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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

No. 662

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

STATUS OF COMMUNISM IN AFRICA REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Dec 79 p 11

[Article by Marc Yared]

[Text] J.A. replies to question asked by Abdoulaye Cisse, from Kayes (Mali):

How many communist parties, or those introducing themselves as such, are there who have gained political power in an African country?

Nine organizations assuming "scientific socialism" are in power at the present time in Africa and the Middle East. They are as follows: PCT (Congolese Labor Party), PRPB (People's Revolution Party of Benin), FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front), MPLA-PT (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party), SRSP (Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party), PSY (Yemeni Socialist Party), PDPA (Popular and Democratic Party of Afghanistan), STP (Movement for Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe), and in Madagascar FNDR (National Front for the Defense and the Revolution).

Only the last two do not officially belong to Marxism-Leninism. Since 1977 SRSP does not maintain cordial relations with the Soviet Union. PCT, PRPB, SRPS and FNDR were initially established (in 1969, 1975, 1976 and 1977 respectively) by "progressist" officers who held the power.

Capt Marien N'Gouabi in the Congo, Capt Matthieu Kerekou in Benin and Gen Mohamed Siad Barre in Somalia (in 1968, 1969 and 1972) had acceded to the highest office following a military coup d'etat. All three created a single party.

On the other hand, commander Didier Ratsiraka was first co-opted by the responsible military officers to be head of the state in June 1975, before being confirmed as president of the republic by referendum in December of the same year, and the front whose principle was adopted by the same referendum is not made up of a single party, but by a coalition of five parties.

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Kerekou, Siad Barre and Ratsiraka still preside over the destinies of their country, but N'Gouabi was assassinated on 18 March 1977 and replaced as head of the state and of the PCT, first by Gen Yhombi Opango and then by Col Denis Sassou Nguesso.

The PDPA (established in 1964) in Afghanistan also seized power (in 1978) by a military coup d'etat. But these are civilians. Mohamed Nour Taraki in April 1978, then Hafizullah Amin, since last September, held the reins of the party and of the country. Becoming a single party, the PDPA was in fact a coalition of two Marxist pro-Soviet organizations, the Khalk (the people) and Parcham (the flag). In July and then in September 1978, the leaders and the cadre of Parcham were supplanted by those of the Khalk in all the wheels of the army, the administration and the PDPA.

The South Yemeni FLN, the Angola MPLA, FRELIMO and STP acceded to power at the time of the proclamation of independence (in 1967 for South Yemen, 1975 for Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe). In the past they had stirred up resistance to colonial occupation. This resistance, except for STP, took the form of an actual liberation war. After having suffered considerable purging or combining with other political organizations, these four nationalistic "mass movements" became "vanguard parties" advocating scientific socialism. The MPLA (in December 1977), the FLN (in October 1978) then changed their names to become one, the MPLA--the Labor Party, and the other the Yemeni Socialist Party.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SENEGAL-GUINEA RECONCILIATION BODES WELL

London NEW AFRICAN in English Dec 79 pp 25,26

[Excerpt] For three days in October the President of Guinea, Ahmed Sekou Toure, visited his once "hostile" neighbour, Senegal. It was his first visit in 16 years but at the end of it the signs are that the two countries have finally decided to bury the hatchet.

Sceptics may have their doubts, but it should be seen in the light of last year's Monrovia accord between Guinea on the one side and Senegal and the Ivory Coast on the other. Since that accord Toure has been imbued with a spirit of reconciliation.

At the close of his Senegal sojourn, Toure and his host, President Leopold Senghor, signed 10 agreements of cooperation. He also had time to tell some of the 600,000 Guinean exiles in Senegal about his new policy of reconciliation within Guinea.

"We have decided openly to bury tribalism whatever the cost. It cannot be done without a backlash," Toure said. He must have been referring to the Foulah ethnic group who make up about one-third of Guinea's population. Since the May 1976 attempt to assassinate Toure, the Foulahs have been complaining of a campaign against them.

Former OAU secretary-general Diallo Telli (believed to be dead), who was of Foulah origin, was alleged to be the leader of the conspiracy. Many Guineans of Foulah origin were arrested and those who managed to escape the dragnet fled across the border to neighbouring countries.

Plot

Just before Toure's Senegal trip, five people were arrested by the Senegalese authorities after a plot to assassinate the Guinean leader was hatched. Why should an attempt be made on Toure's life, at a time when he is changing his attitude after all he has made large concessions to exiles to allow them to invest money in Guinea's development. The logical answer to the question is greed. If relations between Senegal and Guinea are to

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become cordial, the wealthier exiles would stand to lose. They and those in the professions would cease to live their flamboyant lifestyles. They were adequately warned in July 1977 during the 39th Session of the National Council of the Revolution when Toure said of doctors, lawyers and pharmacists: "These liberal and lucrative professions do not exist in Guinea."

Most important, however, is the seemingly cordial contacts that are being extended by Guinea and Senegal after years of discord.

In the end the Presidents of the Ivory Coast, Guinea and Senegal agreed "to end finally, as from now, all dissension which has affected our relations; to reestablish diplomatic relations," and so on. Two months later diplomatic relations were established between Guinea and Senegal.

Since then Toure has visited the Ivory Coast and he now looks set to work amicably with both countries. It had taken a long time for these former French colonies to come to some sort of mutual understanding. But this long period of open hostility could well serve as the foundation of an even longer and better period of harmony.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

ALLEGED EAST GERMAN MASSACRES--East German soldiers committed massacres in Angola, a military official of the Angolan National Liberation Front (the FNLA, which is opposed to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola--the MPLA, in office in Luanda) claimed in disclosures in the West German daily newspaper DIE WELT of 16 October. According to Manzana Ranca, the commanding officer of an FNLA unit, members of the "Felix Dzierzynski" East German elite regiment shot to death about 100 inhabitants of the village of Diowadu Lundu, 25 km from the port city of Ambrizate. The victims were old people, women and children. The adolescents were sent to "reeducation camps" in Cuba. DIE WELT specified that Manzana Ranca was unable to furnish proof of his accusations. The "Felix Dzierzynski" regiment bears the name of the founder of the "Cheka" (the Extraordinary Commission for Fighting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage created under Lenin). It is a "political" unit placed under the command of General Markus Wolf, the head of the SSD [State Security Service]. Some of its members are "cooperators" in Angola. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2973] 9380

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BURUNDI

NICKEL DEPOSITS POSSIBLY TO BE DEVELOPED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3223

[Article: "A Study of Nickel Deposits"]

[Text] Lateritic deposits of nickel and associated metals such as copper, cobalt and platinum group metals, which have been discovered and prospected in Burundi by the mining research project under participation of the United Nations, are reported to contain reserves in excess of 300 million tons of ore.

One of these deposits has been investigated in detail since 1973, using drillings, analyses and various studies, and has now made the object of a preliminary feasibility study. Metallurgical tests carried out by the U.S. company Universal Oil, Product Mineral Sciences Division, and the preliminary feasibility study carried out by another U.S. company, Ralph M. Parsons Co., have yielded positive results.

The Burundi Government is contemplating setting up a mixed group, including an important international participation, to develop these deposits.

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BURUNDI

LEGISLATION FOR SMALL, MEDIUM-SIZE BUSINESSES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 pp 3283-3284

[Article: "New Legislation for Small and Medium-Size Businesses"]

[Text] On 10 October 1979, President Bagaza signed a decree establishing a code for small and medium-size businesses in Burundi.

These businesses include those with no more than 30 salaried employees and engaged in production, processing, repairing, or in providing services.

Certain categories of personnel are not counted as salaried employees. They are the spouse of the head of the business, its parents or grandparents, children or grandchildren, collaterals and relatives up to the third degree, three associates or assistants actually sharing in the work, as well as three apprentices or handicapped salaried employees.

Are not considered to be small and medium-size businesses those whose activity is restricted to the sale or leasing "as is" of objects previously purchased, agricultural enterprises, those working on commission, agencies or business offices, and, under certain conditions, those whose services are of a purely intellectual nature.

All enterprises concerned shall be registered in the trade register. The minister responsible for small and medium-size businesses may authorize the registration of businesses whose services are related to the arts.

Any business subject to registration shall file an application within 3 months of its creation or of the publication of the present decree; this application is to be filed by the head of the business.

When a business registered in the trade register no longer fulfills the conditions provided under the present decree, its head or, as the case may be, his heirs or the liquidator, shall apply within 3 months to have it struck off the register.

A Chamber of Trades is also created: it is a public establishment of an administrative nature, over which the minister in charge of small and medium-

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size businesses shall have the right of oversight, and the statutes of which shall be established by a decree.

The Chamber of Trades shall be, on the one hand, an organization representing the general interests of small and medium-size businesses with the administration, and it shall also be in charge of promoting the trade sector, particularly modern and traditional crafts.

The Chamber may be authorized to borrow, either to cover part or all of its expenses, or to organize professional training programs.

Various measures in favor of small and medium-size businesses are announced, especially a Credit and Guarantee Fund with the National Economic Development Bank, under oversight from the competent minister. Credits and guarantees shall be subject to arbitration by a technical commission created for this purpose.

The titles of craftsman and master craftsman in a given trade shall be protected.

Those entitled to call themselves craftsmen in their trade shall be: the heads of the businesses entered into the trade register, or the managers of such businesses appointed according to the articles of association, both of whom shall submit proof of a degree of qualification and personally share in the work.

Those entitled to call themselves master craftsmen in their trade shall be those who have had the title of craftsman for at least 2 years, who are technically proficient and have a higher degree of qualification in their trade, as evidenced by ownership of a master craftsman's certificate.

Another provision in favor of craftsmen and master craftsmen: where there is equality of price, they may be given preference in awarding public contracts, either by tender or by mutual agreement.

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BURUNDI

BRIEFS

PRESS DISTRIBUTION--A press and book distribution company, Sodipresse, has just been created within Burundi's ministry of information. This company shall be in charge of promoting and distributing newspapers, magazines and books for the general public, at reasonable prices. Sodipresse shall also ensure the diffusion of any publication dealing with Burundi. For this purpose, Burundi has joined the JEUNE AFRIQUE group which has already gained experience in the field of distribution. [Text][Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3347] 9294

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CONGO

BRIEFS

PRESIDENT REQUESTS FRENCH AID--Financial aid to fill in the "holes" in the Congolese budget: this was the request made by the President of the Congo, Colonel Nguesso, during his recent trip to Paris. In exchange, the Congolese President promised to promote contracts to exploit the petroleum deposits for French enterprises. And to reduce the Cuban officering of the Congolese armed forces. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 31 Dec 79 p 13]

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ETHIOPIA

NEWSMAN REPORTS ON SITUATION IN ERITREA

Life in Maquis Described

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov-9 Dec 79 pp 30-33

[Article by Pietro Petrucci]

[Text] Eritrea has definitely rebelled against the geographic maps. To the 1,500 km of "clandestine roads" which the EPLF (Eritrean Popular Liberation Front) partisans has constructed across the country before 1978, a new "freedom trail" has been added in recent months. Used nightly by lines of trucks and vans which travel with their lights out, this "trail" begins somewhere in the desert sands of the Sudan and crosses the inhospitable mountains of the Sahel, the fortress region of Eritrea which, for 18 months, the Ethiopian army has been vainly attempting to penetrate. The most sophisticated air reconnaissance is unable to spot this partisan road. If, in fact, it appears at the top of the highest crests, it is only to disappear again amid the acacias and rocks at the bottom of the narrowest ravines, losing itself in dry stream beds or concealing itself in the crevasses.

This is the first of many surprises I received when I returned to Eritrea 2 years after having witnessed the great offensive which, in 1977, permitted the combatants to liberate 90 percent of the territory and nearly all the inhabited centers.

In 1978, the tide turned. As the result of massive aid in men, arms and technology furnished by certain socialist countries, the Ethiopian army, in June 1978, attempted to find a "military solution" to the Eritrean question. The first alarming news circulated in the corridors of the OAS summit which in fact met in Khartoum in July 1978. Some 140,000 Ethiopian soldiers (soldiers and militamen), thousands of foreign advisers, in addition to 500 armored vehicles and dozens of fighter planes tried to retake the "14th province" of Haile Selassie's empire.

At that time, the Eritrean revolution was considered condemned to death.

At all times fought by Western imperialism and in large measure forgotten by the Third World, members of the Eritrean maquis now found themselves abandoned

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by the USSR and its allies which had, however, helped them for years and years. Who could save them? "The governments and parties which had the courage to immediately condemn this new aggression against Eritrea." I was told with bitterness by Ramadan Nour, secretary general of the EPLF, "can be counted on the fingers of one hand."

A year and a half have gone by since then, and the military authority of Addis Ababa continues to publish victory bulletins. If we are to believe them, the "separatist bandits" from the north are now on their knees. If we listen to the spokesmen of the Eritrean resistance, on the other hand, the story is quite different. It was to directly find out for myself that I asked for and was given permission to spend the month of October in the interior of liberated Eritrea, observing this war which today has entered its 18th year, living in the liberated zones, discussing with combatants and meeting Ethiopian prisoners and deserters.

Male and Female Partisans

One thing is certain and obvious: the Eritrean revolution is not dead. On the contrary, it has entered its age of maturity and is an example of "a popular war of long duration," rich with valuable lessons for all oppressed people. While the Ethiopian army--now that the initial enthusiasm has waned--is wearing itself out on the banks of the Red Sea, south of Nakfa and in the occupied cities, with cannon shot and useless bombs, the partisans are tempering themselves like steel in the mountains of the Sahel.

An example? I had been in Eritrea for several days when I received my second surprise after that of the new road: I learned there that, for over a year, the front's leadership after a long debate had promulgated a law which authorizes and regulates marriages between combatants. That is nothing. Beginning in 1975, in fact, when the Eritrean cities were themselves drawn into the war of liberation, the female population of the liberated zones increased sharply. Today, although women on the frontline are still a minority--I have seen them performing tasks in combat--entire sectors of the "partisan state" are nearly monopolized by women: health and education, for example. Many city families prefer to send their sons and daughters to live with the partisans rather than expose them to the risks and horrors of occupation and terror. And the EPLF, from the revolutionary army that it was, has thus transformed itself into a "clandestine society" which has learned to be self-sufficient, even from the demographic standpoint. Moreover, most of the combatants are of military service age--20 years--and, in the rear, their babies, born in the clandestine society, are already beginning to cry.

I arrived in Nakfa, the administrative center of the Sahel and moral capital of liberated Eritrea, after 3 nights of travel. I again found the same phantom village I had visited in April 1977. At that time, Nakfa, with its four small, Turkish forts, had just been abandoned by the Ethiopians after an 8-month siege. Having returned to life for a year, since the end of 1978, the city with lines of white houses finds itself the preferred target of the artillery and air force. There is no longer a single inhabitant among these

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roofs of twisted sheet metal and torn wall sections which creak in the wind. The mosque is a pile of stones and; in the principal public square, cows and goats come to quench their thirst in bomb craters which the rain has filled with water.

The front, which is trenched as in conventional wars of position, has been stabilized for 7 months a few kilometers south of the city. However, the bombings continue to prevent the partisan society not only from living there but also from cultivating the fields around Nakfa and its river. It was there at night, when liberated Eritrea awakens and works, that I met Maj Petros Salomon, who in a way is the grand old man of the EPLF. Not having yet reached the age of 40 but already a veteran of the war of liberation, Petros is one of the historical leaders--like Secretary General Ramadan and Deputy Secretary Isias Afework--who, 10 years ago, gave Eritrean nationalism its revolutionary character.

I asked him how the men of the EPLF, numbering from 30,000 to 40,000 combatants according to the most likely estimates, have managed to stop the steamroller set in motion by Colonel Mengistu. "The operation which resulted in certain socialist countries reorganizing and rearming the Ethiopian army," he replied while smiling, "was a surprise on the political level but not on the military level. Technically speaking, we had not excluded the internationalization of the war nor the risk of a grand style counteroffensive. And, so, we did not fall into the trap set for us: to force us to engage in conventional war throughout the territory of the country. Thanks to our mobility, we were able to withdraw in order and save all our human and military resources in the interior of our base zone. And, because of this, when the enemy arrived, not without having suffered initial serious losses, at the 'edges' of our defensive perimeter, he stopped. We can say that we neutralized the military superiority of the Ethiopians."

And now?

"Now, time is on our side. The war of long duration continues. Ethiopian morale is being broken against our trenches, in a conflict of the conventional kind; and it is wearing itself out even more beyond the lines, where we have returned to guerrilla warfare. For several weeks, we have been working on what we call the tactical conditions necessary to move to the counteroffensive."

6,000 Living-dead

A few days later, I was to observe that Major Petros had there announced to me military operations already in preparation. What I had already understood by visiting this "southern front" in Nakfa was that even Colonel Mengistu realized the impossibility of militarily conquering a national liberation movement in its age of maturity.

That is also the opinion of all the Ethiopian officers--deserters and prisoners--with whom I was able to talk.

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As for Addis Ababa, the 6,000 men who were captured alive by the EPLF no longer exist. "Die or kill yourself," such is the watchword. Anyone who is captured by the "bandits" ipso facto becomes one of their accomplices. The International Red Cross has been able to overcome the resistance of Ethiopia to intervene on behalf of the 6,000 living-dead of Eritrea. In the last few months, it has finally succeeded in sending blankets, cigarettes, water flasks, notebooks and pencils directly to the prisoners. On a single occasion I met more than 500 of these "Ethiopian phantoms" in one of the many camps scattered throughout the Sahel: they were the survivors of the "fifth offensive" of Addis Ababa which ended in tragedy in July. A column of 6,000 men wiped out.

I spoke about this with Capt Yimar Makonnen (serial number 1,673, 37 years of age, six children) and with Lt Yilma Beyene (serial number 4,239, 32 years of age, four children), both members of the ill-fated Brigade, Unit 503.

"That was to have been a quick-strike operation," the captain recounted, "to penetrate the Eritrean lines midway between the Nakfa front and that of Alghene, to the north. Men coming from Massawa, Marsa Teklai and Asmara joined us at the foot of the mountain. Instead of engaging in battle, the Eritreans allowed us to penetrate on foot into their valleys. At the end of 2 days, logistics ceased functioning. We received neither water nor food. The helicopters were no longer able to evacuate the wounded who, after 3 days, numbered more than 300. When we were attacked, we could do no more, with our water flasks filled with urine and dying of hunger. Men were falling like flies. They became cannon fodder. None of us had imagined anything like that. Now I understand what our companions used to tell us: 'Eritrea swallows up entire divisions,' companions who at the time were the subject of our mockery in the classrooms of the Military Academy or in the barracks."

The fate of deserters is preferable to that of prisoners. They voluntarily surrendered to the partisans; and if they manage to gain their confidence, they can work and live in a state of semi-freedom in the rear, with the hope of regaining their freedom.

Among them, I met Lt Tadesse Merej, age 38, with seven children waiting for him in Addis Ababa. He was in the "Ogaden campaign" and compares the two experiences in this manner: "Here, it was quite a different matter. In the Ogaden, above all there were planes, artillery, armored vehicles, etc. Here, in Eritrea, once the cities and big roads were retaken, the infantry had to intervene, otherwise all the rest would have been for naught. But every time our soldiers attacked the Eritreans, it ended in extermination. When we arrived in Eritrea, everything was all right; however, in short order we became aware of the situation and understood that it was useless, that we could not win this war and that we were continuing to die for nothing."

Printing Plants and Hospitals

The forces of Eritrean resistance is evident to anyone who travels through the Sahel and to anyone received by the various departments; i.e., the

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various "ministries" which permit the "partisan state" to organize its life. Inevitably, visits take place at night, because this big anthill, which liberated Eritrea is, seems to be alive only at night. When the sun comes up and the air force begins to cut across the skies and drop explosives, napalm, phosphorous and fragmentation bombs, the anthill pauses and holds its breath until twilight.

Paradoxically, the trying experiences endured in the five Ethiopian offensives stimulated the organizational abilities of the EPLF instead of extinguishing them. The most evident symbol of this progress, in the military sector, is the appearance in the interior of the liberated zones of Soviet "T54" and "T55" tanks and artillery pieces of the most sophisticated type. The EPLF has 50 armored vehicles and tanks which were wrested intact from the Ethiopian army. Some cadres had to be sent to Syria and Iraq to familiarize themselves with modern weaponry. And the Eritreans often call upon the PLO for their training.

However, progress is not only in the military sector. A resistance radio broadcasts in four languages from a mountain top in the Sahel while maquis printing plants supply books and a half dozen periodicals. Field hospitals and mobile health units now have sterile operating rooms and laboratories for analysis. Transport vehicles travel to workshops or supply points hidden in the most unlikely out-of-the-way places. The anthill repairs weapons, casts spare parts for airplanes, fixes radios and watches and manufactures footwear and clothing. In training camps, among the thousands of young people, boys and girls, who continue to flow toward the Sahel, there is not one recruit who does not have his personal weapon in operating condition.

Cultural promotion groups entertain and cement this society which is destined to continue engaging in this communism of Spartan warfare for many years.

During my stay, on Sunday, 7 October, I had the opportunity of witnessing the battle of Gureito from a mountain peak more than 2,000 meters high in the center of the northern front--that of Alghena--the beginning of the Eritrean counteroffensive. The objective of the battle was to drive the Ethiopians out of a line of crests about 10 km long which was threatening partisan defenses.

I can say that I witnessed a small chef d'oeuvre of military art. The Ethiopians, entrenched on these mountain peaks for over 2 months, suspected nothing. After having spent the night removing mines placed below the enemy trenches, the Eritreans attacked at daybreak, while the mountain tops occupied by the Ethiopians were still hidden by the clouds, as they were every morning. At the end of an hour, the combined effect of surprise, Eritrean spirit and the precision of mortars had completely cleaned out the 10 km of crests. The Ethiopians had withdrawn toward the Red Sea, leaving on the field 250 dead, 25 prisoners, and an entire arsenal. The following day, retaliatory strikes by airplanes and artillery had no effect.

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Ten days later, on 17 October, the partisan radio announced the first large military operation beyond the lines: a small Ethiopian garrison was wiped out along the Massawa-Asmara road. When I left the Sahel, the morale of the "anthill" had climbed to seventh heaven.

EPLF Official Views Eritrean War

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov-9 Dec 79 pp 31-33

[Interview with Isias Afework, EPLF deputy secretary, by Pietro Petrucci, date not given]

[Text] In the EPLF, which has made guerrilla warfare an exact science, the cult of personality has been banned. There are no portraits of leaders nor written or verbal praise, no difference in lifestyles. In 1977, in Eritrea, I had the opportunity of spending several hours talking with three "ordinary combatants"; on the following day, I learned that they were three of the seven members of the Politburo. The writing of the biographies of the Eritrean leaders is an almost impossible task. About Isias Afework, perhaps one of the most remarkable theoreticians of revolutionary warfare in Africa, we learn very little: he is not yet 35 years old; he is from Asmara and has lived in the maquis for 12 years, since leaving the school of sciences of the University of Addis Ababa. He almost never travels, preferring to reread the classics of guerrilla warfare--which he knows by heart--rather than continually seeking new solutions to adopt. A few hours before leaving the liberated zones of Eritrea, I had a long talk with Isias.

[Question] Is it true that the tide has already turned in your favor?

[Answer] When a war machine set in motion by Ethiopia with the help of powerful allies frets and fumes, it is as if it had half lost. And the Ethiopians have been stopped since January, since the third offensive. During the fourth offensive, they did not advance an inch. In the fifth offensive, which was to have been "definitive," they suffered the worst of their defeats. Yes, the tide has turned.

[Question] The Ethiopians number 30 million and you are only 3 million. Will you not wind up by being crushed?

[Answer] If there is anyone with problems of troop numbers, it is the Ethiopians. After a year and a half of mobilization to supply the front with militiamen, the farmers are tired. Revolts against forced recruitment are increasing in the villages, and we understand why. They put a rifle in the hands of the farmers and promised them: no longer than 1 year of war. Now their pay as well as family allowances have been suspended. The economic crisis and the conduct of the war have swept away all promises.

[Question] Are you talking about the advance signs or a phenomenon already underway?

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[Answer] Our side never stops evaluating the enemy forces, seeking to learn how many or where they are. Well, for many months, the effective cadres of the Ethiopian troops have tended inexorably to decrease. The "human waves" which they send against us are becoming smaller. So much so that they are now sending village security patrols to the front.

[Question] That takes care of the militia. What about the army?

[Answer] An army is not improvised. The militia serves as cannon fodder; however, it is also the natural reservoir of an army. At present, militiamen are asking why they are receiving 20 Ethiopian dollars per month while the private gets at least 100. The farmers in uniform are rebelling and do not hesitate to revolt against the army which often thrusts them into our line of fire by means of rifle blows. There is general malaise.

[Question] Two years ago, you described Soviet support of Mengistu as an "error." What do you think of it today?

[Answer] We are trying to analyze Soviet foreign policy not only from our Eritrean point of view but also in the general context. Well, we must conclude that in our opinion there is now a recurrent flaw in the manner in which the USSR shows its opposition to American imperialism: we feel that each struggle should be examined in the light of anti-imperialist interests such as we understand them and such as those fighting for their liberation analyze them.

[Question] Some persons continue to forecast a spectacular alinement on your part with China.

[Answer] All the rumors concerning our contacts with China are false. We have never had nor do we have formal relations with the Chinese Communist Party. Naturally, we are always looking for new allies; and we are seeking to convince the whole world of the rightness of our cause, even the Chinese. But we have not succeeded in doing so. The fact is that we consider the foreign policy of China abhorrent and that we do not understand much about its foreign policy. The view of the world proposed by Peking is the most absurd ever proposed by a communist party. Even in our case, the Chinese leaders are only concerned about knowing whether we share their small formulas, whether we are ready to mimic their slogans in exchange for a little aid. We have no need of such friends. We are content with the fact that other Chinese taught us by making their revolution.

[Question] Does Africa continue to ignore you?

[Answer] No. It is true, in the past, we neglected contacts and diplomacy; however, that, too, is changing. The fact is that a single courageous initiative marks a turning point. That is what happened when Mozambique broke silence and aligned themselves at our side. And Mozambique knows how to recognize a popular struggle for liberation. Today, many progressive countries are with us: Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Madagascar, for example.

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Even Tanzania has told us clearly that it recognizes the rightness of our cause. Others will follow, we are sure. The Zimbabwe Patriotic Front has shown us its sympathy. The wall of silence, therefore, has been broken; and our natural allies are coming closer to us.

[Question] Among the progressive Arab countries, Algeria has authorized the opening of a representation of the EPLF and is maintaining relations with your delegates....

[Answer] That is true. The PLO, Syria, Iraq and others are at our side. Algeria has never stopped recognizing our rights. That is the principal reason for the rather cool relations between that country and Ethiopia. Algeria had even tried to open negotiations between us and Mengistu. And, in this way--Algerian comrades have told us this--Algeria was able to learn first hand that Addis Ababa is playing with words and continues to utilize the "military solution." For this particular reason, Algeria broke off and is making ready to move from diplomatic-political solidarity to another more concrete kind of solidarity.

[Question] Do you think that the socialist countries which are supporting the Mengistu government will change their position?

[Answer] The arms supplied to Ethiopia have proved to be too sophisticated, therefore, ineffective in the case of the Eritrean war. What then, send them more modern arms? They would serve no useful purpose. There remains the hypothesis of total disengagement. I think that the USSR should take another look at its policy in the Horn of Africa. Our revolution was the downfall of Haile Selassie, and the present government knows that Eritrea is the most immediate threat to its stability.

Five Ethiopian Offensives Listed

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov 79 p 32

[Text] With the help of some of the principal Eritrean military leaders, I have reconstructed the course of the campaign to retake Eritrea which began in June-July 1978.

First offensive: Summer of 1978. Recapture of the cities (Agordat, Barentu, Tessenei) and the roads held by the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) in the western lowlands. Reopening of the Asmara-Addis Ababa road. Everything takes place as in the Ogaden: hammered by the air force, "saturated" by the artillery and surrounded by armored columns, the Eritreans begin to fall back.

Second offensive: November 1978. This is the first attack against the EPLF. Recapture of Massawa and Keren (but there, while falling back, the partisans will wipe out an entire column of tanks and capture 50 of them). Defeat of an attempt to land on the side of the Red Sea near Massawa.

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Third offensive: January 1979. After a double successful landing on the coast at Marsa Teklai and Marsa Gulbub, the Ethiopians attempt an assault on the heart of the mountains in the Sahel region. They have to halt south of Nakfa and east of the small city of Alghena.

Fourth offensive: March 1979. This is the first serious setback for Addis Ababa. An entire division is decimated by the effort to reinforce the Alghena and Nakfa fronts. This is a war of position.

Fifth offensive: July 1979. New simultaneous attacks on Alghena and Nakfa to facilitate a bombardment midway between the two fronts. Six thousand of the Ethiopian troops are exterminated.

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ETHIOPIA

ETHIOPIAN ATTEMPT TO TALK WITH WSLF REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 p 25

[Article by Philippe Rochot]

[Text] "We do not take prisoners; we kill them in the field." With a bandolier on his shoulder and an outdated Russian submachine gun in his hands, this combatant of the Western Somalia Liberation Front [WSLF] who made the remark at least has sincerity to his credit. Isolated in his observation post on Drya hill, taken into the Ethiopian army at the end of the rainy season, he is, however, unaware that 50 km from there, in Baile, negotiations had already been announced between representatives of the Derg (the military committee running Ethiopia) and the WSLF (Western Somalia Liberation Front); that the negotiations had ended in a blood bath but that the Somali combatants had captured three Ethiopian personalities.

In Hargeisa, at the central headquarters of the front, guarded day and night by two armed men, Lieutenants Nagache and Gammache and the head of the farmers' committee of Harar province, Abdessalam Ahmed, give an account of how they were taken prisoner. The presence at their side of one of the WSLF leaders Ali Brahim Hussein, who took part in the pourparlers with representatives of the Ethiopian military junta, lends credence to their stories.

The WSLF had for several weeks sought to make contact with representatives of the Derg on the pretext of negotiations but in reality to take officers hostage. The Ethiopian Government, by accepting a dialog with the enemy, intended to bring back to the bosom of the revolution some representatives of the WSLF to break the movement. They were also seeking to obtain a cease-fire to move convoys over the Degahabur road, after the rainy season.

An initial dialog took place at the beginning of October, in the Babile region; however, the front representatives, feeling that the Ethiopian delegates were not representative enough, refused to hold the dialog.

On 19 October, the military governor of Harar appointed a new 10-member delegation, headed by Lt Col Gidey Waldesala. An entire company escorted them. For their part, the WSLF representatives headed by Ali Brahim Hussein,

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were accompanied by 500 combatants. Several hours before the meeting, a serious clash took place between members of the maquis and the Ethiopian army in the vicinity of Jijiga. Therefore, the climate was particularly tense.

The pourparlers did not last an hour. At a prearranged signal, the Somali combatants went into action but were unable to capture Lieutenant-Colonel Waldesala, who was killed with six other members of the Ethiopian delegation. The three other members of the delegation were captured and taken to Hargeisa, in Somalia. The WSLF now had its hostages.

How could the Ethiopian Government have fallen into such a trap? Apart from the short-term advantages which they could have derived therefrom, the Addis Ababa leaders wanted above all to exploit the lassitude which had overtaken certain members of the WSLF, in the face of this interminable war that continues to cause a massive exodus of populations from the Ogaden. One thousand refugees are still crossing the Ethiopian-Somalia border every day. However, that did not take into account the will of the WSLF leaders who would not agree to negotiate except on the basis of the self-determination of the Ogaden Somali. "So long as Amharas continues to treat us as gangsters on the radio, no negotiations will be possible."

Even if the reasons which induced the Ethiopian military junta and the WSLF to make contact were questionable, an effort at rapprochement did nonetheless take place; and the abortive Babile meeting has perhaps opened a breach. The Ethiopian decision to send a delegation would have been incomprehensible otherwise. And the desire of the WSLF to take hostages would have been absurd.

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GABON

DIRECT OIL MARKETING PLANNED, FUTURE OIL RESOURCES STUDIED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 pp 2962, 2963

[Article: "Gabon Will Market Part of Its Oil Directly"]

[Text] Between now and the end of the year Gabon will begin to market part of its oil directly, the Gabonese minister of mining and oil, Edouard-Alexis M'Bouy has indicated to AFP.

The National Gabonese Oil Company (Sonagab) created at the end of last June, will first commercialize a quarter of production or 2.5 million tons, which corresponds to the Gabonese Government's interest in the oil companies operating on its territory. One fourth of Gabon's oil exports is reserved for neighboring African countries such as Senegal and the Ivory Coast. "But," he added, "we are not discriminating in sales of oil."

Seventeen foreign oil companies are operating in Gabon, and their investments in exploration (35 billion CFA in 1978) are "considerable," the minister noted. Some OPEC countries, such as Libya recently, have decided to reduce access to crude oil to companies with insufficient investment in exploration.

The principle oil company in Gabon, Elf-Gabon (see supra) had 7.2 million tons of oil at its command in 1978, or 68.1 percent of total production. Between 1975 and 1978 Elf-Gabon invested 120 billion CFA (2.4 billion French francs). "Encouraging" discoveries have been made, notably in the southeast, where the fields at Mayumba will begin to produce "very modestly" in 1980, according to the president of Elf-Gabon, Andre Tarallo.

The oil reserves make it possible to continue at the present production tempo of about 10 million tons for 10 years, M'Bouy-Boutzit specified. In international oil circles it is estimated that production, which already declined by 5.9 percent in 1978 with 10.6 million tons, should drop below the 10 million mark this year by reason of the exhaustion of some fields.

This year oil should provide Gaon with more than a third of its revenue by reason of a rise in prices which is approaching 70 percent since the month

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of December 1978. The "Mandji" quality barrel is presently selling for \$22 versus \$12.59 in 1978; the "Gamba," for \$22.50 versus \$13.03.

Gabon, one of the most modest OPEC oil-producers at the Equator, also has other resources at its command. According to the World Bank, the per capita income of Gabon in 1976, the last year known, amounted to \$3,780 or just behind that of the United Kingdom (\$4,180) and New Zealand (\$3,200).

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MADAGASCAR

REPORT ON 1978 FISCAL YEAR FOR BNI, BTM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 pp 3032-3033

[Text] For the National Bank for Industrial Development [BNI], fiscal year 1978 will go down as the year of consolidation and of the first authentic achievement. This is made clear in the BNI 1978 report which states that last year the bank opened two new district post offices in Antananarivo and an agency in Ambositra, while the new main office has been installed on the fifth floor of the headquarters building.

In the equipment area, it has acquired a Honeywell Bull 64 data processor. In the personnel area, in 1978 it has recruited close to 100 people thus bringing the manpower to 905 members.

Foreign relations have also been very active and varied, while on the national level, the bank has participated in some important undertakings: new expansion of SOTEM (Textile Company of Majung) whose organization required almost 30 billion MR [Malagasy francs] in investments, with BNI the main shareholder; the launching of the Tsimoro, the Solitany Malagasy (SOLIMA) petroleum tanker; laying the foundation stone of the Toamasina (Tomatave) fertilizer plant; starting the Toly machine-tool production plant; opening the first link in the Zaha hotel chain, the result of cooperation between the BNI and Air Madagascar; settlement of the agreement between JIRAMA (National Electrical Company) and a number of equipment suppliers; implementation of the Madagascar Paper Mills extension work which will be operational around the middle of 1980; completion of the investment programs of the bank's two affiliates: the Tananarive Aluminum Company (TAMALU) and the Madagascar Confectionary and Biscuit Company (SOCOBIS).

The BNI accounts for the fiscal year 1978 at the end of 1978 show a total balance of 63.1 billion Malagasy francs (+ 2 percent at the end of 1977) and a total balance + exclusive of balance of 89.5 billion (+ 20.6 percent).

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	1977	1978
Short term.....	35.3.....	41.1
Average term.....	4.9.....	5.2
Long term.....	3.2.....	2.5

By categories, BNI competition is placed as follows (in billions of Malagasy francs):

Operating credits.....	38
Investment credits.....	8
Social credits.....	3.6
Competition with international business.....	10.5

New close participation in company capital in 1978 amounted to 357 million Malagasy francs, as compared with 349 million in 1977. It involves five businesses: a textile mill, a hotel chain, a fertilizer plant, a dietetic products plant, wood processing industry. Because of this, as of 31 December 1978, BNI's own activities rose to a total of 2.7 billion Malagasy francs distributed among 41 companies.

Fiscal year 1978 results show a net profit of 839.3 million Malagasy francs as against 738.4 million for the previous fiscal year. Let us remember that the BNI capital is 3 billion Malagasy francs.

BTM 1978 Fiscal Year

BTM (Bankin N'y Tantsaha Mpamokatra, or National Bank for Agricultural Development) has just distributed its report for the 1978 fiscal year. This report first of all highlights that 1978 in Madagascar has been distinguished by a sharp slump in output, a business transaction recession, a standstill in mining and industry output, a worsening of the trade balance and the acceleration of price inflation.

Despite the increase in some farm products (sugar cane, clove, peanuts) and minerals (graphite and mica), the combination of different unfavorable elements (climatic conditions, breakdown in trading channels, the peasantry's lack of interest in certain products, etc....) is the reason for this sharp decline in production.

Except for the first month of the year, the trade sector was likewise less active, the slump due to the decline in buying power which followed upon the drop in farm output.

Foreign exchanges have increased only 10 percent in value. Exports have recorded a slight drop, which resulted solely from the increase in imports. For the BTM, fiscal year 1978 marks the year in which the bank has had to face problems arising from reorganization. Despite the many difficulties encountered following the integration and reclassifying of personnel, the standardization of management methods, and the computerizing of operations

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transacted by the bank, the increase in its budget has not come to a standstill. Clients' deposits have consistently increased. Despite the very active competition in the banking sector, these deposits have been normally put to good use. The structure of the bank balance has preserved its sound character. The actual funds compared with time loans have a 1 to 0.8 ratio, a ratio which by making possible without misgivings a substantial increase in long-term loans, would enhance the bank's role as a development bank. The search for lines of credit from foreign money lenders to strengthen the bank's permanent resources in order to continue financing agricultural investment, is continuing without too many problems.

On the other hand, notes the report, without in any way affecting the profit and loss account, we have been able to reconstruct funds corresponding to increased risk on debtors and to acquiring new data processing material. It is necessary to point out that the size of the data processor bought in 1977 is no longer adequate for the bank's needs.

Regarding receipts, the analysis of turnover during this period makes it clear that the diversification policy, in the opinion of the bank worldwide, has produced favorable results. Around 52 percent of the receipts have come from trading activities, 32 percent from agriculture and 16 percent from other activities. The increase in expenses has however become a matter of concern for the bank's administration.

On the other hand, on entering an unprecedented expansion period, the bank found itself faced with the need to apply a consolidation policy in all areas of its infrastructure (personnel, training, organization, material, property), a consolidation which was not able to keep up with the tempo of growth. Moreover, as in all banks, the BTM is engaged in a very decided rationalization process of its operations by means of new techniques.

The BTM total balance, by 31 December 1978, rose to 45.7 billion Malagasy francs, as compared with 36 billion at the end of 1977. The 1978 fiscal year profit rose to 782 million Malagasy francs as compared with 460.7 million in 1977, before tax.

In the aggregate, BTM financing in 1978 amounted to around 65.3 billion Malagasy francs as compared with 47.3 billion in 1977, distributed as follows by large economic sectors: commerce and industry, 33.5 billion (as against 31.8 billion in 1977); agriculture, 25.2 billion (as against 14.3 billion); social credits, 6.55 billion (as against 1.7 billion).

Customer credits were as follows in 1978 as compared with 1977, in millions of Malagasy francs: short term: 27,671,4 million as against 2,925,5 million; long term: 1,094,7 million as against 730.1 million.

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

MALAGASY OFFICERS TRIED--At the end of November, 2 years after their arrest, four Malagasy officers, accused of treason-felony, are to go before a military court of justice. They allegedly admitted to having planned the elimination of the president, Didier Ratsiraka. On the other hand, they have denied having led a huge plot against the state with the support of foreign powers. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Nov79 p 40] 8870

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MALAWI

SUGAR REFINERY IN DWANGA INAUGURATED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 pp 3222-3223

[Article: "Inauguration of Dwangwa Refinery"]

[Text] At mid-October, President Banda inaugurated the Dwangwa sugar refinery project during a ceremony attended by members of the diplomatic corps and by local officials as well as by the president of Lonrho Great-Britain.

This project, built by Lonrho after the withdrawal of the Booker group, at a total estimated cost of 69 million kwacha, counts among its shareholders: Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), the Press presidential group, the West-German Development Bank and the European Investment Bank.

Long-term loans have been obtained from International Finance Corporation (IFC), affiliated to the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, the West-German Development Bank, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the Commercial Bank of Malawi, while the International Development Corporation of South Africa and Mitsui Company have granted purchasing credits to the project.

The planting program started in June 1975 and, on 31 August 1979, 4,000 hectares had been planted in sugar cane, an additional 1,600 hectares being scheduled for exploitation before the end of the year.

To date, 4 million kwacha have been spent on irrigation ditches, 5 million on road construction, and 3 million on auxiliary services. Production started at Dwangwa last June and had reached 10,600 tons on 30 September; this figure includes 1,127 tons of raw sugar for the domestic market, 237 tons of refined sugar and 9,296 tons of raw sugar for exportation. A total of 20,000 tons is expected to be produced during the first year of operation, then 63,000 tons in 1980 and 74,000 in each of the following years.

The markets will be shared equitably with Sugar Corporation of Malawi (SUCOMA) whose annual production is about 105,000 tons.

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Domestic sales are expected to be 52,000 tons in 1978-1979, 56,000 tons in 1979-1980 and 60,000 tons in 1980-1981, while Dwangwa's exportations to traditional markets such as the European Economic Community and the United States would amount to 5 million kwacha in 1979, increasing to 15.75 million the following year and levelling at 18.5 million in 1981 and thereafter.

By then, exports would have increased from the present 56,000 tons (1978) to 119,000 tons. The Dwangwa plant has the characteristic of being self-sufficient as far as energy is concerned since it uses bagasse as fuel.

The juice is extracted by diffusion and the unit can process 3,600 tons of sugar cane per day. To reach the scheduled annual production of 74,000 tons of sugar, 635,000 tons of sugar cane will be necessary.

The Dwangwa site was selected after studies had demonstrated the high potential of the alluvial soil of the area. Tests carried out on-site produced canes reaching 4 meters in height and a yield of 20 tons per hectare.

When the current development phase is completed, 5,740 hectares will have been planted in cane so that, on a medium-term basis, Dwangwa will make it possible to increase national sugar production by 75 percent, and sugar, which accounted for 12.5 percent of exports during the first 7 months of 1979, will become an important source of foreign currency in the country's economy.

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MALAWI

TRAINING OFFERED FOR MODERN FISHING TECHNIQUES OFFERED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 70 p 3283

[Article: "Fishing: The Mqweqwe Training Center"]

[Text] Today, Malawi is boasting 25 fishing centers along the shores of Lake Malawi, against only eight in 1964.

This quantitative increase is due in part to the creation, immediately after independence, 15 years ago, of the Mqweqwe Fishing Training Center located some 30 km north of Mangochi.

Designed to instruct local fishermen in modern fishing techniques, the school has diversified its activities to parallel the agricultural development of the country and today, in addition to the initial training offered to shore dwellers, it also offers a technical assistant training program and a "boat-building" department. Local fishermen are trained for up to 3 months, after which they are familiar with "modern" fishing equipment and know how to use it.

As for technical assistants, their training lasts 2 years and ends with a competitive examination. Malawi's Ministry of Agriculture offers jobs in its Department of Fisheries to qualifying students. In addition, instruction in boat construction is given over a 3 years' period to the best students from technical schools who have chosen to make a career in woodworking and carpentry.

The boats built at the Mqweqwe training yard measure between 4 and 7 meters and are sold to local businessmen, thus providing the training center with funds to buy equipment.

There are two kinds of fishermen, the "independents" who do not need any outside help, and the others who receive government loans. These loans may be as high as 17,000 kwacha (approximately 90,000 French francs) and are repayable in 5 years.

Over these 16 years, the Mqweqwe technical center has fulfilled its purpose and its success is evidenced by the presence of students from Zambia, Botswana, Nigeria and Gambia.

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MALAWI

MALDECO FISHERIES STATISTICS GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3283

[Article: "... And MALDECO Fisheries"]

[Text] Lake Malawi covers one fifth of the total area of the country, i.e., 24,000 sq km. It contains over 200 species of fish which provide the population of its shores with work, income and an important source of protein. Nevertheless, the production of the fisheries, estimated at 80,000 tons per year, is insufficient to cover the requirements of the population as a whole, this resource being not yet fully exploited because of a lack of equipment and of distribution problems.

This is why local fisheries have, during the past few years, initiated a policy of investing in equipment which should, in time, make possible a better utilization of the lake's potential.

One of them, MALDECO Fisheries, a division of the Malawi Development Corporation, has provided its fleet with modern locating equipment. Created in 1968 with a no-interest loan from the British Government, it owns a "sonar" sounder which makes it considerably easier to locate fish banks and determine trawling depth with respect to the surface and bottom of the lake.

In 1978, MALDECO fished 4,700 tons of the principal fish species: chambos, chisawasawa, utaka, usipa, mlamba and kampango. In addition to fishing and selling fresh fish, its activities include the sun-drying of chisawasawa and utaka which has proved a success in the three years it has been practiced. This treatment preserves the essential protein of the fish and has the advantage of ensuring its preservation over long periods, so that it can be shipped throughout the country.

MALDECO's drying capacity has not reached one ton per day during the season. Some species, mainly chambo and kampango, are also smoked in the company's smoke-houses.

MALDECO's personnel includes over 800 people employed in the most diverse specialized jobs. Its equipment includes two machines producing 10 tons of

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ice per day, two other machines freezing fresh fish in 4 hours, and a new fish processing unit imported from Denmark and identical to those used in European fisheries.

It should be added that, in addition to the edible species mentioned above, tropical fish from Lake Malawi are also exported to Europe. This activity, which takes place with the help of South-African experts, brings Malawi 500,000 kwacha in foreign currency every year.

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MALI

TRAORE: SOLE PARTY UNITES ALL POLITICAL TENDENCIES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 987, 5 Dec 79 pp 48-51

[Excerpt] [Question] Almost 11 years after the fall of Modibo Keita and his party, the Sudan Union, you have founded your own, the Democratic Union of Malian People [UDPM]. Do you think that Mali will always be destined for a single party?

[Answer] The party is an unequalled instrument for channeling divergent energies to promote our country's economic, social and cultural development. In a referendum, our people opted for the single party to avoid the demons of division, regionalism, tribalism. In short, to stifle the waste of energy.

[Question] But the referendum did not permit a choice between a single party and more than one party.

[Answer] The UDPM is the party of all the people. All classes of society find their place there. Criticism and self-criticism can be freely exercised within the party, with no constraints.

[Question] Do you think that there lies the best way of resolving the contradictions which affect every human society, at whatever stage of development it is?

[Answer] In our opinion, it is the only way of resolving the contradictions which will inevitably be born in our country. We feel that at the historical phase where our people are, and considering their desire for quick development, the single party is the most appropriate instrument.

[Question] For much longer?

[Answer] We live in a mobile world. If it should happen that economic, social and cultural conditions militate in favor of another type of organization in our political life, clearly and pragmatically, we would adapt to it.

[Question] How is it that, in the "normal" constitutional government which you have just restored, citizens are arrested and condemned simply for handing out leaflets?

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[Answer] It is not a matter simply of handing out leaflets, but of creating secret organizations. Which is condemned by law.

[Question] Perhaps not everyone can express himself in the framework of your party. Since that time, some have tried to do otherwise.

[Answer] Our constitutional government is based on the existence of a single, national and democratic party, the Democratic Union of Malian People, which is defined as the melting pot of our nation's vital forces. As a result, all free and constructive debates relating to our people's future must take place within it.

[Question] Now we must define what is meant by "free and constructive debates."

[Answer] That is clear. Those who reveal themselves through leaflets, outside of the official party, reject the rules of democracy. As a result, they are against the interests of the people who have freely chosen their constitutional government. One cannot opt for such a government yet refuse to apply the democratic principles sanctioned by the party.

[Excerpt] [Question] Do you consider your government a competent dictatorship or a powerful democracy?

[Answer] A dictatorship, even if it is competent, is still a dictatorship. In Mali, we have chosen democracy, that is, government by the people, for the people. Our party's activity is governed by the principle of democratic centralism. That means that the upper echelons must gather the ideas, needs and aspirations of the lower coalition, centralize and rationalize them, and render them in the form of decisions and actions where the lower coalition can recognize itself.

Thus, on the economic plane, we reject the blind competition which results in the elimination of the weak. The state actively intervenes to control, guide and develop those sectors necessary to satisfy the needs of the large classes of the population. In Mali, in a word, we are convinced that if the people are not given their say, they will always end up taking it.

[Question] Many officers who were on your side in the beginning have been dismissed or even imprisoned.

[Answer] That can be explained by the simple fact that they did not believe they should remain loyal to the objectives we set down for ourselves on November 19, 1968. As I had to say it, power is not to be gained for the sake of power. Power must be a means of serving the sovereign people, to translate their deepest aspirations into facts. Some people were not able to accept that truth.

[Question] Do you think that Africa is doomed to military governments?

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[Answer] Surely you know that in Africa there are civil governments and military governments, and that some military governments have returned to a civil government. For many countries, the army for a long time was the only organized force. Which is what explains its different interventions.

[Question] Is there a reason why something, that for other parts of the world would seem the exceptional government, becomes the rule for Africa?

[Answer] It is clear that the army is not the only alternative because, undeniably, other types of structured and organized forces exist in different countries. Thus, I do not think that Africa is doomed to military governments. I do not think so because it has not been stated or proven that military regimes alone fulfill the essential conditions for organizing and ruling nations. However, I do think that, with regard to Mali, the army, which was the product of the people, would have failed in its sacred duty if, on November 19, 1968, it had not put an end to the government in power at that time.

[Question] Do you think that you are capable of one day leaving the government, in a normal fashion, or, like all your African counterparts, do you feel that you are a prisoner of the political system which stipulates that in Africa, once someone has gained power, he does not leave it except by force?

[Answer] I do not feel that I am in any way a prisoner of a political system. My constant concern is to promote and safeguard the best interests of my country.

[Question] But do you think that you can leave the supreme administrative post by normal means?

[Answer] I have no answer to make.

[Question] It has been said that some of your military colleagues have gotten very rich...

[Answer] I believe you are an informed journalist and that you have been following what has happened in Mali since the events of February 28, 1978. I can assure you that, since that date, those few officers who got rich at the people's expense were dismissed and their wealth given over to the state.

[Question] When does Mali think it will join the West African Monetary Union (UMOA)?

[Answer] Traditionally, Mali has favored all concepts of consolidation based on agreement and solidarity and offering real prospects for economic integration. For us this is the only way assuring the economic and social advancement and strengthening our states' independence. With respect to the UMOA, Franco-Malian monetary and financial accords currently in force anticipate that in time Mali will join that organization. And Mali is doing everything possible to arrive at that point.

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[Question] You have now been your country's head for 11 years. Are you totally satisfied with what you have accomplished?

[Answer] Despite the enormous hardships which Mali experienced in November 1968, these 11 years have been satisfactory to us. In all areas, especially farming and industry, the situation has greatly improved. Agriculture's share in gross national production has doubled. Production of millet and rice has practically been multiplied by 2, increasing from 624,000 to 1,109,000 tons and from 134,000 to 350,000 tons, respectively. The same holds true for cotton, which soared from 50,000 to 131,000 tons, and for peanuts.

[Question] To hear you, one would think that the drought did not have the catastrophic effects which one might have feared.

[Answer] In spite of the drought which put our economy to the test twice during that period, and, especially, in spite of worldwide inflation which was reflected in our production costs, Mali has achieved conclusive results in the areas of livestock, fishing and even industry.

[Excerpt] [Question] What about industry?

[Answer] There, our state sector witnessed an increase in turnover of nearly 80 percent, reaching 110 billion FM in 1977 (55 billion CFA).

[Excerpt] [Question] Do your state companies still constitute a heavy burden on the public treasury?

[Answer] Our state sector, as we have often recognized, is having some serious difficulties because of many related factors: insufficient supplies of raw materials due, especially, to little rainfall during the past few years; the repercussions which worldwide inflation has had on production costs; the tightness of the domestic market; fraudulent importing of rival products; machine obsolescence, etc. These factors have measurably curbed the growth of most of our units. The government and the party since its birth, have always been concerned with the financial situation of every enterprise. They have never hesitated in taking necessary immediate measures: offers of capital to our own or foreign individuals; restructuring of the enterprise in question or even the outright suppression of the failing unit in order to keep the rest of the sector viable.

That said, we maintain that our state companies and enterprises, with the results of which we are aware, are having a positive impact on the economic and social life of the whole nation.

[Question] Despite the existence of the West African Economic Community (CEAO), Malian manufactured products seem to encounter obstacles, in the form of protectionist orders, on the markets of neighboring countries. How do you explain this and what do you plan to do to remedy it?

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[Answer] It is true that Malian manufactured products, especially textiles, are the object of discrimination in certain CEA0 countries. And this is in violation of the provisions in the community's treaty and protocols. In Mali, we have always played the CEA0 game honestly and fairly. We hope that our associates will do likewise. We have approached the secretary general of the community with this question.

[Question] Will Mali have enough food for this year, or will it still need help from other countries?

[Answer] In my message to the nation on September 22, I set forth the results of our farm production for the past year. Grain production, although relatively good, is below that of an average campaign. Our grain needs meanwhile will not be met, mainly because of climatic uncertainties, marketing and transport difficulties, and numerous losses caused by plunderers, bad weather and conservation methods. Besides, for several more years, the country will be faced with the cumulative effects of the drought: seeds and supplies of families and nation alike have been totally wasted.

It is too early to predict the outcome of the present farm campaign which has been beset with freakish, irregular rainfalls, poorly distributed with patches of drought.

For all of these reasons, I think that we will require help from others in order to make up the deficit that will result.

[Question] Is it accurate to say that Mali is adverse to the defense pact of the CEA0 countries?

[Answer] Mali is not adverse to that defense pact. Our country cannot but adhere to any organization aimed at protecting the basic interests of the peoples of the region. What we are refusing is to be protectors of colonial privileges, whether admitted or not.

[Question] How are Mali's relations with its neighbors, particularly those to the north?

[Answer] They have been very good. The relations are based on solidarity, friendship, pursuit of matters of mutual concern, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

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MAURITIUS

NAVAL BUILD-UP IN INDIAN OCEAN CAUSE FOR CONCERN

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 10 Dec 79 p 41

[Article by Herve-Masson: "An Englishman and His Rupees"]

[Text] It is a commonly known fact that the Indian Ocean is the center of military and diplomatic one-upmanship on the oil route. Through it must pass the giant oil tankers carrying the black gold from the Gulf to the ports and refineries in the Western countries. But this route does not cut across a deserted ocean; far from it. A glance at a map of the region shows the importance which the newly independent nations on the shores of this part of the Indian Ocean have in the eyes of the great powers.

First of all, there are the countries in East Africa with progressive regimes, followed by the islands in the southwestern area of the ocean: Madagascar, the Comoro Islands, the Mascarene Islands and the Seychelles. While it is difficult for the mightier nations to achieve an outright reconquest of states that have now become sovereign, coup attempts and destabilization by means of mercenary commando groups remain tempting. When such devices are successful, the former guardian power runs to the aid of the new regime, which is obviously favorably inclined toward it (that is what happened in the Comoro Islands). When they fail, one has but to wash one's hands of the whole affair because one was not officially involved (the Seychelles).

It is precisely in order to protect themselves against such unforeseeable events that the progressive countries in the region want to set up a small combined naval force. Madagascar, the Seychelles, Tanzania and Mozambique have reportedly decided to pool part of their resources. Would it be a substantial force? No. A few small units and some 1,000 men, less than the crew of a small aircraft carrier.

Nevertheless, it is this tiny armada that worries the government of Mauritius and is the subject of hostile comments in Reunion, for these two countries, one independent for the past 10 years and the other a French "department," remain the Trojan horse of imperialism.

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The strong French military establishment in Reunion is not reassuring to countries on the Indian Ocean, however. Mauritius has a small army (the Special Mobile Force) of 500 well-trained, well-equipped men and a tiny, wornout gunboat. No planes. The opposition party, the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), maintains excellent relations with neighboring progressive governments, which only increases the fear of Prime Minister Ramgoolam. The latter has therefore chosen (long ago) to play the card of imperialism.

For some observers, Mauritius is also responsible for the militarization of the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Ramgoolam assumed this responsibility in 1965, by giving up the archipelago of the Chagos, including Diego-Garcia Island, to the British, without consulting the people of the islands, the Mauritian people or even the local parliament. He perpetuates it by refusing (as he has just done) to demand that these islands be given back to Mauritius. Oraison, who has studied the background of this villainous concession in depth, is categorical: The entire transaction is tainted with illegality due to existing international conventions. It has never been anything but the result of a swap between the former imperialist power and Mauritius, which was then still an autonomous colony of Great Britain. The jurist therefore disagrees with the affirmations of the Port-Louis government, which claims that Mauritius has retained its fishing and mining rights on Diego and the Chagos. Not only is none of this in the act of cession, but the subsequently concluded lease of these territories to Washington by London stipulates that "no one has the right to undertake oil and mining prospecting on these islands without the authorization of Great Britain." It could be that the archipelago is rich in oil!

As for the claim, often made by Sir Ramgoolam, that at the time, his government was unaware that the English and the Americans intended to build a nuclear-type naval base on Diego-Garcia, it is also false. The author of this article has a handwritten letter from one of the highest officials in the Mauritian Government at the time in which it is stated in black and white: "We shall have our independence, but we shall also have atomic bombs on Diego!"

Thirty Deniers

It was therefore with the blessing of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam that Diego-Garcia became an American base as early as 1965, thereby inciting the Soviets to assert their presence in the Indian Ocean in their turn.

But that is not all. All -- we repeat, all -- of the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands were abruptly deported to Mauritius. They are subsisting there as well as they can, which is not well, but the Mauritian Government is not seriously concerned about their fate. And yet, a certain Mr Sheridan, a British attorney, has just landed in Mauritius. He is the guest of the government, which has provided him with an official car, officially driven by a policeman. This gentleman claims to represent the interests of the "islanders," as they are called. He supposedly came with an offer of

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compensation on the order of 20 million rupees (about 10 million francs) for the 400 to 600 persons forced to leave the Chagos. These people are very poor and in addition, most of them are illiterate, which explains how the man succeeded in making them sign an individual statement in which, in exchange for cash, the people pledge to give up their demand to return to their native island. Judas' 30 pieces of silver imposed on a disinherited people!

Kader Bhayat and Gerard Nina of the MMM discovered the bribe and asked the prime minister for explanations. Ramgoolam said that he knew nothing at all about the matter. It is the height of cynicism when one learns that an MMM deputy, Sylvio Michel, has just filed a motion in Parliament asking that the Chagos Islands be returned to Mauritius.

Is the Indian Ocean a peace zone? That is a utopian idea as long as the Mauritian Government continues to sell out the independence acquired (without any armed struggle) in 1968.

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MAURITIUS

BRIEFS

RUPEE DEVALUATED--Last October, the Mauritian rupee dropped 30 percent in value. This news surprised business milieux and Mauritians in general, who did not expect the government to go so far in its austerity policy aimed at the country's economic recovery. In any case, the action was taken after government consultation with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, both of which agreed to aid the island financially. Estimating that the devaluation was going to result in a 15 percent rise in the cost of living, the government decreed a 13 percent salary increase and took stern measures regarding price control. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 9 Nov 79 p 3033] 8870

NEW ENERGY SOURCES SOUGHT--To decrease oil purchase expenses, which right now represent a tenth of the regular budget, the Mauritian Government would like to find other energy sources. It has entrusted research on this subject to an institution, Inter University Council Scheme, which it has especially established for this purpose. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3033] 8870

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MOZAMBIQUE

PROGRESS ACCOMPLISHED IN ECONOMY DESPITE DIFFICULTIES

London NEW AFRICAN in English Dec 79 pp 61, 62

[Text] Mozambique's FRELIMO Government inherited a severely underdeveloped economy. Its immediate, formidable goal is to restore production in 1980 to pre-independence levels reports Stephen Talbot.

AMACILTA Fernandes, a young Mozambican, worked for a private Portuguese fishing company in Beira before his country gained independence in 1975. When the owner "ran away," the Mozambican Government asked Fernandes to manage the company "even though I wasn't really qualified," Fernandes says with characteristic frankness and modesty. He accepted the responsibility, he explains, because it was a pressing necessity to keep the economy functioning and to guarantee jobs.

When the Marxist government, FRELIMO, decided to establish a state-owned fishing enterprise, EMOPESCA, Fernandes was again called upon to serve as one of the managing directors. A tall, slender serious man, Fernandes readily acknowledges: "These are hard times to work in Mozambique. We have so many problems of production - lack of spare parts, a shortage of skilled workers, not enough capital." Despite the enormous obstacles, Fernandes has plunged into his work and is optimistic about Mozambique's future.

FRELIMO inherited a severely underdeveloped economy excessively dependent on South Africa and Rhodesia. The post-independence flight of capital and managerial and technical skills - aggravated by deliberate economic sabotage - caused a drastic fall in levels of production. In addition, Mozambique's foreign exchange was sharply reduced by the March 1976 closing of the border with

Rhodesia (resulting in the loss, so far, of more than \$500m.) and by the South African regime's decision in April 1978 to end special gold payments for Mozambique's migrant mineworkers.

The port of Beira - Mozambique's second largest city - was particularly hard hit by the economic downturn. Heavily dependent on Rhodesian trade and tourism, the city suffered a sudden loss of revenue and a wave of unemployment.

Fernandes says that the Beira port is finally recovering as a result of Mozambique's slow, general economic recuperation and from increased trade with Malawi and Zambia. Two new cold storage and processing plants for prawns and fish have been completed adjacent to the docks, and with aid from Holland others are being constructed. A harbour wall to increase docking capacity - begun two years ago - should be finished this month. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is helping Mozambique investigate the rich reserves of prawns, lobster, crab, shark and tuna. Prawns are being exported to Japan, Canada and Western Europe, while Spanish, Soviet, East German, Japanese and Italian boats fish the coastline under licensing agreements.

Fishing

EMOPESCA operates 48 fishing boats and is about to purchase another 15 at a cost of \$20-25m. "That's all we can afford," says Fernandes, "but what we

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really need' is 200 boats." Seated in his sparsely furnished office, surrounded by volumes of Lenin and books on fishing ("Lenin did not have too much to say about fishing"), Fernandes stresses that the national fish marketing enterprise, PESCO, is also purchasing as many small refrigerated trucks as possible to transport fish - an important source of protein - inland over rough roads. There is also a major effort to diversify and increase consumption of dried fish.

If the port is beginning to recover, life in Beira remains noticeably more Spartan than in Maputo. Outside Beira there is a bustling, semi-privately-owned sugar company, *Acucareira de Mocambique*, which employs 8,000 workers and produces up to 400 tons of sugar a day. Assisted by technical advisers from Cuba, Portugal and Mauritius, the factory produces 80% of its sugar for local consumption and exports most of the rest to the United States - a major importer of Mozambican agricultural products despite Washington's hostility to FRELIMO's socialism and support for liberation movements.

Perhaps more representative of Beira is a bus and truck assembly factory, *Metal Mecanico*, where workers are building buses, by hand, at the rate of only four per month. The chassis and engines are purchased from British Leyland and most of the spare parts come from South Africa. Many of the workers welding parts and operating drills and lathes do so slowly with the concentration and tentativeness of men unfamiliar with machinery. Others - some of them foreigners - stand close by, instructing. The activity of the 50 or so workers is barely enough to breathe life into the cavernous factory building: there are vast unoccupied spaces with scattered, idle equipment in need of repair.

Recently taken over by the state, the factory has been merged with five other similar companies in the Beira area. The minimum wage has increased from 600 escudos a month (\$18) before independence to 3,000 escudos (\$90). Daily literacy classes at the workplace and intensive on-the-job training have been introduced to overcome the colonial legacy of an illiterate, unskilled working class. Portuguese and North Korean *co-operantes* have been brought in to help reorganise the factory and instruct the new workers. But the factory is still plagued by lack of spare parts and must depend on Britain and South Africa for materials. Efficient assembly line production of passenger buses is a long way off.

The most obvious break with the past is in the factory's management. In place of the Portuguese owners who fled is a six-member administrative council and a FRELIMO party cell. Worker participation in the decision-making process is now encouraged. Most of the factory officials are young, enthusiastic Mozambicans. The exception was a grizzled, pipe-smoking, 53-year-old Portuguese man who had lived in Mozambique for 29 years. Asked why he had remained when some 200,000 Portuguese had left, he said: "My heart is with Mozambique and the revolution. This is where I want to be."

In Maputo, there are better organised, more efficient factories like SOVESTE, a state-owned clothing manufacturer which produces 2,000 shirts, 750 pairs of trousers (including jeans), 700 bras, 3,000 pairs of underwear, and a variety of children's clothes each day, according to Rodrigues Mondlane, the head of the administering committee. An active chapter of the Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM) is helping to integrate the 160 women into the 462-strong workforce - breaking down traditional barriers of discrimination. There is also an active production council (an embryonic union) and a youth organisation headed by a young man who had worked two 18-month contracts in the South African gold mines before being hired at SOVESTE. Unlike many of the older factories in Mozambique, SOVESTE is a light, clean, modern industrial plant.

Workers' wages at SOVESTE and other factories are still low (\$90-\$300 a month) but they have doubled and even quadrupled since independence, while most basic consumer prices have remained fairly stable. One of the aggravating results of the sudden increase in consumer power - and the simultaneous disruptions in production and transport - is the emergence of queues. Long queues form in the pre-dawn hours in the cities in front of meat, fish and bakery stores. Although fruits, vegetables and other goods are readily available in the central markets, queueing for items such as meat has become a way of life. Naturally, there are lots of complaints, but surprisingly little rancour. The lines are orderly and people waiting will tell you that in many cases they would not have been able to afford meat before independence.

In the rural areas, where most people live, FRELIMO is trying to increase production and improve living standards by encouraging the scattered peasantry to

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come together in communal villages. According to official figures, there are approximately 1,000 communal villages with about a million residents. The villages are in all states of development. The "February 3rd" communal village near Manhica, about an hour's drive north of Maputo, is just getting off the ground, but already boasts a newly-installed telephone, a people's store, a rudimentary health dispensary, a school, and an assembly hall for all the meetings a democratically-run village requires. Nearly 500 families lived on this austere, sandy hilltop overlooking fertile but easily flooded fields of rice, sugar and maize. People were enthusiastic about their new lives, but spoke openly about the serious problems they continue to face.

Target

FRELIMO'S immediate goal -- a formidable one -- is to restore production in 1980 to pre-independence levels. President Samora Machel stated recently that, despite continuing economic difficulties, the prospects for meeting the 1980 target are generally good. He added, however, that the economic progress is still insufficient for the needs of the country's 10-12m. people and that the next 10 years must be "the decade of radical transformation of our country" ●

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MOZAMBIQUE

SECRET

BRIEFS

OFFICIAL TO GDR--A high Mozambique official, Manuel Lourenco Rodrigues, the deputy director of the National Office of Statistics, made a stay in the GDR. He was received by Guenter Mittag, a member of the Politburo of the East German Communist Party of which he is the principal economic official. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2974] 9380

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SENEGAL

ECONOMY FACING CRISIS WORSE THAN GENERALLY BELIEVED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Nov 79 pp 32-33

[Article by Jean-Louis Bucher]

[Text] When we recall Senegal, we cannot fail to remember the unrivalled personality of the president, Leopold Sedar Senghor. Or that experience of a pluralist democracy indeed controlled, but which owes its importance to its example in Africa. Or then again to the reputation of the prime minister, Mr Abdou Diouf, which is that of a wise and upright administrator. However, at the end of this year, 1979, for many Senegalese, their country has a far less pleasant appearance: the cost of living is high, monthly bills a hardship, business failing, austerity systematized. In short, there is every indication of a severe economic depression.

Senegal is not alone in experiencing a situation such as this. But we know little about it. In Senghor's country, more than anywhere else, the positive hid the negative. And for a long time. Not only is there a depression today, but for years the Senegalese economy has been in a bad way.

The figures speak for themselves. In 1978, the gross national product (GNP) dropped sharply in true value (some 4.8 percent according to the government, some 7 percent according to the World Bank). The cause of this deterioration, the drought, which brought about a record drop in peanut output (-50 percent!). But, isn't it disturbing to note that, almost 20 years after independence, the economy still depends on a crop as poor and uncertain as the peanut? Since 1960 moreover, the actual growth of the economy has not exceeded 2.5 percent a year, while that of the population has been estimated at 2.6 percent. Result: the income per person has slightly diminished during this period (0.4 percent says the World Bank).

Senegal has by no means emerged from underdevelopment. It is a poor country, with an annual GNP per person of around \$400. ONCAD, National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development, has the monopoly on the peanut market. There misappropriations of funds were discovered to the amount of a billion CFA francs, and it is now in a manifestly critical

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situation. Bud-Senegal, a joint economic company, which was conducting a pilot agricultural diversification study, has just been liquidated. Don't these two instances prove that they must indeed admit defeat?

Faced with such a cruel situation, the leaders, without denying the facts, continued to present them with subtle modifications. "It is true," they admit, "that the achievements of the past 20 years have not been brilliant. But," they point out, "during this period there was at least a 9-year drought. And everything is linked together: a drop in exports, recession in some industries (particularly the oil mills and their suppliers), a decline in state resources, diminution in public investments. These negative shock waves could not be avoided. Despite all this, Senegal has held its own."

It has held its own thanks to the continued development of industries other than oil mills (the industrial output has increased 10 percent a year): foodstuffs, textiles, chemical industry in particular. Thanks again to the favorable rates of phosphates in 1974 and 1975. Thanks finally to the sudden spurt in tourism (10 billion CFA francs in receipts in 1976).

"What does it matter," a high official told us, "if there has been no growth? There has been some development, including in agriculture. In 1960, for example, we were producing neither rice nor cotton." Moreover, it could be added to the government's credit that it has prevented the decline of Dakar, which had been the center of attraction for a huge assemblage of some 30 million inhabitants.

Immediately after, the situation worsened in the course of 2 years and we now wonder about the future. Is Senegal slowly sinking into a deep depression, with unpredictable consequences? The unrest is now becoming evident (including among the long favored educated lower middle class and townsmen), and the revival of folk religion could well be its early manifestations.

Let us not dramatize, now reply those in power. Since March 1978, the government has been carrying out a recovery plan, much needed and since improved. Public finances have been reorganized by the indirect means of various fiscal and administrative measures. Increasing receipts and cutting down expenses have made it possible to "make both ends meet" in 1978-79 with a small surplus. They have also reexamined the lax loan policy which was adopted from 1973 to 1977 and are now weighing its effects: in 1980 debt charges will reach 27 percent of export receipts! It is a question of borrowing less, preferably on long term and low interest rate, in other words, from relief organizations for development.

The same directive holds regarding credit: for any amount greater than 100 billion CFA francs, authorization is now required from the central bank. In an endeavor to meet the priority requirements of productive sectors, they retained as objective to limit to 7 percent any increase in credit between 1978 and 1979. So much for the short-term plan which will make it possible, according to a high finance authority, "to get out of this fix."

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Other measures covering 1980-1985 are now being prepared, such as the short-term plan, in conjunction with IMF (International Monetary Fund). Adopted by the government at the end of November, this average-term plan will be acted upon at the general assembly in mid-December, says the minister of finances. Its major principles are: restrictive budgetary policy, credit margin, limitation of running into debt. Also, "fair pricing policy" (the state is again going to reduce subsidies for indispensable products) and "skimming" of public enterprises (currently they represent 40 percent of the GNP. For many activities, an unconditional assignment to a private enterprise is anticipated.

Several IMF and World Bank missions came to Senegal in 1978 and 1979. A letter of intent, recalling the main principles of recovery was sent to the IMF by Mr Ousmane Seck, minister of finance. On the other hand, the IMF granted a first standby credit of 10.5 billion DTS (3 billion CFA francs), with a second anticipated at the end of 1980. This to some now means that "Senegal's policy is dictated by IMF."

Although it is true that this institution's interventions at times wound national pride, the reaction, limited to intellectual circles, is not basic. The warning from the foreign economist who knows Senegal well seems more to the point: "Straightening out finances is not enough. An authentic recovery means undertaking the restoration of a decrepit industrial plant, renewing productive investments, diversifying agriculture. Austerity should be offset by a redistribution of revenues for the benefit of wage earners and farmers. It is to be feared that the one in power will be reluctant to embark on this route." For that will oblige him to confront his political friends and the very bases of the Socialist Party's electoral power.

Everyone knows that the Senegalese middle class, a small group, has grown very wealthy while investing in nonproductive, indeed even parasitic, sectors. Are they prepared to direct capital toward activities where profit is slower and more uncertain, but supports production? Have they the means to do it? The same problem holds for agriculture. Are they really going to reform ONCAD so that is actually helps the farmer first? The question is far from being a merely technical one. For the administration will have to confront the privileged few of a plant composed of local leading citizens who as a matter of fact have "hemmed in" the masses. In order to achieve a real diversification of agriculture, as they have been saying for a long time now, are they going to direct public investment toward both small and large-scale hydraulic engineering? This would also upset a bureaucracy which has picked up some bad habits.

The route is narrow for two reasons. First, because the means are scanty. But especially because, here more than anywhere else, it may be difficult to do violence to one's feelings. Under other skies, there is no relatively open opposition, ready to rush into the breach. From now until 1983, will there not be the temptation to resort to political methods to assure the support of the bureaucrats, leading citizens and religious people? Only a firm action by President Senghor and Prime Minister Abdou Diouf could

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oblige the Socialist Party to revise its decision. The choice is clear:
to insure the elections and mortgage the future, or insure economic
- recovery and consolidate democracy. Even at the risk of losing the
elections.

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SEYCHELLES

FOREIGN BACKING OF ATTEMPTED COUP EXAMINED

Threats to Socialist Regime

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Dec 79 p 33

[Article by Marc Yared: "President Rene Sees Red"]

[Text] A conspiracy in the Seychelles: Overthrowing the nonaligned regime of President France Albert Rene by means of antigovernment demonstrations, political assassinations and the landing of mercenaries: If one is to believe the Seychelles authorities, this was the goal pursued by a group of conspirators, 100 of which were arrested in mid November.

In the dock was a mixture of foreign businessmen like Saudi billionaire Adnan Khashoggi, "who was trying to turn the archipelago into a gambling center and a hub of weapons trafficking." There were supporters of James Mancham, former president of the republic, liberal and pro-Western, overthrown by a coup d'etat on 5 June 1977. Finally, there was South Africa and even -- if one is to believe Radio Seychelles -- France.

By countenancing the story of a plot hatched abroad, the third in less than 3 years, is the government actually trying to stifle domestic dissent? Or, on the contrary, does there exist a plan of destabilization developed in the West to oust the progressive regimes in the Indian Ocean?

One thing is certain. The Seychelles, once a center of pluralism and tolerance, are now tense and growing more radical.

The chief of state has long cherished the idea of a "Seychelles-type" reform. In the course of his first press conference in June 1977, he said: "We are not Marxists, only socialists in the Indian Ocean."

Politically speaking, it is true that the regime of President Rene has steadily followed a harder line. First of all, he made his movement, the SPPF [Seychelles People's Progressive Front] a single party. Now the state of emergency continues in effect and the curfew is still enforced.

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Internationally, the chief of state first of all attempted an all-points diplomatic opening. While building privileged relations with socialist Madagascar and Tanzania -- although nursing cordial relations with the Palestinian resistance, the POLISARIO Front and liberation movements in Southern Africa -- Rene was known for his nonalignment and his moderation toward the West. But it was mainly to Paris, which provides overall assistance amounting to over 35 million francs annually, that Rene increasingly looked. It is true that relations between the two countries were not without ambiguity. Rene cannot forget that it was a commando group of mercenaries headed by Frenchman Bob Denard, "the dreaded one," that in May 1978 overturned the "progressive" regime in the neighboring Comoro Islands. From there to suspecting Paris -- whose navy is the most powerful in the Indian Ocean -- of having ordered the operation and of trying to do the same thing in the Seychelles is but one step which some willingly take.

How far will the tension with the West go? Is one to expect a series of nationalizations of foreign property, even the private sector? Forced on the defensive, will the Seychelles establish federal-type bonds with Madagascar or Tanzania, which have several hundred soldiers on the archipelago? The question will henceforth be posed.

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Foreign Backing of Plot Suspected

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 10 Dec 79 pp 40-41

[Article by San Fie: "The Hallowe'en Conspiracy"]

[Text] Since the discovery of the plot to overthrow the revolutionary regime of President Albert Rene, the situation in the Seychelles seems less tense. The investigation led by officials indicates that the French technical assistant, Jacques Chevalereau, technical adviser to the Seychelles police prefect, headed a network of Seychelles and foreign conspirators who, in collusion with foreign powers (particularly South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt and Israel), were planning to land a group of mercenaries in order to pull off the same operation as Bob Denard in the Comoro Islands.

Saudi billionaire Adnan Kashoggi was allegedly contacted by the former Seychelles president, playboy James Mancham, to participate in the organization and financing of the plot. In exchange, he was reportedly to have been given the concession of some 20 Seychelles islands where he could have built a "center of the international jet set," with all the gambling casinos, callgirls and drug trafficking it would imply. According to well-informed diplomatic circles, Adnan Kashoggi evidently succeeded in recruiting a certain number of Arab residents in the Seychelles, who "provided information" to the secret services of various Western powers and certain despotic Arab regimes. These agents used their Arab passports to infiltrate certain Seychelles circles, gather information, recruit conspirators and organize antigovernment and antisocialist demonstrations.

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Irrefutable Proof

At present, 70 persons, some of them government employees, have been arrested. "All proper measures have been taken to protect the country from the landing of the mercenaries, who are still in Durban, South Africa," said President Rene. As for Chevalereau, he will be turned over to French authorities, along with proof of his guilt, when the conspirators have been questioned. Concerning the 12 naval instructors taken off the patrol boat "Topaze" by Seychelles police, they were provisionally put on land for reasons of security because of their personal relations with Chevalereau and certain Seychellois now being held.

Although the French technical assistant sent to the Seychelles by Paris did play an important role in the affair, Rene tried to avoid poisoning his relations with France: "These relations are excellent and we do not want them to be compromised by the incident, even if it seems at the present time that France does not hold the same view!"

In fact, French Ambassador to Victoria Francis Dore approached President Rene and members of his government several times, attempting to gain a pardon for Chevalereau and the naval instructors, when Seychelles authorities have irrefutable proof of the role that they played in the plot.

For his part, Seychelles Ambassador Adam officially stated that his government has never accused France of recruiting mercenaries to overthrow the government of President Rene.

However, neither the assurances given by the Seychelles chief of state nor the clarification of his ambassador in Paris seem to have satisfied a certain faction of neocolonial opinion, which refuses to recognize the existence of parallel French networks that operate in a sort of semi-legality, sometimes even without the knowledge of the president of France. Otherwise, how could one explain certain precise facts pointed out to Valery Giscard d'Estaing by President Ratsiraka of Madagascar, President Nguesso of the Congo, President Syad Barre of Somalia, and so many others?

Moreover, Paris' decision to suspend naval assistance to the Seychelles and to recall the naval instructors from the "Topaze" -- whom the Seychelles Government wanted no longer -- proceeds from the same neocolonial mentality. By affirming that the "Topaze" incident was "scarcely compatible with the spirit that should underlie cooperation between the two countries," French Ambassador Dore seems to be unaware or pretend to be unaware of the source of the policy of destabilizing the Seychelles: to wit, certain French officials who have completely misunderstood their mission, which is to "cooperate loyally" in order to improve their country's relations with a developing nation and not serve networks of information and subversion.

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TANZANIA

NYERERE BELIEVED TO BE YIELDING TO IMF DEMANDS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Dec 79 p 28

[Article: "Call on the West"]

[Text] Is Tanzania going to fall under the International Monetary Fund's tutelage? The country is almost bankrupt. Industrial productivity has been declining for the last 10 years. The oil bill is nine times bigger than it was in 1972 although the quantity of oil imported has fallen 15 percent. To this is added the cost of the Ugandan war: \$500 million, or the equivalent of a year's export earnings.

The loans of Tanzania's numerous friends (the United States, Canada, Scandinavian countries, Iraq) have not been sufficient. Since the beginning of the year, industrialists have requested \$675 million of credit from the Central Bank of import raw materials. They have gotten only 24 percent of the requested amounts. "Go to private Western banks," they have been told. But the latter would give Tanzania suppliers' credits only with the agreement of government guarantee agencies, like COFACE. And these agencies are dependent on government commissions whose intervention is not exempt from political considerations. But European governments reproach President Nyerere with having caused the overthrow of Yussuf Lule, Uganda's former president, considered pro-Western.

This is the context within which the struggle between Mr Nyerere and the International Monetary Fund appears. The IMF, which offered \$300 million, is calling for the devaluation of Tanzania's currency and a substantial reduction in the state budget, among other things by abolishing the subsidy for rice. But this commodity, which amounts to 20 percent of the grain consumption, plays a fundamental role in the lives of numbers of the urban class. Overall reduction in the state budget would entail numerous other difficulties: for the government has just established 10,000 additional jobs to absorb some of the demobilized veterans who, otherwise, could have constituted a serious threat to social stability. As early as 1977, Tanzania experienced major social unrest which was put down with difficulty. Lastly, devaluating the currency would worsen the food situation. Tanzanians use barely 160 kilos of grain per person, or as much as in India. One-fourth of this grain is imported. But, in the last 6 months, the price of grain on the world market has increased 20 percent. At the beginning of November, Nyerere categorically

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rejected the IMF's conditions. However, Amir Jamal's recent appointment to the Ministry of Finance seems to indicate a yielding in this position. Because Amir Jamal, the former minister of planning, was dismissed from his post 2 years ago following an extremely critical report on the results of the socialist options chosen in 1967 at Arusha.

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TOGO

POLITICAL CHANGES MAY AUGUR WELL FOR END OF CRISIS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 987 5 Dec 79, pp 34, 3

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] As a good soldier, General Gnassingbe Eyadema knows that in cases of necessity one must not hesitate. Any maneuver providing an opportunity to swindle the enemy on the field is good to execute. Having learned this lesson on the fields of battle in Indochina and Algeria, the head of state likewise applied it in the political arena. As proof of this we have the decisions promulgated by the Congress of the RPT (Rally of the Togolese People, sole party), held in Lome on November 26, 27 and 28.

To mollify the domestic political situation, to disperse the clouds thick with danger which had been gathering on the horizon for 2 years. President Eyadema did not hesitate. 12 years after coming to power (January 1967), he continually proclaimed the country's return to a normal constitutional government and the "democratization" of its institutions. That means that the Chamber of Deputies, ancient edifice built in colonial style, adjoining the palace of the president of the republic at Lome, will soon regain its vitality of yesteryear. However, more than just a scraping of its exterior, it deserves a genuine restoration. In any case, for the 16 years that the building did not house deputies, it has, like the oratorical contests in which former political parties indulged, tended to fall into disuse.

During its first 10 years, Eyadema's government has nevertheless been the single beacon to shine over the Gulf of Benin. While the constellation formed by the adjacent countries, from Ghana to Nigeria, across Benin, was falling prey to an almost chronic political instability and stagnation, if not economic disorder, surprisingly enough Togo, the single star, shone with all its brilliance. Combining good peasant sense with military valor, the Togolese head of state succeeded in establishing an unusual government which, in some respects, borders on the paradoxical. To the point of being unclassifiable on the African political chessboard.

Product of a military coup d'etat, the government outside of its head numbers only one soldier. A native of the north, Eyadema governs with the support of a cabinet, party and diplomatic corps, most of whose staff members are

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from the south. A Christian, he maintains an excellent rapport with the Arab countries. While he is a moderate in his domestic policy, he does not hesitate, in his foreign policy, to consort with the most progressive among African leaders and those of the third world. As in the case of Kaddafi, of whom he is undoubtedly one of the best allies in the Southern Sahara. Which, moreover, did not prevent him from rejecting politely but firmly the Libyan leader's entreaties for a swift reconversion to Islam. Even though matched by a substantial gift!

Since 1967, the Togolese head of state has practiced the politics of smiling. Both with regard to the peasants, whose giant posters displayed at some Lome intersections boast of their achievements and role in the nation, as well as to the youth, students and middle management personnel, who make up the marching flank of the single party in power. This would be hardly the case if, from time to time, an uncontrolled rumor cited arrests. For "subversive" leaflets, or a more or less obscure "conspiracy." The general's velvet glove appeared so soft that they sought to forget the iron hand which it covered.

Eyadema's success was even more striking at the level of economics. All observers agree in acknowledging that during the 10 years from 1967 to 1977, the country has experienced a healthy expansion, supported by large and diverse investments. The GNP went up from 60 billion francs CFA to more than 160 billion, representing an increase of nearly 170% in 10 years!

That rapid expansion effected a profound transformation in the structures of the economy, while producing a marked increase in household consumption. Thus, in several years Lome has become a singular island of tranquility lost in the politico-economic storm sweeping the region. Until these last few years, life was so good there that it was not uncommon for middle management people and businessmen to cross over from neighboring countries. They flocked there even more willingly because the low cost of living which characterized the Togolese capital, combined with the feeling of hospitality and tolerance typical of its inhabitants, assured total ease to its visitors. Without their pocketbooks suffering too badly.

Alas, for about 2 years, the atmosphere has noticeably deteriorated. Starting with the economy. Of course, the world crisis accounted for much of it. In particular, the sharp decline in the price paid for phosphates, Togo's main export product, was right on target. But the international picture does not explain everything. Mistakes in management are equally to blame for the crisis situation which the Togolese economy has been experiencing. The day after the rise in the price of phosphates, following the Israeli-Arab war of October 1973, the Togolese leaders had gotten involved in major prestige operations: for example, hotels like the Sarakawa and, especially, the "2d of February," whose final cost is estimated at nearly 30 billion francs CFA.

Another costly undertaking was the refinery at Lome whose net cost is approximately 15 billion francs CFA. While Togo's annual consumption fluctuates between about 200,000 and 250,000 tons, the refinery has a capacity of one

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million tons. Adding to this a chain of poorly studied and hastily launched operations, such as the steel project at Lome, the international airport at Niamtougou, in the northeast, or the military equipment (airplanes and ships) which is as expensive as it is unnecessary, one can understand that the country is now in a difficult position. The foreign debt exceeds 150 billion francs CFA! In these conditions, it is not surprising that COFACE (French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade) has put Togo on its "red" list, that is those countries where investing is risky. Or that the creditor countries, meeting last June at the "Paris Club," expressed their concern about the future of that country.

The deterioration of the political situation appears of even greater concern. Whereas for the first 10 years of the administration no serious cloud seemed to loom on the horizon, the political sky has suddenly changed to black. For 2 years, the authorities periodically cite "conspiracies" to "recruit mercenaries," trials followed by condemnations. The "tools" of the "permanent conspiracy" were quickly identified: the sons of former President Olympio. But it has not just been limited to them. From discussions to accusations, from meetings to revolutionary movements, the circle of "traitors" has widened considerably. From Olympio's sons, it has spread to cousins, uncles and distant relations.

One thing leading to another, the machine of suspicion finally extended to all last names that sounded foreign: Portuguese, Brazilian, etc. It might as well be said that because of their marriages and various alliances, all nationals from the southern part of the country, great beneficiaries of the colonial system set up, first of all, in Togo as elsewhere, on the coast, today feel pursued by this strange witch hunt. A symptom illustrating this unrest is the secret demand for political asylum by the former communications minister, Polycarpe Johnson who, along with Edem Kodjo, present secretary general of OAU [Organization of African Unity], and the minister of the interior, Lacle, was one of the most solid pillars of the south in Colonel Eyadema's government.

Under these circumstances, the November Congress happened just in time. To let the tongues be loosened, to let the party revitalize its cadres, and to let the head of state listen to the masses. To better resist demagoguery and the overbids of activist factions like the ones who were urging him to execute immediately the conspirators condemned to death in Lome in August. In any case, the courageous self-criticism heard during this congress and the bold decisions made by the head of state enable us to consider that Togo is embarking upon the path of renewal. And that, on the political plane as well as the economic level, it is better prepared from now on for a second wind. But intentions must still be translated into actions.

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