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NO. 2064

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JPRS 74877

7 January 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2064

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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2064

### CONTENTS

PAGE

#### INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PNC Chairman Hopes for Dialog With United States  
(Khalid al-Fahum Interview; AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT AL-USBU' IYAH,  
16 Dec 79)..... 1

Briefs  
Joint Ventures With Arabs 4

#### ALGERIA

Oil Official Ait Laoussine Discusses Oil Pricing Problem  
(AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 4 Nov 79)..... 5

#### IRAN

Moslem People's Republic Party Arouses Hostility  
(Various sources, 11 Dec 79)..... 11

Statement by Qom Seminary  
Khalkhali Favors Banning, by Sadeq Khalkhali  
Reaction of Various Groups

Background Impressions of New Leaders Discussed  
(Bobo Scheutz; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 29 Nov 79)..... 17

Means To Counter U.S. Sanctions Aired  
(KEYHAN, 11 Dec 79)..... 22

Strategy of Possible U.S.-Iran Clash Discussed  
(Jesus Pavlo Tenorio; JUEVES DE EXCELSIOR, 6 Dec 79).... 24

Plan To End Unemployment Announced  
(KEYHAN, 18 Dec 79)..... 28

- a -

[III - NE & A - 121]

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
<b>IRAQ</b>	
Iraqi Position on Iranian Situation Analyzed (AL-HAWADITH, 23 Nov 79).....	30
New Oil Projects Inaugurated in Basrah, Wasit (Yahya Kamim al-Najjar; AL-THAWRAH, 18 Oct 79).....	34
Briefs	
Industrial Investments	39
IDCAS to Baghdad	39
Petrochemical Complex Completion	39
Naval Improvements Sought	40
<b>ISRAEL</b>	
Poll Indicates Begin's Popularity at Unprecedented Low (HA'ARETZ, 24 Dec 79).....	41
Arab Regimes Should Learn From Iran How To Fight America (Editorial; AL-SHA'B, 6 Nov 79).....	42
Arabs Must Take Care That Oil Weapon Is Not Turned Against Them (Editorial; AL-QUDS, 14 Nov 79).....	44
Arabs Must Take Hard Stand Against Reaction (Editorial; AL-SHA'B, 15 Nov 79).....	46
Defense Agency Plan for Settlements Viewed (Zeev Shiff; HA'ARETZ, 19 Oct 79).....	47
Major Development Activity Underway in Galilee (Judah Ariel; HA'ARETZ, 19 Oct 79).....	51
West Bank Students Seen Shortchanged in University Admission Exams (Editorial; AL-HISAD, Oct 79).....	55
Solution to Teachers' Salary Problems Proposed (Yitzhak Shneerson; HAZOFEH, 22 Oct 79).....	57
<b>JORDAN</b>	
Recent Bedouin Demonstrations Discussed (AL-HURRIYAH, 12 Nov 79).....	60

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
<b>LEBANON</b>	
Raymond Iddih Gives Views of Lebanese Situation (AL-DUSTUR, 12-18 Nov 79).....	65
Phalangist Party Reportedly Training Moslem Brothers (AL-HURRIYAH, 12 Nov 79).....	67
Fathi Yakan, Shaykh Majdhub Released by Syria, Interviewed (AL-ANWAR, 13, 21 Nov 79).....	68
Interview With Fathi Yakan Interview With Shaykh Majdhub	
Kurdish Party Official Released by Syrians (AL-NAHAR, 25 Nov 79).....	73
Members of Smuggling, Counterfeiting Ring Apprehended (AL-NAHAR, 28, 29 Nov 79).....	74
Results of Investigation Further Details	
Ihadin Massacre Suspect Sprung From Juniyah Prison (AL-NAHAR, 26, 28 Nov 79).....	76
Armed Attack on Prison 'Al-Maradah' Statement	
Briefs Phalangist Airport	78
<b>LIBYA</b>	
Analysis of the Libyan Revolution, Qadhdhafi's 'Green Book' (Charles Zorbigbe; LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Nov 79).....	79
<b>MAURITANIA</b>	
Country Said To Be Threatened With Famine (Moulaye Hachem; CHAAB, 6 Nov 79).....	83
Minister Assigns Priority to Water, Roads, Housing (CHAAB, 28-29 Nov 79).....	87
Briefs French Loan Agreements Signed	88
French Cooperation Agreement	88
National Educational System	89

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
SULTANATE OF OMAN	
Commercial and Economic Actions in 1979 Reviewed ( 'UMAN, 18 Nov 79).....	90
Oil and Mineral Development and Prospecting Reported ( 'UMAN, 18 Nov 79).....	92
Improvements Made in Water and Electricity Services ( 'UMAN, 18 Nov 79).....	95
Briefs	
Police Force	98
SYRIA	
Evaluation of Efforts To Stimulate Exports Urged (Salah 'Alwash Interview; AL-THAWRAH, 11 Nov 79).....	99
New Economic Vistas Projected (Husayn Ibrahim Interview; AL-BA'TH, 12 Nov 79).....	107



INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PNC CHAIRMAN HOPES FOR DIALOG WITH UNITED STATES

LD181507 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT AL-USBU' IYAH in Arabic 16 Dec 79  
pp 1, 2 LD

[Interview with Palestine National Council Chairman Khalid al-Fahum by  
AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT correspondent in Damascus--date not given]

[Text] Palestine National Council [PNC] Chairman Khalid al-Fahum has expressed the hope of initiating an objective and constructive dialog between the PLO and the U.S. administration without prior conditions. He said that the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories is a matter of life and death for the Palestinian people and that the Palestinians now have no choice but, through understanding with their Arab brothers, to use all the weapons, including the oil and economic weapon, to secure Israeli withdrawal.

In an exclusive statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, al-Fahum said: It is no secret that the PLO is seeking to obtain the support and backing of all the world countries for its just and legitimate demands, which are represented in the UN General Assembly resolutions confirming our people's right to return to their homeland and to establish their independent state on their national soil.

He added: Most unfortunately that official U.S. attitude toward the Middle East crisis was never even-handed. The U.S. political, economic and military support as well as the total U.S. bias in favor of the Israeli side has been clear since 1948.

He said: We are making efforts and seeking to establish a constructive dialog with the U.S. administration, but that administration has so far set conditions that we cannot accept. The first of these conditions for initiating a dialog is that the PLO accept Resolution 242. The PLO has already stressed that it is impossible to accept this condition because it would mean the end of the PLO as the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people. The resolution in question refers to the Palestinian

people and the PLO only from a humanitarian aspect, which means that it does not recognize any political rights for our people in their own country and on their own soil.

The second condition that the United States lays down for initiating a dialog with the PLO is that it recognize Israel when Israel, through the Knesset and the government, declares that it will not recognize the PLO or the Palestinian people's rights as provided for by the UN resolutions even if the PLO does recognize Israel.

Therefore, al-Fahum said: "We hope to establish an objective and constructive dialog with the U.S. administration without prior conditions, particularly since it is clearer than ever that the U.S. administration committed a major mistake by adopting the self-rule agreement and signing such an agreement with al-Sadat in the absence of the Palestinian people and the PLO, their legitimate representative."

He added: "Europe has more and more begun to realize the danger stemming from the continued conflict in the Middle East and the fact that this danger cannot end without a just solution to the crucial element in the conflict, namely the Palestinian problem. Considerable sectors of the U.S. public opinion have also begun to be aware of this fact."

Al-Fahum expressed the hope that European and world opinion, which is increasingly understanding the Palestinian people's rights, would influence the U.S. administration to adopt a better-balanced and more objective attitude to the Middle East.

Asked if he could foresee a better future with the United States sooner or later, al-Fahum said: "The road to the United States is still blocked. But the continued Palestinian struggle, the bolstering of Arab solidarity, the isolation of al-Sadat, the thwarting of the Camp David agreements and the greater understanding of the justice of our cause in Europe and among various circles in the United States itself as well as U.S. concern for its own interests could all be factors which contribute to initiating an earnest and objective dialog between the PLO and the U.S. administration."

He added: "I do not think that the dialog will begin soon, because it will take the United States some time to realize, in the light of its own interests, that there is a need for dialog with the PLO and for recognizing our people's right to establish a state of their own, and to stop offering unlimited and unconditional aid to Israel so that it curbs its expansionist ambitions which the Camp David agreements escalated further. We hear and feel daily the Israeli leaders' insistence on building settlements on our land and persecuting our people. The arrest of the most senior elected mayor and the attempts to expel him from the country are but part of the clear picture of Israeli ambitions in our occupied territories."

He added: "Unfortunately, the U.S. administration and al-Sadat signed the Camp David agreements and, as a result, the enemy thought that the West Bank and Gaza had been sold to him in return for his withdrawal from Sinai."

[LD181509] Replying to a question on the possibility of using the oil weapon again if necessary, al-Fahum said: "Our people's struggle, which is supported by the Arab nation and the socialist and friendly states, will continue and will redouble. We will certainly seek with our Arab brothers to utilize all the weapons available to us in order to speed the achievement of what we aspire to and what are known as the national and unalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Therefore it is natural that, through understanding with our Arab brothers, we should seek to use all the weapons available to us to achieve this. I am referring here to an important weapon in the battle, namely the oil and economic weapon."

He added: "We hope that the world and the United States will realize that we only want peace based on justice, that we refuse to surrender as provided for in the Camp David agreements and that, in resorting to all weapons, we do not intend to inflict damage or harm on anybody. We believe that the continued Israeli occupation of our Palestinian territories is a matter of life and death for us. Whoever sees Israeli expansionism, Zionist arrogance and the insistence on liquidating the Palestinian problem can only justify our stand on the need to resort to all weapons, first among them the oil and economic weapon."

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

JOINT VENTURES WITH ARABS--The Undersecretary of the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals for Planning Affairs and Development Mr. Subhi Yassin, who also chairs the Arab Company for Industrial Investments recently signed an agreement with an unnamed French company for feasibility and economic viability of 11 industrial projects to be carried out as joint ventures between Iraq and other Arab countries. The agreement was in the form of two contracts. The first covers 8 projects while the latter three are covered by the second contract. Iraq holds 16 per cent of the Arab Company for Industrial Investments shares. The company is capitalised at ID 150 million. Saudi Arabia holds 15 per cent of the capital; Libya holds 8 per cent and Kuwait 8 per cent. Syria and Jordan each holds 1 per cent. Contracts are underway for wider Arab participation in the company and other countries are expected to join soon. The Arab Company for Industrial Investment is an agency of the Council for Arab Economic Unity and its specialises in joint Arab ventures. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 31 Nov 79 p 13]

CSO: 4820

ALGERIA

OIL OFFICIAL AIT LAOUSSINE DISCUSSES OIL PRICING PROBLEM

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 4 Nov 79 pp 52, 53

[Article: "Algeria Proposes Three Solutions to the Energy Crisis; Ait Laoussine: Oil Prices Should Be Raised Gradually in Proportion to the Price of Alternative Energy"]

[Text] Iran and Libya have raised their prices, despite OPEC's agreement on a unified price. Is this the answer to inflation and the fluctuations in the currencies of the industrialized nations? The reply to this question has recently been provided by Nordine Ait Laoussine, former vice president of Algeria's oil and gas company, SONATRACH, who is presently an oil consultant in Algeria.

"Saudi Arabia can do nothing to prevent an oil price increase." So stated Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, on a recent occasion.

"The world is heading for a war in the Gulf region between the Soviet Union and the United States," said Mani' Sa'id al-'Utaybah, the UAE oil minister, who also added in a warning to the OAPEEC member states: "As current head of OAPEEC, I believe that member states cannot raise their prices beyond the ceiling without a unanimous decision."

Neither Saudi Arabia nor the chairman of OAPEEC is in a position of strength after Iran and Libya decided to raise the price of their oil beyond the ceiling OPEC has been observing for 6 months now to establish a unified position and a streamlined policy among its members.

As has been the custom before an impending meeting to determine prices, prices have begun to rise indiscriminately and wildly, and competitive bidding has reemerge: Libya demands a 50-percent increase in prices; Iran begins to sell at spot market prices, i.e., \$40 per barrel: Iraq finds itself at a crossroads: Whether to increase its prices or to continue the policy of rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and opt for freezing the present level of prices by reducing production.

According to OPEC circles, this latter course [to decrease production and freeze prices] is unacceptable because it would depress oil markets at a time when the fate of production in Iran is unknown. The freezing of prices would in turn cause an erosion in oil revenues. This year the purchase value-- that is, the real cost-- of a barrel of oil decreased by 5 percent. Freezing the prices would bring the decrease in real value to 10 percent. At any rate, it would be difficult to maintain the freeze for long, because the increased demand for cheap oil will inevitably jack prices up.

Who Can Provide the Answer?

The expected solution at the forthcoming OPEC meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, is for prices to be increased to \$30 per barrel. It is rumored, however, that the OPEC ministers will be called to an emergency meeting to deal with the disintegration of OPEC as a result of the indiscriminate price hikes.

The long-term solution, however, was provided by Nordine Ait Laoussine, the former vice president of Algeria's SONATRACH who is presently an oil consultant in Algeria, at the third annual seminar of OPEC experts, which met in Vienna from 3 to 5 October under the theme "OPEC and the Future of Energy Markets." The following is a summary of Ait Laoussine's paper:

The most important task facing the world today is the need to be exposed to new ideas and views relating to the changes in the oil markets, so as to avoid recurring oil supply crises. Two years ago, I came to the conclusion that prices should be raised over the long run to keep up with the cost of producing alternate sources of energy. This involved a dilemma, for while it is important to accept the fact that prices will have to increase, it is more important to know to what extent, with what speed, and in which direction these increases should occur.

I noted on an earlier occasion that prices can develop in one of two forms: we can have them follow the market forces--i.e. supply and demand--but then we will have no choice but to face a crisis; or, conversely, we can draw up a plan to increase prices through an agreement between producers and consumers to decrease oil supplies in the market. I believe it is not too late to do that.

I am in favor of the second option. I previously proposed a series of plans for a gradual increase in prices linked not only to inflation rates and currency fluctuations but also to a new factor--namely, the production cost of alternate sources of energy, effective the second half of 1980. This is why I proposed an annual rate of increase amounting to 5 percent. I argued that if we were to continue freezing prices at the level of \$12.70 per barrel (the so-called minimum price set before June 1978), this kind of shortsightedness would speed up the increase in demand and would eventually push prices up, with all the well-known implications and consequences.

This is exactly what happened. Looking back, we see that those who wanted to depend on the market as a means of determining demand and price carried the day at the OPEC meeting in Geneva in June 1978 and froze prices on the basis of the \$12.70 per barrel price level, despite high inflation rates and the depreciation of the dollar.

The upshot was that the profits earned by OPEC after the 1973-74 price hikes evaporated and the price of oil per barrel dwindled to only \$7, based on the 1974 value of the dollar; this is lower than the price demanded by the (World Energy Agency)--lower even than the price unsuccessfully demanded by the agency to encourage the development of additional sources of energy outside OPEC. Even the prices which have been based on the minimum price level to raise sales and prices have not been affected.

#### Popular Talk

The problem is that no one has talked about that issue at all. Naturally, talk about lowering prices is less popular than talk about increasing them.

With regard to the consumer nations, the situation was comfortable. With production of oil from the North Sea, Mexico, and Alaska, there was adequate supply at low prices--so much so, in fact, that oil tankers wasted a lot of time sitting in ports waiting for buyers. The balance of supply and demand tipped in favor of the consumer and determined the price of oil.

This situation gave rise to the predominance of the theory of allowing the law of supply and demand to determine prices, but the theory in question contributed little to the development of new sources of energy capable of meeting the needs of those nations in the long run. Why?

It has become customary to speak of market saturation but not of a crisis. Indeed, everyone dismissed the likelihood of a crisis before 1990. But when demand began to rise in the second half of 1978 as a result of the Iranian crisis and the decrease in the industrial states' oil reserves, and it became impossible as a result of the Iranian crisis to make up for the drop in the level of reserves, an oil crisis set in and prices began to spiral upward. And so within a year's time, the world was moving toward a severe crunch--a situation which could be endless.

Any disruption in the oil flow jacks prices up. Added to this, some OPEC nations began to show a preference for selling their oil on the spot market to get a higher return. In less than 6 months, prices shot up by some 60 percent, until the minimum price reached \$20. Official prices rose from \$13 in 1978 to \$20.50 in mid-1979. The increase was reminiscent of, and equal to, the 1973 and 1974 increase.

#### The Simple Law and the Game

The situation I have just recounted was the result of a simple law called the law of supply and demand, or what is also called market forces. Do we want this situation to continue? Do we want in the future to repeat this circular process of an apparent surplus leading to a demand crisis, which in turn leads to rising prices, and so forth and so on? If the answer is yes, then the real price (that is, the purchase value of a barrel of oil) will continue to go up and down indiscriminately and uncontrollably.

I believe that "the market" is no more than an expression of the balance of power between the producers and the consumers at any point in time. If it were up to the consumers, they would want to have large quantities of oil at low prices. If that is not enough, they will manipulate each other by means of the price system, exactly as if they were playing tug of war. In that game, were one of the players to slacken his efforts or lose his attention, he would lose ground.

This is the basic dilemma. A crunch is coming, and we can even begin to detect it. Official sources have been saying that the crunch is coming next year. This is not difficult to predict.

As I have said, prices rose by 60 percent in a very short period of time. The rise affected first the demand and then the reduced level of production in the industrial [as published] nations. This will lead to further complications which will develop later. It is well known that the complications created by the oil price increase in 1973 and 1974 and their effect on the Western and world economies did not begin to appear until 1975.

#### Outside OPEC

What will happen is that the increase in demand will be slow, contrary to expectations. Following the 1975 decrease, demand returned to its previous level and then began to rise annually at the rate of 4 percent. This year the increase will be 2 percent. Some observers expect demand to decrease next year by 65 million barrels a day. That is to say that world production, outside OPEC, of oil and liquefied gas would amount to 35 million barrels per day this year and 36 million next year. OPEC would produce 29.5 million barrels per day instead of 31.5 million.

Actually, despite the decrease in Iranian oil production, OPEC output increased by 7 percent this year. The oil produced by OPEC was not fully consumed, because part of it was used to build up reserves in the industrialized nations. Those nations have published statistics showing that their stockpiles allow them to enter 1980 with reserves far higher than last year's. The new reserves are placed at 4.5 billion barrels. If this level of reserves should decrease early, as usual, because of the industrialists' failure to



reduce their levels of consumption, then resupplying the reserves will be more difficult, because it is hard to tell what will happen in Iran and because OPEC can reduce its production to 27 million barrels per day in the first half of 1980.

What do we have to do to avoid a state of instability in the world oil markets? On the 12th or 18th of next month [December], the result of what the consumer and producing states have learned from past experience will appear. If we allow the market forces to operate and be the determining factor, then we know what the result will be: a decrease in demand will not come quickly because there are different prices; that is to say, consumers would be able to obtain oil. World prices will be affected until production decreases and forces a change in prices, this time in a different direction. The situation will go on and on.

We have not reached paradise yet. The progress we have made to link oil prices to the cost of producing alternate sources of energy is still far short of its goal. Freezing of prices will lead to a decrease in real prices, which will widen the gap between the price of oil and the cost of alternate energy, whose price will increase like any other commodity because of inflation.

Therefore I propose that we not seek a high increase in prices as a way of compensating for the decrease in surplus revenue, and that we should instead maintain the real prices of oil by raising them gradually, in addition to controlling production as a supportive factor.

There is a great desire among the producers to reduce production because they have earned high revenues after the increase in prices, but this desire will gradually abate once the prices are frozen and their revenues are eroded by inflation. Therefore I emphasize that a severe crunch in the oil market would become possible if OPEC maintained its present level of production in the present inflationary conditions, and that prices will affect the producing countries' desire to cut production. But if the producing countries were to maintain the level of real prices, there would be little likelihood that a crunch would occur. Everyone knows that if prices are frozen while the present level of production is maintained, revenues will dwindle quickly in the second quarter of 1980.

There are many who believe that the world is heading for an oil crisis. Most economists agree that the rise in oil prices is not responsible for the present crisis, but that the responsibility lies in the speed with which prices have risen.

I believe that the most important thing we can do to secure the world's long-term energy needs to have the consumer nations publicly accept the need for oil prices to increase and to draw up a phased program to increase prices gradually in proportion to the cost of producing alternate sources of energy for years to come. I therefore propose the following:

- 1) Put an end to sharp fluctuations in oil prices and production levels, and determine levels of production by agreement between producers and consumers on the basis of need.
- 2) Draw up a real reference detailing the cost of alternate sources of energy, in order to use it as a basis for setting down pricing levels for oil. The oil-rich countries should also link their production to their expenses.
- 3) Increase prices annually by 5 percent of the real price, which I think would be suitable for both producers and consumers.

Finally, the oil countries should not merely react to inflation, currency fluctuations, and a deterioration in the conditions of marketing oil. They should take the initiative.

9254  
CSO: 4402

IRAN

MOSLEM PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC PARTY AROUSES HOSTILITY

Statement by Qom Seminary

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 11 Dec 79 p 2

[Text] Greetings to you, the brave, hero and struggling people of Azerbaijan. Regards to you, the decisive and awake brothers and sisters who with firm determination, following your positive vote to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, you hit a heavy blow to the mouth of the criminal America and threw the anti-revolutionary trash who wanted to stain your reputation, out of the Islamic Republic Radio and Television center. You prevented bloodshed and thousands from suffering martyrdom. Everyday, America arranges new conspiracies in every part of the country. This time it has thought of making disturbances in Azerbaijan, unaware of the fact that our dear nation is far more awake and aware than being misled from its Islamic revolutionary direction with such conspiracies and scenes. The Qom Seminary greatly appreciates the awareness and assistance of you heroes under the leadership of the struggling clergy and wishes more success for the Islamic revolutionary goals and its protection. The seminary condemns the imperialist conspiracies in Qom and Tabriz and confirms the following points:

1. The brave people of Azerbaijan are expected to tighten their lines and maintain their unity of words, so that the anti-revolutionaries would not ever think of making conspiracies and plots in that dear territory.
2. The great Ayatollah Shari'atmadari has requested to properly interpret the issues and to banish those who change the realities, censor the news and put it at his disposal.
3. The Ayatollah has also requested to banish those who under the name of Moslem People's Republic Party relate themselves to him as well as to announce the party as an anti-Islamic revolutionary party, so that the stain would be cleaned from the clergy and beloved Islam.

Signed by 'Ali Meshgini, Naser Makarem Shirazi, Mohammad Mehdi Rabani, Mohammad Fazel, Hosseyn Rasti Kashani, Ahmad Janati, Seyyed Abbas Khatam Yazdi, Ahmad Azari Qomi, Mohammad Yazdi, Ali Ahmadi, Seyyed Hasan Taheri, Ja'far Hosseyni Karimi, Mohammad Ali Shar'i, Mehdi Hosseyni Rohani and Mohammad Mo'men, The Qom Seminary

Khalkhali Favors Banning

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 11 Dec 79 p 2

[Statement by Sadeq Khalkhali]

[Text] In connection with the daily events, Ayatollah Khalkhali issued the following statement:

In issue #15836 of ETELA'AT issued on Sunday 2 Ordibehesht 1358 [22 April 1979] I wrote an article against the Moslem People's Republic Party indicating that the religious authorities and sources do not have any differences but that there are some of the supporters of the banned Rastakhiz Party [the Resurgence Party of the People of Iran] and the shouters of "Javid Shah" [long live the shah] or the identified SAVAK agents who want to oppose the principle of the Islamic Republic by inclining towards Iran's Moslem People's Republic Party.

It is worthy of being mentioned that they want to achieve their "Satanic" goals even at the cost of ruining the reputation and destroying the clergy. Therefore, it should be reminded that the Ayatollahs should take the initiative as they did in the referendum and announced that they would vote for nothing but an Islamic Republic. They should announce that the goal is the same. That is, it is the Islamic Republic that everyone wants, so that those who seek excuses would find their treacherous plans futile and the differences would be solved and the nation would move forward with total unity to establish a new Islamic society in the Middle East. This was the most sensitive part of my article which inflamed the adventurers. We all saw that as soon as the article and various documents were published, sourceless news, possibly fabricated, were spread in Tabriz and everyone was shouting that Khalkhali should be executed. What were they saying and what was Khalkhali saying? Eight months ago Khalkhali was saying the same thing that today all religious authorities throughout Iran from the dear Azerbaijan and Tabriz to Rasht, Kerman, Jahrom, Mashad, Qom religious center, the high ranking teachers and the great religious authorities of Esfahan and Shiraz and the grand Ayatollahs and the top religious authorities in all areas ask for the banning of the adventurous party, the so-called Moslem People's Republic Party.

Why have the Sepahlanis, Saberis, and Rahmatollah Marghe'i Moqaddam, then the provincial governor of Eastern Azerbaijan, fled the great nation of Iran? The supporters of the Moslem People's Republic Party wanted to make demonstrations in the Azerbaijan mosque and close the bazaar in Tehran. Did not we see that the group had been set up by the members of SAVAK, Rastakhiz, the mace bearers and shouters of Javid Shah [long live the shah]? Why were some of our contemporaries in fear at that time and went aside and wrote articles against me? They should now come and see what schism that the Moslem People's Republic Party is causing and what unholy ties it has with the Forqan group and what an inseparable tie it has with the People's Fedayin. Now their faces have been identified and the brave and heroic

of Iran under the great leadership of the honorable religious source and powerful Imam has identified all those who have sold themselves and they will all be given a stiff answer as soon as possible.

"Wish the touchstone of experience were used so that the deceitful would lose their reputation."

Thank God that those who wanted to hide their ugly face under deceitful masks by using the names of the great religious sources such as the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari in order to do a great service to International Imperialism and Zionism engaged in a futile task, now they can no longer continue their deceitful plan. We should appreciate all the Islamic religious sources, the grand Ayatollahs and the great nation of Iran in condemning Iran's Moslem People's Republic Party.

We should call their name with respect so that those who have sold themselves could not act as supporters of Islam. I have a statement in this respect which will be published in the future.

#### Reaction of Various Groups

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Dec 79 p 11

[Text] Yesterday the religious authorities and clergy of Kermanshah sent a telegram to the gran Ayatollah Shari'atmadari in Qom expressing their anxiety of the news regarding plots against Islam, the Moslems and the Islamic country and asked him to make a prompt and serious decision for preventing such conspiracies.

A part of the telegram indicates: Now the people expect you to issue an order disbanding the Moslem People's Republic Party in which, unfortunately, the opposers of Islam and the agents of foreign reactionaries have penetrated and to evacuate government buildings which should be taken over by the Islamic government. Because of the existing conspiracies which are about to take place by foreigners it is necessary that the government exclusively handles the deposals and appointments in the province of Azerbaijan. Of course, the government will use your guidances and advice.

The struggling clergy of Abadan, Dezful and Shushtar also sent telegrams to the office of the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari. A part of the telegram sent from Abadan indicates: Most of the agents involved in the tragic event of Tabriz are from the Moslem People's Republic Party who unfortunately affiliate themselves to you. By taking this matter into consideration, the clergy of Abadan request that you issue an order for disbanding the party in order to maintain unity and fulfill the great Islamic revolution and neutralize the satanic plans of the deviated and corrupt persons and also banish the deviated elements from your presence.

Be referring to the recent events in Tabriz and emphasizing the point that the elements causing the event were from the Moslem People's Republic Party, the clergy of Shushtar and Dezful have asked for disbanding the party.

The following telegram was sent from the clergy community of the province of Ilam to the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari:

The honorable grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari: Greetings. All of the inhabitants of the province of Ilam and Poshtkuh express their condolences for the death of the guard and condemn the treacherous plot of attacking your residence. They all demand that you issue an order as to the evacuation of Tabriz Radio and Television, this Islamic propaganda base by the occupiers. And if this has been done by the Moslem People's Party, to issue an order for disbanding the party.

The Religion and Knowledge Society and the Islamic Society of students in Miyaneh have each sent a telegram to the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari offering their condolences on the occasion of the martyrdom of 'Ali Reza'i, the guard, and expressed their hatred from the occupation of Tabriz radio and television station and asked for the disbanding of the Moslem People's Republic Party.

Tens of thousands of people in Azar Shahr and suburbs marched in support of Ayatollah Shari'atmadari condemning the attack on the Ayatollah's house and the martyrdom of one of the guards. The stores in the bazaar and streets were closed for 2 days for the same reason. The people issued a resolution asking for the punishment of those who had attacked to Ayatollah's house.

The clergy of Kangavar have also sent a telegram to the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari stating: The events of Azerbaijan, that is the glorious territory, have caused uneasiness for the people of this territory. It is expected that the disturbances which have surely been planned by conspirators be ended by your actions and orders. Now that it is heard that individuals affiliated with imperialism have penetrated Moslem People's Republic Party, we would be glad if you renounce the party or issue orders for disbanding it.

Clergy of Arsanjan Send a Telegram

Saqatol Islam Seyyed Ali Saqatol Islam sent a telegram from the clergy and the struggling people of Arsanjan to Ayatollah Shari'atmadari. A part of the telegram indicates: We request your honorable position, Ayatollah, that you issue orders that the honorable people of that territory pay full attention to the following two points:

1. The people cooperate with the Islamic government employees, so that they could do their job in that vast territory.
2. The depositions and appointments of employees and directors of government offices should be handled by the government of the Islamic Republic.

We also request that you issue orders for completely disbanding the Moslem People's Republic Party. It is obvious that your influential words throughout the country and abroad and the special obedience which the honorable people of that territory have towards you, both of the above mentioned issues will be carried out."

#### The Clergy of Mazandaran

The clergy of Mazandaran have also sent a telegram to the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari. A part of the telegram states: We request that you take prompt action as you may find advisable vis-a-vis the Moslem People's Republic Party; either to disband the party or liquidate the anti-revolutionaries who have penetrated the party. Also, throw out the persons who have penetrated the religious city of Tabriz, the city of heroes, and have attacked the radio and television station so that any anti-religious conspiracy could be stopped and tragic events would not take place.

#### The Religious Authorities of Mashhad Send a Telegram

##### The Grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari:

The tragic events which recently took place in Qom and the death of the dear guard beside your house have caused a great sorrow. Undoubtedly the plot had been arranged by Imperialist and Zionists agents. Fortunately, it shortly resulted in defeat with disgrace. It proved for several times that anti-revolutionaries will have no fate but defeat in this country. By condemning this anti-Islamic action we seriously ask that you issue orders for the disbanding of the Moslem People's Party as unfortunately various anti-revolutionary agents have deeply penetrated the party, so that their violent and anti-Islamic actions would not hurt your reputation. Signed by Seyyed Kazem Mar'ashi, Abol Hasan Shirazi, Ali Falsafi, Mehdi Noghani, Ali Tehrani, Abbas Va'ez Essi, Seyyed Abdolkarim Hashemi-Hezhad.

#### The Message of the Clergy of Gilan

In a message the clergy of Gilan Province have asked the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari not to allow the enemies of Islam and the revolution to cause disturbances in the beloved Province of Azerbaijan.

#### The Imam Jom'e of Kermanshah Sends a Telegram

In a telegram Hojatoleslam Haj Aqa 'Ataollah Ashrafi Esfahani, the Imam Jom'e of Kermanshah (the chief mollah for Friday prayers and ceremonies) has asked the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari to disband the Moslem People's Party. A part of the telegram indicates: While condemning the attack on your house and the plot in Tabriz, I expect that you disband the party and exonerate your holy presence.

The Clergy of Lorestan

The clergy of Lorestan Province have also sent a telegram to the grand Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Kazem Shari'atmadari. A part of the telegram indicates:

"At this time that the hands of conspirators intend to carry out their inauspicious plans and fulfill the treacherous plans of imperialism and damage Iran's Islamic revolution, the clergy and the people of Lorestan have been deeply saddened by the unfavorable news received from Tabriz about the Moslem People's Republic Party who affiliate themselves to you as undoubtedly they are related to the conspirators. We therefore request that you issue orders for disbanding the party as soon as possible."

9156  
CSO: 4906



IRAN

BACKGROUND IMPRESSIONS OF NEW LEADERS DISCUSSED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 Nov 79 p 6

[Article by Bobo Scheutz]

[Text] Tehran--Almost every day, late in the afternoon and sometimes in the evening, they gather in the round Senate building in Tehran. Thirteen men, more or less well-known in Iran and the rest of the world. They make up the Revolutionary Council, the institution that rules Iran today and these 13 men are the most influential people in the country after Ayatollah Khomeyni.

The Revolutionary Council was secret when Khomeyni set it up while he was in Paris waiting out the shah. He was afraid of assassination attempts and for that reason he wanted to keep the core of the revolution a secret.

On Wednesday Abol Hassan Bani Sadr was removed from his post as foreign minister of Iran.

Until now Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, foreign minister and finance minister, belonged to the Revolutionary Council. But recently he has acted very independently, irritating the rest of the council. However he has retained his post as finance minister.

Bani Sadr is definitely an intellectual, well-known in Iran as an economist. He was educated at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he spent most of his 16 years of exile. He had been known as an advocate of a hard Islamic line but ironically enough during the current crisis he has stood out as the hope of Western diplomacy.

Sadeq Ghotbzadeh

His successor is the colorful chief of radio and TV, Sadeq Ghotbzadeh. He is also a member of the Revolutionary Council. Like Bani Sadr Ghotbzadeh received most of his education in France but he speaks fluent English too as a result of a period of study in the United States. He is always well-dressed and very self-assured. Ghotbzadeh has never hesitated to use the power he has and he is very unpopular in certain groups, especially employees of Iranian radio and TV.

Mohammed Beheshti

The most influential man on the Revolutionary Council is probably its secretary, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti. It is likely that he is the most powerful man in Iran after Khomeyni. He is the leader of the dominant Islamic Republican Party which played a vital role during the death throes of the shah's regime.

He also holds a number of other important posts. Among other things he heads the "holy war for reconstruction," an enormous project over the entire country aimed at getting the economy back on its feet.

Beheshti's background is somewhat confusing. Under the shah he acted as adviser to the Ministry of Agriculture, among other things, and thus cannot flaunt the martyr's halo assumed by several of the revolution's central figures. Many of them were forced into exile or spent hard years in the shah's prisons.

For 4 years Beheshti was head of the Islamic Center in Hamburg and he speaks excellent German and Arabic. His English is also good but in his contacts with the media he prefers to talk through an interpreter.

He is a cautious man who chooses his words carefully and when he speaks in his deep, authoritative voice he makes a very calm and dignified impression.

His name will undoubtedly be mentioned often in the future.

Mehdi Bazargan

To the surprise of many former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan is still on the Revolutionary Council following his resignation from power when the American Embassy was occupied. He is regarded as the liberal representative of the middle and upper classes on the council. These groups are on the outskirts of Khomeyni's Islamic Republic and therefore Bazargan's position is not very strong. But he has a long history of opposition to the shah and that gives him points in Iran today.

Originally he was an engineer and a businessman (Bazargan means businessman in Persian). On several occasions he has been on a collision course with the religious leadership, as in a recent speech when he defended Iran's importation of Western technology. He pointed out that religious leaders liked to appear on TV and reminded them that TV is a Western import.

Ali Akbar Moïnfar

Perhaps one of the least influential members of the council is Oil Minister Ali Akbar Moïnfar. He is a decided technocrat, a close friend of Bazargan and to date he has made no political statements at all in his meetings with the foreign press corps. At a recent press conference he answered only questions dealing with oil and oil exports, replying to every political question that it was not his task to solve political problems.

Abbas Shaibani

Abbas Shaibani is a doctor of medicine and a former president of Tehran University. He too is one of Bazargan's close friends and was often imprisoned during the shah's reign. His profile on the council is not particularly sharp but he was part of the group of experts who prepared the draft of the constitution.

Ezzatollah Sahabi

Ezzatollah Sahabi is an engineer and serves as budget and planning minister in the government that doesn't really exist. He is part of the delegation negotiating with the Kurds with unclear results. Sahabi was jailed by the shah and subjected to brutal torture.

Hassan Habibi

The last of the seven nonreligious members of the Revolutionary Council is Hassan Habibi, the official spokesman for the council. He belongs to the generation of Iranian intellectuals who were educated in France where he joined Islamic opposition to the shah's regime. Habibi also serves as minister of culture and higher education and he wrote the first draft of the constitution for the Islamic republic.

Hashemi Ali Akbar Rafsanjani

Of the six religious representatives on the council Hodjatolleslam (a religious title below the rank of ayatollah) Hashem Ali Akbar Rafsanjani holds the position of minister of internal affairs, a vital post. Not much is known about him but he spent a lot of time in the shah's jails and was not released until just before the revolution. It is generally

believed that at one time he received Palestinian training in guerilla warfare in Lebanon.

Mohammed Javad Bahonar

Ayatollah Mohammed Javad Bahonar has written many books on Islam, some of which are now used as school textbooks. He is the Revolutionary Council's representative in the Ministry of Education.

Musavi Ardebili

Ayatollah Musavi Ardebili is as devout a Moslem as he is an anti-Marxist and he has devoted much time and effort attempting to shield the youth of Iran from the Marxist concept of the world. He was one of the founders of the Islamic Republican Party along with Ayatollah Beheshti and Ayatollah Bahonar.

Mahdavi Kani

Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani is the powerful leader of all the revolutionary committees that sprang up all over Iran after the revolution. The committees range all the way from police stations, courts and social welfare offices to a kind of neighborhood authority and they have a central position in everyday life in Iran. In Tehran there are now 14 of these committees after the great number that flourished soon after the revolution were weeded out.

Kani is one of the religious leaders who actively combated the shah and he is regarded as being very close to the average man on the street. He received his religious education in Qom.

Sayed Ali Khamenei

The latest star in the Islamic revolutionary sky is Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei who is the council's representative in the Defense Ministry. He was recently named by Khomeyni as the new leader of the Revolutionary Guards following the departure of Ayatollah Lahouti for unknown reasons. The Revolutionary Guards have reluctantly accepted their new leader. Khamenei was formerly entirely unknown to most Iranians.

Normally the Revolutionary Council consists of 15 members but two seats are being kept open for the time being and many names have been mentioned as conceivable candidates. These seats will probably not be filled until after tensions on the council have been resolved. No one knows for sure when this will happen and where the split will occur. But much indicates that it will be on the side of the table where Abol Hassan Bani Sadr sits.

Today the council is no longer quite as secret but its members have never been presented publicly. In spite of that it was possible to obtain information from various sources resulting in the 13 names listed here. Another name often mentioned in connection with the Revolutionary Council is that of the religious leader of Tehran, Ayatollah 'omeh Montazeri but I was unable to get reliable confirmation of whether or not he is actually a member.

The council member most often mentioned during the current crisis is Foreign Affairs and Finance Minister Abol Hassan Bani Sadr. His independent behavior recently has left a number of question marks concerning his position on the council and his future actions will be followed with great interest in Tehran.

6578  
CSO: 3109

IRAN

MEANS TO COUNTER U.S. SANCTIONS AIRED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Dec 79 p 11

[Text] In an open letter, the teachers of Abadan School of Petroleum who are members of the "Committee To Fight U.S. Economic Sanctions" present the results of their talks and views on U.S. economic embargo:

1. The Government of the Islamic Republic should handle the monopoly of foreign trade. Considering the great importance of improving the agricultural condition, the government should do its best in establishing and developing agricultural and road construction industries. The government should only buy the primary industrial products from abroad and avoid buying any pre-fabricated foreign commodities as much as possible.
2. To establish an organized staff in Tehran and the captials of provinces called "Self-Sufficient Staff." Based on this project self-sufficient committee will be organized in educational centers, offices, government and non-government organizations, factories, etc. Each committee will provide a report and submit to the central staff their practical capabilities, type of work and their specialty. As an information and coordination center, the self-sufficient staff will find out about the needs of the organizations on services and equipment and will direct them to the proper sections, thus meeting their demands.
3. We suggest that from now on all the universities and higher educational institutes prepare a plan, so that if Iranian students residing in the United States return to the country, they could continue their education in the universities of the country. We, in our turn, are ready for any cooperation within our capabilities. Establishing night classes will be a great help in this respect.
4. We suggest:
  - a. To make a general evaluation and study of the existing vocational schools and workshop in Khuzestan and to provide a report (statistical) in this respect. The workshops can be used for training technicians.

b. To make an overall revision in the training and educational program of Abadan School of Petroleum to make the school meet with the fundamental changes that are made throughout the country.

For this purpose, engineering departments in the field of discovery should be established and excavation and information charts (well logging) departments should be strengthened.

5. We suggest that the Central Department of the Ministry of Oil which has so far been in Tehran be transferred to Khuzestan. We also suggest that an extensive cooperation in research be established between Abadan School of Petroleum and the oil industries. The Research Center of the Ministry of Oil in Tehran should be combined with the School of Petroleum in Abadan to establish an extensive research and training center in the south.

6. Abadan School of Petroleum announces its multi-directional cooperation and technical assistance in the required fields especially in training technicians for getting information on Mud Logging and the use of related equipment which is very much needed by the Excavation Department of the Ministry of Oil.

With the experiences of the school, it can help in selecting, choosing and the rental of the equipment and the companies in charge of operating them, so that the cheapest and best equipment could be selected from various countries in the world (other than the United States) and the least number of experts would be invited to Iran. In the meantime, it will directly and closely supervise their operations and role in organizing an Iranian cadre.

7. We suggest that a seminar be held at Abadan's School of Petroleum in order to study the self-sufficiency of oil industries with the participation of experts in oil affairs in the country.

8. We ask the Oil Ministry to send us the copies of the projects of oil industry that have so far been sent to foreign companies and universities for implementation or completion, so that we would study the possibility of accomplishing them at this training center.

9156  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

STRATEGY OF POSSIBLE U.S.-IRAN CLASH DISCUSSED

Mexico City JUEVES DE EXCELSIOR in Spanish 6 Dec 79 pp 10-11

[Article by Jesus Pavlo Tenorio: "What War Between the U.S. and Iran Would Be Like"]

[Text] When the president of Mexico, Jose Lopez Portillo, was asked his opinion on the critical situation that has arisen between the U.S. and Iran, the chief executive replied that it was for problems of this kind, the essential motive for which is oil, that he attempted to offer a peaceful solution when he proposed his World Energy Plan to the United Nations.

And, as in the case of our president, statesmen the world over have been particularly concerned over how close to conflict Teheran and Washington have come when, after the occupation of the United States Embassy in the Iranian capital, President James Carter ordered dangerous military maneuvers in order to assure the Ayatollah Khomeini that the United States would not be apathetic if the hostages held captive in its diplomatic premises were not released.

It was not long before the international public received an accurate picture of the hostile situation from the almost irrational positions assumed by the aged leader who, at 83 and because he lacks a knowledge of international law, is acting in Iran as if he were the master of everything.

Without, of course, claiming that the United States is totally dissociated from these reactions on the part of the Ayatollah, this nevertheless does not mean that the Muslim leader can violate all vestiges of law and civilized coexistence with impunity. This has obviously established a favorable view toward any initiative by the United States, including, of course, the invasion of Iran and the consequent overthrow of the Ayatollah.

What the War Would Be Like

If all prospects for saving the hostages were exhausted, and the U.S. forces were in three locations at the same time, the military action would occur, but not so easily as to warrant expectations of a swift victory.



Although the United States would not deploy a considerable number of forces with the aircraft carriers "Midway" and Kitty Hawk" in the Arabian Sea, the naval landing force stationed in the Mediterranean would have a military balance with the Iranian army and fleet.

Those aircraft carriers comprise over 200 aircraft of various types. Their landing forces, certainly fewer in number than the Iranian, would be in serious straits before the Air Force cleared the way from the coast of the Persian Gulf to the Iranian capital, which is located a few kilometers from the Caspian Sea, on the border with the Soviet Union.

It would be an excessively bloody war because, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in London, the Iranian armed forces consist of 45,000 men, distributed among the Army, Air Force and Navy. It also has 30,000 reservists, who would be immediately mobilized; and 75,000 national guardsmen who, in turn, would also be potential human resources.

The Iranian forces, which were armed by the United States itself during the Shah's time, are still regarded as the best equipped in the entire Middle East.

For example, they have 2,800 tanks, as well as an extremely powerful artillery, equipped with the most powerful missiles. The Navy has one submarine, three destroyers and four frigates, all provided with missile systems; and four corvettes, seven rapid gunboats, two coast guard vessels, two mine sweepers and three rapid cutters which France is about to deliver to it.

As for its Air Force, it consists of 500 combat planes and about 100 helicopters, all of United States manufacture, except for 16 Super Frelons of French origin.

Added to this would be religious fanaticism, if not patriotic zeal; because, as we have observed recently, the fanatical Khomeini has placed more stress on his "holy war than on the national interests of Iran." Therefore, the war would be excessively bloody.

#### The Waging of the War

On 22 November of this year, in a telephone interview with the British agency Reuters, Ahmed Madani, commander of the Iranian Navy, disclosed that a first step in defending his country would be to close off the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow deepwater channel at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, used by tankers which carry over half of the oil used by the industrialized nations.

This step would, of course, evoke a combined reaction from all those countries, which might well protest against the United States intervention because it would affect highly important interests of theirs, such as their

energy supplies; or, on the other hand, they might join the United States invasion, perhaps certain that, with a political change in that nation, the endless supply of black gold would be guaranteed. Of course, that political change would have to be pro-Western, even more so than the Reza Pahlavi regime was at another time.

When this step had been agreed upon by all those countries, the first conflict would occur between the Iranian vessels and the two United States aircraft carriers, backed by a convoy of torpedo boats provided with missiles and implemented with logistics.

Obviously, before embarking on a conflict, the Iranian Navy would attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz; but the Yankee Navy has the necessary equipment for clearing the way. Hence, this futile attempt to stop them there would only last a few hours; that is, if the United States decided to land inside the Persian Gulf. Because, if it did not do so, it could seize land in the part of Iran bordering Pakistan, which lies in front of the Strait of Hormuz. It would be a little farther from Teheran, but the Air Force would go into action in an attempt at barrage bombing, and the release of contingents of paratroopers.

#### The Impossible Rescue

The Iranian antiaircraft defense would have already gone into action. Its 500 airplanes and 100 helicopters would be taking off to curb this offensive. And the first really important battle would be the one in the air. Whoever prevailed there would have the situation under control.

At this point, the United States hostages would already have been executed; while the fanatical Khomeini would have sought refuge, as he did by fleeing to Paris, while his people had to fight against the tyranny of Reza Pahlavi. Rescue would be impossible, but it is logical that, if this situation were to occur, the United States would have considered that impossibility, evaluating it from the standpoint of clearing up the unfortunate circumstances in which it was left in the Middle East by the fall of the Shah.

The Iranian military equipment would last for about a month in an overt war. But, since all of its ordnance is of American make, it would lack spare parts; and its 500 aircraft would gradually be destroyed, as would tanks and its supply of missiles.

Meanwhile, the United States would have behind it all of its might as the number one nation in the military realm.

#### What Would the Soviet Union Do?

Under these circumstances, there would be only one unknown quantity: What position would the Soviet Union assume with respect to this action being

carried out in its backyard; because it should not be forgotten that Iran has a border with the USSR, which it shares along the entire width of the Caspian Sea.

On Friday, 23 November, in the city of Bonn, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the eternal Soviet foreign minister, Andrey Gromyko, upon being asked about the role that his country was considering in the Iranian crisis, would only reply that the Soviet Union steadfastly backs the principles of international law and the preservation of diplomatic immunity.

In other words, that the USSR by no means supports the occupation of an embassy and the resultant capture of diplomatic personnel. But this is no guarantee of the kind of action that it would take in the event of war. However, it must not be forgotten that the presence on its borders of a country which has become converted into an Islamic theocracy is more dangerous than anyone could imagine; particularly when Hua Guofeng, the top-ranking Chinese leader, has just stated that the real threat is the wave of Muslims that could set fire to the world.

As we can observe, a U.S.-Iranian conflict is more than a landing of Marines, like the last one conducted by Johnson in Santo Domingo, in 1965....

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CSO: 4410

IRAN

PLAN TO END UNEMPLOYMENT ANNOUNCED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Dec 79 p 12

[Text] The Revolutionary Council passed a bill to end unemployment in the country. The topics were exclusively put at the disposal of KEYHAN.

Based on this bill, jobs will be created for all of the highschool and vocational school graduates and the unemployed in order that Iran would reach self-sufficiency from the agricultural and industrial point of view.

Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, member of the Revolutionary Council and in charge of the Ministry of Interior described the details of the fill in an exclusive interview with KEYHAN.

The head of the Ministry of Interior presented the bill to the Revolutionary Council and had it approved said: According to one of the principles of the Constitution approved by the Islamic Republic, the government is bound to provide jobs for all the unemployed in the country by taking the existing capabilities into consideration. Based on this, the Ministry of Interior received a proposal from Khorasan's governor general's office and it was taken into consideration. Hashemi Rafsanjani added: Based on the bill, some task units will be established in various parts of the country. These units called Cooperative Production Units will absorb all the unemployed who are skilled by giving them adequate training.

Hashemi Rafsanjani added: The units will utilize the unemployed in the development and revival of agriculture and animal husbandry to terminate reliance on foreign countries.

He added: Simultaneously with the approval of the bill, the Ministry of Interior presented the necessary guidelines to the offices of the governors general throughout the country for the precise implementation of the bill. Very shortly the offices of the governors general will provide precise

reports on the unemployed to include the graduates of vocational schools, high schools etc...to be submitted to the Central Staff of the Ministry of Interior.

The Minister of Interior added: The cooperative companies will have administrative, technical and management cadres. Each of these companies will be officially registered on the part of the Ministry of Interior in the first phase with 50 or more members. They will receive adequate training regarding the regulations of the cooperative company system.

Hashemi Rafsanjani said: The total amount of oil income in one day which is allocated to the provinces will be spent on the implementation of this project and to help set up the above mentioned units.

In describing the details of the bill, Hashemi Rafsanjani indicated that the members of the cooperative production companies will be the share holders and without any unfair job exploitation, they will continue with their work and activity. Sufficient authorizations have been given to all governors general offices in this respect.

The head of the Ministry of Interior added: The cooperative companies will be a central unit which will provide the major needs of the country. Furthermore, in addition to financial aid, land and other capabilities will be put at their disposal. It is quite natural that the activities of these companies may be expanded and that the graduates of vocational schools, high schools and all of the unemployed will be covered by this project without any limits.

In the end Hashemi Rafsanjani said: Thus, the initiative of our youth will be used and small units and industries will make us self-sufficient from importing industrial parts from abroad in the future and unfair exploitation will no longer be an issue.

9156  
CSO: 4906

IRAQ

IRAQI POSITION ON IRANIAN SITUATION ANALYZED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 23 Nov 79 p 27

[Article: "Baghdad Speaks of 'Iranian Bloc in the Arab Ranks' and Khomeyni Speaks of Personal Vengeance Against Saddam!"]

[Text] When it was announced in Damascus that a visit to Iran would be made by Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, the first Arab head of state to receive an invitation to visit Iran since the Khomeyni revolution, an important Iraqi official told a Lebanese politician who visited him recently that the Arab position vis-a-vis Iran is extremely delicate, and that it is not allowable for the Iranian card to be used in the sensitive areas among the Arab states, "because that would erode Arab solidarity and give Iran more power to involve itself in Arab conflicts." Similar comments were made by other Iraqis while Syrian Deputy Prime Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam was making his commendable efforts with Tabatabai during the sudden crisis that flared up in the wake of Ayatollah Ruhani's statements concerning the Iranian claim to Bahrian.

The Iraqis have become extremely sensitive about any exuberant Arab position supporting Iran. For at a time when Iraqi-Iranian relations are deteriorating day by day, and propaganda and other campaigns have reached their peak--the recent effects of which have included the closing of the Iraqi Consulate in Khorramshahr--the Iraqis no longer view positions of support for Iran as a positive shift toward the revolution of Khomeyni which can be profitably used against the United States and Israel. Rather, the Iraqis have begun to view these positions as a "trap" for Iraq and its role in the Gulf!

While Libyan-Iranian relations have taken a new path since 'Abd-al-Salam Jalud's visit to Tehran--which ended recently in the establishment of diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, after the Iranians had previously opposed such a move until the issue of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr could be cleared up--Iraqi officials have begun to speak of what they term an "Iranian bloc within the Arab ranks," although they have no evidence which proves the existence of such a bloc. Their suspicions in this regard grew to the point that they regarded Algeria's

celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Algerian revolution as evidence of such a bloc merely because the celebrations brought some Iranian officials (Bazargan and Yazdi) together with Bendjedid, Qadhdhafi, al-Assad, and Yasir 'Arafat!

When Iraqi Foreign Minister Dr Sa'dun Hammadi met recently with his colleague, Libyan Foreign Minister Dr 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki, he told al-Turayki that the exuberance which Libya is displaying toward Iran is very hasty, because it will be difficult to back off if it later proves erroneous and detrimental to the national welfare. He said that in Iraq's view, thinking must become clear on the other considerations in this matter so that it will become possible to form collective Arab relationships with Iran which guarantee the interests of everyone.

However, Iraq's image of Iran is different from either Libya's or Syria's image of Iran. For while this image is a sensitive point between Damascus and Baghdad, it is something else to Libya. It is very important to Colonel Qadhdhafi to obtain a certification of innocence in the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, and he can obtain such certification only from Iran. The Arabs who are rushing to support Iran and Khomeyni have different views on Iraq's hostile position vis-a-vis Iran. Some of them say the Iraqis are making a mistake by being alarmed at the good relations between some of the Arab states and Iran, because these good relations will tend to help hold the crisis between Baghdad and Tehran within reasonable limits. It is Iraq which is the loser in its war against Khomeyni because of the Iranian leader's capacity for influence within Iraq, where he lived for a long time and where there is a Shi'ite majority which the Iranians could stir up in a way that would threaten the fate of all Iraq.

There are radicals who say that, by its hostility to the Iranian revolution, Iraq is serving American policy, whether it means to or not. In their view, the United States is more capable of profiting from Iraq's stand on Iran, even though there are those in Baghdad who believe that Iraq is in a position to profit from the American stand on Iran. In fact, some of these radicals say that there are secret Iraqi-American negotiations to supply Iraq with advanced American weapons in the wake of the freeze in Iraqi-Soviet relations and Iraq's being compelled to diversify its sources of armament. Those who hold to this belief base it on the Iraqi assertion that Baghdad plans to double its naval force in the Gulf following the recent naval maneuvers. However, the Iraqis feel that the Iranian maneuvers were not innocuous, and that they were originally intended to achieve the occupation of Bahrain before the Iranian position was met by a strong stand on the part of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the Gulf states.

For their part, the Iraqis chide these Arabs for their silence on the demands of the Arabs of Khuzistan (Arabistan) at a time when these demands had become realizable. They say, for example, that during the reign of the Shah, the Libyans issued a publication called ARABISTAN in which they called for the liberation of this Arab region from Iranian rule and chided Iraq for its silence on and disregard for this problem at that time. They

even accused Iraq of collusion with Tehran. But not that Iraq has moved to support Arabistan, the Libyans remain silent about the issue, as if Arabistan no longer needed to be liberated!

Despite the short period of harmony between Baghdad and Tehran, from the signing of the Algeria pact between the Shah and Saddam Husayn in March 1975 until the victory of Khomeyni's revolution some 4 years afterward, the two sides have had many inroads and have made many attempts to interfere in each other's internal affairs. The Iranians supported and kindled the Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq, and the Iraqis supported and kindled the uprising of the Baluchis and supplied them with weapons. The Iranian organization SAVAK had agents in Iraq, Iraqi intelligence had agents in Iran, and both countries conducted secret operations within each other's territory. The two best known operations which SAVAK conducted in Iraq were the assassination of General Bakhtiyar, who took refuge in Baghdad after he was expelled from Lebanon, and the poisoning of the son of Khomeyni himself in al-Najaf. The Iraqis did not fail to respond to these actions in Iran.

The Khomeyniites act on the basis that Khomeyni has a personal vengeance against Saddam Husayn because Husayn expelled him from Iraq in return for the Shah's expulsion of Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani from Iran, in accordance with a deal concluded between the two leaders in Algeria, and they consider this to be payment of an account which was overdue. The Khomeyniites also say that during the peak of the Iranian people's revolution against the Shah last year, the former Empress Farah Diba was permitted to visit the holy shrines on the occasion of 'Id al-Ghadir in order to defuse the revenge of the people. In fact, they say, the empress was received personally by Saddam Husayn, who defiantly allowed himself to be photographed with her and complied with her request that Khomeyni be expelled from al-Najaf.

The Iraqi Ba'athists, however--who behave toward Khomeyni as if he will eat them unless they eat him first--say that they received Khomeyni in their country from the time they came to power in 1967 and never once disturbed him, but helped him and made things easy for him. It was he alone, say the Ba'athists, who profited from their hostility to the Shah during the 7 years prior to the Algeria agreement, and even after the Algeria agreement they did not disturb him or ask him to leave the country until after he rejected their urgent request that he limit his political activity and respect the principles of political asylum so that the Shah would have no excuse to renounce his obligations. As a consequence, they feel that it was Khomeyni who, without any justification, assailed them with hostility, and some even accuse him of showing ingratitude to Iraq and the Iraqis!

When Khomeyni returned victoriously to Tehran, a member of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party asked Saddam Husayn about Iraq's position on the Khomeyni revolution. Husayn said to him in effect: If this revolution is an internal Iranian affair, then we have no connection with the matter, and indeed we support it and give it our blessings. If it is a general



religious revival, we are politicians and do not preoccupy ourselves with religious matters. Politicians belong in politics, and clergymen belong in religion. But if they want to use religion as a cloak for Persian ambitions in the Arab nation, then we will resist them unequivocally and with determination.

Commenting on this, a Gulf official says that this carefully defined position is the position of one who knows but does not admit something. For the Iraqi regime knows, but does not admit, that the Khomeyni movement is slated to become an internal Iraqi affair, if it has not already done so.

8591  
CSO: 4802

IRAQ

NEW OIL PROJECTS INAUGURATED IN BASRAH, WASIT

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 18 Oct 79 p 6

[Article by Yahya Kazim al-Najjar: "Our National Oil Cadres Present Another Example of Direct Implementation"]

[Text] The numerous projects directly implemented here and there in our country are a clear demonstration of the high competence and expertise achieved by our national cadres.

Yesterday, for the commemoration of the sixth anniversary of the nationalization of the last foreign control in the nationalized Basrah Oil Company, we accompanied a member of the Revolutionary Council, the minister of oil, on a field trip to the governorates of Basrah and Wasit for the inauguration of a number of oil projects were directly implemented by our national cadres for the first time. We observed at close range the degree of expertise achieved by our cadres, as well as the advanced ability to handle modern technology.

Three Products in One Pipeline

This is a pipeline project to transport petroleum products between al-Nasiriyah and al-Kut, which was realized by the Public Institution for Oil Projects for the first time at the cost of 6 million dinars. It is 187 kilometers long and transports three types of white petroleum products in the same pipeline, i.e., gasoline, white petroleum and gas oil. It makes them available to meet the requirements of the Wasit and Dhi Qar governorates, and possibly other nearby governorates, so they do not have to resort to trucking supplies from Baghdad and Basrah, as was done in the past. The capacity of the projects, which was completed in 1 1/2 years according to Mr Talib Dakhil, the director of the project, is 800,000 tons of white petroleum products a year. The project includes nine gigantic storage tanks; a loading unit, equipped with a control cabin, for loading tank trucks; a pumping unit; a fire unit; administrative and maintenance buildings; as well as other installations related to the project both in al-Kut and al-Nasiriyah.

In this project, in which the most sophisticated equipment was used, the director of the project added, the storage process is automatic. The same is true of the safety equipment, particularly the fire-extinguishing equipment, which is highly modern and is being used for the first time in this country. The fire-extinguishing equipment used in this project operates in three ways, including automatic fire extinguishers for the storage tanks and automatic foam fire extinguishers.

Both types of equipment are self-activated at the first indication of danger. The third method involves the use of manual foam fire extinguishers. One hundred technical specialists were trained at the project and subsequently sent to the Biji refinery's storage stations in the north.

#### Celebration in al-Rumaylah

In the governorate of Basrah, the minister of oil inaugurated additional oil projects in the midst of the enthusiastic cheers and songs by the workers and staff of those projects. They wished a long life to the party, the revolution and President Saddam Husayn and praised him for his direct supervision and sustained support which brought this project into existence.

Big festivities took place in al-Rumaylah to celebrate this occasion. It was attended by Comrade Muhammad Hamzah, secretary of the southern organization of the Ba'th Arab Socialist Party and the undersecretary of the Ministry of Oil, Comrade Radi Hasan, secretary of the command of the party's Basrah branch; the chairman of the Public Institution for Oil Projects; and numerous people from the Ministry of Oil and national cadres who participated in the implementation of these projects.

On this occasion, Comrade Tayih 'Abd al-Karim, member of the Revolutionary Council and minister of oil, gave a speech in which he pointed out that the revolution exists, renews itself and flourishes with the help of its children's hard work, their enthusiasm and their willingness to sacrifice, to give and to build. The command of the revolution and the party, he said, has entrusted the oil sector with great tasks, especially after nationalization succeeded in reconstructing the oil sector and building a self-sufficient national oil industry, as well as incorporating that sector into the national economy and creating deep interaction between it and other economic sectors thereby creating a balanced and strong economy. The numerous oil projects which spread across the country after the outburst of the 17 July revolution--such as new oil fields, refineries, gas plants, pipelines, ports, tankers, and so forth--stand as testimony to the appreciation you deserve and the esteem in which we hold you. And, here you are today, presenting your revolution with another series of projects.

Your revolution, the member of the Revolutionary Council and minister of oil added, does not build only for Iraq. Its scope actually extends to the whole Arab fatherland. All its strength and capabilities actually have been consecrated to the realization of the aspirations of the great Arab nation for unity, freedom and socialism. This actually shows the magnitude of your responsibility.

Since you have already performed the greatest achievements in the field of the petroleum industry, the minister told our cadres, I am fully confident that you can accomplish more and even greater achievements, because you have armed yourselves with the shining principles of your party. The minister concluded his address by thanking the Public Institution for Oil Products, the National Oil Company, the Public Institution for Southern Oil, the Public Institution for Oil Refinery and Gas Industry, as well as the Public Institution for the Distribution of Petroleum Products for their efforts and cooperation which brought these projects into being. The minister also thanked the Public Company for Building contracts for its valuable efforts and great awareness of the importance of realizing the oil projects. He also thanked the friendly foreign companies and institutions which cooperated with us in implementing these projects, prominently the Soviet company, "Technoexport."

#### New Projects and Their Importance

The minister of oil subsequently cut the inaugural ribbon symbolizing the launching of the operation of the water-pumping project north and south of al-Rumaylah. He then inaugurated the project instituted by the Public Institution for the Distribution of Petroleum Products to build several installations in al-Shu'aybah, the project for the development of the al-Muftiyah depot in Basrah, the project to build pillars for the al-Muftiyah pier, and the project to lay two fuel and crude oil pipelines to the al-Harithah power plant.

Referring to the importance of these projects, Mr 'Isam 'Abd al-Rahim, chairman of the Public Institution for Oil Products, said that they are characterized by their diversity, their respective operating systems, and the purposes for which they were conceived. First among them is the water-pumping project in the areas north and south of al-Rumaylah, which involves three stages. The first stage was inaugurated today. The preparation for this stage actually started gradually last April, and the work to complete the next two stages will continue gradually. It is expected that they may be completed toward the end of next year.

The implementation of this project, he added, was made possible with the cooperation of a Soviet institution. The Public Company for Building Contracts actually took care of the civil engineering work, which represents the bulk of the work actually completed.

The importance of this stage, the chairman of the institution said, concerns the pumping of water in the field north of al-Rumaylah. This involves the construction of a canal from the shores of Basrah; a refinery and a pumping station with a capacity of 95 million cubic meters a year; a main pipeline 48-inches in diameter connected with the five pumping stations located in various areas north of al-Rumaylah; in addition to the flow lines [al-Jarayan] and the pipelines connecting the pumping stations and the insulation stations, the high tension towers and lines, the secondary power stations, the central control and long range control station, the wire and wireless

communications network, and all the basic requirements of the project. The cost of the first stage reportedly amounts to about 40 million dinars which will increase to 65 million dinars when the three phases are completed.

#### Other Projects

With reference to the project instituted by the Public Institution for the Distribution of Petroleum Products to build installations in al-Shu'aybah, Mr 'Isam said its purpose is to establish a center for the complete operation of the distribution units in the governorate. This includes the construction of a plant to handle the maintenance and repair of the transportation system, a plant for construction, electric power, buildings, warehouses, car wash and lubrication garages, as well as other facilities, all of which will cost about .15 million dinars.

The project to improve the al-Muftiyah depot in Basrah was also implemented, the chairman of the institution added. This project includes the construction of service buildings and a workshop for the maintenance of equipment and machinery. This is in addition to the establishment of a network of paved roads and areas squares at a cost of half a million dinars. The project to reinforce the platform of al-Murityah was also implemented. This includes the construction of concrete pillars for docking oil tankers with a capacity ranging from 8,000 to 25,000 tons. The total cost involved amounted to about a quarter of a million dinars.

All these projects, Mr 'Isam continued, were completed under the supervision and with the cooperation of the agencies of the Public Institution for Oil Projects.

With reference to the project concerning the fuel and crude oil pipelines, the chairman of the institution said, its purpose is to transport fuel oil and crude oil to the electric power station of al-Harithah, which consists of four units whose total output is estimated at 840 megawatts. Thus, it will become the largest electric power station in the country. The purpose of this project is to provide this station with fuel oil and crude oil in two ways. First, by means of a fuel oil network consisting of a major pipeline between the refinery in Basrah and the station in al-Harithah, stretching above ground over concrete supports. The entire pipeline was equipped with an electric heating system. The operation of this pipeline includes a number of electric power stations and high tension lines. This 30 kilometer pipeline is considered to be the longest of its kind in the world.

The second way in which the station is supplied with fuel oil and crude oil involves the use of a crude oil pipeline consisting of a major pipeline branching off the Bazarkan-Faw crude oil pipeline to the electric power station of al-Harithah. It includes measuring, pressure-checking, protective and other instruments and devices.

The institution, the chairman of the Public Institution for Oil Projects continued, directly undertaken the designing and implementation of this

project by its national cadres and in accordance with the time table set for its implementation. The total costs amounted to 2.75 million dinars. The institution consequently saved about 2 million dinars, representing the difference in cost if the project had been carried out by a foreign company.

The chairman of the institution pointed out that a third pipeline is under construction to carry gas to the electric power plant in al-Harithah. This pipeline will be 48 kilometers long and will cost 3.9 million dinars. It is expected to be completed early next year, 6 months ahead of schedule.

#### Cadres and Future

The number of national cadres working for the Public Institution for Oil Projects has grown from 600 in 1977 to more than 2,000 at present. Their number will continue to increase and reach 3,000 next year, in order to cope with the current and important evolution of the institution's work in direct implementation of the various oil projects. As Mr 'Isam 'Abd al-Rahim, chairman of the institution, said, in the next few years the institution must implement, under the approved plan, huge and gigantic projects which are many times larger in both size and cost than those which have already been mentioned and have just been inaugurated. The agencies of the ministry are implementing those projects thoroughly and energetically through advanced work methods, which have never been used in the other public sectors. The final results of some of those projects will become evident during the next few weeks, especially those related to the implementation and in particular with reference of gas projects in the north and the south, as well as the refinery project in the north and various other projects.

2693

CSO: 4802

IRAQ

BRIEFS

INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS--The overall costs of Iraqi industrial investments over the past 4 years have increased above ID 4 billion (\$13.2 billion) according to official statistics published by the Iraqi News Agency recently. The agency said the Iraqi industrial projects include electrification, oil production and refining, petrochemicals, fertilisers and iron and steel projects. The cost of oil projects and other related projects have reached ID 1.1 billion (\$3.630 billion) while electrification projects costs amounted to ID 950 million (\$3.135 billion) and petrochemical projects costs amounted to ID 898 million (\$2.930 billion). [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 31 Nov 79 p 12]

IDCAS TO BAGHDAD--The fifth Arab conference for industrial development held between the 15th and 18th of this month and attended by Industry Ministers of Arab countries has chosen Baghdad for the headquarters of the Industrial Development Center for Arab Countries (IDCAS). The IDCAS, originally headquartered in Cairo was moved temporarily to Tunis after the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty last March. [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 31 Nov 79 p 13]

PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX COMPLETION--Iraq's petrochemical complex at Basrah, being built by the State Establishment for Industrial Project Planning and Implementation in cooperation with foreign companies is now 84 per cent complete. According to the project manager experimental operation of all units at the complex is scheduled for early next year. The manager Mr. Uthman said commercial operations at the plant and marketing of the products will not start before 1981. Mr. Uthman pointed out that the planned capacity of the plant is 150,000 tonnes and its overall cost is ID 350 million. The complex will utilise some 1 million tonnes of hitherto flared gas. The project manager added that the technical skilled cadres for the project have already been trained and that some of them have already been to the Soviet Union and back while some 120 engineers are being trained abroad at present. The project will provide employment for 1,000 Iraqis (engineers and labourers). The complex includes 12 units some of which are already ready while the rate of completion for others ranges between 77 and 99 per cent. [Text] Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 31 Nov 79 p 13]

NAVAL IMPROVEMENTS SOUGHT--Negotiations are underway between the Italian FINCANTIERI shipyards and the Iraqi government with the aim of purchasing some modern warships. Iraq would also like to set up, with Italian help, its own naval [shipbuilding?] industry, since the Iraqi government considers the strengthening of its navy a priority requirement. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMÉES in French Dec 79 p 7]

CSO: 4800



ISRAEL

POLL INDICATES BEGIN'S POPULARITY AT UNPRECEDENTED LOW

TA241046 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Dec 79 p 1 TA

[Text] Prime Minister Begin's popularity continued to decline in December and has reached an unprecedented low. Only 28.7 percent are now satisfied with him as prime minister. This emerges from the nation-wide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the request of HA'ARETZ.

In October, the percentage of people content with Begin as prime minister stood at 30.8 percent, and now it has declined by 2.1 percent to 28.7 percent.

In addition, 40.1 percent are not satisfied with him as prime minister, 26.8 percent are "more or less" content and 4.4 percent have no view on the matter.

Academics, people in managerial positions with above-average incomes, people of European and American origin and people who lived in Israel even before the establishment of the state are outstanding among the dissatisfied stratum.

Defense Minister Weizman continues to be very popular: 61.7 percent are content with him as defense minister in contrast with 12.3 percent who are discontent with him and 20.1 percent who are "more or less" content. Of all those polled, 5.9 percent have no opinion on this matter.

Youths and natives, high and elementary school graduates, manual laborers and people of Asian and African origin feature prominently among those pleased with Weizman.

The poll comprised a representative sample of 1,200 men and women above 18 years of age who were interviewed in their houses throughout the territory.

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

ARAB REGIMES SHOULD LEARN FROM IRAN HOW TO FIGHT AMERICA

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 6 Nov 79 pp 1, 5

[Untitled Editorial]

[Text] Whatever observations can be made about the occupation of the United States and British embassies in Iran, the entire operation indicates an extensive campaign of mass incitement of individual Iranians against American imperialism.

The Iranian people will never forget that it was the United States which ruled Iran for scores of years through the dissolute Shah. The Iranians tasted the fruits of this American domination: murder, torture, imprisonment in Savak detention camps, and the plundering of Iran's resources. Therefore, it is only natural that the pitch of the hostility towards imperialism should rise and that imperialism should be combatted on all levels.

As opposed to this course which the Iranian revolution is following, we see the Arab regimes' slackness, concealed beneath the banners of the Baghdad summit. The regular yearly pilgrimages to the White House continue, as do the petroleum supplies. The petroleum states are operating out of a strong desire to support the exhausted American economy and to revive the ailing dollar. The Saudi leaders do not forget to remind the world from time to time that they will not use oil as a weapon for the sake of Palestinian rights. The Gulf leaders clearly affirm that their enemies are not to be found in the United States or in Israel; in fact, they create apparitions of enemies in Moscow, Teheran, Aden and the PLO as well.

The definite conclusion we arrive at is that those regimes which have something to fear from the masses because they--the regimes--are plundering and monopolizing the resources for their own benefit want to build alliances with the forces opposed to these masses. Therefore, we must not expect such regimes to take any decisive stand similar to the one declared yesterday by the Iranian oil minister, about the revolution's readiness to cut off oil to the United States. But we at least expect those states which raise anti-imperialist slogans to sever their overt and secret lines with Washington.

There are two courses and two ways to fight imperialism. No one would ever find fault with our rulers, if only they would learn the way to fight the United States, even if they learn it from Iran.

8559  
CSO: 4802

ISRAEL

ARABS MUST TAKE CARE THAT OIL WEAPON IS NOT TURNED AGAINST THEM

Jerusalem AL-QUES in Arabic 14 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial: "The Neutralization of the Oil Weapon?"]

[Text] President Carter's decision to stop importing Iranian oil because of the detention of the hostages in the American Embassy in Teheran might become a turning point in the importance of the oil weapon, although it is too early now to judge the results of this decision.

The most likely possibility, prior to the announcement of the decision, was that Iran would stop the oil, and not the other way around. Instead of Teheran's pressuring Washington by stopping the flow of oil, it appears as if Washington has switched the pressure to Iran by stopping its imports.

The cessation of oil imports does not mean that America can dispense with Iranian oil. Indeed, it is capable of ensuring the lost quantities from other sources. These sources will either increase their imports from other countries than Iran, or will buy Iranian oil through a second party state. In both cases, America is ready to overcome the shortage and turn the oil weapon towards the throats of its owners, or it will try to do so.

It is well-known that most of the consuming countries have taken precautions after the world oil embargo during the October 1973 war, and have prepared emergency stockpiles to last them at least 90 days in case of any oil embargo or any sudden crises as happened with Iran. Thus they have become more capable of maneuvering and dealing with the oil countries individually. The differences among the oil states, and the conflict in their interests, make it easy to exploit them. The increase in Saudi oil production is a close, live example of what we are saying.

Does this experience mean an attempt to neutralize the oil weapon? Is America, or other consuming nations, working either individually or collectively to invalidate the effectiveness of the oil threat and its use as a weapon to achieve the just demands of the exporting states?

The only thing which will guarantee the preservation of oil's influence is a unified stand by the exporting states. Without that, the consuming nations will be able to pit one state against another, according to time and interests. In the current American stand there is a warning to anyone who wants to be warned.

8559  
CSO: 4802

ISRAEL

ARABS MUST TAKE HARD STAND AGAINST REACTION

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 15 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Is This the Nucleus of a New Stand?"]

[Text] Two years ago today, the president of the greatest Arab state arrived at Lod Airport to begin the process of reconciliation and mutual alliance with Israel, under American sponsorship, in the most significant strategic turnaround the region has seen in 30 years.

Two years--during which the Camp David agreements and the unilateral treaty were signed and the autonomy talks began.

Two years--during which differences and separation in the Arab world intensified, and the loyalty to America of some Arabs, who declared that their oil had no relation to the Arab cause, increased.

Nowadays we hear new voices and extraordinary signals coming from Syria. We hear the extensive propaganda campaign against the forces of Arab reaction, and we hear of plans to strike at their positions inside the Syrian homeland. Yesterday we heard a statement by a Palestinian official to the effect that Syria will ask the Arab summit to take a decisive stand, without which the Arab regimes will begin fighting one another.

A hard stand must be translated into practical reality. A hard stand has been delayed for 2 years, but it has finally come. Will it be the beginning along the road towards the creation of a hard, national Arab stand which will go beyond the minimum requirement?

8559  
CSO: 4802

ISRAEL

DEFENSE AGENCY PLAN FOR SETTLEMENTS VIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Oct 79 pp 13,20

[Article by Zeev Shiff: "The Defense Ministry's Plan for Settlement (A): Reservations on Paper"]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense has been prevented from bringing up its plan which opposes the system of settlement of Gush Emunim for consideration and government approval. Because of the settlers' choice of site, the army has been pulled into the center of an area populated by Arabs.

It is hard to believe, but it is a fact, that Menachem Begin's government has not, to date, conducted an exhaustive and basic inquiry into the subject of Jewish settlements and has never tackled it with a master plan or a broad perspective. It was kept from developing such a program before the Camp David agreements and has refrained from dealing with the subject since the peace agreement with Egypt. Till now there have been only sporadic considerations and permits for one activity or another (the establishment of a settlement, an expropriation, bringing a unit to an army camp, etc.), but there has been no clarification with respect to national goals and through a concern with defensive, demographic and political factors.

There are exaggerated declarations about many Elon-Morehs; about the Jewish right to settle anywhere in Judaea, Samaria or the Gaza Strip; and the right of Jews to acquire land anywhere in occupied territories. From an operational standpoint, these declarations are only patchwork and improvisation.

The Israeli Government has not accepted, nor has it determined, an inclusive settlement plan. It has, therefore, been following the plan of Gush-Emunim, or Minister Sharon. Actually, in the government's alignment, as well, no single plan has been adopted by the government, and the committee dealing with settlement matters (at first headed by Allon and later by Galili) has been concerned with approving proposals for this plan. Rabin's government acted without constraint on the subject of advancement. Due to Sharon's intervention, Rabin and Peres capitulated to Gush-Emunim, and the Defense Ministry began to cooperate behind the scenes with the settlers who violated the government's decisions.

By A Gnawing Action

It is amazing that even Begin's government, which openly subscribes to the settlement of Judaea and Samaria, has also failed to establish a government program. Apparently this is because it fears an endless argument in the government and the coalition.

There are a number of unofficial programs. Outside of the government, in the Jewish Agency, there is the maximalist and annexist program of Drobles as opposed to the program of Ra'anah Weiss. Within the government, two other programs are current: One is that of Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, which is brought up in a fragmentary way from time to time and which is supported by the religious faction. What appears between the lines is quite clear. The idea is to prepare a foundation for the maximum number of Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip; to establish political realities in centers of Arab population, to split up these centers and, finally, to bring about, in actuality, their annexation.

As with other issues in the past, Sharon operates in this matter as well by means of eating away, by establishing small facts in the territories which, when combined, form a unified line. Sharon does not bother himself much with questions about Israel's image or the fear that we will be blamed for hurting the peace process. His plan suffers from a lack of money and, apparently, of manpower; although he argues that there are many candidates for settlement. These two sources are low in Israel (apparently the Jewish nation is not so enthusiastic about settling in the occupied territories or else there would be more than 7,500 Jews in the territories at this time). Sharon, therefore, is not interested in the fact that the few sources turn to Galilee. For this reason, he has even set aside the suggestions of Major-General Ben-Gal with respect to the Galilee.

The second program is that put forth by the Defense Ministry. Something strange happened to this program. It was presented formally to the government about 1 1/2 years ago. Despite this, a detailed discussion was not organized and it was not approved. It remained a program of the Defense Ministry and not of the Israeli Government. It is surprising that Minister Weizmann does not push for a debate or make an effort to get his ministry's plan approved. He is probably afraid that it will not win a majority in the government. To those close to him he says that he is responsible for defense and not for settlement and does not want to be a leader in this matter. When the government decides to consider this subject of settlement generally, he will be ready to bring up his ministry's plan as well; but he does not wish to initiate the deliberation.

Negative Aspects

This position is not accepted by all the leaders of the Defense Ministry and the army. Others argue that one cannot separate settlement from defense. Broad defense is based on settlement, and if settlements are established in the territories without the army's agreement, they will be a burden for the army and for defense. At any rate, the Defense Ministry's



settlement plan has been revised (in April of this year an addition involving south Mt. Hebron was implemented); but even in its revised form, it has not been brought up for government consideration.

The Defense Ministry's settlement plan (or as it was called at the time of its preparation: "The Swelling Jewish Settlement in Judaea and Samaria") opposes many activities which have been resumed and are being carried out in the territories being settled as evidenced by Weizmann's opposition to the establishment of Elon-Moreh on the borders of Nabulus and his suggestion to let a military installation suffice or his opposition to the expropriation of private lands in order to expand settlements. It is interesting that the program originated from opposition to the method used by the Gush-Emunim in its settlement activity of Gush-Emunim. As early as the beginning of 1978, the Defense Ministry pointed out negative aspects in the development projects and the settlement in the occupied territories.

The sites for settlement were chosen, by and large, by the settlers themselves. This was noted in the introduction to the Defense Ministry's plan. The result was that the government has been dragged along behind the settlers. As a way of compromising, the principle was established that the settlements would be attached to army camps. This resulted in an unhealthy mix of settlers who lived in the camps or on their borders and the army. After a time, the army tried to shake free of this connection.

The Defense Ministry's plan points out that one of the main goals of the settlers in choosing sites for their settlements is to purposely pick an area populated by Arabs. This stems from "the desire to establish a Jewish presence in a region populated by Arabs and thus influence the future of the region." In other words, this is a blatantly political goal to prevent the partition of the territory. As a result, the army dragged after the settlers into the center of an Arab-populated region.

#### Unnecessary Costs

Another of the settlers' considerations is set against a religious or nationalist background. A place is chosen because the site has significance in the history of the people of Israel; for example, the settlement established under the guise of archaeological excavations at Shiloh or the camp of Samaria. Earlier, during the alignment government, this was the reasoning for the establishment of Kiryat Arba'.

According to the Defense Ministry's plan, this system causes great and needless problems and costs. Because they choose their sites on such principles, the settlers are placed in temporary camps. After a short time, the settlers exert pressures to expand, as happened recently with the six settlements whose situation was brought up for deliberation by the government.

The costs are generally multifold. Since the extent of the population in each settlement is restricted to several dozen families, it works out that

the basic start-up costs are extremely high. The smaller the settlement, the more is invested for each family. Since some of the sites were selected in distant areas without taking into account economic and defense factors, the investment in basic costs--access roads, telephones, water, etc.--are especially high.

The defense Ministry's plan points out that all the financing for these settlements comes from the budgets of the government and the Jewish Agency, and that this system of dealing with settlements automatically puts a damper on private investment by the settlers themselves or from other private sources. Small and poor settlements are not likely to draw men of wealth, even if they agree with the group's political position with regard to the territories. As early as the beginning of 1978, the plan pointed out that this system eventually results in the expropriation of territory from the Arabs, "because at most of the sites from the outset there is a restriction on the land which commits them in their planning to be permanent settlements. The answer to this restriction is, generally, the expropriation of territory."

9348  
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ISRAEL

MAJOR DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY UNDERWAY IN GALILEE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Oct 79 p 20

[Article by Judah Ariel: "Development of the Galilee: To Turn Mountains Into Plains"]

[Text] Many residents from central Israel want to move north in order to find a better standard of living. In Galilee, development projects are underway and roads and highways are being paved.

The face of Galilee is changing. It has been a long time since extensive work has been undertaken for the purposes of settlement in northern Israel. Residents of central Israel want to move north to find a better standard of living. Dozens of posts are being established. Access routes which are cut out of the mountains can be seen from afar. Some have already been settled, and others will be settled by this coming Passover. Four settlements are awaiting settlers. In the settlements, tile units have been added. Major roads with new boundaries are spreading northward, and these are likely to transform the traffic pattern. It appears that since the wave of settlement in Galilee that occurred immediately after its capture, at the time of the establishment of the state, there has not been such widespread activity in the north.

To Complete Shlomi

The coordinator of government projects in Galilee, Haim Haham, in cooperation with Zohar Gindel, head of the unit directing development towns, a few weeks ago began to work on settlement in Galilee. The first steps were very hesitant ones. It was announced that there would be an operation to "migrate to Ma'alot." Hundreds of families expressed interest in leaving central Israel to go to Ma'alot, to the low mountain, to a good dry climate. For some, this was an opportunity to find housing. Till this week, 130 families were in this category. About 300 families are on the waiting list. A hundred families are building villas and 160 others have submitted applications for building lots. In other words, this constitutes a genuine advancement and expansion of Ma'alot.

The head of the council of Ma'alot Tarshikha, Shlomo Bukhbot, argues that the advancement could have been faster. In the area of the villas, the foundation is ready. There is a problem because of lack of coordination between the housing department and the administration of Israeli real estate before the announcement about the plots was made. The head of the council asked the departments of housing and absorption to free up 150 housing units in Ma'alot set aside for new immigrants during the waiting period--in other words, a transition spot. According to Mr Bukhbot, it is better to fill these apartments with permanent residents and to advance the town.

Ma'alot's story was a successful one. At present, those involved are carrying out the project of continuing to settle Galilee with the saying: "To complete Shlomi." At a registration held in Tel Aviv, about 1,500 people showed up. It was truly astonishing. No one had expected this, and the staff was not able to deal with such large numbers. Of those who applied, 380 paid immediately to go to visit Shlomi. This week, hundreds of those requesting residence in Shlomi visited in seven buses, and many came in their own vehicles. They talked with residents, visited work places that could possibly provide them employment, looked at apartments and signed all the documents. In the coming days, the first people will arrive to complete Shlomi, a town that for years had a population of only 2,200.

Here is the same story as in Ma'alot. The local council is demanding the immediate release of the 100 dwellings which are set aside as an absorption center in case of need and that they be put at the disposal of applicants. They are also demanding that the 100 dwellings which have not been completed because of the contractor's bankruptcy be completed and given to the new residents.

The organizers of this plan to populate Galilee are certain that the settlement wave is just beginning. Soon such projects will be organized for Upper Nazareth, Afula, Kiryat Shmoneh and other towns. It appears to them that many residents of central Israel, and especially young couples, realize that only in an area far from the center where they can find superior conditions will they be able to advance and find their own housing and a better standard of living.

#### Completion of the Posts

The district committee for design and construction in the northern district recently approved the construction of 30 new posts. The official appointed over the northern district, Mr Israel Konig, said that by this coming Passover one can expect that all the posts will be settled. Roads have been cut through to all of them and paved with material that will make them passable even in rainy weather. The levelling of the sites was recently completed.

A gap exists between the design of the posts and their settlement. It is being said that all of them will be settled by the New Year or, at the latest, by the beginning of the rains. In fact, the posts settled now by units of Nahal in Marveh Eshkhar and Beit Rimon 3. Nahal has already been staying in the settlement of Tzalmon for over a year in the same bloc as Lotem and Mordan, two new kibbutzim of the Kibbutz Meuhad which sprang up more than a year ago in central Galilee. The post which will be occupied in the near future is in Neve-Heled in area nine.

Recently, the speedy establishment of a dozen additional posts was begun by utilizing prefabricated housing units. Each 70 meter unit has three bedrooms, a living room, dining nook, kitchen and bathroom. In addition, they are building a social center in every post where there will be an infirmary, a secretariat, a kindergarten, etc. The existing regional and local councils accepted some transporting of students and some studies in the existing schools as a solution to the education problem.

Tefen and Shegnev, two of the roughest regions in Galilee which had no settlements, are now gaining energy and the looks of the area are changing rapidly. In Tefen, Tuval, a kibbutz of the Ikhud, has been completed and will be settled by an army unit formed at Beit Haemek. Not far away, they are now completing construction of the houses of Kibbutz Kishor, which will be settled by a unit which has been staying at a nearby Nahal camp for several years. In that very same region, two posts are being built now-- Tefen 3 and Tefen 4. They have also started to build Moshov Lapidot for the children of the moshavs.

Manof and Shekhnia are the new moshavs being completed in the Shegev region. They will be settled by units who want to work the land. The people of Manof, immigrants from South Africa who have been waiting for many months in an absorption center in Karmiel, claim that they could have been in their homes already if the timetable for the establishment of the settlement had been followed. This, in turn, would have allowed many additional families who are waiting outside Israel to migrate and settle on their cooperative settlement. The people belonging to the Shekhnia unit are staying at a temporary camp in Shegev together with the Koranit unit whose settlement will also be built on Mt. Shekhnia. The road has only been cut to this point.

#### Development and Hatred

Mt. Shekhnia is named after the service of priests, Shekhnia, who were in this region. It is a mountain ridge which stretches from Kabul in the West to Yodfat in the East. Nearby is the village of Kokhav el Heyg'a which, thanks to the development of the settlements, got a grade A road and a direct road to their village. Despite this, one of the residents refused to turn over a parcel of land (which was not being cultivated) to allow for the paving of a direct road to the new settlements. The man argued: "Even if it were all rock and they wanted to give me all cultivable land, I would not exchange it. I will not be a traitor to my brothers."

When I wanted to photograph the completion of the construction in khishor, the workers shouted: "Get away, don't photograph here," and they picked up tiles to throw at me while they shouted their threats. "We will break your camera." All this happened without any prior conversation.

#### New Arteries in Galilee

The watchman for the Jewish National Fund's forests, who is also responsible at present for land development equipment, told me: "I am in agreement with the setting up of posts. I have been working for the Fund for years and have no complaints. But the people in my town who are working on setting up these posts and are earning a lot are sure of one thing. They are building these posts with Jewish money for Jews; but, in a short while, Arabs will be settling in them." When I asked if he believes this, he answered: "You asked me what people think in the villages about the posts and I answered you. What more do you want?"

Within the framework of the establishment of these posts and settlements, the majority of which will have to support themselves by means of industry and trade, centers are needed. The first has been established in Ramat Tefen, an industrial region in which more than a 100 million pounds were invested. At present, work has begun to prepare an area for an industrial region for Shegev. There are in addition to the local industrial areas such as Ma'alot, Karmiel, Tzfat and Kiryat Shmoneh. Industrial areas have also been established with an eye to providing employment for the residents of Golani and Makhanaim. All of these will provide a center for industry and employment for the new residents of Galilee.

When such centers are established, they will need transportation arteries. Galilee's roads are known to be rough, tortuous and steep. This makes transport more expensive. The Public Works Department is now breaking through and advancing a new network of roads, some of which existed as roads or caravan routes in the distant past and were forgotten--a new road from Haifa to Tiberias which will not have to go over the dangerous rises and descents and a new road that will by-pass Mr. Tzfat and will save a lot of wear and tear on vehicles and will make rapid transport to Upper Galilee possible.

The work that goes into building these roads is hard to describe to someone who has not seen it. Hundreds of thousands of mounds of earth and rocks are brought to turn the mountains into plains. They want to establish new, wide transportation arteries which will be able to handle motor transport dozens of years from now as well. These roads will open new landscapes for those tied to the roads. It has already been promised that along these roads there will be Jewish settlement, new posts and not desolate and empty areas. It is clear to the planners that these roads will not be enough. Additional roads will be needed for Shegev, Karmiel and Tefen.

9548  
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ISRAEL

WEST BANK STUDENTS SEEN SHORTCHANGED IN UNIVERSITY ADMISSION EXAMS

Ramallah AL-HISAD in Arabic No 17, Oct 79 p 5

[Editorial: "We Are Opposed to the Standardization of the Questions"]

[Text] Recently some information media reported the demands of some East Bank officials that the fifth grade examination [tawjihyah] questions on both banks be standardized, and that the West Bank examinations be corrected in 'Amman. There has been much talk about this matter, and we have tried to examine the facts objectively and impartially, intending only to reveal the truth, whatever it is, to the citizens.

During our research, we came upon a letter sent by a West Bank education official to the education officer in the West Bank Command. The letter is numbered 385/6 and is dated 8 Aug 1979. A copy of the letter was sent to the education directors. The signer of the letter refers to discussions conducted with Jordanian officials in 'Amman, during which they expressed their displeasure that the West Bank students excelled over East Bank students, which has an effect on university enrollment and the Jordanian student mission policy. The letter indicates that the Jordanian officials raised the East Bank students' averages.

The sender of the letter excuses the Jordanian officials for this conduct, and uses the words, "The Jordanian officials were forced against their will to raise the marks of East Bank students!" Yes--to put it simply, in order for the East Bank students to excell over the West Bank students, and so that the students from the occupied areas would not get university places or government missions, the averages and marks were raised "with ministerial permission!"

The letter indicates that the above-mentioned Jordanian officials requested that the questions be standardized and that they be corrected in 'Amman, threatening to not recognize fifth-grade examination results next year, or to lower the averages of West Bank students, in case the Jordanian instructions are not agreed to!

We contacted a number of education officials, who corroborated the information contained in the letter, and who affirmed that the letter did not refer to any other aspects which the man "refrained" from enumerating.

■ We learned from them that the Jordanian government will not recognize the third group of the teachers' qualification class, while it did recognize the first and second group, carefully stressing that "we will not enroll them and we will not surpass them."

The Jordanian officials stressed that when the number of students to be accepted at Jordanian universities is calculated, 2,000 seats must be set aside for East Bank students, as opposed to West Bank students, who enroll in their local universities. Another group of seats is reserved for some governorates termed "miscellaneous," such as al-Karak and Ma'an, and a number of seats are reserved for superintendants, teachers, personalities, and so forth.

Thus, with the raising of the grades of East Bank students, only a limited, almost insignificant, number of seats are left for the West Bank.

We have heard about discussions and debates in 'Amman which were devoid of any responsibility, as if the concept of "supporting the resistance" applies only to the East Bank residents, and as if there is no call to support the West Bank and Gaza residents' resistance, for they are resisting without any help!

We are impartially passing on the facts of what we have read and heard, without comment. We say to ourselves that perhaps this conduct is unusual and does not express any official policy. We hope so from the depths of our hearts. We hope that these stories will be refuted in whole and in part, not in a rhetorical, stylistic statement but by practical translation, boiling down to the abolition of the idea of standardizing the questions and insisting on correcting the bank's papers as was done in the past; the allocation of seats for students from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the same basis as if they were from the occupied areas; the accommodation of sufficient numbers of West Bank students in government missions; recognition of and support for the teachers' qualification courses; the dispatching of missions composed of West Bank teachers, for those who want to continue their studies, just as for the East Bank teachers; and moral and material support for our universities to enable them to accommodate our students.

- We all hope that we won't have to look into this matter again.

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ISRAEL

SOLUTION TO TEACHERS' SALARY PROBLEMS PROPOSED

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 22 Oct 79 p 3

[Article by Yitzhak Shneerson: "The Crisis in Education and Its Meaning"]

[Text] The current crisis facing the teaching community appears strange and different in a number of respects. First of all, it is difficult to understand how it can happen that a state committee appointed by the Israeli Government and headed by a superior court judge is not able to get simple data from the Treasury Department about the salaries of engineers.

Matters reached such a state that the chairman of the committee handed in his resignation since, as is known, teachers are tied to the salaries of engineers. If details about their salaries are not known then it is impossible to determine the teachers' salaries.

This is truly a disgrace and not simply due to oversight or negligence. It is unlikely in a nation of law and order that a junior or senior civil servant would refuse to pass on information to a public state committee which had been given its authority according to all the rules and procedures of the state, democratically and in a parliamentary fashion. Here we have to ask the simple question: Who is actually running this country-- the parliament and the government or a bunch of officials who arbitrarily make their own rules and determine the fate of the people and the country, the economy and education? And no one opens his mouth and there is no justice and no judge.

To this point, we have dealt with the technical failure, although, as has been said, there are fundamental flaws which the ordinary mind has difficulty understanding. There is still room, however, to clarify certain things so that it will be possible to find a solution to the crisis that comes every year to every family in Israel which has a member in the field of education. This applies to hundreds of thousands of Israeli youth, the future generation, who are being wasted and deprived without the chance to fight and defend itself and its future. Its fate is being determined and played out, at times, by those whose purpose is to watch out for them and assure them a normal and proper education.

#### There Is No Logic to the Linkage With Engineers

If the truth be told, the main source of the trouble lies in the issue of linkage. It is not logical to link a teacher to an engineer or a nurse to a teacher or a welfare worker to a nurse, etc., because every profession demands particular expertise and specific skills. What justification is there for linking a kindergarten teacher with some academic education, whose esteemed preoccupation is in getting 3-year old children to eat their bananas and to sing "cookie cookie," to an engineer working with an atomic reactor who has devoted many years to the acquisition of advanced knowledge and who bears an incomparably heavy responsibility? Moreover, even within the educational field itself, there are several incomprehensible imbalances which deserve further examination. It is hard to understand how a first-grade teacher who does marvelous and invaluable work, but all the same hangs a sign on the blackboard which says: "Good morning, class A" and changes it the next day to another sign that says: "Dan is clean and Dan is healthy," can be compared to a 12th grade teacher who has to analyze a literary work and to develop the deeper meaning of "The Dead of the Desert" and "The Scroll of Fire."

There is no justification whatsoever for comparing the two. There is no need for unusual preparation or skill to prepare a poster once the teacher has managed to write the words on colored Bristol paper. If she bought it at a bookstore, she only has to unroll it during class and store it in the attic and bring it down again at the beginning of every school year.

In contrast, the teacher who has to prepare a class for matriculation exams must measure himself personally and intellectually against theoretical material, constantly open new horizons, develop new ideas, read copious amounts of background material and make sure that the work discussed is absorbed and becomes a magnet for exciting inspiration that will assure a spiritual spark and joy of creativity.

#### The Distance Between the Two Sides

How can two teachers be lumped together who, though sharing a single crown, have such a qualitative difference between them that it is impossible that that difference should not be expressed and manifested in their paychecks? Although the idea of equality is very noble, its practical translation in every case without distinction results in discrimination and injustice which is quite alien to essential equality. Technical mechanical equality, after all, does not guarantee equality in the worth of a person and the worth of work and skills from the perspective of their quality and value. There is, however, another even more serious defect which is especially surprising in that no noise has been made about it. This is the fact that a woman teacher receives the same pay as a man. More than this, a woman teacher who is a mother is paid a higher salary than a man because even if she does not work full time she receives a high cost-of-living increment as though she were working full-time. On the face of it, this policy appears noble and generous and worthy of praise. We are obliged, however, to look

closely to see if this approach doesn't have a stumbling block to the discovery of a solution to the crisis as a whole.

#### Discrimination Between Men and Women?

First of all, it must be remembered that in all the enlightened and progressive nations, women teachers are paid a much lower salary than men. No one has ever complained bitterly about it, nor have we heard protests about this discrimination between men and women who do the same work even in classes which are identical in level, numbers of students, etc.

It makes sense that there is a social, economic and moral logic to this discrimination since, generally, the woman provides a secondary source of income in the family and is not the main breadwinner. It is not so terrible, therefore, if her salary falls below that of a man who is the family's principal breadwinner. He should not be forced to have his wife leave the house and go to work when her place is to care for her household.

In addition, the woman teacher, by nature of her physical condition, earns justified but extensive vacations such as 3 months maternity leave and time off when, God forbid, her child is sick. Generally, she also uses her 30 days sick leave every year, and no one checks into whether these are actually used for illness or feigned (special study has been conducted concerning this use of sick time but this is not the place to go into it). If we add to this picture the fact that the majority of teachers are of the weaker sex, then a solution to the crisis, from a budget point of view, appears on the horizon. Only the men, who are a minority, could get higher wages. From an educational viewpoint, there is the possibility that more talented men would enter the field of education.

In summary, it should be said that this is a daring proposal likely to arouse anger and excitement. If, however, in the United States, Europe, South Africa and Australia, it is accepted and normal to find a substantial difference in the salaries of men and women, there is no reason for us not to adopt this path which has been proved efficient and good. If we add to this the one fact that the subject of linking is not ancient tradition and that the internal division between types of teachers within the system bears close investigation, then we have before us to all appearances the first signs of a fundamental solution to the crisis. In this way, it would not surface every other day and cause harmful and unnecessary upheavals to the young generation now and in the future.

9348  
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JORDAN

RECENT BEDOUIN DEMONSTRATIONS DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 12 Nov 79 pp 28-29

[Article: "Have the Rural Areas and the Bedouins Begun to Offer Open Resistance to the Authorities?"]

[Text] The repercussions of the central Bedouin movements which emerged into the open with the demonstration of 20 October have not yet ended. The suppression of the demonstration and the successful move to prevent it from advancing toward Amman have not brought this movement to an end--either with respect to its causes or with respect to its effects. On the contrary, these actions have led to the continuation and development of this movement, as is clearly shown by the Bedouins' formation of a high delegation to meet with the king and protest the authorities' policy devoted to oppressing the citizens by continually raising prices--not to mention the authorities' devotion to neglecting the Bedouins' other basic needs.

What are the details and repercussions of the central Bedouin movements? What are their immediate causes and who is taking part in them? Where will they lead? These things are the subject of the following report.

Demonstration of 20 October

The central Bedouin demonstration included approximately 1,000 men from the Bani Sakhr, Bani Hamidah and 'Ajarimah tribes which live south of Amman in the Dhiban area and in the villages located between Ma'daba and Amman. Peasants and Bedouin children also participated in the demonstration, and village leaders, tribal shaykhs, retired officers and students presided over it. The citizens gathered from the various villages and marched toward Amman along the desert highway. In the triangle of desert connecting Ma'daba and Na'ur, the demonstration was blocked by a heavy concentration of army

and general security vehicles which prevented them from continuing the march toward Amman. The demonstrators were clubbed and gunshots were fired over their heads, forcing them to disperse.

The demonstrators shouted comments criticizing the policy of the Mudhar Badran government and its decisions to raise the price of food, especially bread, flour and flour products. The demonstrators carried a petition protesting inflation, the increase in the cost of living and neglect of their basic needs for services, water, and electric lighting. However, the army and general security forces prevented the demonstrators from continuing their advance to Amman to deliver the petition to the prime minister.

The demonstrators protested their suppression by the army and general security forces, and declared their determination to hold another demonstration if their demands are not met.

#### Bedouin Meeting and Formation of 40-Man Delegation

The Mudhar Badran government, which has been accustomed to using suppression to confront protest demonstrations opposing it, was apparently surprised at the sharp reactions which followed the breaking up of the demonstration. On the day following the demonstration (21 October), the Bedouin shaykhs and leaders of the central area held a crowded meeting which included shaykhs from other areas. The people at the meeting deliberated on the government's method of dealing with the just demands of the citizens, the after extensive discussions decided to form a delegation representing them to meet with King Husayn and inform him of their protest against government neglect of their areas, the decisions to raise prices, and the authorities' disregard of their needs. In the event, the meeting elected 40 representatives from among the shaykhs and leaders of the Bedouins and clans of the area to meet with King Husayn.

#### Delegation Refuses to Meet With Badran and the King Refuses to Meet With the Delegation!

After the delegation had made its way to the palace, some high officials of the Royal Chancellery attempted to dissuade the delegation from insisting on a meeting with the king and convince it to meet with the prime minister and discuss their problems with him. However, the delegation sharply refused to meet with Mudhar Badran, whom they charged with direct responsibility for inflation and the deterioration of living conditions. In a sharply worded comment, they said in effect, "We will not meet with the man who took our flour." But the king refused to meet with the Bedouin delegation while it remained so large, seeming more like a pressure demonstration. The Royal Court officials then began to negotiate with the delegation about appointing a small number of representatives to meet with the king, but they rejected this, saying that, "We are all Bedouin shaykhs and none of us is better than any other; if the king wants to meet with us, it will be without conditions."

The king again refused to meet them en masse, however, and the Bedouin delegation was informed that the king was busy with political contacts. They were promised a meeting with him after he returned from the pilgrimage. Informed sources reported that the delegation left the palace angrily when they received this reply.

#### Where Did the Demonstration Come From?

The area in which the protest movements began is suffering from a severe lack of basic services despite its proximity to the capital. The concentration of Bani Hamidah Bedouins is divided among 30 villages within a 30-by-100-kilometer area. In these villages live more than 40,000 people who are suffering from a lack of electric lighting, water, paved roads, schools and health services and are plagued by debts, an inability to pay agricultural loans and the absence of government assistance in developing agricultural lands.

The 'Ajarimah villages, which are centered around the town of Na'ur, are suffering from similar problems, as are the villages in the Bani Sakhr district. Like other rural areas in Jordan, these areas have suffered increasingly because of the lack of effective official measures to combat the successive periods of drought which have plagued them during the past 4 years. The citizens have also experienced increasingly serious hardships due to the continuous rise in the prices of basic commodities--and especially food--the latest of which was the increase in the costs of bread, wheat and wheat products by 25 to 40 percent.

#### Continuous Increase in Prices Aggravates Popular Discontent

In accordance with "defense orders," the government has raised the price of native bread from 60 to 80 fils, and that of European bread to 140 fils, while the price of the small loaf has remained at 20 fils. The price of flour has been increased by 40 percent. The price increases for flour, flour products and bread were made within the framework of the policy of gradually raising prices. Thus, the Mudhar Badran government made price increases of 12 percent for tools, 60 percent followed by 75 percent for fuel, and 20 percent for meat. The prices of transportation and animal feed were also increased, followed by increases in the prices of wheat, barley and bread by the percentages mentioned previously.

As usual, the authorities justified this continuous increase in prices on the pretext of rising world prices--or in other words, their continued dependence on importation due to their historical neglect of agriculture and the other productive sectors--and on the pretext of "easing the burden on the budget"--this huge budget, inflated by nonessential expenditures and luxury, which is not large enough to support basic commodities and ease the pressure of living costs which is bearing heavily on the majority of the citizens.

#### Corruption and Thefts

The exposure of various forms of corruption, thefts and business dealings at the expense of the sustenance of the citizens is another reason for the eruption of the protest movements among the Bedouins and the population of the central area. The news has spread that some governors have stolen large quantities of flour and grain dedicated to the fight against the drought affecting the Bedouins of the central area and the south, with some of the stolen food being sold to citizens at high prices and some of it being replaced with spoiled flour. Legal proceedings have been initiated against the governor of Ma'daba concerning the handling of grain.

#### Members of Consultative Assembly Call for Discussion of Food Supply Policy

Despite the fact that the circle of discontent has widened and has reached the level of protest demonstrations by the Bedouins of the central area, government measures to deal with the situation have remained trivial and limited. Thus, in the wake of the demonstration of the Bani Sakhr, Bani Hamidah and 'Ajarimah tribes, the Jordanian cabinet decided on 28 October to lower the price of improved wheat from 110 to 100 dinars a ton, and the price of barley from 90 to 80 dinars a ton. However, this trivial and limited decision did not put an end to the widespread wave of discontent which is still growing. This has been reflected in various forms of pressure on the members of the National Consultative Assembly, which has been in a state of continuous recess for more than a month. Several members of the council (most of them representatives of the [tribal] areas, particularly the central areas) have begun to take steps to correct the decline in the government position by calling for a special session to discuss the government's food supply policy and its recent measures related to raising the prices of wheat, wheat products and feeds. A memorandum to this effect addressed to the head of the National Consultative Assembly was signed by 10 assembly members early this month. Meanwhile, reliable sources confirm that the Mudhar Badran government, which was formed 4 years ago, may become the authorities' scapegoat if public discontent worsens--especially since the Bedouin movements have laid direct responsibility for the severe deterioration of their living conditions on the Mudhar Badran government.

Widespread circles in the country feel that, while the bold initiative of the Bani Sakhr, 'Ajarimah and Bani Hamaydah tribes to demonstrate and protest in various ways is an indication of the level of general discontent among the people, it is equally an indication of the general mood prevailing in the circles and sectors considered by the authorities to be pillars of support of unwavering loyalty. While the rural and Bedouin base of support has, in various ways, expressed its distress due to official policy and the hardship it is experiencing because of the pressures of living and the lack of basic services and facilities, the fact that the Bedouins' dared to demonstrate, submit petitions and form a huge delegation to carry their protest directly to King Husayn, and their refusal to occupy their time

with the prime minister, reveal an important side of the authorities' dilemma. This side confirms that the domestic policy of the authorities (which includes their economic measures) contains irremediable contradictions which are liable to develop and deteriorate into an open political crisis. For this policy will tighten the stranglehold on all the popular sectors, including the Bedouins, the rural producers, the soldiers and the lower officers. The worsening of the factors which brought about the crisis is being hastened by the fact that the authorities are devoted to suppressive and repressive measures and to dealing with growing discontent through postponement and promises on the one hand, and repression and restraint of public freedoms on the other.

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LEBANON

RAYMOND IDDIH GIVES VIEWS OF LEBANESE SITUATION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 12-18 Nov 79 p 6

[Article: "Increase in International Forces Inevitable"]

[Text] Dean Raymond Iddih is not optimistic about the French and American "fact-finding" missions to Lebanon. He does not believe that they will produce clear results, "especially since both France and the United States have ambassadors in Beirut, and these ambassadors are necessarily familiar with the situation." Therefore, Iddih does not agree with the wave of optimism which the Robin and Philip Habib missions have set off in Lebanon and the region.

Dean Iddih says that he will remain in Paris until Syrian forces withdraw from the Ministry of Information near his home. I had questioned the dean after learning that circles in the "National Bloc-Iddih Party" had discussed this matter with him a few days earlier.

I asked Iddih if there had been a change in the American position vis-a-vis the situation in Lebanon. He replied: "The Kissinger plot to partition Lebanon and allow the Palestinians to settle in it continues."

Iddih wondered what could possibly come out of the Arab summit which will be held in Tunis, "if it is held at all!" He returned to his three proposals, which he believes constitute the only means to a solution in Lebanon. What are these proposals? Iddih replied:

"First, the Cairo Agreement should be abrogated and replaced by a new agreement with the PLO, with the condition that the new agreement not conflict with the 23 March 1949 Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel, Security Council Resolutions 425, 426, 444 and 450, and Article 103 of the UN Charter.

"Second, Arab forces from states which have no ambitions in Lebanon, along with European forces, should replace the Syrian forces. These forces would be put at the disposal of the secretary general of the United Nations, and would include 15,000 to 20,000 Arab troops. This is my opinion. Otherwise,

funds must be placed at the disposal of the secretary general so that he can expand the UN forces. Some European states hesitate to put forces at Waldheim's disposal because of the enormous expense. Therefore, the Arab states should put the required amount at the secretary general's disposal so that the European states could no longer use the excuse that they do not have the necessary resources."

Thus: Arab forces from states which have no ambitions in Lebanon, in addition to European forces--especially since the presence of Syrian forces conflicts with the Arab League resolution issued on 9 June 1976 and the resolutions issued by the Riyadh and Cairo summits in November 1976, for the Syrian Army cannot possibly be considered Arab forces of deterrence.

"Third, these European-Arab forces would be deployed throughout all parts of Lebanon, and then the authorities would be in a position to form a new Lebanese army, disband the militias, and gather the weapons of war from the people."

But why does the Cairo Agreement conflict with the Armistice Agreement?

Iddih answered: "I wish the foreign ministers of the Arab states and the secretary general of the Arab League would examine the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement and the provisions of the Cairo Agreement so that they could be convinced that Article 3 and Supplement 1 of the Armistice Agreement contradict the Cairo Agreement. Israel wants the Cairo Agreement to remain in force so as to provide a legal pretext for it to continue its aggression against Lebanon, which is adhering to the agreement."

In accordance with Article 103 of the UN Charter, precedence is given to resolutions issued by the United Nations and, of course, by the Security Council.

"However, it appears that all Arab states want Lebanon to remain the sole battlefield of the war with Israel. But the Arabs must become convinced that sooner or later the contagion could spread from Lebanon to the [other] Arab states. The Arab borders are so extensive that weapons could be moved from state to state with absolute ease. In every state, there is a group of people whom the common enemy could incite to revolt against their leaders. Thus, if the Arab states do not want to establish a Palestinian state, as President Jimmy Carter has said, and if they only want the war in Lebanon to continue, then they must wait for their turn at the ruin and destruction to come."

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LEBANON

PHALANGIST PARTY REPORTEDLY TRAINING MOSLEM BROTHERS

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 12 Nov 79 p 8

[Article: "Phalangist Party Trains Moslem Brothers"]

[Text] Sources close to the Phalangist Party have confirmed that the party leadership has held a series of meetings with the leadership of the Moslem Brothers organization during which the two sides agreed to establish complete political and military coordination. By the terms of the agreement, the Phalangist Party leadership pledged to train groups of Moslem Brothers in explosion and demolition techniques and assassination operations, in addition to securing quantities of light and medium weapons to be sent in batches to Syria, provided that the Brothers carry out sabotage operations against the regime in Syria. The Phalangist Party also pledged to use its local information organizations and its contacts with outside information organizations--especially Zionist information media--to publicize military and political actions carried out by the Moslem Brothers. The first step in the implementation of the information-related part of this agreement was taken when AFP carried a news item from Tel Aviv concerning disturbances which occurred in the city of Aleppo, while the Phalangist Party radio was responsible for broadcasting the item in Lebanon. This integration between the Phalangist Party and the Moslem Brothers confirms that both organizations are working under the same direction.

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LEBANON

FATHI YAKAN, SHAYKH MAJDHUB RELEASED BY SYRIA, INTERVIEWED

Interview With Fathi Yakan

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 13 Nov 79 p 7

[Text] Mr Fathi Yakan, the secretary general of the Moslem Confraternity, who had been forcibly arrested in Tripoli and detained for 3 weeks, disclosed upon his release that several political and religious leaders were instrumental in obtaining his freedom. In an interview with Moslem leaders from north Lebanon, Mr Yakan revealed yesterday that Syrian Security had interrogated him about his rumored complicity in Moslem Brotherhood activities and suspicious schemes in Lebanon and Syria. He said that upon being cleared of the charges, he was released and, accompanied by several party members and security agents, was driven back to his home in the private automobile of the regional commander of the Syrian Deterrent Force in north Lebanon. He added that he was well treated during the routine investigation, and that he had met with military, political and party leaders during his detention.

In a press interview with AKHBAR AL-YUM, Mr Yakan disclosed that he had met once with Shaykh Majdhub, the imam of Qabb Ilyas.

[Question] How do you feel toward those who stood by you and attempted to help you?

[Answer] There was a common denominator to all their humanitarian efforts. I do not distinguish between one sect or religious group and another, or between one party and another. The problem was humanitarian in essence, a problem of conscience. The problem, which started as an alleged accusation against me, was finally clarified. It did, however, reveal numerous incongruities and led to some positive things between me and my Syrian kidnapers. As a result of numerous meetings with Syria's highest leaders, many issues and former misunderstandings have been resolved.

[Question] With whom did you meet?

[Answer] With Syria's top military leaders.

[Question] With al-Shihabi himself?

[Answer] I prefer not to mention names, but I did meet with the top military leaders without exception. The fact is that what started as an interrogation turned into a political dialog regarding the Lebanese and Palestinian problems in general.

[Question] When you were arrested, what were you charged with?

[Answer] It is clear to me that belonging to the Moslem Confraternity was the principal reason for my arrest. This organization poses a threat to Syria's security. I was implicated by informers whose identity is now known to me. The informers' motives are now clear to the Syrian authorities. I received many apologies over my treatment during the arrest. I was subsequently treated with great respect, and have no ill feeling toward the authorities over my earlier treatment.

[Question] It is rumored that you were physically abused in the beginning. Is this true?

[Answer] During my arrest, I did resist. The identity of my captors was not clear to me. You know that kidnapping is a way of life in Lebanon. Initially, I thought I was to be killed. I was slightly injured during the scuffle. Beyond that, I was not mistreated. On the contrary, when I arrived in Damascus and the authorities learned of my forcible arrest, they condemned the behavior of my arrestors. They blamed those who arrested me for the mistreatment.

[Question] In what prison were you held?

[Answer] I was detained by the military and kept initially at a military center with other detainees. Most of the time, however, was spent at the military hospital and at the homes of military personnel.

[Question] Did your interrogation last for 15 days?

[Answer] Of course not. The interrogation was discontinued during the feast of al-Adha. Most employees go home for the holiday. There were 5 days without interrogation.

[Question] Were you kept with other detainees?

[Answer] No, I was alone.

[Question] Have you ever seen Shaykh Majdhub, the imam of Qabb Ilyas?

[Answer] I saw him there briefly.

[Question] Did you talk with him?

[Answer] No, we did not talk.

[Question] How was his physical health when you saw him?

[Answer] He looked fine to me. Someone asked him how he felt, and he said he was fine. He did not appear ill or tired.

[Question] How did you get to the Lebanese-Syrian border?

[Answer] Some friends in Damascus arranged for my return home. I requested that I go back by way of Homs. I was taken there by private car, accompanied by other cars. At Homs I was met by a military officer who took me to a banquet attended by many military personnel. I was later driven in the military officer's car to the border. We were accompanied by other military vehicles. At the Syrian-Lebanese border, next to Dabbusiyah, we were met by a number of Fatah vehicles and a Syrian security agent. Major Ahmad Ma'mari was also waiting for us. He accompanied my motorcade all the way home.

[Question] How do you feel since your return to Lebanon?

[Answer] I am deeply moved by the united effort on my behalf. Ordinary people, Moslems and Christians, and people of different parties and political persuasions were united in their effort to help me. It was more than I had expected.

[Question] How did you react to what happened during your absence?

[Answer] Of course, I was told yesterday evening of the effort to help me. It seems that the president, the prime minister and the entire government apparatus all intervened on my behalf.

[Question] Did you expect your case to reach such proportions?

[Answer] Yes. In fact I was sure of that, even while I was in Syria.

[Question] Do you have anything to say to the Lebanese and Syrian people?

[Answer] I long for the day when the Lebanese people will stand united against our common enemy. I also ask the Syrian people to try to understand the Lebanese people before they take measures against them.

[Question] What do you read in the eyes of those who come to congratulate you?

[Answer] Most eyes are filled with tears.

[Question] Did your family abandon hope for your return?

[Answer] Only once. Only my wife, who does not give up easily, remained optimistic. I wish you would meet her sometime.

Interview With Shaykh Majdhub

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 21 Nov 79 pp 4, 15

[Interview with Shaykh Majdhub by AL-ANWAR correspondent; in Majdhub's home in Zahla]

[Text] Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman al-Majdhub, imam of Qabb Ilyas, discussed his 27-day detention. He told AL-ANWAR's correspondent in Zahla during an interview at his home soon after his release that he did not inform on Mr Fathi Yakan, the secretary general of the Moslem Confraternity in Tripoli. According to him, Mr Fathi Yakan was introduced to him as a "doctor" while both were under detention in Damascus. He added that they did not recognize each other. In response to our questions, Shaykh Majdhub related the details of his detention. He said he was taken to Damascus by civilian security agents to clear up certain misunderstandings with the authorities. He said that he went without hesitation. In Damascus, he was asked about his views regarding the Syrian initiative in Lebanon. He added that he responded by praising the Syrian initiative, describing it as a helpful and compassionate move, aimed at alleviating Lebanon's suffering, while the rest of the Arab world stood idly by, watching the Lebanese tragedy on television. This, in his view, he told the authorities, was what prompted the Syrian move.

[Question] Dr Fathi Yakan, the secretary general of the Moslem Confraternity in Tripoli, claims that you informed on him during your detention, and that that was the reason for his arrest.

[Answer] During the interrogation, I was asked about the Moslem Brotherhood and whether that organization was active in Lebanon. I denied any knowledge of that group, but I did tell the authorities about the existence of a religious group known as the Moslem Confraternity. I told them that the organization's secretary general was Dr Fathi Yakan, a man I knew personally. I also told them that I had met Mr Yakan in the interrogation room, that he was introduced to me as a doctor, and that I recognized him by his handsome blonde beard.

[Question] It is rumored that you were arrested because of your membership in the Moslem Brotherhood.

[Answer] I was asked about this and cleared of this charge. The interrogators were convinced that I was the victim of a conspiracy.

[Question] Were you mistreated?

[Answer] Initially, I was treated like any other prisoner. When the authorities learned of my true role in Lebanon, I was treated with respect and given a private room. In fact I later met with Syria's minister of information and had a long discussion with him about the Arab situation in general. I also had a 27-minute television interview, which will be aired Thursday evening. The interview sets forth my views on the situation in Lebanon and Syria, as well as the Arab world.

In another interview, Shaykh Majdhub told AKHBAR AL-YUM that he neither relishes nor regrets his month's stay in Damascus. His only regret, according to him, was that his charitable and social work was interrupted during that period. He added that, unlike others, he does not accuse certain quarters of having created a problem in his home town [or homeland]. He thanked the president, the prime minister, the mufti [supreme religious leader], ministers al-Qadiri and al-Mara'bi, the commander of the Deterrent Force [peace-keeping force in Lebanon], and all those who interceded on his behalf.

Speaking of the specific charge leveled against him, he said that he was accused of voicing his criticisms in inflammatory oratory. "A particular group was displeased by my outspoken manner and sent emissaries to tell me so. When the Deterrent Force restored stability, I stopped my attacks. But that group never forgot my criticism. Now, after long discussions, all misunderstandings have been cleared up."

Referring to his views on the situation in south Lebanon, Shaykh Majdhub said that he informed the authorities of his extreme indignation over the situation in that part of the country. He said he "was saddened by the daily toll in lives as a result of the Israeli bombardment, whose aim is to expand the mini-state begun with Israel's initiative and America's blessing in order to protect Israel's northern border." He added that they [the Israelis] provide the mini-state [Haddad's territory] with weapons and men from Cyprus and Europe, to avoid a direct confrontation with the Palestinians."

Speaking of the national movement in south Lebanon, Shaykh Majdhub said: "The national movement is not very effective. It is unable to defeat Israel or to put an end to Haddad's mini-state. The mini-state is growing larger and the national movement is not able to halt the deterioration, and its inevitable defeat is imminent."

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LEBANON

KURDISH PARTY OFFICIAL RELEASED BY SYRIANS

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 25 Nov 79 p 6

[Article: "Jamil Mahu, Returning from Damascus, Says 'I Thank the Syrian Authorities for Releasing Me'"]

[Text] Yesterday Secretary General of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Lebanon (BARTI) Jamil Mahu returned from Damascus, after having been detained for a year, 6 months and 10 days.

At a reception for Mahu at the party headquarters in the al-Watwat quarter upon his arrival at 1830 yesterday there were a number of party leaders and a throng of Kurds.

Mahu announced, "I thank God that I have been released, and that I have been able to see my second homeland, Lebanon. I hope that national unity will be achieved and that the struggle in dear Lebanon will end, for we are all fed-ayeen for the homeland. I thank the Syrian authorities for my release."

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LEBANON

MEMBERS OF SMUGGLING, COUNTERFEITING RING APPREHENDED

Results of Investigations

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 28 Nov 79 p 6

[Text] Yesterday security personnel completed their investigations of Mustafa Mahmud Harun (52 years old), Jamil Ilyas al-Baytar (45 years old), 'Isa Milki Milki (50 years old), and Antoine Mikha'il al-Ghusayn (46 years old), who are charged with counterfeiting American \$100 bills, passports, statements of no prior convictions, and market licenses, and with dealing in narcotics.

Some 37 counterfeit American \$100 bills, four forged passports, and quantities of heroin, cocaine and hashish were confiscated from the suspects' residences.

The four were referred to Beirut Public Prosecutor Zahi Kan'an, who charged them with the specified counterfeiting, punishable according to Articles 443, 444, 461 and 437 of the criminal code and by Decree No 3040 pertaining to narcotics. These penalties call for 4 to 10 years imprisonment.

From the prisoners' confessions it became clear that they were part of an international network for counterfeiting and circulating American currency, which has its main headquarters in Europe, and which also smuggles narcotics on a wide scale, its members using forged passports to divert suspicion from themselves. They also sold counterfeit one-kilogram gold bars for 40,000 Lebanese pounds to Fugitive Suspects Karim 'Isa and Elie Daw.

It also became clear that Antoine al-Ghusayn carried a false passport in the name of George Jean Zuwayn, and that he had accomplices who are still at large.

It was also learned that the large-scale counterfeiting of American money was done in a European country, and that the counterfeit notes were brought in by the network's agents.

The public prosecutor referred the dossier to First Examining Magistrate of Beirut George Abu-Murad.

Further Details

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 29 Nov 79 p 6

[Text] Yesterday Examining Magistrate Mu'in 'Asiran began his investigations of Mustafa Mahmud Harun, Jamil Ilyas al-Baytar, 'Isa Milki Milki, and Antoine Mikha'il al-Ghusayn, who are charged with counterfeiting American \$100 bills, dealing in narcotics, and forging the seals of foreign countries, passports, and statements of no prior convictions. Warrants were issued for the arrest of all of them, even though Jamil al-Baytar stated that it was he who exposed the gang to one of the Lebanese security agencies.

The investigation of the prisoners revealed that this international network has scores of agents, in Baghdad, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Italy, Germany, Holland, France, Turkey and Britain. One of the members has scores of fake stamps to give entry visas for some of the countries which are the scene of the network's activities, including Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Italy.

It was also learned that one of the network members is a Lebanese living in a northern town, who travels between the various countries on a false identity card bearing the name of a senior Interpol officer. It also became clear that the gang had counterfeited quantities of gold bars and sold them to an Armenian dealer in Hamra' Street at a price varying from 40,000 to 45,000 pounds during the world rise in the price of gold.

Jamil al-Baytar confessed that the network would counterfeit the currency in Lebanon by means of a secret press guarded by armed men, and that a technical expert dealt with the network and guaranteed currency printing plates which he would very precisely forge. He said that the network had begun counterfeiting Egyptian 100-pound notes, and that in September an Egyptian, Sa'd Dahshan, took 10,000 notes with him to Egypt to circulate them. Then on 4 October he returned and took an estimated US\$10,000 worth of counterfeit American money in order to circulate it, and then disappeared without a trace.

The prisoners mentioned that the network ensured the narcotics, opium and heroin, from Turkey through its agents, and that 'Isa Milki would go with Antoine al-Ghusayn to the town of Mardin in Turkey to buy raw heroin at 500,000 Turkish pounds per kilogram. Then they would smuggle it to Italy to the account of the Italians Salvador Ranelli and Vittorio Spiciliano, who would send young women to Lebanon to transport the narcotics. One of them, named Suzy, was in Beirut recently; she stayed a week in Beirut and Damascus and delivered the narcotics after the secret word was revealed, and then left Beirut and took the narcotics with her in her own special manner.

The examining magistrate issued a warrant for the security police to pursue the network members in Lebanon.

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LEBANON

IHDIN MASSACRE SUSPECT SPRUNG FROM JUNIYAH PRISON

Armed Attack on Prison

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 26 Nov 79 p 6

[Excerpt] A security source announced that at 1500 yesterday almost 100 armed men attacked the prison at Juniya Castle and encircled it with heavy arms and equipment. Some of them entered the prison and released one of its inmates, Hanna 'Abdallah, who is charged with participating in the Ihdin incident of June 1976.

The policemen were unable to resist the attackers because of their numbers and their many weapons.

Immediately afterwards there were prompt contacts between security and party officials for the return of the prisoner, but as of late last night there were no results.

'Al-Maradah' Statement

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 28 Nov 79 p 6

[Text] In Zagharta yesterday, Sulayman Franjiyah received Archbishop Ilyas Najmah, Roman Catholic pastor for the Tripoli parish, and then Kourah Deputies Bakhus Hakim and Fu'ad Ghusn, and reviewed with them the general situation and the issues of the northern region.

In the morning the "al-Maradah" leadership held a meeting during which it studied the Juniya Prison break-in, the release of one of the Ihdin incident prisoners, the matter of the northern kidnap victims, and the inter-relations of all these issues. After the meeting the "al-Maradah" spokesman delivered a statement as follows.

"When the officials arrested Hanna 'Abdallah at Beirut Airport, it would have been more appropriate for them to have handed him over to the Phalangists right away, instead of transferring him to Juniya Prison, which as the state knows is under the control of the militias just like all organizations in East Beirut, Kisrwan and Jubayl. Therefore, suspicion is

directed at those who ordered his transfer to Juniyah Prison, because by so doing they were endeavoring to premeditate and plan his release. The funny thing here is that the release of the criminal who participated in the Ihdin massacre was accomplished without firing a single shot for cover, which reveals the disgraceful way the officials connive with the Phalangists."

He added, "At the very time the official information agencies are expounding to us the state's willingness to carry out the Tunis resolutions, we see the state's real stand conflicting with its propaganda. The government is disregarding the issue of the northern kidnap victims and is pretending not to see the Phalangists' military extent. It is blocking its ears to the din of Israeli arms and equipment in the Karantina, and at the same time it is working to return the Phalangists to their militias, knowing that they are a threat to its security and the citizens' security."

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LEBANON

BRIEFS

PHALANGIST AIRPORT--The Phalangist Party is currently constructing a military airport, after losing the airport it had set up in Hamat, al-Batrun District. The new airport is located between the villages of Mishmish and Ram on a 50,000-square-meter tract of land owned by 10 of the inhabitants of the two villages. The Phalangist Party had sent an engineering expedition to the locality with several maps of the area in their possession. At first the local inhabitants thought the purpose of the expedition might be to establish a military base, and so they were surprised, several days after the engineers returned, to see earthmoving equipment leveling the ground in preparation for the paving of runways suitable for landings by small military and civilian aircraft. The airport is located in the middle of the Jabayl district, 10 kilometers from the border of the al-Batrun district and 15 kilometers from the border of the Kisrawan district. [Text] [Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 12 Nov 79 p 9] 8591

CSO: 4802

LIBYA

ANALYSIS OF THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION, QADHDHAFI'S 'GREEN BOOK'

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French No 308, Nov 79 p 4

[Article by Charles Zorbigbe: "Power and Democracy in Libya: the Quest for a 'Third Way'"]

[Text] "No democracy without people's congresses!" The slogan bedecks the regular plane of Libyan Arab Airlines. Spread over the walls of the Tripoli airport: "The party system aborts democracy." At Khan Yunis University in Benghazi, the lesson in constitutional law approaches paradox: "The very existence of a parliament means the absence of the people."

Mass education: the revolutionary slogans are quotations from Mu'ammarr Qadhafi's "Green Book."\* The leader of the Libyan revolution denounces the parliamentary system as a "truncated solution to the problem of democracy," because the representative is no sooner elected than he "cuts himself off from the masses"; because parliament "usurps" popular sovereignty for its own gain and becomes a "legal screen" between the people and political power. He demolishes the political party as a "tool of modern dictatorship": the party appears to reflect democracy by "creating assemblies and commissions, not to mention its members' propaganda," but it represents the "power of only a fraction of the whole people," is based only on the "despotism of its members" and their "corruption"; as for the existence of several parties, it "exacerbates the struggle for power...which leads to the destruction of everything the people have gained and sabotages any plan for the development of society." Social classes are shown no mercy by the author of the "Green Book": "like the political party, tribe, or sect," the social class is a "group of people who share the same interests"--"it is only a fraction of the people and represents only a minority." If a political party is formed

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\* "The Green Book"(Paris: Editions Cujas), vol. 1, "The Solution to the Problem of Democracy" (1976, in French and Arabic, 95 pp); vol. 2, "The Solution to the Economic Problem" (1978, in French, 30 pp).

in the name of a class, "it is automatically transformed into a substitute for that class " If a regime claims to be based on the working class alone, "groups appear and transform themselves into classes exactly like the classes that have been abolished, and the struggle to govern society begins again."

To the French visitor the message may seem familiar. Is criticism of the representative system not rooted in the French doctrine of public law since the 3rd Republic, as, for example, in the analyses of Carre de Malberg on the deviation of "parliamentary sovereignty" and in the political class, as is shown in Andre Tardieu's pamphlets on the "captive sovereign" and the "parliamentary profession"? Hasn't the exposure of political parties as oligarchies motivated the foremost European sociologists since the beginning of the century, people like Ostrogorski and, especially, Roberto Michels, who undertook the exploration of Western political regimes? The rejection of class struggle and the apology for "participation" are so close to De Gaulle's thought that one may wonder whether they were inspired by certain leftist Gaullist writings. True, Colonel Qadhdhafi rejects the referendum, which "postures as democracy," while Rene Capitant saw in this procedure the indispensable "question of confidence" that is a part of semi-direct democracy.

#### Ten Years After the Revolution

The "Green Book" is a problem especially with respect to Third World political trends. Is it a return to the sources of the Koranic "law," an absolute truth to be respected, as some Islamic fundamentalists seem to believe, or are they simply a citizen's ideas that tend to carry forth the debate on the ideal structure of government, as Colonel Qadhdhafi sometimes says himself? Is it a universal message, or should it be limited to Libya, as some Near Eastern Marxists suggest? Whatever, the "Green Book" is significant primarily in the political development of Libya. It implies a certain removal from the Nasir model that so fascinated the leaders of the 1969 Libyan revolution that they imitated it in two ways. First, in the conquest of power: since the beginning of the 60's, young officers impatient to have their country achieve the status they thought it deserved and who as adolescents cheered the Egyptian "rais," organized a group of "free officers"; on 1 September 1969 they pulled off a bloodless coup against King Idriss and the Sanusi dynasty, which had become too dependent on foreign countries and caught up in the contradictions caused by the increasingly crucial role of oil, and they proclaimed the republic. Second, in the exercise of power: a Council for the Command of the Revolution was instituted--it is a structure that is strongly reminiscent of Nasir's Egypt, which freed the country economically by forcing the oil companies to restrict their production and pay a higher price for crude (Occidental, which was particularly vulnerable because almost all its production profits came from Libya, was the first to submit) and which was to show spontaneous fervor for Arab unity in the Tripoli pact (December 1969) with Egypt and the Sudan, to the Union of Arab Republics (April 1971) with Egypt and Syria, and in the "Islamic Arab Republic" (January 1975) with Tunisia. The "cultural revolution" launched in the spring of 1972 opened the way to the gradual implementation of "direct



democracy" and put an end to imitation: Nasirism had never rejected government centralism and party structures.

The "taking of power by the people" logically implies the incumbent higher authority withdraws. On 5 April 1974, Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi transferred to his second in command, Major 'Abd-al-Salam Jalhd, some of his executive and ceremonial functions in order to devote himself to ideological activities and citizens' organizations. The great reforms of 1976-77 followed: on 1 September 1976 a "direct people's democracy" was implemented; it was based on a pyramid of congresses and committees. On 2 March 1977 the general congress of the people met, announced that the era of the masses had come, and proclaimed the "Jamahiriya" (an Arabic neologism that means "popular assembly" or "populocracy," according to the curious official translation of Tripoli), the "people's socialist Arab and Libyan Jamahiriya"; Colonel Qadhdhafi became general secretary of the general congress of the people; on 7 November 1977, being disappointed in the grassroots people's committees' lack of initiative, he launched the "revolutionary committees," which were to "motivate the Arab masses to take advanced positions in preparing a new society."

For Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi, political ascetic, Savonarola of Islam, whose prestige is undiminished among his people, are no less than the "sole way to democracy." In his "Green Book" he describes how they are constructed: "The people are divided into grassroots people's congresses. Each congress chooses its committee.... All public services are directed by people's committees that are responsible to the grassroots people's congresses, which tell them what policies to follow and monitor how they are carried out.... The problems brought up by the grassroots people's congresses shall take final form at the general people's congress (whose debate will be submitted in turn to the original committees...)." But doesn't this pyramid of committees look something like a party structure? And a party structure that would increase arbitrary police and bureaucratic power. We experienced this arbitrary power ourselves when we were held at length by the Benghazi police in the company of other participants at the recent international colloquium at Khan Yunis. When an official of the local revolutionary committee denounced us for photographing the marketplaces in the center of town (which is by no means forbidden, incidentally).

#### Libertarian Impact

The international colloquium at Khan Yunis had as its "primary objective to give the lie to the stereotypes of Libya as a home for international subversion and as the leading danger to the West after Cuba," as the chairman of the organizing committee said in his opening address. Was this objective achieved? The discussions were completely free, and the dialogue between foreign university people and Libyan participants--including Colonel Qadhdhafi--was quite open. We will particularly remember the lively diatribe by the American Clement Henri, which was brilliant though its scepticism was somewhat affected, against the Libyan doctrine of the "power of the masses," and the dense and courageous criticism by the Syrian Isam Noman

of the role of the unions ("professional congresses") in the Libyan constitutional view and of the necessity for a political awakening for the exercise of democracy. More generally, the long-term libertarian impact of Colonel Qadhafi's message should not be overlooked: the Libyan leader's most committed partisans believe firmly in denouncing "such myths...as the party of the working class," and this has a chilling effect--whatever new myths may be substituted for the old. Of course there remains the task of creating a new man: will Libyan society advance as fast as the governing officials in Tripoli would like? This is the eternal problem of ideocracy. A new diplomacy must also be conceived: though Libyan leaders are eager, as is legitimate, to extend their influence in Africa, they have damaged their international image for the sake of a too-narrowly conceived Islamic solidarity by supporting the African regimes that most blatantly ignored civil rights.

Colonel Qadhafi turned away from his quest for the absolute at the end of the first part of his "Green Book" by showing a remarkable sense of relativism: "The era of the masses" (whose advent he announces) "may be accompanied by an era of anarchy and demagoguery." Then he concludes with a disconcerting about-face: "This is true democracy from the standpoint of theory, but in practice, the government always goes to the strong."

- 8722  
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MAURITANIA

COUNTRY SAID TO BE THREATENED WITH FAMINE

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 6 Nov 79 pp 1, 8

[Press conference held by Lt Moulaye Hachem, Commissioner for Food Assistance, 5 November 1979, place not given.]

[Text] Yesterday the commissioner for Food Assistance launched an appeal urging all friendly countries and organizations to come to our aid to realize the emergency program whose basic objective is to avert the famine that is a dangerous threat to our country.

Lt Moulaye Hachem, commissioner for Food Assistance, specified that the government is planning to take a series of measures intended to mobilize all the nations resources.

Thus, in the days ahead, a support fund will be opened and will receive an initial deposit of public funds, the voluntary contributions of our businessmen, civil servants, and all others of good will.

This appeal is included in a statement to the national press, in which the commissioner for Food Assistance also refers to the agro-livestock raising situation and the extent of the cereal deficit experienced by our country this year.

The full text of this appeal follows.

[Question] The Commission for Food Assistance, in conjunction with the Ministry of Rural Development, has just organized a survey mission on the agro-livestock raising situation after the winter season. May we know the essential characteristics of this situation?

[Answer] The Ministry of Rural Development and Commission for Food Assistance, in collaboration with the representatives of friendly nations and

organizations, organized a mission to evaluate agro-livestock raising resources throughout the country after this year's winter season. The mission visited --between 14 and 28 October last -- the regions of Trarza, Brakna, Gorgol, Guidimakha, Hodh el-Charghi, Hodh el-Gharbi, the regions of Assaba and Tagant. While awaiting delivery of the evaluation report under preparation, we can already accept the following conclusions which the mission was able to draw.

First, on the level of crops; the crop situation is causing anxiety among both regional authorities and the populations of all the regions inspected. Several factors explain this state of affairs.

To begin with, the inadequacy and the bad time and space spread of recorded rainfall have seriously compromised harvests.

Pending the weather report which will be included in the evaluation report, it may be considered that this year rainfall measurement shows a deficit of at least 50 percent compared to normal. In addition, the poor rainfall recorded during July and August, as well as intervals of sometimes over a month between two good rainfalls have unfortunately forced peasants to repeat sowings several times. Then, the river level measured at M'Backel is slightly below the level for 1972-1973, the first year of severe drought. According to some experts in the river valley, only 4,000 hectares could be flooded this year, compared to about 31,000 hectares in an average year. To the flood deficit was added a very short soil submersion period. Lastly, desert encroachment and environmental deterioration have reduced the fertility of the soils not yet covered with sand.

Secondly, on the level of livestock raising. Even though the health and constitution of the cattle appear satisfactory at the moment, a particularly long and difficult interim period is still to be expected. Indeed, the uneven distribution of grazing grounds will result, as of the beginning of next year, in great concentrations of animals in the zones where there are still a few grazing grounds left, that is, the south of Trarza, Guidimakha, and the south of Guerou. The movement of herds has already begun for Tamchekett and M'Bout, which are -- as you know -- particularly affected this year.

Concentration of this sort will result in the appearance of numerous hotbeds of disease, and will certainly raise the problem of water supplies for the animals and protection of the few pockets of grazing grounds that still exist.

As a conclusion then of this very sketchy account we can take as facts three basic observations.

First the present year and next year are, from every point of view, similar to 1972, 73, and 1977-78.

Second, the agro-livestock raising regions that have been until now least affected are the most threatened this year.

Third. Contrary to last year, human beings --this year -- are more threatened than animals.

[Question] What in your opinion is the extent of the deficit strictly in terms of cereals that our country will face this year?

[Answer] It is very difficult to answer that question, for all the figures need to estimate the deficit -- expected harvests, existing stockpiles, promised gifts, expected commercial imports, etcetera -- are not yet available, and will only be available in a few months' time. Under reservation, then, of the data in accurate figures which will be supplied in the evaluation report, it is estimated that the harvest will be on the order of 24,000 tons, and that the cereal deficit -- taking into account the other elements as a whole -- will be around 70,000 to 80,000 tons.

[Question] What measures are envisaged to meet this situation, which appears to be a difficult one?

[Answer] To meet it, the government expects to take an important series of measures, whose basic objective is to avert famine and stimulate effort and the spirit of initiative among the population. These measures -- for the moment -- are under study by the various administrative groups involved. The measures will bear -- generally speaking -- on -- first of all -- the protection of a few pockets of grazing lands that still exist, and against predators.

Secondly, the supplying of seeds to food-producing farms that have land, especially, and horticultural equipment for the truckfarming country areas.

Thirdly, the acquisition in the form of gifts of commercial imports of cereal deficit [as published].

Fourth, organization of the movement of herds toward the zones that have grazing lands, the boring of wells in the zones lacking in watering places but supplied with grazing lands.

Fifth, acquisition by the state and by private economic agents of 10,000 tons of animal fodder.

Sixth and last, the fight against brush fires.

For implementation of these measures, the government will depend -- above all -- on national effort, which will consist of mobilizing all resources -- private or public -- to combat the effects of the disaster assailing our country for the last 10 years. A support fund will be opened in the next few days. The fund will receive an initial deposit of public funds, as well as all the voluntary contributions that our businessmen, civil servants, and other persons of good will are kind enough to set aside for it.

Unfortunately, the national effort will be inadequate to meet the serious situation our country is facing. That is why I am taking this opportunity to launch an appeal to all friendly countries and organizations to come to our assistance to realize the planned emergency program.

I am, certainly, already convinced that this appeal will indeed be heard.

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MAURITANIA

MINISTER ASSIGNS PRIORITY TO WATER, ROADS, HOUSING

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 28-29 Nov 79 p 7

Text Major Anne Amadou Babaly, minister of equipment and transport declared in a recent statement to the national press that the government is planning to operate 46 drilling units maintained by regional hydraulic brigades and establish 120 reservoirs in 1980 throughout Mauritania to solve our critical water situation. This problem has appeared in the form of drought since 1968, decimating our livestock and leading to rural migration.

Regarding communications problems which require sizeable investments because of the extent of territory, the government intends to regularly maintain highways, which we have paved ourselves, by creating brigades in Rosso, Nouakchott, Atar, Kiffa and Nema. According to Major Babaly, the state is also contemplating training personnel and improving dirt roads to develop the road network, although that may be too expensive. In answer to a question about the housing policy to provide for "the poorest," Major Babaly thinks that the housing units already constructed by SOCOGIM Mauritanian Construction and Housing Management Company, which has few resources, are not very accessible to officials. He reports that the government is negotiating with Saudi Arabia to purchase 469 housing units and that it intends to expand construction with local materials throughout the country, as it has already done with a company in Rosso.

Regarding prices and methods of assigning housing units constructed by SOCOGIM, Major Babaly justified their prices because of the length of time required to construct them, which is marked by absenteeism of job laborers and regular workers, shortage of materials and expenses for labor, which is not used. The minister did not express any opinion about distribution which is the subject of an inquiry. He said the government has set for itself the goal of distributing land, selling it at a reasonable price to allow people to build, thanks to credits which will be granted them by organizations which have yet to be created. The Minister finally spoke during this interview about the deep water port built by the Chinese People's Republic, whose construction began in April 1979.

8490  
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87

## MAURITANIA

## BRIEFS

FRENCH LOAN AGREEMENTS SIGNED--Major Moulaye Ould Boukhreiss, member of the CMSN [expansion unknown], minister of planning and fishing and Quezel Colomb, director of the Central Economic Cooperation Bank in Nouakchott signed four loan agreements Saturday, involving 20 percent of the total cost of the following projects: 1-plant health protection; 2-encouraging dry crops in Assaba and Guidimaka; 3-irrigated areas in Tamourt Naaj; 4-small irrigated areas in the Boghe Plain. The signing of these agreements is included within the special assistance, which France is offering the eight Sahel countries. The loan is estimated at 100 million French francs or 1 billion UM [expansion unknown] payable in 30 years at an interest rate of 1.5 percent and with 10 years of deferred payments. [Text] Nouakchott CHAAB in French 26 Nov 79 p 1/ 8490

FRENCH COOPERATION AGREEMENT--Major Anne Amadou Babaly, CMSN member, minister of equipment and transport and His Excellency Maurice Courage, French ambassador to Mauritania, signed yesterday a cooperation agreement between Mauritania and France on maritime signal systems. In a statement made to the national press, Major Babaly said that this agreement "will make it possible to strengthen the existing cooperation between our two countries." The minister added that "the reliable operation of signals on our coast guarantees the security of seagoing transport and trade and helps to move the national economy forward." Discussing the benefits of this agreement, Major Babaly again said that "with the cooperation of the French technical service, it will especially allow making studies aiming at the coordination and development of our network of lighthouses and buoys, but also the training of personnel assigned to assure the most efficient operation of shore and ship equipment, in view of the specialization demanded in this field." In conclusion, the minister indicated that "cooperation between our two countries can only go forward." He finally thanked the French authorities in the name of the government



and the CMSN and he asked the ambassador to convey his thanks to all the French people. His Excellency Maurice Courage, speaking in turn, declared he was very impressed by the minister's cordiality. He then said that this agreement is a great advantage for Mauritania and is a sign of the deep-rooted friendship between our two countries. Text / Nouakchott CHAAB in French 24-25 Nov 79 pp 1, 8 8490

NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM--On being questioned recently about government policy on national education, Hashi Ould Didi, minister of primary and secondary education, declared that its objective was to achieve a genuinely national educational system. This policy has two stages. An initial transitory stage which will last 6 years. During this preliminary stage, "it is not a matter of our national languages which will be developed by this organization, to be created and introduced in the framework of the future national system." The minister said it actually involves "two languages of education, with the language of education being the medium through which the child learns beyond the language itself, all the disciplines." In these cases and regardless of the field chosen, each student will have one of the languages as the language of education and the other as the language of communication. The second stage will begin at the end of 6 years in our national educational system. This system, considering the circumstances, will be based on the following principles outlined by the CMSN. Officialization and transcription into Latin characters of our national languages (Fulfulde, Soninke and Wolof). Creation of an institute for the transcription and development of the national languages. Teaching of our national languages which in time, must provide the same opportunities as the other national language, Arabic. Hashi Ould Didi was to add that "what seems certain and undeniable to me is that in this system, each Mauritanian will have to master at least two national languages, in addition to Arabic." Text / Nouakchott CHAAB in French 28-29 Nov 79 p 5 8490

CSO: 4400

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2 OF 2

SULTANATE OF OMAN

COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC ACTIONS IN 1979 REVIEWED

Oman 'UMAN in Arabic 18 Nov 79 p 37

[Excerpts] The following text is a review of the most important actions affecting the structure of the economy in 1979:

Industry

A law for the regulation and encouragement of industry and an insurance law were enacted.

Trade

It was resolved to establish a computer unit to collect and analyze commercial and food statistics.

A resolution was issued requiring merchants to put price tags on goods which they offer for sale and to supply the ministry and commerce with their price lists.

Standards and procedures to regulate the making of advertising signs were adopted so that they will describe commercial operations better and more accurately.

An inspection unit was created to supervise signs and pricing at places of business.

The commercial register was reorganized by the introduction of regulations which will insure that work is performed with more promptness and efficiency.

Dates

The ministry received and registered 1,160 applications for certificates for the 1978 date crop. The harvest was weighed at the ministry's warehouse in the presence of the delegate of the office and recorded, and checks totaling 530,880.628 riyals were issued for them. The value of the ministry's sales during the 1977 and 1978 seasons was 672,119.312 riyals.

The ministry granted 134 permits to export other foodstuffs.

The ministry granted 373 permits to import fruits and vegetables.

The ministry is preparing a tourism program.

The committee for the settlement of controversies settled 48 contract cases, 6 rental cases, 20 cases of disputes between companies, and 129 commercial transaction cases.

The ministry participated in the following meetings and conferences:

The regional preparatory meetings for the Asian component in the 77 Group [of nonaligned countries] in Colombo, which took place from 8 to 17 January 1979.

The preparatory meetings for the 77 Group, which were conducted in Arusha, Tanzania from 6 to 16 January 1979.

The meetings of the fifth session of UNCTAD, which took place in Manila from 7 to 15 June 1979.

The ministry also studied the drafts of economic, technical, and commercial agreements, including the following:

The draft of the agreement to create the Arab Organization for Industrial Development.

The draft of the new agreement between the Arab nations.

The draft of the agreement to create an Arab center for technology.

The draft of a commercial agreement between Romania and the sultanate.

CSO: 4802

SULTANATE OF OMAN

OIL AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTING REPORTED

Oman 'UMAN in Arabic 18 Nov 79 pp 35, 36

[Excerpts] The following text is a brief description of the most important petroleum, mining, and quarrying activities which were carried out in the sultanate in 1979.

Since the beginning of the year, five seismic survey teams have been engaged in surveying 8,000 kilometers of earthquake lines to evaluate the geological structures and phenomena in the various areas of their concessions, especially Wadi Arawnab, Rima, Maradi, Suwayhat, Ruwaylah, Khasqah, Jibal, and Tawf Dahm.

The British Petroleum Group undertook to survey 1,200 kilometers at the beginning of this year, and will drill an exploratory well during the coming year when the geophysical studies have been completed.

The Gulf Oil Company undertook to survey 960 kilometers.

The Oman Petroleum Development Company drilled 10 exploratory wells since the beginning of this year, and found petroleum in the areas of Jalmud, Arawnab, Qata, south Barba, Rima, and Mahjur.

Petroleum development in the south of Oman was begun in 1978, and cost 345 million dollars. Operation there is expected to end in October 1980. The project hopes to produce petroleum in the Amal and Marmul fields.

The petroleum of the Barba, Rima, and Qahrir fields is of the light type, which is considered to be of the best quality, and that of the Jalmud, Arawnab, Amal (southeast), Irad, and Qata fields is of the medium type.

Production from Marmul, Qahrir, and Barba will begin on 1 October 1980 and from Amal and Rahab in January 1981. Planning for the rest of the fields is in progress at the present time.

The Southern Region is expected to produce 1,000,000 barrels per day or more in 1982.

The Alif Company of Oman is now drilling a new confirmation well in the Sambah field, which it discovered last year. The company is going to develop this field, and production from it should begin in October 1980. The company also drilled the Ramlat exploratory well, a deep well in the al-Tubul area, but was not able to produce petroleum from it because of technical difficulties.

The Alif-Jilf [approximation from Arabic spelling] group drilled the Bukha experimental deep well in its maritime concession area in Masandam, and discovered compressed gas in it. Plans for production from this well have been postponed pending the completion of technical and economic studies.

The Amoco group has drilled an exploratory well in its maritime concession area south of Masirah.

At the present time, the Oman Petroleum Development Company is drilling 60 development wells, including the al-Haqn and al-Tawkidiyah wells.

An engineering study is now being done in the Yabal and al-Khuwayr fields to determine the possibility of increasing the petroleum extraction from them.

The quantity of gas which has been discovered in the sultanate is estimated at 4.2 trillion cubic feet, and may amount to more than that with the aid of modern methods of research and exploitation. Studies indicate that there is enough gas to last half a century, and therefore the national economy is concerned with the construction of a gas pipeline 330 kilometers long to transfer it from Yabal to al-Ghabrah.

In January 1978, the government signed an agreement with the U.S. Marshall company and the Canadian Baruskabshan [Prospection?] company to form the Oman Mining Company for the exploitation of copper in the mines of al-Asil, 'Arja', and Bayda' in the area of Suhar.

This company will begin processing 3,500 metric tons of copper per day in 1981. The government owns 75 percent of the shares in the company, and all of its activities are done under the direct supervision of the ministry of petroleum and mining.

The ministry discovered large quantities of gypsum on the surface of the ground in the area north of Salalah.

During a comprehensive survey of the Ra's al-Madd area, the ministry discovered manganese ore.

Studies which the ministry has conducted indicate the presence of large quantities of marble near the capital, in the area between Nazwa and Takhal, and in the area of Bidbid.

In a geological survey of the Wadi Suwi area in al-Sharqiyah, the ministry discovered coal. Coal deposits have also been found in Wadi Has, to the east of the area where it had been found previously.

The ministry discovered new chromium ore deposits in the areas outside of the Oman Mining Company concessions and also near Samad.

An agreement has been concluded with the government of the German Federal Republic to perform geological studies in research and prospecting for chromium ores in the area between Sama'il, Izki, and Samad, the area south of Nazwa, and the area west of Nakhl, all of which lie outside of the area of the concession of the Oman Mining Company. Work will begin in these areas at the beginning of 1980.

An agreement was made with the government of Japan for geological surveying and prospecting in the area between Mirbat and al-Hasak to search for minerals in the lowland rocks and also to search for uranium and other radioactive minerals. The Japanese team will also operate in the area of Ra's al-Hadd in al-Sharqiyah to perform studies on manganese ores and to prospect for manganese ore.

The ministry is exercising complete supervision of all quarrying which is in progress in the sultanate, and is issuing special permits for it. It recently granted a permit to the Oman Cement Company to extract limestone, potter's clay, silica, and gypsum.

CSO: 4802

SULTANATE OF OMAN

IMPROVEMENTS MADE IN WATER AND ELECTRICITY SERVICES

Oman 'UMAN in Arabic 18 Nov 79 p 32

[Text] Since the creation of the Ministry of Electricity and Water by a decree on 14 June 1978, it has been working to provide and improve services in those two fields to meet the requirements of the increasing movement of settlement both in the area of the capital and in the towns and villages of the Sultanate.

Electricity

Attention is being directed toward increasing the quantity of electrical power produced in the capital and providing services for the towns and villages. Twenty-six electrical power stations have been constructed in several areas of the Sultanate.

The government bears about 66 percent of the costs of consumption of electricity. Among the accomplishments which the ministry has made in the field of electrical services are the following:

On 19 September 1978, it contracted with the French Alsthom Company for the installation of 6 gas turbine units in the al-Gharbah electricity station with a total capacity of 205,000 kilowatts at a cost of 8 million riyals. This unit began operation during September and October 1979.

It contracted with the Sojex company [approximation from Arabic spelling] for the operation and maintenance of the al-Gharbah station for the generation of electricity and purification of water from 1 September 1979 to 23 December 1980 at a cost of 4.4 million riyals.

It contracted with the Omani National Electricity Company to operate and maintain 12 electricity generating stations in the towns and villages of the Sultanate for 3 years beginning in June 1978 at a cost of 1.2 million riyals per year. It undertook, through the directorate general of electricity and the Salalah Electricity Office and with the collaboration of a group of national electricity companies, to carry out several projects to improve and renovate the electrical system of the capital and the southern area of Salalah by extending aerial lines of 33,000 and 11,000 volts. Ground cables have also been laid. Total costs of these projects are 2.5 million riyals.



On 5 September 1979, it contracted with the Japanese Seito Company for the construction of a 33,000-volt transformer station at al-Falaj at a cost of 1,430,000 riyals. The project will be completed in June 1980.

On 10 October 1979, it contracted with the Belgian I.T.S. Company for the construction of a 2-circuit 132,000-volt aerial line to carry electrical power from the al-Gharbah electrical station to the al-Falaj transformer station at a total cost of 1.6 million riyals. Work on this project will be completed in May 1980.

It constructed a 33,000-volt aerial power line 30 kilometers long to connect the administrative region of Barka' with the system of the capital.

On 8 November 1978, it contracted for the purchase of 2 Marleys-Blackstone [approximation from Arabic spelling] diesel generators with a capacity of 6,800 kilowatts each to meet the increasing consumption in the southern region, at a cost of 720,000 riyals. The two generators were installed in the Salalah electrical station.

It contracted with the U.S. Global Company for the operation and maintenance of the electricity generating and water desalinating station on the island of Masirah from 21 August 1979 to 20 August 1972 at a cost of 1.2 million riyals.

#### Water Services

A water desalinating station in al-Gharbah, which produced 2.5 to 3 million gallons per day when it was opened in November 1975, now produces 6 million gallons per day.

Efforts are being made to find stable sources of water by digging wells. The ministry has also done the following:

It contracted with the TRAF0 [approximation from Arabic spelling] Company for the construction of three reinforced concrete water reservoirs with special distribution systems. One of these, with a capacity of 4 million gallons, is for the district of greater al-Matrah; another, with a capacity of one million gallons, is for the district of al-Watayah; and the third, with a capacity of 4 million gallons, is for the district of the al-Qarm heights. The total cost of this project is 3.3 million riyals, and it is expected to be completed in May 1980.

It has also contracted with the same company for the construction of a concrete water reservoir and a public water system for the town of Sur at a cost of 2.1 million riyals. It is expected that this project will be completed in October 1980.

A contract was concluded for the construction of a water pipeline linking the main line with Bayt al-Barakah at a cost of 250,000 riyals. Construction on this project was started in May 1979.

The ministry is now prospecting for subterranean water to meet the water requirements of the capital in 1980, and new lines are being planned to facilitate the distribution of water to various parts of the capital. This project will cost 66,000 riyals and work on it will be completed in January 1980.

CSO: 4802

SULTANATE OF OMAN

BRIEFS

POLICE FORCE--The national police force has 13 security units in the various districts of the country. It has an academy, a naval unit, an office of immigration, emigration, and passports, an air wing, a fire-fighting unit, a cavalry unit (which was formed in 1974), a traffic unit, a women's unit, and an office of public relations. [Excerpts] [Oman 'UMAN in Arabic 18 Nov 79 p 17]

CSO: 4802

SYRIA

EVALUATION OF EFFORTS TO STIMULATE EXPORTS URGED

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 11 Nov 79 p 5

[Interview with Mr Salah 'Alwash by S. .: "Public Sector Products Export Committee and Attempts To Stimulate Exports; Exports Suffering From Weak Capabilities and Red Tape; Ten Proposals To Be Studied Until Required Formula Is Found"]

[Text] The rise of imports has serious effects on the balance of trade and the balance of payments. It also has harmful effects on the national industry, especially if such growth in imports is not accompanied by a similar growth in exports.

An awareness of these effects did not stop the trend towards an unreasonable level of imports until last year, 1978. Exports, meanwhile, remained at a constant level with crude oil being the primary and the principal commodity exported, followed by cotton. Together, both constituted between 75 and 80 percent of total exports. Remaining exports consisted of a broad variety of goods exported by the public and the private sectors. Some of these goods were engineering goods; some were chemical goods or textile or agricultural products. If we were to say that [this was the case] until 1978, our statement most certainly means something.

During that year the capacity to cover exports rose from 40 percent to about 55 percent as a result of a set of measures that were taken. But this does not constitute the entire solution; one measure or more must be taken.

The solution lies in two principal matters:

First, imports should be reduced.

Second, exports should be increased.

This is the only way we can achieve equilibrium in our balance of trade which should show a profit. If not, it should at least not show a loss. This is a very important matter.

#### The Status of Public Sector Products

The state places major importance upon the public sector. The National Action Paper for the coming period and the statement of the Progressive National Front have emphasized the importance of this sector and of its leadership. The public sector's production index continued to show that production was increasing, but that it was suffering from several problems, one of which was distribution. Scores of plants were suffering from an overstock of their products. In fact, some of them would occasionally stop production because of the lack of storage space. This is a problem from which most public sector companies suffer. It is, therefore, imperative to have a solution.

This time, the solution comes from one direction.

The solution lies in exports, which, as is said, will get two birds with one stone. On the one hand, exports will contribute to correcting our trade balance, and on the other hand, they will contribute to reducing the burden and the problems of storage. Exports will also push the production process forward after such a channel for distribution is found.

#### Examples

Until late 1978 overstocked merchandise at the Homs Textile Company amounted to approximately 1.5 million yards of fabrics.

At the Silk Industries Company--SATEX--in Aleppo, the quantity of overstocked fabrics amounted to approximately 1 million yards.

At the ready to wear plant in Aleppo there were approximately 3 million articles of clothing. There were also 30,000 cases of beer, and the production of alcohol reached the satiation point.

The case was the same at the glass, matches, underwear and canning plants.

In other words, we had nothing to suggest that we were engaged in exporting in spite of the fact that we have several foreign trade organizations that are engaged in export activity. In other words, the export process was almost stagnant.

#### Rescue Resolution

It was, therefore, inevitable that there be a rescue attempt. Such an attempt would begin with a resolution that would set down practical ideas and give the green light that would set them in motion. The prime minister's Executive Order No 271 was issued on 17 August 1978. It stated the following:

"Out of a desire to stimulate the export of surplus public sector products, and based on public interest requirements, a committee is to be formed to

devote itself, though not exclusively, to [promoting] the export of all public sector products. It would regularly submit to the deputy prime minister for economic affairs a comprehensive report of its accomplishments. This report would show its activities and the results of its efforts."

#### The Committee's First Meeting

On 26 August 1978 the committee that was formed in accordance with the aforementioned resolution met for the first time to review its functions and the requirements for carrying them out. It began by sending the ministries of industry, supply, economy, oil, agriculture and defense as well as other ministries a form which it called the Form of Surplus Products Prepared for Exports.

The form included the following: the name of the commercial product; the technical specifications of the product; the unit; the cost of production; the cost of sales; proposed profit ratios; export sale price; place of delivery; the quantity presently available; the quantity available monthly; time of delivery; method of payment; and packaging.

The form included other essential information which the importer would want to know.

#### The Committee's Ideas

On 12 August 1978 the committee had set down its ideas on an appropriate export formula. It attempted to reply in this formula to the following questions:

What goods do we produce in [Syria]?

What are the materials with which these goods are produced?

For whom are these goods produced?

What is the volume of production compared with available production capabilities?

What are the surplus capabilities or what are their shortcomings?

How are these different goods produced? Is this quantity consistent in general with the requirements of consumers?

The committee also emphasized the importance of defining the following matters:

What are the goods that are ready to meet the needs of the local market?

Does our local production meet those needs?

Is there a surplus in [our] production capability that has not been utilized?

Are we producing in accordance with the needs of the local market or in accordance with available production capabilities?

If production capabilities are greater than local demand, are we to utilize those capabilities to produce what is required by local demand?

There were other essential questions in this regard.

What is important is that the committee attempted to respond to the questions it had raised. It came out with a set of proposals, and it took action on those which concerned it. It left the implementation of the other proposals--which we need not review here because this is not our subject--to the authorized agencies.

#### A Meeting With the Chairman of the Committee

The subject at hand for which we made this preface pertains to the committee which was charged with the task of exporting the goods produced by the public sector. We interviewed Mr. Salah 'Alwash the chairman of the committee in an attempt to find out information about its activities and, accordingly, an answer to this question, "Has the committee fulfilled and is it fulfilling its objective, or should it be considered a stage that we must go beyond and a preliminary formula that we must develop?"

[Question] Why was the committee formed, and what are its functions?

[Answer] The committee was formed out of a desire to stimulate the export of surplus public sector products. It was formed in accordance with the Prime Minister's Order No 271 on 17 August 1978. This committee is not exclusively devoted to this task, and it is convened by its chairman during and after working hours to study all products that are intended for export and to make proposals and recommendations that would overcome all difficulties and bring about the success of the export process.

#### The Committee and Foreign Trade Organizations

[Question] There are special organizations that are affiliated with the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade. These organizations carry out import and export operations. How is coordination between these organizations and the committee brought about? Does the committee curb the activities of these organizations?

[Answer] In accordance with the aforementioned Order No 271 the committee has considered all the authorized agencies--the ministries, the organizations, the companies and others--as being under obligation to facilitate the function of this committee and to provide it with all the information pertaining to the export of products. This includes specifications, prices, payment conditions, delivery, times and location of delivery as well as any other information that would help the committee accomplish its mission successfully.

The committee has not replaced any authority, organization or any other agency that carries out any export operation. It also has not abolished anyone of the roles played by these authorities, organizations or agencies. It came into existence to complement these organizations in an energetic and a flexible manner that would help these organizations move with more speed and more flexibility so that the process of exporting Arab-Syrian products would assume a dynamic and an effective dimension that would go beyond the framework of exporting a conventional commodity and include the possibility of not only exporting surplus goods, but also those goods that can be produced for export in an organized, regular and permanent fashion.

#### An Equation

[Question] We in Syria, like in any other country, still depend in our exports in a principal way on raw materials, whereas we rely in our imports on manufactured and semi-manufactured goods in a principal way also. How do we solve this problem? In other words, how do we reverse the equation?

[Answer] It is possible to reverse the equation. This requires sincerity and devotion to work until we rid ourselves completely or to a large extent of the structure of a consumer society and become completely or to a large extent also a producing society that makes major contributions not only in the spheres of the national economy, but also in those of the international economy.

Continued imports in this manner will in time become a heavy burden on our economy. Accordingly, what is required is the reversal of the equation.

#### The Status of Export Activity

[Question] Let us talk about the status of export activity. Does proceeding from this status guarantee the reversal of this equation?

[Answer] In addition to what we have stated about this status, the capabilities that are offered to support and encourage exports are weak. Information that is necessary about foreign markets is almost nonexistent. The methods that are followed are lacking, and the red tape is totally backward.

#### An Important Step

This status of the process, the tools and the methods of exporting has become the state's primary concern, especially after a large number of industrial projects, agricultural projects and combined industrial and agricultural projects were established, and the need to establish a firm and a developing policy for exporting goods became very urgent. The idea of a Public Sector Products Export Committee was a step on the road and does not represent the complete policy that is expected. Although the creation of this committee was a step on this road, it was a driving and an



effective step in stimulating the industrial exports that are necessary to ensure the publications it needs for correspondence and other purposes.

#### The Committee's Activities

[Question] After this, can you tell us about the volume and the kind of trade operations that the committee has carried out?

[Answer] The committee's first export operation, completed less than 3 months after it was formed, was the export of 500 tons of white alcohol to Lebanon for over 140,000 U.S. dollars.

Afterwards, there were visits to North Yemen, to South Yemen and to Kuwait to study the markets there. Some of the products of the Public Organization for the Trade and Manufacture of Grain, of the Syrian Public Organization for Glass and Ceramics Industries, of the United Arab Company for Matches and Particle Wood and of the Conversion Industries Company were exhibited in those markets. The committee sold some of these products at these markets.

Then the committee visited Iraq and sold goods worth approximately 37 million Syrian pounds to the Socialist sector.

The committee has received in Syria a delegation from the Public Organization for Trading Consumer Goods in Iraq, and it sold Syrian products worth almost 33 million Syrian pounds.

In Jordan, products of the Conversion Industries Company and white medical alcohol worth 170,000 dollars have been sold.

We have also exported goods worth 50,000 U.S. dollars to different markets adjacent to Kuwait.

Last July the committee oversaw the setting up of an exhibition of Arab-Syrian products in Baghdad. Goods from the public, the private and the vocational sectors worth 40 million Syrian pounds were sold. Other contracts were signed with public sector organizations. The contracts are worth almost 20 million Syrian pounds.

#### Proposals for Establishing an Export Organization

[Question] We ask again about the status and the functions of the committee and about the justifications for the existence of foreign trade organizations. We do not believe that this situation can be logical. Do you have an idea of a suitable formula for an organization, for organizations or committees that would carry out the export process?

[Answer] The committee has proposed to the supreme responsible authorities a comprehensive view of an appropriate formula for establishing a public

organization that would specialize in exports. It has emphasized that until such an organization is established, we must do the following in order to continue the export process with all available capabilities:

1. We must direct all the sectors of production to reconsider the production capabilities that are available to them and to indicate these surplus capabilities that may be utilized in exports through annual plans that make note of those capabilities with the foreknowledge of the committee.
2. These sectors are to be directed to reconsider their cost accounting for export purposes.
3. These sectors are to improve and to develop their productivity. They are to pay attention to the principles of packaging and of preparing such packages appropriately and safely.
4. We are to assist these sectors in lifting many of the restrictions that prevent them from taking flexible action to export their products.
5. We are to study markets that are socially similar to ours, and we are to establish trade centers there where our products would be displayed to familiarize these markets with our products so we can market them through these trade centers.
6. We are to utilize our embassies, the chambers of commerce and industry and banks to furnish ourselves with all the information possible about all the markets.
7. We are to take advantage of international expositions that are held either in Arab countries or in foreign countries.
8. We are to establish all the terms that are necessary to make it easy for the different production sectors to stimulate the export of their products which are ready for export or their surplus products and their exportable products.
9. We must also utilize all possible means to advertise our products well. This includes full compliance with the ideal conduct for exporting goods and finding the necessary appropriations for this purpose.
10. We are to establish, train, develop and motivate on different levels the cadre that is necessary for this process.

#### An Evaluation Process

These are proposals whose possible application and effectiveness in stimulating the work of the committee or of other organizations, we cannot determine alone. However, we do think that these proposals are important

and reasonable, but so that we can be more specific, we are asking for an evaluation of this committee and of its activities. If the result of the evaluation shows that the committee succeeded in the mission with which it was charged, and we believe that it has accomplished this mission, we must continue to support it until we succeed in finding a suitable and a permanent formula for carrying out the export process. We believe that expanding this committee is possible and that its members ought to be devoted exclusively to the proposed organization.

Giving export [activity] major, exclusive and specialized attention will have numerous effects on the national revenue. It will balance the Syrian balance of trade and will make a glorious contribution to the international economy.

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SYRIA

NEW ECONOMIC VISTAS PROJECTED

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 12 Nov 79 pp 10-11

[Interview with Dr Husayn Ibrahim by 'Abd al-Ru'uf al-Safri]

[Excerpts] Economic policy is being concentrated on developing resources and self-capabilities, both material and human. This means that we are heading toward true progress.

The exploitation of oil nationally has important repercussions on our growth progress, but in practice, we had not thought about concentrating on developing the remainder of our resources and mineral wealth, most of which being of more importance than oil, until after confirmatory action, especially when it was done by the General Institution for Geology and Mineral Wealth.

Despite the short life of this organization, it has been able to establish its credentials and capabilities on different levels, since it has supplied, and will continue to supply our national economy with enormous capabilities and has surpassed oil potentials scores of times.

This organization has been able to complete the geological survey of many parts of the country. The results, established on a scientific basis, were excellent. Thus survey was badly needed, since it is considered the basis for the raw materials exploration program.

This organization, without our knowledge or our being told by the public industrial sector organizations, has submitted economic feasibility studies for several proposed projects. At the same time, this organization advocated the preparation and training of national cadres which will be required, commensurate with the determined capabilities during the next few years, for the development of our mineral resources, especially the exploitation of iron ore in Zabdari, salt mines, asphalt, chrome and copper, as well as the exploitation of sandy limestone, magnesium, basaltic wool, red brick and gypsum, and increasing our exports of phosphates and other kinds of mineral wealth not yet exploited in a manner required and desired.

Our conversation with Dr Husayn Ibrahim, director general of the General Institution for Geology and Mineral Wealth, which has lasted more than 10 hours, is based on facts which the organization has established during its young life, and at the same time deals with a comprehensive review of this organization's accomplishments up to the present time, as well as the future probabilities for our national economy. Finally, it is a candid discussion of the directions of industry as a whole in the country.

However, permit me to say, before setting forth the dialogue, that I had imagined that our industrial potential, or more precisely our raw material resources, were modest and limited. But after this conversation I was persuaded that the contrary was true. The organization will supply our economy with enormous capabilities, and our country, as soon as the raw materials are exploited and industrialized, will surely be among the wealthy and developed nations. However, this organization has difficulties and problems, the foremost being interference, routine, and so forth.

However I don't wish to prolong my introduction. It is better that we begin the interview.

[Question] It is well known that since its inception, the institution has raised the point of the need to exploit raw materials, particularly building materials, as substitutes for cement. How far has this got to, and what is the importance of that with respect to the local market?

[Answer] We raised the idea of manufacturing building materials on the basis that they could be a replacement for cement, at a time when our construction sector was relying especially on cement. This is what creates a kind of monopoly, as well as encouraging the growth of the black market. This is a well-known economic fundamental in all of the world. From this standpoint, we raised the matter of cement substitutes, relying upon the availability of raw materials for construction in the country and in various localities. For example:

Limestone, or lime in general, is abundant in the country in a ratio of approximately one third to the soil. As for sand, I don't believe that anyone would deny that we have many types of sand. Then there is marbled limestone, I mean marble. Then there is another material, natural gypsum. There is a sixth of the country's area covered with basalt rocks, which can be used as stone for construction or which can be smelted and industrial materials extracted from it, to be used in several industries, for example basaltic wool. The raising of these ideas requires their clarification and simplification to enable us to give a clear picture of all the aspects, such as new industrial materials to assist our national economy, so that we can increase the diversity of the construction [industry]. This is what is impairing our economy so far.

[Question] What can be said about asphalt and its two types, and is the reserve sufficient to be industrialized? What is the economic extent of this project in the event of industrialization?

[Answer] We have a huge reserve of natural asphalt material in its two types, calcic and sandy, from which the heavy oils and so forth can be extracted. The overflow can be used as raw materials for construction, and also red brick can be manufactured from it. Arab and foreign countries have a more than 10 year headstart on us in this industry. I say that regretfully because these raw materials are abundant in our country and readily available in all parts of the country. No one has so far done anything to exploit them.

[Question] What is the economic extent of this project in the event of industrialization?

[Answer] It would certainly be economical. Studies which we have done so far have proved that it is economical and that there is absolutely no reason to delay implementing these projects. I must emphasize that these projects should have been carried out 20 years ago, or at least begun.

We now have a study for the asphalt project, for the purpose of setting up a factory in Latakia to produce asphalt tiles at the rate of 1.25 million squares annually. We are now on the verge of completing it once the tests and analyses of samples have been completed.

[Question] What about economic feasibility studies for the rest of the proposed projects?

[Answer] First of all, the economic feasibility study for the gypsum project has envisioned the establishment of three economic production units in areas where this raw material is available.

The second project concerns marble, for the purpose of industrializing this very important material, which the country imports at an annual cost of more than 100 million Syrian pounds in hard currency.

Two facilities will be established in Latakia and Damascus. We have been eager for that, because we can show solid evidence of this industry's feasibility and importance for the country. We have found in those areas excellent types of marble, comparable to and competitive with Italian marble. Our reserve is sufficient for 100-200 years and comprises seven different types of marble. We proposed the establishment of two facilities several months ago.

[Question] What about the cost of these two facilities?

[Answer] We completed the economic feasibility study for the marble project in 1978. At the same time we did a parallel study of soliciting bids based on economic factors and on the size of our initial production, and we settled and committed ourselves. However, I'm sorry to say, certain bureaucratic actions and some interference forced us to postpone the project until the second half of this year. I was unable to give the go-ahead

to the specific foreign company until 26-7-79. The costs of the project have not increased much despite the fact that we compressed the construction costs and made use of every element and material. The costs will not exceed 50 million Syrian pounds for the two places, including the equipment needed for the quarries and overseeing the civilian installations. The production value of the project for a year and a half will fully cover these costs.

The third study is an economic feasibility study for the sandy limestone project. I would like to emphasize this because it is of considerable importance, if we realize that the country as yet does not have a single lime factory. This is very regrettable if we recall that a third of the country's soil is calcic. We import burned lime from Lebanon, and lime is used in various chemical industries. We did a study on erecting a lime factory, in addition to a sandy limestone works. It is less expensive than concrete and pumice stone. Its costs might be less than half the cost of pumice stone. Apart from that, limestone is more suitable than pumice and more resistant. From all aspects, it can be an excellent substitute for pumice and for cement in the construction sector. We also have some other studies which will be completed soon, such as red fired brick. When I obtain the results of the semi-finished tests, we will complete the feasibility study for red brick and submit it to higher authorities.

[Question] What about magnesium; is it possible to produce that locally?

[Answer] Magnesium is a heat-resistant element well-known in the world and is used in vast quantities in all industries which use ovens. The raw material for this element is abundant here in the area of al-Basayt. It is the "green rock" whose scientific name is "serpentine," and is found in huge quantities. We have made preliminary studies with respect to exploration, geological survey, excavation and digging. Samples were taken and analyzed, and we have sent off semi-finished samples. We hope to receive the results soon so that we can complete the economic feasibility study for this project. This will be one of the most important of our projects and most ideally suited for a developing country such as ours. One ton of this material sells for 700 dollars in most world markets, and the demand for it is increasing as time goes on.

Then there is the salt project. We are now working to amend the previous study. A preliminary study has been drawn up to erect a small complex in the al-Tabbanah area to develop the mine, to establish a small facility, in addition, to package the salt for cooking and for industrial uses, and a third small facility to produce hydro- and sodium chloric acid. This is what is called integration of small industries and integration of raw materials industry.

[Question] What about the institution's new projects in accordance with the Fourth Five-Year Plan?

[Answer] The fact is that the institution has no Fourth Five-Year Plan, because it was established in the middle of the fourth plan. The previous directorate of geological research had a plan limited to exploration activities and certain geophysical survey operations.

We have deviated from this plan, not at all out of a desire to deviate, but because the institution has been tasked with new duties. It has been made incumbent upon us to propose extra-ordinary projects outside the scope of the fourth plan. For example, the iron ore project in the al-Zabdani area. After the exploration and survey operations were completed, we proved the increase in the reserve quantities, in a way which could be said that we have a reserve sufficient to establish the industry, if this industry is confirmed after completion of the economic feasibility study now being prepared. In the light of exploration and other operations, we signed a memorandum in which we referred to the reserve. His Excellency the president issued an order to follow up on this benefit. We are inspired by this direction and this august wish which motivates us to continue our work. The amount of our reserves has increased remarkably and surely. If the economic feasibility is proved, I see no reason not to establish this industry. Bear in mind that we import more than 800,000 tons per year of iron and steel products, using hard currency. This is what overburdens the national economy.

[Question] What about the institution's budget and its new projects for next year?

[Answer] I was told that we asked for a huge budget for 1980; I believe these words to be somewhat exaggerated, because I have not asked for projects which existed previously. These projects are being broached for the first time. I look at the returns from the project and at its economic benefit. I want to begin the project when the economic study is completed, but the fact of routine and bureaucracy stands in the way of that.

It was not at all our fault that these projects have not been broached before. This does not mean that they are bad and that our scientific convictions should not be carried out. We have broached them in all confidence, sincerity, and truthfulness, bolstered by statistics, legal opinions, expertise and hard work, and our projects cannot be delayed.

Therefore, we only ask in light of what our studies in the institution show, after the time-table for implementation for this industry has been drawn up. Next year we will be ready to begin implementing the sandy limestone project. But actions are taken at times which affect the economic feasibility study. The world is in constant and continual motion. Moreover, the gypsum project was delayed 217 days and the marble project 6-7 months. I am afraid that the plans and the implementation schedule, which I am now setting up in the institution, will have to be skipped, if the routine and the bureaucracy oppose us. When I planned to carry out four projects next year,



I was opposed by the same obstacles and roadblocks placed in our way for the previous projects. Naturally we will not be able to implement these projects. They appear, at the end of 1980, to be uneconomical, although this evaluation is incorrect.

Moreover, next year we have the magnesium project. I emphasize it because it is one of the very important projects of its kind, since it introduces a new factor into our national industry. It is not technologically difficult but it does require new expertise. We are now acquiring that.

I believe that these studies, the previously mentioned economic feasibility studies, along with the magnesium, salt and fired brick studies, all will be completed in the first quarter of 1980. I stress this date because I am also committed to it. In the event higher authorities approve, we will be ready within 2 weeks to begin. You see, my timetables to implement these projects are subject to the bureaucracy and to certain obstacles and hindrances.

[Question] Are the laws the obstacle or what?

[Answer] I think and believe that our present laws are suitable. If we apply them lock, stock and barrel, and unless our work is hindered, I believe that they enable us to fully carry out whatever actions we wish in order to implement the projects. The obstacles are not in the laws but in their execution. Bad execution is the basic obstacle and hindrance to these endeavors.

We have requested 390 million Syrian pounds for next year. I wish to note here that this amount is no more than what one production line in an existing cement factory in our country requires. Does this take into account inflation? At the time the reverse was true.

Then there is the al-latrite project. This is next in importance to bauxite in the extraction of aluminum. We made a study in the institution, and this material is found here west of Homs. We have made several tests, during which we worked more than 7 months. We are awaiting results of the analysis of the samples. Note that Poland for years has exploited aluminum from this same material found here in abundance. Note that we have not charged the state anything.

We in the institution, because of our expertise, offer the desired authority, initiative, and cooperation with specific, professional units.

[Question] What have you prepared for the coming Fifth Five-Year Plan?

[Answer] We are now drawing up time-tables for the fifth plan. I believe that we will expand in the area of exploiting raw materials, exploring for them, evaluating them in terms of economics, and attempting to industrialize them as a matter of course.

We have the matter of chrome and copper in al-Basayt. This has special importance especially for the president and for the institution as well. We have surveys underway in many parts of the country for certain of the colored minerals, such as zinc and lead. We are exploring now for these things and are coming up with initial signs and indications, calling for optimism. This is also the case regarding oil shale.

We are now putting our efforts on the fifth plan, and we will work out the details for some of the projects whose studies were not completed during the Fourth Five-Year Plan.

I think that the Fifth Five-Year Plan will be tantamount to a phase of implementation, to implement not less than six projects of the most economical and most feasible projects of the national economy and which will support the remaining areas of industry.

Nevertheless, I think as concerns the five-year plan: you know that sometimes three-fourths of a five-year plan's projects generally are recycled from the previous plan. Therefore, we err in estimating the record of timely programs for an industrial project; the influence of development forces the matter to be the reverse of what is planned, and the scientific language of the age must be dealt with and understood.

We are now setting up a study group in the areas of geology and mineral resources, which included geological survey and evaluations of competence. For the next 20 years future surveys for mineral wealth in the country will be based on this. This survey will mean indications for us either to implement the Fifth Five-Year Plan or to conceive features of the plan to follow. This will give us a great deal of protection from error.

[Question] Our country is in a technological transition stage; is it possible for the institution and the country to shorten and compress it?

[Answer] In fact, this is what I wanted to respond to, under the slogan of small production units without recourse, or rather instead of large industrial complexes, beginning with industries which do not need very high technical expertise and do not need very high technology, and without recourse to a need for complicated industries, which would compel us to import nearly everything from abroad.

We are now asking ourselves to build an industry from the bottom to the top. The industrial pyramid must rest on a base, and cannot begin the other way around.

The large industrial complex creates and brings with it problems which can be summarized by two factors:

1. The administrative factor. We do not have this now, because the industrially advanced foreign nations developed this element during more than 100 years.

2. Complex technology in large industrial complexes requires public utilities and so-called supplementary industries which must be ready at any time to supply these complexes not only with spare parts or raw materials, and the like. We have examples, but let us urge it. We have proposed the small industrial facility whose economic feasibility can be proved before anything is committed to the raw materials. In the future, these small industrial units can be expanded. This small installation is like a building brick, the first foundation stone, upon which we can add more stones in the future. Therefore, the small complex which I envision for the rock salt in Dayr al-Zawr is composed of three production units joined together. These small industrial units are of great social importance. The technology of these units can be controlled and consequently, we are qualified, throughout, to solve their small problems, whereas it would be the reverse with large industrial complexes, looking out for problems which we had never before faced, because we had never passed through the stage of developing small industries. This is currently being done in India, Algeria, and some African states. The industrially advanced nations never advocate the establishment of these units and these installations, because they see that as a danger to their interests, since the developing nations in this way can rapidly reach a specific industrial level and will be able to do without imports.

In the small units, the maintenance time can be compressed, and their production capacity can in fact be achieved.

[Question] It has been observed that many of the country's old and new industrial installations cannot achieve the production capacity set for them. Why?

[Answer] Such installations as these lacked economic feasibility studies. In all candor we must say that no economic feasibility study has been found for many of the large projects. The truth is that the country's economic capabilities are vast, but the workforce has been located badly in some areas. Within the scope of our organization, we have taken steps to correct this matter diligently and with scientific conviction. Before everything else, we use statistics to prove specific quantity, type, length, width, and depth of any operation in its place. I believe that during the next 20 years, if we continue on this program, you will see very small industries but they will be effective and will support the national economy effectively, and will be preparing themselves for expansion.

Comment: A conversation like this with Dr Husayn Ibrahim is lengthy, and there are several different and positive comments about iron, phosphates, etc., which we will deal with in detail next time.

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114