of the mixed intergovernmental committee on Algerian-Hungarian cooperation, stressed the importance of this initiative in view of the considerable upswing which the construction sector is expected to experience within the framework of the next development plan. The importance of the talks between the Algerian and Hungarian delegations on 14 November was further underscored by the proximity of the next meeting of the mixed committee, scheduled for early in 1980.

On the occasion of the Hungarian housing engineering conference, Algerie Presse Service, the national press agency, recalled that bilateral cooperation in this field received its first impetus in 1970 with the signing of an agreement calling for the establishment of a heavy prefabrication plant of the "Olygon" type with an output capacity of 500 housing units per year to the benefit of the EPBTP (Multipurpose Housing and Public Works Enterprise) of Annaba. This unit became operational in May 1978.

Furthermore, the protocol signed at Budapest on 23 September 1978, established a schedule of meetings between the respective organizations of the two countries for the purpose of seeking suitable ways and means for consolidating the bonds of bilateral cooperation. In this context, a certain number of projects was carried out. Thus, the organization of cultural exchange to the benefit of the housing industry workers, on the Algerian side, provided

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an opportunity for sending 70 families of workers from the Annaba EPBTP to Hungary, between 26 August and 16 September 1979.

Concerning practical implementation, the Annaba EPBTP is still holding talks with the Exemport enterprise for the construction of 2,750 housing units (2,000 at Annaba and 750 at Guelma) with the pertinent facilities (schools, shopping centers, transportation).

A contract was signed between the Vati and Cadat enterprises with a view to assigning, to the Algerian fund, a multidisciplinary team of 12 experts for a period of 2 years to study urban development and the improvement of the Skikda region. The experts are now in the area.

Moreover, 27 Algerian trainees (20 technicians on scholarships, three for postgraduate studies in urban development and four higher-level technicians in the field of dimensions and prices) will go to Hungary at the end of the month while SONATIBA (National Infrastructure and Building Construction Company) is negotiating with the Femmunicas enterprise for construction of an iron foundry.

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ALGERIA

BRIEFS

FRENCH IRRIGATION EQUIPMENT--The roll-on-roll-off vessel "Antinea," of the UIM (Metallurgical Industries Union), delivered 283 tons of irrigation equipment from Sete to Algiers, including 162 crates of aluminum pipes weighing 132 tons, intended for irrigated sugar beet cultivation in Algeria. This equipment was produced at Paulhan (Herault) by the Irrifrance Company which also signed irrigation equipment contracts with Tunisia, Morocco, and the Antilles. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3261] 5058

LINE OF CREDIT FROM LLOYDS--The Lloyds Bank of Great Britain last week announced that it had just opened a new line of credit of 6.5 million pounds made available to the BAD (Algerian Development Bank). This capital could also be used for the collective financing of small Algerian purchases in Great Britain involving goods and services whose value does not justify the negotiation of individual loans. As the orders come in gradually, the Algerian bank could draw on this credit in order to cover up to 85 percent of the amount of the bills. This is the second transaction of this kind between the two banks. The first loan primarily served for the purchase of cranes, forklifts, and machinery intended for the food industry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3262] 5058

AIRPORT EXTENSION--As part of a four-day inspection and working visit to the governorates of Tlemcen, Sidi Bel-Abbes, and Mascara as well as the district of Arzew, Mr Salah Goudjil, minister of transportation, on 12 November visited the international airports at Oran-Es Senia which is to be the subject of studies with a view to a possible expansion of its capacity. The annual traffic volume presently is something like 900,000 passengers, whereas the capacity of the facilities in place does not exceed 600,000 passengers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3262] 5058

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EGYPT

EGYPTIAN POLITICAL WRITER COMMENTS ON EGYPT, ARAB WORLD

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22 Nov 79 pp 35-37

Interview with Lutfi al-Khuli; date and place not given

Text This is the second and last segment of an interview with Lutfi al-Khuli, the politician, writer and thinker, about issues running the gamut from the emergence of the communist movement to the issue of unity and pan-Arabism. In this segment he responds to questions covering the relationships and problems of the Egyptian left from 'Abd-al-Nasir to Anwar al-Sadat. The dialogue also covers the position of al-Sadat and his unilateral peace with Israel and then Lutfi al-Khuli's view, as an Egyptian political thinker, of the present Arab reality following Camp David. At some spots in the course of the dialogue, he takes a break and gives his uninhibited impressions of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, Anwar al-Sadat, Khalid Muhi-al-Din and Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal.

Question You are a regular party-line Marxist. What was your impression of the 23 July revolution at the moment it erupted?

Answer The moment the revolution erupted was a profoundly happy moment because it got rid of the monarchical regime that was allied with feudalism, capitalism and imperialism. It was the beginning of the move upward.

Question Some of its opponents from the right and the left charged that it was American inspired and was a coup, not a revolution?

Answer No, it was not American. I personally do not believe that. However, given the struggles, the chaos, the novelty of the experiment, the army element and our unprecedented ideas, the revolution was inevitably shaped in the form of a military coup and the use of the army, in line with the literature prevailing in socialist thinking, certainly had to lead to a sort of reaction and fascism.

The publications of the free officers prior to the revolution had taken up the position of the nationalist movement in its leftwing extensions; they opposed alliances and imperialism and supported agrarian reform.

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Those who launched the revolution were young, junior officers who had entered the military academy in the climate of the rebirth of the nationalist movement in the 30's.

Accordingly, we were pushed and pulled by two lines of thinking; one, on the one hand, was a feeling of welcome towards the nationalism of the leaders of the movement and the possibility that it would be a real key to a better society and, on the other hand, a feeling of apprehension over its military hue.

The revolution's actions thrust us into this hesitancy and conflict: the execution of the two workers, Khamis and al-Baqri in 1952, then the promulgation of the first agrarian reform law in 1952 as well, the convening of a constituent assembly to draft a constitution, abrogation of parties, establishment of single-party liberation body and removal of the monarchical system.

Question As a regular Marxist as well, how did you evaluate Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and his role at the beginning of the revolution and then upon his death?

Answer 'Abd-al-Nasir was not an ordinary person. In fact, his place was to play a positive, unique role in the course of history. Suffice it to say that when he inclined toward a given trend in his country, the Arab homeland or the third world, it was that trend which would dominate.

Accordingly, he used to represent an objective force through this unique historic role. Whatever negative aspects there were in his dealing with democracy, he was a fundamental guarantee of political and economic independence and social development with dimensions of socialism, pan-Arabism and the Arab struggle.

So, the loss of this guarantee gave rise to some very worrisome factors, particularly since 'Abd-al-Nasir did not leave behind an organized people. The street was in disorder and there was no school containing Nasir's cadre to fill the vacuum were he to leave the scene.

Question What is your evaluation of Nasir now, in 1979, after everything that has happened since he left the scene?

Answer Were I to take a position against him, I would be guilty of subjectivism and narrow horizons. I have transcended all this. He, without argument, was one of the greatest leaders of the nationalist movement. He led the great beginnings in the history of Egypt: he initiated the liquidation of colonialism and the blows at imperialism and the multinational corporations and he began the realization of political and economic independence.

Question I see you stress "the beginning" only?

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Answer He was the one who made the great beginning in giving the national liberation movement an advanced social content with socialist horizons. He was the one who made the start in converting Egypt from an agricultural society to an industrial-agricultural society. He was the one who made the great start in Arab unity. However he was also responsible for some relapses in these initiatives, such as the triumph of one-man rule, the approach of employing divine decisions...nevertheless, one must take into consideration the base nature of the colonialist hegemony and Arab and domestic reaction, including the bureaucracy and its stand against him.

Question You met and talked with Nasir more than once and you were a confidant of those who were in very close touch with him. Who was Nasir the ruler, Nasir the man and Nasir the citizen?

Answer I used to feel that 'Abd-al-Nasir respected ideas and education and was open to different ideas and opinions through free discussion and through reading.

'Abd-al-Nasir was not a sociable person and had few friends. I raised that with Haykal and Haykal raised it with him and his reply was: "I am now a president of a republic. If I go out who should I sit down with? Should I suffer immersing myself in the homes of the high officials and the wealthy while, at the same time, I cannot go to the home of a worker and a peasant?"

However he was quite sensitive to the masses through his direct contact with them in his public speeches and reading the letters he received and in the reports which would be submitted to him. Right there was the weak point for the entry of the cancer virus of the security machinery which through a variety of methods would arouse his anger against a specific person or persons.

Question Didn't he punish the security officials when he discovered that he had been the victim of one of their reports?

Answer He didn't punish the apparatus.

Question Exactly where would you put Nasir, in the right, center or left of the 23 July revolution?

Answer Nasir naturally was in the leftwing of the 23 July revolution and enjoyed the advantage that he was a man of the state.

Question And Khalid Muhi-al-Din?

Answer Khalid as well. Nasir even gave the name Khalid to his oldest son. However, he used to say to Khalid Muhi-al-Din: "You have been in too much of a rush in raising issues."

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What If Zakariyah Muhi-al-Din Were President?

Question Had Zakariya Muhi-al-Din continued on as vice president of the republic and had he not resigned to be replaced by Anwar al-Sadat, do you think that Egypt would have concluded a unilateral peace with Israel as has happened in the al-Sadat era?

Answer No. Zakariya Muhi-al-Din was opposed to a peace with Israel.

Question How could a ruler or president divert a country the size of Egypt from its national and pan-Arab course? Why was the opposition to President al-Sadat politically and popularly weak?

Answer There are objective and subjective reasons. The situation which Nasir bequeathed to Egypt gave the legitimate ruler, particularly in an Egypt with one-man rule and a bureaucracy constructed over 7,000 years, a leading role in defining the nature of the course to be followed and also in creating an alliance of specific social forces.

Question There is a feeling that the Egyptian opposition is still coexisting with the regime. Why isn't there a total political boycott of the regime as long as it has defined its options and its alliances against the Arabs and with Israel?

Answer The political and social circumstances of people who make a living from their work, such as me, do not permit that. They have no property or businesses, merely their own potential. The ones controlling the major issues work in the public sector. If you are at odds with the establishment, you don't work. So a view in a vacuum is not realistic; you either had to attack him or abandon your work.

Question But don't you consider this position as being at the expense of your principles?

Answer It was not at the expense of principles at all. If there were no alternative to conflict, we would say no, engage in conflict, have our salaries cut off and make the sacrifice if that called for the duty of sacrifice.

The main problem between us and Nasir was that we had a distinctive program, perspective and political and social position, both with regard to the course of the Nasir experiment or with regard to the course of the al-Sadat experiment, though in differing degrees.

The issue was that we should continue to have an independent position with regard to expression and action. During the Nasir era, we succeeded in having him accept our independence and coexist with us on this basis.

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Consequently there was not break and AL-TALI'AH was not shut down. 'Abd-al-Nasir used to deal with us as a party and this went on with President al-Sadat until the 1975 incidents, the student clashes, and things reached their peak in January 1977. There were clashes and al-Sadat and the regime rejected our independence and closed down AL-TALI'AH. I was removed from the Socialist Union, having been in charge of foreign relations and was a member of the central committee. My colleagues, Fu'ad Mursi and Isma'il Sabri, were kicked out of the cabinet. In this connection, Marxists had not participated in the cabinet throughout 'Abd-al-Nasir's era and only for a short time in the al-Sadat era.

Al-Sadat Is Changing the Course of the Experiment

Question You were subjected to prison in the Nasir era and not during the al-Sadat era. Why not? Can you put your experience with the two men on a single plane?

Answer You cannot say that. The fact is that prison was a means of striking a blow at freedom of opinion and expression. However, Nasir's methods were temporary and were in the context of continuing the experiment while al-Sadat's are permanent and within the context of changing the course of the experiment.

Question As long as that is the case, why isn't there a complete break between the system and the opposition? Does the Grouping Party draw a distinction between the system and its institutions and the al-Sadat government and its actions and policies?

Answer The system means the constitution and its political, economic and social bases, bases that say that Egypt is a part of the Arab homeland, has a socialist program, is a state of democratic institutions and that all forces are guaranteed freedom of expression. We are abiding by the system. We say that the government establishment through its practices is the one that is violating the constitution, in other words, violating the system.

Question It appears a little ambiguous to me.

Answer We are fighting to have the constitution a respected reality. Given this concept, we are siding with and cooperating with the system and derive our legitimacy from the sense of this constitution.

We oppose the government for its violation of and departure from the constitution, both in its domestic and foreign policy and particularly with regard to its handling of the Arab-Israeli struggle and Egypt's pan-Arab obligations.

Question About the Grouping Party: is it a party, a grouping or a front?

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[Answer] When the issue of forums began to emerge in 1976, the progressive and nationalist forces with a pan-Arab, socialist and democratic dimension found themselves facing several options. We could either fight and quarrel among ourselves over who would get the leftwing forum and pave the way for the government establishment to pick its leftwing as it wished, or the left could be an expression and a unified political structure could be built for the left, despite differences in ideological and social programs.

There were meetings and get-togethers among the Marxists, the Nasirists, the enlightened religious types and the progressive socialists. They discussed the situation and found that the disagreements among them were not so great as to prevent them from identifying the crisis and the way to solve it and to come with proposed solutions for it. So was born the name "the National Progressive Unionist Grouping" [NUPUG]. It reflects the nature and objective of the elements that comprise it.

You ask me whether this party is a party, a grouping or a front. In fact, this issue was put before the founding body which included 214 persons. The reality is that we now have the fabric of a party, a fabric which from the standpoint of cohesiveness is closer to a party than a front. A party narrows rather than widens disputes and strengthens unity of action. In general, it was the movement, experience and the time which ultimately dictated the actual choices. It is clear that the course of event is moving toward adoption of a party formula.

[Question] To which faction of the NUPG party do you belong?

[Answer] I am in the Marxist faction. I think that one must draw a distinction between a Marxist and a communist. The phenomenon of independent Marxism is now a major one. The Marxists who belong to the NUPG party must not belong to any other organization or party, overt or underground.

The NUPG Party Made No Mistake in Entering the Elections

[Question] Didn't the NUPG Party make a mistake in deciding to enter the general elections in Egypt recently, particularly after al-Sadat's law barring candidates from challenging the unilateral peace treaty with Israel?

[Answer] The fact is that there were two trains of thought in the party. One view held that with this law the elections had lost any political significance and that our participation in them would imply shedding some legitimacy on the peace agreement and yet not give us the opportunity to challenge it in debate and to define why we had opposed and would oppose it.

The other view held just the opposite. It held that as long as we were a party, we had to get involved in these campaigns, whatever the restrictions that had been imposed, with the goal of knocking down these restrictions. The second view won out.

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In the election campaign and the statements of our candidates, we said that we had issued statements setting forth our position on the Camp David agreement and then our candidates and speakers went around reading these statements and positions. Had we made any direct reference to these agreements, we would have been subject to prosecution.

So, the campaign was political. We had to interact with the masses through these elections and it was a successful tactic, whether or not the elections were free with the results preordained.

Question Sometimes it appears to me that there is more media coverage surrounding the NUPG Party than is justified by its real size?

Answer We don't claim to be a majority party. We are a minority party but a minority that contains the most effective ideological and technical elements in various fields. In conformity with the law, our records and the records deposited with the parties committee show that the party has 160,000 members.

You may say that this is a size on paper only. Yes, that is the paper size of the membership. However, it is the active membership that expresses the effectiveness of the party. We have members who are making sacrifices, some by moving their employment and some who are being subjected to pressures and intimidation.

In any case, we have what could be described as the essence of responsive, competent Egyptian thought in all spheres of activity, economic, union, political and ideological. Here lies the essential strength of the party which is bolstered by the unity among all its elements, tributaries, rank and file and leadership.

There are symbols in the party leadership embodying a new manifestation in the Egyptian political mentality. The party struggler words illegible of Nasirists, pan-Arabist and Marxists, like Khalid Muhi-al-Din. He is one of those who set off the July revolution. He was at odds with the revolution over the issue of democracy but he did not stoop to mudslinging when he was in opposition to Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and this shows his honesty and idealism.

Question How would you classify Khalid Muhi-al-Din politically: a Nasirist, a Marxist, a socialist or what?

Answer He is in fact a religious man; he prays, goes on the pilgrimage and fasts. He follows a Marxist course in his thinking, perspective and personality but he rejects the Marxist philosophical paths; in other words, he rejects dialectical materialism which he views as incompatible with religion, but he accepts its social and economic laws and theory. He is completely sincere in this.

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[Question] In a few words, how would you classify him?

[Answer] I consider him a religious Marxist. Religion is no obstacle. In Europe there are religious Marxists and communists. The French Communist Party deleted from its slogan the phrase "No member shall be a religious believer."

[Question] But doesn't that conflict with scientific Marxism?

[Answer] One of the main errors of Marxists is to believe or imagine that their battle is with heaven; the battle, in fact, is with exploiters and tyrants. The values of the struggle exist in Islam. There is nothing to prevent there being a socialist society in conformity with scientific laws, based on a strong democracy, with a single pan-Arab dimension but, at the same time, flying the banner of Islam.

It is constantly reported that Marxism stated that religion is the opium of the masses. Yes, Marx said that but he also said: "I am not a Marxist." He opposed freezing theory and transforming it into dogma as that abrogated the theory of dialectics, according to Marxist thinking.

They have confined themselves to saying that Marx said that religion is the opium of the masses but they have left out the full text. He also said that religion has the fighting values needed to charge the masses with the strength and power to defeat injustice, tyranny and exploitation. Consequently, religion becomes the strength of the masses.

Our populace in Egypt is, in fact, a religious populace; in other words, it believes in religiously defined values. In the Marxist concept, the faith of the masses is converted into physical power; without it, there can be no change or any achievement of actual, tangible progress. Otherwise, we would have had to import an irreligious populace.

[Question] When you were talking directly with 'Abd-al-Nasir in the 1961-1962 period, what issues were mainly on his mind and what was his position toward them?

[Answer] Discussion, for example, revolved around: What is the political option and what is the collective option? He was also very interested in the pan-Arab option and in social development. For instance, in his view Marxism would lead to apostasy; he rejected it from the ideological and denominational standpoint but agreed with its social laws.

[Question] And democracy?

[Answer] It was the topic of constant debate and we never reached agreement except in sort of a compromise solution. We agreed that the communists should dissolve their organization and be accepted as members in the Socialist Union.

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In any case, Nasir used to interact with us as a party and this interaction in this concept continued with the arrival of al-Sadat.

Question You are a friend of Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal and you have worked with him. What is your view of him as a politician?

Answer We must first make clear that there is a political disagreement between us but each of us respects the other. I do not believe that he has ever used his administrative or political powers to suppress any view or to dictate that things be written along a given line.

Haykal was 'Abd-al-Nasir's mentor in his development when he used to think that there was Soviet imperialism and no American imperialism until they found that friendship with the Soviet Union was a strategic basis for the international relations of Egypt and the third world, and that America was the leader of international imperialism.

Question Does he take pride in his political capacity or his journalistic capacity?

Answer Haykal is a journalist, not a man of political action. Haykal is an individual and is unaffiliated thanks to his individual independence.

Question Does he have no political ambitions?

Answer His political ambition is through being a journalist and he directs it to serve a given line of thinking or regime.

Question How would you personally evaluate his journalistic ability?

Answer He is an extremely capable journalist, particularly as a reporter, a writer, an editor or an editor of a whole newspaper.

Question However there are those who accuse him of turning AL-AHRAM into a power center during his time there?

Answer AL-AHRAM used to reflect all attitudes of the nationalist and political forces. For the right there was Butrus Ghali who was the editor of the magazine, AL-SIYASAH AL-DUWWALIYAH. For the left there was AL-TALI'AH that was edited by the Marxists. For the center there was Tawfiq al-Hakim, Najib Mahfuz, Bint al-Shati' and al-Husayn Fawzi.

So AL-AHRAM was not a power center but was a center of diffusion.

Question Is he a political analyst or thinker?

Answer Haykal is a journalistic writer and follows the American journalistic school in analysis. Read Kissinger's memoirs and read Haykal's memoirs about the Ramadan war and you will find a similarity in the narration and drawing of lessons from them.

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I and Al-Sadat's Political School

Question And you, are you a politician or a journalistic writer?

Answer Journalism and writing as far as I am concerned are an extension of my political work and are means to serve the ends of this work whether strategically or tactically. I don't mean journalism in itself or writing in itself but with regard to technical or literary works; that kind of writing in particular.

Question A few years ago you wrote a series of articles on "the al-Sadat political school." Do you now think that your analysis matches its reality?

Answer Permit me to claim with all due modesty that in that set of articles I published in 1975, through my work in the Socialist Union and through many hours and days of discussions that I had directly with President al-Sadat and those around him, I predicted al-Sadat's course in broad lines, both domestically and externally and both with regard to his relations with the Soviet Union and America and his Arab relations, as well as his proceeding to conclude a peace with Israel.

I claim that the incident that made me monitor all of President al-Sadat's positions was his venturing to reopen the Suez Canal.

Some or most of these articles came as a shock in the nationalist movement because they pictured me as defending al-Sadat.

The fact is that I laid out the al-Sadat phenomenon which they had not taken seriously when the first beginnings appeared in a political laboratory or plant. I did not insert my own point of view; I merely monitored what was going on on the basis that it was a new political school that was constantly taking the initiative while his opposition was always taking reactive positions with no initiative.

I concluded that he would reach a peace with Israel with America's help and support from Iran and would try to substitute for the Arab and pan-Arab world with the so-called Islamic world, that is, Iran, Turkey and similar countries.

The important thing was to confirm the soundness of my predictions. He called me in personally and discussed that with me and, following this discussion, I became further convinced that my predictions were correct.

Question Now where does President al-Sadat stand in your final analysis.

Answer President al-Sadat has attained his choice and must pursue this option because abandoning it would mean that he would leave and he does not want to leave. He views himself as having undertaken an historic

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action and feels that time will prove that he took the definitive course and he will continue to pursue this course. So he has no possibilities for retreat because he has picked his option.

However, normalization of relations, Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty are facing mounting opposition from the Egyptian people and its political forces.

Question What do you think the Arabs must do as long as al-Sadat has picked his course and is no longer able to retreat from it?

Answer The Arabs must take into consideration that Egypt can only be Arab from the standpoint of its reality, destiny and best interests.

Question Do you expect President al-Sadat to turn to dissolution of the NUPG Party?

Answer The campaign against the party is continuing and will not be broken off and an attempt to dissolve it and the use of approaches that would lead to that are all in the cards.

Question Why do you insist on staying in Egypt while many of al-Sadat's opponents have left, particularly those from the leftwing?

Answer For a person who has his obligations, his political work and his affiliation with a political group or a party is, in fact, an unjustified flight.

I Will Not Leave Egypt Even Were I To Face Prison

Question As a consequence of this, won't you have to go along with the system at the expense of your positions and principles?

Answer There is no going along with it in political action. With regard to writing, I am barred from it so where will I be going along? I will not leave Egypt even were I to face prison. Prison is in the cards for me and my colleagues in the NUPG.

Question Every system has its own circumstances. In general the issue of democracy is a pressing one and is the daily bread for the average Arab. It is not longer acceptable to impose restrictions on him and his rights must be respected under any system. Without that we cannot restore strength and progress to the Arab liberation movement and cope with the imperialist-Zionist incursion. These restrictions put the people and an individual in the position of being only an onlooker.

Question Whis has priority for you- - socialism or unity? Can social justice or socialism be achieved before unity of the homeland and unity of the people are brought about?

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Answer Achieving economic integration and pan-Arab unity. True democracy will be achieved when all Arab territory from the Gulf to the Atlantic becomes a theatre for the open expression, work and action for the Arab union. Zionism is certainly defeating the achievement pan-Arab action and unity.

Question What are your aspirations as an Arab and as a political thinker?

Answer The time is here for a sort of forthrightness and absorption of the fruit of past experience. We need a new and wise Arab enlightenment movement in the era of the worrisome international relaxation, the era of the scientific and technological revolution, in the era of the new Palestinian renaissance, in the era of the new oil phenomenon which gives the Arabs tremendous underlying and fundamental capabilities but whose time will end by the end of the century and in the era of the new Islamic renaissance.

The time is here for an open, rational and comprehensive dialogue among the fundamental ideological tributaries, the religious, the (modernist) liberal, the pan-Arab and the Marxist, on the basis of the fruit of experience over the past quarter of a century and of reality and present problems.

The time is here for us to learn from one another and to overcome the statement that one current has a monopoly on truth to the exclusion of others and claims to alone speak for people and history.

The ultimate objective is to fortify the Arab mentality and the Arab psyche against ignorance and backwardness and against narrowmindedness and wrong thinking. Consequently we will leap into the contemporary era and progress.

The time is here for us guide the course of disputes among, disputes that cannot be disregarded whether from the social or political aspect in order to be worthy of being Arabs, masters of our fate and in touch with the realities of the time.

Question Do you believe that this dialogue among these currents of opinion is possible, given their differences and quarrels?

Answer The important thing is that we have the courage to engage in a dialogue and the courage to recognize that those who disagree with us have some relative truth on their side which we may have ignored and are continuing to ignore.

Israelis Yes...Zionists No

Question And the issue of Israel?

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Answer We cannot coexist with or have any interests with Zionism; otherwise we would deny our existence. With Israel, here is an issue that appears more complex; Zionist Israel, no; with the Israelis, yes.

Question Is there a precise difference between Israelis and Zionist Israel?

Answer I mean with the non-Zionist Israelis; otherwise we will fall into another racism. Zionism is a tentacle of imperialism and colonialism in a naturalized form. For example, one could not conceive of reconciliation with British colonialism while it continued to occupy Egypt so how could one do so with naturalized colonialism.

Question What is the ultimate solution of the problem of Israel?

Answer The only practical solution is a democratic state in which the Arabs and the Israelis coexist. The fact is that the Israelis today are in a dilemma: on the one hand there are the domestic crises and the deteriorating economic situation and, on the other, the important Arab threat.

Question How do you interpret the steadfastness of the religious Arabs in Egypt?

Answer It is not only in Egypt, it is going on throughout the world. The religious tide is emerging in a new form, even in the socialist countries.

Question What is your interpretation of what is now going on in Iran. Is it a revolution, anarchy, a transition stage or what?

Answer One must recognize that the movement to bring down the Shah was no less than any other revolutionary action throughout history, both in the bold undertaking and in the tactics. We must acknowledge the genius of al-Khumayni, the Iranian people and the religious leadership.

There is still the problem of building the state. The revolution is dominated by multifaceted quarrels and still has not crystallized as it is in a state of interaction. Accordingly, one must not be hasty in passing judgement on it.

I think that the Arabs must continue to engage in a dialogue with it because of the importance of the Iranian factor in its hostility to imperialism and Zionism. We must avoid creating an imaginary battle between Arab nationalism and the situation in Iran at present lest we encourage a conflict between Arab nationalism and the so-called Iranian nationalism.

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IRAN

KHOMAYNI'S RULE SEEN IN SERIOUS TROUBLE

Vulnerable Position

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 21 Dec 79 p 56

[Article by Jean Larteguy: "Khomeyni Has Had It"]

[Text] I have just spent 3 weeks in a world apparently seized by religious madness. Everywhere, the crowds acclaim God and deliver themselves up to all kinds of deliriums in His name. In Iran, the constitution was approved 99.6 percent even in the provinces where, following the watchwords issued by the political, ethnic, and religious chiefs or simply their laziness and ignorance, nobody had gone to the urns, which made the vote count easier. But Khomeyni wanted more. The mass support of an entire people who did no longer function and who had shouted "Allah Akbar" for entirely too long seized with fear in the face of the abyss which was opening up before it and, in spite of the distribution of some foodstuffs, beginning to feel stomach cramps.

He rather clumsily provoked his rival, Shariat-Madari who, in the name of that same God, rejected that aberrant constitution. Grabbing the ball on the rebound, Carter, the big Satan, girded himself to the applause of an American electorate, suddenly recovered from its Vietnamese complex. He sent two giant aircraft carriers and their escorts to the Persian Gulf. For the sake of appearances. A former officer in the U.S. Navy, he knew very well that one could not risk them in those narrows where a few missiles would be enough to bring his formidable armada to grief. At any rate, the appearance of Phantom aircraft in the skies over Iran could lead to the murder of the hostages. He also let it be known at the same time that he intended to secure the "release of the hostages" through a cautious method in order to avoid bloodshed.

He also reassured his reelection by a mixture of firmness and moderation while waiting for the dust to settle in Iran where events followed each other in fast order. There were two obstacles that still hindered a "reasonable" solution to the hostage problem.

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First of all there was the Imam Khomeyni. But his excesses made him less and less credible. His partisans were abandoning him to follow the wise and moderate Shariat-Madari, supported not only by the Bazar and the 15 million Azarbayjanis and Kurds, but also by a large portion of the Shiite clergy who realized that the time had come to save the furniture.

The second obstacle consisted of the students: They no longer knew how to arouse the "revolutionary" enthusiasm of the masses. They also had to stay in the limelight somehow, to swagger before 300 journalists from all over the world who were seeking their incoherent declarations but who, disheartened by their lousy performance before the cameras, were only too eager to kick their backsides. If they wanted to push their logic to its end, the only thing left for them to do would be to try the hostages. And perhaps even to execute some of them. Unless somebody could find a solution to what they secretly wanted: A means for exercising their clemency without losing face.

It seems that this is the way we are going to drift. The hostages supposedly would be tried by an international tribunal which does not mean much while the crimes and exactions of the Shah's government would be examined in the United States as soon as the hostages have been released.

Carter would then be reelected; Brezhnev's slow agony would not be troubled by the threat of war and the Russians could in peace accomplish his difficult succession.

The only thing the men behind the scenes would have to do would be to settle accounts and to gather the fruits of this crazy revolution whose dupe would once again have been the Iranian people.

Iran ceased to exist as an organized nation. No more administration, no more army or police, no government, nothing but crowds who, like bees swarming insanely after having lost their hives, cluster around mosques or the American Embassy--invoking Allah and Khomeyni.

To get the country going again, to save it from famine, anarchy, and collapse, to be able to continue to use its energy resources which are considerable, the Russians and Americans must restore a certain degree of order. The Russians want the gas in the north and the Americans and the Westerners want the petroleum in the south. These two sources are in danger of drying up if the revolution goes on.

There will not be any joint occupation of the country by the Russians and the Americans, the former in the north and the latter in the south, as in 1941. But, in the long run, there will instead be a neutralization with spheres of influence which boils down to the same thing. This will prevent provoking Iranian nationalism--due to the presence of foreign forces--which is still very much concerned with form rather than substance.

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The pie will be divided up after it has fallen from the beaks of the mullahs, those black crows, perched on their minarets.

We will then see the rebirth of an autonomous republic of Azarbayjan which will discover affinities with the neighboring republic of Soviet Azarbayjan. The Kurds will once again allow themselves to be put off by promises of autonomy which will not be kept. They will thus be more useful than if they were reunited.

Even more important will be the implementation of a new strategy in the Middle East. These spheres of influence will soon create defense problems. It will be necessary to prevent one of the thieves from grabbing what the other one has.

I returned from a visit to Sinai to the big Israeli base at Etam, near Al Arish, which is to be returned to the Egyptians within 2 years but which, according to the Camp David Accords, can no longer be used for military purposes. In other words, it will no longer have any use. One will then see just about nothing because everything will have been carefully camouflaged and buried.

There are other bases of this kind at Etzion, at Sharm Al Sheik, designed according to the American model, which can shelter 100 aircraft.

As was explained to me by the Israeli colonel in charge at Etam, these bases present an enormous advantage over aircraft carriers. An aircraft carrier uses 60 percent of its aircraft for its own defense and 40 percent for attack. At a ground base, 100 percent of the aircraft are operational.

From Sinai, the fighters and fighter-bombers can cover the entire strategic zone of the Gulf and southern part of Iran, Khuzistan, where the petroleum is. There will no longer be any need for bases in Iran; threatened Saudi Arabia would recover its shield.

It would suffice for the Israelis and the Egyptians to agree on permitting the utilization of these bases by the Americans who would pay the proper price. Israel and Egypt are caught up in a big economic crisis; inflation in Israel this year will exceed 120 percent. Egypt needs American wheat, technicians, and dollars to replace the petrodollars which the Saudis, the emirs, and the sheikhs of the Gulf had given it.

The Americans would thus assume the defense of Israel which would have a free hand in southern Lebanon, in dealing with the Palestinians and they would also handle the defense of Egypt which could at last settle accounts with Qadhadhafi.

The Egypt-Israel-U.S.A. bloc would become a center of attraction for the moderate Arab countries and the Camp David Accords would be extended to all those who had initially rejected them--provided the American awakening

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continues, forcing President Carter to pursue a more realistic policy, where the defense of human rights would be replaced by the traditional defense of spheres of influence.

Certain indications are highly revealing. Arabia and the countries along the Gulf suddenly have displayed a certain friendly understanding toward the policy pursued by Sadat. They now condemn the principle but no longer the man. That leaves us with the two pillars of the Rejection Front, apart from Libya, whose policy is tied to the moods of Qadhdhafi alone. One of them, Syria, because of its internal situation, as well as its commitment to the Lebanese quagmire, runs the risk of being persuaded to pursue a more graduated policy. As for Iraq, it runs the risk of causing surprises. It would be tempting for it to grab some oil deposits in the Arab province of Iran, called Khuzistan which is also called Arabistan.

The Soviets temporarily seem to accept this form of settlement which suits them. With their troubles in Afghanistan, they are not for the time being too fond of the Iranian revolution. It is entirely too Islamic, entirely too disordered, not enough Marxist, and without any deep foundations.

Everything still depends on the life of the 49 hostages, the frustration of several hundred students who believed for a moment that they were the center of worldwide attention, the madness of an old man belonging to another century, the disorderly intrigues of the Palestinians who, as is their habit, created confusion everywhere, but above all, the reason and interest of all those who want to settle the affairs of men between men, without a God complicating everything, in other words, those who normally should be in charge. Khomeyni would only have precipitated a new Yalta, another division of that part of the world. And after several weeks of exaltation, their blood purged, the Iranians would return to their disenchanted cynicism and their habitual skepticism.

And, depending upon the camp they belong to, they would explain to you that this entire affair was a coup set up by the Russians or the Americans and that Khomeyni was nothing but an old fool who did not realize that.

Revolt of Shariat-Madari

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 21 Dec 79 pp 52-55

[Unattributed article: "The Uprising Against Khomeyni"]

[Text] Ali Reza was one of the personal guards of the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari. He was killed at the moment the latter's residence was attacked by supporters of Khomeyni. The mutiny started the moment the coffin and the photo of the dead man was displayed in the streets of Tabriz.

The clashes which resulted in ten dead at Tabriz, the capital of Azarbayjan, above all sprang from a quarrel between prelates. The radio



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station, taken by assault by the supporters of the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari and then retaken by those of the Ayatollah Khomeyni, changed hands four times. At the head of those who, at Tehran, had been listed as insurgents, there was an 82-year old man whom many Shiites consider to be their real imam. Shariat-Madari as a matter of fact in 1962 resigned from that supreme office and that, in the end, saved the life of the man who at that time was only the number two man in the hierarchy, Khomeyni, today his adversary. At the time, Khomeyni was in prison and was about to be sentenced to death. He became untouchable after being appointed imam thanks to Shariat-Madari. And he was exiled. The moral authority of Shariat-Madari therefore is great. Our special correspondent Hatami interviewed the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari. He told him, "Azarbayjan demands that it be consulted in all matters affecting it directly. We furthermore demand the repeal of Article 110 of the new constitution which gives all legislative, executive, and judicial powers to a single guide. We do not accept this guide, whose name is Khomeyni, any longer."

Everywhere in Iran, discreet representatives of the challenger, Shariat-Madari, are rallying the discontented around themselves. Here, the Ayatollah Okmabadi of Tabriz, in the name of Shariat-Madari, receives the opponents of the Ayatollah Khomeyni at Qom.

The strength of the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, who opposes Khomeyni, springs from the discontent which is rising everywhere. "I am like the hole at the bottom of the gutter," said Shariat-Madari. "I attract the water that flows." This water comes from the four corners of Iran. First of all there are the moderates who want a change in regime. But that water also comes from on high; their leader, Mr Moghaddam, who heads the Radical Party, barely managed to avoid being arrested by Khomeyni's police who had come to pick him up at his home; he got away, undressed, through a door which he locked behind himself with a key. This escape, by the skin of his teeth, served to stir up his supporters even though his life was not exactly in danger at that point. The merchants in the bazaars and the clerical employees of offices in which no work has been done for many months are similarly riled. Finally, there are the workers whose wages cannot keep up with runaway inflation and the Islamic government itself has admitted that 65 percent of the country's economic activities have ground to a halt. Tehran now resembles a vast slum where people sell anything on the black market, including meat, auto tires, and whiskey (at F 500 per bottle). The crowds cluster around the mosques where the mullahs, illiterate and turbaned, hold forth. And if violent and devastating civil war does not break out tomorrow, then the Iranian pie will be divided among the chief users of the country's energy, that is, the Soviets who need Iranian natural gas and the Americans and the Westerners who want to assure their petroleum supply. The Shah's fall thus in the end would have turned out to be a good thing for everybody--except for the Iranian people and all of its ayatollahs.

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More than Khomeyni, the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari has become the "Mardjae-e-Taghlid," the religious model to be imitated, the man whose name means "Guardian of the Law." His home at Qom is only a few hundred meters away from that of the Ayatollah Khomeyni. And this is where, surrounded by his faithful followers, he signs checks and issues orders while making pleasant small talk. He slowly nibbles away at the man he accuses of having carved out for himself the lion's share of a tailor-made constitution. "Mr Khomeyni (This is what he calls the ayatollah) has lost his sense of reality," he says. Madari is in favor of having the mullahs return to the mosques and wants the establishment of a constitutional government; he has become the leader of the petty-bourgeoisie, the liberals, and the students who do not make religion the guiding principle of the revolution. As for those who recaptured the television building at Tabriz his first statement was this: "We must restore it to the legitimate agents of the state." To use the trademark of his rival, his main weapon simply is civil war which he can unleash with one word: "If the executive branch makes more mistakes, then Azarbayjan will explode," he says, "and in that case a considerable segment of the army will join us." Khomeyni, who is aware of that, is biding his time. For the moment, he criticizes the fact that one of Madari's advisors is a young, red-bearded Englishman who has converted to Islam. "An agent of the CIA," proclaims Khomeyni. "The Islamic Republic does not need him."

## Gains for Bakhtiar

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 28 Dec 79 p 58, 77

[Interview With Shahpur Bakhtiar, the Shah's Last Prime Minister, by Genevieve Chauvel: "Khomeyni Is Paving the Way for my Arrival"]

[Text] Shahpur Bakhtiar, the Shah's last prime minister, sentenced to death by Khomeyni, received our correspondent Genevieve Chauvel in the apartment where he has been living in exile for a year, near Paris, with his son who is a medical student. No knickknacks, no paintings. This sparse decor features only a huge map of Iran which he keeps looking at constantly.

Question: Carter said that he would not use force against Khomeyni. Do you believe that he might nevertheless do so?

Shahpur Bakhtiar: No. In my opinion, America must not intervene militarily in Iran. The wisdom with which the United States has tackled this problem, the calm and firmness on the part of Carter in the face of those hysterical individuals whom Khomeyni gathers around him every day to make his shrill sounds has borne fruit. For the first time in more than 30 years, the Security Council has unanimously demanded the unconditional release of hostages. It certainly makes sense for the USSR, China, Great

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Britain, France, America, and a good number of other countries to vote together in this way. Mr Khomeyni has already lost on the international level. It would therefore take a miracle for him to understand the enormous booboo he made.

Question: So?

Bakhtiar: I do not believe in miracles. Many people, even those who have had some education, those who attended Western universities were dazzled and found something miraculous in the ayatollah. Not I. But I do not think that he was as ignorant as all that. Now people are beginning to understand that there has been fighting, that there have been massacres, that people were in prison for many years, suffering inhuman treatment, all for nothing. They had been wrong and it was an error in calculation. The new and ridiculous constitution made the whole world laugh. I think that Mr Khomeyni wanted power, that he always had complexes and suppressed desires. But today he has nothing to offer. The results of the referendum and the troubles in Azarbayjan prove that people are beginning to have enough of this comedy which is started up over and over again and only diverts the people from the real problems. Things are going to get heated up increasingly until the inevitable explosion.

Question: And you are going to intervene at that moment?

Bakhtiar: Before that. I will not wait for the disappearance of Mr Khomeyni.

Question: Soon?

Bakhtiar: Mr Khomeyni is paving the way for my arrival. In view of the situation of chaos and the insurmountable difficulties in the economic area, I believe that the government can no longer maintain what is left of cohesion and order in the country. Unless of course there is some sort of upheaval or violent military action. Consequently, I hope that I will very soon be in Iran and I know that the difficulties will start on that day. I left Khomeyni a state that was coherent. He is going to leave it in a condition of total chaos, with a ruined economy and with very advanced disintegration of the country as a whole.

Question: Have you retained contacts in Iran? Are people waiting for you?

Bakhtiar: I do know whether anybody is waiting for me but I do have my supporters. So you can draw your own conclusions. I am not here just for nothing. But I am not going to the theater or the movies every night. I try to organize the authentically national and progressive forces inside Iran. On the outside, I try to explain the way I see things to international public opinion. I have been fighting for social democracy and against fascism, dictatorship, and corruption for 40 years. The future government

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must be center-left. For many reasons due to the current structure in Iran, a right-wing administration or even a center administration would not be in line with the country's profound needs where social inequalities are so great.

Question: Do you not think that the Shah might return?

Bakhtiar: That question no longer comes up.

Question: Do you have any foreign support?

Bakhtiar: When it comes to moral support, to consent, I find much sympathy and many supporters in France, Great Britain, and especially in Germany. And I think that America is beginning to understand that I was right, against Khomeyni who, in spite of his bitter anti-Americanism, remained on very good terms with the United States, who supported him, until the hostages were taken. Now I believe that Khomeyni has displayed the admirable genius of having organized and aroused popular discontent around him. Not in the country (where things are very progressive) but beyond our borders. That is palpable above all in the Arab countries. Nobody can accept this frenzied fanaticism any longer.

Question: Just how far can the Ayatollah Khomeyni go?

Bakhtiar: He cannot go far. He is stuck. He cannot do anything. He can spill blood, he can cause a little more disorder, he can ruin the economy a little more, but the movement is irreversible.

Question: Still, people say that the ayatollah has produced a mystical, religious fervor which aroused the Iranians--is that not so?

Bakhtiar: Pascal said that man is a bundle of contradictions. In each one of us there is certainly a little more or less of the mystical. There are moments when these feelings are galvanized, when they are stirred up by economic, moral, or political factors. This Islamic push, which you referred to, does not necessarily have an anti-imperialist origin. But I believe that America made big mistakes in supporting certain corrupt regimes throughout the world, including Iran. Mr Khomeyni benefited from that in order to preach an Islamic Republic in his own way which has nothing republican about it and whose Islam is to be taken with a grain of salt. Egypt is the country with the largest number of Muslims in the Middle East. And there is no Islamic push over there. Nor is there any in Turkey. The troubles are of linguistic or ethnic origin. Khomeyni did not introduce any trace of democracy in Iran. There was no revolution here but rather an upheaval, a revolt, which, because of its incompetence and in spite of its undeniable prestige, could not be channeled in a good direction.

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Question: Do you believe that the Islamic revolution is the underlying motivation for Khomeyni? Does he not also serve to galvanize the crowds, as Hitler did with his antisemitism?

Bakhtiar: Hitler at least in the beginning believed what he said. That was absurd. But he really believed in the superiority of the Aryan race. He was profoundly antisemitic. These are unacceptable things but he believed in them. By profession, Mr Khomeyni is a mullah which means that he must preach Islam. But his Islamism is a rather special thing. Now he finds himself facing problems which he cannot solve. He knows nothing about the economy. As for politics, he cannot even read a map. Now, that anti-American push does not solve anything. What has to be done is to rebuild a country which is in a catastrophic situation. Mr Khomeyni is a Muslim in his own fashion; I do not deny that but he does not consider himself to be an Iranian. When I say that I am first of all an Iranian and then a Muslim, Khomeyni finds that to be blasphemous. I find that this is the truth. I can always change my religion but I cannot change my nationality. For me, being an Iranian is an absolutely undeniable fact. For him, Mr Khomeyni exists wherever there is Islam. Now, nobody believes him. People laugh in his face. Shiism involves only one-tenth of the world's Muslim population. And out of that one-tenth, Mr Khomeyni represents only a portion. What does he really want? Iran or a caliphate as during the time of the Omayyads and the Abbasids?

Question: Do you expect to get support from the opposition movements which emerged through the uprisings in Kurdistan, Azarbayjan, and in your own tribe, the Bakhtiari?

Bakhtiar: These uprisings have been exaggerated. They are only a symptom of the breakup of a country which has enough of these troubles already. No region, no minority in Iran demands secession. There are local problems which are sometimes very serious and which, overall, the Shah's government did not pay enough attention to. The ayatollah's opposition is in Qom itself. Only the atmosphere of terror does not yet enable it to express itself.

Question: What is the role of the USSR in the current situation?

Bakhtiar: I have no contacts to know the answer to that question. But I do know that the USSR would love to have two kinds of government in Iran: Either a government in its pay with an iron curtain down on the Persian Gulf, which is very unlikely considering the current state of international forces. Or a government like that of the Shah's, with whom the Soviet Union was on excellent terms. What the Soviet Union cannot tolerate would be a progressive, perhaps even a pro-socialist government which would not be in its pay.

Question: What is the position of the army?

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Bakhtiar: Unfortunately, the army accepted dictatorship for a long time. Khomeyni cruelly killed and dismantled this army. He is afraid of it. And sometimes, as in the case of Kurdistan, he needs it. Personally, I think that our army must be restored on national bases and it must be respected.

Question: That army was strong and it was well equipped by the Shah. Was it the strongest in the East?

Bakhtiar: Regarding equipment, I agree. As for the rest, it left much to be desired.

Question: Due to lack of training?

Bakhtiar: No. Promotions were not in line with the merits of the soldiers and officers. There was too much discrimination and, besides, this army was a separate organism in the nation. It was not a national army.

Question: How can one explain the fact that the Shah left without fighting? In his memoirs he regrets not having reacted immediately by force.

Bakhtiar: For the period of 25 years following the downfall of Mossadeq, the king had every chance of transforming his country. With the abuse of power in the long run, a dictator makes mistakes. And he made unpardonable mistakes from whom Khomeyni today derives benefit. The king was mathematically forced to leave and I was the one who suggested this to him. If he had not agreed, I would not have formed the cabinet. Because things at that time were at such a fever pitch that the explosion could have taken place overnight. As for his memoirs, I am sorry that the king is writing books. He began fifteen years ago. A king who governs and who protects himself against attacks does not write books and does not start bitter debates. It would have been preferable if he had kept quiet forever, in his own interest.

Question: Do you feel threatened following the murder of the Shah's nephew?

Bakhtiar: I always felt threatened, more than he. But I kept my cool, before and after. I do not know who killed him but this was a beastly thing to do. I was told that, in the Pahlavi family, he was not a rotten apple.

Threats by Khalkhali

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 28 Dec 79 p 57

[Interview with Ayatollah Sadeg Khalkhali by Georges Menager: We Will Kill Bakhtiar Regardless of Where He Is"]

[Text] The Ayatollah Sadeg Khalkhali, 52, is the Fouquier-Tinville of Iran. His circuit-riding revolutionary tribunal

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has already dispatched hundreds of opponents of Khomeyni to the next world. He is at the same time the bloody representative of the imam, the hand of the Lord, and the sword of Islam. He is called the "flying judge." Getting around in an American helicopter, it is he who, everywhere in Iran, punishes the "corrupt of the earth" in the name of Allah. During the Kurdish revolt, it was he who sentenced the rebels to death, witnessing the sentence before judging other crimes, against the Koran." It was he, finally, who demanded the murder of the Shah's nephew in Paris and it was he who proposed that he preside over the tribunal charged with trying the American hostages at the embassy in Tehran. In the holy city of Qom, the home of this little, pot-bellied man with a short beard, smiling easily in the tumult of events, is a low-level, rather ordinary mansion frequented by young bearded men, revolvers sticking out of their belts, their eyes burning with defiance. Seated like a tailor in the corner of the central room, he received our special correspondent Georges Menager.

George Menager: Are you still going to get Shahpur Bakhtiar?

Khalkhali: After the departure of the Shah, it was Bakhtiar who gave the order for the massacre of the people. He is thus responsible for the crimes which the old regime committed. This is why, as far as we are concerned, he is sentenced to death. If we can, we will bring him back to Iran; if not, we will fight him and we will execute him wherever he may be. The imam himself has also said that Bakhtiar should be executed.

George Menager: Do you also want to prosecute those you consider to be traitors, all the way to the White House in Washington?

Khalkhali: We are after them everywhere, even in the far corners of the White House. They will never be safe from our grasp. They cannot escape us, except if they die. Then, God will take charge of them.

George Menager: Specifically, who?

Khalkhali: We already gave their names: Ardeshir, Zahedi, Hushang, Ansari, Nahavandi, Mohakrei, Razmi, Panizdan, Oveissi, Gholamreza, Pahlavi, Farah, Ashra (Pahlavi), Mohamed Reza (the fugitive Shah), Shahpur Bakhtiar, Shrisemani, Amuzegar, Shaban Djafari, Azari Shahram (Pahlavinia, son of Ashra), Sabeti, etc.

Many people, like them, are sentenced to death as far as we are concerned. If we can bring them back to Iran, so much the better; if not, the sentence is at any rate irreversible and they will be executed.

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Georges Menager: Even the wife of the Shah, the former Shabanu Farah?

Khalkhali: Yes, except if she kills the Shah, in which case she will be pardoned and will be able peacefully to return to Iran.

Georges Menager: You claimed credit for the murder of the Shah's nephew in Paris. But in your communique you were wrong on the first name; you announced the assassination of his brother. Did they get the wrong man?

Khalkhali: The person who was killed in Paris was also sentenced to death. The same goes for his brother who will be executed in turn. But we have not yet decided, as they said, to exterminate the entire former imperial family. This does not involve the children; they are innocent of the crimes of their parents.

Georges Menager: Is it true that you tried to assassinate the Shah in Mexico when he was at Cuernavaca?

Khalkhali: Yes, we wanted to kill him but it did not work. They then beefed up his protection which has become very expensive. This by the way is why he moved. Not because he is sick. His cancer? If he has one, it is he who caused it in our country for 57 years. The cancer is his very existence.

Georges Menager: People say that you carry on your person the personal weapon of Hoveida?

Khalkhali: This is the weapon I was given as a reward when I had him executed.

Georges Menager: In your vindictiveness to prosecute the traitors to Iran, what do you make of those grand principles of Islam which are represented by generosity and pardon?

Khalkhali: We have already pardoned a large number of people who had to repent. Many were also released. But those who were at the head of the old regime--the nation will not forgive them. The treason and crimes they committed are unpardonable and we will express the will of the nation.

Georges Menager: Do you still have Carlos in your ranks?

Khalkhali: I have not had any contact with Carlos recently. He phoned me especially in the beginning (of the victory of the revolution, of course) to tell me that he was ready to serve our cause without any compensation. And we do not turn down anybody who wants to render a human service. If you want to do so we will not turn you down either.

Georges Menager: At the start of this interview you told me that journalists--in other words, myself included--are representatives of Zionism. Why?



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Khalkhali: No. I did not mean to say that. If I said something like that, it was just to make small talk. But Associated Press, United Press, and Reuter's and the vast majority of the information media are controlled by the Zionists although individually the journalists are honest people; they gather the news and they generally report the truth.

Georges Menager: Can you tell me how you fought during the time of the Shah? What was your part in the revolutionary fight? And what role do you play today?

Khalkhali: It would take a long time to tell you what I did. The imam put me in charge of the Islamic tribunal and I took responsibility. I am both the attorney-general and the head of the tribunals.

Georges Menager: Were you always the leader of the hard-liners, the feddayin of Islam?

Khalkhali: As regards the feddayin of Islam, I am not their official leader. They accepted me and they listen to what I tell them.

Georges Menager: You were imprisoned under the old regime; did SAVAK [Intelligence and Security Organization] torture you?

Khalkhali: No. I was not tortured in prison. On the contrary, they respected me. I was arrested, imprisoned, and exiled several times over the past 15 years. I was never tortured, I was never even slapped.

Georges Menager: Is it true that you were on several occasions in a psychiatric ward during the time of the Shah?

Khalkhali: No, that is not true.

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IRAN

## ARMY SHOWING SOME SIGNS OF REVIVAL

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 12 Dec 79 p 8 - WA

[Article by Robert Fisk]

[Text] IRAN'S army, the broken backbone of monarchical power, is feeling its way cautiously back to life at a critical moment in the history of the Iranian revolution.

As Ayatollah Khomeini continues to invoke the spirit of martyrdom and calls for the training of 20 million armed youths amid predictions of an American invasion, the new Islamic Republican Army is trying to rebuild its strength to its pre-revolution complement of 280,000 men.

After the appointment of the Bazargan Government last spring, every officer from the rank of General and above was retired (more than 300 of the former Shahs' commanders departed in just two weeks) and conscription was lowered from two years' service to a crippling one year.

Now it has been raised to 18 months and about 200,000 men are reporting for duty, a figure much higher than that propagated in the Pentagon's most recent assessment of the Iranian army.

Nowhere have the army's problems since the revolution been more apparent than in Kurdistan, where ad hoc units were thrown together to fight Kurdish rebels demanding autonomy for their region. So great has been the turnover of troops in the Kurdish battles that every Iranian army division, especially the 28th which is based on Sanandaj, has been involved in the fighting.

Yet Kurdistan gave the army a new motivation and revived

its old command and control structure. More important, it proved that the revolutionary guards, the Islamic praetorian guard which owes its allegiance primarily to the clergy and not to the Government, could not cope with serious internal unrest. The guards were unable to overcome the Kurdish guerrillas.

Zealous, over-enthusiastic and inexperienced, they suffered heavily in Kurdistan, and while the force, which numbers about 8,000 acts as a coordinating central command, it at least has to acknowledge the necessity of maintaining a regular army.

The commander of the army's first division in Teheran, which contains the pro-Khomeini elements of the old imperial guard, said that the Kurdistan campaign had proved that "the army still has a rôle to play in Iran".

But maintaining an army is one thing: maintaining its equipment is quite another. In theory, the army can mobilize up to 1,600 tanks, including 800 British-manufactured Chieftains and 600 American M60s.

Most of the American tanks are in good working order as they are comparatively easy to maintain and repair, but the Chieftains, with their sophisticated firing mechanism, may already be down to half-strength through lack of maintenance. Some of them have been cannibalized for spare parts.

The Iranians also use the American M47, which made an appearance in Kurdistan recently, but they are almost useless in armoured warfare and could not be employed against an invading force.

The new army is commanded by Major General Hossein Shaker, an allegedly general man regarded as a good military coordinator, who was trained at Fort Leavenworth. But the old Turkish and Kurdish blood in the officer corps has been sapped away.

The only senior officer of ethnic minority extraction is Brigadier General Zahir Najad, who was promoted from colonel to command the 64th infantry division at Orumiye six months ago. He is of Turkish descent.

Some regular officers are now helping to train the Revolutionary Guards, who are also rumoured to have a cadre from the Palestine Liberation Organization assisting them. Certainly the guards act not just as a paramilitary gendarmerie but as a check on the army's power as well.

Dr Mustafa Chamran, the Minister of Defence, has bemoaned the fact that his officers are not more "revolutionary". They are certainly regarded as a moderate, politically disinterested group of men who are more concerned about the army's national prestige than in advancing the Islamic cause.

In the right environment, the army in Iran could reemerge as a credible force capable of putting up considerable resistance to a limited military assault on the country.

But once the army's power is rebuilt it may also present a political threat; and there are those in Iran who may prefer to risk the dangers of outside attack in order to safeguard their revolution.—From The Times, London.

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MAURITANIA

MINISTER PRESENTS BROAD OUTLINE OF 1980 BUDGET

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3015

[Text] Ahmed Ould Zein, Mauritanian minister of finance and commerce recently declared that "at the present time the Mauritanian financial situation is marked by a serious imbalance on the level of public finances as well as in the balance of payments."

In his press conference, published in extenso in several issues of CHAAB, our national daily paper, Ould Zein added, in connection with the orientation of Mauritania's budget for 1980: "On the level of receipts it is necessary to work towards an increase in receipts without modification of the total rate of taxation, which is already high, but make every effort to recover any outstanding amounts due."

The minister continued: "In regard to expenditures an effort will also be made to reduce them. Of course expenditures must be considered according to their nature, but in connection with the expenditures for civil management, the measures already in force will be continued. On the level of personnel there will be no new recruitment, except for the personnel already in training on the outside. All possible means for the reduction of manpower will be used by making public servants who are not indispensable in public offices, available to the para-public sector and state companies whenever there are openings on that level."

"As regard expenditures for maintenance and equipment, the same strict measures which prevailed in the second semester of 1979 will be continued. They will be reexamined systematically and these expenditures and all others, for which there is no justification, will be abolished."

"As regard expenditures for investments, in accordance with general economic policy options, which require that only profitable investments be encouraged henceforth, the amounts apportioned to these investment expenditures will also be reexamined, taking into account the advisability of the investments available at that time."

As for state companies, subsidies will be reexamined and even cut off if the enterprises cannot justify them. The state companies, of a commercial or industrial character, will have to demonstrate their viability before they can expect government subsidies.

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Ould Zein estimates that "if we continue this program of thorough austerity we think that within a period of perhaps about 4 or 5 years, the balance on the budget level will be assured."

For the 1979 fiscal year, Ould Zein specified that "reductions in credits for administrative management, represented approximately 1.4 billion UM, or almost 10 percent of the total budgetary expenditures, and due to the requirements of the department management, some derogations were made in the education, health, etc. sectors. These derogations amounted to about 250 millions up to the present time. We therefore foresee that by the end of this year other derogations, other credit openings will be necessary in an amount of 300 to 350 millions. Thus, due to these steps we will have a total gain of 800 millions."

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MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

SPANISH FISHING AGREEMENT SIGNED--A bilateral cooperation agreement in relation to fishing was signed in Madrid on 26 October, by the Mauritanian minister of planning and fishing, Moulay Ould Boukhreiss and the Spanish minister of transports and communications, Salvador Sanchez Teran. This agreement, the text of which has not been circulated as yet, establishes the new conditions under which the Spanish fleet will be able to exploit the Mauritanian banks after Nouakchott's withdrawal from the Tiria El Gharbia Province, annexed last August by Morocco. The Mauritanian delegation invited the Spanish ship-owners to come to Nouakchott in December in order to review the various stipulations regarding the cooperation proffered by the new policy formulated by Mauritania in connection with fishing. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3016] 7993

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TUNISIA

GOOD OIL PROSPECTS IN GULF OF GABES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Dec 79 p 28

[Article: "Good Oil Prospects"]

[Text] While deposits in exploitation show signs of depletion, oil prospecting in Tunisia is making good progress. On 18 October, Cities Service Tunisia Petroleum Corporation was granted a prospecting zone in the Gulf of Gabes.

This is the fifth permit given to a U.S. company, other foreign companies (French and Italian among others) sharing a total of six permits. All together, the permits granted cover a total of about 150,000 sq km, i.e., 90 percent of the country's area. Prospecting is entirely at the risk and expense of the companies.

At the beginning of 1979, oil indications were discovered in the Gulf of Hammamet (approximately 100 km from Tunis). Other "encouraging" signs were found near El Borma (site of the main deposit in exploitation in the south). There, the most important discovery, announced on 28 September, appears to be that of Sabria-north No 1 well, near the pipeline used for the transportation of the El Borma oil. This well, drilled by Amoco Tunisia Oil Company, who bought a 99-year lease for it, has a daily output of 930 barrels of crude oil.

Production and research should therefore supplement, and eventually replace, the deposits now in exploitation. At El Borma, water-injection had to be used to increase the output, while Ashtart (an offshore deposit not far from Sfax) has reached its full production rate. Tunisia's most important exportation product, oil, has brought it approximately 410 million dollars in 1978, corresponding to a production of 4.9 million tons; the 2.7 million tons produced during the first half of 1979 represent an 11.7 percent increase over the same period during 1978.

Under these circumstances, one can understand why Tunisians are dreaming of oil prospects which are "not bad at all."

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