

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040016-8

8

1

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8850

8 January 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 1/80)

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

For further information on report content  
call (703) 351-3165.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF  
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION  
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8850

8 January 1980

### NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

(FOUO 1/80)

CONTENTS	PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS	
Saratawi, PLO's Man for Difficult Tasks, Said To Have Resigned (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 22-28 Nov 79) .....	1
Speculation on West German-Mossad Attempts To Assassinate Palestinian Leaders (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 8-14 Nov 79) .....	5
Briefs	
Memorandum of Agreement With Iraq	8
Inter-Arab Steel Project	8
ISLAMIC AFFAIRS	
Islamic Sulfism, Reform Discussed at Paris Symposium (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 22-28 Nov 79) .....	9
ALGERIA	
Opposition Leader Discusses Status of Revolution (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 8-14 Nov 79) .....	13
Progress of Cleanup Campaign Reviewed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Oct 79) .....	21
Briefs	
Oil Report	26
Reforestation Campaign	26
Algerian-Soviet Contract	26

- a - [III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
IRAQ	
Bilateral Relations With Iran on the Decline (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 8-14 Nov 79) .....	28
Briefs	
Aid to Zambia	29
MOROCCO	
Maritime Transport Agreement Signed With France (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Nov 79) .....	33
Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank Reports on 1978 Activities (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Nov 79) .....	35
Situation in Major Industrial, Trade Sectors Reviewed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Nov 79) .....	37
Briefs	
Morocco-Iraq Shipping Line	41
WESTERN SAHARA	
Ohoud 'Morocco's Most Ambitious Operations Against Polisario' (M. Mlamali Adam; NEW AFRICAN, Dec 79) .....	42
Algeria: Polisario Front Official Acknowledges New Moroccan Division (Manuel Somoza; PRELA, 14 Dec 79) .....	45

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SARATAWI, PLO'S MAN FOR DIFFICULT TASKS, SAID TO HAVE RESIGNED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22-28 Nov 79 pp 30-31

[Article: "Kreisky's Sickness Afflicts Palestinian Heart Surgeon; 'Arafat: As We Have Military Fedayeen, We Also Have Political Fedayeen; Difficult Missions Performed by 'Isam Saratawi Provoke Rejectionist Front"]

[Text] The Palestinian affairs editor has written: 'Isam Saratawi is the man of the "difficult diplomatic tasks" in the PLO. He has resigned. No, he hasn't resigned. He has resigned! What is his story? And why all this clamor over his role and his relationship with each of Kreisky and 'Arafat?

The subject of discussion was about Dr 'Isam Saratawi, the Palestinian National Council member, and his contacts that have angered some of the Palestinian organizations which have accused him of "treason" and of violating the Palestinian national resolutions and the Palestinian national charter. When Yasir 'Arafat (Abu-'Ammar) took the floor, he told the conferees, who included leaders of the Palestinian organizations and other Palestinian officials: "Brothers, as we have military fedayeen, we also have political fedayeen and brother 'Isam is one of these."

'Isam Saratawi, who is said to have presented his resignation from the Palestinian National Council to Yasir 'Arafat a few days ago--a resignation on which the PLO Executive Chairman has not decided yet--joined the Palestinian revolution in 1967. He founded at the time a Palestinian military organization which included tens of fighters and which was called the Organization Working for the Liberation of Palestine.

The organization's fighters were distinguished by wearing camouflage uniforms that almost covered the face completely. But this organization soon merged in Fatah in 1969 when the Palestinian resistance was present in Jordan. Before that, 'Isam al-Saratawi had practiced medicine in Kuwait for a short period after graduating as a heart surgeon from U.S. universities.

Dr al-Saratawi is from the village of Sarta in central Palestine. His father was a teacher who at one stage of his life took refuge in Iraq and taught there.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The issue that angered al-Saratawi, who is one of the very close confidants of Yasir 'Arafat, and that is said to have caused him to submit his resignation is the violent attack to which he has been exposed by a number of Palestinian organizations since Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky announced last October that al-Saratawi and Ariele Elia, the leftist Israeli politician, had won his personal award out of appreciation for their efforts to realize a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. Some of the Palestinian organizations have accused al-Saratawi of treason and of falling into the Zionist snare, demanding that he reject Kreisky's award. But al-Saratawi turned down their request out of his appreciation for the Austrian leader, whom he appreciates very highly, and has preferred to resign from the Palestinian National Council in order not to embarrass the PLO and Yasir 'Arafat in particular.

Constant Contacts

It has also been mentioned that al-Saratawi had contacts with a group of Israelis working under the name of the Israeli Council for Peace, led by Reserve Gen Matityahu Peled.

Reports have also been circulated in Cairo that al-Saratawi met with Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil last October.

What aroused the protests of some leaders of the Palestinian organizations is that al-Saratawi was sitting next to Elia at the award-giving ceremony. The two shared the award of 24,000 dollars in half.

Al-Saratawi is usually entrusted with the difficult and complicated tasks connected with some foreign contacts--tasks that could provoke arguments if revealed. Some of these tasks have actually created several crises among the resistance factions, especially between Fatah and some of the rejectionist fronts, because al-Saratawi holds his "suspect contacts," in the opinion of the rejectionist fronts, as a representative of the PLO and not in his personal capacity. Many observers had expected for al-Saratawi a fate similar to that of Sa'id al-Hamami "because he plots against the Palestinian cause," according to some Palestinians described as "radicals."

Meeting With Kreisky

Dr al-Saratawi has a strong relationship with Kreisky, the Austrian leader, and is considered a friend of his. The beginning of the acquaintance between the two came in 1975 through mutual friends, considering that al-Saratawi is one of those who are active in the Palestinian revolution.

At the time, Kreisky was very interested in the Middle East issue and in the PLO in particular. He had met 'Arafat during the tour which the fact-finding committee of the Socialist International made under Kreisky's leadership in 1974, i.e. after the October 1973 war.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Since the first meeting 4 years ago, Kreisky and al-Saratawi have met more than 200 times [sic] in various periods. During the meetings, al-Saratawi was in constant contact with 'Arafat and conveyed to him the viewpoint of the Austrian leader who represents the Socialist International and holds the position of its deputy chairman. In return, al-Saratawi was getting the viewpoint of the PLO leader and conveying it to Kreisky. This is why al-Saratawi can be considered the maker of the "Vienna meeting" between 'Arafat, Kreisky and Willy Brandt.

In regard to the planning for the Vienna meeting, al-Saratawi says: "The idea of the meeting was put forth at the end of September 1978. The truth is that Kreisky put it forth after the Camp David negotiations." Al-Saratawi add: "Abu-'Ammar was not aware of the matter at the time. When a worker in the political field, like me, finds an opportunity, he makes use of it. I did not put it forth in the name of Abu-'Ammar. The idea occurred to me and I asked Kreisky: What do you think? I met Kreisky in Paris during the conference of the Socialist International and then in Vienna a few days later. We reviewed the outcome of the Camp David negotiations and I explained to him their drawbacks from our point of view."

Al-Saratawi further says: "I proposed the meeting but did not set the place. Brother Abu-'Ammar was in Moscow at the time and was planning to proceed to attend the Baghdad Arab summit. Kreisky approved the proposal and the meeting date was set for November 1978. Certain circumstances developed and did not permit convocation of the meeting in November because of the elections in Austria which took place ahead of schedule and were won by Kreisky's party. There were also circumstances that preoccupied brother Yasir 'Arafat."

Al-Saratawi goes on to add: "After the Austrian elections, we had a working plan for two meetings: One bilateral with Kreisky and a second with the Socialist International leadership, i.e. with Willy Brandt, the former German chancellor, and a number of other leaders, in the presence of Kreisky. We later combined both ideas. Several dates for the meeting were discussed as of the beginning of May 1979 but none of them could be met. SALT II, for example, caused the date to be delayed. Finally, the date in which the meeting took place in the presence of Brandt was set."

Saratawi Entrusted Officially to Make Contacts

The truth is that 'Isam al-Saratawi has not made any contacts with any side or any political personality in the world in his capacity as an individual not connected with anybody. Had it been so, nobody would have received him. He has always been officially trusted with these contacts. Yet he has shouldered personally the burden of the dangers to which he and his life may be exposed and has actually faced the violent criticism to which he has been exposed with the courage of "political fedayeen," as 'Arafat himself has said.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The first of the troubles facing al-Saratawi was the so-called "Kreisky document" issued on 27 January 1977. At the time, Kreisky asked al-Saratawi after a meeting between them to sum up what he had said in a message containing the gist of the discussion that had taken place between the two. Strong clamor was raised over this message in the Palestinian National Council and in the Arab papers which asked 'Arafat to explain the truth of "al-Saratawi's message."

The truth is, as al-Saratawi has said in a recent interview with SHU'UN FILASTINIYAH [Palestinian Affairs] magazine, is that "the organization received no document and no maps because I wrote the message in my personal name and on the stationery of the hotel in which I was staying. The message was a summary of my view of what the organization could accept within the framework of a just solution to the Middle East problem."

When the question of the message was raised in the well-known manner in the Palestinian National Council, Yasir 'Arafat explained that it was a personal message from 'Isam al-Saratawi. This top-level Palestinian admission of the presence of the message had a good effect on 'Isam al-Saratawi and absolved him of the charge of forgery of which some Palestinians had accused him, especially since a statement had been made denying the issue of the message altogether and exposing al-Saratawi to the charge of forgery.

Thus, al-Saratawi who was exposed to scathing criticism from some Palestinian organizations because of the so-called "Kreisky message" has fallen anew the victim of the "Kreisky award" and has submitted his resignation from the Palestinian National Council, preferring to withdraw from the political battle being waged by the PLO and in which he has been participating despite all the dangers of falling a martyr of the political struggle and of being accused of "treason" as well.

The Palestinian sources close to the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee say: "It is very difficult for 'Arafat to accept al-Saratawi's resignation."

But will al-Saratawi insist on the resignation? And who has the courage to replace him?

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI

8494  
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SPECULATION ON WEST GERMAN-MOSSAD ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE  
PALESTINIAN LEADERS

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 8-14 Nov 79 p 26

[Article: "The Arabs Ask Bonn: Did German Intelligence Cooperate With Mossad in Embellishing an Attempt to Assassinate "Arafat and Khalaf?"]

[Text] The scandal of the interrogation of Palestinians by Israelis in prisons in Bavaria has developed into a "political scandal of the first order" in West Germany. Meanwhile, the Palestinians and Arabs are watching developments to learn if the Bonn government will offer them a reasonable explanation for a "plot" hatched by Israeli intelligence to use some of the imprisoned youths in an attempt to assassinate Palestinian leaders.

The issue of the four Palestinian prisoners whom West German security authorities allowed to be interrogated by Israeli intelligence agents is interacting on various political and official levels, and is threatening to develop into a political scandal following the raising of the issue by Arab diplomatic circles here as well as Palestinian circles in Beirut.

The Bundestag (lower house) is currently conducting a parliamentary investigation into the matter through two of its committees to learn who is primarily responsible and what steps must be taken to prevent the recurrence of such an incident.

The work of the two committees is not expected to be easy, however-- especially since the state of Bavaria where the arrest and interrogation of the Palestinians took place is governed by a conservative administration while the Federal Government is made up of a Liberal-Democratic coalition. Both governments are exchanging accusations and trying to shift the responsibility onto each other's shoulders.

It appears that officials of both governments are involved in the issue-scandal. It is reported here that officials of the federal intelligence organization informed their associates in the Bavarian security organization that "Israeli agents" would be present at the interrogation.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Mr Klaus Kenkl, head of the federal intelligence organization, has acknowledged that he reprimanded assistants who permitted the Israelis to attend the interrogation of the Palestinians. Meanwhile, it has become clear that the Bavarian security official who allowed the Israelis to participate in the interrogation did not inform his superiors of his action.

Brainwashing Operations

It is also reported that the interrogation of the arrested Palestinians was not confined to judicial questioning, but, according to Palestinian sources, it developed into attempts at intimidation and forcible administration of certain drugs as part of a brainwashing operation to convert the prisoners into agents of Israeli or German intelligence.

In fact, the Israeli agents succeeded in making one of the prisoners, by the name of Muhammad Yusuf, submit to being controlled and receiving instructions to assassinate Mr Salah Khalaf (Abu Ayad), who is described as the number two man in FATAH.

Muhammad Yusuf returned to Beirut, but fell prey to unpleasant thoughts which seized him, and in the meantime his conscience was awakened to the seriousness of the mission which he had been assigned. He was afraid, however, that the Israeli agents would take revenge on his family if he did not carry out the deed. Finally, the appeal of his conscience won out and he informed Salah Khalaf of what he had been assigned to do. However, Yusuf committed suicide by shooting himself on 18 October.

The Arabs and Palestinians Meet

The tragedy truly jolted the consciences of many. It has been learned here that the concerned Palestinian organizations filed a protest with the German Embassy in Beirut over this shameful legal and judicial violation. The embassy reportedly received an implied threat that the Palestinians would resume opposition to German interests unless a full investigation is conducted and an acceptable explanation of the matter is given.

In addition, the ambassadors of Iraq, Kuwait and Syria have begun to act here, and have filed an official protest with the Foreign Ministry, which quickly promised to provide an acceptable official explanation and conduct an investigation. At the same time, the ministry asserted that this incident does not mean that it is part of German policy to side with Israel against the Arabs.

In a veiled threat, the PLO's representative here, Mr "Abdallah al-Ifranji, said: "The Germans must not be surprised if a strong reaction occurs when our sons are left in the hands of the Israelis to be interrogated."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

However, the statements of Salah Khalaf in this connection were welcomed. He announced that the PLO does not intend to take revenge, "Because we are not a vindictive people, and we will leave the matter for the people of West Germany to judge." He said that the case of Muhammad Yusuf is only a part of a vast plot by German, Israeli and American agents to entice Palestinian youths into coming to Germany and then attempt to buy them.

This case has been made even more serious by hints that, in addition to Mr Khalaf, Yasir 'Arafat may also have been the target of an "implanted" operation similar to those occurring in Germany.

A Palestinian youth reportedly said that he was ordered to commit "misdeeds", and revealed that Mr 'Arafat was the target of an assassination operation.

#### German Reactions

Official and political circles here in Germany fear that this affair, which has been described by the Bavarian minister of interior as a "scandal of the first order," will injure West Germany's reputation in the Arab world--especially since the Bonn government has made tremendous efforts this year to improve its standing with Arab governments as well as the Palestinians.

As a result of these efforts, the German authorities obtained commitments from the Palestinians to refrain from taking any actions against German interests as long as the Bonn government abides faithfully by its commitments.

Still, there is nothing to indicate that the PLO wants to become entangled in conducting terrorist actions against European interests at this time, especially since it is now concentrating all its diplomatic efforts on penetrating the European "barrier of silence." Consequently, the PLO does not want all the effort it has put out during the past few months to collapse.

It can now be said, with full reservation, that the crisis in relations between the PLO and West Germany has entered a phase of total settlement through Germany's provision of unequivocal and reassuring guarantees that it will not deal with Israeli intelligence in the process of carrying out measures to monitor Palestinians who enter and reside in its territory.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

8951  
CSO: 4802

7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ--A preliminary agreement on economic and trade cooperation between Algeria and Iraq was signed in Baghdad on 11 October following the close of proceedings of the fourth session of the joint Algerian-Iraqi commission at the expert level. The preliminary agreement was signed by Mr Abdelghani Akbi, Algerian minister of commerce, and by his Iraqi counterpart, Mr Hassan 'Ali al-'Amiri. It includes a list of goods which will be exchanged between Algeria and Iraq and provides for the opening of a maritime link between the two countries and shopping centers to increase the volume of trade and to familiarize people with both countries' products. During his visit to Iraq, Mr Akbi presided over Algeria Day at the 17th International Fair of Baghdad. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2816] 11915

INTER-ARAB STEEL PROJECT--Meeting in Algiers last week, experts of the Arab Countries Industrial Development Center (IDCAS), the Arab Economic Unity Council (UEA), the Islamic Development Bank (BID) and the Arab Mines Company studied the possibility of setting up an inter-Arab steel project. The purpose of this project, in its initial stage, is to satisfy Arab iron and steel needs, estimated at 18 million tons for 1985 according to these experts. In his speech opening the proceedings, Mr Slimane Bentobal, chairman of the board of directors of the Arab Iron and Steel Union, said that "such a project is possible only with the combined efforts of Arab countries. Individual efforts by each country will not enable such a project, despite its resources and potential, to command attention on the international market in view of the competition of industrialized countries." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2817] 11915

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

ISLAMIC SUFISM, REFORM DISCUSSED AT PARIS SYMPOSIUM

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22-28 Nov 79 pp 76-77

[Article: "Islam in Paris Symposium; Toward New International System"]

[Text] In the face of the strong western current against the east and against Islam in particular and within the framework of the cultural symposiums organized by the Islamic World League in Paris with the aim of opening a healthy dialogue between the east and the west under the auspices of Dr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaldun al-Kinani, the league director, an important symposium was held this week. Following are the details.

"Reforming Sufism and Making Reform Sufist" [Taslif al-Sufiyah Wa Taswif al-Salafiyah] is the title of the lecture delivered by Dr Muhammad Mubarak, a former minister and a visiting professor at Jordanian and Saudi Universities, at the opening session of the symposium. Afghan thinker (Najm al-Din Bimat), the deputy general director of culture and information of UNESCO in Paris; Dr Sa'id Mugharbal, the official in charge of UNESCO's relations with the Arab countries; Algerian researcher (Muhammad al-'Ayshubi and Dr Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, a former Syrian prime minister, took part in the discussion.

Islam and Civilization

At the outset of his discussion, the lecturer dealt with the social conditions that accompanied the rise of the Islamic world and the religious concepts derived from the Koran and the Sunna which were able to "build a civilization that spread throughout mankind." Islam thus "proceeded from a broad popular base" because it responded to the masses' "material and spiritual" aspirations and hopes.

Dr Muhammad Mubarak goes on to define the view of the westerners interested in Islam, saying that "they enter Islam by way of perverted sufism. This will lead to the creation of an intellectual current that turns away from dealing with the vital contemporary issues, such as fighting colonialism and combatting poverty."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This is why the lecturer draws attention to the pitfalls to which Islam is exposed in the west and why he warns of the need "to re-examine sufism on the basis of the Koran and the Sunna. We can thus eliminate the split among the Muslims over the concept of sufism in the Islamic thought."

#### Sufism and Reformism [al-salafiyah]

The lecturer also dwells on the crux of the reformist thought and examines its negative and positive aspects, asserting that "the best of things is the golden mean," i.e. "reforming sufism and making sufism to settle the sharp conflict between the sufists and the reformists in some Islamic countries because this conflict obstructs us from fighting the other ideas when our enemy is atheism." Dr Mubarak concludes his lecture with this question:

Can we enrich the sufism found in the Koran and the Sunna with the moral psychological element because the westerners will then discover that we have not done away with their civilization and technology and that the interaction has happened? The lecturer concludes that "the decadence under which the Islamic society lives is due to intrigue by the enemies of Islam" and not to the Muslims themselves.

Even though the time set aside for discussion was short, the discussion itself was daring and profound. Dr Sa'd Mugharbal's answer was clear and truthful and Dr Mugharbal brought the audience back to the present reality when he said:

#### One Half Billion Illiterate People

I am afraid that we may return the Islamic world to the yellow books. Our orthodox religion which starts with the word "read" [in the imperative form] has more than 500 million people who cannot read or write. I believe that a return to facility, simplicity and realism is the solution because the Islamic world is now going through a dangerous labyrinth that pushes the Arab man toward what is old in particular. This is why the citizen has begun to doubt and to cast doubts on everything, except for God's book. There are even those who cast doubts on the Sunna.

#### God Is Great

Afghani thinker (Najm al-Din Bimat) focused on a return to the Koran to eliminate the disagreement that has accumulated among the Muslims throughout ages so that their unity may be bolstered and their sectarian rancors may be replaced by amity under the banner of "God is Great."

He announced to the audience that he will devote the rest of his life "to defend Islam," having retired from diplomatic work in the UNESCO this week.

The comment of Algerian researcher Muhammad al-'Ayshubi on the lecture was:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

If we consider the dark period through which the Muslims have passed and the various injustices inflicted upon them, we can understand today the causes of the disagreement of the Muslims over their spiritual balance--disagreement resulting from the various periods by which they have been affected. Perhaps this explains the difference in viewpoints between those who believe in a single creed and those who call for it.

#### Sufism of West

If there are Europeans who enter Islam from the door of sufism, then this is due to their escape from the psychological pressure and anxiety under which they exist in a stifling material life that is void of spiritual values. They resort to Islam and take refuge in the sufist ways because of the veneration and appreciation these Europeans find in them.

This is in addition to the psychological calm that is free of strife and struggle. Meanwhile, the non-European Muslims calling for the renaissance of the Islamic world are muddling through the problems of development, the strife of achieving progress, the injustices of oppression and the yoke of colonialism. These people understand Islam in the form of fighting and jihad [holy war].

The commentator adds: In essence, sufism is nothing but a struggle to purge the soul and to steer it clear off the vices of life and the passions that desecrate it. This is what we find in the venerable Koran which says: "He who fears God and curbs the passions of his soul shall have paradise for his abode." The Koran also says: "He who has purged it [his soul] has succeeded."

If the essence of sufism is the element of purifying and elevating the soul, then purification of the soul leads to straight and clear thought, clear vision and firm belief. Considering that our Islamic thought is based on firm foundations, it urges us to correct the concepts of our life so that we may rid ourselves of alien thought forever.

#### Development From Within

I asked al-'Ayshubi: Is the social and cultural structure that retains its sufism and reformism forever in the Islamic society capable of rising and developing through "intermarriage" with the western technology?

He said, eliminating the ambiguity: The Islamic world is in a dire need to develop from within so as to rid itself of the tyrannical and oppressive regimes that still close the doors of development and progress in the face of their peoples. The Islamic peoples are now calling for reforming and changing the present conditions so that the Muslim individual may live in a healthy Islamic society with his full rights.

There is no doubt that the Islamic peoples will rise one day to build their social, political and economic future on Islamic foundations. The pivot

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of these foundations is consultation among the nation's members, as God, may He be praised, said: "Their affairs are run in consultation among them." The Islamic world cannot perform its role toward humanity if it is muddling through conflicts with itself, forgetting and neglecting its values and the elements of its strength.

Development with all its aspects, be they cultural, economic or technical, cannot succeed if it is not based on sound and firm economic foundations. This is our condition for development and for the Islamic world to take its place among the international powers.

Muslims and World

[Question] Can we imagine a certain role performed someday by the Islamic countries among the major powers struggling in the world?

[Answer] Yes, this is possible. The Islamic world which was represented a few years ago by weak and powerless states is now marching forth from popular bases that nothing can withstand.

Thus, the age of colonialism which usurped the rights and exploited the resources has gone and the Islamic peoples have risen to dictate their will, to stress their entity and to determine their future.

The Islamic world is now going through a phase of transition which will inevitably lead to rejuvenation. This world is proceeding to fortify itself with structures, bases and establishments that respond to its Islamic aspirations and goals. When it achieves this, it will be able to perform a role and to prove its ability as a balancing international power.

There is no doubt that the military, industrial and financial powers will try to maintain the status quo, even if the matter requires the use of intimidation and violence. But the inevitable will for change to which peoples cling cannot be deterred by violence or intimidation.

Toward New International System

Al-'Ayshubi adds: The Islamic world must reject continuation of the status quo imposed by the international powers and must struggle to establish a balance international situation. The strength of the Islamic peoples will provide the proper opportunity to restore the Islamic civilization to its place.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI

8494  
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

OPPOSITION LEADER DISCUSSES STATUS OF REVOLUTION

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 8-14 Nov 79 pp 34, 35

[Interview with Mohamed Boudiaf: "One of the Historical Leaders of the Revolution of a Million Martyrs Explains How His Country Won the War but Lost the Peace; Mohamed Boudiaf Says, 'Border Army Rules Algeria; Ben Bella Is Wonderful Person When One Is Alone with Him'"]

[Text] Mohamed Boudiaf is one of the historical leaders of the Algerian Revolution, but he differed with Ben Bella and has been living in exile ever since, away from the homeland for whose independence he had fought and struggled. Today, Boudiaf chairs the Socialist Revolutionary Party, which is a national, Marxist, leftist party that is classified politically to the left of traditional communist parties.

If AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is making its pages available to the statements of this political leader on one of the most noble occasions which modern Arab history boasts of--the 25th anniversary of the Algerian Revolution--it is affirming its interest in serving as a platform from which political and popular leaders can express their views. Accordingly, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is prepared to be responsive to opinions that contradict or oppose those of Boudiaf.

This year's celebrations of the silver anniversary of the outbreak of the Armed Popular Liberation Revolution in Algeria on the first of November 1954 were not confined to the huge and unexpected military parade that took place in the Algerian capital under the cover of MIG 25 airplanes. The celebrations were not confined to the popular demonstrations which marched through the streets of the capital proclaiming that the past was over and that a new leaf would be turned in the history of independent Algeria under its third president. The celebrations were not confined to the broad cleanup and security campaigns which the capital of the million martyrs was experiencing for the first time in its new history. All these phenomena and celebrations have rather coincided with an examination posture. Officials of Algeria headed by Chadli Bendjedid adopted this posture; and the historical leaders of the historical revolution adopted this posture also.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Among those leaders is Mr Mohamed Boudiaf who has been associated with the revolution ever since it was a mere idea in the minds of some fighters. Mohamed Boudiaf celebrated the silver anniversary of the revolution with an open letter to President Chadli. [He wrote the letter] in his capacity as a founding member of the Liberation Front Party, a former deputy for the provisional government of the Algerian Republic and a founding member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party which is described as the most important leftist opposition party in Algeria since independence.

#### Boudiaf Recalls

In this open letter of his Boudiaf bemoaned the absence of the numerous fighters who had made the first move on the first of November. He reminded [readers] of the story of that handful of fighters, the members of that special organization, who had exploded the first bomb with the limited means they had at that time. There were 22 fighters who had refused to become entangled in the political struggles between the leaders, and they undertook the responsibilities of the struggle regardless of the consequences.

Boudiaf mentioned the names of those who lost their lives because they believed in the freedom of the people: Ben Boulaïd, Ben M'hidi, Didouche Morad, [Suidani?], Ben Abdelmalik, Zighout, Baji Mokhtar, Chihani, Dhabana and others.

After these preliminary remarks in his open letter to President Chadli, Boudiaf shifted to the abnormal conditions [that have been evident] since independence. He accused "a group of opportunists, businessmen and adventurers" of taking advantage of the vulnerable points in the Liberation front during the days that followed independence. He also accused this group of attacking the revolution's accomplishments.

In a posture of examining 17 years of independence Boudiaf made the following sketch:

There is a keen interest in the accumulation of capital at the expense of the primary needs of the masses.

Grandiose projects are preferred over a genuine policy for development which would be supervised by the Algerians themselves.

There is a preference, regardless of the cost, for imported technology and modernization over the establishment of a national economy and the development of different resources, especially agricultural resources.

There is a move to force the country into a position of subordination to the western market in technology, commerce, finance and even food.

There is an inequitable distribution of wealth instead of the establishment of equitable social relations. This led some people to accumulate tremendous fortunes at the expense of the majority of the people. It led

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

to the creation of numerous problems such as unemployment, migration from the rural areas, a housing problem and problems of health and migrant labor, etc.

The masses are being removed from the political arena, and everything is being concentrated in the official agencies.

Instead of making an effort to unify its peoples, the area of Arab Maghreb is being turned into an arena for the struggle between the superpowers.

In order to get out of all these crises under the leadership of Chadli Bendjedid, Boudiaf suggested several reforms. The most important of these reforms are: issuing a full pardon to all political convicts; guaranteeing the freedom of expression and freedom of the press; guaranteeing freedom for political activity and for professional organizations; and abandoning the one party system.

This is the picture that Mohamed Boudiaf sketched of the Algerian Revolution a quarter of a century after it broke out in the open letter he wrote to President Chadli.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI met with Mr Mohamed Boudiaf on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Algerian Revolution, one of whose historical members he was. It also met with him on the occasion of the letter that he wrote. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI interviewed Mr Boudiaf about his opinions and his points of view on Algeria today.

#### Secrets That Are Being Announced for the First Time

Boudiaf began his statements by going back to the conditions that paved the way for the outbreak of the revolution.

Boudiaf said, "Messali Hadj, who founded the Algerian People's Party among whose members the revolutionary spark was ignited, was in the last days of his life without a theory and removed from the party and from the masses.

"The first time that carrying out the revolution was seriously considered was in 1952 when we established a revolutionary committee that included a group of officials. The purpose of that committee was to bring about a revolution throughout Northwest Africa."

Boudiaf went on to explain this secret that is being announced for the first time and said, "In March 1952 we established the revolutionary committee in the hope of saving the party from division. It was an expression of a course of thought that existed among the ranks of public opinion. Between March and June of the same year we published a magazine entitled LE PATRIOTE; only five issues of that magazine were published.

"The purpose of this first attempt in 1952 was to bring about a comprehensive revolution. We charged some persons with contacting the base (al-Hamadi and al-Hashimi who had trained Boumedienne). Abdelhamid Mehri, the present

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

minister of information was among those who had been charged with this task. Mustafa Bula'id had manufactured bombs himself and stored them in Batna, which was an important center for the revolutionaries. Our colleagues from Morocco contacted us, and we intended to work throughout all of North Africa.

"But this first attempt did not succeed. The police placed restrictions on the fighters, and they were dispersed, but in 1954 they were reunited.

"In practice, the revolution began with the Committee of 22. We had 200 guns, and the fourth and the fifth provinces embarked upon the revolution with no weapons whatsoever."

Boudiaf went on to reveal another secret, "We had basically decided to fire the first shot on October 15, but the fact that communications with some groups had been impaired delayed the date to the first of November. I remember that Rabah Bitat, the present speaker of the People's Assembly used to ask, 'What will we do if the people do not go along with us?' And we would reply, 'If the people go along with us, we succeed, and if they don't go along, this would be another experience that would be added to our people's history of struggle.' Ben Mahidi had only two bullets in his gun. Ramadan Abdelmalik was the revolution's first casualty. He died on the first of November.

"Our only hope was the people, and the people accepted us and went along with us."

Weakness in the Political Structure

[Question] Why then did these divisions happen later, and why didn't the leadership of the revolution preserve its unity?

[Answer] The launching point [of the revolution] comprised a minority, and this minority was characterized by several weaknesses. First, it did not have enough time to shape itself in a completely revolutionary fashion. None of the bases and principles that had been formulated prior to the first of November was sufficient.

Second, the fighters were encountering considerable difficulty in forming a political agency along with being revolutionaries. Ninety percent of the Algerian people participated in the revolution. But this was not the situation of the political organization--the front which represented all the people.

When the Soummam Conference took place, the front was responsive. It was unfortunate that this conference asked all the other agencies on the scene, such as the group of Ferhat 'Abbas and the Association of Ulema to join it, but it did not have a unifying theory.

Most of those who fought the war in Algeria died. The rest left the country to proclaim their ideas, but those who remained inside the country worked hard.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Among the [revolution's] other weaknesses are the struggles over power. Independence faced all these problems. When the country got its independence, more than 1 million persons had lost their lives and more than two and a half million persons were in prison and in camps. The problems which the country faced were difficult problems. It did not have a stable administration, and there was no established course.

The only organized force at that time was the border force. This is what is being written today in the Newspaper, EL MOUDJAHID. Weapons shaped the force that contemplated power. Slogans controlled the situation, but there was no political organization.

The Border Army Rules

[Question] Does this mean that the border army has been ruling Algeria since independence?

[Answer] One of the fighters compared the crisis of coming into power in 1962 to an elephant with a head the size of a pin. The Evian Agreements between the provisional government and France were mysterious. The sovereign power was divided as it came into the country: one part was in Algiers and another was in Tlemcen. Colonialism took maximum advantage of these disturbed conditions. It withdrew from the country, carrying with it all state archives including papers and accounts. It took advantage of the fact that there was no sovereign power and of the fact that power had not been transferred in a normal and orderly fashion.

Algeria won the war, but it lost the peace.

[Question] But don't you think that regardless of its identity, the leadership did pursue a course that was politically progressive?

[Answer] It is the border army that rules; the rest is political cover. They took three of the five leaders whom France had kidnapped and imprisoned.

All those who have not been in agreement with the government ever since that time were called all kinds of names, the simplest of which was that of traitor. Algeria has the disease of slogans.

[Question] What were the effects of that on the popular level?

[Answer] Today, there are two standards in Algeria: there is socialism without a foundation, and there are people who are poor on the one hand, and a leadership that has enriched itself, on the other. I have often asked myself, "Did Boumedienne have a history of struggle?" I believe he does not.

The dispute over power arose on the anniversary of independence in August 1962. Was it possible for us to go along with obscure forces whose principles and features were not clear? There was a bourgeoisie constituency in the provisional government, and we called for a meeting for clarification.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Boumedienne objected and said, "No. The government comes first." There were 15,000 fighters in the front at that time. They constituted a minority in relation to the people. From this minority another minority emerged to confront the leadership. [Certain] objective difficulties and circumstances were responsible for these excesses.

#### Charters Were Written in Offices

[Question] The present Algerian regime has adopted the 1976 Charter as its constitution. It is known that this national charter was subjected to broad popular discussions and was accepted by the people.

[Answer] The charter does not express anything. There was a series of charters before it. The upshot of the matter is that a group of intellectuals was brought together and placed in an office to write this charter. The charter is merely a written work that will join other written works which preceded it.

The deliberations over the charter remind me of an anecdote that used to be told during the days of the Algeria Charter. One person called for the boycott of the elections, and when he was asked why he was doing so, he said, "I read the charter; it has useful things and useless things. If I said yes to the charter, I would be accepting the useless things; and if I said no I would be refusing the useful things."

[Question] But those who visited Algeria during that period noticed that there was relative freedom to criticize [the government] and to speak.

[Answer] The regime became fearful of this phenomenon and tried to prevent people from speaking their minds. There were successive strikes immediately after the discussions about the charter, and the workers asked for a wage increase.

There is another frightening phenomenon, and that is the deterioration of political and social morals. Everyone who did not support the writings and the slogans of the government was considered an instigator and an enemy. Everything that came from outside the regime was viewed in advance as hostile and was confronted with hostility, rejection and accusation.

[Question] Are you thinking of going back to Algeria? What are your personal conditions for going back?

[Answer] As far as I am concerned, the basic conditions that we are proposing are, first, the freedom to move about, the freedom to discuss matters with Algerians and the freedom to organize--to organize the party.

[Question] Are there court sentences against you?

[Answer] In 1964 Ben Bella sentenced me to death.

18-19

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Ben Bella Is Wonderful, but...

[Question] By the way, what do you think of Ben Bella?

[Answer] Ben Bella is a wonderful person when one is alone with him. But as soon as he is in the presence of more than two people, his conduct is changed completely, and he immediately begins to talk like a leader with a major propensity for power and leadership.

[Question] What do you think about current political activities in Algeria?

[Answer] The media is being monopolized in Algeria. Everything is official and the PAGES Group, that is, the Socialist Vanguard Party which functions through the Liberation Front, includes former communists and may be found in some organizations and institutions--the Youth Alliance and the Agricultural Revolution--is practicing political terrorism and creating a difficult situation.

[Question] How do you explain the good relations that exist between the French left and the Algerian regime?

[Answer] The French left is playing the game. Take, for example, Marchais's repeated visits to Algeria. We discovered that there was a plan to cooperate with Algeria. This plan was drawn up by the French left prior to the former French parliamentary elections. The plan would have been implemented in case the French left had won the elections. This plan, which was revealed after the left failed to win the elections, was in reality a new colonialist plot to gain control over Algeria's capabilities.

[Question] What then is the role of your organization, the Socialist Revolutionary Party?

[Answer] It is unfortunate that opportunities for dialogue were broader during the days of the occupation. Dialogue [then] was more meaningful. At the present time we are the only political organization that has an organizational base. We have existing structures, and we are, therefore, calling on others to organize and to debate. Every one of our chapters is financially independent. This allows us to exist in different sectors.

[Question] Finally, you are one of the leaders of the first of November [Revolution], and you are living in Morocco. What is your opinion of the Sahara problem?

[Answer] What is happening today is harmful to both countries and is totally inconsistent with the notion of a united Arab Maghreb. Such tension which is in existence [today] serves the interests of no one.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI

8592  
CSO: 4402

20

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

PROGRESS OF CLEANUP CAMPAIGN REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 pp 2807, 2808

[Text] In launching the campaign against "social ills" in early September, the president of the Algerian Republic, the FLN and the government apparently intended to revive that revolutionary enthusiasm so often invoked but actually neutralized by a whole series of factors: the people hardly believed in it any longer, the party no longer had any impact, too many government officials were passive or negligent and authorities reacted only with isolated and poorly coordinated efforts. President Chadli Bendjedid's merit is having understood that the Algerian people were vaguely waiting for something to happen and that if authorities energetically plunged into it together, the people would join in that initiative.

In this campaign against "all forms of negligence, bad behavior and waste," unity of action has been achieved among party organs, the administration, the police, the courts and elected officials. Every citizen immediately understood the hope which an effective cleanup would produce and that the economic and social ills from which he suffers, shortages, waste, bureaucracy, corruption, lack of good citizenship, could be eliminated if he did his part. For "those who jeopardize the Revolution ... who hinder the development effort ... who scoff at the principles of the Revolution and its options ... those responsible for waste ... parasites ... " must be punished "at whatever level of responsibility they are found." But information media immediately stressed individual responsibilities: "Everyone must become aware of his shortcomings and strive to eliminate them ... Everyone must do his job properly" (EL MOUDJAHID, 6 September 1979). In fact, the youth of the capital, stimulated by mass organizations, immediately lent their assistance, particularly in removing trash and cleaning.

It was the party coordinator, Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, who pointed out for the Algerian Press Service (8 September) that this operation, which "is neither improvised nor temporary," is in keeping with the public will to "decisively and equitably put an end to all forms of delinquency," but requires "a self-critical spirit ... impartiality ... and great inspiration." The operation is aimed at "respect for order and moral principles ... Once all social structures have been unified: from the family to the school, to the mosque, to the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

enterprise, to the party cell, to information and communications media, we will then be able to isolate fringe elements, for it is better to prevent than to cure."

Recalling this verse of the Koran: "God will not change the situation of a people unless they change themselves," and maintaining that "Islam is the first religion which called for agreement between faith and action," Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui completed his statements by referring to the Arab-Islamic heritage and to Algerian social traditions, the sources of the Revolution's moral values. "All precepts of Islam," he explained, "encourage cleanliness; even acts of piety require cleanliness for the mind, for the body and for the environment ... In our current terminology, corollaries of a person's responsibility to his neighbor, which Islam considers important, are freedom, responsibility, civic duty and limits to individual rights."

Launched in Algiers, the cleanup operation was extended to Oran and Constantine several days later and by early October it involved every community of any consequence in the country. The initial enthusiasm continued with particular ease as positive results became immediately apparent. The transformation of the urban landscape was striking almost everywhere: clean sidewalks and fronts of buildings, removal of garbage and refuse, disappearance of vagrants, illegal street vendors, those with time on their hands, etc., improvement of the flow of traffic. New buses put into service in Algiers coincided very timely with the removal of vehicles from illegal parking places.

#### New Problems Caused by Cleanup Effort

However, the effort could be effectively continued only if people's zeal did not diminish and if material resources were available. With regard to the first point, the authoritarian framework was not enough; "Every citizen must actively participate in the management and control of public affairs" (EL MOUDJAHID editorial, 6 October). As for the second point, important financial efforts were announced, in particular by the municipality of Algiers; but needs were considerable and just when people were congratulating each other on the restored appearance of the famous Casbah, 16 houses on the verge of collapse had to be evacuated and emergency relocation had to be provided for 150 families ...

The educational and therefore edifying aspect of the cleanup operation was demanded by its organizers; but inspections were sometimes indiscreet and the repressive aspect immediately took on considerable importance. Household visits were made, especially in outlying districts and suburbs, and sometimes resulted in the hasty destruction of installations of a "shantytown" type on terraces and balconies, as well as the order to slaughter or remove sheep and poultry raised "in town." Checks were made to track down civil servants neglecting the office for the cafe and certain municipalities banned card games or dominoes in bars and drinking establishments during working hours.

After hunting down evidence of urban livestock breeding, actually terrible for sanitation and public peace, some people also advocated the elimination of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"underground industry," as in the Casbah of Algiers, which employs underpaid youth in deplorable sanitary conditions. All of that is certainly justified; but traditional life-styles and livelihoods are destroyed in the process and must definitely be replaced. A change in customs will also be essential for such changes to take root. Thus the cleanup, while being educational in itself, requires an additional educational effort. This is also a path to which Algeria is committed: the cleanup operation is only one episode that is more striking than others and must not be judged separately.

As the repressive aspect of the campaign aroused some Western press agencies, however, the public prosecutor and president of the Court of Algiers, Mr Hocine Ait Chalal and Mr Ahmed Medjihouba, held a press conference on 3 October. They pointed out that the courts had acted completely within the law, punishing only outright violations: theft, insalubrity, nonobservance of highway regulations, etc., and that no major incident was reported. From 6 to 30 September, 981 individuals were brought before the public prosecutor of Algiers and 452 of them were given sentences equal to or greater than 6 months in jail, 103 with lighter sentences; nine were acquitted and the others were released on bail. Nearly 70 percent of those sentenced to more than 6 months are recidivists, who will be punished by being banned from the capital; the sentences will be served on the esparto harvesting and reforestation sites of Saida and Tlemcen, respectively, in compliance with an ordinance of 12 February 1972 for the social rehabilitation of those concerned.

At certain times, however, the police appear to have acted so obviously according to traditional Moslem standards of the "Commandery of Good" that some people considered this to be evidence of righteousness; thus unwed couples were harassed to a slight extent. Referring to Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui's aforementioned statements, however, it will be noted that the authorities urged the application of Moslem faith and morals only very cautiously and moderately. And the tone of the appeal to workers, made on 8 September by the Algiers wilaya [governorate] chapter of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] was totally secular.

#### FLN Commissions in Full Swing

Paralleling the cleanup operation, the activities of national FLN commissions were stepped up: it was planned that the operations of several commissions would coincide with this operation, thus providing a framework for it.

In early September, the commission for social affairs organized among its subcommissions (moudjahidines and labor, health and sickness insurance, hygiene and living conditions, social action and social security), a series of 27 task forces covering areas as diverse as population and demography in relation to family policy, information and bureaucracy, social ills, immigration, purchasing power, wages and prices, etc. On 8 September in a plenary session, the social affairs commission heard a long report by Dr Mohamed Amir, its chairman and a member of the FLN Political Bureau, who boldly examined the most specific details and clearly stated a certain number of resolutions to be taken, methods to be selected and problems to be solved, and also without any fear of referring to Islam, which he looks at from a very modern angle.

23

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Dr Amir, among others, said that the commission must find out how to make the masses sensitive to problems of public hygiene and to establish the foundations for such a policy. During the years of formulating major legal texts, "a significant minority of profiteers, egotists, antisocial and uncivic elements, through their antinational, antisocialist and anti-Islamic action," covered the country with an unhealthy climate, from which everyone suffers by rejecting his responsibility to others. It would be necessary to stop mentioning a person's responsibility to his neighbor in order to plan his own individual participation: "if that were no longer in keeping with socialism and Islam ... What can be said," the speaker continued, "about illiteracy and feudal mentality, which are incompatible with the liberal spirit of Islam and the logic of socialism, and backward ideas from which women continue to suffer? About the idleness which prevails during the month of Ramadan, when people fight, traffic, speak and live only for food ... How is it possible to achieve true social justice when a distinction is no longer made between the city and the country, between men and women, and when nepotism is ignored? Social action consists of combatting material and cultural disparities and must bring about the disappearance of the welfare mentality from our society ... How is it possible to cover the shortage of 1 million dwellings and build another 2 million by returning to 1966 employment levels in 1990? How is it possible to eliminate slums and shantytowns, to provide sewers, water, electricity and gas for everyone, to establish a housing policy ... which must not just be based on the cost price of a square meter of construction?"

Meeting again 3 days later, the commission for education, training and culture gave its attention to illiteracy and Arabization, formulation of a policy for scientific research and a cultural policy, etc... Its draft resolution will be binding for the respective ministries when it has been adopted by the Central Committee and the FLN Political Bureau. Such action shows the extent of the responsibilities which the party intends to assume in formulating general policy and is reason for wondering about the role left for the National Popular Assembly.

The commissions for policy studies and formulation on one hand, and for economic affairs on the other, opened their proceedings on 18 and 20 September. Meeting under the chairmanship of an eminent former minister, Mr Belaid Abdesselam, 12 acting ministers, 11 of which were actually present, and about 120 other members, this commission set up eight subcommissions; it is considering the regulation of large fortunes, establishment of the limits of "nonexploitive ownership," acceleration of economic integration and the formulation of precise, complete evaluations before preparing the next plan. Mr Abdesselam stressed that the mission of this body, entirely different from a simple interministerial commission, is to use grass roots opinion as its primary reference and to give consideration to the daily problems of the masses. Since it is not a body which parallels government structures, it must clarify the party's decisions for the information of the masses and include the latter in discussions of economic affairs, so that the Central Committee will have a complete idea of problems and will be able to solve them definitively. "The party's entry into the country's economic management," EL MOUDJAHID concludes, "is a factor which in itself provides much hope" (23 September).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The commission for legal affairs and general organization, also chaired by a Political Bureau member who is not a member of the administration, was set up on 29 September. Its chairman, Mr Said Mazouzi, referred to the role of social transformation which the party is assuming, which implies "that the party is qualified to conceive, prepare and especially implement a policy in keeping with the revolutionary aspirations of the masses."

Meeting in turn on 4 October under the chairmanship of former minister Ahmed Bencherif, the Higher Council for Youth and Children includes, together with five ministers, the general secretary of the UNJA [National Union of Algerian Youth] and the general secretary of the UNFA [National Union of Algerian Women], who will be its reporter: Mrs Fatma Zohra Djeghroud, a Central Committee member, is thus being given a great responsibility. The council intends to be "a forum for young people." Like the commissions themselves, it is "a permanent structure of the Central Committee." One of its tasks could be, its chairman suggests, to formulate an ordinance providing for the liberation of Algerian women.

These activities of FLN commissions represent a unique feature of Algerian political life, which is seeking its own forms of democratic expression.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1979

11915  
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

## BRIEFS

OIL REPORT--The Algerian Press Service [APS] confirmed on 9 October that Algeria will export less crude oil next year in order to market more refined products. According to the APS, raising the capacity of the Hassi-Messaoud refinery and opening the In-Amenas refinery in southern Algeria, and particularly the opening of the Skikda refinery, will increase "production availabilities of refined products for export" next year (MTM [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS] of 12 October, p 2754). The APS recalled that the giant Skikda refinery--with an annual capacity of 15 million tons--will open in 1980 and will operate at 50-percent capacity that year. "This will enable SONATRACH," the agency stated, "to market more refined products than in the past, to the detriment of crude oil." "To provide its regular customers with a maximum of crude oil," the APS also stated, "SONATRACH had to prepare a strict plan, of which it informed its customers." The APS further stated that "erroneous interpretations" originating abroad, according to which SONATRACH wished to reserve certain quantities of crude oil for sale on the open market, have already been denied by the national company. Finally, with regard to condensate, the APS said that "it is planned that SONATRACH will practically double its exports in 1980 as a result of the impending opening of new processing units at Hassi R'Mel," where Algeria's main deposits of natural gas are located. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2816] 11915

REFORESTATION CAMPAIGN--The 1979-80 reforestation campaign was simultaneously opened in early October in the areas of the green dam, Mouilah (Djelfa wilaya [governorate]) and El-Bayadh (Saida wilaya), by colonels Mohamed Atailia and Kamal Abderrahim, Central Committee members and respectively in command of the 1st and 2nd military regions. This campaign, as pointed out in Algiers, is part of the continuation of the work started in 1974 by young people in the national service and the project of building the green dam, which is to cover an area of several million hectares. The green dam, a long-term project, is also part of the integrated development operation based on the need to protect the steppes against desert encroachment. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2816] 11915

ALGERIAN-SOVIET CONTRACT--An Algerian-Soviet contract amounting to 22.4 million dinars (nearly F23 million), and involving a study for establishment of a heavy electrical and mechanical equipment industry in Algeria, was signed in Algiers on 10 October. The contract was signed on behalf of Algeria by Mr Redha Amrani, assistant director of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, and on behalf of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the USSR by Mr Andre S. Slivinski, economic affairs adviser in the Soviet Embassy in Algiers, in the presence of the general secretary of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, Mr Mourad Castel. The amount of the contract will be totally financed by Soviet credits, in accordance with Algerian-Soviet economic and technical cooperation agreements. Under the terms of this contract, the Soviet Union has been commissioned to prepare a technical and economic report on the expediency, ways and means of providing Algeria with a heavy electrical and mechanical equipment industry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2917] 11915

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAQ

BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN ON THE DECLINE

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 8-14 Nov 79 pp 22-23

[Article by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's correspondent in Baghdad: "What Is Expected of Baghdad? And What Is Expected of Teheran?"]

[Text] The ayatollahs are greatly mistaken if they think that they can guarantee stability in Iran by exporting trouble to their neighbors.

Have Iraqi-Iranian relations become more tense in the course of the last few weeks? Yes, but what are the considerations which, in positive and negative terms, dominate Iraqi-Iranian relations? And in what way? And to what extent? And what are the bases on which it would be possible to build healthy, sound, normal relations between the two countries, regardless of the difference in their ruling regimes?

Once again Iraqi-Iranian relations are becoming tense and coming to a head. This is a direct result of the anarchy, confusion, and chaos which dominate Iran's foreign relations which are, in turn, the result of a real lack of political stability in this important country which shares with the Arabs the coastline of the Arabian Gulf.

It is clear that those who are running the new government in Iran have not possessed in the past, nor do they at the present time possess, experience and expertise as statesmen. Consequently they do not possess the [type of] wisdom, which officials acquire from this [experience], which teaches them that silence quite often is golden, whereas letting fly with words, haphazardly, not only leads merely to internal crises, but also to foreign crises which afflict relations with other countries.

At this stage Iran is by far the country which is most in need of being cautious--until some of the ayatollahs learn how to keep their tongues inside their mouths and reflect on what is happening to their country before casting their eyes to places beyond their own borders.

And as for Iraqi-Iranian relations, since the rise of the new Iranian regime at the beginning of this year these relations have passed through

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

fluctuating periods of instability, dominated by crises which have been reflected by reverberating and resounding declarations from the mouths of the ayatollahs. All of these [declarations], one way or another, have expressed views and aims which could not be described as showing any feelings of brotherhood in religion, [common] history, or wanting to be a good neighbor.

Iraq in particular is virtually at the head of the list of Arab countries, bordering on the Gulf, that suffered from the abuse and policy of the regime of the deposed Shah. And his hostile attitude toward the present nationalist regime in Iraq reached the point where he felt impelled to give virtually obvious backing to Barzani's rebels, hoping to wear down the material resources of Iraq, and [change] the direction of its young revolution. Plotting together with forces hostile to the Arab nation, he hoped to plunge [the revolution] into a state of psychological frustration. This was due to his opinion that [the revolution] was incapable of concluding, in its favor, the battle against the separatists. But the Iraqi revolution consolidated itself and took up the challenge which previous Iraqi regimes had been unable to confront. Then the Shah finally realized that he too had become a victim of his costly [war of] attrition, and that Iraqi determination to win the war was unequalled by anyone else's determination. So he yielded, and in Algeria in 1975 an agreement was arrived at which established principles which guided relations between the two countries and restructured them according to the priorities required by the circumstances--with all their positive and negative aspects--of that period in time. Iraq's primary aim therein was to express its good intentions and turn over a new leaf in its relations with Iran, regardless of the nature of the regime which existed in [Iran].

However Iraq was surprised, right after the rise of the present regime in Iran, by its negative attitude for which [Iraq] could not find a logical, reasonable explanation. Iraq preferred to observe a policy of wisdom and prudence, realizing--by virtue of its own well-established, firmly-rooted, durable political regime--the extent to which a new regime suffers from problems, contradictions, struggles, and negative phenomena.

But Iraq was not able to simply idly stand by when the negative and hostile declarations and statements, which were dripping with both open and concealed hatred for everything that is Arab, changed from being merely words into being encroachments upon the security of the Gulf under various pretexts.

Nevertheless Iraq preferred to be courteously patient, favoring efforts to quiet matters down, and even refrained from replying to the slander and provocation. Iraq never was the one who started trouble. Its reply was also as a reaction and it never struck the first blow, since it kept in mind all the considerations that served as ties between it and Iran. But when faced with [Iran's] ignoring its good intentions and throwing out accusations, by various means, against it, [Iraq], so to speak, reached the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

limit of its patience. Iraq today is not the Iraq of 1968, nor is it the Iraq of 1973, nor even the Iraq of 1975. This is sensed by political observers here. And everybody who is familiar with Iraq's conditions, situation, and its growth in its capabilities and potential, knows this.

If an observer wants to make a statement by using a comparison, [he will say that] Iran does not find itself today, nor would it find itself tomorrow, able to export its negative phenomena to Iraq or to influence the course of events there. This is due to the disintegration of internal conditions in Iran and the weakness of the new regime which actually did bring down the Shah's regime, but is still unable to serve as a positive substitute for it and to present itself to its neighbors as a factor of stability, stabilization, cooperation, and tolerance in the region.

Perhaps Iraq, due to its previous troubles with Iran, has a right to express its suspicion and alarm and has a right to adopt sound and clear attitudes which embody its will, feeling of independence, and staunch determination to confront every challenge with an even stronger reply. This is based on its belief in itself as an Arab nation and its desire to exercise sovereignty over its lands and to participate in building the future of its greater [Arab] homeland.

Therefore Iraq was not speaking haphazardly when it said that it may be forced to review everything which has a bearing on its relations with Iran. Perhaps even today the average Iraqi will consider that he has the right to sympathize with persecuted minorities which have been crushed within the framework of the "Empire" or [sympathize with] the nationalities of the "Iranian Empire." At the head of this list of minorities is an Arab minority, [the members of which] have been living practically as beggars while riches have been snatched right from under their feet.

And if this is the thinking today of the average Iraqi who is observing the course of events and losing his patience, then a visiting political observer or journalist could well imagine that similar feelings and considerations might have the upper hand in the emotions and logic of those who have the reins of power here.

Judging by the declarations and statements issued and attributed to authorized Iraqi diplomatic sources last week--all of which came as a surprise to Iraqis, to political circles, and maybe even surprised Iran--can it be said that the tenuous ties which bind Teheran and Baghdad are either about to be severed or [in fact] already have been completely cut?

The truth is that it is a mistake to think that Baghdad's political and diplomatic behavior, especially on the level of international relations, can be characterized as being of the rash nature which is dominant in the Iraqi temperament. Any observer here can sense that the regime is intent on calculating its moves and steps carefully, deliberately, with a high degree of objectivity, and on the basis of the national interest and national policy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

And for this reason it is also possible to say that the authorized statements issued--concerning the 1975 agreement, the three Arab islands that Iran has occupied since 1971 in the Strait of Hormuz, and also the cause of the Arab minority in Arabistan (Khuzistan)--have not been all, or even partly, spontaneous or merely probes or "balloons" which were released into the air.

If the Iraqi's hot-blooded nature is embodied precisely in such behavior, it is [also] embodied in honesty and purity which knows neither capriciousness nor fickleness. An Iraqi is candid about his love and his hatred. And he does not show the negative side of this equation, which dominates his behavior, unless he is provoked and pushed in that direction. The observer who reviews the positions [taken] and the sequence of events finds that Baghdad has always been in the position of being exposed to provocation on the part of the other side which thinks and imagines that the Iraqi house is made of glass, which will crack or break when one merely throws pebbles at it.

In spite of all of this, a political observer here feels that Iran, not Iraq--I repeat, not Iraq--is capable of doing a great deal in the way of eliminating all of the causes which have led to the recent disintegration in relations with its Arab neighbors, with Iraq, in particular, being at the head of this list.

Unless the new Iranian regime takes into account the fact that Iraq has an active role [to play], is of effective size, has a great deal of weight, has its distinctive viewpoint and also has moral and material interests in the Gulf--by virtue of the national, spiritual relations that bind it to its sister [Arab states] there and by virtue of the fact that the Gulf is also an artery for Iraqi oil which is exported to the world markets--then it will be difficult for relations to once again become what they were. In fact it is more accurate to say that it would be difficult to establish [relations] on any but these bases and principles which Iran must recognize, no matter who seizes the reins of power in Teheran, whether he be a shah or one of the ayatollahs from the religious establishment.

There remains another point. Perhaps a political observer here can address it on his own behalf and by virtue of his awareness of the nature of the circumstances and principles which govern policies [followed] in the region. This [point] is that it is better to spare the parties concerned with mediation and peacemaking efforts if they aim at achieving gains for those undertaking the efforts, or if they have in mind bargaining or expecting Iraq to bargain--that is, to bargain over any of its rights or principles of national sovereignty and point of view with regard to its national role and role in the Arab world, and especially with regard to its role in the Gulf.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI

9468

CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAQ

## BRIEFS

AID TO ZAMBIA--Baghdad--President Saddam Husayn's invitation to the African president, Kenneth Kaunda, to visit Iraq clearly reflects the course along which the Iraqi political leadership is proceeding in order to build fundamental and close relationships with the African countries. This is rooted in a firm belief that Africa is a basic ally of the Arab people. The bonds of friendship between the two presidents were strengthened during the summit conference of the non-allied nations in Havana a few months ago. Iraq's expanding interest in the black continent expresses its support for all of the African liberation movements and its desire to support Zambia's steadfastness and defense capabilities since it is one of the confrontation states which opposes the collapsing racist regime in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. In an effort to contribute toward strengthening Zambia's economy and growth plans, a loan and aid agreement between the two countries was signed, according to which Iraq will offer Zambia a cash grant of 9 million dollars as well as a cash loan amounting to 30 million dollars. Iraq has revealed the fact that the Iraqi Fund for Foreign Development is prepared to assess the economic benefits of the development plans which Zambia is coming forward with in order to determine its share in the financing of those plans. The two countries have also decided to strive to set up joint projects. One important accomplishment of the visit is that the two sides have agreed to establish a joint bank, in [the activities of] which other friendly African nations will be invited to participate if both sides agree on their participation. Iraq has also decided to supply Zambia with crude oil, and an allotment of 150,000 metric tons will be delivered during the course of 1980. He [Kaunda] also praised the Havana summit conference, emphasized the right of the Palestinian people to recover all of their land and rights, and condemned the Camp David agreements. And the Zambian president praised the revolution in Iraq and President Saddam Husayn, saying: "The revolution is in safe hands. President Saddam Husayn is an extraordinary leader." [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22-28 Nov 79 p 17] 9468

CSO: 4802

32

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOROCCO

MARITIME TRANSPORT AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH FRANCE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3012

[Text] French Minister of Transport Joel Le Theule was in Rabat from 2 to 5 November. While there he signed a maritime transport agreement with Moroccan Minister of Commerce and Industry Azzeddine Guessous. The agreement provides that Morocco and France will share the activity equally on a strict basis of reciprocity. Le Theule said, "The basis for line traffic will be 40 percent for Morocco, 40 percent for France, and 20 percent for third parties--in other words, 50 percent for each of the two parties."

According to an AFP dispatch from Rabat, this agreement officially caps the arrangement agreed on last 28 September by the shipowners of the two countries concerning regular line traffic. The agreement, which was negotiated and initialed in May 1978, provided in particular for a harmonious development of maritime trade between the two countries and for balanced participation by their merchant fleets in that trade. But difficulties arose at the end of this summer with the implementation of Moroccan cabinet circulars providing that only Moroccan shipowners could carry the products listed on a special schedule--representing nearly 90 percent of the traffic--and requiring cargo declaration procedures considered difficult to comply with by French shipowners.

The dispatch emphasizes that the signing of the agreement comes only a few weeks after a reorganization of jurisdictions within the Rabat government that took the merchant marine away from the Ministry of Transportation and assigned it to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

During his visit, Le Theule met with Prime Minister Maati Bouabid and the ministers of equipment and transportation, who expressed to him their desire to see the development of bilateral cooperation, notably in the fields of fishing, port facilities, and technical assistance in connection with rail, road, and air transportation. Le Theule said that for that purpose, the two parties decided to set up special expert commissions "to work out the best ways of fostering bilateral cooperation in those fields."

During a press conference given in Rabat on 5 November shortly before his departure for Paris, Joel Le Theule confirmed that the France-Dunkerque

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

shipyards would deliver three phosphoric acid carriers to the Moroccan shipping firm of MARPHOCEAN [expansion unknown]. He said that those ships, "costing several hundred million French francs," represented 40,000 gross registered tons.

An agreement for the acquisition of those ships was signed last 24 October between the Dunkirk shipyard and MARPHOCEAN. Its financing was worked out at the conclusion of recent negotiations between the Moroccan Budget Department and departments in the French Ministry of Economy. Le Theule said, "This order is now definitely decided on in principle, and an option even remains open for the later purchase by the Moroccan shipping industry of additional ships of a larger kind before 3 March 1980."

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979

11798  
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOROCCO

MOROCCAN FOREIGN TRADE BANK REPORTS ON 1978 ACTIVITIES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 pp 3012-3013

[Text] Throughout 1978 the Moroccan economy felt the effects of the deteriorating economic situation. The government did its utmost to maintain the basic equilibriums by acting on the burden of public spending, the volume of imports, and the distribution of credit while also putting the 1978-1980 3-year plan into shape. That plan is centered on an annual growth rate of 4.9 percent in the gross domestic product, compared to 7.4 percent during the third plan.

Despite a temporary financial squeeze, the Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank recorded satisfactory activity and improving results.

The consolidated balance sheet as of 31 December 1978 (Morocco and the Paris agency) totaled 4.7 billion dirhams (an increase of 11.69 percent in Moroccan operations and of 166 percent for the Paris agency). In off balance sheet financing, commitments through the opening of confirmed and secured credits amounted to 4.1 billion dirhams.

At the end of December 1978, customer deposits totaled 2.2 billion dirhams (up 26.11 percent in Morocco over the end of 1977). On the opposite side, commitments in the form of bills, advances, and credits totaled 2.7 billion dirhams. The total in treasury bonds came to 0.7 billion dirhams.

Financial participations amounted to 104 million dirhams following subscriptions during the year to the Arab-European Bank, MAGHREBAIL [expansion unknown], and the National Economic Development Bank.

On the asset side, outstanding bills and claims were recorded at 43 million dirhams; a corresponding reserve was set up on the liability side of the balance sheet.

The Paris agency subscribed bond issues in Kuwaiti dinars at an exchange value of 23.6 million French francs (36.1 million as of 31 December 1978). The agency expanded its operations considerably, and its capital was increased to 10 million French francs.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

After deductions for amortization, reserves, and taxes, the consolidated profit came to 20.5 million dirhams (17.2 million for Morocco and 3.1 million for the Paris agency, with the Tangiers-free zone agency showing a net profit of 0.2 million dirhams).

The general meeting on 16 June 1979 distributed a dividend of 9 percent on capital of 70 million dirhams (increased during the year to 80 million by the incorporation of reserves). The consolidated balance sheet as of 31 December 1978 showed 55 million dirhams in reserves).

Attached to the bank's report are tables covering Morocco's foreign trade in 1978: the distribution of imports (12.4 billion dirhams) and exports (6.3 billion), a breakdown by trading area, a list of the main suppliers and customers, and a table showing the main products imported and exported.

Represented on the bank's board of directors are the Bank of Morocco, the Moroccan Treasury, and various public organizations (the National Economic Development Bank, the Deposit and Management Office, the Moroccan Phosphates Office, the Marketing and Export Office, the National Tea and Sugar Office, and the Maghreb Credit Finance Company), as well as several important Moroccan individuals.

El Hadj Abdelmadid Bengelloun is now chairman and general manager of the bank.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979

11798  
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOROCCO

SITUATION IN MAJOR INDUSTRIAL, TRADE SECTORS REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 pp 3200-3201

[Text] The CGEM (Moroccan General Economic Federation) held its first monthly meeting of the new season at the start of August. The meeting was held in Casablanca under the chairmanship of Mohamed Amor. As is traditional, this first meeting was devoted to a debate on the economic situation. The company heads and representatives of the various professional associations turned their attention to the general development of the economy in 1979 and to developments in the major industrial and trade sectors.

In view of the effects of the Saharan war and the repercussions of the austerity policy--a policy made worse by the measures adopted since June 1978--the Moroccan businessmen expressed their willingness to assume the responsibilities incumbent on them as a result of the lower level of activity and the difficulties of the moment, notably those resulting from the decline in government purchases and the reorganization of certain financial and commercial operations, such as those concerned with credit and imports.

In its report on this businessmen's meeting, CEDIES (the organ of the CGEM) sums up developments in the major sectors of industrial and trade activity. That part of the document is reprinted here in full.

Public Works and Construction

The characteristic factor in this sector is the circumstance that three-fourths of its turnover in recent years has come from the state. During the last 5-year plan (1973-1977), the firms in this sector invested heavily in order to satisfy the considerable volume of government orders. But since 1978 those orders have been sharply reduced, with the consequence that the firms involved have been placed in a difficult situation.

37

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The effects of that change in government policy were not actually sharply felt until 1979, since in 1978 the firms managed to operate more or less satisfactorily thanks to jobs under completion.

In view of this situation, the public works sector finds itself facing a certain number of constraints, mainly the following:

1. The need to provide a minimum guarantee by the state in operations that the firms might undertake abroad (notably in black Africa and the Middle East), considering that in such cases the formulas for revising contracts as a result of price changes are not recognized everywhere.
2. The need to permit those firms to apply the declining-balance method in depreciating the heavy equipment they have accumulated and to grant tax exemptions under the Investment Code as is done for other exporting firms.

#### Mining Industry

Since the difficult years of 1975 and 1976, the situation in the mining industry has gradually improved for almost all ores with the exception of zinc, iron, and copper.

Even so, mining remains excluded from most of the opportunities and inducements made available to other industries. Moreover, the latest budget amendment burdened it with an ad valorem tax of up to 10 percent on exports. That levy takes into account neither the financial equilibrium of the firms nor their prospects, considering the highly uncertain prices on the world market.

In such conditions, although the situation in mining is not bad overall, its future prospects depend to some extent on adequate recognition of the realities characterizing it.

#### Trade and Services

The first half of 1979 is seen by the professionals as a transitional period between the satisfactory developments of the preceding years and the situation that has developed parallel with the difficulties experienced by the other sectors of industrial activity. One of the main causes of concern expressed in this connection involves the latest measures limiting imports, since those measures have further aggravated the situation caused by those adopted in June 1978.

The problem here lies not only in the absence of dialog between the administration and the importers, but also in the generalized application of decisions directly harmful to the carrying on of industrial activities, one example being the extension of restrictions on spare parts to include the basic semifinished materials needed by industry.

Moreover, the new regulations do not give adequate recognition to operations currently underway and do not allow for the necessary flexibility in their

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

application. This concerns notably the period of validity of operations extending beyond 31 December 1979 and the commitments to be assumed beyond that date in order to avoid any break in supplies at the start of 1980.

The trade sector is also faced with a certain number of anomalies in the distribution channels. These are due in part to the practices of some manufacturers, who do not market their products through normal channels, and in part to the growth of parallel markets that escape regulation and thereby counteract the beneficial effect of incentives to the substitution industry.

In every case there is an almost general decline in the volume of business in this sector, as can be seen in the drop in the vehicle market (a drop of 20 percent in the case of passenger vehicles and of 40 percent in the case of utility vehicles) and in the farm equipment market (of from 25 to 50 percent, depending on the kind of equipment).

#### Industrial Sector

As far as the industrial sector is concerned, activities are developing differently depending on the branch of industry involved.

In the case of the mechanical, metal, and electrical industries, import restrictions have had beneficial effects on household equipment goods. In the area of heavy industrial equipment, on the other hand, the drop in state investments has had such a severe effect on structural and boilermaking activities that layoffs have occurred.

Concerning this branch, the possibilities for steady growth do exist, considering the country's need for those products. At present only 11 percent of the total demand is met by national industry.

Sizable projects are planned, but they are a long time in coming (notably in the sugar and phosphate industries), with the result that local industry is in danger of being caught unprepared when they do start up.

To that must be added the general problem in relation to the law on industrial integration and equalization--which has not yet been passed--and the cash problems resulting from delayed payments by government offices and departments.

As far as the electrical industry is concerned, orders have declined by 10 percent in comparison with 1978, and the prospects for 1980 seem to give grounds for concern.

As far as metal packaging is concerned, activity seems to be tied mainly to developments in the production and exporting of canned goods. It is feeling the effect of weather conditions, which are affecting farm production (the apricot crop was 50 percent below that of 1978), and also of the uncertain conditions in fishing and the marketing of canned fish.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Lastly, there is the food industry. Sugar consumption should remain at last year's level, while the soft drink industry seems to be experiencing a sudden standstill in consumption after a long period of growth (up to 40 percent annually). This is apparently in keeping with developments in consumer purchasing power.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979

11798  
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

MOROCCO-IRAQ SHIPPING LINE--Beginning this November, two merchant ships--one Moroccan and the other Iraqi--will provide regular service between Morocco and Iraq at the rate of one round trip in one month by the first ship and one round trip the following month by the second. This decision, which is intended to strengthen cooperation between Rabat and Baghdad in the field of maritime transport, was reached during the talks held in Rabat at the end of October by an Iraqi delegation headed by Mohsan Abdelali, president of the Iraqi General Maritime Transport Company, and officials of the Moroccan Ministry of Transportation. A protocol of agreement to that effect was signed by the two parties. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3012] 11798

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WESTERN SAHARA

OHOUH 'MOROCCO'S MOST AMBITIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST POLISARIO'

London NEW AFRICAN in English Dec 79 pp 15-17

[Article by M. Mlamali Adam]

[Text]

ENDICOTT House is a villa on the outskirts of Boston, US. Although it was the scene of a hard-fought battle a mere decade ago, it bears no scars because the battle was simulated. At the time the unarmed conflict interested only war games enthusiasts. It has since captured the curiosity of people outside the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under whose aegis the battle was joined. The reason is clear. The simulated clash of December, 1968 now looks more and more likely actually to happen.

The list of players who took part in the war game between Algeria and Morocco was impressive. It included the director of Fletcher School of International Law and Diplomacy, who acted as the US President;

the US Aviation Under-Secretary, who took on the role of the late President Boumedienne; and a career diplomat played King Hassan of Morocco. Experts on armaments and specialists in European, Middle Eastern and Soviet affairs manned the supporting cast.

The "war" was projected for July, 1970. It was nursed along by calculated leaks about the internal affairs of the two countries, provocateurs were deployed and a press campaign inspired: all with the purpose of raising tension between Morocco and Algeria until it triggered open war.

The cause then, as now, was the Western Sahara, and there are those who argue that even the CIA leak about Hassan's tottering throne is a re-run of the Endicott House "take" of 1968.

Eleven years later, however, the Endicott House war game still looks durable. Admittedly it failed to predict the change of leadership in one key country, Algeria. But that is a minor drawback. Chadli Benjedid, who succeeded Boumedienne, is committed to the same policies concerning the Western Sahara as his predecessor. Conceivably this has dismayed King Hassan of Morocco who let himself believe that Algeria's hard line on the Sahara was of Boumedienne's own making.

### Interview

In a recent interview Benjedid said, far from being a personal decision, Algeria's attitude on the Sahara was the collective will of the Revolutionary Council and he took no more part in forming it than other council members. Benjedid went on to warn that when a war between the two fraternal countries breaks out it will be an ill wind that blows nobody any good; it would not stop at the borders of Algeria and Morocco but would engulf all countries bordering on the Mediterranean.

The new Algerian President, however, dismissed out of court the need for mediation with Morocco. He argued that his country is not fighting with Morocco over the Sahara but only differs with it on its appreciation of the movement of the Sahrawi people and their right to self-determination. It is a principle that Algeria holds dear and on which it cannot compromise. In the clearest statement of policy yet, Benjedid left the door open for summit talks with Morocco on one

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

condition: "The question of Sahara cannot be the subject of discussion between us behind the backs of the Sahrawi people and their front."

### Anniversary

Speaking on the fourth anniversary of the Green March which laid a physical claim to Western Sahara, King Hassan countered this rebuff with the retort that Morocco would never forego "its Sahara." Neither in his lifetime nor in that of his successor would the Sahrawi people be allowed to set foot in the Sahara or to gain a foothold in it. The King deplored the blood that continues to be shed, the resources that are being laid waste, and the opportunities that have been lost.

Observers have taken this to refer to the projected meetings between him and Boumedienne which fell through. A year before Boumedienne's death, King Hassan managed to make contact with him. The purpose was to find a negotiated solution on Sahara. Hassan entrusted the handling of the preliminary talks to his sister, Princess Aicha, and she met Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim in Lausanne in December, 1977. Ibrahim was Boumedienne's personal adviser at the time. Princess Aicha was later relieved by Redha Guedira, the King's adviser.

### Advisers

The two advisers met seven times in the first quarter of 1978, drafted a working document on the creation of the Sahrawi state. A *rendezvous* was fixed for the two heads of state in Belgium on July 6. Boumedienne was said to have been ready to keep the appointment, but Hassan showed little enthusiasm. On July 10, Ould Daddah was toppled. The Algerians suspected that the *coup* was Rabat-inspired and thereafter spurned Morocco's approaches. Another event intervened that rammed home the bolt on the door to negotiations even further: Algeria's and Morocco's conflicting stands towards the Camp David accords signed by President Sadat.

While Hassan sympathised with these, they displeased Boumedienne. He rejected them because they fell short of Palestinian demands. Algeria joined the rejectionist states and this in turn caused the secret meeting, scheduled for Paris, to fall through. Reports emanating from Algeria at the time either denied the idea of the meeting altogether or sought to explain it away on the grounds of Boumedienne's ill-health.

### Rendezvous

There was another unkept *rendezvous*. This came during the 16th OAU summit in Monrovia. Hassan let it be known that he would turn up for the summit if Benjedid did. The unspoken hope was that the two would meet and sort things out. Benjedid did turn up, while Hassan left people guessing until the last minute when it was announced that he was going to stay away. Observers concluded that the OAU's Committee of Wise Men, which unequivocally pronounced in favour of self-determination, kept the King at home.

That view was reinforced last month by the United Nations Committee on Decolonisation. By a vote of 83 in favour, five against and 43 abstaining, the committee adopted a resolution "re-affirming the inalienable right of the people of the Western Sahara to self-determination and independence." For the first time, the committee called upon Morocco to end its occupation of the Western Sahara. Saudi Arabia, whose offer of mediation failed to take off earlier this year, and Zaire which is considerably indebted to Hassan, sided with Morocco. Gabon and Guatemala also joined Morocco in rejecting the resolution. Senegal's abstention, however, may have chilled Morocco, for it has all along been the King's staunchest supporter.

areas. POLISARIO guerrillas, said a highly placed Moroccan officer recently, boast "Stalin organs" with a range of 20 kms. These hold more than their own against Morocco's American 105mm howitzers whose range is 5kms less. Guerrillas, too, feel more confident with 14.5mm machine guns against the Moroccan's 12.5mm guns.

Added to this is the fact that the Moroccan army is just not trained for guerrilla combat. Furthermore, there is the whole question of too many demands competing for scarce resources. For the fact is Morocco is fighting one war as it prepares for another. It is engaging the guerrillas now but must also reckon with a potential war with Algeria at a time when, according to Finance Minister Abdelkamel Reghaye, 45% of the country's budget goes on war.

The hopes that rest on the success of "Operation Ouhoud" could founder for another reason: the difficulties inherent in combing such a vast desert. It is 200,000 sq.km, 270,000 km if Tiris al-Gharbiya is included. It is largely with this in mind that Morocco has contented itself with fortifying urban centres which then become easier to defend. Girt with security belts these include Saguiet El-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Hamra which in the past was surrounded by woods and escarpments ideal for guerrilla hide-outs. Others are the port of El-Aaioun, Guelta and Boudjour. The most important is Smara, the third key town in the Sahara. It is 150km east of El Aaioun and 250km from the Algerian border. Smara is also regarded as a holy city having been set up by a famous *marabout*, Mohamed Mostafa, well-known to many as Maael Ainin.

### Key element

Otherwise, Morocco's key element in protecting the towns is a shock group consisting of 300 men who are highly mobile and armed with light and heavy machine guns. They, too, like the guerrillas traverse the desert in Spanish Santana vehicles, Toyota and French jeeps. Their morale is high. This should gratify Col. Abrouk, the commander of Moroccan troops in Western Sahara, for having introduced the idea. That is probably why garrison soldiers in some areas have now received orders to leave their posts in pursuit of the enemy. But now that the towns are less easy to attack, POLISARIO guerrillas are turning their attention to villages. Here the ingenuity of Morocco's *Forces Armees Royales* is being tested.

It cannot afford to slap *cordons de securite* on every village and hamlet, but nor can it afford to see the POLISARIO in uncontested control of them. In June this year POLISARIO launched a severe attack on the tiny locality of Assa in Goulimine region. The purpose of the operation was to alienate the ethnic group of Ait-Oussa from the King and rally them to the side of the POLISARIO. It had the opposite effect. The attack having ended, the villagers sought audience with Hassan and demanded weapons so that at least they could defend themselves. They got them, along with rudimentary training. It is conceivable that Assa may have laid a pattern for the future. However, a curfew is still in force in Goulimine six months after the event, with Moroccans unwilling to take chances.

The war has taken its toll elsewhere. Land routes are avoided as much as possible which means work for the sea-route between Agadir and El-Aaioun. Helicopters and C-130 transport planes as well as Pumas are used for civilian purposes, especially between El-Aaioun and Boudjour. When lorries are used, then

their numbers are vastly increased and they are placed under heavy guard.

Operation "Ouhoud's" heaviest battle is likely to be fought in Ausert in ex-Tiris Gharbia and Ouarkizz, two solid POLISARIO bases. Situated on the south of Draa Valley, the Ouarkizz zone is a chain of mountains which cut from east to west. It has 10 paths all of which are controlled by the POLISARIO.

However, what finally compelled Morocco to launch "Ouhoud" is believed to be POLISARIO's attack on Smara. Five thousand guerrillas, operating in three columns, swooped on Smara on the night of October 6. Some accounts say that the roaring of their jeeps betrayed them and the garrison troops were set on the alert.

### Technique

However, the guerrillas deployed the draw-lure-and-ambush technique. As the first squad of POLISARIO approached it counted on bearing the brunt of resistance and got it. However, it made a tactical retreat drawing the pursuers to a reserve second group. This gave battle as it lured the pursuers further into an ambush. On withdrawal they changed roles.

Subsequently POLISARIO claimed that it left 1,269 dead, 1,200 injured and 65 taken hostage, while Morocco countered that POLISARIO lost 1,085 men, 195 vehicles out of 400 used in the operation. Morocco itself lost 121 dead or injured.

It was obviously a duel of *communiqûes* with each side trying to outbid the other. However, Morocco considered the operation important enough to call in Mirage F-1s which can carry 14 250kg bombs or 44 rockets or air-to-surface guided missiles.

Operation Smara was preceded in August by two attacks, one on Bir Anzarane where POLISARIO deployed 3,000 men and another on Lebouirate where it sent 5,000 men. Lebouirate is an advance post near the Zag fort. In June they attacked Tan-Tan. The target was the port which was nearing completion. There is no doubt that the guerrillas wanted to make a repeat performance of Zouerate when they seized a whole town in Mauritania, but they failed to reach their targets, despite the claims in their *communiqûes*.

It is the cumulative effect of these attacks that form the background to "Ouhoud." Morocco's first decisive attempt to contain and destroy POLISARIO guerrillas.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 IC Magazines Limited

CSO: 4420

44

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WESTERN SAHARA

ALGERIA: POLISARIO FRONT OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGES NEW MOROCCAN DIVISION

PA150040 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1530 GMT 14 Dec 79 PA

[Article by Manuel Somoza]

[Text] Algiers, 14 Dec (PL)--Bachir Mustafa Sayed, assistant secretary general of the Polisario Front, today charged that the Moroccan regime is preparing another special division for the war in the Western Sahara.

In his statement to PRENSA LATINA, Mustafa Sayed said this division--the second and last Rabat will be able to send to support the 50,000 men engaged in war in the Sahara--is quartered at the Bigrim base.

The purpose of the military mobilization is similar to the one started in October under the name of "Operation Ouhoud." It is to boost the fighting morale of the royal army which has been trying to annex the Sahara region since 1975, Mustafa Sayed said.

He added that the use of these units will be combined with a greater utilization of the air force which has been modernized by France and the United States through the sale of new fighters.

When the guerrilla's antiaircraft fire shot down the first Mirage (French) fighter, French pilots and technicians serving as advisers to King Hassan II affirmed that it was only a technical malfunction, he said.

However, now that the guerrillas have destroyed three Mirage planes and captured one pilot, Mustafa Sayed added, "I believe there will not be much doubt about our ability to challenge the enemy air force."

He reported that Rabat has been using U.S.-made F-5 Mirage planes [as received] and helicopters brought from El Aaiun, the capital of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR]. The fighting has been going on in southern [name indistinct] since November near the Zaak base.

"It is not only words when we say the Polisario Front is able to wage the liberation war inside Moroccan territory," he said before discussing the diplomatic achievements of the Saharan people.

45

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In referring to the meetings between Mohamed Abdelaziz, secretary general of the Polisario Front, and the presidents of Togo, Niger and Benin, Mustafa Sayed said Abdelaziz' African tour which ended yesterday was very productive.

He added that "the battle is almost 100 percent won, and it seems inevitable that the SDAR will become an OAU member before the next summit meeting of that organization."

He also praised the agreements reached at the meeting of the OAU special committee on the Saharan issue held recently. He noted that "Hassan II has demonstrated his total inability to find a political solution to the conflict."

He charged that U.S., French and Egyptian military aid to Rabat plays a decisive role in the Moroccan position.

Moreover, he praised the stand of the socialist community during the current sessions of the United Nations General Assembly.

He affirmed that the Polisario Front is and will be willing to work for a political solution to the conflict, "but the solution must be based on respect for Saharan territorial integrity and independence."

CSO: 4410

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY