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Japan Report

(FOUO 1/80)

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

JCP DIETMAN ON U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE, MIDDLE EAST

OW011001 Tokyo JPS in English 0858 GMT 1 Dec 79 OW

[Excerpts] Tokyo Dec 1 JPS--On behalf of the Japanese Communist Party and the Progressive Unity, Mitsuhiro Kaneko, deputy chief of the Secretariat took the floor in the Lower House plenary session, posing questions on political discipline of the Ohira cabinet, problems of state finance crisis, energy, corruption and scandals, security, and foreign policy.

On the energy problem, Mitsuhiro Kaneko called for a control on wild-profit seekings and speculations by oil majors, major companies and trading firms, and a curb on rising oil prices. Calling for a fundamental policy change to overcome the present energy crisis, he demanded that the government (1) end the U.S.-followed diplomatic policy toward the Mideast and establish economic relations with Mideast countries on the principles of equality and mutual benefits, and (2) launch on the rehabilitation of domestic coal industry.

Kaneko touched on the relations between U.S. military bases located in Japan and planned military operations by the U.S. in the Middle East, questioning the government's views, he asked:

The U.S. 7th Fleet, making Yokosuka a home port, is now being sent to Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. This sailing is being carried out at the time when U.S. President Carter is suggesting a military intervention in Iran. This is the matter of extremely seriousness, and sheds light again the dangerous features of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. How does the Japanese Government view the sailing of the U.S. 7th Fleet? If the government approves its sailing, it means that Japan is sharing military threats against the Middle East with the U.S.

Should Japan hope to promote friendly relations with Middle East countries, and for a new resolution of energy based on the principle of mutual benefit. The Prime Minister must declare in Japan and abroad that the government will not allow to use U.S. military bases in Japan for military interventions in the Middle East countries, and must strongly lodge a protest with the U.S. administration.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'AKAHATA' EDITORIAL ON LDP, SINGLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCY

OW031359 Tokyo JPS in English 0850 GMT 3 Dec 79 OW

[JPS headline: "New Moves To Introduce Single Member Constituency System: AKAHATA Editorial"]

[Text] Tokyo Dec 3 JPS--Since the beginning of the second Ohira cabinet, the Liberal Democratic Party has been rapidly stepping up its maneuvers for the introduction of the single member giving a warning to these moves.

The editorial says: "The single member constituency system which will lead the LDP occupy to attain absolute majority seats in the Diet, has been consistently maneuvered by them for introduction, to check their historically inevitable retreat, and to establish their one-party domination. In the last general election, the LDP suffered a big defeat, and the JCP gained 41 seats, the highest mark in the party history. Needless to say that this has become a new motive for the government and the LDP to maneuver for the introduction of the single member constituency system.

"Using a focal trick of recent political scandals, and repeating deceptive propaganda that 'an inexpensive election is needed' (for preventing the political corruption), the LDP government is doing their best to take in the opposition parties for the introduction of the small constituency system.

Furthermore, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party, anti-communist opposition parties, are rapidly exposing their essence as new government parties, analogous to the decline of the LDP, and revealing their programs for the alliance with the LDP forces, and even the Socialist Party, influenced by Komeito, has taken a step for the right leaning line. It should not be overlooked that this has given a realizable condition to the LDP for their maneuvers for the introduction of the single member constituency system.

"We are giving a strong warning that a dangerous sword is being pointed at the root of democracy now, and appeal to all people aspiring for democracy to rise in action to prevent the danger, rising above the differences of the political parties they support."

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MILITARY

STANCE ON SDF EXERCISES WITH FOREIGN FORCES ADOPTED

OW050415 Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 2 Dec 79 Morning Edition p 1 OW

[Excerpts] The Maritime Self-Defense Force [MSDF] is scheduled to participate in Operation Rimpac next March jointly with the Canada, Australian and New Zealand navies, as well as the U.S. 3d Fleet. A government source disclosed on 1 December that Japan's decision to participate in this exercise was made personally by Prime Minister Ohira.

According to the same source, the United States suggested the exercise plan this past March. Subsequently, the defense agency and the Foreign Ministry discussed the matter, and in late April, just before Prime Minister Ohira's U.S. visit, the then defense agency director, Yamashita, asked for Prime Minister Ohira's decision on the matter. The prime minister then decided to allow the MSDF to participate in the exercise. Later, in October, the defense agency formally decided in favor of the plan after consulting the Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. In making this decision, the defense agency once again obtained the prime minister's prior approval.

In the past, joint exercises with U.S. forces were subject to the defense agency director general's approval. Therefore, it was unusual that the prime minister's prior approval was sought for exercise Rimpac. This indicates that despite the contention that Rimpac is merely an "extension of Japan-U.S. joint exercises," Rimpac is something different from past exercises.

Rimpac will mark the first exercise in which Japan will join with other countries besides the United States. This exercise includes some phases which cannot be explained within the framework of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. That is why the government formulated a uniform view to justify Japan's participation in that exercise.

Cabinet Legislation Bureau Chief Tsunota's remarks during the Upper House Budget Committee interpellation session on 28 November were made in line with this uniform view. He said: "Exercises with any foreign country are possible as long as they are 'educational training necessary to perform the assigned activities' as prescribed in Section 21, Article 5 of the Defense Agency Establishment Act."

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However, opposition parties began to criticize this uniform view on the grounds that it indicated an attempt to drastically expand the scope of countries with which Japan would carry out joint exercises, and there should be a "brake." As a result, the defense agency was compelled to adopt a basic stance on future joint exercises.

Thus the defense agency interprets the government's uniform view as having the following legal constraints:

1. Japan cannot exercise collective self-defense rights nor participate in exercises which assume support for other nations.
2. Japan cannot participate in offensive exercises in view of its commitment to the defense-only principle.

Thus the defense agency has reaffirmed its stand that "it is legally impermissible for Japan to participate in exercises like Operation Team Spirit which assumes an incursion from the DPRK."

As a matter of policy judgment, the defense agency puts the following restrictions on even those exercises which are legally possible:

1. Joint exercises will be carried out with free countries only.
2. No joint exercise will be conducted with parties in conflict or divided countries.

Thus the defense agency will push its stand that joint exercises with the ROK are impossible.

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MILITARY

EXPERTS DEBATE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER JSDA

Pessimistic Future of Civilian Control

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Oct 79 pp 105-108

[Article by Professor Michio Morishima of London University: "Heated Debate: War and Peace--Question of New 'New Armament Plan'"]

[Excerpts] Let us move onto the topic of civilian control. Like Mr Seki, I, too, believe that if we are to have a military force, civilian control should be established. A modern military force exists not for the purpose of satisfying the combative nature of citizens, but as a means for attaining political objectives--among them, independence. Therefore, the military should be subordinated to politics. On this point there is no disagreement between us. My special warning to Mr Seki has to do with the incomplete nature of the basis for civilian control in Japan. Establishing (nominal) civilian control without regard to foundation building, and thinking that all is well because there is a framework of civilian control may lead to the breakdown of that control, takeover by the strengthened military and reversion to the military control era of the past. A worse situation still would be if the civilians themselves become fascist and directly use the military for evil purposes. (One must not forget that the Nazi corps were a civilian-controlled military force.) Therefore, I cautioned that the foremost need is the construction of a social foundation.

To my argument, Mr Seki rebutted that, "although I, too, [word "too" underlined in text by Morishima] agree that the calibre of (Japanese) politicians is poor, nevertheless, this is a comparative question."¹ "The Self-Defense Force of today is different from its counterpart of the militaristic era." "It is true that Japan's democracy has some half-fledged features, but this, too, is a comparative question and I think that considerable credit can be given to Japanese democracy."² Mr Seki's line of reasoning is not always clear, but judging from above passages, he appears to believe that though the calibre of Japanese politicians is low, they are at least capable of controlling the military. The Self-Defense Force differs from the old military corps, and democracy is well established in Japan. Therefore, it

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is possible for Japan to have a "considerable degree" of civilian control-- though not 100 percent. And as a finishing stroke, he adds, "I do not think that the Japanese people would be foolish enough to make the same mistake twice--on the question of civilian control. Mr Morishima appears to under-rate the Japanese people's sagacity. I do not know about the Japanese intellectuals, but I think the people at large are not such fools."³

I do not believe that Mr Seki's thinking is convincing. He hypothesizes that there is a perfect society and rates the actual situation by its distance from this perfect state. He seems to think that as Japanese are no fools, if we eliminate the faults and encourage the good points, Japanese society is going to approach the state of perfection by and by. I do not agree. Each society has merits and weaknesses, but frequently there are situations in which merits are at the same time weaknesses, and vice versa. I stressed this point in "England and Japan" and its "Sequel." My essay regarding amateurism and professionalism in relation to civilian control was based on the same concept. The choice between amateurism, which has certain merits and disadvantages, and professionalism, which possesses a different set of advantages and weaknesses, rests with the citizens' value sense.

If my thinking is correct, Englishmen would try to develop the meritorious aspects they themselves value highly. (I mean by this that there are weaknesses corresponding to the strong points.) Germans will try to develop strong points that Germany possesses. As a result, in spite of "card" reshuffling resulting from numerous wars, England and Germany still persist in their respective "card" gathering. Consequently, their fates are always at odds with one another. In the same vein, Japan has its own unique value sense and because of it, Japan has achieved success, but at the same time is faced with difficulties. Of course, people's value orientation is not fixed and changes with the passage of time. But it is too optimistic to suppose that it is capable of great change. Fortunately (unfortunately for Mr Seki), the current Self-Defense Force is a weak body and thus at present, the problem is not evident, but if it develops to a scale approximating the old military corps, then it will become independent and will eventually develop into a uniquely Japanese military force. To the degree that the postwar Japanese businesses--their operation and labor management--resemble prewar Japanese businesses rather than English businesses, the new Japanese military force is more akin to Japan's old military corps than to the English military.

With this new Japanese military force encounters a situation akin to that faced by England during 1935-1938 (a situation where the German strength on the Continent was greatly aggrandized as a result of the British cabinet's appeasement policy), would it disregard the situation as the British military force had done? When we consider their professional conscience, their sense of responsibility as Japanese, it would not be surprising at all if they decided to break the law, disregard protocol and assume power. Moreover,

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many people would either give tacit permission to their revolt or they might even support their action. Especially if an influential thinker like Mr Seki declares that the politicians have been poisoned by appeasement doctrine, they would be encouraged to translate their belief into action.

What has thus far been described would have taken place (and did take place) in the old Japanese military corps. Mr Seki would probably claim that the present Self-Defense Force is not the old military corps, and thus such a situation can never be. But the incident he cited as proof of the distinction between the two military groups (the fact that when Yukio Mishima burst into the Self-Defense Force compound and tried to stir them into action, he failed to incite the Self-Defense corps) was of a trivial nature. There was no imminent threat. A peculiarly uniformed man with a Japanese sword crashes into the compound and urges them to act according to his unique concept of aesthetics. The professionals simply laughed it off. If they had been stirred even slightly by Mishima's plea, they, too, would have been mad.

Even in the old military force Mishima's theatrical demonstration would not have had any impact except during the mass civilian hysteria era toward the end of the war.

In the 2.26 [February 26th] incident, the soldiers were incited by a small band of young officers. But these officers--especially the leader, Captain Shozo Ando--were men of exceptional character devoted to the welfare of their men. Moreover, many soldiers who participated in the incident were acting under orders. To compare the soldiers inveigled by Ando and other officers with the Self-Defense men who reacted with contempt toward Mishima's agitation speech and to conclude that the Self-Defense Force is unlike the old military force is like comparing a child who scores only 10 points in a differential calculus test with one's own child who scores 100 percent in an ordinary arithmetic test and concluding that the latter has a superior brain.

In any case, in a national emergency, if the Diet members chosen by popular vote (and ultimately the prime minister) are incompetent and indecisive, the military will not act, either. This in a nutshell is the formula for civilian controlled military. I think that among the readers there are those who hold that in such an extraordinary situation, the military should be resolute and act independently in order to protect the country. As long as many people believe this, we must conclude that there is a latent tendency toward military control in Japan. In order for soldiers and civilians alike to believe that even under such an extraordinary situation, the military should not act on its own, the Japanese value orientation must be altered.⁴ Civilian control must necessarily be preceded by the building of a foundation for civilian control. Without fulfilling this necessary condition, it would be a counterfeit civilian control which will collapse at a crucial time.

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FOOTNOTES

1. I have never once said that the quality of Japanese politicians was low in my previous essays. I have merely pointed out that the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Japan is different from that in England.
2. Mr Seki states that, "Mr Morishima stresses the fact that Japan is an anti-amateur state. Does this mean that he holds that democracy is unsuitable in Japan?" I am not of the opinion that democracy in any form will not thrive in a country which professes anti-amateurism. In reality, Japan is a democratic state, at least in form, and parliamentarism has been well established here since before the war. But the relationship between amateurs (general public and its representatives) and professionals (bureaucrats, soldiers and so on) in a state where amateurism prevails is different from a state espousing professionalism.

In a democracy where the professionals were dominant, legally chosen parliamentary representatives were not able to rebut at all--not even in parliamentary debate--once they had been "silenced" regarding military affairs by the military. In this manner, the mode of life in a democracy in which the professionals are dominant differs from a life in a democracy where amateurs are dominant. When we state that democracy is well established in Japan, we need to consider what type of democracy is well established in Japan.

3. I have never undervalued the sagacity of the Japanese people. Mr Seki states that "common people of Japan are not fools; thus they are not so foolish as to repeat the same mistake twice, even on the question of civilian control." If this logic is true, as long as Japanese are not fools, a former mistake will never be repeated. Such a claim is the worst type of persuasive argument. I have heard this kind of absurd and dangerous logic from those who professed to be "imperialist economists" and/or "Japanese (nationalist) economists" during the war. I think that Mr Seki is about to repeat their mistake. Of course, Mr Seki appears to regard the Japanese intellectuals as fools. Thus for the intellectuals to commit this kind of error twice would not be inconsistent at all to Mr Seki.
4. In a country where the citizens have a certain type of value orientation, if the national assembly becomes putrefied, a coup d'etat will result as a matter of course. The fact that Japanese democracy is not quite so brittle is attested to by the Lockheed incident and the like (!), but even in Japan, once the people realize that the parliament or the cabinet is powerless against an external enemy, they will probably readily assent to the abolition of civilian control.

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Optimistic View on 'Civilian Control'

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Oct 79 pp 139-141

[Article by Yoshihiko Seki, lecturer at the Waseda University and chief editor of JAPAN ECHO: "Heated Debate: War and Peace--Question of New 'New Armament Plan'"]

[Excerpts] As many people have pointed out, the question of civilian control is indeed a difficult problem. Mr Morishima warns me that the basis of civilian control has not been sufficiently established in Japan, and that without laying down the foundation for it, there is a danger of reversion to the old military control era, or else the civilians themselves may become fascist and use the military for evil ends. It is not clear as to what Mr Morishima means by laying the foundation for civilian control. But when I think of the basis for civilian control, I think of diffusion of parliamentary democracy and democratic socialism in the sense of enlargement of social justice.

I think that relative to the short history of democracy in Japan, the above-noted foundation laying has been quite successfully accomplished in Japan. This is demonstrated by the fact that although the Communists and the Liberal Democrats were poles apart in the 1950's, today both sides have come closer to the middle of the road, at least in domestic policies. This can also be assumed from the well-established support toward the democratic principles of the new constitution among the populace. In these regards I give quite a high score to the Japanese. Of course, this is not to say that there are no shortcomings.

Mr Morishima further states that, "Mr Seki hypothesizes that there is a perfect (100 percent) society, and that Japanese society is gradually moving toward this perfect state." This is a complete misinterpretation. I have always denounced the theory that there is a perfect society in this world. If such a state does exist, then social progress would come to a halt. What I want to say is that it is possible to express as an abstract ideal a direction toward which we should go. Without such direction no social reform would be possible.

In relation to this, Mr Yuichi Yoshikawa, chairman of Peace for Vietnam Committee, has stated in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU that "the necessary thing is a nation building effort that the populace of a given country can accept as worth defending. If the country is worth defending, its people will automatically rise to resist an unjust invasion." On reading this passage one receives the impression that Japan is not a country worth defending. In so far as there can not be a country which is 100 percent worth defending, all discussion is relative. What country is Mr Yoshikawa referring to as a state worth defending? Is it the United States, the USSR, a country like Switzerland, or a country like Vietnam, which produced

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the "boat people?" Although many Japanese may be dissatisfied to a greater or lesser degree, I believe that they consider Japan--whose self-image is middle class--a country worth defending. I wonder if Mr Yoshikawa thinks that Vietnam is more worthy of defense than Japan.

Going back to the question of civilian control, Mr Morishima appears to be regarding the present day Self-Defense Force as analogous to the old military force. For example, he states that "once the Self-Defense Force grows to the scale approximating the old military, it will start to go its own way." I do not know what scale is the scale close to the old military, but Mr Morishima is overlooking the changes in social order that occurred in postwar Japan. Granted that national character does not easily change, more important than national character is the social system. A comparison of post-World War I Germany and post-World War II West Germany would lead many to conclude that the national character of Germany has not changed very much, but I doubt that many people would anticipate another Nazi Party takeover in today's West Germany. Mr Morishima writes in the current essay that once the Japanese Self-Defense Force is aggrandized in size, would it stand by inactive when Japan faces a type of situation that Great Britain confronted during 1935-1938 (as a result of the English cabinet adopting a policy of appeasement, German strength was vastly expanded in Europe)? The British military force did not act. Can the Japanese military follow the example of the English counterpart? Supposing that an event such as England confronted during 1935-1938 could occur in the vicinity of Japan, I cannot predict what direction such a situation would take. But even if Asian communism is greatly expanded or even if, on the other hand, a man like Hitler appears on the scene, the present Self-Defense Force, which has not thus far intervened [in political affairs] as the old military had done, is not likely to interfere in the future.

Mr Morishima, moreover, states that as long as many readers believe that in the event of national emergency, if the Diet members and politicians procrastinate, the military should make an independent decision, there is grave risk of Japan becoming a military-controlled state. This, too, is an arbitrary judgment. If and when the situation becomes as Mr Morishima fears, the popular cry for change of prime ministership will become loud enough that there will be a transfer of government--as England dismissed Chamberlain and in his place elected Churchill. The danger of forceable military takeover, judging from the current situation, is quite slim. This was well demonstrated last fall when Kurisu's comment led to his dismissal. Many citizens supported the government's action as an inevitable step.

In relation to this affair, Mr Morishima states that within the framework of Japanese value orientation which gives preference to professionals, even though Japan is a democratic state, "the lawfully chosen representatives of the people were not able to rebut--at the National Assembly debate--once they had been 'silenced' regarding military matters." Consequently, he stresses the danger of democracy reliant on professionals.

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On this question, too, Mr Morishima completely disregards the difference between the prewar and postwar Japanese political systems. Needless to mention, in prewar Japan, the military held an independent supreme command authority unfettered by control of the Diet. Because it was such a perverse assembly system, independent military action was permitted. In the same section, Mr Morishima states that parliamentarism was already established in prewar times. But the practice of party politics based on ordinary election by male votes was in effect for only a few years, and it was a crippled system with the Privy Council, the House of Peers and the military having conditional claims.

I might be belaboring a minor point, but in the previous essay Mr Morishima stated that, "where the scale of military preparedness is small, in order for the military to be effective, the people must follow its dictates, and though there may be a nominal civilian control, it must necessarily be a showcase entity." I rebutted this statement with examples. In the current dissertation, he revised his argument and states that, "I merely meant that all things being equal, in the case of smaller-scale military preparedness, civilian control tends to be merely a figurehead." If this is so, I would like him to cite concrete examples.

As for the difference between amateurism and professionalism, Mr Morishima has cited numerous examples on previous occasions, and repeats them in his current essay. I do not contradict his theory that in England sagacity of non-professionals is given a relatively high value, whereas in Japan there is a tendency to give undue weight to the know-how that the professionals possess.

In so far as politics is concerned, the important key for democracy is the blending of professional know-how and sagacity of the general populace and their representatives. This has been enumerated by many theorists, foremost among them John Stuart Mill. In the Japanese postwar values, there is a portion that changed from the prewar days and there is a segment that remained unchanged. With regard to the question of civilian control, at present there is no evidence to suggest that the factors negative to it are gaining in strength. There is no evidence that directly verifies this claim, but there is indirect proof in the "Survey of National Character" conducted by the Statistical Research Agency every 5 years. That is to say, those who believe that "in the event that a superior statesman emerges, it would be better for Japan to give him the helm of the government than for the populace to debate the issues" decreased from 43 percent in 1958 to 23 percent in 1973. Those who oppose this precept increased in number from 38 percent to 51 percent. (Statistical Research Agency, "Survey of National Character--Sixth National Survey," 1978, 85 pages.)

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Demilitarization Will Not Guarantee 'Peace'

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Oct 79 pp 143-146

[Article by Yoshihiko Seki, lecturer at the Waseda University and chief editor of JAPAN ECHO: "Heated Debate: War and Peace--Question of New 'New Armament Plan'"]

[Excerpts] The last question is how to ensure Japan's safety. I have nothing more to add to my constructive theory [which I have already enumerated], so I will limit myself to rebutting Mr Morishima's criticisms. First of all, Mr Morishima wrote in the previous essay that "it is dangerous to develop heavy industries and centralized information industries." I rebutted, "Then do you suggest that we abandon heavy industries and centralized information industries?" Thereupon, Mr Morishima now insists that, "I have never in any portion of my previous essays suggested that Japan should forsake heavy industries or centralized information industries." Yet, he has written that "Switzerland has an excellent international monetary organ, and no heavy industry of any significance. It is necessary for the Japanese industry to switch its emphasis to commodities that would not be of much use to the enemy in the event of occupation" (previous essay, page 106). If this is not Mr Morishima's true feeling, I have no rebuttal on this point, but then I will be forced to give a "zero rating" to such an ambiguous statement contrary to his true convictions.

The second question is whether or not the United States would come to the aid of Japan should an emergency situation arise. I wrote that as long as Japan makes an effort toward self-defense in compliance with its national strength and maintains friendly relations with the United States, the United States will not forsake Japan. Mr Morishima was critical of this exposition, and stated that in so far as past historical data do not verify this as a valid international hypothesis, it is nothing more than "agitation." Fortunately, an international relations specialist, Mr Fuzo Kamitani, has addressed this issue more persuasively than I myself could have in the last month's issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU.

The gist of his article was that the United States would no doubt continue to have life and death interest in East Asia/Pacific region. Japan's security and maintenance of Japan-U.S. amity are indispensable to U.S. Asian policy. Therefore, it will not sit by while Japan is attacked or invaded.

As for historical proof, we have only to cite U.S. support of Korea during the Korean conflict and its intervention in Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, the U.S. intervention was not successful because of the incompetence and corruption of the Saigon regime. I believe that at present at least, we can be assured that in the event of foreign invasion against Japan, if the latter demonstrates a will to fight and act accordingly, the United States will not remain a mere spectator.

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With regard to this point, Mr Morishima rebuts that, "if the United States intervenes in a fight between Russia and Japan, the conflict will lead to a Third World War. Such a crucial decision will be approached with extreme caution and after scrupulous consideration [by the United States]." In the event of a nuclear war about 20 million Americans will die. At worst, the earth will become desolate. Therefore, the majority of Americans will decide to leave the Japanese to their fate and the president, too, will follow the voice of the people. As Mr Morishima asserts, there is little doubt that a real war between United States and the Soviet Union could at worst end in desolation of the planet earth. Therefore, no doubt statesmen will decide on such an issue with extreme caution and after scrupulous consideration.

But the same consideration will be made by the Soviet leaders who also risk the lives of about 20 million of their people. The American nuclear strategy is to lead the Soviet leaders into thinking that a large-scale invasion of Japan could result in a real nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. My thinking is that accordingly the United States is obliged to commit itself to ensuring Japan's security to the utmost.

Of course, this avenue is not without pitfalls, and therefore I seek the progress of simultaneous nuclear arms limitation negotiations between the United States and Russia; Japan should support the progress of the said negotiations as much as possible. But at present, my conclusion is that there is no better way to preserve Japan's security than to place ourselves underneath the U.S. nuclear shield.

In relation to this topic, a certain university professor of my acquaintance had his students read the Morishima-Seki debate published in the July issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU, and he asked them to comment. I was informed that there were several students who supported the Morishima view on the ground that we cannot put our trust in the United States. But contrary to Morishima's conclusion, they concluded that Japan, too, ought to have nuclear armaments. I oppose both of these extreme views--non-armament/surrender and nuclear armament/resistance. I think we need to be mindful of the fact that for "an influential high-powered thinker" like Mr Morishima, to stress mistrust of the United States may add fuel to the stand diametrically opposed to the original intent of the said view.

Thirdly, I am well aware that Mr Morishima does not subscribe to communism, but I am puzzled by the fact that while he preaches insincerity of the United States, he seems quite trusting of Soviet "good will," although he does not view "Russia as the savior." For example, he states that Japan should perfect such Soviet-directed software as Siberian development and cultural exchange while taking the demilitarized neutral position. As long as Russia is convinced that it would be advantageous to respect Japanese independence rather than occupy Japan, exceptional situations aside, it will not commit aggression against Japan. In exceptional situations, Morishima advises us to surrender. In his previous dissertation, he intimates that even if Japan does come under Soviet control, in the case of unconditional surrender, Japan will have political autonomy.

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I, too, think that as long as Russia believes in the advantage of keeping Japan neutral, it will respect Japanese neutrality. This would be a situation analogous to the People's Republic of China leaving Hong Kong to go its own way. But if there was no Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Pact, and if the Soviets know in advance that the Japanese response would be unconditional surrender and that Japan can be occupied with practically no sacrifice on their part, and, moreover, if they think that it would be more advantageous to get hold of Japanese heavy chemical industries and centralized information industries and apply them to the Siberian development or use them as strategic bases for an offensive against the United States or China than to leave Japan neutral (and it would be quite reasonable for the Soviet leaders to think this way), they would subjugate Japan and Japan's political autonomy would be recognized and granted only within the scope convenient to the Soviet Union. In this case an allegorical argument that China is leaving Hong Kong alone does not hold water because the circumstances would be different. If we must introduce a metaphorical example, it would be more appropriate to cite the Morishima argument that as a strategic base for attacking Great Britain, Hitler decided that attacking the Benelux nations would be more advantageous than respecting their neutrality, and thus invaded these countries instead of going through Switzerland (if this hypothesis is correct).

Though Mr Morishima may reply that the two--Hitler and the Soviet leaders--are different, and assuredly there are a number of points on which Hitler and the recent Soviet leaders do differ, both follow a logical formula in analyzing events. This has been explained in detail by Mr Morishima with respect to Hitler. I would like to put an even greater emphasis on the fact that the social structures of Nazi Germany and the communist countries are similar, and also on the difference between these social systems and the social framework of the United States and other Western democratic states. In discussing national defense theory, Mr Morishima almost never touches on the social structure question. I do not deny that the people's values do have some influence on a country's foreign policy. But I believe that its social structure has an even greater significance. After World War II the United States, in spite of bitter fighting during the war, repatriated the Japanese prisoners of war immediately. Meanwhile, the USSR interned them for a long time in Siberia and refused to repatriate them. I hold that these differing responses are attributable not to their differing national characters, but to their respective social structures.

In other words, the characteristics of a liberal democratic state are plurality of political parties and recognition of plurality of opinions as a fact of life, and the supporting value orientation which in turn sustains the said system is the respect for individual spiritual life. After the conclusion of a war even the enemy nationals are recognized as a group of individuals whose spiritual lives are to be respected. The belief that they should be repatriated as soon as possible and assistance of food extended to the starving originates therefrom. It also supports the conviction that a promise of a mutual security pact is binding as far as it is practicable.

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In contrast, the characteristic of Nazi or communistic absolutism is a single party, single opinion system. Existence of opinions and parties other than the ruling party and its official dogma is denied. And the thinking which supports this system and at the same time emanates from it is that the leader or the controlling party has the absolute truth and the individuals have value only as means for realizing the controlling party's ideology. It gave rise to the retention of prisoners of war and their subjection to years of labor under deplorable conditions. This system even represses its people's civil liberties. The fact that Japan surrendered to the United States and thereby gained happiness is due to the fact that the United States had the social structure described above. If there be a state under Soviet control that has political autonomy, I would like it named.

Next, I would like to touch on the hardware/software question. In the current essay Mr Morishima states that, "Japan should adopt a national defense plan chiefly reliant on software." At a casual reading, it would appear that he accepts hardware (soldiers and weapons) as secondary items in the national defense plan. But was it not Mr Morishima's opinion that the Self-Defense Force should eventually be reorganized into a corps of engineers? If he approves of the Self-Defense Force as a secondary element in the defense plan, then the difference between his opinion and mine is one of degree. But here, I will advance this discussion under the assumption that Mr Morishima's opinion denotes software development exclusively.

I contend that in addition to diplomacy, economic cooperation and cultural exchange--what Mr Morishima refers to as cultivating Japan's allies through software--we need to effect balanced development in hardware or national defense through military strength. Mr Morishima claims that this kind of balanced plan would fail, and due to limited funds available, both would be diluted and the software plan would become practically useless.

But many Western developed states do follow the balanced software/hardware policy. These include such armed neutral states as Switzerland and Sweden. If Mr Morishima insists that though these countries may succeed Japan would fail, I can cite in rebuttal recent achievements in Japanese international cooperative efforts. Of course, I admit that the Japanese international cooperative efforts are not far-reaching enough, but would Mr Morishima claim that since international cooperation had heretofore been conducted in conjunction with an effort to increase Japan's national self-defense capability, it has been diluted and therefore is practically useless? Unless he can explain why it would be ineffectual to develop both of them side by side by giving reasons, his argument is not convincing. It seems to me that Mr Morishima's criticism of me quoted below is quite applicable to his own stand: "His argument is nothing more than an arbitrary conclusion. At best it demonstrates anxiety; at worst, it is inflammatory (seditious)."

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Lastly, let us touch on Mr Morishima's counterargument regarding the "Red or Dead" issue--a debate between Bertrand Russell and other unilateral abrogation advocates and its opposition, Gaekel [transliteration]. I think that Mr Morishima's argument that if worst comes to worst, we should surrender with white and red flags in hand is similar to the unilateral abrogation adherents' argument that voluntary surrender of nuclear arms is preferable to nuclear death, and that the worst that can happen would be to come under Soviet domination. Mr Morishima insists, however, that his plan is better dead than red," and that it is the fourth proposal to the Three Proposals advocated by Getschell. He reasons that the possibility of Soviet attack is very slim. But as I stated before, Mr Morishima's proposal, though it may not regard Russia as God, is predicated on Soviet good will. Therefore, for those who mistrust the Soviet Union due to its unique social structure, this would be tantamount to selecting "Red." I think that Gaekel's and my proposal is the plan which would bring neither death nor red, though it is not completely free of risk. As I have already enumerated my reasons for subscribing to this view elsewhere, I will not repeat them here.

With regard to comments from various gentlemen regarding the Morishima/Seki debate (published in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU), I have nothing more to say beyond what I have already touched on. But I accept Mr Shinkichi Eto's criticism that "Mr Seki's suggestion for getting shelter and other nuclear attack preparations ready is premature, and therefore he [Eto] opposes it." I therefore revise that passage to read, "shelter and other questions should be considered as issues for the future." As Mr Eto states, the priority issue is the qualitative revision of the Self-Defense Force so as to make it strong enough to provide true defense of the country.

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MILITARY

INTELLECTUALS, READERS COMMENT ON 'WAR AND PEACE' DEBATE

Debate Introduced

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 94-114

[Articles by 10 intellectuals and 5 readers: "Surrender or Resist?"]

[Text] Is Mr Seki's assertion that "As there is no danger of attack, the self defense capability and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty are unnecessary," too hopeful an outlook? Or is it, as Mr Morishima states, that "Rather than inviting the miserable aftermath of war, it is wiser to make an orderly surrender and obtain the right of political self-determination." This dialogue in the July issue of this magazine evoked a great reaction. To which side will 10 authorities in various fields align their Proposals?

Shinkichi Eto

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 94-95

[Article by Shinkichi Eto, professor, Tokyo University: "An Intellectual Stimulus"]

[Text] In dialogue and in writing a debate which provides an intellectual stimulus is enjoyable. The debate between Mr Seki and Mr Morishima has indeed been so. There has been no attempt to establish dominion in the realm of empty polemics or to domineeringly protagonize the sole validity of one's own position. They differ from those who do not attempt to get out of the octopus jars set in place 30 years ago, singing the same song. With supple minds, tackling the reality of history, they are able to formulate theories. We have been greatly entertained.

The two sides agree that we cannot attain a complete capability for maintaining the peace through military power alone, and for this reason support maintaining peace through means other than military, that is, in the word to which we have become familiar, they place emphasis on non-military peace maintenance measures. Mr Morishima states, "At present it is not 'hardware' like tanks and

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missiles which protects the nation, but the 'softwear' such as foreign relations, economics and cultural interchange." Mr Seki says, "A country's peace may not be defended by military power alone, however by the same token it cannot be protected without military power...I too am in complete accord with Mr Morishima's proposed softwear tactics."

The points on which the two sides differ are firstly on the efficacy of military power, secondly on the difficulty of civilian control, thirdly on how to respond to a highly unlikely enemy attack, fourthly on their appraisal of the international environment and fifthly on what course Japan should pursue. Regarding the first point Mr Morishima proposes the matter of why Switzerland was able to maintain its neutrality in World War II, and states that this was because Switzerland was neutral and Hitler wished to use Switzerland as an avenue in negotiations with enemy nations. Mr Seki opposes Mr Morishima's conclusion and asserting the efficacy of military power states, "I think that my suggestion that this was due to the military losses that Hitler envisaged from Swiss resistance is not mistaken."

I have on hand a book put together by the Justice Ministry Police Department and issued by order of the Swiss cabinet to each family entitled "Civil Defense." One paragraph states, "It is no coincidence that we escaped attack during World Wars I and II. This good fortune is due to our unbending will to defend ourselves and the efficacious preparations of our army." At the least, it cannot be denied that the Swiss Government holds its military capability in high estimation. As Ikuhiko Hata states in the 5 September 1979 issue of GENRONJIN in stating that he would like to research the Swiss precedent thoroughly--while acknowledging the existence of Ryoichi Taoka's research--that leaving this aspect unconsidered no quick decision (on Japan's position) can be made.

On the second point Mr Morishima concludes that civilian control of the Self Defense Forces is difficult, and makes this assertion on the conjecture that the army may again get out of hand. This does not differ from Mr Seki's contention that we must guard against such an exigency with the Self Defense Forces. On the third point--the unlikely event of an invasion of Japan--Mr Morishima, while admitting the unlikelihood, speaks out for preserving the integrity of the country and submitting under an orderly system, obtaining then in return the right of political self-determination. Mr Seki fears that there is a danger that if the Soviet Union knew it could occupy Japan without sacrifice it would do so immediately if the necessity arose, and that there is a danger that other countries opposing Japan might take over one part of the country. For myself, I would like to say that above everything we should pursue every available means in an unmitigated effort to anticipate and avoid a condition which invites invasion. Let us reflect on the fact that Tasuku Nakazawa believed that we should not go to war because we could not match the United States. Both men have convincing arguments, but here I must set forth my own ideas. For me, "every available means" actually encompasses a moderate capacity for self-defense and a strong spirit on the part of the people to resist. The firm determination in the words, "though outmatched

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in a sudden invasion we will respond," is an important deterrent. If in the Blitzkrieg of 1940 Hitler had known that Switzerland would capitulate in an orderly way, bypassing anticipated opposition in the Netherlands and Belgium, the German army would have gone through Switzerland and invaded France from the Swiss border which had no Maginot Line.

On the fourth point, the appraisal of the international environment, Mr Morishima states clearly that "I believe there is no possibility of the Soviet Union invading Japan." I also think this is so, but that it is the anti-Soviet American deterrent which is speaking here, and I would like us to consider the situation with America completely withdrawn from Asia. What would the Soviet Union do with Japan? It is hard to gauge.

Finally, with regard to what course Japan should pursue, I am opposed to Mr Morishima's theory that zero weapons is good and support the same Mr Morishima's realistic policy that we should not rush to cut back the Self Defense Forces. And I oppose the contention that Mr Seki's proposal to provide shelters is premature. Japan's self defense costs rank seventh in the world at the enormous figure of \$900 million, but money alone cannot purchase a defense capability. What is necessary is that the Self Defense Forces become a truly strong and upright "bone" of the people, under no circumstance venturing outside the country, an essential element in upholding the independence of the nation. For that reason quality rather than numbers, and the present membership should be diminished.

Shinji Komada

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 95-97

[Article by Shinji Komada (writer): "Shutting the Door With Moderation"]

[Text] Reading the words of Yukio Morishima and Yoshihiko Seki in the debate on "War" I had a frightening thought. This is because I recollected a war experience of my own.

The most frightening recollection among my wartime experiences is, rather than something that occurred upon being cast out into actual warfare, an experience prior to that. It was at the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942. I was a teacher in an old-time high school in a rural area, still in my twenties. At a meeting of the teachers the principal announced, "There has been an announcement that the 3-year graduation is to be shortened by half a year." The teachers were silent. After a while a science teacher declared, "I can just barely manage to teach the course in 3 years. Even now there is too little time. If it is shortened by 6 months, what is there that can be taught?" Lightly striking the desk with his hand, his voice wavering, this teacher wept. The teachers meeting felt as empty as a gathering of those facing their deathbeds.

That is all there was to it. In the secrecy of the teachers meeting he could bring himself to say only that little. Leaving the teachers meeting he could

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say nothing. In the debate Mr Morishima says, "In Japan as a rule a 'national consensus of the people' takes shape impulsively and with surprising speed. Furthermore, once this 'consensus' is reached, the national character is such that it is extremely difficult to voice a differing opinion." It is not difficult. It is my frightening experience that weeping in a private room is all that can be done.

That I found a reading of the comments of both men frightening goes along also with my wish that a stop be called to too much heralding of war, war. This is because I think that there exists to a large extent in the Japanese character something which, while all the outcry of thus and so is going on, could suddenly catch hold and grow and become serious. This is because there are those who are aiming for this and clamor for it in a loud voice.

Both men, typical scholars, relate such things as what Hitler did at the beginning of the war, how Chamberlain acted, thus and so about Switzerland and Belgium, and what Kennedy wrote about it afterwards, what Churchill wrote afterwards, and use them as proof to support their assertions. And in the midst of this they exclaim that "It is necessary to extract a lesson from history but if one says that if this had been done at the time, and thus speculates with an admixture of empty ideas and draws out one's personal moral, then we learn nothing from history." (Morishima) But in effect Mr Seki's assertion seems to be that we should have "a minimum defense capability." Mr Seki says that this "minimum defense capability" is a "force with which Japan by itself can continue at war until the arrival of the American relief army--for example about 2 weeks." Mr Morishima's assertion is that in modern Japan "the Self Defense Forces should not be made any larger than it already is and moreover should not be immediately lessened or abolished. Ultimately it should be changed over to a special corps of army engineers with a combat capability of zero and "in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union should attack again there is nothing for the Self Defense Forces to do but resolutely with order and discipline surrender. Rather than inviting a full-out war and earning an honorable death, and then having the enraged Soviet army sweep down and usher in the post-war misery, make an orderly surrender maintained with dignity, and then obtain in return the right of political self-determination. This is, I believe, much the wiser course."

This part of Mr Morishima's assertion is a very attractive way of engaging defeat and if this were a lecture he might get a round of applause here, but from my experience of actual war, war does not happen like some war game and this "resolutely making an ordered and disciplined capitulation" is a dream and nothing more than a dream. And is not "receiving in exchange the right of political self-determination" a naive view as well.

However, between the two, I prefer Mr Morishima's opinions. We should shut the door. We should also be careful of fire. When thieves are everywhere we should take doorclosing much more seriously. And even then if a thief should break in, it would be better to not surrender in the attractive manner Mr Morishima suggests, but in great distress, seeking only to save our lives.

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Door-shutting naturally varies with the prevalence of thieves. If the door is locked too ostentatiously, there is the danger that the thieves will rather set their eyes on it.

Yuichi Yoshikawa

Tokyo BUNCEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 97-99

[Article by Yuichi Yoshikawa (Former Director of Vietnam Peace Movement):
"Software--A Country which Deserves Protection:]

[Text] I have been asked, upon reading the dialogue of the two men, to add something. I am opposed to the existence of the present Self Defense Forces and my position is one of having previously called for its demilitarization. So broadly speaking this means that I am in support of Mr Morishima's arguments and opposed to Mr Seki's position.

I in particular support for Mr Morishima's argument that the great expenditures engendered in armaments could be expected to do more for Japan's defense if channelled into cultural interchange and the improvement of international relations. There is virtually no part of Mr Seki's arguments which departs from a reiteration of the door-closing policy which has been resolutely repeated up to the present.

However looking over the arguments of both men, what leaves me unsatisfied with both is the point that they leave the inner core of the meaning of "nation" in a time of national defense virtually untouched.

A defense debate divorced from the questions of who should protect us from what and what is a defense-obligated country becomes meaningless. As Mr Morishima also states, during World War II the final line on what the Japanese Government attempted to defend was "the entire nation"--that is the status of the emperor, and not the lives of the people. From what does the present Self Defense Force intend to protect us and what are they protecting?

Inferring from Mr Seki's arguments, the Japanese "nation" which should be defended appears to be a country which supports non-intervention in heavy industry and intensive know-how type industries and "the current level of living standard." As long as the "national interest" and peace of the Japanese nation are promoted in this way, in the midst of competitive economic war for resources and markets, we must also engage in ever more oppressive policies against the Third World. However this is not the place to debate directly Japan's future course and I limit myself to a discussion of what it is the Self Defense Force is trying to defend.

It must first be recognized that the object of Self Defense Force protection is not the people. According to Sadao Fujii's indication Admiral Tatsuo Chikudo, head of the Maritime Self-Defense School, concludes that the object

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of defense upon which the Self Defense Force should place the main emphasis is "the national soil," this being not the protection of each individual's life and property as is generally held, but the public defense capability of the police, the fire department, medical facilities and in the event of an emergency of the organization which would likely unite them as a force for protecting the people." That is, the first object of defense is not the life and safety of the people.

How are the people of the country viewed? The Self Defense Force excludes the people. That within the country there are both supporters and opponents of the Self Defense Force is natural if Japan is a democratic country, but they do not wish to recognize this. The Self Defense Force regards critics as enemies and opposes them severely. This is not only the approach of the ranking officials of the Defense Agency in response to the issues raised by the opposition parties. For example in the attitude towards the Nozaki family of the Hokkaido Eniwa Affair (Eniwa Affair 1955-67) the Self Defense Force approach to private citizens and citizen groups became clear for the first time.

At present, as Mr Seki himself says, "civilian control is without doubt not proceeding well" and he places the blame on "the strong opposition to the Self Defense Force" on the part of the socialist and communist parties. It is also clear that the idea of emergency legislation is also directed towards the power of opposition.

As Mr Morishima also says, as a force in avoiding war, "software" is now becoming increasingly important over "hardware." Within this so-called "software," together with the policy of peaceful relations supported by the people, is included the fact that the people themselves find it worthy to defend the country, and in an unlikely invasion, even in the event of the surrender of the government, in various forms the populace holds a determination to resist in numerous ways.

Mr Moriyama, extracting the example revolving on the emperor system, argues that this is a "weaponless deterrent power." In the event the emperor were captured, irregardless of any judgment of whether in Japan any large-scale rebellion would occur, "even if a large portion of the occupying army remained for a long period, we may expect that the occupation affairs would not proceed in an orderly manner favorably," for the invading country and we may reckon that the strength of the all-out posture of popular resistance is an important and essential element.

Take a case of a military base; a base surrounded by hostile nearby residents can not completely fulfill its functions and would gradually have to be abandoned, an actual example being the first struggles in Okinawa in a number of localities over the bases. In this case it is not necessary to delimit, as Mr Morishima says, the use of weapons. (However this is of course not use of arms by a Self Defense Force protection organization hostile to the people.)

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However, that this is possible, as was touched on earlier, is due to a moral sense of resistance felt by the people. That is, the precursor is that one must be committed to defend the country oneself.

The present day actions of the Self Defense Force, the actions the government is permitting to occur, lie rather in the opposite direction. Internationally the government for example violates a United Nations proclamation and aids countries like South Africa and Namibia which ignore human rights, and continues to adopt policies which earn the opposition of the Third World. Within the country it authoritatively suppresses differing ideologies and movements on defense and intently pursues peace preservation law and increasing military strength. If this continues it is hardly plausible that the people would regard such a country and army as something they should defend themselves. An army alienated from the people can serve no function whatsoever.

What is necessary is not an education which cultivates an abstract "love of country." In actuality the people of the country have a commitment to protect the country, to work to make the country. If it is a country that values protecting itself, the people, in the event of an unjust invasion, will of themselves arise in resistance.

Makoto Nakajima

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 99-100

[Article by Makoto Nakajima (critic): "Urge Continuation of the Debate"]

[Text] Examining both arguments, Yukio Morishima's "New 'Armaments Plan Proposal'" and Yoshihiko Seki's "The Peace Cannot be Preserved Without Weapons," I felt that the former has let us hear an argument for reinforcing rearmament but the latter has a fairly unique and keen perception. I would like to present only three outstanding points from Mr Morishima's arguments, first that in the event America and the Soviet Union came to grips as apart from Vietnam, Korea and Taiwan, Japan with a population of 100 million and a major power with the second largest GNP in the world would without doubt become enveloped in a third world war. Next, the choice as a course of action in the unlikely event of a Soviet attack as an ordered surrender retaining national integrity and in exchange obtaining the right of political self-determination. And finally that the best form of self defense for us is to avoid war before it happens, and that for that reason we should incorporate not a group of people who can act in the event of war, but people who can act before the outbreak of war. The second point is one that has not been made well by the existing reformist groups, and is much more convincing than establishment of disarmament only on the basis that there is no likelihood of a Soviet invasion. It seems to me that the unproductive argument that with no rearmament and taking a neutral position there will be no invasion, or because of it there will be an invasion, is here being repeated.

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On the first point, in a recent Gallup Poll, in the event that the Soviet Union invaded Japan, 42 percent of American citizens answered that the American army should be sent to Japan. Compared to 92 percent of leaders in the field of foreign policy who said the U.S. should respond to western Europe by sending U.S. forces, 81 percent of those leaders believed that if a Soviet invasion of Japan was to take place, U.S. troops should be dispatched, and we may call U.S. citizens and policy makers' appraisals fairly close to reality. Further, the YOMIURI SHIMBUN published on 9 July "top secret information" on a decision on a plan for Self Defense Force troops and reinforcements in the event of an invasion of Kokkaido for a resistance of one month's duration. In this plan, mainly with the Reservists of the Self Defense Forces and former Self Defense Forces members, 77,000 personnel are expected to be called up for service. And the same paper stated that this ties into a military conscription system.

The normalization of China and the U.S. foreign relations, the restoration of Japan-China relations, the conclusion of the Japan-China Peace Treaty, and in the disputes between China and Vietnam, we see the gradual formation of multi-lateral relationship of the EC, U.S., Japan, Korea, China vs. the Soviet Union and adding to this the energy crisis we can see that all the ingredients leading to "a third world war" are in the process of becoming aligned.

The conditions for a world war come together at a focus point around 1985. The problem is how to one by one demolish the dangerous ingredients. The best thing for our country is not curtailing local conflicts but eliminating the conditions for a major war. However as Mr Morishima says, the prevention beforehand of war must be accomplished with the economic and industrial appeal of the country continuing to grow as it is.

I believe the most essential things is Mr Morishima's third stated point. On this point Mr Seki as well is in general accord.

However, what sort of people are these "who play an influential role before the war." These are the people who can accurately assess the damage to the economy of the populace brought about by war, and those who at the same time can foresee the possible situation of the "post-war" world. Those who can measure these things will spare themselves in every effort and in every conciliation to prevent war.

Next year is 1980, the 55th year of the Showa reign. I would like to strongly emphasize that there is a need to consider the time of 40 years ago, the year of 1940, the 15th year of the Showa era. In the first half of this period we have the establishment of support systems, the reorganization of wartime economic systems for heavy and chemical industries in time of war, the production of staple food by farmers, mobilizing men and sending them overseas. In the latter half we have the loss of the war, an occupation, and the reform of ideologies and political systems after the war. A mere 10 years comprising all this and yet out of Japan's history in no other century was such a rich lesson given to us as it was presented today. I believe that research into the history of the 1940s, from every angle, has become necessary to us.

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For the last 10 years I have criticized simple views of history which see this period as a simple aggressive period, a dark age, or a transition period between facism and democracy.

Especially in the beginning of the 1940s it was a time when "those who play an influential role upon outbreak of war" were held necessary, and in fact those sort of people existed mainly among the ranks of the bureaucratic technocrats. It may be said that the eve of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1938 is important. However, even more so then it was precisely the period from 1936-1937 to the end of the forties that there were some persons, although not enough, who demonstrated for the prevention of world war. I do not here have space to prove this in detail but place my hopes in the overall tendency in the people to oppose and feel aversion to war. Specifically in those faced with the onerous task of choosing a national policy of war or peace, in an attitude which views the outcome of a lost war only in a negative way in the defense problem today, and moreover in the question of non-armament and of staying neutral or emergency legislation, we must not fall into controversy over either of the unproductive extremities of action, for this can lead to fomenting an inadvertent descent into war and an irresponsible nationalism which does not take into account the aftermath of war.

The 1979 debate between Messrs Morishima and Seki is comparable to the dialogue in 1978 between Jun Eto and Akigo Honda and the two debates have some connection. Mr Eto's fresh discussion of the meaning of the occupation and Mr Morishima's discussion of future "surrender" are problems which should be considered in the same light. As one outside the ring, I hope for a recess in the debate.

Masamori Sase

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 101-103

[Article by Masamori Sase (Professor, Defense Academy): "Disappointment with Mr Morishima's Arguments"]

[Text] Mr Morishima's arguments disappointed me on a number of points. I had expected some original arguments from Mr Morishima, but all he has presented is a number of dogmas. This is the first reason for my disappointment. Below I will present two major examples of this dogmatism and offer a number of proofs.

1) Mr Morishima claims that in Japan war cannot be suppressed but only avoided and advocates efforts in the direction of neutrality. The process whereby he demonstrates this is through a weighty consideration of the Swiss example in World War II. He asserts strongly that the reason this country was able to maintain peace was because "Hitler" was considering using Switzerland as an avenue for negotiations with the enemy nations. However as Mr Seki pointed out there are a number of documents which show that this assertion has no authority whatsoever. Conversely, the German army which Moriyama

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designates as Hitler, while formulating a plan for the invasion of Switzerland, gave up the execution of the plan in the face of the Swiss posture of opposition. Moreover at the time the Swiss people themselves were hardly considering at all that they had--as Mr Morishima calls it-- "a capacity for inter-mediation." Indeed if we compare this to a strict definition of neutrality, they were compelled to make "concessions" to Germany which tortured their conscience. However Switzerland did not only "support" and cooperate with Germany. In Switzerland as well a large number of Nazis appeared, but even so the overall posture of the Swiss people was opposed to Hitler. To exaggerate this disparity slightly the tenor of feeling in the Swiss was not neutral at all, it was pro-Western European. These sorts of things are shown clearly in for example W. Links' "The Swiss at War 1933-1945" (1974). At least Mr Morishima should engage in an investigation of that order.

In the event the Soviet Union attacked, Mr Morishima writes that the Self Defense Force should make a disciplined and orderly surrender and Japan "in exchange would obtain the right of political self-determination" and concludes that "under Soviet control, if only we persevere, a form of socialist economy suitable to Japan is possible," exactly as though the values of surrender to the Soviet Union and political self-determination can be interchanged, and as though any other form of socialism other than Soviet-style communism or peoples democracy--such as social democracy or people's socialism--would be permitted. Nothing more need be said beyond that these two propositions are unfounded. But it seems Mr Morishima intended to submit the semblance of a basis for his arguments. That is, "As I have friends in Hungary and Poland, when I met them, I listened to them exhaustively regarding freedom of thought and other matters, and from their comments I believe that the degree of freedom which they are permitted is the same degree as that permitted in Japan in 1940. Or again, "Since I believe in people, the Russians together with the Americans, (bearing both red and white flags) I say greet the Russian troops." But this is not a substitute for the basis of an argument. To bring forth a "talk" with friends without substance or rule to confirm this serious proposal is an affront to the intellect, and if an espousal of one's personal beliefs is sufficient to establish the basis of an argument, academics has no important function. What astounded me even more is the matter of the ease with which he sets forth and uses such words as "Soviet control" and "political self-determination." For one country to "control" another is to subjugate that country's "right of political self-determination" and that a country has "self-determination" shows that it is not under "control." The two things from the first are conceptually opposed to each other. Does Mr Morishima not realize this? Is this not so when in good and in bad "the Japan of around 1940" was acting on the basis of political self-determination and he is mixing this up with the "freedom" of present day Hungary and Poland? For the former there was political self-determination, but the freedom within the country was meagre. For the latter there is a lack of both. There are a number of so-called socialist countries which oppose Soviet intentions and pursue political self-determination. In the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, this was frustrated in the face of Soviet military power. What about the examples of China, Yugoslavia and Romania?

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If Mr Morishima says that he wishes to bring forth again the "white flag, red flag" argument I would like to have him investigate towards just whom the armies of these countries are deployed in opposition.

The next thing which disappointed me in Mr Morishima's arguments is their terrible preconclusions and ring of inevitability. I present the main examples.

1) Mr Morishima holds that Japan, differing from England, is a country which espouses anti-amateurism and in which the specialists have an extended range, and warns that if no exception is made with regard to defense, "if there is no reform in Japan's high school education, with the situation remaining that the soldiers are the well-educated, and if the army is strengthened, but with nevertheless the civilians controlling the army, Japan will likely again become a nation under the control of the military." If we proceed with this type of argument, to the extent we do not abolish amateurs, it is nonsense for Japan to consider civilian control of the army. But in no way is it such a simple matter. Regarding the advantages for England of civilian control, it is an over-simplification to conclude that there is "the army and then there are amateurs." Certainly the English army is under government control but the fact that in the government and parliament there are military men and authorities on a general par in ability should be mentioned. To the extent of my knowledge a number of treatises verify this situation. The word "amateur" which might be so construed, does not mean the establishment of the transcendancy of the carefree non-specialist. On the other side, in order that the civilian control system of our government does not end in failure, changeover to amateurs is not the sole antidote. Rather, A) Without ignoring military problems politicians must deepen their knowledge of military matters, B) Provide a thorough education for those in uniform to obtain compliance with civilian control and C) Map out a harmonious merging of government and the military. I am bearing a part of the burden of B) myself, and from my experience I can never side with the sort of preconclusion Mr Morishima espouses.

2) Mr Morishima's statement that, "In the present stage of nuclear weapons development, if a war occurs it is the end," is again a terrible preconclusion. If people, including pacifists, would investigate the aftermath of World War II, they would not consider that "if there is a war it is the end." The reason is that the world has experienced after the war an unrecountable number of wars and disputes. From the eyes of those who have experienced this the extreme position that, "In either event in the worst possible case, unfortunately for Japan there is only an honorable death for 100 million people, or a surrender of 100 million," is untenable. That in addition to preconclusive theories this sort of extremism exerts an influence is the outstanding feature of Mr Morishima's arguments. However, logically speaking, there are several gradations in actual war, from an all out nuclear attack "where nothing can be done" to non-nuclear and small-scale engagements, and a great breadth of choice of from 100 million surrendered to 100 million dead is a spectacle. Why does Mr Morishima ignore this?

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A mountain of faults which should be pointed out remain. Of these I will broach one more point. That is that on many occasions Mr Morishima uses the word "winning capability." It may be said that throughout his argument he has submitted the checkmate theory to criticism. But essentially this checkmate theory bears no relation to thought on "winning capability." Not only this, but in view a position of the sort that holds, "the generals of the Self Defense Force are addicted to 'winning capability'," I cannot but wonder at his intentions, whether this is based on ignorance or is due to some other reason. It is impossible that anyone could not be disappointed with arguments based on dogma, preconclusions, extremism and then ignorance or intentional distortion.

Masanori Kikuchi

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 103-105

[Article by Masanori Kikuchi (Assistant Professor of Soviet History, Tokyo University): "What Sort of 'Japan' Should We Create?"]

[Text] In discussion on the defense of Japan, divided into arguments for an absolutely unarmed neutrality and an absolute rearmament, we have passed through 34 years of mutual denouncement and reply. At the present stage when such unsettling pronouncements are being published one after another the attitude of Mr Morishima and Mr Seki on frankly expressing ideas on Japan's defense, i.e., if America and the Soviet Union should happen to go to war, the discussion of a Soviet invasion of Japan, etc., must be regarded as significant.

The proneness towards racing the engine in discussions of national defense and the difference in the outlook on the future lies in the point that the difference outlooks on the future of the two exerts a great influence on their current assertions. And the outlook on the future international situation, formed by appraisals of the situation and the historical awareness which measures it, is by its nature prone to being greatly influenced. What I felt firstly from the arguments of both parties is in the actual "if only" examples from history, almost all are limited to major warsites in Europe and to the experiences of World War II, and it is excessive to draw upon this historical process as data in considering why Japan was plunged into the war. I found this strange. It must be concluded that, the relevant parts of both parties' positions notwithstanding, to interpolate a large number of "if onlys" from European history is surely unproductive in any debate. Suppositions of the sort that "if only" an unwavering attitude had been taken against Hitler, and analysis based on the assumption that then it wouldn't have happened thusly, no matter how many meanings may be extrapolated, is only this and nothing more. History is history just because things didn't happen that way. And if both parties pile up "if only" style arguments we must go back to the source of World War I and the military cooperation of Germany and Russia during World War I.

If the stage of the debate were shifted to Japan and Asia, the problem could probably be better engaged. The loss of the war on 15 August 1945 was the

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destruction of the path of Japan's former military nationalism. And if we pursue that course of events we understand how difficult Mr Morishima's stated civilian control is. This experience has sunk into the very flesh of the Japanese people. And the history of authoritative power controlling news, thought, religion, gatherings, trampling all rights of the people underfoot is clear. For this reason especially, democracy--not the wasted remains of it--is necessary. It is also important that because of the defeat in the Pacific War, the Japanese people know that those who had advocated it and been inspired by war, when defeat came, changed their nature like cameleons, negated war, abandoned the people in a tragic situation and took flight in self-preservation. For those who advocate rearmament the most important thing is to promise that in the event of war they will stand themselves in the front line, and so earn the trust of the people. It must be seriously brought to mind that the reason that discussion of rearmament can not obtain strong public support lies in the conduct of betrayal entered upon by its precursors.

I used the word "front line" but this is in a moral sense. The shape of war has changed greatly. Mr Morishima speaks for the appeal of occupation and the capitulation of the country, surrendering and holding up the white flag if the Soviet Union attacks and avoiding the horrors of war and says that we should create a unique socialism under the Soviet embrace. Mr Seki refutes this.

Both sides state that they do not reckon the Soviet Union as an enemy, but in reading their arguments invariably the form of the Soviet Union appears. I dislike a playful "if only" sort of history but to me that the present day Soviet Union should entertain a proposal such as the occupation of Japan is unthinkable. Knowing the serious internal contradictions and the stultification in foreign policy in the Soviet Union we must arrive at this conclusion. While calmly observing the trends of the Soviet Union, it is important that Japan should not break its flexible yet rigid fundamental posture and it should also exercise caution against irresponsibly broadcasting a Soviet threat and avoid the error of forming a single policy with respect to the Soviet Union.

The era to debate the pros and cons about whether Japan should "submit" or "intimidate" when it comes to diplomacy is now something of a past. Fundamentally Japan should take an acrobat-style pursuit towards foreign relations. And it is the Japanese people who support the acrobat from below. Indeed a disbelief in political authority is the most dangerous thing. It is not necessary to reiterate that on this point the authority of the present Liberal democratic Party is driving the people towards a spirit of political indifference. The opposition party cannot evade this responsibility.

In Iran or Nicaragua there is a fitting reason why authority should tumble. This is that the leaders think only of personal gain and leave the people in the midst of great poverty. To say that this is permeated with communism is a mistake. Mr Seki's allergy to communism exceeds my imagination, but let us take leave of an unhistorical sense which places Hitler, Stalin and Mao Zedong

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in the same line and then, adding "if only" makes erroneous declarations. Rather it would be better to make the issue the difference between a Germany which has not ceased its pursuit of war criminals and a Japan who makes a former war criminal, who appeared invariably in graft scandals, the prime minister. Unfortunately socialist countries have a number of serious faults, but we cannot utilize these faults in order to praise Japan. Love of the country is born for the first time when the Japanese people become truly one with the government. In making the base of discussion what kind of Japan we should create, the controversy over national defense will bear fruit for the first time. A national defense discussed apart from love of country is dangerous. And the road towards making Japan a country that the Japanese people can truly love lies foremost in controversy.

Tadae Takubo

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 105-107

[Article by Tadae Takubo (Critic on Foreign Affairs): "A Happy Era"]

[Text] I think that Mr Morishima's arguments take in problems of too wide a periphery. If our eyes are dazzled by the problems raised one by one, no matter how many sheets of paper there are it will not be enough. But to squeeze these problems dry to the utmost, let us go ahead with, "In the unlikely event that the Soviet Union should attack there is nothing for the Self Defense Forces to do but resolutely with order and discipline surrender. Rather than inviting an all-out war and earning an honorable death, and then having the enraged Soviet army sweep down and usher in the post-war misery, make an orderly surrender maintained with dignity, and then obtain in return the right of political self-determination. This is, I believe, much the wiser course." I am obligated to quote partial quotations, but in adding, "In either event if the worst possible case should occur, unfortunately for Japan there is only an honorable death for 100 million or surrender for 100 million. If we say that an honorable death is meaningless, then we are left with surrender, but if surrender it is, then, zero armaments are sufficient," the essence of Mr Morishima's arguments becomes manifest.

Arguments for the unarmed neutrality of Japan are statements which do not heed the precedents in the world. The basis of this argument is the general view that Japan has a so-called peace constitution and that the international environment is encompassed by the three great powers of the U.S., China and the Soviet Union. However if from the outer surface of this basis we enter a step within, we will consider that, since we cannot wage war, there is no other means but to surrender and for that reason armaments are unnecessary and Japan must take a neutral stand. Thus we attain the real motive.

This section on the real motive is imposing, and Mr Morishima for the first time revealed the details, and it all seems to have been systematized. Considered only in this way a defense policy becomes unnecessary for Japan. In this sense it is an epoch-making argument. I wonder what sort of impression

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the late Admiral Nurumi Inoue, in his grave, has on Morishima's argument? Although perhaps not enraged, I think that he is smiling grimly.

What I just cannot understand is that although this argument is formulated on an attack against Japan by the Soviet Union, people throughout Japan should also foster more countries which feel Japan's existence is beneficial to them.

I ask that Japan become the mediator for the east. I believe that an eastern country can understand the other eastern country better than [a Western country can] and that a country which can become a mediator for the world is necessary. Without relying on weapons or armaments, stacking up results in economics, culture and foreign relations, etc., I ask that we be a mediator of peace.

The present time is called the nuclear age. In armaments and energy, a basic idea proliferated by "nuclear" is being formulated into every subject. I think this is rather frightening. No matter how much peaceful use of nuclear energy is called for, there is no change in the fact that nuclear material is dangerous. It is needless to say that ever since the discovery of an atomic nucleus, the existence of mankind has been threatened. In this sort of age, can we avoid war by arming ourselves? In the June issue of GENDAI in an article entitled "Our Strongest Defense", by former chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs Kurisu stated that "since it is impossible for Japan, unlike the Soviet Union, to put up its full war capability, if in some area we can excel in exerting its influence and use it as a deterrent power, an opponent with greater overall power would not easily turn against us." It is a discussion with no end. It may be an immediate deterrent but can never be absolute. The top seat will soon be taken over by another country. The point is unclear on what sort of international climate will be the basis of the attack. He completely ignores U.S.-Soviet relations, Sino-Soviet relations, U.S.-China relations, the Korean Peninsula and the international climate which envelopes Japan, and he says "in the event of Soviet attack", surrender does not make any sense. I imagine that he bases an attack against Japan on present U.S.-China-Soviet and U.S.-Japan relations but he has not touched at all on the actions of the U.S., tied in with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Professor Moriyama says that under current Japan-U.S. relations, even if Japan is invaded by the Soviets, the U.S. will not come to her aid, but this is absurd. I consider that depending on conditions and circumstances the U.S. may even invade Japan.

It is common knowledge that the two countries of Japan and the U.S., under a nuclear umbrella and tied by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, consider the Soviet Union as an enemy. I do not know under what circumstances it would occur, but if Japan hoists up the red and white flag, for America this conduct would be a clear betrayal. To put it clearly, if after being under U.S. protection long since the end of the war Japan were to open up the castle and invite the Soviet Union, don't you think it's possible for the U.S. to attack Japan? The change from "love" over to "hate" is frightening. If the single nation of East Germany proceeded to surrender to the NATO army, the Soviet Union would not likely sit by.

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In the 19 July issue of SANKEI SHIMBUN in the column "Sound Debates" Tokyo University professor Yoshitaro Katsuta pointed out that, "For America, if a major power with the economic expertise like Japan falls helplessly into the hands of the Soviet Union, a 'preventive occupation' is a possibility," but it certainly would not seem to end with that. For America Japan's strategic value is extremely great. If professor Morishima placed himself in the White House and thought about a Japanese-Soviet war with the interests of the U.S. at the center that should become clear. It is impossible that the U.S. in a sportsmanlike manner should laugh and then just cut Japan off asunder.

In the event of a war with the Soviet Union do we raise our hands in surrender from the first, or do we fight for a while and then pursue the choice of 100 million honorable deaths or 100 million surrendered, then making "a surrender replete with integrity?" I feel that this section is very vague. Professor Morishima can state that, "under Soviet occupation, building a form of socialist economy suitable to Japan is possible if we persevere," but I question whether this statement was made after deep thought on what it would be like under Soviet occupation. Unfortunately as it is not possible that we conduct an experiment and ask the Soviet Union to please occupy Japan for 5 years, everyone has no course but to speak out as he pleases on whatever they fancy. But I cannot be as optimistic as Mr Morishima. Is there any guarantee that political self-determination will be recognized? I do not mean to say that it is going to be unbearable to exist under Soviet occupation, therefore we chose 100 million deaths. This, as Mr Seki says, is an extreme situation and it is something for the cabinet and prime minister to decide. To think of it, we are fortunate to be in a society where free speech is permitted, where food and clothing are sufficient, and where we can debate 100 million deaths or complete surrender and so on. This phenomenon speaks for how peaceful a nation like Japan is.

However, at present, among Japanese, I don't see any serious attitude taken toward the militarily and economically fragile state of their own country, and there is no concern over how to cope with the situation either. I think the danger exists within the minds of people, and long before we are invaded by another country, I am afraid to say that it is likely that 100 million will lose the mental strength and become scared. And they will fall to a spiritual death.

Fuji Kamiya

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 107-109

[Article by Fuji Kamiya, (professor, Keio University): "An Era of Relativism"]

[Text] Since I am allowed certain space, I would like to limit myself to presenting some doubts I have with respect to professor Morishima's thesis.

(1) Today is the age of collective security. It is often stated that in today's world, apart from the great powers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union,

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there is no country which by itself can preserve the security of its own nation. But even the U.S. and the Soviet Union single-handedly cannot guarantee the security of their nations without the cooperation of their allies. If this is so for the U.S. and the Soviet Union Japan cannot consider national defense without the cooperation of its ally America. It must be said it should be very natural for us to always think of national defense on the premise of U.S. cooperation. The far-fetched scenario of Japan fighting the Soviet Union by itself--which has become a standard scenario nowadays--is not an appropriate position for discussing the problem of Japan's defense.

(2) But at the time of emergency, will America come to our aid? This, together with the credibility of the nuclear umbrella, is the question hurled out by those who have repeatedly opposed the U.S.-Japan security system. This is a problem which cannot be tested. If we suppose that America will come to our aid in actuality, this is after an attack or invasion has been inflicted on the country, and so the damage is already done. The object of our defense policy is to see to it that an opportunity for testing the reliability of America does not come.

If testing or objective verification is impossible, then ultimately we can only return to the subjective problem of whether to believe or not believe in America. However this is not a problem which can be settled by preference or by feeling, and we must sufficiently examine the persuasiveness of the argument which lies behind any such subjective judgment.

In order to place trust in the U.S. defense cooperation with Japan, I believe that we need to examine, at the least, the following two matters. A) First there is the problem of whether America will in the future as well be a Pacific power, and my answer to this is "yes." There is no doubt that increasingly in the future as both a Pacific and Atlantic power it will continue to hold a vital interest in the regions of eastern Asia and the western Atlantic. An America without its influence in these two areas is unthinkable as it is a great world power, and I can't imagine that in the foreseeable future the country would submit to losing its position as a great power. B) Next, what is the basic axis of the America-Asia relationship? I am not leaving aside Japan-U.S. relations. For America, the present stable alliance with Japan and the preservation of friendly U.S.-Japan relations--in addition to harmony in Asian policy and its effective enforcement--is essential. With the reconciliation and normalization of China-U.S. relations, it has been mentioned that now the center of Asian policy may be shifted from Japan-U.S. relations to U.S.-China relations, but for a long time to come, that is nothing more than an illusion and beyond comprehension. In politics, economics, militarily and technologically, China is still in every way an unrealized country.

Essentially, for a matter of life and death in Asia, Japan is the decisively important nation and accordingly America could not, after all, sit by and see Japan submit through attack or invasion to a third power.

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(3) Since the history of mankind was established from ancient times by war and peace, when we studied history, we used to memorize the chronology of wars to study that subject. Even now, I imagine, those students who are preparing for their entrance exam may be doing the same to prepare for the history exam. However present day wars do not easily become objects of memorization. For future students who are studying to take the exam, it will not be an easy task to remember all about the Vietnam War. This is because in all probability there is no teacher or instructor who can conclusively teach when it began. The difference between peace and war has become so vague. On the other hand, at the time of the recent Tokyo Summit meeting, excessive use of police protection became the controversial issue. It is easy to criticize this, but if something happened it would be irrevocable. Considering the Red Army and so forth, even a nation like Japan which is considered to be one of the most peaceful and free, did not have confidence in the safety of a small number of vips without calling out the entire police force.

As I mentioned above, nowadays there is no absolute guarantee of peace. The same cannot be said for every country and place, but generally speaking there can only be a relative guarantee of the peace. However while we submit to this relativism we have no course but to pursue an even slightly better peace. How would it be to stand on the out-dated thought, "For a nuclear nation, a non-nuclear army is no threat," or decide, like John Foster Dulles, on "all or nothing." It is hard to get used to such dichotomy in the modern time which we call the "age of relativism."

4) I cannot concur with Mr Morishima on surrendering to the Soviet Union in response to a Soviet attack, "obtaining in return the right of political self-determination" and even under a Soviet occupation, "if we only persevere" we can "establish a splendid society." I would prefer to abstain from the "freedom" of 1940 Japan or the "freedom" of Poland. Japan is able to maintain its prosperity because it trades with the advanced democratic nations extensively. The past history should have proved to us that Japan, in surrendering to an invader and confined to the framework of the COMECON system, could not possibly establish "a fine society."

Kyoko Hayashi

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 109-111

[Article by Kyoko Hayashi, (writer): "The Japanese People Wish a Permanent Peace"]

[Text] I read over again today Japan's constitution. The result was that I was moved by the introduction to the peace constitution,--which was enacted on 3 May 1947 after the much of suffering experienced at the end of war, and which, in an excellent fashion, left nothing unsaid--presents the spirit of the Japanese people of the time. And I realized again how a Japanese nation should be molded and I find the idea of proposing additional words to the constitution unnecessary.

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What came to mind after reading the dialogue on war and peace between Mr Morishima "The New 'Armaments Plan Theory'" and Mr Seki "Without Weapons Peace Cannot be Preserved," is the simple question of protecting the country or our lives from a hypothetical enemy. Is it a matter of one of two choices, to fight or to surrender? And at the same time I question simply whether defense of our nation is untenable without the premise of militarization. Is the maintenance of peace without military force, a national defense based on peace, a desk theory of amateur? It is of course not necessary to split hairs on the arguments of both parties, and I know that both men's continued debates are for the sake of peace, nonetheless the following doubts come to my mind.

Mr Morishima gives as title to his opening paragraphs, "Tribute to the late Admiral Narumi Inoue," and records that the Admiral states strongly that competition with the U.S. and Great Britain in building a naval force is by no means for the sake of protecting Japan. The same could be said for today as well. What is possible for Japan is not deterring war but only avoiding it. I, from my meagre but wholly sufficient experience of war, believe also that in any event we should avoid war. To survive war and to go on living is nothing but the destruction of body and soul. Suppose we obtain peace after war; we should recognize the fact that some of our people sacrifice their lives. A peace obtained in exchange for lives is unconceivable. However I can not go along with Mr Morishima's idea of avoiding war by orderly surrender to a hypothetical enemy nation. In avoiding war I think that there is only one way which is for the people to adhere to Article 9 of Chapter II of the Constitution of Japan. This did not evolve from a complaisant concept that, as in Mr Seki's words, "is based on the opportunistic outlook that it is inconceivable to believe any country would invade Japan that has a peace constitution." For those of us who have experienced World War II, the old wounds of the past are not slight enough for us to discuss peace with an opportunistic outlook. It is hard to say that Japan faces a risk of encountering invasion from one side only. It's possible for Japan to become an invader. Could this opportunistic outlook be derived from the debates on peace which acknowledges both possibilities Japan faces?

Mr Morishima proceeds with what we have to learn from the "political position of Switzerland which is neutral country," and states that, "the important thing is to be always active in the arena of international politics and accumulate good records of being a mediator during peace time." Mr Seki as well states that, "the most important thing is to exert out utmost efforts to avoid war. I am in full support of the software diplomacy asserted by Mr Morishima, which is through foreign relations, economic cooperation, and cultural interchange, etc. We should create foreigners knowledgeable in Japanese affairs and should have good relations with more countries that feel the presence of Japan is beneficial to them."

I believe truly that the only thing that can serve as a deterrent to war is people. I think there is nothing but individual's efforts and human wisdom and driving the word "peace" firmly into our heads is the only answer. As a

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means of preserving peace, war and militarization should not be considered; human wisdom is the answer. Especially in order to avoid a war in the nuclear age, it can be achieved by using human wisdom. If this is not achieved by the unified effort of the entire world, the day of self-destruction of mankind is most likely to come. The oil energy problem, the Vietnam problem, whatever the problem is we have come to an age when one country's policy could not possibly solve all of the problems we face in the world.

As a place to solve problems peacefully in the world as one, I feel secure in the existence of the United Nations. If it is said that it exerts little influence, those of us who ask for peace have a responsibility and duty to persevere in raising the level of its influence. I believe it is the United Nations that can serve as a deterrent force in avoiding war.

We Japanese pledged ourselves to "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." Before mocking it as empty rhetoric, we should make greater efforts. A mere 32 years has elapsed since then.

Tokichi Harada

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 111-112

[Article by Tokichi Harada (Commentator): "The Blind Spot in 'The Great Debate'"]

[Text] The opposing ideas on 'defense' which divide the country into two, "the anti- and pro-armaments theories, appear in the July issue of the magazine BUNGEI SHUNJU as a debate in four parts. These are Morishima Yukio's "New 'New Armaments Program'" and Seki Yoshihiko's "Without Armaments, the Peace Cannot Be Defended."

A debate is fair, superlatively intellectual, and full of vigor. The editor's postscript states, "These debates might have become a 'starting point'--which we are surely to touch in future debates--when national defense of Japan was to be discussed. I have absolutely no objection to this. And I must confess also that I felt a slight boredom and a secret disappointment.

The instigator of the debate Mr Morishima states that returning to Japan from London on the airplane he read Mr Seki's article "We Should Be Able to Deal With Emergencies Such as a Surprise Attack" in the SANKEI SHIMBUN and was amazed. He states that, "I even felt frightened to go home," and "for the 10 hours to Tokyo, with my wife as a listener, argued obstinately against Mr Seki."

It is needless to say that it was Mr Seki's article in the newspaper and the "completely changed" image of Japan that so excited him. Considering this from a different angle; the fact that he could not even imagine and expect such a transformation means that he had held all these years deep in his heart

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the golden age of unarmed neutrality theory in the sixties. With the feeling of the sixties he takes on the present, becomes indignant, then this emotion triggers him to debate on "War and Peace." It is natural that his debate gives the strong impression of being only "a declaration from the sixties."

Mr Seki's defense theory was formulated independent of any relationship with Mr Morishima's questions and expectations. It may be said that his rebuttal to Mr Morishima's "Without Armaments the Peace Cannot Be Preserved" impresses us with his maturity and confidence which he acquired during the past 10-odd years of continued struggle with rationalization of his idea and theory of unarmed neutrality. In the face of a challenge he says what should be said, plunges in to make the points that should be made, until he feels that to argue any further would be futile. If the above is so, there is nothing strange that we have in this debate a splendid condensation of a substance with the defense debate of the sixties and we should frankly admit that we have here an "original document" of the genre.

But having done so, let us address ourselves directly to the lack of rigor in these emotional ideas. Reading over the dialogue, what unfortunately came to mind was the recollection of a "time capsule." It seemed that the unfruitful defense debate of the sixties had been packed as is into a time capsule, buried deep under the ground, and that it was unearthed to set loose a repetition of the same old thing. I could only think that although the backgrounds and the rhetoric may be modern, the substance was identical with the issue we had already discussed in the sixties and in the early years of the seventies. The strong feeling of, "What else to talk about now?" was with me, and that is why I felt a slight boredom and a hidden disappointment. In a word, we are "tired of listening" and "disgusted" with the fruitless debate on armament-disarmament which may continue for who knows how long.

If, in this debate, there were some new development beyond the sixties, it must be Mr Morishima's arguments which we might call "the promoting of surrender." Mr Morishima arrives at the conclusion that, "Under the worst possible circumstance there is either death or surrender, and if death is meaningless there is only surrender, and if surrender is the choice, there is no need to arm ourselves." And also, "Rather than invite the horror of the aftermath of war...an orderly surrender with dignity, and obtaining in return the right of political self-determination." (He devoted 30 pages to prove his thesis.) We might as well call it "the theory of unarmed surrender."

When a question was posed, "Will a foreign country truly not instigate an attack if we are unarmed?" we may say that Mr Morishima has rearmed himself logically with the "unarmed neutrality theory" which has dropped in favor so completely recently, so much so that we may call his stand "a change in approach." He offers the solution to the question of "an unlikely attack" as "an ordered surrender with dignity" and "the right of political self-determination" and tries to make his point that "accordingly we should carry through with disarmament."

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Again, unfortunately, we must state that in the background here as well we have an image of the Soviet Union tinted by the rosy-hued miasma of the sixties. In the sixties, was he unaware of the controversy over a country which approved "a surrender with dignity" and a country which considered "zero armaments?"

I wish to add that this "promoting of surrender" argument, and Mr Seki touches upon this also, is exactly the same sort of thing we went through in the fifties with Lord Russel's peace theory. This as well is no new development and is nothing less than a pretense.

It is well to learn from the lessons of history of the last world war, but in order for a "time capsule" argument to bloom and thrive in 1979 like the lotus blossoms of ancient times which came to life again, to obtain a realistic and correct assessment of the present day Soviet Union and current insight, into the substance of wars in progress in Africa, the Middle East and South-east Asia is absolutely essential. These are the real pictures and it is the modern day reality that transcends the period of the sixties.

Other Readers Opinions

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese 79 pp 113-114

[Text] The Defense Controversy is Still in Time

Reading Yukio Morismina's treatise, his points made in opposition to Mr Seki's views aside, I felt a great sympathy with his ideas, and read them with great interest.

However I've always been puzzled about the current trend which seeks to evade all mention of armaments. So, his argument that, "Differing opinions on the national defense controversy must be presented at an early stage" made a strong impression on me. And he states that having the military in obedience to civilians is the same as forcing the military group to play a role of grand champion of a stronger sumo wrestler.

When I ponder how many politicians there are in Japan who have figured out how much military power Japan needs in case it becomes a stage for war, I can only feel a sense of revulsion. And furthermore if we consider rearmament from the position of how much time is necessary to put that military capability into effect and how much ammunition will be necessary, the whole debate is an empty one.

Politicians, bureaucrats, and you people, who continue forever to debate 10 year-old issues: We are standing at the threshold of the age when people should be, as Mr Morishima says, debating the question of rearmament and establishing national security for Japan. (Company employee, 57 years old)

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A Rejection of Quantitative Concepts

It may be impertinent, but I thought "the great debate" did not attain its goal. That is, the two parties had totally different views on life and society to the extent that there is nothing common between their basic thinking and, it is only natural that the debate does not go anywhere.

Personally I believe that the arguments of Mr Seki appear natural, and that Mr Morishima seems to have taken things for granted that what he believes is always correct.

He adheres to the historical path Switzerland has taken, calls for making fine records as a mediator, placing emphasis on the light industry, etc., and his thinking is so naive that I cannot believe he is considered to be a top intellectual. For example, even if the fact that Switzerland was not enveloped in the horrors of the last world war is due as he says to its neutrality, there is no significance to this, other than that "that was the Switzerland of that time." In the event Japan becomes the object in a worldwide war, neither neutrality nor a mediation role is going to be the contributing factor for being able to escape wars.

Furthermore Mr Morishima states that in a nuclear age, a country without nuclear weapons is powerless and that in the event of war it would be the end, but I do not think so.

A nuclear attack on a small country like Japan and leaving it to a devastated state removes all the merit from an invasion. Yet the ordinary weapons I have in mind are by no means bamboo spears.

At the base of Mr Morishima's various thoughts, there seems to be quantitative concepts, but can human beings live in such a practical way? When the incident of a uniformed policeman murdering a female co-ed occurred, I saw a man laughing and saying, "If she'd let him have his way, she could have survived." but for human beings, is there not something more important which surpasses this sort of thought? So even if more police officers were to be killed than hostages the police department will be able to continue its operation. And women sometimes choose to die rather than be sexually violated and survive.

Anyway, even if Mr Morishima's ideas are correct overall, we should expect to encounter some people who were not enlightened, and thoroughly understand this human society just as Mr Morishima does not. When those people were killed off one by one or were sent to mental institutions and to concentration camps, would he be able to eulogize the degree of freedom of the 1940s?
(Student, 25 years old)

The Idea of a Free Citizens Army

Mr Morishima advocates "absolute non-resistance" and writes that teaching the young people to "waive both the white and red flags and peacefully welcome

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the Soviet forces," is "a duty for those who experienced war." I am one of those who experienced war, but have a different notion of "duty for those who lived through war." It is the idea of having a democratic citizens army.

In the recent past there was a saying, "25 years life time." This was a time when the war was in its last stages, we were continuing to send out a special offensive force, and even junior high school students were sent to war as members of the "young mens corps." During the period of over 30 years, since the war ended in its inconceivable fashion, I realized that the feeling of sorrow held by the people of my age toward the death of those young people during the war changed. More elderly people are feeling sad about those young people who had to die in the war. It is downright unreasonable that young people should die in wars before old people do.

Now having reached middle age, I would like to propose a democratic citizen's army to those of my age, and to those older in order to protect our nation and to give a chance for young people "not" to die before older ones.

Let us be prepared for the time should our country's independence be threatened, to stand and defend the most dangerous front lines before young people do.

Participation is based on free will, with those who consider Japan a country worthy of sacrificing their lives, as well as those who do not think this way but believe their participation in a citizen's army is a must for the future of their descendants and countrymen, and also those who can not resign themselves to foreign control, all taking up arms as a united force.

For weapons, rifles will be sufficient. As it is a non-professional group, no ranks will be established and direction will be left to the specialist. The criticism that "it is worthless", will naturally be made, but isn't this rather in accord with the present constitution? If and when we the elderly people with some common sense and determined to pull us together to protect our nation, there may be less chance of being looked down upon by other countries. (Doctor, 58 years old)

The Amateur's Blow, the Professional's Parry

"The Great Debate--War and Peace" was very, very interesting. The former debate between Mr Morishima and Mr Tsuru was, in terms of the Takarozuka Theatre, like a recital contest between an amateur still in training and a specialist, and was not a very good pairing. But this time the casting was good and both had enough sense to be stars. When I had finished reading, my impression was "the amateur's blow, the professional's parry." Mr Morishima danced brilliantly, seemingly to benefit Mr Seki's appearance. Yes indeed, it was truly enjoyable reading and was interesting to read the arguments of an amateur quietly overturned one by one by the opposition.

As something to read, or as a thought, Mr Morishima's arguments were very interesting and there were parts I could concur with, but the paragraph which

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began with, "if we only persevere" ended up as an amateur's argument. Does not the defense problem begin with the fact that we are not certain whether we are strong enough or not, no matter what age we are in, it's impossible to be confident of being strong? Mr Morishima writes, "because I believe in people." I also believe in people. But I do not believe in the Japanese. I like them individually. But I have no belief in the group.

Groups of Japanese are not gatherings of individuals, and are flocks of people gathered together in one effort without any individuality for a certain effect. I am uncertain that with zero-armaments, and after a surrender, each person could live with dignity sufficiently to build a fresh social system. There is no doubt that most people will change positions quickly and adopt the posture of the invaders, and then there will be many of those who can distinguish themselves within its system. (White collar worker female, 20 years old)

The Tragic History of Unarmed Neutrality

Professor Morishima points out that, "because Japan made a dignified and admirable surrender to the U.S. Army." We were able to achieve, after the war, a miraculous reconstruction. Just as the professor points out, it is true that the people of Japan through the loss of the war gained freedom, and became affluent. Professor Morishima ignores the serious matter that it is the "U.S. which hoped for the non-armament of Japan" allowed the creation of today's Self Defense Force (derogatively speaking a puppet army). Historical instances of "the conqueror creating the same sort of army" are not limited to the U.S. Luxembourg was a very similar sort of unarmed neutral country but Nazi Germany invaded Luxembourg, recruited the youth in the army and sent them to their death on the Russian front. When the Soviet Union liberated East Europe they set up the Warsaw Pact Army, and in 1968 used it to attack Czechoslovakia.

From these historical examples, we see that even if small- and medium-sized countries hope for dis-armament, the great powers ignore this and use them as the vanguard in the invasion of other countries. So, shouldn't we small and medium sized countries arm ourselves on our own will and resist the invading great power even if the enemy is too much for us?

And another point, while Professor Morishima cites Switzerland alone as a neutral nation, why does he not make mention of the tragic history of Luxembourg or the bitter historical experience of Liechtenstein which became unarmed and neutral in 1868. If he is to advocate unarmed neutrality, he can not ignore the history of the two countries. (Newspaper reporter, 37 years old)

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MILITARY

EXPERTS DISCUSS FUTURE OF JAPAN SELF DEFENSE FORCES

Tokyo SHUKAN ASAHI in Japanese 13, 20 Jul 79

[Special Series: CAN JAPAN SURVIVE: "Defense" Part I and Part II. Interview articles by Keitaro Hasegawa]

[13 Jul 79 pp 141-145]

[Text] [Text] The Soviet carrier 'Minsk' has passed the Tsushima Strait, and it appears that debate on matters of defense will intensify further. It also seems that the nation's perception of the Self Defense Forces is gradually changing. However, surprisingly much is not known about the actual nature of the Self Defense Forces. How are the Self Defense Forces different from the old armed forces? What kind of impact did the affair of the dismissal of Hiroomi Kurisu as chairman of the Joint Staff Council have? We have tried to look into the truth of the matter.

The Self Defense Forces are composed of army, navy, and air forces. Among the Self Defense Forces, which are "technocrat bodies," the Ground Self Defense Force is lowest in terms of technical-group elements; the relative weight of importance placed on the "personnel" [soldiers] is large. For that reason, among the forces, it comes closest to the old armed forces' concentration on "human bullets." If we look at the Ground Self Defense Force and clarify the difference between it and the old army, there exist great differences.

The military intervenes in politics. For example, in the case of a coup d'etat, the army is always at the heart of it. Neither the air force nor the navy is instrumental in bringing about a coup d'etat. Even if they should be instrumental, the coup d'etat will definitely fail as long as the army does not act and if the army is opposed to it.

Thus, examining the Ground Self Defense Force is the best way to investigate the operations of the Self Defense Forces as a whole.

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The place is Akasaka, Tokyo. There is no air-conditioning in the Ground Staff Office in the Defense Agency building. In a brief respite from rain, the strong early summer sun makes the hot and humid air all the more unbearable. Here in this office I interviewed the head of the public relations corps of the Ground Self Defense Force, Colonel Shigematsu. He is one of the 3rd group of Defense College graduates. He was born in 1936.

Interviewer: It is necessary for soldiers of a defeated nation, professional soldiers--especially professional soldiers who cannot expect to be praised by society in general--to have selfconsciousness as soldiers because they dared choose the soldier's way of life. This is true in any country. In your case, in what respect do you feel pride as an officer of the Self Defense Forces?

Shigematsu: I believe that to belong to a group of those professionals who are concerned with the nation's defense and the job of protecting the country is sufficient reason for dedicating one's whole life as a man.

Interviewer: Soldiers of a defeated country cannot help but always feel responsibility for the defeat. Especially in a country such as Japan, where the Self Defense Forces are not officially recognized as a military organization, I think that in choosing the profession of soldier it is necessary for a person to make up his mind that it will not be easy. Where does that kind of determination come from?

Shigematsu: From education, I should say. In general, when Self Defense Forces' member joins up, he does not come in burning with the determination to protect the country. It is no different from choosing another profession, like civil servant, private businessman, whatever. Motivation is not strong. After joining and going through initial training, and then the training that comes once a person is assigned to one of the forces, for the first time the new member understands how important a job it is to be charged with the defense of the country. Such understanding is accompanied by the confidence that the new member has not made a mistake in choosing membership in the Self Defense Forces as his occupation.

Raising Sense of Duty During Training

Interviewer: You are saying that a person joins the Self Defense Forces in the same way he would choose any other profession? Although he is choosing a profession where one uses weapons and kills people, he does not need any more determination than that?

Shigematsu: That is correct. In elementary and junior high school, the new Self Defense Forces' member has not been taught at all about national defense, about the work of defending the country. Therefore, he has no knowledge about the profession called "defense" until he enlists and receives training. The new member chooses the Self Defense Forces just as he would choose another occupation. He does not have any special sense of duty.

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Interviewer: In other countries people are taught in elementary school about national defense, about military matters. They understand that joining the armed forces is different from entering another profession. Only in Japan is that not the case. However, how does the member, who joins without any special motivation, without any self-determination, immediately understand the importance of national defense?

Shigematsu: In the first place, there is the generally a great understanding [toward national defense] among Japanese as a whole, and the high level of their intellectual capacity. Second, looking at the situation in the world today, the latent consciousness present in any country that that country has the particular right to protect itself is awakened in the Forces' training.

Interviewer: The instinct of self-defense is found in all living things. In humans as well. It is natural for the Japanese people to protect Japan. Is it really awakened by the Defense Forces' training?

Shigematsu: I think so. That and group thinking, perhaps. Once a person is part of an organization, he wants to contribute and do his best. I can say that this, too, is one aspect of it. To add one more, one wants to use weapons, to wear a uniform, and to participate in well disciplined and group oriented activities. Is this not also a young person's instinct?

In the pre-war armed forces, there was Imperial Rescript for the soldiers. The first line, which says, "Japan's armed forces are under the perpetual command of the Emperor," was surely the basis of those orders. The imperially-led forces were done away with because of our defeat in the war. The Self Defense Forces, which were set up differently, became a group that "in order to protect Japan's peace and independence and to preserve the country's security has the principal duty to defend the country against direct or indirect attack and when necessary to maintain public order." (Self Defense Forces Law, Section 3, paragraph 1)

As opposed to "the Emperor commands the army and navy" (Section 11 of the constitution of Imperial Japan), "the prime minister, representing the Cabinet, has supreme command of the Self Defense Forces" (Self Defense Forces Law, Section 7). Thus, the Self Defense Forces are under the civilian command of the prime minister.

Herein lies the decisive difference between the pre-war army and navy and the post-war Self Defense Forces. This is also the decisive difference between pre-war imperial rule and post-war democracy.

When we take note of these differences, we are made to realize that the Self Defense Forces are no longer simply the successors of the former imperial forces.

In talking about training in national defense or, simply, sense of duty concerning defense, which Colonel Shigematsu spoke of here, the Self Defense

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Forces have no textbooks to teach their members awareness of national defense. Education of a sense of duty in "defending our nation" is, as a rule, carried out during the officers' training course, but actually explanation and lectures given to the soldiers during the period of basic training are playing a major role in educating SDF members about the sense of duty.

As opposed to the old army which required memorization of the "Imperial Rescript" for the soldiers, the SDF's officer training stresses "spontaneous" training--even though moral education lacks its consistency--in that the officer's initiative can be freely demonstrated, learning of sense of duty for national defense within the Self Defense Forces is extremely flexible.

The Qualities of the Japanese People Which Make for High Morale

Interviewer: Because of the old army's use of the draft, people were forced to enlist. There were many young men who did not necessarily want to enter the armed forces. I think that for those soldiers, the word "to be taken" expressed the feeling. Compared to the old army, how is the morale of the Self Defense Forces?

Shigematsu: I was born in 1936. When the war ended I was a third grader in elementary school. I don't know much about the old army. However, I think that the morale of the present Self Defense Forces is extremely high. If I think back to what I saw when I studied for a year in the American Command and Staff School, the Self Defense Forces are superior, with respect to both unit performance and willingness to do whatever their duties call for.

Interviewer: In both the American and British armies, which are, likewise, run under a voluntary enlistment system, the decline in soldier quality is a great problem. In a volunteer army, society's dropouts, failures, those who cannot find employment elsewhere, volunteer for the army as a way of making a living. In the case of the Self Defense Forces, it was said that young people join in the same way as they would select any other occupation. They do not have deep convictions when they join. But somehow they become more highly-motivated soldiers than those in the American army. Is there a special reason for this?

Shigematsu: The morale of the Self Defense Forces is high because of the good quality of the soldiers. The educational background and quality of the Japanese people are in general superior to Americans also. The high morale among SDF members is also due to great efforts made by the members over a period of close to 30 years. Of course, a peacetime army, no matter what the country it is, devotes most of its time only in training and educating SDF members. The Self Defense Forces are no exception. For the very reason that there is strong motivation among soldiers and officers, even if they are "outcasts", the result of continuing efforts to build the morale of the Self Defense Forces is gradually becoming visible.

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In training the minds of SDFs members, a great proportion of time is spent for the moral education to create members of society also. It is training of members in how to conduct themselves in society.

The degree to which this training has been successful is indicative in the crime rate registered among SDF members. The more than 200,000 SDF members comprise a group of average Japanese. To what extent do these members commit crimes and how does it compare to society at large?

In order to see the positive results of moral education--the "nurturing their sense of duty" of the Ground Self Defense Force--we took a look at the crime rate.

In a survey made by the Ground Self Defense Force police unit, criminal offenses in 1977 were about 27 out of 10,000 people. This is about one quarter of the crimes committed by the general public, which is 112. As for murders, there was one case in 1976; none in 1977. The results are not bad.

Interviewer: Is there no index to measure the degree of the Self Defense Forces' morale? For example, the officers?

Shigematsu: In the ranger course, now, almost all second lieutenants volunteered. As you know, compared to ordinary infantry soldiers, rangers undergo rigorous training. It is commonly known that in today's Self Defense Forces, almost without exception ranger training is taken voluntarily by all.

Interviewer: Even in America, commissioned officers who volunteer for ranger training are in the minority. To say that in Japan almost all are volunteers is extraordinary, I think.

Stressing SDF Members' Initiative and Independent Action

Interviewer: In the armed forces of foreign countries, there are strict differences in rank between officers and enlisted men. For example, methods of salary payment are different. Commissioned officers receive a month's pay in advance on the first day of every month, but enlisted men receive a week's pay at the end of the week.

The problem is the discrimination which is obvious in this system. It is all right to pay commissioned officers a month's salary in advance, but they pay the enlisted men at the end of the week because it is never known when they are going to desert. In other words, commissioned officers are regarded as individuals who can be trusted, but enlisted men are thought of as mere providers of labor, in other words, as "human bullets." Therefore, when enlisted men are given orders by officers, the officers watch to see whether or not the enlisted men carry out the orders. If they don't watch over them, the officers cannot be sure that the orders are carried out.

Shigematsu: I did not know that in foreign armed forces officer and enlisted men's pay was given on different days. In the Self Defense Forces everyone

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has the same pay day. Rather, the officers take the lead and set an example. The enlisted men learn from that. The enlisted men understand how the officers think, and they try, through their own initiative, to do what the officers would do. In no branch of the Self Defense Forces do officers supervise the actions of each individual member.

Interviewer: In the old army, internal corps regulations were fixed: the commander was the father, the squad leader was the mother, and the soldier was the child. Such a corps-family arrangement was emphasized and within that training was carried out. How is it in today's Self Defense Forces?

Shigematsu: We stress the initiative and independence of the members. In times of trouble, we work things out as a whole group, with the commander and officers taking the lead. Enlisted men do not criticize or refuse orders, but they contribute their opinions to the officers. Thus, when it comes to carrying out orders, the men behave as if the order were their own idea. How the officers achieve this kind of cooperation is an important key in increasing member initiative and at the same time strengthening the group cohesiveness of the Self Defense Forces.

Interviewer: How was it in your division?

Shigematsu: I have been commander. Often, in breaks from training, I would call my men together and talk to them. Things talked about at those times--for example, the topic of just how important is the job of defending the country--helped the troops in better understanding matters of defense. I think that this type of discussion during training is much more effective than doing it via lectures in the barracks. That is probably because the whole corps has the shared experience of participating together in training. It is because real feelings emerge there. After speaking to the men about the importance of defense, their motivation changes.

Interviewer: In the old armed forces, training was accompanied by physical punishment, beating and kicking. The Self Defense Forces training utilizes methods which demand member self-realization and independent behavior. This is a reflection of the fact that Japanese politics have changed from a pre-war imperial system to a post-war parliamentary democracy. Also, it derives from the technical need to make a modern army, that is, an army that uses modern weapons. What modern weapons demand of soldiers is close teamwork with high level technology.

Shigematsu: That is correct. To make full use of the mighty equipment, the fire-power of which cannot be compared with the bayonet-charging old army, close team-play among Self Defense Forces' divisions and troops cannot be lacking. Each member of the Self Defense Forces fully understands his own role and carries out his own responsibilities 100 percent. That is the goal of training. I think that in order to achieve that we must make the men understand the significance of defense--and that it is important to carry out training from that perspective.

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The Uniformed Group Shuns Political Debate

One difference between the Self Defense Forces and the old army is the quality of weapons. The main weapons of the infantry of the old army were 38-caliber rifles and bayonets. The non-automatic 38-caliber rifle took one minute to fire five rounds. The 64-caliber small rifles with which the present Self Defense Forces are now equipped, are automatic and can go over 300 rounds a minute.

Moreover, the old army relied on horses and men's feet for infantry movement. The Self Defense Forces, however, are mechanized and at all levels have high mobility and speed.

It is needless to say that high-level technology is necessary for the soldier to operate modern weapons with large capacity for mobility and fire-power. This makes it all the more necessary for the officers to have high levels of technical skills. The officers not only teach the soldiers how to use the weapons, but they must be able to maintain the supplies which support the fire power, together with coordinating and organizing the various types of weapons according to the purpose.

Moreover, a high degree of tactical ability is also necessary to fully understand the sophisticated weapons, and the function and ability of the divisions which operate those weapons, and to demonstrate in the most effective way the fighting strength as it would operate in actual conditions.

The officers of the Self Defense Forces are all technocrats and specialists in high-level technology and war technique. The men of the Forces are skillful at and have mastered the operation of the weaponry. The Self Defense Forces as a whole is a body of technocrats. Skilled people can be trained in a relatively short time. However, that is not the case with officers. After completing 4 years of War College and one year of officer candidate school, at last they become corps commanders. After that they spend several years working in a division, and they train in specialty school and for 2 more years in officer school. It takes 10 years to reach commander class.

In the old navy, the training entailed "10 years for lieutenant, 20 years for commander." In the Self Defense Forces, where high technology which cannot be compared to pre-war time is demanded, commander training similarly requires a long time. It is natural that the Self Defense Forces also put great stress on officer training. Officers are the core of defense.

The Kurisu affair of July 1978. Hiroomi Kurisu, who was chairman of the Joint Staff Council, said that the Japanese armed forces might act on their own in case of a surprise attack. The affair, in which he was expelled from the top post of the uniformed forces, sent unexpected shockwaves among the Self Defense Forces' uniformed personnel.

By interviewing Colonel Shigematsu, chief of the Ground Self Defense Force public relations corps, we were able to learn how extensive and how strong were the shock waves of the Kurisu affair.

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In the first place, self-control of the uniformed personnel was greatly strengthened. They spoke in unison.

"There are no individual opinions concerning the way the Self Defense Forces should operate. We express our opinion through a spokesman. Please go to him."

It is courteous, but the tone is quite firm. In it we can see an expression of the self-initiated intention to adhere to internal rules, as a body of professional war technicians.

In the second place, it is a fact that the idea of not wanting to get involved in politics has become more deeply rooted. It is completely different from the young officers of the old army who would have a drink and start grieving over the nation and discussing politics. "Serve in the army silently." (General order of April 1923). SDF members consider the military their career and their psychology is such that they don't like to have anything to do with politics, and consequently, they do their best to avoid politics while they drive themselves to become true soldiers.

"Following correct procedure, we report political opinions to superiors-- for example, those concerning defense policy. Such opinions are passed up the chain of command, from regiment commander to chief of staff and on to the ministry. We do not think it proper to alter defense policy on the strength of broadcasting opinions outside of the Forces and resorting to public opinion."

Therein lies the nature of the ranking defense officials which tries to bring itself into line with military bureaucracy--whose first concern is chain of command and order.

In the third place is trust. "Shigematsu was in my class. He is an honest type and, above all, he is not a person who hides his convictions. I trust him. Please listen to all he says. He is not mistaken in whatever he says."

That was said by an officer outside the Ground Self Defense Force, who is also a member of the 3rd group to graduate from the War College. Therein lies the feeling of mutual trust that transcends the separate spheres of Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces. Joined together as classmates who eat rice from the same pot for 4 years of War College, the relationship gets this strong. It makes one aware of an aspect of the uniformed forces that is not otherwise known.

The Kurisu affair convinced SDF members further not to get involved with politics. Stepping away from the arena of political debate, the Forces say they are trying to devote themselves to their duties. The trend to discuss defense policy within the uniformed Forces has disappeared. By mutually respecting formal channels of communication and by discouraging individual contact within offices, the Forces are trying all the more to strengthen their group unity as an organization. The difference between the Self Defense Forces and the old armed forces lies in this kind of spontaneity and self-initiation, change that is undertaken by the SDF members.

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In the old army the young officers were more politically aggressive toward the government however, the Self Defense Forces mind their own business and leave discussions of defense policy to the politicians. It seems that political intervention by the uniformed forces is, for the foreseeable future, impossible.

The nature of the Self Defense Forces is fundamentally different from that of the old armed forces. It has gone from an imperial army to a democratically-controlled military group. In what way are the Self Defense Forces, which have gone from an infantry-centered "human bullet" attack force to a modern army that stresses fire power, useful for Japan's defense? How will they deal with internal problems? They must look into many problems, such as a problem of matching Japanese defense policy to everchanging international situations. I would like to discuss these matters in the next issue.

[20 Jul 79 pp 125-129]

[Text] A book such as "The Russians Have Landed!" is number five on the best-seller list. Talk that Japan could fall victim to a surprise attack tomorrow, that "the Self Defense Forces are a scarecrow and have only 3 days' worth of ammunition," is often heard and stirs up national insecurity. Facing the "crisis 80's," is Japan really safe? We sought frank opinion from Michita Sakata, chairman of the LDP National Security Research Council.

Even now, when Japan's defense is the responsibility of the Self Defense Forces which are a body of military specialists, decisions regarding defense policy must be made by the government, which is a civilian organization. Japan is a parliamentary democracy. Under what conditions does the ruling LDP make its decisions, and what kinds of defense policies are they contemplating based on those decisions?

In the inner LDP the National Security Research Council is in charge of defense problems. We asked the frank opinion of its chairman, Mr Michita Sakata, who was formerly the Director General of the Self Defense Agency.

Interviewer: For Japan in the decade of the 80's, issues of security and defense are extremely important. The LDP, under the present constitution, has made the Self Defense Forces civilian-controlled. Can the Forces preserve Japan's security in the 80's?

Sakata: Honestly speaking, there is insecurity. The way the Self Defense Forces are presently organized under the constitution, there is no threat to other countries and there is no chance that our own public welfare will be endangered. However, a group that is opposed to the sort of defense strength that is neither too little nor too much--looked at domestically or internationally--is putting down roots. Perhaps such opposition reflects thinking left over from the pre-war time. They say: change the Self Defense Forces into a body the same as the pre-war military; to do that revise the constitution, and moreover, get nuclear weapons. Such talk is courageous, but it does not

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take into consideration the present international situation and, moreover, it ignores the constitution which is firmly rooted in Japan. There is a group of people in the LDP that is pushing forward their single-minded militaristic views.

The danger that these people may take the lead within the LDP has not been eliminated. As long as this danger exists, I do not think I can quit the Security Research Council. (laughter)

Interviewer: Within the ruling party there is a persistent group that blindly wants to increase defense power. If these people get hold of civilian control, it will mean that Japan learned nothing from its defeat in World War II. The uniformed group of the Self Defense Forces have the idea that they are completely different from this group. Does the ultra-rightist group of the LDP think it has caught up with the "trend" of the inner Self Defense Forces and their taking such a stance?

Sakata: Actually, it is not clear. When I was Director General of the Self Defense Forces (from December 1974 to December 1976), even among the Self Defense Forces officers, I felt there were clear differences of opinion between those who served in the pre-war army and navy and those officers are of the post-war generation. The post-war generation underwent the new-type 6-3-3-4 education (6 years of elementary school, 3 years of junior high, 3 years of high school, 4 years of college), and they are accustomed to the new constitution. After leaving the post of Director General of the JDA, I haven't had direct contact with the uniformed officers, so, for example, I do not really know how these officers interpreted last year's Kurisu affair.

Interviewer: I wrote about it in the previous article, but, the officers who graduated from the War College, at least think that Kurisu's pronouncement was out of line. I believe that the Self Defense Forces--which were established under the new constitution--have been accepted well and the idea of having defence forces has taken root among the officers of the post-war generation.

Sakata: That makes me glad. Truly glad. I thought that the new constitution has taken root among the post-war generation, but I was very worried about what kind of effect the Kurisu affair had on the uniformed personnel. When I was Director General of the JDA, my instructions to Self Defense Forces members were: "It is the duty of the Self Defense Forces to defend the constitution," and so it was natural to issue such instructions, but much was made of it at that time.

Interviewer: I think the Self Defense Forces Law is well-formulated. You cannot say that there aren't any points which are difficult to put into actual practice, but there aren't any basic, important points that are missing. To say that we cannot defend Japan if we do not revise the constitution is probably a bit too strong--and I think it is only nostalgia for the pre-war armed forces.

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Sakata: I feel the same way. The present Self Defense Forces are not the old army and navy. A constitutional reform not desired by the Japanese people is out of the question. The defense forces must not be something which threatens either foreign countries or our own people. The Japanese people will not permit the military to be domineering, to ignore the proper political procedures. They will defend the constitution to the end. This must be the basis of Japan's defense policy.

I did not know anything about "defense" until I became Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, because I never studied about it. What I determined to do at that time was to start tackling the defense issue with a clean slate and analyze defense problems like average Japanese people would do, in short, deal with it from an amateur point of view. Even with respect to the Self Defense Forces Law, I thought the amount of study I did on that subject was just enough for the immediate needs. It is not necessary to create a special situation on purpose and to be pressured to write laws applicable to it. My idea on this is no different, even now.

Interviewer: Do you say that emergency legislation is unnecessary?

Sakata: To investigate whether or not there are defects in the law is not to reform it immediately. We must exercise considerable caution. I think there is no need to do things in a rush.

The Soviet Union--Not Prepared to or Capable of Attacking Japan

Interviewer: When we analyze "national defense", we must consider international conditions that affect Japan. Do you think that the present situation in Asia and the international situation which involves Japan is becoming strained? Or, do you think it is loosening up?

Sakata: I think the strain is decreasing. The situation in Asia after the end of the Vietnam War is clearly headed in the direction of detente. Of course there are many trouble spots. There are several disputes: Cambodia, the China-Soviet border, the 38th parallel. However, if you look at it as a whole, there is no mistake that those are sporadic disputes and that, as a whole, things are moving in the direction of detente.

Interviewer: Looking at the worldwide situation, SALT II has been formulated. Speaking of the power relationship between America and the Soviet Union, even if you say that the Soviet Union is gaining military strength which will exceed that of the United States, it cannot be thought that the strain will intensify all at once. What is your opinion on this?

Sakata: There is no limit to the fine points. If we talk only about military aspects there are any number of problems. Because technology is rapidly advancing, it's nip and tuck as far as weapons are concerned. It will always be so.

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Politicians must not be trapped in those fine points. They must look at the whole picture. If they don't, they will err in their judgment. They must look at the whole picture--not only in military matters, but in politics, diplomacy, as well as in economics, culture, and society. If they do this, it is certain that the world will move toward detente. There is no danger of a world war any time soon.

Interviewer: Is the defense system, which was established under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty with its axis, sufficient to maintain peace?

Sakata: Yes. Even with detente, we cannot disband the Self Defense Forces. Rather, small to medium scale fighting strength has become important. The United States and the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities are balanced so that they cannot use nuclear weapons. Because they run the risk of all-out war by using large scale conventional strength, even if the U.S. and Soviet Union greatly exceed the military power of medium-small countries, they cannot fully use their own military strength.

Therefore, even medium-to-small countries that only have limited military strength can play a role equal to that of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In other words, having less military power does not mean one has no say in things. Even if the military strength of the Self Defense Forces is not great compared to that of surrounding countries, it does not mean that Japan is not secure.

Interviewer: A Soviet military build-up--especially an increase of troop strength in the Far East--has been talked about. It is said that the deployment of the Minsk and the construction of bases in Kunashiri and Etorofu is evidence of that. However, it is only the airborne sixth division of Khabarovsk that is filling the Soviet 44 divisions with a full complement of manpower, and which is being deployed from central Asia to the fourth military district in the west. Even those that are 80 percent full constitute only three divisions in the Khabarovsk area. The remaining 40 divisions are only training troops, which have only 50 percent of troop capacity. They are all gazing at the Soviet-China border. The troop strength aimed at Japan is no more than a single navy regiment in Vladivostock. Even if troop strength is increased to some degree, and even if the Minsk carrier comes, it is considered that the Soviets are not prepared to attack Japan.

Sakata: The Soviet Union has amassed all its nerves in its opposition to China. Because they are a large continental nation, they have acquired a habit of guarding themselves and consequently they are watchful of their borders. They are not prepared to invade us by crossing the ocean. As long as China and the Soviet Union continue to rival each other, I think it is all right to view the situation as unchanging.

Interviewer: In a geopolitical sense, Japan's defense system is premised on the fact that the country is an island. A country that attempts to invade Japan would have to carry out both a sea and land invasion.

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Sakata: There are no countries near Japan that have the capability to deploy land and sea strategy on a big scale. Most likely this situation will not change in the foreseeable future.

Manufacturing Capability that will Permit Emergency Production of Weapons and Ammunition

Interviewer: Japan is a big power. If, by chance, a neighboring country should attack Japan, it is not possible for it to be a surprise attack without any warning at all. In the first place, it is not only that diplomatic relations with that country would deteriorate; the international situation would likely get strained. In other words, one can say that there are hardly any cases of unexpected invasions. We can assume that in order for an invasion of Japan to take place, quite a bit of time must elapse.

Sakata: It is almost impossible to assemble the military strength and to deceive reconnaissance satellites. Moreover, all countries would modify their policies toward Japan, and it would take a lot of time to invade Japan.

Interviewer: The Japanese people have the experience of the attack on Pearl Harbor. What if that kind of thing were done to Japan? It's strange for people who have actually done such a thing to worry, but...

Sakata: Certainly an assailant is the one who wouldn't like it if what he does to others is done to him. That is precisely why we need to be resolved to defend the constitution. Article 9 of the constitution may be called a "reflection" on Pearl Harbor. However, in actuality, reconnaissance satellites and so forth have developed and we are in a situation where the movements of troops all over the world are monitored minute by minute. It is a world where we know immediately if war ships are gathered in Hitokappu Bay. There cannot be a second Pearl Harbor.

Interviewer: For example, a submarine blockade without a direct invasion of Japan is conceivable. Because we only have four anti-submarine ships, our ability to fight at sea is very limited. However, Japan's shipping strength is number one in the world. We should be able to mass-produce anti-submarine ships if we have ready-made blueprints and if we mobilize all the country's factories. We should also be able to have crews trained quickly.

In my opinion, in a total of 2 years--one for building the naval vessels and one for training the crew--quite a strong defense can be prepared.

Even in the case of land weapons, if we run the manufacturing capacity of Japan fully, we can be ready quickly. At present levels we can produce 48 type 74 tanks a year. However, in the opinion of those in manufacturing, if we go into mass production, it will be one-half year at the most in order to reach a yearly production level of 1,000 tanks.

Even with regard to ammunition, it would take at most a year to construct and equip factories to mass-produce it. If the equipment is set up, the time

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period necessary to get supplies is about 3 months, so even after the situation becomes strained, we will have sufficient time to prepare.

Sakata: Before the war Japan's industrial power was weak. If we hadn't stocked weapons and ammunition during peacetime, we couldn't have made war. Because our present manufacturing capacity is great, it is not necessary to stock up ready-made weapons and ammunition during peacetime. Rather, it can be said, it is sufficient if we develop new kinds of weapons.

Even if the worst happens, because Japan is an island nation, great forces of tanks cannot readily invade us. Even in our anti-submarine forces, Japan has the capability to develop, in a short time, great strength. That capability alone is sufficient.

Interviewer: Even with an anti-submarine strategy, the side that controls the air wins. That is what happened in World War II. As long as the U.S.-Japan Security Pact is honored, it can be supposed that control of the air of Japan and the surrounding sea will not be taken by force by the United States.

Sakata: Of course Japan has no defense against nuclear attack. Moreover, to have power of defense against nuclear attack is related to having nuclear capability. We must crush all nuclear bases which can attack Japan. To proceed with that type of preparation is only to raise tension around Japan. The very act of adopting that kind of defense policy would ensnare Japan in danger. I think that Japan should not acquire nuclear capability.

Interviewer: Japan at present is a very strong country with respect to manufacturing strength. If Japan launches a full-scale military expansion one can say she is a country in which great forces can be instantly ready and equipped with all new weapons--including nuclear. If we think of the great latent strength Japan has, America, to say nothing of the countries near Japan, will have to beware of Japan's defense policy.

Sakata: It may be said that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has the function of applying a brake to Japan's military expansion. The power of the United States has certainly declined, but, nevertheless, America does not wish Japan to increase its military strength to the degree that such an increase will bring great change to the international order in Asia. I think that America does not desire Japan's military expansion because it will upset conditions in Asia.

Interviewer: Because the defense budget is decided in the Diet, the Diet takes part in the civilian control of the military. Each party must have a defense policy.

Sakata: It's not only the Diet. The people must also have an interest in defense. Looking at the percentage of support of the Self Defense Forces, last year it rose to 86 percent. A national consensus for the Self Defense Forces and defense in general is growing. Even among supporters of the Socialist Party, which advocates de-militarized neutrality, quite a number of

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people recognize and support the existence of the Self Defense Forces. Even among supporters of the communist party it is the same. It is certain that peoples' interest in defense has increased, and the idea of de-militarized neutrality is fast losing strength. For that reason the responsibility of politicians has grown heavy.

The Self Defense Forces' "Old Boys", and Their 'Single-minded, Old Fashioned' Military Thinking

Interviewer: Many important lessons were learned from Japan's defeat in World War II. For example, although Japan is an island nation, she put together an armed forces as if she were a large continental nation. Under imperial control, we tried to make the Japanese people, who live in an island nation, play the same role as that of continental people. This makes impossible demands of the people. Thus, when the army was disbanded at defeat, the people immediately returned to their island way of life. It is like bending a stalk of bamboo: if the added pressure is taken away, it goes right back to its original shape.

Sakata: Former Army General Tsukamoto, whom I respect, has studied Japanese history and concluded that if Japan pursues a policy of invading the continent without having a primary defense policy, we will definitely end in defeat. I think so too. When I was in command (October 1976), I decided on "the big line of defense plans"--the basis of that concept being that Japan is an island nation. We have put together regiments to use for a continental invasion, supplying them with heavy tanks, but they have no immediate use for defending Japan and will get us nowhere. I am annoyed more by these Old Boys who are slaves to the old ways of thinking than those uniformed members of the Self Defense Forces.

In general the Self Defense Forces are a "school." The only thing both officers and soldiers are doing now is training. Look at the school system. Compulsory education extends through junior high. High school and up is all voluntary. Isn't it all right to consider the Self Defense Forces as that type of school system? There is no need to impose teaching on those who do not wish to learn. It would be a different story if situations were to become such that people thought Japan will be in serious trouble unless everyone did not receive defense training. The volunteer system we have now will suffice in the meantime. There is no need to proclaim a draft system. I wish the Old Boys would understand this a little.

Interviewer: The Diet members who have been in the Self Defense Forces are not very many but they must play important roles as military specialists.

Sakata: Military specialists in the Security Research Council have a single-minded, and narrow point of view. When we speak about contemporary national defense we cannot get by solely on a military term. As I said earlier, we must keep our eyes on a broad spectrum--political, diplomatic and economic. We try to analyze situations by calculating only how many tanks and planes we have. They should be politicians in business suits--not uniforms. I

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tried to convince them that "peace" cannot be maintained by military strategy alone. Well, I doubt if I can ever correct the way those old boys think...

The Difficulty of Controlling Nationalism

Interviewer: The point about civilian control--it is not a matter of looking at it as an imminent issue, but it is a matter of viewing it in the long-term perspective. In that sense I think Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida was great. His forecast for these 30 years was right on target. What will be the perspective from here on?

Sakata: It's on record. I said it when we began. I cannot be optimistic. Although Japan's GNP is number two in the free world, we are eighth in defense spending. To control those who criticize this and to maintain an appropriate defense force which is not too strong and not too weak is never easy. The Japanese people have nationalistic sentiments, so when the situation becomes such that Japan seems to be unfairly held back, the subject that we should strengthen our defense power will be taken up by storm. To skillfully control that feeling is quite difficult.

Interviewer: Even among the uniformed members, not everyone understands these things. There are those who are hotblooded and who burn for the Old Boy approach.

Sakata: That is true. Although a politician's ability is important, but I think his attitude is more so. I am afraid this is too personal but at the time when Miki was in power, a campaign to oust him was initiated, and Fukuda invited me to sign the call for his resignation.

I told Fukuda that I was the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and I was not deputy prime minister. The Director General of the JDA takes orders from the prime minister--as is stipulated in the Self Defense Forces Law. Because the Self Defense Forces in turn takes orders from their Director General, what would happen if he went against the prime minister? There would be no civilian control. Suppose I were to go against the prime minister, and then if the Self Defense Forces' members were to take positions against me, I could not possibly control my men. Mr Fukuda was surprised and he never came back to solicit my signature. I have never talked about this to anyone, but, I dared to mention this story because after all, it is necessary for politicians to always realize the weighty role of the JDA Director General. Nothing is better than "not" having military forces, however, the way the world is today, I do not think we can do without military power. And, for that reason, I believe the role of Director General of the JDA who holds the future of the entire Self Defense Forces is important.

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MILITARY

EXPERT SAYS JAPAN FACING SLOW BUT DELIBERATE 'MILITARIZATION'

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[Article by Susumu Takahashi, Asst Professor, History of International Politics, University of Tokyo]

[Excerpt] Value System Leading to Reactionism

Introduction

The 1970's are almost at an end. What kind of "era" will the period of the 1970's be. Many signs materialized in the 1970's indicating that contemporary history had a turnabout. In that, a forecast of the future was uncertain and, on account of that, the terminology, "era of uncertainty," "chartless era," and "era of confusion" was frequently used. And now that the 1970's are almost at an end, the words that represent the trends of "rightist movement," "conservatism," and "reactionary," have begun to appear. The "present" situation is felt to be abnormal and a feeling of crisis has deepened. It seems to this author that the feeling of a loss of historical direction from this uncertainty in the future's forecast is a phenomenon often seen at a "turning point" and also, regression to the conservatism and reactionism of the past is a phenomenon often seen at a "turning point."

In this short treatise, I would like to try to analyze these two phenomena seen at a turning point. Why does the feeling of a loss of historical direction exist and, in that, what kind of reactionism has come forward? Before that, I will clarify this author's concern with the problem since it can be supposed that the analysis and explanation concerning this problem will differ depending on viewpoint. That is, why has it become difficult to discuss and think about "peace" as the Japanese have come to have "peace and wealth." Looking at the present world, the question of "war and peace" certainly exists and at the same time, the problems of poverty and oppression, seen in the third world, are seen as worsening each year. Then, the importance of the subject of analyzing and clarifying the circumstances of a loss of peace is not lost at all. It is thought that what has to be considered at the same time is what kind of ideology makes it difficult to consider peace and allows peace to continue. Therefore, I have decided to analyze from the viewpoint of a peace theory one value system created in the situation of "peace in abundance"

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and try to consider first its present position and circumstances. Next, I would like to point out and explain one aspect of the reactionism that has come forward at present in that situation.

1. "Present"---Two Opposing Value Systems

The Archetypal Peace Theory

At the time of Japan's departure after the war, the fundamental viewpoint on which the peace theory was established was considering international peace via the system constituted by men. Since I have previously published a manuscript concerning these points ("Sengo Nihon no heiwa-ron," ["Post-war Japan's peace theory"] in SEKAI, June 1978) I will avoid a detailed explanation, but at this time I would like to emphasize repeatedly the following three points. The first point is that the levels of man, the system and international peace are set as individual levels and consideration is given to the principles in each level; peace has been established in the sense of anti-war inclination in men, pacifism in the system and a no-war situation in international society as values. Secondly, concerning the connection between these three, it was thought until the anti-Japan-U.S. security treaty revision movement in 1960 that peace was from men and peace was from the system, but it can be said that the connection from man to system was exceedingly weak. In other words, it can be thought that the theoretical connection between the anti-war sentiment at the level of the individual and pacifism in the system had not progressed very deeply. And thirdly, a systematization of these three levels was completed in the 1960's through the anti-security treaty movement and the anti-Vietnam war movement.

First of all, the connection between the level of man and the level of the system, the weakest link, was reinforced by means of introducing democratic thinking as a "movement," and at the same time, the people's defiance for the right to live peacefully and for demilitarization appeared as man toward the system, and the chain was completed. The most unifying assertion in this point is the thought expressed by Sadao Maruyama that, from the viewpoint of the people's sovereignty, ultimate authority to judge whether there will be war or not lies in the people. (Sadao Maruyama, "Kempo kyujo o meguru jakkan no kosatsu" ["Short study of article 9 in the constitution"] in SEKAI, June 1965). At the same time, the connection between the level of man and the level of world peace, that is, the anti-war inclination, was reinforced. Until now, each individual thought of being anti-war from the viewpoint of war's victims. But in the anti-Vietnam war movement, anti-war sentiment began to be considered from the position of war's assailants. This signifies that a generalization of anti-war feeling had progressed from opposition to war as something which directly destroys the life of each and every individual Japanese to opposition to war in general with the ability to conceive of the inhumanity of war over and above the individual's situation.

At this time, as previous examples of the process of generalization, it should not be forgotten that, through the experience of the bombing of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki and the experience of the fear of lethal fallout, there existed a generalization of opposition to nuclear weapons which destroy not only the individual's peace but also humanity's peace. And the connection between the level of the system and the level of world peace has been reinforced in the groping for ways to develop pacifism as a principle of the system in actual international politics. The concept of positive neutralism toward the promotion of the security treaty revision was presented as a policy and all aspects of the nuclear deterrent theory, popular in the 1960's, were criticized.

The fundamental viewpoint and value system of the aforementioned peace theory of post-war Japan is a passive peace in the sense of anti-war sentiment at the level of man, pacifism in the level of the system and a situation of no war in the level of the international system. And the connection between the level of man and the level of the system was reinforced by means of the peace through democracy=democracy theory as a movement; the viewpoint con- sidering international peace via the system from men is what made the value of peace coherent.

Value System Under High Level Growth

Then, regarding the problem of "war and peace," the archetypal peace theory was able to establish this viewpoint; but this peace theory begins to lose its persuasive power in the situation of "being in peace and having a wealth" existing since the 60's. That is to say, the point of issue on "war and peace" is that it has ceased to be a critical problem to the vast majority of Japanese, and the point of issue has begun to be manipulated by the conservative party government so as to make the point of issue less salient. Well, just what kind of value system has prevented the consideration of and ability to imagine a loss of peace, still existing throughout the world, transcending the peace achieved in our own familiar world. At post-war Japan's point of departure, there were demands for "material abundance, rebuilding the national economy and obtaining economic independence." With this national consensus as the basis, it can be thought that an undeniable value system had been completed under high level growth.

Then, I think it is necessary for research into the developmental history leading to completion of this value system to be worked out separately. But I think the next two points can be pointed out as characteristic of developmental stages. First, the domain of the economy was presented by the conservative party administration as a trade-off for the domain of "war and peace," presented in the aforementioned peace theory. The logic of promoting the security treaty revision and the logic of the Japan-U.S. economic security theory provide typical examples. The second is connected to the first. The viewpoint of this value system is that two middle levels which do not have any correspondence to the viewpoint of the peace theory have been allowed to surface as main strategic points. (fundamental axis) One is the level of society located in a middle level between man and system; it appears as the main domain so much so that it can be said that it has given salience to the point of production in economic society. It goes without saying that the

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nucleus is enterprise. The other is the level of international economy located in the middle of the levels of world and system.

These next points must be heeded, especially from the perspective of international economy. Concerning diplomatic normalization with China, which was placed in a directly opposite pole to Japan in Japan's modern contemporary history, it was asserted as one of the main arguments at the time the request for normalization was made that economic ties with China are necessary for Japan's economic independence; and concerning Korea, having an aligned polarity to Japan, government loans were offered at the same time as the Japan-Korea treaty; and finally, concerning Southeast Asia, which is outside this polar field, an "informal empire" was established via Japan's reparations.

In this connection, the question of relations between Japan and Asia has posed large problems for modern contemporary history. China was placed at an opposite pole as a major power, of which Japan was conscious (a nation concealing the possibility of competition with Japan.) On the other hand, Korea was placed in the position of aligned polarity as a lesser power, of which Japan was conscious (a nation included under Japan's formal empire). Southeast Asia was placed outside this field of polarity as a target area for expansion, of which Japan was not conscious.

Domestic Aspects

In 1950, the Japanese per capita income was 135 dollars; but it was 1909 dollars 20 years later in 1970. That showed an approximate 14 fold growth in 20 years. In that, one value system was established. That is, with the levels of society and international economy as the fundamental axis levels, value was given to man-society-system-international economy-international politics, and one value system was completed. First of all, I think it may be supposed that the appearance of the level of society as the first fundamental axis was coupled with a positive appraisal of enterprise (large enterprise) which was to be the bearer of high level growth. The appearance of the level of society---it includes various groups such as the family (needless to say), religious groups and cultural groups---signifies that enterprise as but one of the groups comprising society was allowed to surface as the nucleus. The value enterprise embodies under high level growth is advancement. It is felt that capital input of a set period of time results in a ~~+~~ output in the following period of time in accordance with the effort of enterprise, the nucleus, and this is a normal situation and will continue. Let's say a tangible expression of advancement as a value is the economic activity of expanded equipment and plant investments which support high level growth.

Additionally, advancement, the value of this level of society, gives value to the level of man and the level of the system. When value was given to the level of man, it is thought that the following three premises existed. First of all, each individual experienced starvation immediately after the defeat and had a basic desire to escape from it; abundance came on top of a continuation of this escape from starvation. Secondly, the relationship of

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society and man, that is, the relationship of enterprise and workers, did not only exist as a mere offer of labor based on wage agreements, but also was a relationship within a quasi-cooperative system called an "all-supportive enterprise;" this is a social relationship in which the individual is buried within the group. Thirdly, more than just satisfying the workers' abundance, enterprise has furnished its workers with a life environment of company houses, health and recreation facilities and such that the individuals himself could not provide, and generally speaking, has guaranteed the individual's advancement. From these premises, assimilation has come into being as a value on the individual level. The behavior norm is that the social group to which one belongs guarantees advancement in all areas of life for its members (both materially and spiritually) and the members have a strong sense of belonging to that group and faithfully carry out the roles expected by the group.

On the other hand, the value, advancement, in the level of society also influences the level of the system. Conservative party control has been continuous except for one period right after the defeat. In that time, the logic whereby the conservative party justified its control has consistently been the logic that stability in the system is a necessary indispensability for advancement (growth of Japan's economy).

In particular, the significance of the Ikeda administration's economic policy, the income-doubling program, lies in the fact that "it ratified the reality achieved throughout the post-war period and merely confirmed that that trend would continue." But it can be said that the political significance is that it has officially declared that the government links advancement and stability and these two are inseparable. What is noticeable here is that while it is natural for the financial world, the largest pressure group advocating conservative party control to have made strong demands for stability (for example, the financial world's activities seen in the political process are unified behind the LDP), the opposing reformist parties and the labor movement who stand behind them have shown the robberism activities of the pressure groups in this advancement, which has been acknowledged and advanced as reality.

Thus, domestically, the situation of advancement under the rapid growth of enterprise appeared natural (value was given to it) and it is thought that together with the surfacing of the level of society with enterprise as its nucleus, assimilation at the level of man and stability at the level of the system became values. The value system of assimilation=advancement=stability is indicated by various expressions, such as "GNP for the sake of GNP."

Foreign Aspects

The amazing character of Japan's post-war economic growth was not limited to domestic aspects. Presently, Japan exists as an indisputable economic power and Japan's international economic expansion seen in this process was amazing. After the defeat, Japan's economy had as its objective economic independence, and was exerting itself to strengthen its international competitive power, and was struggling to catch up with the advanced capitalist nations. However, it can be said that such a conscious effort to catch up was unable to allow

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an acknowledgement of the international economic expansion that existed as a fact. Concerning this, in the relationship with Southeast Asia where expansion existed as an invasion not as competition, it was bluntly pointed out that an awareness of the existence of this invasion and Southeast Asia was not seen until the anti-Japanese riots at the time of Prime Minister Tanaka's round of visits to Southeast Asia in 1974. Then it was argued that this kind expansion was acknowledged and affirmatively asserted.

I think the essential points can be pulled together in these three. The first is the indication of the indispensability of commerce and the emphasis on the necessity of domestic support for commerce. All people have recognized ideologically that "the road for Japan's existence as an island nation with a population of 90 million can lead to nothing but trade with foreign countries. However, we have not been conscious of how difficult that is or how great an effort is necessary. Especially, we forget that it is different than domestic transactions and has to be accompanied with a great degree of political effort. As a result, we entrust that part of Japan opened to the outside to free operation." In this, commerce has been given the position of "national prosperity" in Japan, and warning has been given to the narrow-minded views of the nation's elite and the public in general who do not sufficiently understand what "national prosperity" is.

The second is the high estimation of the capability and rationality of having commerce as the nucleus. "The connection with the outside world made commercial relations its axis. Unknown factors surely remain. In that case, the adaptability of merchants and the spirit brought by freedom are decisively important."

Thirdly, the government's domain of activity was limited to maintaining an environment for commercial activity (as the nucleus). "The policy government should take can be divided broadly into two categories. The first is the government strives to turn the people toward the outside and promotes a departure into the outside world, is responsive to the part opened to the outside, regulates and supports it; in such a case, the government should not do its own planning nor provide too much guidance. The second is government carries out the long-range policies only it can do. Enterprise freely performs the activities which generate profit. Therefore, it is necessary for government to carve out a future for the people without thinking of present profit."

As pointed out in Mr. Takasaka's dissertation, it is thought that, in high level growth, the viewpoint which considers international relations to be based on international economic relations has been established as a level. And in the level of this viewpoint, a consciousness has been created that Japan's economy can expand endlessly if efforts are made. The value of foreign expansion, corresponding to advancement in the level of society, has been established. There was recognition of Greater Britain in one of the premises of Sealy's books. Japan's international political outlook, specializing in the level of international economy, made "Greater Japan" a premise.

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Then, in international relations, when international economy became the fundamental axis, the significance of being the fundamental axis is that it influenced the other two levels of international politics and the system. First of all, maintenance of the status quo is advocated at the level of international politics. Namely, the maintenance of the IMF-GATT system with the cold war structure, the framework making international economic expansion a possibility, was made the supreme position. The question of special procurements for Vietnam during the Vietnam war is one typical example.

Kan Kawada has concluded: "In the past, Japan's economy was given a powerful foothold for redevelopment after World War II by the Korean War. Now again, Japan's economy has found a clue for a return to prosperity in the Vietnam war, and has not only obtained the primary means, which could not be ignored, for checking the full breadth of unfavorable conditions in the international balance of payments, but also has tried to take upon itself an important new role in Asia through this war. The formation of that new role for Japan's economy has advanced in close correspondence with America's Asian strategy, clearly expressed in the Vietnam war---that threw a huge problem on Japan's future." (Kan Kawada, "Ajia e no chosen" [Challenge to Asia] University of Tokyo Press, 1969) It can be said that the international economic expansion of Japan's economy was allowed to advance in cooperation with maintaining America's cold war structure. Japan-Korean relations are undeniably an undisguised manifestation of international economic expansion and maintenance of that framework.

Then, this maintenance of the status quo has been reinforced by the theory on maintaining the Japan-U.S. security treaty, based on the "strategy theory" of the so-called "actualists" that began to be emphasized in the mid 60's. Then, when the proof is read, the viewpoint becomes "national security," and although the governed, the general public, enter into consideration to a certain extent, a point of view on war and man has been dreadfully lacking.

Then, this international economic expansion has affected the level of the system. The most representative bearer of this international economic expansion is the "multinational enterprise." It goes without saying that these multinational enterprises have aimed at stability in the system in the host countries, and there is a union between the enterprise and the host country's political elite as a pathological phenomenon. And the multinational enterprise is strongly politically-colored by nature. But it can be said that it is necessary to take heed of the role government has performed in this international economic expansion. Government executes the maintenance of the fundamental system of international economy, such as currency, commerce and the like, but it can be thought that in Japan, more than that, private enterprise's foreign profit is "national prosperity," and the government has protected and promoted it. In relations with the advanced nations, there was resistance to the demand for "trade liberalization" that began in the mid 60's. And in relations with the underdeveloped nations, a base for expansion was built by the government, seen in the reparations to Vietnam and government loans to Korea. It is thought that in this, an integration of profit between

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government and enterprise materialized; and the continuation of conservative party government was deemed natural for enterprise, and the value of stability in the level of the system was further reinforced.

As mentioned above, it can be thought that even in foreign relations, the maintenance of the status quo in the level of international politics and stability in the level of system were created as values with international economic expansion in the level of international economy as the fundamental axis. A positive assessment of this kind of value system was "economic power," a negative assessment was "economic animal."

New Value System

The value system created under high level growth and supporting that growth ---the value system of level of man=assimilation, level of society=advancement, level of system=stability, level of international economy=international economic expansion, level of international politics=maintenance of the status quo--- has one specific feature. That is, the values in each of these levels have originated and materialized from the logic of "formation." Consequently, correctly speaking, the substance taken as values existed as the situation up until now. It is thought that they were put into the position of "values" after the pathological phenomena of this "situation" appeared and were acknowledged.

Then, it can be said that through the medium of these pathological phenomena, a new value system has started to evolve in a form connected to the previously mentioned archetypal peace theory's viewpoint and at present, it is opposed to the value system under high level growth.

First of all, it is thought that the pathological phenomenon at the level of man is "individualization." In that, a feeling of helplessness as a member of society has existed at the foundation. It has been analyzed that the consciousness of the "my home type" people, who are a majority among the Japanese at present, is as follows. "The spatial extent of the daily life of these people is often limited to the home alone or to home and work; consequently, the extent of their interest is also narrow." "Then the paucity of feelings of solidarity and the non-interest in society, which come from the narrowness of human relations, can be indicated as the basic posture of these people toward society." (NHK Broadcasting Public Opinion Poll Research Center Compilation, "Gendai Nihonjin no ishiki kozo," ["Structure of consciousness in the modern Japanese"] NHK Books, 1979.)

In addition, one more pathological phenomenon has occurred at the level of man. It is the so-called "abandoned people;" it is the discarding of those who have been stripped of the ability to assimilate within enterprise because of their misfortune or social restrictions. The segregation and discrimination from competitive society of patients with diseases caused by environmental pollution, children orphaned in traffic accidents, the elderly and others is steadily advancing. A re-establishment of humanity has been attempted many times in this loss of humanity at the level of man, but I think

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that value is expressed in the word, "citizen." That is, first of all, the re-establishment of the individual as the nucleus, and the strategic release, at the point of residence, of the people who have been buried in enterprise. Next, there is positive participation in society by the individual. And what must be heeded is that there exists in the value of "citizen" a solidarity with the "abandoned people" who live as human beings.

The following concerns the level of society. In the first half of the 1970's there was criticism of enterprise because of land speculation and the like. And the questioning of the social responsibility of enterprise is fresh in our memory. But in reality, it is thought that new values occurred at this level also. I think they can be put together in the terms, republic and decentralization of authority. Here, the thinking has been pointed out that the domain of the individual's self-determination must be expanded within the organization. And the principle tying individual with individual must be formed in a horizontal association. Republic and decentralization of authority were strongly demanded, centered in a local self-governing body, making the main place of activity the point of residence. But the realization of this value of the new way the relationship of individual with individual should be is overdue with respect to production, or enterprise. In such a phenomenon, I think it can be seen how abnormally the social group, enterprise, sticks out under high level growth.

And then, concerning the level of the system, as was seen in the Lockheed incident in the 70's, a "grass roots racketeerism" took root behind stability, under what Michitoshi Takahata called "pressure (group) democracy." It came to be widely held that there is a need for new democratic principles. It goes without saying, that would be nothing other than "participatory democracy."

Since many discussions have taken place concerning "participatory democracy," I don't think an explanation is needed, but what is noteworthy is that recently, Professor McPhearson has presented "defensive democracy," "developmental democracy," and "equilibrical democracy" as models of liberal democracy, and has made the analysis that this "participatory democracy" perhaps cannot take place nor endure unless there is an extensive value consciousness in the power of the governing principles of the code of conduct in liberal democracy, the core of developmental democracy---each man and woman has an equal right to exercise and develop completely his or her own potential ability." (C.B. MacPhearson, "Can Liberal Democracy Remain," Iwanami Shinsho, 1978.) Somewhat analogously, it can be thought that the so-called "post-war democracy," premised on the creation of "modern man," after a time held that "Japanese-style democracy" would be an adherent of "equilibrical democracy," and at present, that has been taken over by "participatory democracy" which holds the "citizen" to be the image of the ideal person, and has begun to develop again.

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Global Viewpoint and Values

Thus, domestically, the value system that citizen=public and decentralization of authority=participatory democracy was formed, but, at the same time, in international relations as well, a different viewpoint was formed and value system was established. It is thought that it was generated from the problem situation of how to grasp coherently these two situations---the situation where a buildup of military strength has advanced unabated, despite the fact that a dismantling of the cold war structure in East Asia took place in the 70's (the situation in the Korean peninsula is an exception to this), and the situation where the economic control of the underdeveloped nations by the advanced nations was so swollen that the people in those lands resisted, as indicated in the anti-Japanese riots which occurred in various countries in Southeast Asia in 1974.

The existing value system toward such a problem situation presented as a solution a "balance of power" between the four (five) poles of the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union (and Europe), and transactions based on a profit redistribution in accordance with the regulations of the the diverse interests among the advanced nations' economies (advanced nations summit), and the advanced nations' initiative in the economies of the underdeveloped nations. However, this solution, based on a separation of international politics and international economy, ignores completely the world-wide militarization that has suddenly increased in the 70's, and moreover ignores the magnification of the north-south differences in the 70's. From the perspective of those who desire reform, the viewpoint shown here spells out the mechanism for oppression by the military=economic control of the advanced nations and tries to resolve it.

What demands attention here is that the center of this viewpoint is always man. The "logic of nationalism" is negated and the "logic of humanism" which gives substance to "dealing with the question of man's needs and happiness," not from the point of view of each country separately, but from the world point of view. (R.A. Falk, "Road to comprehensive nuclear arms reduction---three intertwined ropes," and "New plan for nuclear arms reduction," Iwanami Shoten, 1977). The value brought out by this viewpoint was precisely the liberation of man at the global level. On account of that, that value cannot be thought of as separating international politics and international economy, but if one dares to speak of separating them, first of all, there would be economic independence for the nations to which the oppressed masses belong, and the nuclear extinction or comprehensive complete arms reduction which should completely negate the nuclear arms expansion that exists in the culmination of the mechanism of global violence that has supported this oppression.

In this way, the new viewpoint and value system, opposing the ideology created under high level growth, came into existence. I think that "today," when it is said that Japan is at a "turning point," it means that the value system under high level growth is facing a reality that will not permit its continuation and a new opposing value system has begun to appear and has emphasized

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the need for reform. Actually, the value system under high level growth can be analyzed because this new opposing value system has appeared.

2. "Reactionism"---Silent Militarization

Conservative Ideology

At present, recognition of "reactionism," "rightism," and "conservatism" has spread, and the voice of fear toward the present situation has started to be heard. For example, Ryutaro Komiya, in his report, "Ureubeki Nihon shakai no usenka" /"Japanese society's lamentable turn to the right"/ in a special symposium in GENDAI KEIZAI (Spring issue, 1979), described Japan's present overall situation as a "turn to the right" as distinguished from "having become reactionary," from his judgment that "fortunately it can be interpreted fundamentally as 'having become conservative'" and he analyzed the phenomenon of this "turn to the right" and its causes and expressed concern for the direction it will take. When the present situation is analyzed with either the term "turn to the right," or "conservative" or "reactionary," what most analyses indicate is that, first of all, a consciousness demanding a continuation with the past (for example, the recent past, meaning "only yesterday," the era of high level growth) has been emphasized, and secondly, that degeneration is seen both in the doctrine of reform of the future (for example, the doctrine of socialism) and in the nucleus of present politics.

Since I think that either an overall or individual analysis of such a grave situation will be made in the future as well, I think I will simply point out in this chapter specific features of the ideological situation seen in relationship with the preceding chapter. And then, I would like to examine critically the situation of military preparedness in present day Japan, which can be analyzed only as "having become reactionary" from the angle of view of the peace theory, and the security debate dealing with it.

At present, as mentioned in the previous chapter, it is thought that the value system under high level growth is in a situation of having been challenged both by "reality" and by the new value system. And then, it can be said that the value system under high level growth has been ideologically reinforced in this opposition.

The value of domestic advancement has always been evaluated in terms of Japan, a country which succeeded in modernizing, but now it is being evaluated in terms of being a model country for the world. "It is evident that Japan can accomplish the unique role of being an inspiration, example and pattern for the developing countries, especially nations that, like Japan, do not have a Western European background. However, at the same time, Japan greatly deserves to be a model even for the most advanced Western European nations... Among those nations politically democratic, intellectually free and socially egalitarian, today's Japan has clearly become one of the most competent and prosperous nations of the world. Our commonly held notion was that the world learns from Western Europe, but today there are many points even the most proud advanced nations of Western Europe ought to learn from Japan."

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(E. Reischauer, "Golden opportunity given to Japan," ASAHI JOURNAL, 25 Mar 1979) Such an assertion is but one example. The negative aspects that Japan's advancement has brought have been completely forgotten.

This advancement has been evaluated as follows, when it arrived in Southeast Asia passing through the level of international economy (international economic expansion). "After the decisions were made that allowed Japan to recover and become a powerful industrial nation, the businessman became Japan's only image. Japan's goals can be summarized in one word. Profit...Unfortunately, the reality of this one race, seeking economic goals without rest and lowering all other affairs to a secondary place, and its image seem to have become one. This conformity was not born because contact between the many races of Asia and Japan was made solely through leaders of the industrial world. It has also come because the Japanese people in general are hopelessly linked together with the totalitarian system, and because of that, their attitude toward the outside world reflects the singlemindedness of their own material advancement. In this way, even though the Japanese people also are negatively influenced by their own huge enterprises, in a different sense, they are tacit accomplices, closing their eyes to the exploitation of the third world." (Renato Constantino, "Daisan sekai kara mita Nihon---Nihon no minshu ni uttaeru," ["Japan as seen by the third world---appeal to the Japanese people"] SEKAI, February 1979). (Underlining by this author). Thus, even taking just the one value, advancement, the assessment here has been made that Japan should be the world's model, but in the estimation of the victim of that advancement, the Japanese close their eyes to the "third world exploitation."

As pointed out in the above examples, it can be thought that the value system under high level growth has been historically generalized by the opinion, "it is something Japanese," and the present ideological situation has let a reform of the present be denied by its discontinuation with the past. That is a conservatism within conservative control; it has molded the soil for reactionism. It is fresh in our memory that the logic of the group who requested the quick approval of the Era Name bill was the emphasis that it is "something Japanese."

A Regional Military Power


Well then, speaking of reactionism, last year's emergency legislation discussions could be taken up, but I think I would like to point out from a different angle the problem points concerning Japan's militarization, currently making steady progress. Before that, I will mention one basic fact. On the front page of the 26 July issue, IL MONDO dealt with the visit to Korea for the first time after the war by Yamashita, present director-general of the Defense Agency, and had this headline, "Japan, regional military power." According to the 1979 issue of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute yearbook, "World armaments and arms reductions," Japan's military expenditures in FY 1979 was 6.226 billion dollars (current value). (It is the largest military power in East Asia, except for China.) and amounted to a level about 1.5 times the approximate 4.415 billion dollars (current value) for military expenditures by the five ASEAN nations.

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A voice of warning has arisen from the Southeast Asian nations regarding the fact that it is such a military power. For example, an Indonesian Security authority has stated: "When one looks at the increasingly expanding and enlarging economic presence of Japan, itn't it natural to think that Japan would have recourse to military power in order to protect its interests in an emergency situation. Japan's insistence that it will not and cannot become a military power is understandable, but, in reality, I think that would collapse in the face of the demands of reality." (ASAHI SHINBUN, 24 March 1978) What I would like to take up here as a question is that at present many people think that the war potential of the Self-Defense Forces is fine as it is, but is that an affirmation of the present situation with an understanding that, although less than one percent of GNP, it is second in East Asia in terms of absolute amount.

International Military Order

It is necessary to analyze the function this kind of Japanese military preparedness is fulfilling in international politics from various angles. But here I think I would like to attempt to consider it from the analytical framework of the "international military order." This concept of "international military order" has been posed in order to grasp global militarization, and the unending increase in military expenditures is a direct indication of this global militarization. The total amount of world military expenditures is



(This diagram has been simplified)

approximately 334 billion dollars (current values) and matches the aggregate GNP of the world's 38 poorest countries. It has reached a scale where it uses in just two days more than the total budget of the United Nations and its special agencies. In addition, the sudden increase in military expenditures by the third world in recent years demands attention. The arms sales by the advanced nations are behind this, as many people have pointed out.

Then, this analytical framework points out that such an increase in military expenditures has formed one system.

This system can be divided into five levels, and each of these levels is closely linked, and an interlocked military arms order has been achieved throughout the world. "The military-industrial complex" of the military superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, has been placed at the top; it has continued a persistent military buildup. The second level

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is the arms competition between both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. And the third level is the level of arms shipment network, in which "armaments, going beyond the confines of one country, flow from the superpowers and other advanced nations to foreign countries." The fourth level is the arms competition within the third world. The fifth level is a system of oppression, seen in most of the third world, represented in the military=technocrat control structure and modernized in the developing nations. From this analysis, it is pointed out that a vertical relationship between three of these five levels, the control of the military-industrial complex, control by international transfer of arms and the brutal oppression within the developing countries, is the main reason for the "detente-style military expansion." All the weight of this military order system falls on the people of the third world, placed at the bottom of this hierarchy. (Yoshikazu Sakamoto, "Gunshuku no seijigaku" ["Politics of arms reduction"], SEKAI, June 1978)

The relationship between the "international military order" and the so-called North-South problem can be considered as follows. To lay a finger on this point, the world-wide continuation and magnification of the structure of inequality, that is, economic exploitation of the underdeveloped countries by the advanced nations, which is called the North-South problem, is deeply connected to the world-wide arms system. A Swedish peace researcher has arranged this relationship in the above diagram. Formerly, the North-South problem was considered BC axis as its basis, and it was thought to be tension between imperialism and the growth of independence among the people of the third world. However, the problem was not only that, but here is the problem of the AB axis, this is, militarization whereby a world-wide arms system has promoted imperialistic control. And there is the problem of the AC axis, that is, conflict and peace, which is how the arms system relates to the independence of the third world (for example, what kind of situation would exist if one or several of the third world countries escaped from their present subordination?) (Jan Öberg, "The New International Economic and Military Orders as Problems to Peace Research," BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS, Vol 8, No 2, 1977)

Theory on Security of the Economic Powers

Next, I think I would like to examine Japan's frequently advocated "security concept" from the viewpoint of this "international military order." It is a "comprehensive security concept" which makes its supreme position the continuation of Japan's foreign economic expansion, which has suppressed the autonomous growth of the third world, and furthermore approves a rise in the ratio of the defense budget to GNP from the present 0.0 percent to 1 percent, (Mainichi Shimbun, 1 August 1979) and tries to give justification to the increased amount of defense expenditures.

A report entitled, "Development of a comprehensive strategy based on the international environment as well as economic and social changes in our country," which the Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics was commissioned to draw up by the Research and Development Organization and which is regarded as the model for this "comprehensive security concept," explained

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some interesting facts. It is thought that this report was written with a consciousness of the problem of how to re-establish as the basis the value system under high level growth, which was unable to continue under the structural changes in the international environment, and how to reconcile it with the new environment. The conservative nature of this has been disclosed in a paragraph concerning the "consciousness of the problem." Four points were listed as making it necessary to have a clear-cut basic concept. Excluding the point that the goal of "catching up with the level of Western Europe" has been accomplished, the three points of the change in international environmental factors, an increase in international interest in Japan's basic concept and the necessity of realizing national prosperity and international responsibility within a deepening of international mutual dependence have not presented essential factors but rather conditional terms.

Looking at the details, it is clear that the values of advancement and international foreign expansion, which this writer submitted as the fundamental axis of the value system under high level growth, has been inherited intact. First of all, as for the inheritance of the value, advancement, it can be shown that it has help up the "existence of a more desirable way of life" as one of the nation's objectives, which should be the nucleus of the basic concept; and it has been asserted that the "stage which makes the minimum level of subsistence the goal of the nation, that is, ensuring food for tomorrow for a large majority of the consituent population, has already been achieved in our country's case, and, even though it cannot be said that it will not happen, it is extremely difficult to think of coming to such a situation in the future where this goal must be held up. Many informed people, when talking about a change in the "quality of life," have made the continuation of abundance the "nation's" goal, without ever questioning what its substance is.

Moreover, complementing this, the "superior national character whereby order has been maintained and society has been managed efficiently" has been cited as one of the "national (traditional) causes" making it possible for Japan's economy to continue into the future and for Japan "to surpass other advanced nations and the developing nations in economic power and to develop strategically economic power as the fundamental axis." "The greatness of Japanese loyalty to enterprise is almost without parallel in the world and was a major cause for supporting high level growth. Hereafter, loyalty will certainly weaken little by little, but it cannot be thought that it will die completely. And because even in an era of the manpower surplus anticipated from now on, it is not anticipated that the life-long employment system and the system of promotion by seniority will change, it is thought that the tendency for the Japanese peculiarity of enterprise-being-one-family will continue" So it has been observed that the value, assimilation, at the level of the individual will continue.

Then, the value, foreign economic expansion, has also been inherited. As a part of the operation of each theory in the basic concept, a "regional approach" was formed. In that case, the "Asian Pacific domain" was mentioned as the "domain which could be entrusted with Japan's growth at a relatively

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low cost and risk, as looked at from the financial, political and military points of view." And mention has been made of the economic view that "ASEAN has made economic cooperation inside the area the economic development strategy after the oil crisis, and is trying to actualize this by making economic relations with Japan closer. Adding the nations of Oceania to ASEAN, there is a move to set up a Japan-Oceania-ASEAN cooperative system. America's participation will be an important condition in order to develop this cooperative relationship further. Along with giving economic substance and importance to this regional cooperative relationship, America's participation would add political and psychological security."

In this connection, a "Japan-ASEAN exchange conference" was held in Thailand in August of last year, and the so-called "Fukuda doctrine," brought out when Prime Minister Fukuda visited the ASEAN nations in August 1977, was the subject of discussion. I think it ought to be kept in mind that, at its conclusion, "Japan said the Fukuda doctrine is the opening curtain on ASEAN becoming more friendly and equal partners with Japan; but the Southeast Asians did not believe Japan's assertion." (ASIA QUARTERLY, 1979, Vol 11, No 1)

Secret Military Buildup

Thus, the value throughout this report is none other than the value system under high level growth, but what cannot be ignored is that this report, in an item called "security," dealt with the defense efforts which made military power the main measure," that is, "security in the narrow sense," and asserted the following two points. The first demands rightful recognition of the Self-Defense Forces and the arms buildup under the assertion of "forming a national consensus toward the defense question." While reporting that a qualitative repletion of basic defense capability is important, it was asserted that "in that case, defense expenditures will be decided in the end by how much the people will tolerate; there is no theoretical basis why it must be limited to less than 1 percent of GNP. It is also necessary to strengthen a minimum crisis control capability to be able to cope with emergency situations to a certain limited degree. For example, coping with major earthquakes and the disposition of displaced persons from the Korean peninsula."

The second demanded "non-partisan mutual agreement" on a military cooperative relationship with America, the military superpower, and "an effort to decrease the conspicuous asymmetry regarding the capability and responsibility for defense in Japan-U.S. relations" without "expanding interpretation of the concept of self-defense." And as a price for the effort to decrease this asymmetry, it has listed the "economic and political activity which would indirectly contribute to a furtherance of the security of the Asian Pacific region."

In August of last year, the "Japan-China peace and friendship treaty" was concluded, but it has been said that, except for Cambodia, all the Southeast Asian countries expressed caution regarding the treaty. This reaction has been expressed: "The Japan-China peace and friendship treaty has pointed

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out that permanent antagonism is impossible, if it is for national prosperity ...we welcome the conclusion of the Japan-China peace treaty, but at the same time, in reference to this treaty, we must fortify ourselves so as not to be victimized by the superpowers." (SOIR KARUYA) (Osamu Watanabe, "Samazama no Tonan Ajia shokoku no hanno," ["Reaction of Various Southeast Asian Nations"] Asahi Asia Review, No. 36, 1978, No. 4)

In the era of high level growth, the value at the international political level is maintenance of the status quo; the Japanese military buildup has grown within that framework. And then, this report has tried to promote a Japanese military buildup within a limited framework, while carrying out the maintenance of the status quo in the present changed situation.

Summing up the examination of this "comprehensive security concept," I think it can be said that there will be attempts made to increase the present military buildup situation within this framework, based on a continuation of the value system under high level growth. In other words, following the previously noted diagram, it can be thought that attempts will be made to continue it by more closely committing the imperialism=spontaneous growth relationship (North-South problem) to the international military order, albeit in a limited way.

Discussion on Security of Military Powers

The arms buildup of the world's top ten military powers has been reinforced by a movement to make it an independent variable. The recently materialized request for an arms buildup by the Self-Defense Forces made the arms buildup an independent variable in the assertions expressed in the "Defense White Paper," published in 1979 and acknowledged at the 24 July cabinet meeting. Regarding this white paper, various leading publications have pointed out specific features as follows.

First, in part I, "International Military Conditions," the Soviet military buildup was stressed. In particular, data was presented in one report on the "military situation surrounding our country," indicating a buildup of the Soviet Far East Army, and, more than that, the buildup of the Soviet Far East Army is "an important concern for our country's defense." It was mentioned that "it appears the Soviet Union has been engaged in building bases since last year, along with deploying ground forces on a moderate scale, equipped with tanks and guns to the islands of Kunashiri and Shikotan, territory belonging to our country. (Underlining by this author)

Second, the "principles of the defense program" were determined at the National Defense Council and cabinet meeting in October 1976, and the "basic defense capability" concept, setting as the goal the ability to deal effectively with limited and small-scale aggression, was established. In this white paper, while there is no major change in the basic conditions assumed in the principles, "expressions with hidden connotations" were used regarding revision of the principles. It has been expressed that "it is necessary to allow suffi-

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cient time to shift to a new defense capability setup, and it is necessary to perceive as quickly as possible the implications of a change in international politics and military conditions and to reflect on policy." It was reported that the Defense Agency does not deny that this came forward with the aim of beginning the groundwork for revising the principles. (ASAHI SHIMBUN, evening edition, 24 July)

Then, it is a commonly known fact that there has been dissatisfaction among "those in uniform" regarding this "basic defense capability" concept from the time it was originally established. At a defense meeting, Commander Nagano requested that another look be given to the defense principles, saying: "at present, objective circumstances have gradually changed from the time these were decided. We are in a situation where a change in the principles must be faced in the near future." He stressed "increasing the level of our defense capability." (MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 29 March)

Well then, how should the view of a Soviet threat and the request for arms buildup, stated in this "defense white paper," be considered? It can in no way be thought that there is a high degree of friendship in present Japan-Soviet relations, compared to Japan-China and Japan-U.S. relations. It cannot be thought that the Soviet threat asserted by the Self-Defense Forces exists as asserted. This is pointed out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' warning that "the Soviet military capability is played up too much." (MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 27 July)

If so, this kind of opinion on the Soviet threat can be thought to be a false image for military buildup. Professor D. Zenkhaus, a West German peace researcher, concerning the relationship of threat-deterrent-military expansion, raised the question of the validity of the "action-reaction shame," which is threat from another country→necessity of deterrents→promotion of military expansion, and asserted that the connection of the structural profit collaboration system directing the military expansion represented by the military-industrial complex→deterrent theory, which is the ideology justifying the request for that military expansion→the image of a threat created by ourselves can explain today's military expansion. And the analysis must be that a linkage between the insistence on military expansion by the Self-Defense Forces and the emphasis on the Soviet threat is at work.

Next, it must be considered that the present Soviet threat theory has begun to have repercussions on public opinion. The aforementioned Professor D. Zenkhaus pointed out that the process of a linkage between military expansion profit system→deterrents→threat allows the image of threat to permeate the country's populace, reflecting this fabricated threat. He also pointed out that there exists a vicious circle process of military expansion profit system→deterrents→threat→permeation of the image of a threat from another country at the level of the general public→affirmation of military expansion by the general public. This process is called an "autism model." I think this penetration of the Soviet threat theory into the general public is indicated by the fact that novels about hypothetical situations, such as "Sorengun joriku su" ["The Soviet Army Lands"] have become best sellers in Japan.

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Above all, it is necessary to pay attention to how easily the stereotyped image of the USSR=unfriendly nation is accepted in Japan. Both Hiroshi Azuma and Toshinao Yoneyama investigated the racial attitudes of the Japanese in "Henken no kozo---Nihonjin no jinshukan," ["Structure of prejudice---Japanese racial prejudice"] (NHK Books, 1967) and pointed out a very interesting fact. That is, among the English, French, Germans, Americans, Italians and Russians, the Russians are lowest in degree of acceptance and highest in degree of rejection. Considering this, the judgment can be made that the "autistic" phenomenon of constantly promoting military expansion by using the Soviet threat theory as the springboard has regrettably been allowed to evolve.

Previously, I critically examined the comprehensive security concept and the defense white paper, and neither allows a reversal of Japan's military buildup. The comprehensive security concept clearly tried to strengthen the present international economic order by a renewed commitment to the international military order, and the defense white paper does nothing less than plainly try to strengthen the international military order by Japan's military buildup. Now a dangerous situation exists, in which the choice in the defense question has begun to be manipulated as either the comprehensive security concept or the defense white paper.

Conclusion

Finally, this writer would like to try to explain the meaning of analyzing Japan's militarization from the viewpoint of reactionism. In the first half of this small treatise, I indicated that the basic viewpoint of the post-war Japan peace theory is considering international peace via the system from men, and its value system is anti-war inclination-pacifism-international peace. In summary, it can be said that we have renounced military sovereignty as a "nation." Looked at from this position, the present state of the security debate, which has tried to promote anything but a reversal of the arms buildup, is but a way of saying "reactionism."

Then, if one considers resistance to the reactionism that has come forward at present, the peace theory has as its theme the theoretical consideration of the connection of each level in the aforementioned new value system. In particular, if the domain of militarization is mentioned, one large critical problem is how to clarify the theoretical doctrine of pacifism established by the principles of the peace theory in the new value system, citizen-republic and decentralization of authority-participatory democracy-global human liberation.

On 6 August, the following two facts were pointed out regarding this crisis. "Prayer services for peace" were held in Hiroshima on 6 August, the 34th anniversary, and on that same day, Defense Agency Director-General Yamashita made an official visit to Yokota Base for the first time since the war and consulted with the Japanese and American army commanders who were there.

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MILITARY

CRITIC ANALYZES EXPERTS' ARGUMENTS ON NATIONAL DEFENSE ISSUES

Tokyo CHUO KORON in Japanese Oct 79 pp 66-97

[Article by Tsuneari Fukuda, Critic]

[Excerpt] In order to place the arguments on national defense issues in the proper perspective, what are the basic issues that we must consider? The self-deception underlying the arguments between Morishima and Seki and arguments held heretofore will be exposed.

Prologue. Only an Exile Can Propound the Non-resistance Doctrine.

Michio Morishima, professor at London University, has written an article titled "New 'New Military Preparedness Plan Theory'" in the July issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU. Following the example of Adm Narumi Inouye, who in January 1941, approximately a year before the start of U.S.-Japan war, wrote an article, "New Military Preparedness Plan Theory," in which he cautioned against a naval shipbuilding race with the U.K. and United States, Morishima wrote his present-day "New Military Preparedness Plan Theory" and simply added another word, "new," at the beginning. The sub-title reads, "dedicated to the deceased Adm Narumi Inouye." Admiral Inouye had no doubts that military armament was necessary for Japan's defense and supported the existence of the army and navy at the time. Otherwise, how could he have dedicated himself to the navy and risen to the rank of Admiral? Therefore, his "New Military Preparedness Plan Theory" concerned the conduct of military strategy and tactics and was not an argument that military armaments are unnecessary, a theory advocated by Morishima. The latter should be fully cognizant of this view. That he titled his article, "New 'New Military Preparedness Plan Theory,'" is a "complete deception of the title," as pointed out by Hayao Shimizu in the September issue of SEIRON magazine and furthermore, it not simply a smug pun or joke but a clever fraud, but I will not question it at this time.

What Morishima wants to say, in essence, is that should the enemy attack, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the people should abide by a non-resistance policy and surrender unconditionally. He has listed each of the reasons for believing that that is the best step to take, but as

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mentioned by Shimizu in SEIRON, his arguments are sophistical and mutually contradictory. Not only that, they are merely abstract, paper plans and he is being inconsistent and drawing conclusions that suit him best by arguing that certain steps, which might be only 1-out-of-10 or 1-out-of-100 possibilities, are the only ones that can be taken or on the other hand, placing expectations on possibilities with odds of 100-to-1. In extreme instances, he is trying to deceive the readers by nonchalantly telling lies as though they were truths. An example of this vicious practice is the section in which he describes the civilian control of the U.K. In a broad sense, his argument can be interpreted as the "fallacy of begging the question" (Petitio principii).

His action, which I find most unpardonable, is his attempt to use vulgar, pretentious play or should I say, his acting as a show producer to become popular with the vulgar masses. His arguments can be summed up as non-resistant, defeatist doctrine, but he does not truly believe in it. He has taken into consideration "safety valves" which will prevent his extreme views from "exploding" and anticipated that his views will be popular. Probably, he first enjoyed the taste in his dispute with Tsuru [Shigeto] and the respectable university professor, who had been treated as an alien, was built up, in his exiled place of London, as an agitator, by Japanese journalism. He must've been carried away by the joy of his first pleasure and started his second round of arguments. Essentially, his argument deserves to be treated with silent contempt, but a full-grown adult can be blinded by a blowgun, shot playfully by a child. Thinking that his argument cannot be ignored, I am refuting it. I do not wish to start a controversy, however, with Morishima. My aim is to use this opportunity to put the defense controversy in the right perspective, and believe that Morishima's non-resistance doctrine is a good target.

Probably what I said might be an exaggeration but I feel as though, somewhere in my heart, I was waiting for the appearance of such a target. Since the target is an easy one, there is no reason to let it go unscathed. Although belatedly, the target finally appeared as it was destined. I am not the only one who thought so. Tadae Takubo wrote the following remarks in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU:

"Japan's non-armament, neutral doctrine has no parallel in the world. The bases for this doctrine are Japan's Peace Constitution, the international environment of being encircled by the three great powers of the United States, PRC and USSR, and public opinion. Probing one step deeper into these ostensible bases, the underlying truth will be discovered, I believe, which is: since we cannot wage war, we must accept surrender and to do that, armament is unnecessary and we must take a neutral stand. Professor Morishima boldly and minutely made public for the first time, this underlying truth. Clear-cut thinking will lead to the conclusion that defense strategy is unnecessary for Japan. Considered in this light, it is an epoch-making treatise."

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In the same BUNGEI SHUNJU issue, Tokichi Harada also writes as follows: "This (content partially omitted) is a change in attitude or strengthens the logic for the argument (non-armament, neutral doctrine) which had been on the wane."

Furthermore, Hayao Shimizu expresses similar views in SEIRON, as the foregoing two persons, and supports Morishima:

"When I read Morishima's article in BUNGEI SHUNJU, I was impressed by the fact that there are people in this world who make such brazen jokes and believed that the Japan Socialist Party [JSP], which advocates disarmament and neutrality, would receive quite a blow. (Omission). In other words, the situation that the JSP wanted to keep hidden, i.e., the condition of unconditional surrender to the USSR was exposed by the professor, who says the condition is acceptable. It is only natural that I considered the professor's article a literary parody with the intention of criticizing the JSP. (Actually, I have some doubts as to the professor's intent. That is because in the end, instead of boosting the morale of non-armament neutralists, the professor's article might result in heightening the militaristic, defense consciousness of the Japanese people who realized the destination to which non-armament neutrality might lead.)"

Regarding this point only, I believe that Takubo alone has accurately grasped the political motives of Morishima's contention. Although it might be a literary parody, I cannot believe that Morishima's non-resistance argument will, as Shimizu says, "result in heightening the militaristic, defense consciousness of the Japanese people." The reason is that in the past year or two, the Japanese people, or rather, the Japanese newspapers, began to show a cautious attitude toward the USSR, but this is only an outward change and is not related, in actuality, to defense consciousness or national consciousness. You can take my word that this cautious attitude will become diluted, depending on Soviet actions. The necessity of national defense is, without question, a realistic problem. Therefore, the extent and methods are naturally swayed by happenings. But what the problem should be depends on national consciousness and views, that is to say, it is tied to the relations between nation and individuals or the source of human existence. In that sense, it cannot be said that Morishima's advocacy deprived the non-armament, neutral doctrine of its substance nor was Seki's opposing argument, with which I am in full agreement, strong enough to bury the non-resistance theory. Not only in logic but in actuality, the non-resistance doctrine was deep-rooted in post-war Japan and even if Morishima loses in the controversy, the doctrine will remain alive. As far as I can surmise, the ones who were puzzled were not the JSP members who preach the non-armament neutrality but the conservative party members, who claim the Self-Defense Forces [SDF] is constitutional, and leaders of the bureaucracy. They are the ones who are grateful for Morishima's words, saying only an exile could've said them, and feel inwardly relieved. I am not making irresponsible statements. If you read this entire article, you should understand that what I have

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to say is justifiable. Then, I would've accomplished my aim of placing the defense argument on the right track.

Part 1. What Does "Civilian Control" Signify?

In practically all cases, the conflicts of opinions seen in debates and controversies are not conflicts of opinions themselves but differences in the meanings the participants attach to words even while mutually using the same words. In controversies conducted on the erroneous assumption that similar words possess similar meanings, mutual understanding and agreement, in a broad sense, cannot be reached through dialectics, and result needlessly in chaos and confusion. Particularly, in post-Meiji era Japan, the new Chinese words which were made up for purposes of foreign language translation, and the foreign words which were misused without benefit of translation in post-WW II, have contributed to this trend and our thoughts have reached the stage of utter confusion. The newly translated Chinese words have a brief history and have lost the breath and depth of the original words. They have lost their association with other similar words though these words might be likened to the roots or branches of a tree intertwining with another tree. Not only in debates and controversies but even in our daily lives, about 80 percent of the Chinese words that we use are new Chinese words. Words such as overbearing or courageous, modest or vulgar, etc have been used from ages ago, but such clear Chinese words which have practically become a part of our national language are not used much recently. Instead, abstract words such as nation, sovereignty, human rights, democracy, peace, freedom, international environment, industrial make-up, restraining power, national defense, etc are used frequently in newspapers, and controversies over political and social problems rely almost wholly on this type of new Chinese words. In pre-war China, not crisp, new paper bills, but wrinkled, worn-out bills were desired. The old bills had passed through many hands and can be trusted as genuine bills, but there is a strong suspicion that new bills might be counterfeits. New Chinese words should be treated with the same caution. The most suspicious word is civilian control, and Morishima is utilizing to the maximum, the weakness of this counterfeit word.

Among the new Chinese words, civilian control was used for the first time after WW II, and if Japan had academies like those of the U.K. and France, the word might not have been included in the Japanese dictionaries. As far as I know, even in the U.K. and the United States, the word "civilian control" has a vague, subtle meaning and is troublesome in usage. In any country, the military is necessary for national defense, but once its role and size exceed an appropriate limit--and as Morishima says, such a possibility is not limited to Japan, and though there are differences in degree, the possibility exists in any country--it becomes necessary to protect the administrative and legislative bodies from one's own

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military, which was created to protect the country from foreign enemies. Therefore, the word "civilian control" denotes only an intent, and during the past one or two centuries, the method and system of control have varied with different countries, depending on time and practices. In the United States, following WW II, there was the Korean war, followed by the Vietnam war and from the late 1950's to early 1960's, various controversies arose. According to one interpretation, the word "civilian supremacy" was ordinarily used but "civilian control" was substituted when the Vietnam war became mired and something had to be done. As is known, McNamara advocated and carried out the intervention of the executive branch in military affairs. The truth of that interpretation cannot be verified but we cannot overlook one fact and that is, there is the danger of the military pressuring the civilian, but on the other hand, there exists the equal danger of the civilian exercising power over the military. By right, both parties should be equal to the two wheels of a car, but civilian supremacy is sought because the military is the sole possessor and custodian of military weapons. No matter how manifest civilian supremacy is made, there is no absolute method or system to completely prevent the military from running berserk. The important factor is maintaining relations of mutual trust. Military recklessness cannot be blamed on the military alone, and it is wrong to think that civilian supremacy is the "charm" to prevent it. The civilians who are in a superior position must be experts who can deal on even grounds with the military.

Morishima claims that civilian control is possible in the U.K. because of the doctrine which gives supremacy to amateurs. Masamori Sase questions this point in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU. Morishima's claim cannot be dismissed as sophistry. It is simply an out-and-out lie. There are few countries like the U.K. which respects experts. Japan is the country of amateur supremacy. By appearing for a number of years on TV programs, such as "You at 3 o'clock" and "Economics in the Living Room," one can become a Diet member or a metropolitan governor, but in the U.K., such a peculiar phenomenon does not happen. The academic world and academism are well established. Even if one becomes famous by writing in newspapers or popular magazines, should the subject of the article be outside of his specialized field, the achievement is not credited as a professor's accomplishment and does not contribute to his promotion. With Morishima, even if he wrote, on the basis of his slight personal war experiences, arguments opposing armament and war and became popular by having them published in the GUARDIAN, the event will not be a credit to him. In fact, his position and trust as an economist within London University might be hurt. If he were teaching in a Japanese university, he might gain direct or indirect benefits. If his income from journalism becomes greater than his university income, he will be that much busier and he might gain direct or indirect benefits. If his income from journalism becomes greater than his university income, he will be that much busier and he might have to neglect some tasks as a scholar and professor, but no one will blame him. In the U.K., even among journalists, there are experts who can talk on even terms with scholars of international politics. The same is true of politicians. Pitt, who defeated Napoleon of France, can be said to be the first prime minister of the U.K. and he is the second

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son of the well-known Count Chatham. His political genius can be traced genealogically to generations of politicians. In the British socially stratified society, the family line serves the role of an institution to train experts. During the Victorian period, when modern art flourished most, the three prime ministers who served three terms respectively, namely, Count Derby, Gladstone and Marquis Salisbury, were all political experts bred by the family lineage. In recent years, Baldwin and Chamberlain of post-WW I and Churchill of WW II years are no exceptions. The situation is the same in the other Anglo-Saxon country, the United States.

Morishima might interpret the foregoing circumstances as evidence of the amateur supremacy doctrine that he has conceived but he is misusing the term, "amateur." He is contributing to the misunderstanding by making such claims as, "In the U.K., not only the military but other experts are under the thumb of amateurs. Therefore, it is not strange to have civilian control." If we are to interpret Morishima's word "amateur" in a good light, we can say that it refers to one with the expertise to understand what the other experts are saying and with the comprehension to put the opinions of experts in the proper perspective. In a broad sense, that can be interpreted as political supremacy, at its best. The problem lies, however, in his phrase, "under the thumb of amateurs." Such careless remarks can be misunderstood as the expressions of a frustrated and exiled professor. As Morishima knows, not only in the U.K. but in the advanced countries of Europe, the setup is quite similar. Although the military is said to be "under the thumb" of the amateurish civilian, the civilian representative is the president or the prime minister, under whom the national defense minister and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] hold equal positions. The JCS chairman has the right and responsibility to attend Cabinet and National Defense Council meetings and at times, to present his views directly to the president or prime minister. In the United States, the set-up is somewhat different and civilian control is not held, as in the U.K., by the prime minister alone, but is divided between the president and Congress. The military is swayed by politics more than in the U.K. For example, even if the president strongly advocates the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the ROK, the military can take its case to Congress to try to suppress the president's action through political manipulations. Or, there might be cases where the president approves but the Congress opposes, although the military might not have lobbied, and a stalemate results. In such cases, there is the danger that the military might take the situation in its own hands. Thus, depending on the methods used, civilian control does not necessarily have the same meaning or bring about the same results.

What is the situation in the country with which we are concerned, i.e., Japan? Unlike the Defense Ministries of other countries, the Japanese Defense Agency is an extension of the Prime Minister's Office. The National Defense Council, which the premier chairs, is made up of the foreign minister, finance minister, Defense Agency director and Economic Planning Agency director, all of whom are "part-time" members. The

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Joint Staff Council [JSC] chairman, who is an expert and the highest responsible official in SDF, has no right to attend, except when so ordered by the prime minister. To serve as the civilian watch-dog, there is an Internal Bureau within the Defense Agency, and neither the JSC chairman nor any of the SDF officers can be a member. The Internal Bureau is staffed by officials on TDY from the National Police Agency and Finance Ministry, and uniformed officers of SDF are excluded. As Morishima hopes, the government and ruling political party believe that the Japanese people consider civilian control unsuitable for the nation. They have strongly upheld the doctrine of amateur supremacy, which excludes officers, a set-up which has no parallel in the world. An article in a recent issue of a certain magazine stated that even Morishima, who is an "economist of the Establishment," has begun to advocate non-resistance. The fact is that because he is a member of the Establishment, he can safely advocate maintaining the status quo of SDF and denying civilian control.

What I am concerned about, however, is not the opinions of an exile, Morishima. It is the nonchalant attitude of the government's ruling party which shows no concern for his irrational arguments. In fact, because he advocated the continuance of the present treatment of SDF as persons outside of government service, as was the case before civilian control, he brought to light the stalemated situation. On this score, I even want to pay my respects to his "courage." I feel this was because the government has obscured the fact that the present-day SDF is still at a standstill, as before the enactment of civilian control, but led the people to believe that principles of civilian control were being followed. The Japanese people are not the only ones. Even among experts who discuss defense issues, any talk about troop strength, equipment and military costs but with respect to the most fundamental problem of a higher level, i.e., the national and social role of the military, few are willing to try to correct the distorted situation. To repeat, that situation remains in a frozen, isolated and confined state. If the situation which existed prior to civilian control continues, as heretofore, the local SDF commander must act on his own judgment, in case of emergencies. To prevent this from happening, Hiroomi Kurisu, JSC chairman, made the sound and modest request last year of strengthening the civilian control set-up. He was misunderstood, however, and forced to resign. The responsibility lies with the civilian government and the Diet, which pretended that the present-day SDF had been under civilian control from before.

When Masamichi Inoki was head of the Defense Academy, I was once asked to attend the graduation ceremony as a civilian representative and to address the graduates and student body. Of course, I did not touch on the stalemated situation and spoke as though the SDF was under civilian control as in Europe and the United States. I told them that before they considered themselves as military men with a profession, I would like them to think of themselves as a citizen, as a civilian and as a human being. This is not an easy act to perform even under the civilian control of Europe and the United States. It is nearly impossible in a society where they are excluded from the civilian ranks and considered as persons with specialized profession and locked in a cage reserved for collective groups of experts.

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Morishima prophesies that if the stalemate is broken and normal civilian control is exercised, the military will run amok, but I think the reverse is true. If one is treated as an outsider and confined for too long a period, not only the military but anyone will have the urge to give vent to his pent-up anger and run berserk. Speaking like a "scholar of the Establishment," Morishima claims that arms reduction of the early Showa era led to militarism, and learning from the experience, he opposes arms reduction or complete disarmament. As is the case with the majority of the people who oppose his views, Morishima is concerned with the number of troops and quantity of equipment and completely disregards the quality aspect.

Although he is likewise one of the "scholars of the Establishment," Inoki realizes that the present-day SDF is in a situation which existed prior to civilian control. He is advocating that the SDF be "placed under the people--in other words, the Diet." Although Japan is a democratic country where sovereignty lies with the people, as far as civilian control is concerned, it is risky to permit only the popularly-elected Diet members to represent the people. If that is the case, the only alternative is to follow the example of the United States and divide the control between the chief of the executive branch and the Congress. Probably, that is what Inoki wants. It is truly strange, but our Diet has abandoned the right to deliberate on defense outlays. If the SDF is to be placed under civilian control as in Europe and the United States, the military must consider arguments affecting increases, decreases, improvements, etc of equipment, armament and troops, and present a budget draft, like other ministries and agencies. The draft should be mulled over and revised by the Finance Ministry and the original and revised drafts should be passed to the Diet for consideration and deliberation. Even if the top agency of the civilian control is not the Diet but the prime minister or president, the Diet should still assume that responsibility. Because the Diet forsook that right, the SDF was treated more and more like outsiders and placed in a state of confusion. As far as the budget is concerned, the Defense Agency is under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry.

The foregoing discussion has made clear that Morishima believes civilian control is difficult to administer in Japan and that the fault does not lie with the military, which is to be controlled, but with the controlling side, the civilians, for lacking the necessary qualifications and capabilities. There is no need to scare the populace at this time by mentioning the rash actions of the military during wartime. I do not believe that the civilian side lacks the qualifications and capabilities. To be exact, the civilian side is not lacking them but does not want them. The Diet does not lack the ability or confidence to place the military under its control, but on the pretext of the people's sovereignty, the Diet regards the SDF as an explosive or dangerous object and does not want to touch the problem. Of course, like the people, the Diet members do not really think that the SDF is a dangerous item like nitroglycerine. On this point, the Diet differs greatly from Morishima. Within the Diet building, the "floor is covered with oil and a stick of match can cause a dangerous explosion." Plainly speaking, the "oil" is the constitution and

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the SDF laws. If they are ignited, matters can become serious. Trying to adopt an illegitimate child of a kept mistress can result in a running quarrel between husband and wife and disrupt the harmony of a household. Similarly, what the Diet fears most is any risk which will create unrest. If the government or ruling party can be likened to the husband who fathered an illegitimate child, it can be expected to fervently try to gain time by feigning ignorance or taking the attitude of "see-not, hear-not and speak-not" to his wife, the opposition party.

Part 2. "Orderly and Fully Dignified Surrender" and "Right of Political Self-Determination."

In Morishima's article, the above-mentioned are practically the only words which touch on morality and the way a person should live. Although somewhat long, the following excerpt from his article is quoted in full because it reveals most frankly, his flippant attitude:

"The ASAHI SHIMBUN, dated 23 August 1945, carried an article which stated, 'The enemy troops are approaching, but be brave and calm in dealing with them.' As a matter of fact: a) I believe that the Japanese people made a dignified, admirable surrender which the later generations can recall with pride. Because the people made such a surrender, Japan was able to make the miraculous recovery that it did... Likewise, should the Soviets attack, the SDF has no choice but to surrender with courage and orderliness. A horrible aftermath is expected, with frenzied Soviet troops pouring in, should the SDF fight to the end and prefer death to surrender. Rather than that, the Japanese should make an 'orderly and fully dignified surrender'; and b) instead, obtain 'the right of political self-determination.' I think that this is the wiser course to take. As long as dissensions do not break out all over Japan nor a segment of the Japanese people torture and abuse the remaining Japanese, I believe that it is possible to build a sound society, even if Japan falls into the Soviet orbit--perhaps, it might not be perfect, but a semblance, of the socialistic society espoused by Seki."

Of the abovementioned points "a" and "b," with respect to "b," logical counter-arguments have been made respectively by: first, Seki himself; Shimizu in SEIRON; Sase in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU; Tadashi Matsubara in GETSUYO HYORON (13 August issue); and Ikuko Taniura in the "Readers' Comments" section [September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU], after she read the Morishima-Seki controversies in the magazine. From their respective professional standpoints, Seki, Shimizu and Sase are laughing at the optimism, or rather, the ignorance of Morishima who holds such dream-like expectations of the USSR. Furthermore, Shimizu is claiming that the SDF is a "white elephant" if its mission is to surrender unconditionally, and is raising the question, "Why should the Japanese people have to pay high taxes to maintain a useless military force?" I am in agreement. Morishima would like, however, to keep the SDF as it is, without civilian control, and let it surrender unconditionally. He thinks it is "wiser to obtain the right of political self-determination" by handing over the SDF as a gift

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or ransom money to the Soviet military. For this purpose, he is claiming that the SDF "should not be suddenly decreased or abolished."

Unlike the abovementioned three persons, Matsubara and Taniura are objecting to Morishima on the grounds of morality and humanity. With regard to Morishima's arbitrary assumption that "as long as dissensions do not break out all over Japan nor a segment of the Japanese people torture, abuse and oppress the remaining Japanese, Matsubara states "human beings are not like that" and explains in detail the indecencies of human nature. In the HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN, Morishima has written an article containing the same views as in item "b" of the excerpt quoted above. In the article, he states, "Even under Soviet domination, as long as we are firm, it is possible to build up a socialistic economy that is suited to Japan." The article was reprinted as his supplementary article in BUNGEI SHUNJU. On this point, Taniura reflects on her surroundings and daily living and says, "The phrase 'as long as we are firm' made the article appear to be that of a layman. We are not firm. Or, we cannot say that we are firm under whatever circumstance. I have doubts that, after surrendering without military preparedness, we can create a social system under which individuals can continue living with self-respect. I feel certain that an increasing number of people will come to the forefront by immediately conforming to the set-up of the ruling side."

I find it very difficult to believe that this article was written by a 21-year-old girl. I cannot imagine that such a "firm" girl exists in present-day Japan. I am not saying that because I hold women in low esteem but because I think that women who have such self-awareness would find it awkward to express themselves in this way, especially if they are only 21 years old. Probably, she is using an alias. Taniura concludes with a positive assumption that, "an increasing number of people will probably come to the forefront by immediately conforming to the set-up of the ruling side." For persons of our age, her assumption appears to be far more realistic than Morishima's afterthought, which is only an experimental past-time, that Hitler could have been contained in this manner or that it was impossible to restrain him. About 10 years before Taniura was born, repatriation ships loaded with Japanese POW's who had been captured by the Soviets entered Maizuru port, but she probably doesn't know what happened aboard those ships. Within the USSR or Soviet-occupied territory, there appeared Japanese who "came to the forefront by conforming to the set-up of the ruling side." At the time, they were called "activists" (positive elements, active elements), and as the repatriation ships neared Japan, the situation was reversed and those who had been abused by them began to take revenge. This scenario was repeated on every returning ship. We must not forget, however, that within the Japanese homeland, "an increasing number of people had already come to the forefront by conforming to the set-up (occupation forces) of the ruling side." Such being the case, as Taniura states, she and other youngsters who are offsprings of those very people cannot be expected to be firm at any time under any circumstance.

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I want to present, at this time, another factual story about the experience, of my friend in Ta-lien at the time WW II ended. Morishima claims that it cannot be helped if the Soviet troops "went to the extreme in plundering and assaulting" because "the Soviet troops were watching for an opportunity to invade, and with the declaration of war, they poured in as if the embankment had broken through." This is not true. It was a fact that in North Manchuria, the Japanese and Soviet troops waged hard-fought battles, but they were not "resisting to the end" or "preferring death to surrender." In the end, they did surrender. Learning about the surrender, the master of the railroad freight station in Ta-lien began to think. It was useless to offer token resistance. Rather, he should follow the example of the story by Eiji Yoshikawa, which he loved to read, about surrendering Ako castle [scene of Chushingura or 47 Loyal Retainers]. He re-read the story for an entire night. He then made a detailed inventory of the items in the freight station warehouse, had the list translated into Russian and calmly awaited the enemy troops to make an "orderly surrender." The general populace followed suit. The Soviets entered the war on August 9th and 10 days later, invaded Ta-lien. Of course, they were not troops which fought the Japanese military. They were troops which had been dispatched suddenly from Northern Mongolia to occupy Ta-lien before it fell to Chiang Kai-shek's army. They were not frightened by the Japanese troops "fighting to the end" and were not "frenzied troops pouring in." The results were contrary to the expectations of "Tai-lien Kuranosuke" [pun on name of the head of the 47 loyal retainers in the Chushingura drama] and the Ta-lien residents faced a pitiful end of the war. They were plundered and assaulted daily.

What is most difficult to comprehend, however, is point "a" of the above-quoted Morishima's statement. During the war, I was not a good citizen. I did not oppose the war and I was war weary. I could not rely on the government or troops and felt that the uppermost task was to assure the minimum livelihood of my family and close friends. For that reason, I cannot indulge in the self-praise that, as Morishima says, "[We made] a dignified, admirable surrender which the later generations can recall with pride." But I was not the only one, and I regret to say that as far as I know, there was not a single Japanese at the time who is worthy of the praise of having made an "orderly and fully dignified surrender." Even if there were several or several tens of such admirable Japanese persons, they were not of sufficient number to be referred to as the "Japanese people." The people met the American troops with envious eyes and drooling mouths at the sight of chocolates, Lucky Strikes and food rations that they carried, and wore servile smiles on their faces. My self-respect will not allow me to claim that our appearances at the time conformed to the request of ASAHI SHIMBUN that "the enemy troops are approaching but be brave and calm in dealing with them."

Furthermore, Morishima states in his article in the section immediately preceding the excerpted part that "once the Potsdam Declaration was accepted, Japan (military nation) recovered and coped with the situation in a model, splendid manner." But can we say that? Since I wrote the

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"current constitutional theory," 14 years have passed. In that article, I mentioned that judging by the treaty provisions, I can say that the unconditional surrender of the Potsdam Declaration was clearly directed at the Japanese military and not at the Japanese Government or people. Moreover, the declaration does not imply that we must unconditionally accept everything, e.g., the constitutional revisions demanded during the Occupation in violation of international laws, reform of the educational system and meddling in our language use, culture and customs, or destruction of the various traditions, which might appear trivial, but which support the Japanese feelings and upon which our pride and confidence are built. I do not wish, at this time, to put the blame on the Occupation Forces. In fact, the reverse is true and I wish to criticize the attitude of us Japanese people or the civilian leaders at the time. Of course, the authorities concerned must have had various excuses. The Potsdam Declaration, which was clearly intended to be a surrender with conditions, was accepted as unconditional surrender. This flippant attitude of the Japanese people in permitting non-resistance resulted 30 years later in breeding casual-thinking persons who view the post-war confusion as "a dignified, admirable surrender which the later generations can recall with pride," who believe that because the Japanese people were able to do so, they succeeded in building up today's prosperity, and thus affirm, without questioning, that Japan is as it should be today. This attitude is what bothers me the most.

At any rate, I wish to call the reader's attention to the five points below. First, for us ordinary people, "fully dignified surrender: is an incomparably more difficult task than fully dignified conquest or occupation. Only those who have fought with full dignity can carry out a "fully dignified surrender." Second, how can the Japanese people, who could not make a "fully-dignified surrender" to the Santa Claus-like, generous American forces do the same with the poor, backward Soviet troops? Setting aside the question of dignity, among the Japanese at the time, there were some who although servile did "deal in an ideal manner" with the American Occupation Forces. Although treated as 12-year-olds by General MacArthur, when the general was dismissed by President Truman for ignoring civilian control during the Korean war, many of the Japanese people knelt on the ground in respect and regretted his departure. The reason for that can be simply explained as the poverty suffered during and after the war. According to Morishima, British and French leaders said, "In order to fire up the people, first Hitler must be allowed to beat them up thoroughly." Following this reasoning, in order to make a "fully dignified surrender" to the Soviets, as well as to the Americans, Japan must first return to the poor living conditions of 30 years ago. The post-war "miraculous recovery," which he praises on the one hand, must be completely reversed. on the other hand, if we are to follow his advice. For Japan to do this, the USSR or the United States "must be allowed to beat them up thoroughly." It is true that in a democracy, the government's leadership is weak. It is difficult to restrict individuals and enterprises which are apt to pursue their own interests and to confine them to one direction. It is not true, however, that to facilitate control, Churchill planned from the beginning to sacrifice the harmless people of his country and of Europe

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as bait to Hitler and to force Roosevelt to participate in the war by using their sufferings as excuses. To uphold the honor of the hawk faction, I proclaim war against such atrocious, or rather, unpardonably inhuman schemes of Morishima.

Third, whether they be American or Soviet troops, they are foreigners who cannot understand our language. If the "Japanese are firm" enough to make a "fully dignified surrender" to them, it should be much easier to deal with the Japanese SDF than with Soviet Occupation Forces, even if the SDF should get out of hand in the future. The Japanese people should find it simple to make a "fully dignified surrender" to the military authority of the SDF and if "deviation" is permissible, to obtain to some extent, "the right of political self-determination." Fourth, after earnestly explaining the non-resistance doctrine and the bases for it, Morishima states, "In spite of the foregoing 'defense plan', I want to make clear that I do not personally believe that the Soviets will ever attack Japan." If that is the case, Morishima wrote 60 or 70 pages merely to earn fees to make up for the high-yen and low-pound exchange. That makes me angry, but leaving personal feelings aside, let me continue my questioning. Whether the Soviets attack or not, the aforementioned "fully dignified surrender" is difficult for ordinary people to carry out. In spite of that, Morishima thinks that the Japanese easily accomplished the difficult task in 1945 and thereby, made the "miraculous recovery." Because of such feats, Morishima anticipates that today's Japanese will be able to carry out the same difficult task again, even in the "unlikely event" of a Soviet attack on Japan, which he himself "believes will not happen." If he believes the Japanese people are so competent why does he flatly assert that civilian control, which is much easier to implement, is not possible in Japan?

Fifth, Morishima states, "Because I have faith in human beings, I believe in the Americans and the Soviets and have no fear of a nuclear attack." If such is the case, the only ones who cannot be trusted are the Japanese, who cannot implement civilian control. Morishima claims that he has faith in human beings, but who is going to believe such a big lie? For him, human beings are only "economic animals." Thus, he can say that the SDF should be frozen in the pre-civilian control status, content itself with the stigma of a "transistor salesman" or "workaholic living in a rabbit hutch" while Japan dashes ahead as a great economic power. The word, "great economic power," was made up by the Japanese or is a translation of "econommc giant" and is a new Chinese character. The original word "giant" does not necessarily mean a "big person" or "possessor of super powers" and is sometimes associated with words, such as, "boor," "barbarian," "ghost," etc. Therefore, it is probably preferable to translate "economic giant" as "economic ogre" or "money greed." At any rate, economic power is not the only qualification for a major power. In the fall of year before last, when I interviewed former Prime Minister Heath of the U.K., he said economy and defense should be considered as a "set" and the ensuing remarks that he made can be considered as very frank for a foreign statesman. He does not mince words. The question is "whether the Japanese nation is planning to remain the western defense set-up of the United States, Western Europe and Japan." If Japan wants to remain, it "must

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devise methods to eliminate the "economic friction" with the United States and the European Community. If Japan does not want to remain, it "must not depend on joint defense set-up and defend its own country by itself." On hearing this, I was about to question him again but I refrained and replied that the Japanese people are lacking in awareness of and determination for "joint defense set-up," and are dominated by the desire that "they want to stay forever in the 'air pocket' created by the pressures of all and sundry powers." Heath burst out laughing as though in agreement. What I wanted to say was, "you claim that it must not depend on joint defense set-up and defend its own country by itself," but a more appropriate way of putting that is "only if you think things out and become determined that one must defend one's country even if only by oneself, are you ready to share the realization that one must rely on a joint defense set-up." David Binder of the NEW YORK TIMES made similar remarks. He stated, "The majority of the American people think that the Japanese Government and the people, as a whole, should bear more responsibility toward their fate. One segment of that responsibility is defense. What I want to say is that no matter how sensitive they are to risks of militarism or to the tragedies and misfortunes wrought by a military set-up and military adventures in the past, and no matter how much they fear their reoccurrence, I do not think they can fully mature as human beings or as a nation if they only keep saying that they refuse to defend Japan, that they hate to come in contact with anything bearing the name of arms and that they want to be completely neutral to all countries."

Needless to say, Morishima is opposed to the views of both of the above-named persons and myself. Morishima talks about defense and economics but he discusses them separately and does not think of them as a set. Furthermore, he ignores the framework of U.S.-Soviet world strategies and holds the delusion that Japan alone can obtain the special privilege of extra-territoriality. Probably, he fears the military recklessness which ignored the economy before and during the war and is taking an opposite stand to encourage an economy which ignores defense. He is advocating that the industrial set-up be changed and that Japan get away from "heavy industries and knowledge-type enterprises." Since both Seki and Shimizu have adequately refuted this anachronism, I shall not swell on it, but Morishima is saying that Japanese industries "should change to the type that will not greatly benefit the enemy, should they occupy Japan." To do this, Japan must revert not only to the Taisho and Meiji eras but to the Edo period, while the population must be decreased to one-third and the other two-thirds must be put aboard Japanese refugee ships for overseas exile. There is no need, however, to listen to such rash arguments. I want to point out to the readers that the military recklessness which ignored the economy before and during the war, and the run-away economic ogre which ignores defense after the war are two sides of a coin. A favorable interpretation is that this represents the brains and energy of the Japanese while an unfavorable interpretation is that it represents abnormalities in Japanese adjustments to modernization and westernization. The latter is a specially serious problem and I shall comment on it again.

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Intermission. In the Foyer

In the foregoing paragraphs, I have tried to make a concentrated attack on the two key points of Morishima's arguments, the non-resistance doctrine and defeatism. I do not expect, with only the above attack, that the exiled Morishima will hoist a white flag and the Rising Sun flag and make a "fully dignified surrender." Like a cornered rat biting the cat, resistance must be expected even if the two key points are taken. Actually, Morishima has prepared various "hiding places." I shall itemize and expose a number of them. (1) Hitler did not attack Switzerland because of its armament and civilian troop organization, geographical conditions and neutrality, and among them, Seki considers the civilian troop set-up as the most important reason. Saying that is wrong, Morishima opposes and stubbornly claims that Hitler refrained because he wanted to utilize neutral Switzerland for peace negotiations. With impudence, he is advocating at length a similar view, which appears more like the sudden inspiration of a high school student, that Japan become a neutral country to serve as the peace-maker between the United State and the USSR. But an incidental idea is worth only that and it was torn to pieces by the readers' comments in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU. Newspaper reporter Teruji Oishi writes that "Professor Morishima dwells at length on the armed, neutral country Switzerland, but why does he not mention the tragic history of Luxembourg (became an unarmed, neutral country in 1868) nor the bitter history of Liechtenstein (became an armed, neutral country in 1868)?" This is not the Morishima-style rhetoric with bad intentions but rather a "poor inductive method" which tries to draw conclusions from only one or two examples. For example, I have a secretary who is an American, and despite my warning that her father not possess a gun, the father does not listen and buys a pistol to guard his store. One day, a burglar entered the store, and because he drew his pistol, he was shot instead and wounded. Using this silly anecdote Morishima tries to justify unarmed neutrality. With this one example, one cannot establish the logic that if one possesses a pistol, one will be shot and wounded. On the contrary, there are probably countless numbers of cases where the pistol protected the family and fortune.

I am in complete agreement with Morishima's views, however, that Hitler did not invade Switzerland, not because of its armed civilian defense set-up but because he wanted to keep Switzerland as a medium for peace talks. It is true that to serve as the medium for peace negotiations, the country must be a neutral one. But "the reverse is not necessarily true," and just because a country is neutral, it does not mean that it has negotiating capability, regardless of whether it is armed or not. To have the capability and qualifications, the country's neutrality must be recognized historically and geopolitically by the entire world. Therefore, even if Japan is swayed by Morishima's agitation to change its industrial set-up to one that "will not greatly benefit the enemy, should they occupy" and become an insignificant power, it is too late to proclaim neutrality on the grounds of non-armament. The world will laugh and not pay any attention because it would be the same as a child being neutral by nature. How can such a country serve as the mediator between the United States and the USSR? The SALT agreement, which is under negotiations between the United States and the USSR, is not an easy problem which can be mediated by calling in neutral Switzerland. SALT

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is diplomatic negotiation which might be considered as the preliminary skirmish of WW III, but war has not started and we are at peace. Yet, no country has the power to mediate or conciliate. Whether it be Morishima's or someone else's plan, there is no way that Japan can materialize the impossible.

(2) As quoted above, Morishima says, "I do not personally believe that the Soviets will ever attack Japan." As the basis for his belief, he quotes the words of Jiro Kamishima, but to cite only one authority is insufficient documentation. Why does he not use his own head and think carefully? He used Kamishima to substantiate his belief because the latter states that after WW II, wars and armed conflicts were waged in the world for only the following reasons: (a) the concerned countries were founded under strained circumstances (Israel, Cyprus, etc); (b) the concerned countries had contiguous land boundaries (PRC-USSR, Vietnam, India-Pakistan, etc); and (c) the concerned countries were invaded by allied countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc). These source materials themselves are too scanty. Historically, as compared with the several thousands of years which have elapsed, the past 30-odd years are an insignificant segment. Probably, both of them think the nuclear restraint has changed the complexion of wars conducted in the preceding several thousands of years. Perhaps that is why the Korean conflict was omitted from the abovementioned second example. I do not believe at all that nuclear power has a restraining effect. To those who do believe, I want to ask, "then, in that case, military preparedness is after all a guarantee of peace, even though to a limited extent?"

Kamishima and Morishima have forgotten an important development. The USSR has sent in pro-Soviet elements to foreign countries, created a state of confusion and under the name of revolution, had others fight wars for them. They have invaded other countries or made them satellite countries. This is another form of war. Yugoslavia is continuously under this threat and barely managing to hold its own. The same applies to various African countries. In the case of Africa, Cuban troops were thrown in although Cuba and Africa are not adjoining land areas and the abovementioned examples (a) and (b) do not apply. Presently, Vietnam is falling into the Soviet power sphere and Iran is facing the same risk. In both cases, foreign wars are not being waged. Furthermore, I want to point out a case of *ignoratio elenchi* which Kamishima and Morishima are overlooking. They have ignored several thousand years of history and concentrated solely on the 30-odd years after WW II. Abovementioned examples (a), (b) and (c), all point to "wars which had been waged" under such and such or so and so circumstances and listing past events a posteriori. To use the same cases and say that "war will occur? under such and such and so and so circumstances in the future (or "for only the following reasons") is taking a slanted position that is fallacious. Likewise, the reverse position does not hold true that "under such and such a situation war is sure to occur." To what extent we should take into consideration the events of the past 30-odd years is a matter of probability and at the most, it is only 30 percent at this time. Within the next 5 to 10 years, the probability might drop to 10 percent. It is far more realistic to think that a U.S.-USSR war can be waged across the oceans and on the basis of a 30 percent probability, to plan diplomacy and defense measures.

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(3) Morishima praises, as a model of non-resistance policy, the attitude of Kaishu Katsu in surrendering Edo castle in the closing days of Tokugawa shogunate. Morishima says, "When defending one's country, courage is needed to compromise on points that call for compromise and to surrender when the time calls for a surrender," and continues, "By surrendering Edo castle, Kaishu Katsu saved the Tokugawa family." This is clearly a case of ignoratio elenchi, because one's country in this case is Japan in entirety and not just the Tokugawa family. Even if Katsu had resigned himself to the demise of the Tokugawa family, he had the choice of surrendering to the forces of Sattcho [Kagoshima and Yamaguchi] for the good of Japan's future or for the same reason, to fight to the end. In any case, Morishima's arguments are not logical. I do want to point out here that not only Katsu himself but the Tokugawa family which was saved by Katsu lost everything by making a "fully dignified surrender." Although Edo city was not burnt down, "the right to political self-determination" was not obtained. Edo citizens were losers and became outcasts while Edo culture was barely kept alive and continued to decline until its complete termination by the Great Kanto Earthquake. Morishima further states, "If war had been terminated by holding an Imperial conference when the U.S. troops landed on Okinawa, how many Japanese (and Americans) lives would've been saved, how much of cities and fortunes would've escaped burning and how much of traditional cultures would've been kept intact." The people and city of Edo escaped burning because of the speedy termination of war, but wasn't the traditional culture of Edo destroyed? At any rate, the foregoing excerpted section and his earlier remark are flagrantly contradictory: "The Japanese people made a dignified, admirable surrender which the later generations can recall with pride...because the people made such a surrender, Japan was able to make the miraculous recovery." Of the two alternatives, which does Morishima prefer? In any event, unless a rain of incendiary bombs blanketed the cities throughout the country, it would have been impossible to attain the "miraculous recovery" of today. Is Morishima implying that the then Koiso-Yonai Cabinet foresaw that to bring fear to the Japanese populace and militarists, they had to "permit the United States to beat them up thoroughly," that they had been unable to do anything while secretly awaiting the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that we should be grateful for that?

(4) Morishima is not qualified to discuss culture. Yet, he talks about "traditional culture," "cultural exchange" and "brain export," so the discussion gets needlessly confused. He says, "At present, it is not hardware such as tanks or missiles but software such as diplomacy, economic cooperation and cultural exchange that defends the country." He labels Inoki and Seki as defense advocators, but isn't Morishima also one, whether the defense measures be hard or soft? Culture cannot defend a country, however, and culture is not a defense measure. He seems to think lightly of the word software but that is because he thinks software is a substitute for hardware. If he thinks in that vein, the software might eventually wind up as hardware.

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As I mentioned earlier, the pre-war military recklessness was the result of abnormalities in adjustments to foreign culture and civilization during the westernization and modernization processes. In the same sense, the post-war overconfidence in peace and democracy and the beginnings of economic recklessness, created by economic fattening and equality with West European advanced countries, represent abnormalities in adjustments. The symptoms are getting worse. The best evidence is Morishima himself. His term, "fully dignified surrender," is a confusion of morality and politico-economics and is a good example of adjustment abnormality shown by the post-war Japanese software to the hardware called defense, which is the product of modern, Western thinking. To prevent such illusions, cultural exchange is important no matter what it represents. The most urgent task for Morishima is to give his brains, which can be considered as software, some hard training so that he can answer the question, "Is the passenger aircraft which carries an international goodwill mission an 'angel' and the bomber which attacks an enemy base a 'devil'?"

(5) I want to make one last comment during this "intermission," and that is on Morishima's "rear base" which both Seki and Shimizu could not destroy. I realized this after reading their counter-arguments to Morishima. That is the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Regarding it, Morishima states:

"Because Japan cannot defend itself alone, Japan is not safe unless the United States comes to the rescue. If you should question them as to whether they will come to our aid without failure, their only answer is probably, 'I hope so.' Even if there is a security treaty, the situation is the same."

The foregoing lines contradict, in logic, what Morishima himself has written earlier. He has said that because he has faith in human beings, he believes in Americans as well as Soviets. If that is so, he should not be so confident, without Soviet assurance, that the Soviets will grant "the right of political self-determination" as long as Japan surrenders unconditionally and hold such doubts about the security treaty with the allied country of the United States. The USSR is bitter about the strategy of Soviet containment through restoration of U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations. Morishima says that "in this situation, shouldn't Japan try to take an opposite stand by widening the distance, a bit, from the United States, and strengthen the tendency toward neutrality and thereby, strive to lower the tension between the United States and the USSR?" On the other hand, he has said, as quoted above, he feels safe that "in spite of the abovementioned 'defense plan,' I do not personally believe that the Soviets will ever attack Japan."

In effect, Morishima's true intentions are to keep a little distance from the United States but to retain their strong support to minimize the possibility of a Soviet attack. This view is one of reliance on the United States, which is similar to that of Yoshio Nakano of 20 years ago, who supported the position that U.S. forces, stationed in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, were playing a watchdog role to prevent the SDF from taking reckless actions. Why didn't Seki and Shimizu point this out? This is merely my guess, but I think that they were blinded by the

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fiery proposition of unconditional surrender to the Soviets and overlooked the deep-rooted, cunning nature of Morishima, which is to conform to the Establishment. Both Seki and Shimizu believe in America's commitment to Japan. Rather, they are trying to convince themselves that they must so believe, but in their hearts, they have great doubts. Each has made the following comments:

"In order to have the Americans come to our aid immediately in emergency cases, Japan must minimize U.S.-Japan economic frictions and promote mutual understanding by having close cultural exchange between the two countries, and at the same time, Japan must possess self-defense power that is commensurate with its own economic power. Although they are allies, the American people are not so good-natured as to see the blood of their own youths flow to save a country that does not possess the will or power to fight for itself. I believe that the United States is not so merciless as to sacrifice a friendly country that is fully prepared." (Seki's statement.)

"The important point in this situation is the determination of Japan to cooperate with the United States to defend the Free World. Japan's will to defend itself and to assume responsibilities befitting its national strength to defend Asia will also benefit the United States and strengthen the determination of the United States to protect Japan from nuclear attack.

"Rather than worrying about whether or not the United States will come to our aid, we should be more concerned about creating national conditions that will make it imperative for the United States to defend Japan." (Shimizu's statement.)

With regard to the foregoing statements, I have doubts on two points. I question whether the present-day Japan is making sincere efforts "to have Americans come to our aid immediately," especially as to whether Japan "possesses the will to fight for itself" or "had the determination to cooperate with the United States to defend the Free World." "Will" and "determination" are not visible, and it is easy to verbalize but difficult to implement. The important considerations are the apparent measures and the concrete policies. What are the national conditions that will make it imperative for the United States to defend Japan? What worries me is the passive attitude of Japan, as for example in trade, where Japan does not act on its own until the Americans complain. Furthermore, there is a taboo against bringing up the problem. Unless the government and the people discard this self-deception, the arguments on defense issues will not get on the right track.

Part 3. No Assurance whatsoever That the United States Will Help.

Morishima says, "Because I have faith in human beings, I believe in "believe" too carelessly. To be really frank, he is telling a lie. As I mentioned earlier, if you are going to have faith in human beings, you must naturally believe in Japanese, rather, you must place greater faith in Japanese. As far as Japanese are concerned, he says only that he does not believe Japanese have the capability of civilian control. If he says that he does

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not recognize Japanese as human beings, his view is logical, but on the other hand, he is saying that "we must not forget that Nixon and Carter betrayed the confidence of South Vietnam, the ROK and Taiwan," and "I believe, that at least for the next 10 years, American youths will never take up arms to rescue Japan." When he says he "believes," he means "partially believe" and "not believe" means "partially not believe." There is a difference between "partially" and "absolutely." I am not trying to find fault but I do want to caution that trying to raise an issue by using rash, vague or deceptive words will not only bring negative results but invite confusion needlessly. At the same time, I want to question Seki and Shimizu. Seki's words, "self-defense power commensurate with its own economic power," are also ambiguous and though not downright deceptive, there is sophistry even if well-intentioned. The same is true of Inoki who advocates 1 percent of GNP for military expenditures. As compared with the "declining, Grand Old Country" [U.K.] which is still using the same buildings and bridges of 400 years ago, Japan has no natural resources or stockpiles and is tearing up and repaving the same streets the year round. The GNP of such a country should not be exaggerated. As compared with other countries, too much money is spent on food, clothing and shelter and the people might become "workaholics living in a rabbit hutch." The true value of the national income must be readily discounted in its consideration. It is difficult to refute the argument of Shinkichi Eito that a "halt" should be placed because presently, "Japan's national defense outlay totals 9 1/2 billion dollars and seventh in the world." It is true that as Eito says, "Defense power cannot be built by money alone." As Eito continues, "What is important for the SDF is to become strong" and as the "backbone" of the people, it should not "appear on the outside" but it should become an essential element in supporting the independence of the country by being tightly interwoven with the people." But the SDF that I am thinking of, one that has a justified role nationally and socially, that is legally recognized and under official civilian control, cannot be kept from "appearing on the outside." Though "defense power cannot be built by money alone" and "quality rather than quantity" counts in personnel, it is too hasty a conclusion and premature in logic to say that "the present number should be reduced." The reduction of troops is a matter of quantity and not of quality. The "strength" of the SDF is without question a problem of quality, but strength in that sense reverts to the problem of quantity. An SDF that is "tightly interwoven with the people" is truly a matter of quality, and the SDF's existence, aims and role must be urgently considered. That we must consider these problems at this time is unusual, but to try to evade the real issues with abstract talk reveals abnormal attitudes which require even more urgent consideration. It is difficult to refute the argument of Shinkichi Eito that a "halt" should be placed because presently, "Japan's national defense outlay totals 9 1/2 billion dollars and is seventh in the world." It is true that as Eito says, "Defense power cannot be built by money alone." As Eito continues, "What is important for the SDF is to become strong" and as the "backbone" of the people, it should not "appear on the outside" but it should become an essential element in supporting the independence of the country by being tightly interwoven with the people." To do this, quality rather than quantity counts in personnel and the present number should be reduced.

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To be truthful, when I read this, I became disappointed with Eito. There are two contradictions. It is true that the "backbone" cannot be seen from the outside and as a rhetoric or figure of speech, there is nothing contradictory with the words, "tightly interwoven with the people." But the SDF that I am thinking of, one that has a justified role nationally and socially, that is legally recognized and under official civilian control, cannot be kept from "appearing on the outside." Though "defense power cannot be built by money alone" and "quality rather than quantity" counts in personnel, it is too hasty a conclusion and premature in logic to say that "the present number should be reduced." The reduction of troops is a matter of quantity and not of quality. The "strength" of the SDF is without question a problem of quality, but strength in that sense reverts to the problem of quantity. An SDF that is tightly interwoven with the people" is truly a matter of quality, and the SDF's existence, aims and role must be urgently considered. That we must consider these problems at this time is unusual, but to try to evade the real issues with abstract talk reveals abnormal attitudes which require even more urgent consideration.

Likewise, Shimizu's statement, "determination of Japan to cooperate with the United States to defend the Free World," is made on the assumption that there will be the "determination." Also, his statement, "to assume responsibilities befitting its national strength" is an assumption that "if Japan assumes." If predicated on assumptions that conflict with present realities, views such as, "that will also benefit the United States and strengthen the determination of the United States to protect Japan from nuclear attack," are optimistic but meaningless. I have no disagreement with Shimizu's view that "rather than worry about whether or not the United States will come to our aid, we should be more concerned about creating national conditions that will make it imperative for the United States to defend Japan." I believe that it would be more accurate to say, "Rather than worrying about whether or not the United States will come to our aid, we should be more concerned as to whether Japan can create national conditions that will make it imperative for the United States to defend Japan." Not only that, but what worries me more is the fact that we have too many discussions over defense issues that emphasize the necessity but disregard the obstacles that we must face. If that is the case, we cannot complain if Morishima says, "Even the realistic defense arguments are as ephemeral as the fanciful peace talks, and under a thin veneer, there is nothing more than an ideology."

When I toured the United States in 1973, U.S.-Japan relations were at the worst. The Nixon administration was scarred all over by the Watergate incident and betting everything on the conclusion of the Vietnam war. Although this is hindsight, the American Congress relied on President Nixon's capability for the latter and after utilizing him fully, planned to eliminate him by capitalizing on the former crime. For Japan's future, was Watergate or the Vietnam withdrawal the more crucial problem? I believe that for Japan the latter was the more important problem and the former was hardly of concern. But the majority of Japanese newspapers continued to criticize U.S. intervention in Vietnam and denounced the Hanoi and Haiphong bombings which were

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made to enable withdrawal and welcome the end of the war. On the other hand, the Watergate incident was treated like a domestic matter and reported in detail daily although it was an American internal problem which had no direct bearing on Japan's fate. The presses were not the only ones. Even among the government's LDP members, there were public statements such as calling Ngo Dinh Diem's government a "crazy government" (Yasuhiro Nakasone) and "they cannot be called a government or a political administration" (Kiichi Miyazawa). Miyazawa appeared as though he were siding with the "Peace of Vietnam Committee" by making such remarks as, "Americans frequently make such mistakes." According to Miyazawa, the mistake that America frequently makes is to bind themselves by adhering too closely to the concept of political legitimacy and committing the error of protecting undemocratic governments. Those words might have prophesied the fate awaiting Japan someday. I say that not because I think a military coup d'etat is likely to occur, but the present Japanese Government not only cannot handle the problem of civilian control but cannot cope with the confusion stemming from the democratic processes. The legitimacy of the government's power for overall control is in question.

The same Miyazawa later became the foreign minister in the Miki Cabinet. The majority of the readers have probably forgotten what he said when he went to Washington, D.C. but since I had visited the United States in 1973 and had come inkling of the White House stmosphere, I received a great shock. What he said was carried in Japanese newspapers in big headlines. I do not remember the exact words, but when he went to the White House, he said, "The United States is obligated to defend Japan--I want it confirmed." The newspapers treated it with big headlines on the front page because people were beginning to have some fear that the United States, after the Vietnam war, might abandon Asia and eventually Japan. If so, why did the people continue to oppose the Vietnam war, criticize the government's attitude of adherence to American diplomacy and continue to oppose the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty? What shocked me was that, until then, neither the Japanese Government or nor even a Cabinet member had told the people or the SDF, "you have a duty to defend Japan and we ask for your confirmation." The government has still not said so.

I met several tens of Americans and became aware that practically all of them did not have a sense of "obligation to defend Japan." After returning to Japan, I wrote on the situation in articles titled, "Appeal to Japanese and Americans" which were published serially in BUNGEI SHUNJU. The following year, the articles were compiled into one, with supplementary writings, but it was almost totally ignored. I do not feel bitter about it. What I want to say is that it was ignored because the Japanese feelings toward U.S.-Japan solidarity are undermined by tacit reliance on what might be termed as Japan's fate. As I have mentioned earlier, even Morishima, who is claiming that United States, will not come to our aid, is relying on a sense of security brought about by the United States. The "realistic defense theory," which calls for positive actions to seek U.S. aid, has no teeth because of the same feeling of security.

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When I sent to the United States 6 years ago, U.S.-Japan relations, particularly in the strategic, military sphere of the security treaty, was at the lowest ebb. Since then, President Carter's age began and though the cold relations were once thawed, strained events began to occur one after another such as military troops' withdrawal from the ROK, termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan and U.S.-Japan trade war. In spite of these events, the Japanese Government especially the Foreign Ministry, and the great majority of international relations observers believe that the U.S.-Japan security guarantees have taken a turn for the better. That is probably the reason why Japan has expressed a will to become a country worthy of aid but is in a stalemate. I would like you to recall once more the words of Heath and Binder which have been quoted previously. Perhaps it would be rash to have the two persons represent NATO and United States, but both have strong doubts about the will of free society or democratic camp in Japan. If the action is limited to an expression of determination, it is the same as the Japanese Government's conventional measure of "considering with positive attitude" which Heath criticized half jestingly.

As an example that the pendulum of U.S.-Japan relations has swung back recently from the worst period of 6 years ago, some cite results of a Gallup poll conducted of 266 important diplomatic personnel. To the question of whether to dispatch American troops if Western Europe is attacked by the USSR, 92 percent replied in the affirmative, and in a similar situation involving Japan, 81 percent replied in the affirmative, and in a similar situation involving Japan, 81 percent replied positively. This is an increase of 20 to 30 percent within the past several years. To accept the results as they are shows simple faith in the dubious factor of probability and to confuse an idealistic argument of "should do" with the realistic argument of "will probably do" reveals only an optimistic outlook. What is most difficult to understand is the nonchalance of the people in not realizing that the most dubious question was not asked, i.e., what if Western Europe and Japan face dangerous crises simultaneously or if Western Europe calls for help and after so many divisions of American troops have been sent, Japan then faces a dangerous situation? In that case, how many of the 81 percent would continue to say that Japan should be helped? There is no question that the number would decrease to less than 50 percent. Depending on the seriousness of the danger in Western Europe, the percentage would probably ebb to a low of between 10 and 0 percent. To complicate matters, the U.S. presidential elections will be held next year and Senator Edward Kennedy, who has announced that he will run, has 60 percent popularity while incumbent President Carter is not even close. Should Kennedy run, it is almost certain that a President Kennedy will emerge. In a conversation with Kennedy, I asked why Japan is needed by the United States and he replied, "as a market." Frankly, I was dumbfounded, because that is what the Japan Communist Party said 30 years ago. With respect to the defense treaty with Taiwan, he says clearly that it binds the United States only to the extent that "when Taiwan faces an emergency, the United States is obliged to deliberate in Congress as to whether it should assist." When it comes to Japan which is getting a free ride for its security, it is extremely doubtful that the United States will give due consideration.

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Another point which I cannot understand is that Seki and Shimizu talk about the necessity of "minimum military preparedness" and say it is important for the SDF to resist for 2 weeks. In the United States, where civilian control is divided between the president and Congress, to force a decision within 2 weeks on whether or not to fight the USSR is sure to result in a negative reply. Whether it be Western Europe or Japan that it wants to help, the decision to assist will rest on the judgment as to whether that country is worth assisting or not. At the same time and more important is the estimate of the battle situation, i.e., whether effective assistance can be rendered. To bring about this situation, Japan must be able to resist for 2 or 3 months. Many people talk about the strategic importance of Japan to the United States, but that is not simply a fixed estimate of geopolitical position in peacetime, but is a fluid, changeable estimate depending on the battle situation after war starts. This is also a trap into which the probability factor falls an easy prey. The intelligence information that the U.S. Defense Department, for the past 10 and several years, has been prepared to pull back the Asian defense line to the Philippines -Guam-Mariana Islands cannot be dismissed as groundless.

Part 4. Japan Cannot Be Defended With Maximum Military Preparedness Under Present Circumstances.

To resist for 2 or 3 months, or even 2 weeks, is not an easy task under present circumstances. Eito claims that even today, the troop strength is too high. I do not think so. Recently, Seigyo Takasaka wrote that during the Ikeda-Robertson talks in 1953, "Ikeda-Miyazawa took an extreme Finance Ministry standpoint in negotiations with the United States." In short, priority was placed on economics and although the United States demanded that the GSDF strength be placed at 350,000 at that time, the Japanese side decreased the number to 180,000 in the negotiations. Takasaka is not necessarily critical of this stance. The United States agreed and did not again request increased troop strength, not to save Japan but made strategic plans on the premise that Japan would be lightly armed. Takasaka continues that the world's strategic situation has changed today and we must discard the "self-righteous idea that we can decide Japan's security measures according to our plans and efforts" and change its "light armament dogma." I agree with him. But to be frank, even with heavy armament, the basic problem would not be solved.

The reason is simple. Even with huge outlays of 9 1/2 billion dollars, or thrice that, 30 billion dollars, to increase and strengthen troop strength and armament and assemble a force with high morale, the outcome of the early stages of the war depends on fate and fortune. It is not conceivable that there would be no losses in 3 months or even 2 weeks. The "defense-oriented" SDF cannot count on a Pearl Harbor attack or sinking of the Prince-of-Wales. To ask the SDF, which emphasizes defense and self-guard, to hold back the enemy is like Morishima's asking the SDF to come under civilian control in order to prevent its running amok. In both instances, the SDF is being asked to "fight a major bout." In fact, that is asking the SDF to fight like a sumo grand champion but "only a truly powerful force can wage a calm battle where it is forced to retreat to the last defense line and after a moment's pause, can turn the tide by switching to the offensive."

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There is a limit, however, to counter-attack. As long as it is "defense-oriented," it is forbidden to pursue beyond its territorial waters and sky. In light of this, Morishima can be interpreted as pointing out that civilian control is impossible for a lightly armed military and is suggesting a changeover to heavily armed forces. Both Seki and Shimizu misread Morishima's true intentions and opened fire because they mistook the long-awaited ally for an enemy.

Even if Japan pretends to become a "grand champion" with outlays of 30 billion dollars for heavy armament and large forces, once war starts the position of the military "grand champion" can follow the downward path daily. Before the end of the tournament, the military "grand champion" might drop to a much lower rank and in the ensuing tournaments, have difficulty in staging a comeback. In the case of a real sumo tournament, on the final day. The fighting strength of today's SDF is at the peak in peacetime or just prior to the outbreak of war and as time passes, it only weakens. Although "money alone cannot build up defensive power," money can purchase weapons and armament. If naval ships and bombers are lost one after another, money can buy the necessary goods to maintain "minimum defensive power," and get even superior quality replacements. But where are the military crews to be obtained? The only "manpower source" is the reserve Self-Defense personnel. If decrease by aging is calculated, the strength of the forces is automatically restricted. Unlike the past, new weapons are improved constantly and to utilize them, new skills and training are needed. Hurriedly conscripted civilian amateurs are helpless. In the first place, the Japanese civilian government is not authorized to conscript recruits from the populace. In fact, it is restricted from doing so. It has the duty to tax the people and provide education to the children but it does not have the obligation to defend the country. Miyazawa's bluster in Washington, D.C., that "The United States has the duty to defend Japan" might be apt words.

"There is no need to think so deeply. It's a matter for the Japanese people to handle. In case of emergencies, we will not adhere to troublesome laws involving rights and duties and willingly take up arms. Not only the Japanese but Bismarck said that, 'there is no law when facing necessity.'" There are those who preach such optimistic doctrine. But for an adult with brains, there are two pitfalls. First, pre-WW II days are over where the minimum armament was rifles and grenades with the "chrysanthemum emblem." The majority of today's armaments are precise, mechanized ordnances which amateurs cannot handle. It takes 3 years to train an officer who can command a company equipped with such armaments. It is no longer sufficient to wave a sword and order the troops to attack. The second pitfall is the tendency to think that laws exist only to be broken. Morishima considers the SDF a "white elephant" but thinks that it is dangerous to decrease its size suddenly or to abolish it. He thinks of the SDF as "wanted in peacetime when it is not really needed" and when the enemy attacks and is urgently needed, it is a "useless item." As mentioned earlier, however, there are two sides to a coin and this view harbors risks. To think of laws as decorations and that "there is no law when facing necessity: is to deny civilian control itself and provides an excuse for the military to run berserk.

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At any rate, the first pitfall is that hurriedly mustered soldiers, whether as volunteers or through emergency, wartime conscription, are useless and cannot form a "powerful military force." If my memory serves me correctly, the United States alternately used the draft and volunteer systems in WW II, the Korean war and the Vietnam war. The volunteer system is used today but military training is still carried on in colleges. Needless to say, only volunteers are accepted, but volunteers exceed the recruiting quota. American youths seem to have the will and fervor to defend their country. Among them, quite a number also seem willing to defend West Europe. Why is Japan lacking in that spirit? The reason is the Peace Constitution, which is a "house made of cards," and Japan fears that by touching it or even blowing upon it, the house will fall. Not only politicians and bureaucrats of the government and opposition parties but college professors, salarymen, men of letters and journalists, as well, or anyone with the facade of a pseudo-intellectual, do not want to discuss this subject, even in private, for fear of ostracism by their colleagues. It is easier to criticize political bribes. Americans are aware of this spiritual rigidity. Why have the Americans abandoned the concept of "mutuality" in the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and become "lenders" while permitting Japan to get a free ride as "borrowers." I questioned Kennedy persistently on this point and his only answer was, as mentioned earlier, "Japan is necessary as a market." In other words, "defense can be bought with money." As though in agreement, a segment of the Japanese people have thoughts such as the defense outlay should be 1 percent of the GNP or the "white elephant" SDF can be regarded as a form of taxation, or Japan's share of UN support should be increased from 2 percent to 3 or even 5 percent. They do not want to tear down the constitution which is a "house of cards." Buying a free ride in a mutual security arrangement is like getting admitted to college illegally, without studying, or for college women to get promoted to the next grade by offering their bodies. It is bribery and it is prostitution. If Americans are considered as mercenaries, that is trading in human lives.

The problem lies not with Kennedy alone. There are a number of American intellectuals and politicians who give their tacit recognition. I remember the comment made, about 10 years ago, by a high official of the U.S. government. The Peace Constitution, which renounces armaments and is the only kind in the world, is troublesome for the Americans but they are willing to maintain the status quo and permit the Japanese to get a free ride in security matters because: 1) since America gave it to Japan, it is difficult for Americans to complain even if Japan misuses it; 2) if Americans demand constitutional revisions or rearmament, it will become impossible for the LDP Cabinet to stay in power; and 3) if Japan should again become a great military power, the United States might feel threatened by its nationalism and militarism, and more so, the neighboring Southeast Asian countries would have a deep sense of insecurity. The aforementioned are the three main reasons. These are only private views, however, and both governments have never once seriously considered the problem. The subject is considered taboo for agenda of official conferences

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of civilian scholars and intellectuals or it is considered unrefined to take up the subject in debates.

Whenever the premiership changes, the new prime minister visits the United States and holds what is called the summit conference. Claiming that this has laid the basis for stronger partnership ties between the two countries, both leaders wear big smiles and shake hands. This act is nothing more than a formality. A former civilian employee of the U.S. Defense Department, Lawrence E. Kahn, published a magazine called KAIGAI HYORON [OVERSEAS COMMENTARIES] in which he strived to inform Japanese readers of foreign developments. He once majored in Far Eastern history at the university and his wife is a Japanese. Probably for these reasons, in a interview with me on Fuji TV, he aptly described the deception in post-war U.S.-Japan relations.

"The United States and Japan entered the same arena but they have never contested each other in earnest. Since Perry, there is a long history of relations between the two countries but only once have they squared off seriously and that occasion was the Pacific War." He added that he considers it truly strange that practically all the Japanese firmly believe that the United States will not abandon Japan. No American has ever been so frank on a public platform. In any event, both Japan and the United States have respectively utilized, when convenient, the Japanese constitution as a cover to hide under. For Japan, the constitution could be used as an excuse for the security free ride and provided a comfortable position from which to become an "economic great power." While the Soviet military power was inferior, the United States could afford to leave Japan in a comfortable position and could even profit by letting Japan sleep. The situation is not the same. In contrast to the increasing military power of the USSR in the Far East, the United States is yearly withdrawing from Asia. Because of the abovementioned three reasons, however, the United States is not revealing its true intentions. In a selfish light, the United States would find it easier to withdraw if it is giving Japan a free ride. It would be easier to abandon Japan. Isn't President Carter trying to withdraw from the ROK, which is not getting a free ride?

In spite of the foregoing developments, many of those who advocate U.S.-Japan joint naval maneuvers planned in waters off Hawaii. Before the temporary freeze of the U.S. withdrawal from the ROK, joint maneuvers were held by U.S.-ROK land and naval forces. It was a gesture to calm the fears of Koreans over President Carter's military withdrawal plan. It was a gesture to restrain the North Koreans from descending southward. It was also a gesture of the Far Eastern U.S. military forces to check the topmost civilian leader, President Carter. There are probably various other reasons for holding the joint U.S.-Japan naval maneuvers but the strongest motive is probably a restraining gesture against the Soviets. Whatever the reason, one cannot interpret it, without reservation, as evidence of U.S. commitment to Japan. I am not concerned, however, with that aspect of the joint maneuvers. According to our constitution, our SDF is for "defense only" and cannot be sent overseas as an aggressive

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force. How can the Maritime Self-Defense Forces [MSDF] set out for distant Hawaiian waters in American territory and hold joint maneuvers with the U.S. Navy which is not even thinking of "defense only" strategy? The opposition parties and newspapers, which had shown sadistic fervor during the constitutional trial of SDF, are pretending not to notice the joint maneuvers. This can be interpreted as increasing defense awareness against Soviet pressure. But we cannot be happy over this because the maneuvers are clearly a repudiation of civilian control. If the National Defense Council had approved the plans, the government must be tried for the crime of breaking constitutional laws. Some might say that MSDF should concentrate on such tasks as clearing the waters of mines, but that is a poor excuse of a shyster lawyer, like Ashida's [former Prime Minister] interpretation of Article 9, Section 2 of the Peace Constitution.

That trade wars can be solved on the simple economic level is the common belief and trend of the times, but economics and national defense must be considered together as a "set." The classic concept of an independent country has been completely demolished in a world polarized by the U.S.-USSR confrontation. In a large sense, Japan does not have the "right" of political self-determination" although it is under the nuclear umbrella of generous America. The security free ride further weakens Japan's position. Even if a mutual security guarantee, with equal responsibilities, is worked out, the burden is presently too great for Japan. As long as a potential enemy country exists, we cannot eliminate restraints and restrictions from the outside. This is true not only today but in the future and applies also to individuals. What we can do is to build up an independent and autonomous position so that we can voluntarily yield the "right of political self-determination" at the appropriate time and to develop the ability to judge and determine our counterpart. We must be able to stand on common grounds and mutually solve problems of conflicting interests and confer on means and methods of cooperation. Presently, the defense problem is being shelved, without questioning, and trade wars and problems over natural resources and energy are being viewed as mere economic matters, with temporary, stopgap measures used to solve them. In so doing, Japan is following the steps, in reverse, of the Greater East Asia War and will be surrounded again by the ABCD net and chased into a corner. When that happens, Japan will be shoved aside from her comfortable position and forced to take a nasty fall.

In that sense, I cannot fully understand how people who view the U.S.-Japan relations and defense problem as I do, and I'm not even considering Morishima, can approve of measures to bypass the constitution. Do they truly believe in protecting the constitution and view the SDF as constitutional? Or, are they people who do not believe in the constitution but like the Americans, take a solicitous attitude, because they fear that if they cause the downfall of the LDP, a new revolutionary opposition government might emerge and not only create a small rift between the United States and Japan but destroy the security treaty? Are they planning to propose a constitutional revision after the constitution has become meaningless with the passing of time and getting a free ride is only verbiage and not a fact? If that

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is the case, Bismarck's statement that "there is no law before necessity" might not be appropos but it would be a case of "changing the law as the necessity arises." Morishima is saying that now is the time to reduce or abolish the SDF and making remarks to the effect that we must gain time. Shimizu's counter-argument is that why do the Japanese people have to pay such high taxes to support a white elephant?" Can't the same statement be made with respect to biding for time to revise the constitution? It is a fact that the support of the present constitution would not cost a cent and there is no concern about waste of tax money. But I fear that the longer the deception continues, the Japanese people will lose faith in law and politics, become corrupted with conspiracy and hypocrisy and degrade themselves to the level of Morishima's non-resisters. This is also true of those who believe that the SDF is constitutional and who want to safeguard the constitution. The illogical and unrealistic preamble and Article 9 of the constitution plant seeds of distrust among the people like laws and politics which say, "Before necessity, laws may be interpreted freely without any restriction." At any rate, a nation's populace, like an individual, who does not have the conscience to admit deception as deception and who alternately become self-assertive without any qualms and submissive without pride, will be despised, forsaken and eventually thrashed by all the other countries.

Epilogue. I Do Not Trust Human Beings and Furthermore--

I do not trust human beings, and therefore, I do not trust Americans nor Soviets. Of course, I do not trust Japanese. I can trust another person, only as an individual. But I am unaccustomed to thinking of abstract beings, such as humans, in terms of trust or distrust. I might trust a certain American or a certain Soviet but not collectively, the United States of America or the USSR. So says Morishima and inquires as to whether his thinking is normal or abnormal. He should ask that question of London University's professor "D" whom he trusts. In this connection, it might be said that my thoughts are what I learned at some time, in the past, from the literature and history of the U.K.-Europe and the United States. As an individual, the one I distrust most is myself. Next, is my wife, then children and then friends and as the relations become more distant, my trust increases. Simultaneously, my concern decreases as to whether I can trust or cannot trust and instead of regarding my counterpart as a person, I have to think of him only as a functional element within the framework of my work or interests. I would be exhausted if I considered the ticket collector at wickets of railroad stations as individuals and tried to deal with them socially as human beings. I think that they will be eventually replaced by machines as modernization advances. Like U.S.-Japan relations, I tackle the problem squarely only if some unpleasant incident occurs. The reason that I distrust myself the most is because I want to trust myself the most and I want to be a complete person. In my speech and actions, I act as though I have the fullest confidence in myself. "As though" implies that I am pretending to be a complete person. Mori Ogai's work, [ka-no-yo-ni] is often the subject of literary talks but most of

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those who discuss it are mistaken in their approach to the subject. As a literary figure who was most familiar, at the time, with West European thinking, Ogai was aware of and concerned with the conflict between the West European thoughts that individuals are ephemeral and the Japanese habit of viewing things spontaneously. Of course, he was sincere and not being indifferent and skeptical.

If individuals are ephemeral, the nation and populace are also ephemeral, and fictitious. Recently, frivolous discussions have been rampant on differences between Eastern and Western cultures. Discussions lead to boasts about the nature of the Japanese people and the Japanese nation and the Japanese virtue of having a "sense of shame" is forgotten. Explanations as to what type of person one is should be left to others. If we have the time to comment on the special characteristics of the Japanese people or Japanese nation, we are best advised to consider how the world looks at a country or an individual. Generally speaking, Westerners look upon themselves and others as unmanageable and to reasonably restrain the desires of multifarious individuals and to cope with the confusion resulting from individual conflicts, a framework called a nation is needed to govern and to regulate the conflicts between the desires of the governing and governed parties, laws are necessary. In general, the Japanese people hate to see their children sent to wars and be killed so they oppose wars, resist military forces and deny conscription systems. This is a "mother's feeling." A "father" probably feels the same but a "father" presents logical arguments. In order to build up the fiction of a nation, he thinks that it is unavoidable if his child is recruited for war and also looks upon the system as a fiction. But he has feelings, also, and might try to manipulate so that his child only would not be drafted. I think that is also possible. As a "father," an individual wears two masks, one of the "people" and one of the "parent" and plays the two roles. It is the person's character which enables one to become a unified whole while playing the two different roles. It is our self-awareness that "we are not firm" which demands nation and defense, fictions of another dimension, which made us firm. Character, law and nation are all fiction and their destruction must be prevented by arches and buttresses, and means must be devised to maintain them.

At the moment, defense is not a support for the buttress but it is also fictitious and is a fiction which preserves the fiction of nation. Although Morishima says he believes the Soviets will not attack Japan, most of his article was written on the assumption of a Soviet invasion. He has arbitrarily decided that "in discussion of defense issues, the focal point cannot be determined unless an imaginary enemy is designated," but historically speaking, defense is not a matter of choosing another country as a potential enemy. Depending on changes in the international situation, it is possible that all the countries can become potential enemies. Shimizu says that, depending on the Soviet movements, "the United States will immediately protect and occupy Japan" as a preliminary action. Not just the United States, but I cannot trust any country to that extent. There is far greater possibility that the following will happen. With the famous statement, "Is shall return," U.S. forces will temporarily withdraw and at some appropriate time, drop two or three hydrogen bombs on the Japanese islands to prevent the Soviets from using Japan as an arsenal. Like a lone

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voice in the wilderness, Morishima might continue shouting that the Japanese industrial set-up must be changed, but it is already too late. If that happens, that reason alone would be sufficient for the United States to look upon Japan as an unnecessary partner. In the feudal period, there was a saying that "once a man leaves his home, he can expect to find seven enemies." It teaches one to regard all strangers as potential enemies. Thus, there were fictitious thoughts in Confucianism, too.

When Morishima says, "Civilian control is an extremely difficult task for Japanese to carry out," the Japanese he is referring to are the Japanese of the period when adjustments could not be made to the westernization and modernization of the post-Meiji era. He himself is an example. He uses the words "hardware" and "software" with the commonly accepted meanings. But as I wrote in last year's September issue of this magazine, the relation between these two words is a relative one like the relation between purpose and means. For example, the weapons and ammunition used in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars were literally hardware. The troops and the organization set-up used, however, were software. But for a farmer who is drafted and becomes one of the soldiers in a squad which belongs to a regiment, a brigade and a division, the military set-up is a hardware. As compared with the modern military forces, the Western bureaucracy, educational system and parliamentary democracy are software, but unless one is aware that they are fictitious, they can change to hardware, which is even more difficult to manipulate than the controls of bombers or nuclear weapons. That applies not only to defense and military forces. In our surroundings, there are many other things which are more difficult to adjust to, but like Morishima, the majority of the people are unaware of the situation and "have lost the software." Yet, Morishima keeps talking of software.

International relations, and the treaties which regulate them, are perhaps the most fragile fiction. The constitution is a hardware which can be compared to a defective car. In spite of that, we are being forced to implement it. Finally, I wish to question those who believe that the SDF is constitutional. By forcing its application upon the populace, what will happen to the software called the Japanese people? Fiction is a structure. The Japanese constitution is a poorly built structure and that is why I call it "a house of cards." That is only a mirage or delusion. Fiction is not a mirage but a strongly built structure. Efforts to adjust to and maintain fiction will build up character. To put it another way, the character of each individual and the effort to prevent its destruction builds up and strengthens fiction. Demanding conformity to a mirage will cause the heart, which is a software, to lose conscience (good conscience, self-awareness) and character. When that happens, it can no longer be called character and is a destruction of character and deterioration of moral spirit. Even if no other country attacks Japan, irresponsible defense talks will gradually wear away the fiction called the Japanese country and the character of each individual in the populace. Opposition to Morishima's non-resistance doctrine, no matter how strongly made, will in effect assist it and contribute to the brainwashing of the Japanese people.

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ECONOMIC

'AKAHATA' EDITORIAL ON PROPOSED BUDGET CUTS IN WELFARE

OW031415 Tokyo JPS in English 0858 GMT 3 Dec 79 OW

[Text] Tokyo Dec 3 JPS--The Cabinet on November 30 approved the "appraisal of financial conditions for fiscal 1980," (the framework for budget) reported by the finance minister. This is an exceptional event that the Finance Ministry makes an unofficial announcement of the draft budget.

AKAHATA carried an editorial on December 3 entitled "Budget Compilational with Deep Cuts in Welfare." The editorial said: "The bearing of the compilation of the budget for next fiscal year, being advanced by the government and the Finance Ministry in the name of the 'first year for the financial reconstruction,' is chiefly aimed at coercing sacrifices on the people, in an attempt to preserve the measures for the service to big business, and the military spending, and to make drastic cuts in the costs involving the people's living.

"One indication which plainly demonstrates the Government-Finance Ministry position for the compilation of the budget at the sacrifice of the people, is a bare-faced attack on welfare and social securities, including the paid medical costs for the aged (free of charges at present) the paid medical care for the patients (the same), and the abolishment of children's allowances provided in the children's welfare law.

"What must be placed importance than any others on the 'reconstruction of national finance' is that the priority should be given to the following positions: the defense of the people's living, particularly further advance of welfare and social securities.

"Now that the Government-Finance Ministry's bearing for a full swing retreat in welfare has become known, a stronger rise in the national struggle is needed for defending the people's living and the reconstruction of the national finance for the service to the people."

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INDUSTRY SOURCES DISCLOSE UAE TO TRIPLE OIL SHIPMENTS

OW071249 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 6 Dec79 p 5 OW

[Text] The United Arab Emirates will triple its oil supplies to Japan from the present 20,000 barrels to 60,000 barrels a day beginning next month, oil industry sources in Tokyo have disclosed.

The sources said that a notification to this effect came from the UAE in reply to a Japanese request made to Manj' Sa'jd al-Utaybah, UAE minister of petroleum and mineral resources, when he came to Japan last October.

They said 40,000 barrels is less than 1 percent of total Japanese daily oil imports. At a time when oil-producing countries are expected to come up with policies for squeezing their production, however, the increase in supplies from the UAE will still be a considerable relief for Japan, they said.

Currently, 30,000 barrels per day of UAE oil is shared by Maruzen Oil Co and Daikyo Oil Co. The increased supply of 40,000 barrels will be shared 10,000 barrels each by the two companies. The remaining 20,000 barrels are expected to be imported by Nippon Mining Co.

The UAE reportedly has surplus oil production of 100,000 barrels a day available for export as a result of its recent 5 percent reduction in its oil sales to the major Western oil companies.

Negotiations for prices for the increased supplies of oil to Japan are expected to be conducted later this month after the general meeting of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Caracas, Venezuela.

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PRIVATE FIRM TO REPROCESS SPENT N-FUEL BY 1990

OW060018 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 5 Dec 79 p 5 OW

[Text] Japan will have its first privately-run company to reprocess spent fuel from nuclear power plants by the end of 1990, electric power industry sources said Tuesday. For that purpose, a founding members meeting will be held in Tokyo on December 13 and the company will be inaugurated around next February to build a reprocessing plant, the sources said.

The power industry will provide about 70 percent of the new company's \$10 billion paid-in capital, with the rest being shared by the steel industry, nuclear power equipment makers, chemical companies, trading firms and banks.

The sources said the plant will most likely be built somewhere in Kyushu, with Tokunoshima of Kagoshima Prefecture being named as a possible location.

According to the plan, the reprocessing plant with a capacity to reprocess five tons of spent nuclear fuel per day will be completed at a total cost of \$486.7 billion and put into operation at the end of 1990.

Japanese power companies have thus far had their spent nuclear fuel reprocessed by British and French nuclear fuel reprocessing companies because reprocessing by a private company had been prohibited in Japan until recently. Part of their spent nuclear fuels has been reprocessed by the Governmental Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation at Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture. But the law regulating nuclear fuel reprocessing was amended last June to allow a private company to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and help establish Japan's nuclear fuel cycle.

Kiyoshi Goto, vice president of Kyushu Electric Power Co, has been picked tentatively as the new company's president, the sources said.

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BRIEFS

BANKS REPORT BUSINESS SLUMP--The 13 biggest commercial banks in Japan suffered marked business deterioration in the semiannual bookkeeping period ended last September chiefly due to the slump of the national bond market. Their financial reports showed that the combined gross income of the so-called "city" banks totaled 3,860,063 million yen in the April-September period, up 17.4 percent from the previous six-month term. But their combined current account profits decreased 36.7 percent to 172,216 million yen and net profits also fell 15 percent to 111,026 million yen. All the 13 banks saw drops in net profits after tax while 12 of them suffered decreases in current profits as well. They blamed the sharp profit decline on the protracted market price decline of government bond issues and the inevitable evaluation losses resulting from the holding of such bonds. They said such bond portfolio evaluation losses totaled 204,486 million yen, up 110 percent from the preceding half-year period. The reduction in the gap between lending and deposit interest rates due to the two hikes of the Bank of Japan's official discount rate in the period also contributed to the business aggravation, they added. The 36.7 percent decline in current account profits was the biggest in 11 years and the 15 percent fall in net profits was the sharpest in five years. The banks include Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Fuji, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, Sanwa, Tokai, Taiyo Kobe, Mitsui, Kyowa, Daiwa, and Hokkaido Takushokubanks. [Text] [OWO31341 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 2 Dec 79 p 5 OW]

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