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15 January 1980

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 661



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

JOINT EQUATORIAL GUINEA-GABON COMMUNIQUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3279

/Text/ In terms that are ambiguous but still favorable to Morocco, the only nation mentioned explicitly, a joint Gabon-Equatorial Guinea communique released in Libreville at the close of the visit of President Obiang Ngueme (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 16 Nov 79 p 3218) states the position of these two nations on the Western Sahara.

The two presidents "expressed their happiness about the total readiness of the kingdom of Morocco to seek peace and understanding in the region by proposing to the president of the OAU the holding of a summit conference so that the chiefs of state or government of all the countries bordering on the Sahara could meet in order to study means to implement in order to ensure a harmonious economic and social development for all the states of the region, for the well-being to which their peoples aspire."

The joint communique continues, stating that the new president of Equatorial Guinea has expressed his gratitude to Gabon for its "unceasing" and "unconditional" moral and materiel support.

The two chiefs of state also signed the general cooperation agreement between the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Gabon, and the accord creating the joint commission on cooperation between the two countries.

Also signed in the presence of the two chiefs of state were the by-laws governing this commission and the trade agreement designed to promote and intensify trade between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

In the same spirit, they decided to hold the first meeting of the joint commission at Malabo next year, at a date to be mutually agreed upon by diplomatic channels.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

CUBANS IN CONGO--Is a war between Gabon and the Congo in the offing? Various frontier incidents have pitted the two countries against each other during the past 2 weeks. According to the French intelligence services, three Cuban battalions (900 troops) are now based in Brazzaville. The Congolese aim appears to be to probe the ability of Gabon to defend itself, particularly with respect to the presidential guard of Omar Bongo which is staffed by French and Moroccan officers. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 24 Dec 79 p 11]

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL ON COURSE--Commenting on the prospects for Angola's foreign policy, Radio Bandeirantes said from Sao Paolo that "the policy will not be changed and will follow the orientations defined by the late president of the republic, Agostinho Neto. This statement is very important for Brazil, which has increased its cooperation with Angola. It is especially significant as it is based on statements made in Brazil itself, during the visit of the president of the Central Bank of Angola to Brazil. The Brazilian supermarket chain, Pao de Acucar, is now the backbone of the Angolan food supply system. Food supply is one of the most serious problems which the Luanda government has to face and is a problem that it must solve. Furthermore, a group of Brazilian experts has been hired to reorganize and manage the Angolan hotel system. The continuation of the orientations defined by President Neto implies that Angola will maintain a flexible foreign policy and relations with the greatest possible number of countries. Although pro-Soviet, President Neto did learn from America and had tried to attract foreign investors. Brazil has benefited from this flexibility, by establishing itself in the young Portuguese-speaking nation. The Brazilian presence in Angola does exist, and it will continue to grow." /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3289/ 7679

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BENIN

IMPACT OF FORTHCOMING BENINESE ELECTIONS IS DISCUSSED

First General Election Scheduled

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Nov 79 p 31

[Text] On Tuesday 20 November the Beninese will elect their 336 people's commissars to the National Revolutionary Assembly. Mathieu Kerekou, the "great combat comrade," and his friends from the Military Revolutionary Government (GMR) may have wished to show their fondness for symbols on the occasion of these first general elections since the 27 October 1972 coup which gave power to a junta of young officers. A red ballot will signify approval of the single national [candidates'] list, which includes, side by side, "farmer and craftsman candidates," "worker candidates" and "local middle-class candidates." A white ballot will signify rejection.

Beyond its generally foreseeable returns, the 20 November election marks the beginning of the second phase (or second wind) of the Benin revolution.

The People's Revolution Party of Benin or PRPB, a single, "vanguard," Leninist-type party created in 1975, has extended its influence into every sector of public life, through grassroots organizations of self-defense, such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, or CDR, or the Revolutionary Action Groups, or GAR. Its top leadership, the Political Bureau, Benin's real executive entity, is made up of six men: three civilian prefects, who speak for the intellectuals and cadres who inspired and supported the nation's "radicalization," and three military leaders: Barthelemy Ohauens, minister of industry and dean of the government, often represented as being liberal; Martin Dohou Azonhiho, minister of security and national orientation, who is considered to be the regime's ideologist as well as head of the orthodox Marxists, and Mathieu Kerekou, president of Benin for the past 7 years.

Still, "pockets" of discontent remain, owing to the militarization of everyday life and to a few ancient ills such as corruption and smuggling, which the authorities have not been able to cure. Last June's student protest is significant in that respect.

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Economically speaking, on the other hand, some undeniable successes have been achieved, even though the overambitious First National Three-Year Plan (1978-1981) had to be cut back to more modest objectives after its first phase was completed. The foreign debt has remained within reasonable bounds and international organizations have granted loans without too much reluctance. In conclusion, the recent discovery by two Norwegian companies of the small offshore petroleum deposits at Seme (projected daily output: 15,000 barrels; local daily consumption: 3,000 barrels) will, by 1981, enable Benin to join the very exclusive set of petroleum producers.

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Feverish Political Strife

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 12 Nov 79 pp 50-51

[Article by Mariam Sysle]

[Text] An atmosphere of intensive political strife surrounds the creation of a major component of the institutional system: the National Revolutionary Assembly.

Inching forward in a gradual but irreversible march, the People's Republic of Benin is proceeding towards completion of its stated objectives. Thus, since 10 October, the entire nation has been waiting for the time when the National Revolutionary Assembly (ANR) will be established. This is a major event that has been expected ever since 26 August 1977, when the Fundamental Law,* first constitution ever freely created by the Beninese themselves, was adopted. It incorporates both the total gains made by the revolutionary movement of national liberation launched on 26 October 1972, and a preparatory phase to the people's democratic revolution.

As a single legislative body and the supreme instrument of national power, the National Assembly will be made up of 336 people's commissars. They will be elected for 3 years and will be answerable to the electorate for their actions, and thus revocable at any moment in the event they should betray the people's trust.

The duties of the National Revolutionary Assembly will include voting on laws, adopting the national plan and the budget, and voting taxes. One of the ANR's most important aspects, however, as a nationwide instrument of participation and mass control (the assembly will be empowered to challenge the supreme authorities) will be to speak for a broad union of all patriotic and revolutionary classes and social strata, a union that is absolutely needed, in today's phase, in striving to successfully liquidate the economic grip of imperialism, to defeat the forces of the feudal system, and radically change farming structures.

* see AFRIQUE-ASIE issue No 149 of 28 November 1977

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Under those circumstances it was out of the question, for instance, to take one's inspiration from electoral systems prevalent in bourgeois democracies. On the contrary, there was a need to consider both the objectives set by the People's Revolution Party of Benin (PRPB) and written into the Fundamental Law, and the present-day national realities. But those realities presuppose that a necessary balance be struck between a concrete affirmation of the PRPB's leadership role as a guarantee of the continuity and increased depth of the revolutionary process, on one hand, and of the unity and the equally effective participation of all patriotic and revolutionary classes and sectors in public affairs, on the other hand.

This is the reason why the People's Republic of Benin is introducing changes in this area, too. And the reason why the electoral system worked out to establish the ANR may seem complex at first glance, is that the legislators are being guided by many concerns.

An Equitable Representation

According to a tradition now solidly rooted in Benin since October 1972, the first concern is to guarantee the full and total participation of the population in choosing the candidates. At the same time, however, that involved setting up a multilevel system of controls in order to prevent reactionaries, demagogues or hoaxers from slipping into the list of candidates. The third concern has to do with guaranteeing an equitable representation of all classes and strata of Beninese society, and to make it impossible for some of those [sectors of the population], for instance, the agricultural workers, unaccustomed to public speaking contests, to be wronged to the detriment [as published] to the other, more skilled groups. Similarly, it was necessary to make it possible for the PRPB and the grassroots organizations to be represented within the ANR. Thus those concerns provided preliminary guidelines for the distribution of people's commissars within the ANR. In accordance with the ordinance of 29 April 1978, therefore, the National Revolutionary Assembly will include 84 agricultural workers and craftsmen, 33 industrial workers, 8 representatives of the local middle class, 25 teachers, 42 agency representatives from various branches of the government and public utilities, 20 top national cadres, 6 representatives of religious organizations and 33 members of the people's armed forces (ranging from privates to officers). Finally, the PRPB and such grassroots organizations as cooperatives, women's and youth organizing committees, National Federation of Workers Unions of Benin and committees for the Defense of the Revolution, will each have 21 and 64 deputies at the ANR, respectively.

As to the electoral process proper, it comprises three phases. From 10 to 17 October, registers were open, nationwide, for the benefit of all citizens desiring to present their candidacy to the posts of people's commissars, although a certain number of conditions and criteria had of course been set for those positions. For instance, in short, candidacy is restricted to those who actively support the current revolutionary movement and who have not been involved in embezzlements or other dishonest acts. Automatically, excluded were hired hands or propaganda spokesmen for former regimes of national renunciation, as well as all those involved in plots against the People's Republic of Benin.

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In the same spirit, all actions reminiscent of past practices--whether they involve attempts to corrupt the electorate or manifestations of regionalism or tribalism, have been strictly outlawed for the entire duration of the campaign.

That campaign began in effect on 19 October, with the democratic referenda that were to continue until the 31st of that month and during which a selection of candidates was supposed to occur. That selection is being effected according to socio-professional categories, at the levels of the village, district, province or nation, the barracks or the factory, if the election involves a farming candidate, a militant member of a grassroots organization, a military person, or a worker.

The Stakes

The general principle involved in all cases is as follows: the candidates are selected at the grassroots and the slate thus created is finally submitted to the PRPB central committee, which will be in charge of the last control and selection.

In the form of a single national list of candidates for people's commissars, that last selection will ultimately be submitted to the Beninese electorate on 20 November for approval or rejection.

In fact, the voting process has been taking place in an atmosphere of intensive political strife and extreme vigilance. Indeed, it involved preventing the reactionary forces from taking advantage of this time, when institutions are being democratized, to infiltrate the ranks and thus distort the meaning of the process now going on.

The stakes are considerable. This is why we are now witnessing a wide mobilization of the people in Benin, as emphasis is being placed on the indispensable rally of all progressive forces, because also involved is the preparation of further phases in the establishment of new institutions and [the preparation of] the Second National Congress of the PRPB, which is expected to take place this year and to give the party a solid foundation.

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CAMEROON

LIMITED CONCESSION POLICY BEARING FRUIT

Paris JUENE AFRIQUE in French 31 Oct 79 p 26

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima]

[Text] The fever which gripped the French stockmarket at the beginning of October did not keep 8 million Cameroonians from going about their daily business. The fever did not even overly disturb the sleep of the country's leaders, apparently more concerned over preparations for the upcoming congress of the Cameroonian National Union. Twice during the same week, the announcement of the discovery of oil deposits caused a rise in the price of oil stocks on the Paris stockmarket.

At the beginning of August, the French company Elf-Aquitaine announced the discovery of two small oil deposits in the Ekoundou concession and in the Rio del Rey concession to the north. Following close behind, the French oil company announced on 28 August the discovery of signs of oil during the drilling of "Victoria Est," on permit H17, in Cameroonian waters. There is more: We have learned that the American company Mobil, at the end of September, also discovered a large deposit in the offshore area called Sanaga-Sud. That was enough to set off a tempest on the Paris stock exchange. And yet this last report is not entirely correct, as it was modified a few days later.

Traces of hydrocarbons have indeed been discovered off Kribi by Mobil. However, this is a natural gas deposit. It is true, though, that its presumed size is enough to send shivers up the spines of those in the know. Some European experts are saying, in fact, that this deposit is one-fourth that of Frigg which was placed in service in 1977 and is located in the North Sea. The Frigg deposit, which is coowned by Great Britain and Norway, has recoverable reserves estimated at 258 billion cubic meters of gas. Therefore, we understand the fever which has gripped specialized sectors and at the same time the discretion of Cameroonian leaders in the face of this "manna" of modern times, which for some is synonymous with a poisoned gift.

The zeal with which foreign companies are issuing communiques is not by chance. Prospecting for oil in Cameroon began in 1951, under colonization. It was not until 1977 that the first deposit was discovered, namely that of

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Kole. This situation was all the more surprising as Cameroon is located in an "oil basin" which almost all its neighbors have been tapping for a long time. That explains the decision made at the time by the government to place a time limit on the exploitation permits issued to foreign companies. It is certain that this measure had a big impact since it encouraged competition and brought about the present explosion. However, although the blossoms are already bringing the promise of fruit, above all it is a question of keeping ourselves from being carried away by the oil phenomenon.

After a rather cautious beginning, the production of black gold has continued to increase in a substantial manner. In 1978, oil production was barely 800,000 tons, representing 4.5 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs in revenues; i.e., 2.7 percent of the total budgetary resources. The annual production of the four deposits exploited by the Elf-Pecten-Shell group, off Victoria, is said to now total about 2 million tons; and it is estimated that a high of 5 million tons will be reached between now and 1983. That is to say, the refinery being built in Victoria will be fully operational when its capacity is 1.5 million tons, with a possible expansion to 2 million tons. This also means the future is bright since according to estimates of the reporter of the laws committee of the National Assembly, "production of 1 million tons per year would produce 20 billion CFA francs."

This information was given in December 1978 during a debate on the new hydrocarbons system. In its own way, Cameroon intended to have control of its resources. Also the new text reduced considerably the privileges of foreign companies by imposing a tax of 57.5 percent on revenues, particularly.

Therefore, although Cameroon can today be pleased over being safe from an energy crisis, oil, on the other hand, is apt to produce problems of another kind. It was in the former English-speaking sector that the first deposits were discovered. Some Cameroonian nationals in this region considered the latter to be the poor relation of the country; and some members of the opposition abroad have gone so far as to disseminate pamphlets demanding a return to the federation. Unquestionably, the action was marked by a strong smell of oil. In a related connection, neighboring Nigeria has not hesitated to again bring into question the border agreements between the two countries, as the deposits had been discovered not far from the border. Although the oil deposit discovered by Elf was off Victoria, not far from Nigeria, the natural gas deposit was discovered off Kribi, in the former French-speaking Cameroon. That is one reason for the government, ever concerned about the country's unity, to be reassured to the extent that it has now been shown that oil is not the monopoly of a single region.

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CAPE VERDE

DROUGHT SHATTERS HOPES FOR ANNUAL FOOD PRODUCTION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3268

Text Cape Verde, which has suffered from an endemic drought for over 10 years, will harvest almost nothing this year. The lack and irregularity of the rains have ruined all hopes and another hard year now lies ahead.

According to FAO experts who have just filed their report, Cape Verde's grain production this year will not exceed 1,000 tons; its annual consumption is 48,000 tons.

In any event, say these experts, even under the best of conditions, Cape Verde, which has no rivers, will not be able to produce in the mid-term period more than a third of its grain needs. So they suggested that action be taken to change the food habits of the Cape Verde population and to introduce new types of grains, such as millet and sorghum, to develop animal production and improve the diet of the local population. They further recommended that the aid already promised be given immediately.

Facing this situation, Mr Edouard Saouma, director general of the FAO, on 10 November approved the sending by the UN/FAO's PAM (World Food Program) of emergency food aid valued at \$908,000 to provide help to the farmers.

The PAM will send 2,500 tons of corn and 190 tons of edible oils. The aid to Cape Verde also includes a gift in cash of \$67,250 to cover the transport, storage, and handling expenses for the food sent.

Corn and edible oils will be distributed to 14,000 families of farmers--about 70,000 persons in all--for a period of 3 months.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

PRESIDENT DEFENDS HIS POLICY DURING MASS MEETING

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3216

[Text] On 10 November in Bangui, President Dacko held a mass meeting during which he denounced "the opportunism" of the opposition and exhorted Central Africans to strive to improve the economy of their country.

The day was declared a holiday so that the people of Bangui (200,000 inhabitants) could go to Boganda stadium, where the meeting took place. But because of bad weather only 6,000 spectators were on hand to applaud the president when he arrived at the podium, surrounded by members of the government.

Speaking in the Sango language, Mr David Dacko began by denouncing the opposition movements, whose leaders, he said, "carried out a noisy propaganda campaign abroad to overthrow Bokassa, whom they had only recently been supporting. I, on the other hand, was quiet during my exile, but I succeeded in overthrowing the tyrant without bloodshed."

Calling for multipartisanship, he also denounced the opposition "which is trying to misuse its power, since its various movements are composed essentially of people belonging to a single ethnic group, who do not consider themselves, first of all, as Central Africans." Nevertheless, he promised, "I am going to consider multipartisanship."

Then turning to the economic and social situation, the president underscored the necessity of improving agricultural production and, in general, of working together. Mr Dacko, on that subject, denounced strikes, which were frequent that week in various administrations in Bangui. "The role of the labor union is not to disorganize the economy of the country," he criticized. The Central African chief of state then addressed himself to the youth of the country, a large number of whom are unemployed. "These young people should be oriented toward constructive work, especially agriculture, within the framework of a paramilitary structure," he said. In 1962, President Dacko had already inaugurated a "civic service," within the structure of the National Youth Pioneers.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CONTINUED POLITICAL UNREST, FRENCH RELATIONS DESCRIBED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3277

[Text] In accordance with the terms of a constitutional act, supplementary to the act of 21 September 1979 (provisional organization of authority in the CAR [Central African Republic]), President Dacko on 30 October decided that "the vice president of the Republic shall assume the duties of the President of the Republic when the presidency is vacant."

It is known that Mr Maidou was named vice president of the CAR when the empire fell, and that he enjoys an especially marked esteem on the part of the French authorities who are cooperating with the Central African Republic.

However, the possibility of the arrival of Henri Maidou, the last prime minister under the dethroned emperor, who had earned the nickname "Mr Denial" by virtue of his attitude after the Bangui massacres, would scarcely be to the taste of the Central African populace.

The AFP recently noted that the inhabitants of Bangui were disturbed by the release on 15 November of M. Massengue, the former chief of police of Bokassa. Also, everyone in Bangui medical circles knows that the physician who in 1976 agreed to kill the newborn son of one of the emperor's opponents who was himself executed the day before, is circulating freely in the city.

In the face of such impunity the population is beginning again to criticize the presence at the head of the state of former dignitaries of the Empire, beginning with the president and vice president themselves, David Dacko and Henri Maidou. In reply, Mr Dacko recalls on every possible occasion that he was merely a hostage in Bokassa's hands, and that it was by pretending obedience that he was able to prepare for and succeed in overthrowing the tyrant. And to calm public opinion, he continually promises to extradite Bokassa soon.

But that is not enough in the eyes of a population that believes the Investigative Commission formed to drive out Bokassa's accomplices has, up to now, challenged no one but "underlings."

Forms classified as "confidential" that the Commission had distributed to the population, which were really appeals for informing, were often returned to

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it anonymously, with the names of Dacko and Maidou at the top of the list. The AFP representative saw about 20 like that, before they were sent.

The climate becomes all the heavier because among those who were known for their devotion to Bokassa, some are again raising their heads. Thus, recently, several dozen members of the former imperial guard, disarmed and chased out of the army after the coup d'etat, have come to threaten the Treasury employees, demanding in vain that they be paid, like other civil servants.

In this atmosphere, relations between the Central African authorities and the French authorities seem to be singularly equivocal. The French daily LE MONDE stated that a helicopter and French soldiers took part in the search that resulted in the arrest, in the northern part of the country, of Ange Patasse. President Dacko, on the other hand, on 27 October signed two decrees (No 79-073 and 79-078) concerned with appointment "in exceptional cases" to the Central African Order of Merit. The two decrees have to do on the one hand with an executive secretary in the French Interior Ministry, on the other hand with many French members of the military, including six superior officers who are appointed to the rank of commander.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

FUEL SHORTAGE CONTINUES--The shortage of hydrocarbons that Central Africa is experiencing is a major worry for President Dacko, who, at the time of the big meeting in the Boganda Stadium in Bangui (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 November 1979, p 3216), yielded the floor to the head of Centra-Hydro, the national distributing company. The latter condemned the employees and gas station attendants who he said are refusing to deliver to their customers in order to favor their friends and resell the stocks secretly to "Arab traffickers," who can thus flood the province with fuel on the black market. We note that since 19 October the Centra-Hydro Company, which was partially denationalized in the empire's last days, has a new general manager, Tinor Ibrahim. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3277] 8946

EEC GRANTS EMERGENCY AID--The European Commission on 13 November decided to grant emergency aid to the Central African Republic, in the amount of 300,000 units of account (1 unit of account = 5.89 French francs). This aid, granted in accordance with Art 59 of the Lome Convention, is intended for the purchase of essential supplies (medicines, sugar, insecticides, etc.). It is a response to the appeal for international assistance launched by President Dacko, and follows a mission carried out on the spot in late October by representatives of the Commission. This emergency aid is granted without prejudice to later additional intervention. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3277] 8946

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CHAD

GUNT'S ESTABLISHMENT MARKS TURNING POINT IN NATION'S HISTORY

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov-9 Dec 79 p 28

[Article by Mariam Sysle: "Twenty-two Men in a Boat"]

[Text] Has Chad emerged from chaos and has the risk of the country's breakup been averted once and for all? One thing justifies hope: the establishment, on 10 November, of the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT), following 6 days of negotiations between the leaders of the 11 political and military groups meeting in Douguia (a small town some 60 kilometers north of Ndjamen). The setting up of GUNT marks a turning point in the country's tormented history.

On 11 October, the representatives of the 11 groups met and, following laborious negotiations, the meeting ended in failure. On 21 August in Lagos, they had signed the agreements that were ratified in Douguia. GUNT, headed by Goukouni Oueddei (People's Armed Forces), who is in turn seconded by Lt Col Abdelkader Vadel Kamougue (Chadian Armed Forces), is made up of 12 "northern" ministers and 10 "southern" ministers. Gathering together all the country's political and military factions, this government reflects the extreme ethnic and religious diversity of Chad. Bantus, Gorans, Arabs, animists, Christians and Muslims rub elbows on the new team.

There are also authentic leaders of the FROLINAT such as Dr Aba Siddick (who is minister of higher education, research and scholarships), the former "rebel toubou," Hissein Habre (who becomes minister of national defense, veterans affairs and the disabled), and former ministers of General Malloum. Key posts have also been entrusted to men who are, rightly or wrongly, considered to be pro-Libyans, in particular, Acyl Ahmat (minister of foreign affairs and cooperation), and Mahamat Abba Said, named minister of interior and security. In other words, the Douguia conference succeeded in overcoming personal rivalries and political divergencies and in bringing together on the same team all groups and the main figures which in one way or another have influenced the course of Chad's history over the past 15 years.

A veritable wager has been won and for certain observers, this can only be cause for optimism. Actually, the establishment of GUNT appeared to be

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the only solution which, given the current circumstances, could prevent the country from once more being engulfed in civil war and avert the increasing threat of a breakup. As Ndjamea Radio emphasized at the time of the Douguia conference: "Without peace between the different Chadian factions, national life can only be blocked and disorganized and the country will become the inevitable prey of foreign greed and meddling."

It would therefore appear that a decision was made to heed the lessons of the past. For the first time, there is a government which, in principle at least, does not neglect any region and grants their rightful place to the northern region, always forgotten, and the Muslim populations. We know that to a great extent, the Chadian drama was caused by the policy of divisiveness begun by the French colonizer and continued by Tombalbaye and his successor, General Malloum, both relying on the same narrow group interests to perpetuate, along with their own power, France's control over the country. This policy of division, which stirred up foreign greed and facilitated outside meddling, so ravaged the country that the FROLINAT itself suffered from it, as seen in recent years.

Has the establishment of GUNT thereby put an end to the Chadian mess? Actually, while a great step toward peace and normalization has just been taken, the agreement just concluded remains fragile. There is justifiable concern that the extreme heterogeneity of the team in power might carry in itself the seeds of division and collapse. Nor will there be any lack of subjects of disagreement (from the problem of demilitarization of the capital to the means to be used to get a country bled white by the war back on its feet). It would be naive to think that personal ambitions and rivalries have disappeared as if by magic.

Ferryboats

One can predict that certain members of GUNT, Hisssein Habre, for example, whose thirst for power is well known, will do everything possible to look after number one, even if they have to compromise the fragile balance finally established. Nor can there be any doubt that certain foreign powers (including France) will exploit these rivalries in order to safeguard their own interests. Moreover, GUNT has to solve an extraordinarily difficult problem: restoring confidence and normal life in one of the poorest countries in the world, now completely bankrupt in all spheres. When one realizes that it is the French soldiers (a contingent of 1,500 men remains) who provide the only remaining air links, who keep the Chari River ferryboats, on which gasoline arrives from Cameroon, running and who even take care of the sick (the only hospital still operating is the Tako military hospital, headquarters of French Col Le Tonquedec), one can see that GUNT's room to maneuver is extremely small and that crucial problems still have to be solved.

The main task of the new government is to enforce the Lagos accords in their entirety. In other words, it will have to organize the departure of

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the French troops and prepare for free and democratic general elections to be held in 18 months. Following such elections, a new team should take over. But there will be no lack of obstacles and in that period of time, many new questions may emerge. Under such conditions, it is not surprising that while the people were relieved to learn of the establishment of GUNT, they did not greet it with joy.

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CHAD

BRIEFS

ORIGINAL FROLINAT WITHDRAWS FROM FACP--Dr Abba Siddick's original FROLINAT has withdrawn from the Provisional Front for Joint Action (FACP), which was created on its initiative last May in Tripoli and regroups five FROLINAT groups. In a communique issued on 16 November in N'Jamena, the original FROLINAT speaks out against creating, within the FACP, "small tribalist groups intended to orient the movement toward objectives that are not its own." In particular it accused the president of the FACP, Mahamat Abba Said, the new Interior Minister, of having come to an agreement, "under cover of tribalism," with the president of the Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR), Ahmat Acyl, the present Foreign Affairs Minister, to divide between themselves "certain important ministerial posts." The group leaders' Douguia meeting was extended, chiefly because of the refusal of the other FACP leaders to award to Dr Abba Siddick, who had been promoted to minister of Higher Education, the Foreign Affairs portfolio he was demanding. With Dr Siddick's retirement from the FACP and the government, there is nothing left of the movement but the profoundly pro-Libyan tendencies embodied in Ahmat Acyl, Mahamat Abba Said, Abdoulaye Adoum Dana and Hadjaro Senoussi. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3278] 8946

SECURITY IN N'JAMENA--A Politico-Military Technical Commission to study security problems in the city of N'Jamena has been created by the Chadian chief of state, Goukouni Weddeye, according to a communique of 14 November from the presidency of the Republic of Chad. The Commission, made up of ten members, will present a "detailed report" to the national union transition government, which will "decide accordingly." Various demands have indeed been evident in the Chadian capital for some time; armed men are legion there. Merchants, especially French merchants, have been the victims of arbitrary arrests, after which, taken before improvised popular courts, they had to turn over sums of money to various politico-military organizations or be shot. French diplomats, confirming this news, even stated that they had sometimes found themselves in delicate situations as a result of this insecurity in the Chadian capital, where all administration has disappeared and where payment of pensions to former fighters, for example, is no longer carried out. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3278] 8946

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CONGO

GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARD PRIVATE SECTOR NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3219

[Text] During the visit to Paris of President Sassou Nguesso (MTM, 2 November 1979, p 2933), at a meeting in the offices of the CNPF [National Council of French Employers], in Paris, on 30 October, chaired by Mr J. Dromer, the chairman of the ACP [Central Advertising Agency] Committee, Mr Lopes, the Finance minister, confirmed that the president of the People's Republic of Congo had asked his aides to "put their cards on the table" and indicate the sectors in which foreign private interests could freely intervene, in particular in the hotel business and tourism, and those in which it would be desirable to have a mixed economy company. Mr Lopes cited as a good example the case of Impreco Company [Textile Company of the People's Republic of the Congo], in which the Congolese government owns 33 percent of the capital: at the end of a certain amount of time, the government will be able to increase its participation, or to own the entire operation.

The finance minister also pointed out that the indemnification of nationalized companies, or expropriated ones, was accepted in principle but that a calendar had to be drawn up for the dates of the payments, taking into account the financial means of the government.

He let it be understood that personal income taxes were going to be reviewed so as not to penalize expatriated executives, whose expertise is useful to the Congolese economy, by imposing rates which are too high.

The minister of the plan, Mr Pierre Moussa, then broadly outlined, at the same meeting, the Congolese investment code and he described the thrust of the interim annual plans which cover respectively the years 1980 and 1981, before the 5-year plan 1982-1986 is worked out. Priority is to be given the agricultural and forest sectors and the industries both upstream and downstream which are linked with them. The beginning of forest production in the northern section of the country will follow the project for the reconstruction of the railroad.

The minister, citing the privileged position of the Congo with respect to transportation abroad--RCA [Central African Republic], Gabon, Cameroon, even Zaire--emphasized the size of the problem of road and river transportation.

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A major project for a paper mill, using eucalyptus and pine, is being planned for Pointe-Noire, with a Finnish group. Production amounting to 240,000 tons per year is anticipated, at a satisfactory return because of the rapid growth of the trees. The investment would be on the order of 100 billion CFA francs and the finance minister emphasized that the private foreign sector might participate in supplying capital for a mixed economy plant, conceived on a take it or leave it basis.

"During these frank discussions, the French private sector was struck by the favorable climate that the Congolese authorities are trying to create, as well as by their desire to confront problems realistically, without hiding either their options or their difficulties," we read in a recent informational note from the International Committee for Black Africa.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

FIRST FRENCH-LINGALA DICTIONARY--The first "complete" Lingala-French dictionary will be published shortly in Leipzig, according to an announcement of the official East German information agency ADN. Lingala is one of the main languages used in the People's Republic of Congo. The dictionary was ordered by the Brazzaville government. Its author is Mr Adolphe Bzonkanga, who worked for several years at the University of Leipzig with Professor Brauner, a specialist in African languages. The work contains 10,000 terms. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3219] 8956

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GHANA

BRIEFS

1978 STATISTICS WITH JAPAN--Japanese sales to Ghana in 1978 totaled \$40.91 million, a drop of 29.7 percent compared to 1977; purchases by Japan from its partner totaled \$105.43 million, a drop of 29.9 percent. Ghana's deficit in the exchanges between the two countries thus remained at approximately the same level. The drop in Japanese sales was attributed mainly to this African country's lack of foreign exchange, and the drop in Ghanaian sales to the low price of cocoa. These are the percentages registered in the lower Japanese sales: food products (mainly canned mackerel), 8.4 percent; light industrial products (mostly textiles), 40 percent; metal products (sheet metal and sheet steel), 60 percent; machinery (mainly for transport purposes), 25.6 percent. The drop in Ghanaian sales bore mainly on the following articles: food products (fava beans and cocoa butter), 40.5 percent; raw materials (manganese ore and wood), 40.5 percent; industrial products (diamonds and aluminum ingots), 65.4 percent. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3399]

BANK GAINS UP--The Commercial Bank of Ghana has registered net gains of 15.1 million cedis for the period 1978-1979 which ended on 30 June. This is an increase of 25 percent over the preceding period, when gains were of 12.1 million cedis. Of the 15.1 million earnings, 1.5 million reverted as dividends to the government, the sole stockholder. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3399]

ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH GDR--In October in East Berlin, Ghana's minister for economic planning, Dr Amon Nikoi, signed a series of contracts with German Democratic Republic officials, which will tend to stimulate trade between the two countries. These contracts, whose amounts have not been released, call for the supplying by the GDR of farm equipment, machine tools, and scientific equipment, and for the construction of roads in exchange for purchases of cocoa and other Ghanaian agricultural products. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3274/ 7679]

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DETAILS ON GIHOC CLOSINGS--In early October the GIHOC (Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation) was forced to shut down over half of its industries and to lay off their personnel for lack of sufficient supplies of raw materials. It was even considering closing all the other enterprises if the situation continued to worsen. The first nine enterprises closed (of a total of 16) were those involved with ship construction, metal industries, vegetable oils, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, marble work, distilling, and electronics. The GIHOC agreed to pay 2 years of salaries to the personnel laid off--7 million cedis--but did not think it would be able to do the same for personnel of the other enterprises if it should also be forced to close them. One of GIHOC's officials explained that its problems came from the fact that it had obtained from the government import licenses amounting to only 96 million cedis, while it needed more than twice that amount, at least 200 million cedis. /Text/ /Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3274/ 7679

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GUINEA

SPECTRUM OF COOPERATION WITH FRANCE REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 9 Nov 79 pp 3001-3003

[Article by Jean Latremoliere: "The Economic Follow-up of French-Guinean Reconciliation"]

[Excerpts] Nearly a year after President Giscard d'Estaing's trip to Conakry, spectacularly confirming the reconciliation, how have relations between France and Guinea developed?

To ask this question is also to evoke the criticisms raised against the principle of the trip and the meagerness of the results which it appears to have produced. These criticisms testify first of all to the difficulties encountered by the government in the pursuit of its African policy in a system where attacks from the right are rarely balanced by approval from the left. Should we think that respect for human rights stands in the way of this shift or deplore the break in a Gaulian tradition assigning to Guinea the role of an explosive situation? In the pre-conflict situation of the continent, such a point of view appears out of date in any case, strengthening of economies remaining the only way of ensuring, as a preventive, the stability and consequently the neutrality of states, whether it is a question of those with which cooperative links have long been established or of others. This is shown by the U.S. interventions in Guinea as well as, mutatis mutandis, by the support given until recently by the USSR to the former Central African Empire.

The presidential trip was directly in line with this policy, and the combination of circumstances made it especially timely. Certainly not that Mr Ahmed Sekou Toure had indicated any intention of parting company with his Eastern allies. There are at present in Guinea 300 Soviet military advisers and about a thousand Soviet experts in the various sectors of production, without prejudice to 500 Cuban technical assistants, balanced by an equivalent number of Chinese collaborators. The bauxite deposit at Dobele, near Kindia, continues to be mined by the Russians, under conditions truly so disadvantageous for Guinea that we may ask whether the operation contributes to strengthening the government's confidence in the USSR. On the contrary, however, indications

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were not lacking, before and after Mr Giscard d'Estaing's visit, marking a certain desire for disengagement by Conakry, with regard to the socialist countries, in order for it to diversify the range of its partners and to set its "nonalinement" on more solid foundations.

Indications of a Reconciliation With the West

Among the elements likely to come into play in the sense of a reconciliation with the liberal world, there are some of a positive nature. Others, on the contrary, are the result of an indisputable economic and financial stagnation.

In recent reports, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund noted the favorable prospects opened by the forthcoming entry into production of the bauxite deposits at Tougue, Dabola, Pita and Aye-Koye, which should bring to 14 million tons the exports of this mineral, as well as by the increase in aluminum production at Fria, possibly reaching 2 million tons; by the beginning of iron extraction in the Nimba Mountains; and above all, by the new awareness of their responsibilities developed by political leaders and staffs.

For its part, Guinea's adherence to the Lome Convention facilitates this reconciliation, with commitments of over \$75 million, not including the special long-term, low-interest loans, having the effect of developing Guinea's contacts with European enterprises in the field of agricultural development, fishing, industry, technical education and highway infrastructure.

But the large public debt of \$990 million, to which must be added \$150 million in short-term borrowings from private banks and a Russian loan of \$40 million for the purchase of military equipment, as well as the general decline in the turnover and profits of the 177 semi-public companies and enterprises--certain factories working at 5 or 10 percent of their capacity--also explains the serious need of financial support felt by the Guinean Government at this phase of its development. This context is at the bottom of the numerous economic missions sent during the last 3 years to Canada, the United States and Europe, of the arrival in Guinea of missions from the Ivory Coast, of the reestablishment of relations with the FRG, lastly, of the easing of the state's trade monopoly, particularly in the import-export field, until now reserved for a national company, which will henceforth be opened to private initiative, subject to payment of a deposit. It is not unrelated to the political liberations that have taken place since May 1978 and considered encouraging, although insufficient, by Amnesty International. It came into play during certain internal political vicissitudes, ending, as a result of a trip to the Ivory Coast, in Mr Ismael Tour's exclusive from, and then reintegration in, the government. Lastly, it is found again in the reasons for the official trip which the Guinean chief of state is to make to France in the spring of 1980.

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Official Cooperation

To make a fair judgment of the significance and amount of the credits which the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made available to Guinea by way of cooperation, we must first know that this administrative cooperation, in the form of grants, was not new, having been inaugurated in fact as early as 1977. From a relatively low amount, in line with the credits available to the Quai d'Orsay under this heading, it has nevertheless increased in value from 6 to 9 million French francs and will reach 12 million in 1980. The modesty of its interventions can be explained by the need for getting to know again, before undertaking large-scale operations, a territory which, since 1958, has become largely strange to us, whether methods, institutions or men are involved.

It is less to the direct impact of these actions than to the possibilities they open, without mention of the liberalism which prevailed in Paris in 1977 and 1978, for guaranteeing export loans and financing operations not normally dependent on medium-term credits, such as the extension of the Independence Hall, that the development noted in trade exchanges since 1978 is due; during the fiscal year 1978, French sales to Guinea, with a value of 480 million French francs, represented 40 percent of Guinean imports, French purchases, consisting mostly of bauxite, representing 16.5 percent of Guinean exports.

Intervention of the Central Treasury and Guaranteed Private Credits

It would be unjust to attribute to the Guinean authorities, in this patient work of developing bilateral cooperation, only motives of self-interest. This awareness of a common language and culture certainly encourages them. It is striking to note that the position of the French language, since the departure of our instructors, has been maintained by the local teachers alone, under conditions that are far from disastrous. A simplified French, for common and technical use, has been disseminated among the school population much better sometimes than in other African countries where our cultural cooperation traditionally makes substantial credits available. There again, our possible interventions should be considered at length, in the sense of instruction at the highest level, care being taken not to go against teaching methods or to seek to reform manuals corresponding to a type of education which it is not in our province to evaluate.

It is clear, however, that if President Sekou Toure and the Guineans as a whole have decided to take aim at the old reasons for discord, it is in the hope of benefiting at one and the same time from French financial support and French technology in order to promote vast projects, notably those which would provide them with the decisive element, energy, which is lacking in order to pass through into a new stage of industrial development. At the forefront of these projects, naturally, is the Konkoure hydroelectric development project whose French ancestry is willingly recalled at Conakry.

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We cannot, naturally, reply to these requests by an immediate acceptance concerning an investment evaluated at a billion dollars, whose financing by France alone is out of the question and which justifies, in any case, a serious reactualization, the technical progress achieved since 1958 making it possible to expect a doubling of power (750 MW in place of 350), but the cost per kilowatt, however, approaching the limits of profitability. Hence the need for having available, during this phase of the study, a banking tool with much greater versatility and flexibility than those provided by administrative cooperation, possibly also serving as a driving force in the further search of international capital.

Lessons of the First Years of Cooperation

It would thus be contrary to the truth to talk of a chilling of French-Guinean economic relations, after the certainly sincere popular enthusiasm aroused by the President of the French Republic's trip to Conakry.

It would be unrealistic, on the other hand, to be silent about the sectoral gaps in this cooperation, as well as about the technical reasons which sometimes make it difficult and tend to slow its financial yield.

The most surprising of the gaps concerns agriculture. Everything seems to happen in Guinea as if the government intended to protect it jealously from any foreign intervention or involvement, while the technical assistants, almost all of whom have come from Eastern countries, are unanimously in agreement about the exceptional difficulties they find in working in a system where a traditional sector, still predominant, lives in a nearly closed economy, secretly hostile, for monetary reasons, to any commercialization, having almost no financial or technical support available, alongside a modern sector made up of several hundred agropastoral farms, whose rigid collectivist structures do not plead in favor of their profitability. The results of this policy are measured by the volume of foodstuffs imported--balanced, it is true, by the clandestine export of a good number of local products--and by the continuance of free food aid from the United States, the EEC and France, justified in part by some transitory droughts, but not to be considered, in a country with such rich potentialities as Guinea, as a normal resource.

In this field, where French technology seems to be, a priori, one of the best placed, particularly for rich tropical crops and cotton, the cooperation which has just been instituted has not brought any improvement. Our research institutes and our semi-public companies have, moreover, scarcely done any research on this. The only interesting element in this field would be an Ivorian initiative, in particular that of Mr Diawara, in the direction of the establishment of large, Sodepalm-type companies devoted, with Japanese aid, to rice or, with United States aid, to soybeans.

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Having noted this surprising gap on the part of a government that has achieved, in the mining sector, a task full of promise for the future, thanks to a relatively liberal investment code and a strict wage policy, we should note, on the other hand, that one of the difficulties foreseen for our cooperation in Guinea results from local, still large-scale financial requests relating to sometimes risky projects, whether in the field of urban construction, iron and steel metallurgy or oil prospecting. Without challenging the principle of this mass strategy, we would be satisfied to see it coexist with a ground-level development generating a more immediately discernible improvement in living conditions.

But the principal difficulties encountered by French cooperation in Guinea are financial. We saw previously the broadness of view with which were calculated, at the time of the resumption of economic relations, the guarantees granted to private credit. At the time of Mr Giscard d'Estaing's trip, arrears or nonpayments were being maintained within reasonable limits. Since then, they have undergone considerable slippage, all the more disturbing since, as they relate to short- and medium-term guarantees, they involve the first repayments for operations decided on since this resumption.

To what is this situation due? Currency receipts are to a certain degree fixed in character, consisting 97 percent of sales of bauxite and aluminum abroad, shares of profits due to the Guinean state by virtue of the capital which it holds in the large mining companies, and the export taxes levied on mineral products. Currency expenditures, on the other hand, have increased enormously during the last few years. Beyond the level of service on the public debt (nearly \$80 million), the increase in the oil bill, not only as a result of the rise in crude but also because of the growth in the number of cars on the road since the reopening of the frontiers, also plays an important part. This bill is probably about \$50 million per year today. Lastly, the weak purchasing power of the syli encourages smuggling, worsening its rate of exchange and the reactions of foreign creditors.

We should hope that President Sekou Toure's next visit to France will make it possible, in the mutual interest of France and Guinea, to lessen the gravity of this situation.

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GUINEA

INCREASED EXPECTATIONS FOR COOPERATION WITH FRG

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3269

Text Mr Louis Beavogui, the prime minister of Guinea, from 12 to 17 November made an official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, accompanied by several ministers of his government. This visit served to stimulate relations between the two nations, after a period of diplomatic coolness, lasting from 1971 to 1975.

During his meeting with Mr Beavogui, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Mr Helmut Schmidt, remarked that 30 million marks (about 70 million francs) have been allocated for financial and technical cooperation between the two nations in 1979.

The head of the Guinean government met in Cologne with representatives of the BDI Federation of Industrialists of the FRG, and spoke with them of the possibilities of strengthening bilateral industrial cooperation.

Conakry is now trying to obtain increased participation by West German firms in developing Guinea's raw materials, such as iron ore and bauxite. On the subject of bauxite, 32 percent of the FRG's bauxite needs are supplied by imports from Guinea. For this reason, bilateral trade is highly deficitary on the side of the Federal Republic, whose imports from Guinea in 1978 amounted to 70 million marks (about 164 million French francs), while its exports came to only 18.1 million marks (about 42 million French francs).

West German industrial sources pointed out that the present political climate in Guinea is favorable to a renewal of economic relations with the FRG.

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IVORY COAST

DOMESTIC BOTTLE GAS SHORTAGE REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3019

[Text] A shortage of domestic bottle gas was noted in Abidjan between 1 and 19 October. Although the situation quickly returned to normal, or at least became comparable to that which prevailed earlier, the daily paper FRATERNITE-MATIN made a survey on butane distribution, which showed that a new shortage could still occur.

In Ivory Coast, only SIR [Ivorian Refining Company] processes crude oil. Butane represents only a minor portion of the population's need for petroleum products. Ivorian gas consumption amounts to 13,000 tons, a 20 percent a year increase, while SIR processes some 2 million tons of crude annually.

The first problem stems from the fact that Ivory Coast supplies certain neighboring countries with petroleum products. Demand from the Ivorian, Malian and Voltan markets totals 2.2 million tons, while SIR's production capability is only 1.8 million tons a year. Thus some work has just been started to expand the refinery for the purpose of doubling production around 1981. For the time being, however, Ivory Coast must look abroad for the petroleum products which it cannot produce at home.

With a theoretical capability for butane production of 45 tons a day, SIR should be in a position to supply the Ivorian market, whose consumption amounts to more than 30 tons a day. In fact, by reason of its low storage capability (1200 tons), SIR can't always meet domestic demands and must therefore periodically call upon foreign production.

Thus PETROCI [Ivorian Petroleum Company] a national company created in 1976 and responsible for the domestic hydrocarbons market, found it necessary to import 500 tons of butane from Nigeria to satisfy the demand. The delivery took more time than expected.

As a second factor, the gas bottle traffic has also caused tensions in the market. Indeed the price of the deposit of gas bottles set by the Ivorian commerce minister was 2,000 CFAF, while deposit cost in countries bordering the Ivory Coast was 3,000 to 3,500 CFAF, which resulted in a traffic of empty bottles towards neighboring countries, creating a shortage on the domestic market.

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In view of the fact that the distributing companies (AGIP, Texaco, Shell and Mobil) pay 8,000 CFAF for every empty bottle, each unreturned bottle represents 6,000 CFAF in gains prevented for the distributor, or, today, 5,000 CFAF, since the Ivorian Government has decided to set the deposit price at 3,000 F.

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KENYA

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NEW SUNDAY WEEKLY PUBLISHED--The STANDARD of Nairobi, controlled by the Lonrho group, began publishing a Sunday edition called the SUNDAY STANDARD on 11 November. The two other Sunday newspapers in Kenya are the SUNDAY NATION, the Sunday edition of the DAILY NATION, of which the majority of the shares are controlled by the Aga Khan, and the Nairobi TIMES, headed by Mr Hilary Ngweni, who also publishes the WEEKLY REVIEW. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French p 3221] 8956

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MALI

BRIEFS

COTTON HARVEST--The CMDT (Malian Textile Development Society) has just forecast the results of the cotton harvest in Mali, which is now in its closing stages. Total will be about 144,000 tons, a clear increase over the total for preceding campaigns, which were: in 1976-1977, 119,000 tons; in 1977-1978, 113,600 tons; in 1978-1979, 127,690 tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3394]

NATIONAL SEMINAR ON JUSTICE--President Moussa Traore, speaking on 13 November at Bamako, closed the first national seminar on justice, which was devoted to cooperation with other public institutions of the nation. On this occasion he said he was "favorable to a healthy and on-going cooperation" with the magistrates in the "implementation of a healthy system for the dispensing of justice." He assured the magistrates that the government is ready to take action to improve their conditions. General Traore did add, however: "Our justice system must be improved, for we would not want to be forced to take certain steps which would be both painful and humiliating for our system of justice." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 pp 3268-3269/7679]

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NIGER

BCEAO BULLETIN'S REPORT OF ECONOMIC SITUATION GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 pp 3272-3273

[Text] A recent bulletin of economic and monetary statistics of the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) was devoted to Niger.

Among the principal marketed agricultural productions of the 1978-1979 season, shelled peanuts were recorded at 8,513 tons (6,072 tons below the preceding season), representing a value of 6,000,000 CFA francs. The cotton-grain harvest was 4,371 tons (3,000,000 CFA francs). At the end of July 1979 deliveries of peanuts to local oil works totaled 7,372 tons, a net decline from July 1978 (14,331 tons).

Uranium ore production for 1978 was 2,109 tons, for an export value of 52,400,000,000 CFA francs (1,441 tons and 28,400,000,000 CFA francs in sales in 1977). Cassiterite production remains marginal (90 tons, for 144,000,000 CFA francs).

For the first five months of 1979, traffic out of Benin by the Benin-Niger Joint Organization went up to 61,458 tons, 41,153 of which was in hydrocarbons.

At the end of May 1979, the index of merchandise turnover of the principal commercial enterprises was established at 319.1, compared with 309.7 one year previously (base, 100, specified for the year 1970).

At the end of July 1979 the general index of prices for African consumption showed 273.9, compared with 260.1 on 30 June 1978 (base, 100, for the year 1970).

On 1 May 1979 the minimal guaranteed interprofessional wage rate increased from 75.67 to 99.11 CFA francs.

The general budget for the fiscal year 1 October 1978-30 September 1979, made up in revenue and expenditures at 81,200,000,000 CFA francs (+ 24,800,000,000 over the preceding) and established without foreign contributions, devotes 21,900,000,000 to equipment expenditures (+ 8,900,000,000).

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At the end of December 1978 the debt incurred outside of Niger represented an exchange value of 29,800,000,000 CFA francs (+ 2,000,000,000 over the end of 1977) and the available margin not yet utilized from aid obtained was calculated at an offset of 40,200,000,000 CFA francs (+ 6,100,000,000 over the end of 1977).

As of 31 May 1979 banknotes and currency in circulation totaled 23,600,000,000 CFA francs (compared with 18,700,000,000 one year previously). Also as of the end of May 1979, demand and fixed-term deposits in commercial banks rose to 34,400,000,000 CFA francs (26,500,000,000 at the end of June 1978).

In comparison, registered utilizations from credits open to the economy were 47,600,000,000 CFA francs (figures at the end of April 1979), an increased volume by 9,500,000,000 in one year. In this recourse to credit, publicly-owned and semi-publicly-owned firms intervened for 12,100,000,000 CFA francs, the private sector showing 35,500,000,000.

As of 31 May 1979 the local net position of the Nigerian Treasury showed a positive balance of 11,800,000,000 FRA francs, compared with a surplus of 10,400,000,000 one year previously.

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NIGER

BRIEFS

NO NEW CANADIAN PROJECTS--The Canadian ambassador to Niger, Gilles Lalande, stated on 6 November in Niamey that the Canadian government will not be able to start any new development projects in Niger for at least two years. The Canadian ambassador, who was received on 6 November by President Seyni Kountche, said he had informed the Nigerian chief of state of his country's difficult economic situation, which is causing the new conservative government to review the development aid programs. This situation, the ambassador emphasized, will necessarily have repercussions on aid to developing countries. "All projects in progress will be continued," Mr Lalande said, "but unless a miracle occurs Canada will refrain from starting any new projects."
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3272] 8946

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RHODESIA

DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS PRESAGE DIFFICULT ELECTIONS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 pp 20-21

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima]

[Text] Everything went very fast on the morning of 14 November in London, at the majestic and austere Lancaster House. When Robert Mugabe spoke in the name of the Patriotic Front, the few participants at the conference--not open to the public--understood that something was about to happen. ZAPU's leader went right to the point. He asked Lord Carrington to modify the 13th point in the settlement plan proposed by the British Government. Initially it called for control of Rhodesia's army by the British governor during an interim period. No allusion was made to the troops of the Patriotic Front, when they were supposed to enforce the cease-fire.

The question was to know if liberation fighters were going to wait for elections stationed in their camps in neighboring countries or if they could come back to Zimbabwe at the announcement of the cease-fire. Lord Carrington did not avoid the question. He reassured Robert Mugabe saying that the army of the Patriotic Front would be treated in the same manner as the present Rhodesian army. This concession was important for the front which backed off from its demand to have the interim period extend over 6 months. Consequently, the British government's proposal was retained (2 months of transitory period), over the compromise of Kenneth Kaunda, who preferred a 4 months' period. However, it was the trip to London by Zambia's president which got the conference out of an impasse. In 10 weeks the position of the British Government, concerned with tactfully handling Abel Muzorewa's regime to avoid an irreparable breakup, was confronted with the intransigence of the Patriotic Front, whose two factions do not always speak the same language. Kenneth Kaunda's presentation of the "last chance plan" jeopardized the ZANU-ZAPU coalition, bringing it to the point of breakup. This late alliance between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe seems more and more like a "combination of circumstance." The Patriotic Front was formed in September 1976, at the time of the Geneva conference organized under the auspices of the British and the Americans. The aim was to oppose interior political men--notably Abel Muzorewa, former partner of Nkomo, who had chosen--the solution of entente with Ian Smith.

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The failure of the Geneva conference only worked to give more credibility to the Patriotic Front. It was recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as sole representative of the Zimbabwe people. But the personalities and ties of its two leaders are so different that unity seems to rest on a thread. Robert Mugabe is presented as a Marxist militant, as shown through his ties with Samora Machel and Agostinho Neto. Next to him Joshua Nkomo could easily pass for a moderate. It is a fact that Nkomo is rather difficult to define. He is highly regarded in Moscow and is welcomed in several Western countries. It is not by chance that those who wished to see the end of the Patriotic Front came to him. Tiny Lowlands, for example, the boss of the almighty national company, Lonrho, used Kenneth Kaunda in 1977 to attempt a rapprochement between Nkomo and the nationalist leaders of the interior.

This is probably the reason why proposals by Zambia's president have always been received with suspicion by Robert Mugabe. In London, Kenneth Kaunda was confronted with the radical intransigence of the Patriotic Front's coleader. He first opposed the idea of a cease-fire before the elections. On the other hand, he demanded that forces from the Patriotic Front serve as the embryo of the country's future army. Last but not least, the 6 months' transition period demanded by the Front was necessary for strategic reasons.

The return to Zimbabwe of elements from the liberation army will be followed by the return of numerous exiles who would increase the ranks of supporters of the interior. However, several months of electoral campaign would be necessary for men who had been cut out of the country for many years. That is why it was difficult to bargain on the length of the transition period. Thus, the acceptance of the British proposal shows to what point pressures were inflicted on leaders of the Patriotic Front. It is evident that the fear of a breakup worries all parties concerned. Kenneth Kaunda used this argument with an extreme ability. In case of a breakup chances for peace would be considerably reduced. The front line countries would have to choose between two factions. The weight of the war is felt more and more and consequently, pushes "protectors" to advise their "proteges" to compromise.

But at this point a Muzorewa-Nkomo alliance would push Mugabe back in his last hideout and Mozambique hosting his troops would then engage the war more deeply with all foreseeable consequences. It would be a repeat of the Angolan crisis, with the only difference that external opposition would benefit from the total support of Eastern countries USSR ahead, more than ever determined to implant themselves in the region.

Is the laborious compromise of London an insurance for the future of the Patriotic Front? For the moment, the main unknown factor is the result from the various electoral consultations to be organized at the end of the London conference. Abel Muzorewa intends to maintain the advantage gained on the field. Will it be possible? One of the dangers menacing the Patriotic Front is the radicalization of his position to the point of provoking a schism in itself. For Muzorewa it would be an unqualifiable present, comparable to the

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one given by the Union of Cameroon People (UCP) to President Ahidjo in 1958. The dissolution of the Cameroonesse nationalist movement allowed Ahmadou Ahidjo to recover a number of UPC leaders, whose opposition to his regime lasted but a few years. Their adherence to the president's party ended with the extinction of the external opposition, to which, little by little funds were cut off by supporting countries. The situation has not reached this point yet, even if the militant commitment of the beginning has been replaced by disappointment, caused by the war. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that political groups forming the Patriotic Front will campaign together and win the elections. ZANU and ZAPU would then have a majority in the assembly. It would be another crucial outcome. Everything will depend on the party that holds the majority. If friends of Robert Mugabe win, a tendency to the left will be observed just as in Mozambique. Up to this point nothing is decided and all hypotheses are possible. If no faction can obtain absolute majority, it is probable that bargains will occur between leaders of minority formations composed of dissidents from various origins and leaders of important formations. This is the case with the democratic party of James Chikerewa who is an ex-friend of Abel Muzorewa; and with reverend Ndabaningi Sithole's ZANU faction. These two men would be tempted by a coalition with Joshua Nkomo. But in the best of cases it is not certain that his coalition will collect more than 33 percent of the votes. The ZAPU leader will have to choose between Muzorewa and Mugabe in any case.

In the race for power in Salisbury, Nkomo is uncontestedly the pivotal figure, toward whom all attention is turned. Zambia, where Nkomo's men are, is pushing hardest of the frontline countries toward the conclusion of an agreement which could put a stop to a war that is very costly. Robert Mugabe who has not said his last word, relies on Mozambique and Tanzania. The favors of Angola go equally to ZANU, but the country is not really located in the combat zone, since it does not have common borders with Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the distant but influential Nigeria would rather support Joshua Nkomo, who gathers the maximum number of crucial trump cards, for the time being. Hovering very adeptly between East and West, courted by Americans, British and Soviets, will he know how to exploit the situation judiciously?

It is probable that at the time of the next deal of cards, the legacy of Angola will haunt leaders of Zimbabwe. Will leaders of African countries, today supporting one of the Patriotic Front's factions, accept the defeat of their "proteges," especially if it ends with total elimination of their power? For nationalists who fought for 15 years against the illegal regime of Ian Smith, the hour of truth has definitely come.

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RHODESIA

ZANU PRESIDENT MUGABE GRANTS INTERVIEW TO 'THE GUARDIAN'

LD211207 London THE GUARDIAN in English 21 Dec 79 p 6 LD

[Interview with ZANU President Robert Mugabe by Patrick Keatley in London on 20 December 1979]

[Text] Steely is the word for the ZANU president, Mr Robert Mugabe, joint leader of the Patriotic Front delegation to the Lancaster House conference.

He is a man of steel, but a man without bitterness. Ask him about those 10 barren, wasted years in detention in Mr Smith's jails and he disagrees with both adjectives.

"We learned discipline," he said in an interview with THE GUARDIAN yesterday. "We divided up the day into a time-table, for our studies. It was a chance for many of our young men to complete an education that had been halted by the system."

A reserved, modest man, Mr Mugabe prefers not to talk about his own self-imposed agenda. He already had his B.A. from Fort Hare University in South Africa, and two other degrees. In prison he registered as an external student of London University and proceeded to take a law degree, then a master's, and was mapping out a PhD in 1974 when political levers at last wrenched open the gates and put him on the plane to the north and freedom.

Would he categorise the London conference on Rhodesia as a success? "Sixty percent success" is the laconic judgment. He feels that the basis for negotiation was tilted from the start in favour of the Salisbury delegation, nominally led by Bishop Muzorewa, but under the thumb of the outwardly silent military leader, General Walls.

"I still regard it as a piece of collusion," he says. "We are not content to leave it as it is. We expect the governor to face up to realities in the immediate weeks ahead."

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The collusion, in Mr Mugabe's view, began with the drawing up of the maps. The front leaders, and their military commanders, were astonished to be told that 15 places on the periphery of the country had been designated as "assembly points" where the guerrillas would be concentrated after they emerged from the bush. Why 15? No one could say.

The working talks, with maps and charts, which they expected to have with serving officers from the Ministry of Defense were expressly forbidden during the first 12 weeks of the conference. As for the Salisbury delegation, General Walls made no move to meet the front commanders.

Mr Mugabe points out that the maps with 15 assembly camps marked for the front were already prepared before the British military team had returned from their confidential reconnaissance trip to Rhodesia.

"So there was collusion," he says. "This was General Walls' plan, presented to the British, who accepted it. When we demanded a 16th place, in the heartland, they had to send an official to clear it with General Walls last weekend in Salisbury. So what we worry about now is further collusion that may exist with South Africa.

"We are dealing with people who committed Udi once," he said, "they could be tempted again, especially on the most delicate day of all, at the end of the election campaign. For we shall win--make no mistake about that--the front will sweep the board. And then will be the moment of temptation, with South Africa able, and perhaps willing, to provide the backup. We must know where the British governor will stand, on that vital day."

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SENEGAL

AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3202

[Text] Mr Cheikh Cissoko, the Senegalese secretary of state for Water and Forest Resources, recently announced that the lack of rain this year, which was very noticeable in the Sudan-Sahel region, has seriously changed the composition of the pastureland where leguminous plants have replaced the gramineous ones, on which cattle normally feed. The new situation, Mr Cissoko stated to representatives of the countries and organizations which furnish aid, is going to provoke a major transhumance and an outbreak of brush fires. Therefore he was asking for emergency aid to protect the 900,000 head of cattle.

This year there will be no millet harvest in the northern part of Senegal, which is the poorest region in the country, the Senegalese secretary of state continued. He concluded by saying that the problem of storing agricultural products is a priority in Senegal, where infrastructures with a capacity of 100,000 tons, at a cost of 3 billion CFA francs, are to be completed in the intermediate future.

In addition, 3 million trees have been planted in Senegal during a reforestation campaign, which was unprecedented in its scope, and which had the participation of the population. The campaign, which lasted more than 6 months, was begun last April by President Senghor in Lagbar, in the north-central part of the country, in the Sahel zone. The campaign was closed by Mr Abdou Diouf, the prime minister, who stated that financing of more than 7 billion CFA francs was planned to carry out major reforestation projects with the help of Canada, France, the United States and the UNDP [United Nations Development Project].

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

PEANUT PRODUCTION DECLINE--The decline in Senegal of production of peanuts, the country's main export product, will be lower this year by 350,000 to 400,000 tons, Djibril Sene, Senegalese Rural Development Minister, indicated on 15 November. The decline, affecting not only peanuts but also other agricultural products, is basically due to the drought that hit Senegal, and the government's decision to grant credits in seeds only to those peasants who have paid their debts. Thus, according to the minister, peanut production will be approximately 650,000 tons, millet and sorghum 500,000 tons (against 800,000 tons last year), cotton 27,000 tons (against 35,000 tons) and rice 125,000 (against 140,000 tons). On the other hand Mr Sene announced that the Senegalese cooperative movement is soon to be reorganized, to reduce the number of cooperatives and improve their organization and management. Likewise, ONCAD (National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development), which is responsible for marketing the peanuts and training the peasants, is to be restructured. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3267] 8946

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL COUNCIL SESSION--The second session of the Senegal Economic and Social Council was opened on 16 November by its chairman, Magatte Lo, in the presence of Daouda Sow, minister of Information and Telecommunications, who is responsible for relations with the Assemblies. Two texts were submitted to the 51 Council members and nine associate members. The first concerns a draft law on direct taxes reform (fiscal reform updating the first book of the General Code on taxes). The second text deals with the bill exempting from the value-added tax imports and local purchases of raw materials for manufacture of books and newspapers in Senegal; the bill also is intended to abolish the tax on film showings and to modify certain provisions of the General Tax Code. On the other hand, the Economic and Social Council will have two studies to examine, which should be completed during the session, which is to end on 15 December or after. They concern an investigation of maritime transportation problems, and another on protection of soil and forests. The latter study is intended to strengthen the prevention of deforestation and desertification. Finally, the planned hearings concern seven diverse questions, notably: a consultative committee on industrial and energy research; an interministerial council on the "export program;" the life of the Senegal Railroad Company; and the operation of the Social Security Fund. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3267] 8946

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INDICTMENT OF RND LEADER--A month after his indictment (16 October) by the Dakar court, Shaykh Anta Diop is still waiting for Senegalese authorities to set the date of his trial. Shaykh Anta Diop, 56, researcher at the Basic Institute of Black Africa, director of the radiocarbon laboratory and a world renown Egyptologist, is being prosecuted as secretary general of the Democratic National Rally (RND), a party founded in 1976 but not recognized in Senegal. In addition to being indicted, Shaykh Anta Diop has been forbidden to leave the Senegalese territory, which halts his international activities. Diop is vice president of the UNESCO international scientific committee for the drafting of the general history of Africa, president of the Association of Researchers from the Black World and a member of the bureau of the International Union of Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences and of the academic council of the UN African Technical Institute for Advanced Training. In 1966, along with Dr Dubois from the United States, he shared the Festival of Black Arts (Dakar) prize as the author having had the most influence on black thought in the 20th century. However, despite all these titles, Shaykh Anta Diop has not been forgiven for trying to revive a banned political party. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 p 29] 11,464

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SOUTH AFRICA

'AFRIQUE-ASIE' INVESTIGATES ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 12-25 Nov 79 pp 46-48

[Article by Jane Bergerol: "Deserters by the Thousands"]

[Text] Young whites are starting to realize that the reality of war has nothing to do with the propaganda.

At the end of October, more than 300 South African soldiers were AWOL from their barracks. They were protesting, in an organized group, against the delay with which they were granted leave (specifically) and with which they were paid their remaining salary after they had spent 5 months fighting in the combat zone in northern Namibia. This mutiny was the first to make headlines in the South African press and at the very moment that the military authorities have to face up to a growing opposition of civilians to the prolongation of compulsory military service, and at the same time that in the white universities a war resistance movement is developing comparable to that which American students launched against the Vietnam War.

For having participated in this movement, some white students were arrested, and several student publications were banned. The national union of white South African students published a pamphlet on "South African Law and the Conscientious Objector" which publicly reopened the debate, at the risk of incurring penalties of up to 6 years in prison for inciting refusal of military duty or even, simply, for having posed the question if whether it was always necessary to agree to performing said duty.

In London, in September, I met some young white South Africans who had fled their country to avoid being arrested and imprisoned. Some of them had deserted, others had left to avoid conscription.

In the British capital they have formed the Cape Committee For South African War Resistance. This committee has relations with a similar group formed in Holland and with the Front For Aid to South African Military Refugees, formed in the United States, where about 100 resisters arrived--most of them secretly--and who all risk, if they are caught, being extradited to South Africa.

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Black = Red

These resisters are, of course, only a small minority. A spokesman for the Aid Funds was able to state recently that "90 percent at least of white South Africans would be only too proud and too happy to be able to kill blacks to defend the motherland." Another told me in London, "As for the vast majority, the whites have no reaction to the situation. They say, 'Yes, that's military service, you don't like it, but you do it.' Nevertheless, right now this great listless mass is beginning to stir, and sometimes it refuses."

According to South African official statistics, the number of resisters is now from 3,000 to 5,000 a year. In fact, there are certainly many more because only the students are easily counted.

At the present time the resisters in London told me, "All white males must first do 2 years of military service. Then for 8 years, they have to do a month every year. But today with the South African army always active, they do serve, in fact, periods of 3 months every year, and some even stay for 6 months out of 12 under the colors."

And the nonwhites? For some time there has been talk of requiring the Indians and the coloreds do military service, which will doubtless be compulsory in 1980 or in 1981. In the meantime, according to official statistics, the number of "volunteers" has increased in nonwhite units. Many are unemployed, forced to enlist if they want to eat. One could say it is a matter of "economic enlistment." As long as compulsory service will not be imposed on the blacks and the coloreds, the resisters are, evidently, all whites. One of them told me that, to guard against this opposition to enlistment, the government was giving a real military training in so-called "vacation" camps to the children and was carrying out on them genuine brainwashing: they submit them to an incredible "antiblack and anticommunist" propaganda campaign, which produces in some an authentic paranoia.

Comic books also play a role in this "training." There is one, MARC THE CONQUEROR, in which the hero is a white athlete whose task is to eliminate "terrorists." On one page, two small white children are playing in a garden and a black African in work clothes is intruding in the background. Then Marc the Conqueror arrives and kills the black, who, surely, was a "terrorist." This simplistic idea, black laborer equals terrorist, is ceaselessly inculcated in the children throughout all of their schooling.

Once in the army, the young whites are subjected to an even more brutal brainwashing. A deserter told me, "Everyday they grind into us that these blacks are reds ready to violate our mothers. They also tell us that the guerrillas do not know how to fight, and that the terrorists are only a pack of bandits without any discipline. But, when one is in combat, one sees that the guerrillas are much more effective than we had been told, and they often win."

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"It is all this that the young white South African is starting to understand today: namely that the propaganda does not correspond to anything that he has to brave when he finds himself confronting the realities of war."

"They have tricked us," the resisters are saying in substance. "In 1976, they made us serve periods of 3 months, because of the war with Angola. They told us that after our troops withdrew from Angola, it would be finished. Now, under the pretext that the army is always active, it all continues and the periods of service are sometimes even 6 months. This angers many, not for political reasons but for personal reasons. Others are of the opinion that if the duration of military service is prolonged, it is because the liberation movements are becoming stronger. Then they no longer support the government and they are less and less hostile to these movements because they are disappointed: defend the present system?, they say; why are we fighting? That's the big question right there that many are coming to ask themselves."

Shaved Head

It is in that way that the opposition against the Vietnam War started in America. Even in the army itself troops are complaining about the food; one unit completely shaved their heads because they were required to have their hair cut short every 2 weeks; another unit refused training. Against these forms of opposition, repression is getting more and more brutal; seven soldiers were killed in their barracks last year. When the whites revolt, they are treated as harshly as the enemy.

Thousands of whites are resisting conscription. "The military police are very active, but, it seems, less and less effective because more and more people are hiding out in the countryside to avoid being drafted. They constantly change their address, they take undeclared jobs, because they know that the Ministry of the Army looks through the tax records to find them."

Once again, those who refuse military service for political reasons are a minority within a minority. "Nevertheless," the representatives of the resisters' committee tell us, "the population is disagreeing more and more with the government. It is still not very political. But experience proves it: when people refuse to fight and are excessively abused by the army, things end finish up by becoming political and people come to ask themselves in the name of what they are required to make war."

For the Resistance Committee, this opposition movement is essential. "Essential because this forces the white South Africans to become aware of a reality that the vast majority prefers to ignore."

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

PORT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM--The Tanzania Harbor Authority (THA) management has just made public an ambitious program for modernizing the Tanzanian ports, to be extended over four years for a cost of 1,300,000,000 shillings. The program involves the ports of Dar es Salaam, Kilwa, Lindi and Mafia. It includes realization at Dar es Salaam of a wharf for hydrocarbons, a repair shipyard, merchandise warehouses and enlarging the port's main access channel. New piers would also be constructed at Lindi, Kilwa and Mafia. The World Bank, the Great Britain and the Norwegian banks would aid in realizing this THA program. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79] 8946

ZANZIBAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN PROBLEMS--Since the triennial Zanzibar development plan was put into operation 18 months ago, only 31 percent of the desired objectives have been attained, basically because of the shortage of financial resources, the secretary general of the permanent commission for the Zanzibar plan, Professor Khamisi stated in mid-November. At a one-week meeting in Zanzibar, he stated that approximately 1,000,000,000 shillings were necessary. The Zanzibar government was to turn over 545,000,000, while foreign sources of financing were to furnish 593,000,000 shillings, in the form of loans and subsidies. But, Mr Khamisi emphasized, when the plan went into effect the government not only did not increase its share of the financing, but in addition the loans and subsidies were not easily granted by the other sources of financing. Mr Khamisi, on the other hand, thanked the Tanzanian government for having granted the Zanzibar government a loan, under advantageous conditions, for 150,000,000 shillings, to complete certain projects. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3281] 8946

GUIDE TO PRIVATE SECTOR--On 6 November President Nyerere announced that the Tanzanian government was studying the creation of an official body which would "guide" the private sector, particularly industry, in Tanzania. The head of state declared specifically: "We are seriously thinking of creating such an organization. I think we realize the need for it. It will not only guide the private sector, it will also tell us where, when and how the government's participation will be used in a private enterprise." This organization will define the economic sectors in which the private sector will be authorized to function, as well as the role it will be called upon to play within the framework of the Tanzanian development strategy. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3222] 8956

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UGANDA

BRIEFS

PARAGUAY MAY TAKE AMIN--Idi Amin for oil: That is the deal being negotiated between Libya and Paraguay. General Stroessner, who has been the dictator of this South American republic for 25 years, offers hospitality without much concern for anything. He is ready to receive the ex-president of Uganda--who will have the company of the deposed dictator of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza; many former Nazis; OAS activists; and assorted swindlers--if al-Qadhafi assures his supplies of black gold. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Oct 79 p 37] 8143

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