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27 December 1979

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 659

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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USE OF AFRICAN ARMIES EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Oct 79 pp 39-43

[Article by Hamza Kaidi]

[Text] Libreville, 18 February 1964: the coup d'etat led by the Gabonese officers aborted; French paratroopers put President Leon Mba back in power.

Conakry, 22 November 1970: a commando force of Guinean exiles, aided by Portuguese mercenaries, landed on the beach of the Guinean capital. They knew little of the terrain. A few resistance fighters from the PAIGC [African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde] and probably some Cuban instructors in Guinea: the Sekou Toure regime was saved.

Shaba, Zaire, 10 March 1977: Katangan refugees from Angola invaded the province and attacked Kolwezi. The Zairian army, including the famed Kamaniola "elite" division, was routed by fewer than 2,000 Katangan "gendarmes." Only the intervention of Moroccan troops saved the Mobutu regime. A year later the Katangans returned and this time took Kolwezi. The intervention of fewer than 500 French Legionnaires again saved the regime.

On 21 September 1979, several hundred French paratroopers landed at the Bangui airport, bringing along with them a chief of state handpicked to be the successor of Bokassa, whose empire fell without putting up a fight.

From Gabon to Ethiopia, and including Zaire, Angola, and Chad, many regimes in Africa have survived only through the intervention of foriegn forces, which sometimes have less than one regiment of paratroopers. Others have fallen or nearly been toppled by small units from abroad. Just several dozen mercenaries operated successfully in the Comoro Islands, but others just barely failed in Benin.

Surviving with Difficulty

So what are the armed forces in these countries doing? What good are they if they can't manage to do their essential job, to defend their national territory, even against smaller forces?

Yet the armed forces of 34 of the 43 independent nations of Sub-Saharan Africa, as of 1 January 1979, had nearly 750,000 men in military service and nearly 210,000 paramilitary forces. These figures added together may appear astronomical. But we must remember the unequal distribution of troops from one country to another. Only two armies have over 100,000 men (Ethiopia with 221,600 if we include its large militia, and Nigeria with 173,000). One country has over 50,000 men (Tanzania: 51,600), and six have between 20,000 and 50,000 (Somalia: 46,500; Angola: 40,000; Mozambique: 24,000; Zaire: 20,500; Ghana: 20,000 Uganda: 21,000--before the fall of Idi Amin). The others have often symbolic armed forces, whose troops range from 1,200 (Central Africa) to 14,300 men (Zambia).

Furthermore, if we deduct from these figures the 394,600 men of the two major military powers (Ethiopia and Nigeria), the 32 other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa would have a total of 355,400 men, or about half of the troops that the country reputed to be the most pacifist and the most neutral in the world, Switzerland, can mobilize. Nearly 625,000 men can be mobilized there in 48 hours. Nor do these 32 African countries carry any more weight against the other champion of pacifism, Sweden, which can mobilize nearly 750,000 men in 72 hours.

While there is in Europe one regular soldier for about 100 inhabitants and for 0.30 to 1 square kilometer of territory to be defended, one soldier for 52 inhabitants and 0.6 km^2 in Cuba, one for 23 inhabitants and 0.1 km^2 in Israel, the two major military powers in Africa, Ethiopia and Nigeria, have approximately one soldier for 406 inhabitants and 5.3 km^2 of territory. At the bottom of the scale, we find the countries with limited resources, such as Niger: one soldier for 2,335 inhabitants and 589.3 km^2. We also find the "big countries," such as Zaire, which has only one regular soldier for 1,351 inhabitants and 722 km^2 of territory.

These considerations by themselves show that the armies of Sub-Saharan Africa are hardly capable of defending their respective countries against external aggression because of their small numbers and the extent of their territories. Such gaps could be compensated by firepower, mobility, discipline, and good training. But that is not the case. Most of the African armies lack all these advantages.

Limited Armed Forces

Firepower is limited by the lack of heavy artillery, of armored units, and by the inadequacy of air support. There again, the equipment is very unequal. While some countries, such as Ethiopia or Angola, may have about 500 pieces of artillery (canons, howitzers, and rocket launchers of all calibers), others have only a few 60 or 81-mm mortars. While the power of a conventional army is measured in our times by the number of planes and tanks, 23 countries in this area have never had the smallest combat tank and 14 have no combat planes. Of the 1,205 tanks belonging to the nine other countries, 1,105 are owned by just three countries: Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola. So Nigeria, the leading African country in population and economic weight, which numerically has the largest regular army, does not have a single heavy tank. The 50 light Scorpion tanks used in its army are just enough for a coup d'etat. In aviation, the situation is about the same. There are 14 countries which do not have a single combat plane. Ethiopia, Zambia, Zaire, Angola, and Mozambique all together have over half (229) of the 384 aircraft listed as belonging to all of the Sub-Saharan countries. And as a comparison, Sweden has 432. Over half of these African planes (221) are subsonic aircraft. While they were still good a few years ago for light tactical support or for anti-guerrilla operations, they can now be used for these purposes only at the cost of heavy losses, since the appearance of backpack surface to air missiles of the Sam 7 type. Then there are 163 supersonic planes. Ethiopia alone has over half of these. Moreover, a good number of these planes are barely operational. The lack of an adequate ground infrastructure, the inadequacy of maintenance services, and the lack of spare parts often keeps them crippled on the ground.

Furthermore, it is not enough to have troops and materiel. The troops have to be brought to the operating sites. But the nature of the terrain (swamps, forests, deserts), the poor road system, and often the lack of transport vehicles are a heavy burden impeding troop mobility. A "detail" of supply is illustrated by the story of a country which was tempted to cross swords with its neighbor after a border incident, but which had to swallow its bellicose resentment: it did not have the fuel it needed to transport its troops.

Significant Gaps

Military training also often leaves something to be desired because of the absence of real firing maneuvers, which a number of countries can not afford because of the cost of ammunition.

Another handicap, and perhaps the most important one: the officer corps. Most of the African national armed forces, derived from the old colonial forces, were created by the former home country which took responsibility for providing officers and equipment.

The process first began for French-speaking Africa in Cameroon. When this country was due to become independent on 1 January 1960, the French authorities decided to provide it in advance with a tool that would enable it to maintain public order and political stability. So they decided to transfer to the authority of Cameroon all of the gendarmerie forces in the territory. The operation took place smoothly, since this body was composed essentially of local people. Other units were to be formed later through French military assistance.

Unequal Equipment

Based on this experience, the French armed forces ministry presented to the government a plan to form national armed forces for the future African states, a plan called the "reasonable plan." This plan called for the pure and simple transfer of renamed units, but also for the training of cadres for the future armed forces to be done as quickly as possible. The plan immediately ran up against almost insurmountable problems. For security reasons, the French command had applied a policy of "mixing" in all its colonial troops. Now it had to reverse the policy, that is, to group forces based on their origin. The operation immediately revealed gaps. Some countries, where France had always conducted intensive recruiting, were now "advantaged over others which were left practically without officers."[1]

Thus, until 1939, there was not a single officer from Ubangui (now the Central African Republic) in the French Army. The

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1. Moshe Ammini Oz: "The Training of African Military Cadres during the Establishment of the National Armed Forces." REVUE FRANCAISE D'ETUDES POLITIQUES AFRICAINES, No 133, February 1977.

first lieutenant, promoted because of World War II, died during the conflict. His successor, in the person of Jean Bedel Bokassa, came only in 1958. Right before independence, outside of the auxiliary guards, there was a single Central African gendarme, Sgt Izamo. He became a captain in 18 months[2].

In February 1960, there were in all a total of 86 African and Malagasy officers[3]. The "reasonable plan" called for 800 officers (620 in the armed forces and 180 in the police forces), and 2,200 non-commissioned officers. The French authorities managed to assemble 415 RTOM [Natives of Overseas Territories] officers in military service, student officers, and French officers made available to the future African national armed forces. They still needed nearly 400 more.

Lack of Infrastructure

But the RTOM officers belonged mostly to the overseas infantry forces, where they had served as natives. The top-level African officers could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Rarely responsible for staff or command functions, confined to posts as advisers on African affairs, they were ill prepared to deal with organizational and administrative matters. Only a few had ever commanded anything above a battalion level.

In addition to these forces needed to set up the ground forces (mainly infantry), the training of air force and naval officers also had to be planned for. In 1960, there was no officer from Sub-Saharan Africa serving in the French Air Force. About 50 officers and at least 450 non-commissioned officers had to be trained to serve as pilots, mechanics, and technicians of various types[4]. In any event, they could only become operational after 5 years. So it was decided that until 1965, the crews serving in the African and Malagasy forces would consist of French personnel.

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2. Captain Bussiere: "The Central African Republic without Boganda." Publication of the Center for Advanced Studies of Modern Africa and Asia, 1963.

3. Major Lucazeau: "The Advancement of African Officers and the Africanization of the Officer Corps." CMIDOM [Military Center for Overseas Information and Documentation], February 1960.

4. Moshe Ammini Oz. Op. Cit.

The training of African national naval forces in the coastal states was to encounter the same problem. The high level of technical skill required of officers necessitated a training program lasting 5 years. The French general staff had estimated the needs of the African navies at 90 officers and 180 non-commissioned officers. But in 1962 there were only two Malagasy officers serving on board the French training ship, the Jeanne d'Arc. One of them, Didier Ratsiraka, was later to become the Malagasy chief of state.

The French schools which were to train officers for the African armies based their program on the "reasonable plan" and the French military authorities drew up an accelerated training program, based on the educational level of the African entrants. Admission standards were softened in favor of certain applicants. Others were accepted just at the request of their government. This second method was used by most of the applicants.

The Lack of an Officer Corps

This program planned for the military cadres from French-speaking Africa is in reality an example of what was done in the countries under Belgian or British influence. Here and there, the lack of specizlized cadres at the time the national armed forces were created was to place a severe handicap on the future of the African military institutions.

Some countries provided top-level officers for their armed forces in rather strange ways. The former president for life of the Central African Republic, Bokassa, provided his country's army, which had about a thousand men (a little more than a battalion), with a marshal--himself. At the time the Congo-Leopoldville became independent, Sergeant Mobutu was promoted to the rank of colonel, chief of staff, and then to general, commander in chief. In Gabon, Sergeant Bongo became a reserve captain and later was made a general at the request of the armed forces. The marshal's rank was "conferred" on Idi Amin Dada by his own tribe. The most rapid rise (but which was also quite ephemeral) was in Zanzibar, where Sergeant Okello became a marshal through a coup d'etat. But he was quickly returned to civilian life and his job as a mason. But it was the soldiers and officers of the public forces which became the ANC [Congolese National Army] who, at the time the Congo-Leopoldville became independent, received the most "original" promotions. At the request of Patrice Lumumba, the officers were "democratically elected" by their troops. However, it is true that the French revolutionary armies had given an example of this in 1789 and again in 1792. Now, 20 years after independence, the national armies are still suffering from the way in which they were formed. The Zairian Air Force gave an example of this on 8 December 1978, when two Mirage aircraft from the Zairian Air Force, registered as M220 and M410, were returning from a mission to Bangui. They were unable to land at the Kinshasa airport because of bad weather. The crew members, Maj Uzapango Kanzeka Mba, Capt M'Pele, and Lt Luanba Nguy Wamguy, found a strange solution to this problem: they parachuted out and abandoned their planes. The planes flew on and crashed in Angola after running out of fuel[5].

Sophisticated Arms and High Costs

It is true that Africa spends the least on national defense. Between 1963 and 1973, military spending of South Africa was larger than that of the rest of the continent combined (not including Egypt). In 1978-1979, 34 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa spent $4 billion on their national defense. This figure may seem fabulous. But all these military budgets together are hardly more than the budget of a small European country without any great military ambitions, such as Belgium (which spent $3.636 billion). This spending is less than a third of the money spent by Saudi Arabia for its defense ($14.180 billion in 1979). It is less than a fifth of French military spending ($21.510 billion) and a sixth of West Germany's ($24 billion). While spending per soldier is estimated at $318,651 in Saudi Arabia, $42,215 in France, and $48,651 in the Federal Republic of Germany, it is only $559 in Somalia, $952 in Liberia, and $10,116 in Nigeria. But Gabon heads this list, spending $40,461 per soldier.

"We are setting up weapon systems which are nothing on a world scale, but which are a crushing burden for our countries," a Latin American statesman once said. This remark is applicable to all the African countries. Although reduced in relation to other regions of the planet, military spending is very burdensome for our countries. The high cost of sophisticated equipment, often old-fashioned when it is first acquired, limits our armament potential.

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5. AFRIQUE DEFENSE, No 10, January 1979.

Combat Aircraft South of the Sahara

Angola	31	12	19
Benin	0	0	0
Botswana	00	0	0
Burundi	0	0	0
Cameroon	4	0	4
Central Africa	0	0	0
Chad	5	0	5
Congo	10	0	10
Djibouti	0	0	0
Ethiopia	100	77	23
Gabon	9	5	4
Ghana	12	0	12
Guinea	13	3	10
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	0	0	0
Kenya	21	12	9
Liberia	0	0	0
Madagascar	8	8	0
Malawi	0	0	0
Mali	8	0	8
Mauritania	13	0	13
Mozambique	30	30	0
Niger	0	0	0
Nigeria	21	3	18
Rwanda	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	0	0	0
Somalia	25(2)	7	18
Tanzania	20	0	20
Togo	11	0	11
Uganda	31 (1)	21	10
Upper Volta	0	0	0
Zaire	31	13	18
Zambia	37	0	37
Total	440	191	249
Destroyed or out of service	-56	-28	-28

(1) Destroyed
(2) Out of service.

Note: Of the 34 countries, 14 do not have a single combat plane.

An armored division costs $400 million. A flight of fighter bombers of the F-5 type, now outmoded, costs $120 million. According to UNESCO, the price of a new prototype bomber is equivalent to the annual salary of 250,000 teachers, 30 faculties of science with 1,000 students each, 75 hospitals. How many African countries can afford such luxuries?

Over and above the price of equipment, another factor limits the capabilities of our armed forces. Relying totally on foreign sources for all weapons supplied, from a simple rifle cartridge to a fighter or transport aircraft, they can not undertake the slightest large-scale operation without the support of a non-African power to replace worn out or destroyed equipment.

The case of Somalia, during the Ogaden conflict, illustrates to perfection this dependence, which may be just as significant in peacetime. For example, a good supersonic intercept aircraft uses, on the average, nearly a third of its cost in spare parts every year. To illustrate this, a western diplomat has said that a modern jet fighter has to change tires after about six landings, and some maintenance procedures can only be done by the aircraft manufacturer or in highly equipped shops that are located only in the developed countries.

So, what good are these armies? Many of the African countries have asked themselves this very question. Some have decided to relegate this budget-devouring institution to the background, feeling that the purchase of war materiel is an anti-social act. How can they spend tens of millions of dollars on the purchase of armored vehicles and planes, when their citizens are suffering from malnutrition, illiteracy, etc.? Isn't it better to spend this money in more productive sectors? Perhaps, but for many of the newer countries, their army is one of the principal symbols of their restored sovereignty. In what state would the celebration of their national day be complete without a military parade?

An Uncertain Sort of Defense

Then, in our countries, the armed forces, whether revolutionary or descended from colonial days, have as their main job to defend the established regime, often against its own citizens. Defense of the territory against an external danger is secondary. And don't they handle the first job better than the second?

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 39. Aside from the Maghreb and the few countries which have really had to fight a war, the African nations are maintaining troops more ready to take power than to defend a territory.

2. p 41. The Zambian army at Lusaka (at left): 14,000 armed men, a symbol.

3. p 41. A Zairian soldier (above): an army which barely has 20,000 men.

4. p 42. Guinean soldiers: to save the Sekou Toure regime.

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ORIGINAL MEDINA SOUMBOUNOU INTERVIEW CREATES STORM OF PROTEST

Reactions to 'Medina Affair'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 978, 3 Oct 79 pp 14, 15

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado]

[Text] A man told a journalist that an African chief of state had provided him with arms to overthrow another African chief of state. The man, a Malian citizen, is named Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou--better known as Soumbounou. He took refuge in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, a year ago. The journalist is a JEUNE AFRIQUE [JA] reporter, Mohamed Selhami. He was introduced to Soumbounou by a (very) high-ranking Libyan official. The chief of state in command of the operation was allegedly none other than Col Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi. And the chief of state to be overthrown was the president of the Republic of Mali, Gen Moussa Traore. JEUNE AFRIQUE published an interview with Mr Medina Soumbounou (No 975) and the "Medina affair" was born.

For the would-be "liberator" of Mali went even further, maintaining that he would spearhead a vast operation aimed at no less than establishing the "United Islamic States of the Sahel" and involving many other countries.

Besides Libya, Medina Soumbounou also listed Iraq, Benin and Togo among his supporters. He even implied that Algeria and Saharan guerrillas were also "in on it." Besides Mali and Libya, he declared that the "United Islamic States of the Sahel" would include Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Chad, whose chief of state, Goukouni Oueddei, had allegedly already agreed to the idea. This last statement brought a flat denial by the Chadian Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT).

Barely 48 hours after publication of the Medina Soumbounou interview in JEUNE AFRIQUE, we received this cable from N'Djamena: "If it is true that the president of the GUNT met with Mr Didi Demba Medina in a Tripoli hotel to discuss African problems at the heart of FROLINAT's (Chadian National Liberation Front) concerns, he never spoke about any establishment of the United Islamic States of the Sahel."

The second reaction was from Mali, which had nothing to deny but which, very officially, provided extensive information on the person of Mr Medina Soumbounou: a crook who had brushes with French, Moroccan, Liberian, Nigerian and Swiss courts. As far as Mali was concerned, the "Medina affair" was obvious. An adventurer of that caliber could not seriously aspire to being the "future master of Bamako."

Other governments reacted in turn. The ambassador from Morocco to Libya, Mr Driss el Fellah, was ordered to ask Tripoli officials for clarification concerning the reality of this proposed establishment of the United Islamic States of the Sahel (JA No 976). In Egypt, Radio Cairo constantly remarked on the interview published by JEUNE AFRIQUE and seized the opportunity to question once again the mental health of Colonel Qadhdhafi, who is reportedly at the root of the plan. As for Libya, it adopted a diplomacy of silence for 2 weeks before deciding to invite a JEUNE AFRIQUE journalist to meet again with Medina Soumbounou, who provided general confirmation and retracted details.

Of all the countries implicated by Medina Soumbounou, only Mali understood (or was willing to understand)--which is all to its credit, since it was the main target--that by uncovering the "Medina affair," JEUNE AFRIQUE had only done its duty. Col Filifing Sissoko, President Moussa Traore's discreet confidant, even congratulated us on our "determination to seek out information and our absolute duty to report it."

We were reproached, if not insulted, by other governments. In Chad's view, "the JEUNE AFRIQUE interview was intended only to spread discord and confusion among Chadian and African brothers." In Niger, the statement was made on 20 September that "Niger authorities have at no time sought to prevent the sale of the JEUNE AFRIQUE issue in question, although it challenges the integrity of the country." Togo "categorically rejects Medina's fantastic allegations," who claimed that he was maintaining relations with Togo. Finally, Benin--broadly implicated by Medina Soumbounou, it is true--said that it had "never endorsed any movement aimed at undermining a broadly established government. Thus it is with great contempt that we consider these wild claims by Mr Medina, that ridiculous puppet in search of notoriety." The Cotonou daily EHUZU went even further and this time accused JA: "Who do they expect to deceive with this press campaign cleverly orchestrated by JEUNE AFRIQUE, whose sympathies and ties of allegiance with high finance and anti-African reactionary circles of every kind are so well known?"

The matter is settled: JEUNE AFRIQUE is being manipulated by imperialism to spread discord among Africans. Yet the stubborn facts are there and unfortunately for those intoxicated with their fantasies while reveling in slogans and watchwords, JEUNE AFRIQUE has only done its job. The fact that in doing so we have lifted the veil surrounding the wildest and most deranged ambitions, as well as certain preposterous schemes, does not eliminate the reality. We did not invent Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou. He exists, he has a past and a Malian passport of his own creation--a passport which also bears the stamp of the border police of the People's Republic of Benin. This is proof, should there be any need for it, that--at least unknown to its leaders--Benin definitely received on its soil that individual possessing a passport not recognized internationally.

Medina Soumbounou is not just anyone in Libya. He has a large following. Showered with poorly invested petrodollars, he enjoys a certain degree of esteem, so much so that it was a very high-ranking Libyan official (we confirmed this) who showed our reporter to his quarters. The fact that Medina Soumbounou has since been accused of paranoia changes nothing. It is even more disturbing.

For this "Medina affair" again shows that Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's intentions are not at all clear. In fact, this is unfortunately not the first time that Qadhdhafi's ambitions have been laid bare. As early as September 1975 (JA No 766), JEUNE AFRIQUE disclosed the military occupation of the Aouzou strip in Chad by Libyan troops. In spite of OAU principles regarding the inviolability of borders inherited from colonization, Qadhdhafi at that time considered it his right to appropriate part of Chadian soil, just as he considered it his right to have designs on other neighboring lands.

Qadhdhafi has often revealed his designs on countries other than his own. Thus, dispatching Libyan troops to Uganda to fly (in vain) to the aid of an Idi Amin was only a hapless attempt to implement a secret agreement: Idi Amin had previously agreed to the principle of installing an Islamic radio station in Kampala to cover all of east Africa in return for the promise of Libyan aid to keep the Ugandan dictatorship afloat.

More serious than these aims is the rash extravagance of the ruler of Tripoli. Authentic revolutionaries and the least respectable adventurers live together in the Libyan capital. The Palestinians (with just reason) as well as the few Malians (no doubt without just reason) serving as courtiers to a Demba Medina Soumbounou are living off Libyan wealth. But between Yasser Arafat and Goukouni Oueddei (formerly aided by Qadhdhafi) on one hand and Idi Amin or Medina Soumbounou on the other, there is a wide gap. Thus we cannot help but note that, as a decidedly extravagant backer, Colonel Qadhdhafi finances anyone to do anything.

Thus when Libya supports Amin Dada and successively aids each of the Chadians who fought (and are still fighting) each other in order to divide them, it is not surprising that an adventurer of the caliber of the Malian Medina Soumbounou has also managed to sponge off Qadhdhafi, in the name of a mythical federation of "United Islamic States of the Sahel." Whether he was the victim of a hoax or whether he really financed the operation, it is a sad affair for Qadhdhafi. And it would have been dishonest of JEUNE AFRIQUE to conceal this information.

Fantastic or not, paranoid or not, the statements and claims of a Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou were accurately reported by JA, or at least almost, since we toned down the slanderous remarks and insults to chiefs of state. It is not the individual whom we considered important, but rather the danger which he represents and the danger represented by his contacts and claims.

It was our duty to inform; we did so and will continue to do so. If we have been accused of informing, we take pride in it. It is now up to the nations involved to assume their responsibilities. Some have done so, but others have not.

Second Medina Interview

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 978, 3 Oct 79 p 17

[Article by Special JEUNE AFRIQUE Correspondent in Tripoli, Hamza Kaidi]

[Text] At the invitation of officials of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, I went to Tripoli to meet with "Doctor" Medina Soumbounou, who apparently wanted to deny the remarks made to my colleague, Mohamed Selhami (see JA No 975).

The reception was very cordial. But very soon the complaints against Mohamed Selhami began to fall like rain. I began by reminding the "doctor" that his interview with my colleague had been recorded and that I had listened to the tape. Apparently that hardly seemed to bother him. Much to the contrary, that material evidence only served to intensify his denials, which would subsequently be challenged by other statements in a tangle of contradictions.

Contradictions

Had he intended to forcefully overthrow the government of General Traore? "Doctor" Medina began by dismissing that idea. His movement prefers a peaceful solution. But General Traore (whose rank Mr Medina disputes) allegedly said recently "that he came to power by force and that he would leave only by force." Medina Soumbounou's movement, the UDRM (Union of Malian Republican Democrats), wants "Moussa to change his policy and to allow Malian exiles to return to their country to practice their occupations according to their abilities." If that were done, "Dr Medina would be the first to side with Bamako." But he does not think that "Moussa can give up the power which he has tasted." He therefore considers himself forced "to take him in hand."

According to its leader, the UDRM has 30,000 active members in Mali. Its militants include "close associates of Moussa, members of the armed forces, the police and the national police force." Then why seek the aid of Libya, Iraq, Benin, etc.? Mr Medina considers this necessary because "the movement needs funds."

Need for Funds

This idea was rejected a little later: the UDRM has tens of thousands of members paying their dues regularly. "This has enabled its Executive Committee to contact the officials of 47 countries." A delegation has allegedly even been dispatched to the Maldives.

The UDRM's chairman also stated that he has not received any Libyan aid to date, although he came to the Jamahiriya 9 months ago for that purpose. The Libyans were simply contacted. "They have promised to study the matter, but they have not yet made a decision to date." Medina has simply been allowed to settle in the Jamahiriya, "since Libya is Mali" and "Doctor" Medina Soumbounou is in his own home in this country, as much as any Libyan.

Iraq? It was simply a matter of sending a delegation there to request its aid. As for Benin, it was never involved. The same is true in the case of Togo. Mr Medina simply stated his admiration for President Eyadema, "that humane leader who pardons those who wish to kill him. He is worthy of his rank of general."

According to the UDRM's leader, he did not bring up the plan for establishing the United States of the Sahel. It was Mohamed Selhami who got Colonel Qadhafi to endorse that idea. However, he said that Mali should support the plan for a federation combining Chad, Libya, Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania. In the case of Niger, "Doctor" Medina does not wish to meddle in its internal affairs because he is not Nigerois.

He is not aware of the existence of a Goukouni in Niger. As for Goukouni himself, "Doctor" Medina is deeply fond of him. "Goukouni is Medina and Medina is Goukouni."

For the time being, the UDRM's only concern is to liberate Mali, which has been impoverished by "Moussa, that puppet of the French and imperialism." When the UDRM comes to power, French, Germans and Americans, etc., will have to leave. Yet France was spared and its cooperation desired in the first interview.

Psychiatry

In the meantime, "Moussa Traore only has to sit tight." "Doctor" Medina has 7,000 men ready to take up arms. He will "blow up all of Bamako if necessary." The Malian chief of state will be judged for his crimes by a public tribunal. It is not for Medina to execute him with his own hands. But he will be hanged in Bamako in public. The UDRM's leader swore to this on his honor.

Without claiming any professional knowledge of mental illnesses, all these contradictions (and many others which I cannot relate) lead me to believe that I was dealing with a megalomaniac whose case deserves psychiatric treatment. Libyan officials think so too. Embarrassed by "this person's" schemes, which have harmed the country at a time when it is preaching modera-tion, officials are thinking of withdrawing the asylum granted him. But in the meantime, contrary to what has been said, "Doctor" Medina is totally free to move about in Tripoli.

11915
CSO: 4400

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

LIBYA TO HAND OVER MALI DISSIDENT--Libya has promised to hand over Malian dissident Medina Soumbounou to the Mali Government. Soumbounou had stated that he was plotting to overturn the Bamako regime with help from Tripoli. The promise to turn the man over was made to a Malian delegation headed by the secretary general to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, who had come to Tripoli to ask for explanations from the Libyan leaders. It was confirmed on 5 October in Bamako by Mr Hamed Ed Houdeiry, Colonel Qadhdhafi's special envoy. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Oct 79 p 36] 6182

CSO: 4400

ANGOLA

U.S. ACCUSED OF ABANDONING CONCILIATORY POLICY

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov 79 p 29

[Article by Augusta Conchiglia: "The Permanent Invasion"]

[Excerpts] The fourth anniversary of Angolan independence, celebrated this year with a measure of austerity, was marked by the ever-increasing threat of South African attacks.

At the commemorative meeting--the first public manifestation since President Neto's death--the new president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, referred to these problems.

"We have multiplied our efforts to ensure the defense and stability of our territory. We have no claims on foreign territory. But we are compelled to maintain and develop a powerful army to defend ourselves against our enemies abroad."

Indeed, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAPLA), have progressed rapidly in the use of modern and sophisticated weapons. Of course, the element of surprise and the vastness of the terrain (nearly 1,000 kilometers of frontier), as well as the blind selection of targets, may momentarily ensure a degree of impunity for the aggressors. However, any probability of occupation of Angolan territory by the enemy is now out of the question.

Moreover, the contingent of internationalist Cuban forces--now held in reserve--would immediately intervene on the side of the Angolan army in case of need. Consequently, Pretoria is attempting to hit the national economy, to terrorize the population by continuous air raids, commando raids and sabotage actions, and is trying to intimidate the Luanda government in hopes that it will give up its support of SWAPO.

It is also a fact--as the Angolan minister of foreign affairs, Paulo Jorge, stressed--that the impunity enjoyed by South Africa, which professes total disdain for the United Nations, is possible through the direct support provided by the Western powers, with which it shares the benefits of economic looting and the subcontinent's strategic positions, notably in Namibia. These are the powers which are encouraging Pretoria to continue its attacks against Angola.

Among these Westerners, Paulo Jorge has singled out the United States, which again distinguished itself by hostile maneuvers against the People's Republic of Angola. Lucio Lara, the secretary of the MPLA Central Committee, had denounced these maneuvers when he had referred to the campaign about the "Soviet brigade in Cuba" on 26 October. Indeed, the Americans seem to have abandoned their velleity of initiating a dialog with Angola, adumbrated last year, opting instead for the resumption of a policy of threats and pressures. The puppet Savimbi's visit to the United States and his meetings with high officials of the White House and the CIA are important indications.

Consequently, the FAPLA's and the ODP's [People's Defense Organization] task remains crucial. The militia, whose political and military training will be reinforced, will act against both foreign enemies and a reactionary petty bourgeoisie's attempts to oppose the workers' and peasants' interests. The armed populace is on guard.

CSO: 4400

ANGOLA

BRIEFS

BELGIAN SUGAR AGREEMENT--The Luanda government signed a 20-year contract with a Belgian company, the SOPEX, aimed at reorganizing sugar production in Angola, which fell to 30,000 tons since the nationalizations began. The primary goal is to boost production to 80,000 tons. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 986, 28 Nov 79 p 35]

CSO: 4400

BENIN

CADRES FAVOR REVOLUTION RATHER THAN MARXISM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2951

[Article: "The Cadres: Yes to Revolution, No to Marxism-Leninism"]

[Text] "People will not say tomorrow that the cadres who are not members of the party have been accomplices to the improvisation now being observed in all fields ...." Such was the conclusion drawn by a "comrade cadre" at the conclusion of a meeting in Cotonou from 5 to 17 October 1979 called by the head of state in order to enable the national cadres responsible in various economic sectors to emerge from their isolation and join the People's Revolution Party of Benin [PRPB] or one of its base organizations.

This meeting will have enabled the cadres to evaluate the regime whose "failure and improvisation" they noted, characteristics which led to the adoption of Marxism-Leninism as an action principle whereas "our people are not inclined to understand it." They felt that a flight forward was involved because the regime was "cut off from the masses and the realities of our country."

They denounced the production drive as it was pursued, the struggle against sorcerers, and against corrupt merchants. They exposed the failures in the application of the "new school" reform.

Thus, after drawing up a critical survey of the regime since 26 October 1972 the cadres proposed that the regime should request all the other social classes of the nation to state how they are implementing the revolution. In all cases, the cadres of the Beninese nation are saying "yes" to the revolution but they reject Marxism-Leninism at the present stage which is for them that of the struggle for national liberation. They refuse to join the party.

In the social realm the cadres requested that the regime of President Mathieu Kerekou should decree a general amnesty in favor of those who went on strike in June 1975 (a general strike which followed the assassination of Capt Michel Aikpe, the then minister of interior--see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 July 1975, p 2059), who had been misled "by some of those who are in positions of command today." This amnesty should be extended to all those who have not tried to undermine the state's internal security.

The cadres decided to set up a liaison committee between themselves and the head of state to assist the latter in the implementation of their recommendations.

When the conclusions of the meeting were voiced, President Mathieu Kerekou listened very carefully to the spokesman for the cadres and then, while congratulating them for their candor, he severely criticized the wait-and-see attitude of the interested parties whom he reproached with staging "an intellectual coup d'etat" by means of this document.

For his fellow-citizens who are familiar with his abrupt reactions, President Kerekou's closing speech, free from any customary verbal abuse, evidenced that he approved the analysis, the evaluations, and proposals of the cadres at least in part.

In a single-party country where the party members are always tempted to tell themselves that what they do is just, a certain amount of courage was necessary to gather 300 or 400 cadres of the nation in order to tell an African head of state in public that he was mistaken.

This step taken by Colonel Kerekou is undoubtedly to his credit, but he would prove his good will even more by carrying out some of the recommendations that were made such as the amnesty measures to enable both sides to place their abilities at the country's service. The motto should henceforth state: "Courtiers are not the best advisers."

2662
CSO: 4400

BURUNDI

EIB LOAN GRANTED TO SMALL, MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2840

[Text] The EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK (EIB) has granted, within the framework of the Lome Convention, a conditional loan of 500,000 European Currency Units [ECU] (1 ECU= 5.85 French francs), that is, about 64,2 million Burundi francs, to aid financing of small and medium-sized industrial and artisanal undertakings in Burundi.

This operation, the first by the EIB in Burundi, has taken the form of an inclusive loan to the NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK. This institution, whose capital is held chiefly by the State, was created in 1966, and plays an important role in development planning in the country. The CAISSE CENTRALE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE (Paris) and the DEUTSCHE ENTWICKLUNGSGESELLSCHAFT have equally underwritten a portion of the capital.

The loan was granted at 2 percent interest on risk capital provided for by the Lome Convention from budgetary resources of the European Community (EC), administered by the EIB in its quality as EC agent.

The loan is intended primarily for financing studies for the preparation of industrial, agri-industrial, mining, and tourist trade investments, and, eventually, for minority share holdings in these same sectors.

9330
CSO: 4400

CAMEROON

OIL, NATURAL GAS STRIKES ON CAMEROON

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2832

[Text] A new communication from the COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE DES PETROLES (CFP), dated 11 October 1979, indicates that, following the discovery, announced last 27 September, during drilling at Sanaga A-1 South, off the shore of Cameroon, a large flow of methane gas, together with condensates, was obtained during tests which have just been carried out. Four tests were made, at depths between 1,200 and 1,500 meters. The flows vary from 170,000 to 420,000 m^3 a day. Further drilling will be necessary to determine more accurately the size of the deposit whose reserves already appear significant.

The Sanaga A-1 South drilling, located about 120 km southwest of Douala, was made under authority of the H-38 permit within the framework of an association including the following companies: MOBIL EXPLORATION EQUATORIAL AFRICA, the operator: 54 percent; TOTAL EXPLOITATION PRODUCTION CAMEROUN, a 100 percent owned affiliate of the CFP: 18 percent; OCELOTS INDUSTRIES LTD: 16 percent; DAMSON OIL CORPORATION: 12 percent.

A MOBIL communication also confirmed the discovery, and also indicated that the drilling was continuing and that technical testing would be carried out as soon as the maximum depth was reached. We have also already mentioned elsewhere that promising indications, which might point towards the presence of oil, have been discovered by the ELF-SEREPECA-PECTEN group, off the shore of Victoria in Rio del Rey, not far from Nigeria (cf. MTM, 12 October, p 2769).

In any event, in both cases, official sources in Yaounde indicate that it will be advisable to continue exploration before being able to determine the size of the deposits.

It will be recalled also that three groups of companies are currently continuing exploration off the shores of Cameroon and in the Wouri river basin around Douala. Since 1978, the ELF-PECTEN-SHELL group has been operating 4 wells off the shore of Victoria. Their present production is estimated at about 2 million tons.

Three years hence, specialists estimate Cameroon's petroleum production could reach 5 million tons whereas national consumption is estimated to be 600,000 tons a year. Petroleum production will make it possible to fully supply the Victoria refinery, work on which began 1 year ago and which in 1981 will have a 1.5 million ton capacity, expandable to 2 million tons.

Construction of the refinery, which is being managed by a semi-public company, SONARA (National Refinery Company), with CFP participation, is underwritten by the PROCON-FRANCE Company, an affiliate of the American group PROCON. Its cost is estimated at 66 billion CFA's.

If Cameroon is presently undergoing a petroleum boom, an AFP correspondent writes, it is doing it most discreetly, at the instigation, it appears, of the Cameroon authorities, who fear the "demobilizing effect" of petroleum fever, at a time when the country is involved in giving new impetus to its agriculture, especially in the cocoa and coffee sectors. Furthermore, petroleum resources are still limited and nothing makes it possible to affirm, in spite of the recently discovered indications, that the country will experience abundance in this domain.

9330
CSO: 4400

CAMEROON

EIB LOAN GRANTED ALUCAM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2832

[Text] The EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK (EIB), the longterm financing institution of the European Community, lent, on 11 October, within the framework of the Lome Convention, 7.6 million European Currency Units [ECU] (one ECU is worth about 5.85 French francs) for the enlargement and modernization of the Edea aluminum plant. This financing has been the object of two different operations: (1) a loan of 5.3 million ECU's granted the CAMEROON ALUMINUM COMPANY (ALUCAM), the exploitation company of the plant and affiliate of the French firm PECHINEY UGINE KUHLMANN; the loan is for 10 years at an interest rate of 6.35 percent, which includes payment of 3 percent interest on the resources of the EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (EDF). (2) a conditional loan of 2.3 ECU's for 20 years at 2 percent interest on risk capital provided for by the Lome Convention and administered by the EIB in its capacity as agent of the European Community; it has been granted the United Republic of Cameroon, in order to cover a portion of its subscription to the increase in ALUCAM capital. The enlargement and modernization of the plant is expected to increase its first melting aluminum production from about 50,000 tons to 80,000 tons a year; this increase will promote a rise in aluminum exports from the Cameroon, as well as supplying various local plants. It is expected that about 150 jobs will be created. The entire cost of the project is estimated to be some 100 million ECU's. The CAISSE CENTRALE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE (CCCE) and the SOCIETE FINANCIERE INTERNATIONALE (SFI) will equally share financing the plant.

9330
CSO: 4400

CAMEROON

CAMEROON COTTON PRODUCTION REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2832

[Text] The Development Committee of the North Cameroon Province, which met recently, examined the progress of cotton production which continues to be the largest industrial crop of this province.

The Fourth 5-Year Plan (1976-1981) assigned ambitious goals based on the 1969 production. It forecasts reaching 120,000 tons on 130,000 hectares in 1980-1981. In 1978-1979, cotton production is estimated at about 60,000 tons with 34,000 hectares of intensive cotton cultivation against only 40,000 tons.

It is hoped, for 1979-1980, that 55,000 hectares will be under intense cultivation in addition to several thousand hectares under traditional cultivation. A harvest in the range of 75,000-80,000 tons may be reasonably anticipated with only very moderately favorable pluviometry.

For 1980-1981, 70,000 hectares of intensive cultivation are planned, giving the possibility of a harvest of around 100,000 tons. The plan's projections could only be reached in 1981 or 1982. For a harvest of 100,000 tons the plant capacity of the province would be satisfactory.

Nonetheless, planting 70,000 hectares with intensive cultivation poses financial problems, representing making available to growers 14,000 tons of complete fertilizer, 3,500 tons of urea, 1,200,000 liters of insecticides, and 150,000 liters of herbicides of a total value of about 3 billion CFA's.

Furthermore, within the framework of the WORLD BANK--Central North Rural Development--project, consideration is being given to confering on SODECOTON (SOCIETE DE DEVELOPPEMENT DU COTON AU CAMEROUN) the task of carrying out an integrated development action comprising several panels [volets]: agricultural development, retimbering, rural runways--and social programs: health and education.

9330
CSO: 4400

CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT--Italy and Cape Verde will sign a cooperation agreement next January. This was announced in Praia following the visit of an Italian delegation headed by Ambassador Rossi Arnaud. During this visit, the delegation studied with the Cape Verdean Ministry of Transportation the possibility of cooperation in the field of civil aviation. Cape Verde requested this cooperation, which should encompass the fields of professional training, organization, administration and equipment. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3330]

CSO: 4400

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

GATHERING OF NATION'S VITAL FORCES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2833

[Text] Mr David Dacko's government called a meeting in Bangui on 15 October, called a "gathering of the nation's vital forces." It was the first meeting of the various political parties and groups since the imperial regime was overthrown on 20 September.

Attending the meeting, in addition to President Dacko, were such political leaders as Mr Ange Patasse of the MPLC, and Mr Idi Lala, of the FPO [Ubangi People's Patriotic Front].

Speaking in Bangui at the opening session of the meeting, the president said that "security in the CAR could be assured only by a national army, well organized and well trained. We do not yet have this army and therefore the Public Safety government approves keeping the French troops(....) With Bokassa extradited and his killers disarmed, in other words, when the danger to Central Africa's people is past, the French army will leave."

Mr Dacko also dwelt on the need for a cleanup in the institutions of the state, stressing the fact that "the situation we have inherited is worse than catastrophic in every domain."

When Mr Patasse took the podium, he excoriated "the arbitrary power that has taken over in the CRA," particularly "the illegal confiscation of radio transmitters by the gang of fascist reactionaries in power." The MPLC leader called for "negotiations with France for an immediate withdrawal" of its troops and their replacement with OAU forces." He did, however, advocate cooperation with France, "made dynamic and atrengthened on an egalitarian foundation." He then called for presidential and legislative elections within 6 months.

Mr Idi Lala also called for the "immediate withdrawal of French troops," and for elections within 6 months, to be organized by a Public Safety government. The FPO, he said, demands the arrest and banishment of "all of Bokassa's former collaborators."

The labor unions and the youth and student movement also took part in the meeting, which broke up into committees for work on 15 and 17 October.

The situation in Bangui is still tense, with strikes complicating matters. Mr Alphonse Koyamba, first deputy prime minister in charge of the economy, flew to Paris on 15 October for "technical" talks about Franco-Central African cooperation.

6182
CSO: 4400

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

ASECNA REJOINED--The government of the Central African Republic decided on 12 October to rejoin the Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA), from which it had withdrawn in 1974. Following that decision, Bangui airport had been without civil air traffic on 13 and 14 October. The traffic shutdown came as the result of a quarrel between the new government and some categories of airport staff, centering on Mr Jean Mete Yapende, director of ACESNA (Central Africa's air safety agency). The agency had been created by the imperial government at the time of the decision to pull out of ASECNA. Mr Yapende told reporters that he had been given assurances by the authorities that discussions would be undertaken as to the future of employees of the old ASECNA. [Text] Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2833] 6182

CSO: 4400

CHAD

GOVERNMENT AIRLIFTS OPINION LEADERS TO UNITY TALKS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 October 79 pp 2833-2834

[Text] An air shuttle service was provided between Ndjamena and Dougia, a town some 80 kilometers north of the capital at Ndjamena, to serve the conference on national unity there.

Attending the meeting on 11 October, in addition to the president of the National Union transition government, Mr Goukouni Weddeye and his vice president, LtCol Kamougue, were Messers Hissene Habre (of the armed forces of the North), Brahim Youssouf (of the People's Armed Forces), Ngangebe Kosnaye (of the Chadian Armed Forces), Moussa Medela (of the Western Armed Forces), Dr Fatcho Ballam (of the National Democratic Union), and Dr Abba Siddick (of the original FROLINAT).

Mr Ahmet Acyl, ailing chief of the Revolutionary Democratic Council, sent Mr Adoum Manani as his representative.

The leaders of four other factions were absent: Messers Mahamat Abba Seid, of the People's Liberation Front (FPL), Abdoulaye Adoum Dana, of the "Volcan" Army, Aboubakar Abdel Rahmane, of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Chad (MPLT), and Hadjaro Senoussi, of basic FROLINAT.

The Dougia meeting had raised tremendous hopes among Chad's population groups. Nevertheless, it does not appear to have been much of a success. In fact, the scheduled conversations had barely got under way when the conference was postponed, without any date's being set for another meeting.

The French ambassador, Mr Marcel Beaux, made a quick trip to Dougia, where he spoke for the first time with LtCol Kamougue.

His visit was part of the new envoy's round of getting-acquainted visits with Chadian government people, following the presentation of his credentials to President Goukouni Weddeye.

According to the Chad Press service (ATP), demilitarization of the capital city of Ndjamena is now well under way. The forces which have withdrawn from the capital have moved into the following localities:

Dougia and Massaguet for Mr Goukouni Weddeye's FROLINAT People's Armed Forces;

Massenya, Bokoro, Dourbali, and Koundoul for the Armed Forces of the North;

Chongole, Liwa, Bagassola, Choukahadjia, Maom and Moussouro for the Western Armed Forces; and

Sahr for the Chadian Armed Forces, a detachment of which was stationed in mid-October at Mandelia, 50 kilometers south of Ndjamena.

A decree by President Goukouni Weddeye of the transitional National Union government reported on 10 October by ATP, abrogates all orders and decisions regarding appointments to positions of responsibility by the previous government of Mr Lol Mahmat Choua. From now on, only the president of the transition government and of the interim committee may make such appointments.

6182
CSO: 4400

CHAD

BRIEFS

SCHOOL TERM BEGINS -- Classes for school children in Chad are set to begin on 15 October, "despite the particularly difficult situation the country is going through right now," said the president of the transitional National Union government, Mr Goukouni Queddei. Classes are to resume in phased order, beginning with the elementary schools. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2823] 6182

CSO: 4400

GABON

ALLEGED CORRUPTION BEHIND BONGO FINANCIAL DEALS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov 79 p 26

[Article by Fode Amadou: "Omar's Pearls"]

[Text] Gabonese dissidents had been able to read confidential documents which had been carefully stored away in the presidential archives of the Omar Bongo republic. Today, these same dissidents are disclosing some of the pearls in these files.

One learns about the role played by certain French personalities in the signing of economic and financial agreements benefiting Gabon, a role they had played "after the payment of significant commissions." One learns that these same personalities, as well as others (whose names are mentioned in the files) had helped Omar Bongo, always after the payment of commissions, to acquire several properties (notably in France, Switzerland and the United States) through "loans" or even through donations of French organisms with interests in Gabon. An example: Bongo purchased a large property in Beverly Hills, California, for $2.2 million thanks to a City Bank of New York loan, which had been granted him because it carried the guarantee of "certain French banking circles." Another example: Bongo reportedly purchased in France a second property worth 20 million francs and a third in Switzerland, whose price was not disclosed. Gabonese dissidents (and they are not alone) are saying that "one wonders with what 'salary' was Bongo able to purchase these 'small' country properties." One learns that Gabon is directly financing a number of periodicals printed in Paris or elsewhere and sold in Africa. One of these, published in Paris, reportedly received "several tens of billions of CFA francs" through intermediaries, often French, who reportedly also earned commissions. Some others, directly or indirectly, reportedly also earned important sums for publishing voluminous information on, for instance, 'Gabon's prosperity under Bongo's leadership."

One learns that "foreign personalities" (French, Swiss, German and others) have secretly invested capital in private or semi-governmental Gabonese companies. In three of these so-called "Gabonese" companies, foreign capital reportedly amounts to 65 percent.

In sum, there is a Bongo scandal never reported so far in the international press. When this press will decide to do so, Gabonese opposition circles are saying, we shall provide names and details that could arouse as much indignation as the Bokassa affair.

For the moment, it would be interesting to find out whether Jean-Francois Ntoutoume, Gabonese minister of information, who has just stated that freedom of the press (domestic or foreign) reigns in his country, will allow the Gabonese to read what we have just written. One thing is certain: it is that AFRIQUE-ASIE, already banned in Gabon for years, will not be permitted to circulate in the country very soon. Of course, we are not surprised: too often, supported by irrefutable evidence, we have denounced Bongo's neocolonialist policies, his complicity with the mercenaries who attacked Benin, with Hassan II, with the Angolan puppets of the UNITA and FLEC, with the conspirators who are attempting to overthrow the popular Sao Tome government. Too often, again, we have written that his is a corrupt regime. Thus, the Gabonese must resign themselves to reading only the newspapers financed by their master....

CSO: 4400

HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES IN SEKOU TOURE'S GUINEA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 980, 17 Oct 79 pp 24-27

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado]

[Text] Of 4,000 political prisoners held, 300 have been freed. What happened to the others? Sekou Toure says: "All those sentenced to death are dead. Our prisons are empty."

"If, 20 years from now, independent Guinea is to look like Haiti, it would have been better for Guinea not to be independent."

That statement is attributed to Mr Seydou Diallo, Guinea's ambassador to Cuba in 1959. He said it 20 years ago. Seydou Diallo fled to Mali 10 years ago, escaping arrest by the skin of his teeth on charges of "conspiring" against Guinean President Ahmed Sekou Toure. Guinea has come quite close to what Haiti was in the days of Dr Francois Duvalier, the sinister Papa Doc, the Haiti of the Tontons-Macoutes, hired and paid to arrest people for no known reason, and to kill often without reason. As a sign of the times, Haiti--willed by his father to Jean-Claude Duvalier, who has in turn become president for life--entertained President Sekou Toure as his guest from 13 to 16 September. A month earlier (from 5 of 7 August), Sekou Toure was in the United States, where he was warmly received by the man who passes for a crusader for human rights, Jimmy Carter.

Just prior to his trip to the United States, the supreme ruler of the Guinean revolution had taken the precaution of getting rid of a thorn in his side by freeing, a few months after Valery Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Guinea, the archbishop of Conakry, Mgr Raymond-Marie Chidimbo, who had been languishing a prison (for conspiracy, of course) for several years. Handled under U.S. pressure through Liberian head of state William Tolbert, that particular operation was designed to soothe American public opinion. The man Washington was preparing to welcome was no longer a bloody tyrant. President Sekou Toure did even better than that. Now that Mgr Chidimbo has been freed, Guinea's jails are practically empty.

A Pris-based opposition movement known as the Coordinating Committee for the Defense of Democratic Freedoms in Guinea (CDLG) recently announced that right now there are 9,570 people being held prisoner in the infamous Guinean concentration camps. The CDLG report--from the same outfit that last year prematurely announced that Mgr Chidimbo had been executed--is wrong again. Another opposition organization, the Regrouped Guineans Abroad (RGE), comes close to the truth when it charges in a communique released in Paris on 3 September: "Since the events of 22 November 1970, the number of persons arrested and imprisoned for political reasons is estimated at somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000. The number of dead (by execution or for all other reasons) is somewhere between 3,000 and 3,500. About 250 prisoners have been released--; about 100 prisoners are still being held..."

The truth is unfortunately more blood-chilling. According to other informants who roughly agree, of the 4,000 people arrested since January 1971, only 280 have been released and less than a score are still rotting in jail. In all, 300 survivors. The rest? Dead or vanished. This means that more than 3,800 prisoners have undergone the final solution, and been swept away.

Lightened now by the weight of those prisoners, Sekou Toure could cross the threshold of the White House with his head held high, to shake the waiting hand of the virtuous Jimmy Carter. The curtain had fallen on the concentration camps, a new leaf had been turned over. Sekou Toure was cleansed and whitewashed. Long live democracy.

Why this quashed indictment, not to say good conduct star, for the man who used to be known as the one who showed Idi Amin, Bokassa, and Macias Nguema how it should be done?

The fact is that Sekou Toure cannot be compared with the former dictator of Uganda, Central Africa, and Equatorial Guinea. Mere improvisers, they did their killing without finesse. The first of them delighted in having his alleged opponents executed in front of everybody. The second specialized in picking victims who saw too clearly: children. And the third staged massacres in public places, sports arenas, by preference.

There was nothing so crude in Sekou Toure's way. He set up a well oiled, smooth-running machine for repression. Invariably, things started with a plot. Sometimes it was true, as in November 1970, when some of his opponents felt it was not beneath them to call in Portuguese mercenaries to invade Guinea. Or it might be false, as in 1976, when the former secretary general of the OAU, Diallo Telli, then Guinea's minister of justice, was arrested (and then executed) on trumped-up charges of a conspiracy against Sekou Toure. In both instances, the repression machine worked perfectly.

The first phase: rounding up conspirators (or alleged conspirators) chosen for their public conspicuousness so that their arrests would make a huge sensation. That is what happened to some mercenaries who had tried to land in Conakry on 22 November 1970. The same thing happened to Diallo Telli, whose "plot" was announced amid great sensationalism (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, Nos 814, 815, and 826).

Second phase: the confessions. All political prisoners in Guinea have gone through this phase. How was it done? Simple indeed: physical torture (the most brutal involving the use of electric shocks) or psychological torture (threats against the prisoner's family). The most effective of all kinds of torture, though, is what prisoners in Camp Boiro or Camp Kinda call "the diet." Again, the method is simplicity itself: nothing to eat, nothing to drink. That is how Diallo Telli died (J.A. No 931). "As a rule," one who escaped from Camp Boiro told us, "they don't last more than a week. I watched a cellmate crack after 4 days. Another hung on for 8 days. After that, they'll confess to anything at all. I mean anything they're ordered to confess."

These confessions provide the starting point for another round of arrests. So, after the mercenaries' attempt to land on 22 September 1970, President Sekou Toure could arrest those he called "the fifth-column soldiers": peasants who had never heard of mercenaries, intellectuals who belonged to the PDG, who suddenly became "lackeys of imperialism, mercenaries or intellectuals...tainted, dishonored."

Once arrested, the fate of the accused is sealed. Innocent or guilty, they are shipped off to the concentration camps: to Boiro, the most notorious, quasi-permanent headquarters for the general staff of the revolutionary Inquisition, traditionally headed by Ismael Toure; or to Kinda, an enormous detention center where political prisoners are often handed over to the mercies of common criminals; or to Kankan, the place no prisoner has ever left alive.

There are other camps, scattered all over Guinea. Everywhere there are secret cellblocks, built to hold 400 people apiece, "half of whom die of starvation or asphyxiation," according to testimony from escapees. Which are the most unbearable places? The metal cells. Cages of sheet iron: walls of sheet iron, roofs of sheet iron, in which the heat kills as well as does hunger. A hell, where there is nothing to do but to die. These are usually reserved for Africans, with Europeans--even those who are "mercenaries"--having a right to "easier" places.

All these macabre details are all too familiar. We knew all about them long before the atrocities of Idi Amin, Bokassa, or Macias Nguema were committed or heard of. Idi Amin, though, ran away. Bokassa has gone to earth in exile. Macias Nguema was shot. In the name of human rights and of the rights of peoples.

Sekou Toure, though, stayed where he was. For 21 years, now. Because he was smarter than his political doubles, he put together a repression machine that was more precise, more discreet, more efficient. When Amnesty International exposes the secrets of his death camps, Sekou Toure never lets himself be put on the defensive: he attacks: "Amnesty International," he says, "is a vicious mob." When the French Socialist Party--even though it is headed by a man like Francois Mitterand who used to be his friends--voices concern over the fate of his prisoners, Sekou Toure moves straight to the offensive: "The Socialist Party," says he, "is the party of French filth." Equally offensive, and effective, is his charm when he turns it on for the French establishment: Edgar Faure has the highest praise for Sekou Toure's humanitarianism; Valery Giscard d'Estaing is struck with admiration for the real leadership qualities of the tribune who, 21 years ago, kicked De Gaulle's France out of Guinea with a single speech.

Adored by some, loathed by others, Sekou Toure is certainly no ordinary man. Personally fascinating, he has always been keen enough to make shameless use of his skill at the about-face. Now that he has emptied his prisons, nobody can accuse him of being a common jailer. Political ideology has never governed his acts. His alliances with socialist countries, like those with the capitalist powers, have all seen stormy times: one after the other, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Federal Germany have tried, according to him, to bring him down.

In the last analysis, Sekou Toure has never belonged to any camp but his own. One of his former friends and advisers, who escaped from Camp Boiro, wrote: "The political and moral image of Sekou Toure always comes before anything else. He has never permitted anyone to contradict him, instantly equating contradiction with sabotage. Sekou is an intelligent man, though. Nobody can ever accuse him of perversion or corruption. As to his ideology, he has never had one. He has only one aim: there will never be a 'former' President Sekou Toure."

This inability to make an ideological choice is not a defeat. It is, in fact, the initial decision. In September 1959, Sekou was already proclaiming: "There are those who say of us, 'They are in the socialist camp;' others say, 'They are in the Western camp.' But we, we want to make ourselves over. Even if a devil were to come down from the sky, bringing Africa's freedom with him, we would deal with him." If that devil exists, maybe he has already landed in Sekou Toure's Guinea. He has not, however, brought freedom with him. Except for those who are dead.

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CSO: 4400

GUINEA

BRIEFS

TRADE UNION DELEGATION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA--A delegation of the National Confederation of Guinean Workers (CNTG), led by CNTG general secretary Kandas Conde, visited Czechoslovakia from 11 to 15 September at the invitation of the Central Council of Czechoslovak Trade Unions (ROH). The delegation was received by Mr Tomas Travnicek, deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak National Front, and held talks with representatives of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), whose headquarters are in Prague. A cooperative agreement between the CNTG and ROH was signed by the leaders of the two trade union organizations, Mr Kandas Conde and Karel Hoffmann. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2635] 11915

IDA AGRICULTURAL LOAN--Two IDA [International Development Association] loans amounting to $23.4 million will be used by the Republic of Guinea to help finance a second road project ($13 million) and a project for developing rice growing ($10.4 million). With regard to the road project, some 1,500 km of roads will be repaired and 4,600 km maintained. The project for developing rice growing will help to strengthen local structures: manpower and technical capacity, in order to develop rice growing. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2635] 11915

BID CEMENT LOAN--The Islamic Development Bank (BID) granted Guinea on 26 November a total of $6 million for the purchase of cement. An agreement was signed in Djiddah by BID President Ahmad Mohamad Ali and Abou Bakr Sidki, assistant director general of the Guinean state company IMPORTEX. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3331]

DETENTION CAMPS VISITED--A French lawyer was able to visit the Boiro detention camp. On a mission for the International Human Rights Federation, attorney Yves Jouffa went to Guinea in November. He was received by President Sekou Toure, who granted him permission to visit the well-known prison and hold a meeting with Guinean engineer Bah Mahmoud, arrested in August together with 10 other opponents of the regime who had returned, as he had done, following the appeal for "national reconciliation" made by the chief of state. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 986, 28 Nov 79 p 35]

CSO: 4400

GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

FRENCH PRESIDENT'S VISIT--French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing will go to Guinea-Bissau on an official visit at the beginning of 1980. This was reported by the Portuguese news agency ANOP, which cited "reliable" sources in the capital of the former Portuguese colony. According to ANOP, the French president would include a visit to Bissau in a tour of various African countries. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3330]

CSO: 4400

IVORY COAST

REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE IN 1978

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 pp 2809-2813

[Text] When one examines the statistics of foreign trade of the Ivory Coast for 1978 one notes a sudden decline in the values of the exports, while imports continued their progression at an almost linear rate. The development since 1975 is shown by the following figures (in billions of CFA francs);

Year	Exports	Imports	Balance
1975	254.5	241.4	+13.1
1976	392.5	311.6	+80.9
1977	529.2	429.5	+99.7
1978	524.4	522.5	+ 1.9

The balances was just barely achieved.



Key:
1. Billions of CFA francs
2. Exports (tonnage)
3. Exports (value)
4. Imports (value)
5. Imports (tonnage)
6. Development of the foreign trade of the Ivory Coast
7. in value
8. in tonnage

Furthermore, if one speaks of tonnages--although this point of view, quite theoretically has no formal value--one notes the following development:

	Exports		Imports	
	Tonnage (1,000 tons)	Index (1975=100)	Tonnage (1,000 tons)	Exports (1975=100)
1975	3789.5	100	3126.8	100
1976	4558.2	120.2	3486.4	111.5
1977	4481.6	118.3	4259.6	136.2
1978	4041.1	106.7	4627.4	148

One sees that while exports had increased by 20.2 percent in 1976 compared with 1975, they are no more than 106.7 in 1978 compared with 1975. And this occurred while imports over the same period rose to 111.5 in 1976 (1975=100), then to 136.2 in 1977, reaching 148 in 1978, or 1 and 1/2 times the volume of 1975. And suddenly the tonnages imported greatly exceed those imported. [as published; must mean exported]

Finally, if one takes account of the average value of the ton exported and imported, one obtains the following trend:

	Value of the ton exported		Value of the ton imported	
	CFA francs	Index	CFA francs	Index
1975	67,180	100	72,200	100
1976	86,100	128.2	89,380	115.8
1977	118,100	175.8	100,850	130.6
1978	129,770	193.2	112,910	146.2

This means that in comparison with 1975, export prices have an index of 193, while import prices have an index of only 146.

Therefore, despite this trend in prices and rates favorable to the Ivory Coast, the situation of the exchanges is deteriorating. Is it a trend or temporary business conditions. The answer to that question is of vital importance. One concrete example will enable one to judge.

Actually, let us consider certain important items of export and import and engage in the following speculation:

In the hypothesis of stability of rates and average prices between 1977 and 1978 and by applying these same values and rates to the tonnages achieved in 1978, what would have been the effect on the balance of trade?

Let us look at the theoretical results:

1) On exports.-- Coffee: the tonnages achieved would have obtained yields of 196.7 billion CFA francs (against the 131.4 billion actually obtained); cotton: the figure would have been 20.3 billion instead of 16.5; loss of profit for these two items: 69.1 billion CFA.

2) On imports.--For all items taken together: fish and crustaceans; milk and milk products; lime, cement; cottons and cotton goods; iron, cast iron and steels; aluminum; tools, hardware; industrial machinery; electrical apparatus and navigational materials, the expense would have been 199.2 billion CFA instead of 242.7 billion. The excess of expenditures due to the increase in prices = 43.5 billion CFA.

One sees that only for the items examined, the loss of profit + excess of expenditures = 69.1+43.5=112.6 billion CFA. The surplus of maneuver would have been comfortable.

Unfortunately industrial prices rose unceasingly and the world prices of nonvalorized or transformed agricultural products are at least fluctuating or fragile.

But the Ivory Coast must still mainly count on exports deriving from its great agricultural or agricultural food production, yield from which in 1978 amounted to: coffee, 130.9 billion CFA, cocoa, 200.6 billion CFA; wood, 71.3 billion CFA; fats and oils, 14 billion CFA; fresh fruits (avocados, bananas), 9.9 billion CFA; fruit juices and preserves, 9.8 billion CFA; canned fish, 4.9 billion CFA; or a total of 441 billion CFA francs, or 84 percent of exports.

The favorable trend in cocoa and the effort in agro-food constitute positive elements, the latter still unfortunately representing only a small fraction of exports.

The problems of Robusta coffee have little chance of diminishing, due to the prices having become almost uniform, which has led buyers, especially in France, to turn increasingly to the more aromatic varieties, such as the sweet Arabica types of Central America. The only way out over the intermediate term will perhaps be found in exploitation of the Arabustas.

With regard to wood, one will see below that after the record exports in 1977, the trend is downward, and the average prices per ton are dropping rapidly. Furthermore, the proportion of exports attributable to the wood industry is still too small in comparison with exports of timber.

Finally one notes, with regard to cotton and cotton goods, that if the Ivory Coast exports more than 8 billion CFA of cotton goods, it imports almost 10 billion.

On the import side the equipment effort continues, but it requires growing parallel purchases of raw materials for industry, plants, spare parts, tools, etc. The rise in the prices of consumer products (meat, fish, milk, flour preserves, sugar textiles...) is very noticeable. Finally one must note the increase of almost 29 percent (in value) in one year of certain products related to the rise in the living standard, such as perfumes, pharmaceuticals, books, underwear, etc., which represent more than 6 percent of imports (see below).

Some questions

In the present state of development of the Ivory Coast economy and the world context, one has the right to ask some questions, especially in the short term, for even if the effort is great:

--world industrial prices will probably continue to rise;

--the prices of the main agricultural products are rising, true, but demand is becoming increasingly urgent, which implies a sustained but long search in the direction of quality-price relationship;

--the big programs under way will need still more time really to produce economies or receipts;

--total Ivorian manufactured products still represents only a very small part of exports;

--the operation and maintenance of equipment will require more and more care.

But one element in the valuation of trade could, in our opinion, shed useful light on decisions to be taken in this sphere. It consists of this: if one excepts the suppliers of petroleum products, it is very instructive to throw into relief the value per ton imported or exported by trading partner.

Average value per ton by partner in 1978
(thousands of CFA francs)

Imported			Exported		
1.	Switzerland	1390	1.	USA	492
2.	Austria	1111	2.	Netherlands	351
3.	Great Britain	812	3.	Niger	330
4.	Japan	728	4.	Japan	259
5.	Federal Republic of Germany	538	5.	USSR	255
6.	Netherlands	281	6.	South Africa	195
7.	U.S.	245	7.	Poland	188
8.	Italy	230	8.	Senegal	142
9.	France	158	9.	France	136
10.	Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union	153	10.	Great Britain	134
11.	Canada	121	11.	Federal Republic of Germany	99
12.	People's China	98	12.	Algeria	90
13.	Senegal	79	13.	Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union	89
14.	Taiwan	75	14.	Mali	82
15.	Spain	43	15.	Upper Volta	71
16.	Nigeria	26	16.	Spain	50
17.	Iraq	25	17.	Italy	44
18.	Venezuela	25	18.	Greece	31

While the statistics are content to "quantify" trade, such a value makes it possible to a certain extent to "qualify" them overall as to the terms of trade: the degree of elaboration and sophistication of the products, quality, reliability and toughness of materials, reputation of the partner, etc. Judging thus the mutual interests of the partners one may then using as a departure point, push the analysis further and define and orient future trade strategies.

The table of average value per ton by partner confirms that:

--France is located in the middle as partner, supplying 158,000 CFA francs for purchases of 136,000 CFA francs.

--The British supply expensive products (812,000 CFA francs), and are content to buy products of average interest, while the United States buys products clearly more expensive (492,000) on the average than what it supplies to the Ivory Coast (245,000).

--The German Federal Republic sells rather expensive products (538,000 CFA francs), but buys at a low price (99,000).

--As might have been expected, Switzerland sells the most elaborated products, but it is not among the 18 main clients.

--Likewise Austria, Canada, China and Taiwan are practically speaking suppliers only, the last two selling products of small value.

One will note, finally, that this table restores the crude petroleum suppliers to their proper importance, since they occupy, and by a considerable distance, the three last places in imports.

I m p o r t s

Suppliers

Ninety percent of Ivorian imports are concentrated on 18 suppliers. In addition, among the 10 percent remaining, one should note a certain number of countries the importance of which is due only to specific items or to state markets which do not reflect actual business relations. Thus:

Iran, Oman, Trinidad, Curacao.....	6.5 billion CFA (petroleum)
USSR, Poland......................	3.6 billion CFA (fresh fish)
Algeria...........................	3.2 billion CFA (wines)
Argentina, Brazil, Ireland........	3.2 billion CFA (meats)
Cameroon..........................	1.9 billion CFA (aluminum)
Pakistan, Mexico..................	1.6 billion CFA (rice)

represent a total of 20 billion CFA, or 3.8 percent of imports.

--The main supplies from France. --Iron, cast iron, and steels (28.9) --Machines (27.6)--Automobiles (26). Electrical apparatus (20.2).--Pharmaceutical products (9.4).--Plastic materials (5.8). Milk products (5.7).--Cements and clinkers (5.4). --Cereals (5). -- Published articles (4.5).--Aluminum materiel (4.1).-- Paper, cardboard (4).--For a total of 146.6 billion CFA (71.4 percent of the total).

The products

Food products and beverages. -- Out of the total imports of 522.5 billion CFA for 4,627,000 tons in 1978 (against 429.6 billion for 4,260,000 tons in 1977), these products represented 12.4 percent by value of the imports (1977: 13.3 percent), with 64.6 billion for 645,000 tons (against 57.1 billion and 629,000 tons in 1977), the rise amounting to 13 percent by value.

Of the above figures, beverages were 7.2 billion (1977: 6.9) a slight advance despite a decline in the quantities imported (5 percent less).

Meats represented 5.4 billion (coefficient 127 in comparison with 1977: 4.3 billion) for 15,224 tons.

Fresh fish and shellfish: 8.4 billion (coefficient 120/1977=7 billion).

Milk and milk products: 11.9 billion (of which milk was 9.7) against 9.7 billion in 1977 (of which milk was 8). The coefficient of increase in value is 123 despite a heavy drop in tonnages: 46,000 tons against 62,000 tons in 1977 (coefficient 74).

Cereals: Imports remained stable at 278,000 tons (14.9 billion against 14.4 billion in 1977). These figures and the imports of wheat declined in tonnage and value: 5 billion (1977: 5.5), while those of rice rose, reaching 9.4 billion (1977: 8.6).

A strong increase in imports of flour and semolina which rose from 25,000 (1977) to 46,000 tons (coefficient 184) for values of 2 (1977) and 3.3 billion (1978) respectively.

- Food preserves and preparations. - These items remained stable in quantity (17,000 tons), rising in value from 4.3 billion (1977) to 4.7 billion (+10 percent).

- Sugar. - Imports of sugar (saccharose) are at a coefficient of 179 in tonnage (125 in value), with more than 30,000 tons in 1978 (1977: 17,000 tons) for a value of 2 billion (1977: 1.6 billion).

- Textiles. - The cotton item (55) represents 10.2 billion (1977: 9.9), a figure of which cloths account for 9.7 billion (1977: 8.81 coefficient of increase: 110). The imports of synthetic and natural fibers (items 56 and 57) declined slightly: 2.8 billion.

- Petroleum products. - Imports of petroleum products remained stable at 49.8 billion. One will note, nevertheless a decline in crude (38.6 billion against 41.6 in 1977), compensated by a corresponding rise in refined products, oil, and miscellaneous.

- Materials for industry (84). - These materials represented 54,000 tons (1977: 47,000) with a value of 77.1 billion (1977: 62.4), or a coefficient of value increase of 123.

The 18 principal suppliers of the Ivory Coast in 1978

	(19) Rang	(20) Pays	(21) Tonnages (1 000 tonnes)	(22) Valeurs (milliards CFA)	(23) % du total	(24) Principales fournitures	(25) % du total	(26) Rang
(1)	1	France	1 297,8	205,2	39,3	(Voir plus loin) (27)	39,4	1
(2)	2	Japon	52,3	38	7,3	Véhicules (16,8) Bateaux (12,5) Radio-TV. (28)	5,2	4
(3)	3	RFA	70,1	37,7	7,2	Machines (12) Véhicules (6). Produits chimiques. Fer, fonte, acier. (29)	7,4	3
(4)	4	USA	111,7	27,4	5,2	Machines (8,1) Riz (3,9). Véhicules (3,8) Appareils électriques Papier, carton. (30)	7,6	2
(5)	5	Italie	96,1	22,1	4,2	Machines (4,2). Chaussures (2,1) Fer, fonte, aciers Véhicules Pétrole. Appareils électriques. Purée de tomate. (31)	3,3	7
(6)	6	Pays-Bas	72,4	20,3	3,9	Lait (5,2) Cotonnades (2,8). Machines (1,8). Véhicules Radio-TV. (32)	4,2	5
(7)	7	UEBL	114,3	17,5	3,3	Machines (6,3) Fer, fonte, aciers (2,7). Radio-TV (1,9). (33)	2	10
(8)	8	Espagne	395,9	16,9	3,2	Cargos (8) Ciment et clinkers (2,9). Fer, fonte, aciers Verrerie Matériel aluminium Pneumatiques Conserves de sardines. (34)	2,1	9
(9)	9	Nigeria	538,9	13,9	2,7	Pétrole. (35)	3,7	6
(10)	10	Roy-Uni	15,3	12,4	2,4	Machines (3,2). Véhicules (2,7) Cigarettes. Fer, fonte, acier Peintures et vernis Boissons (36)	3	8
(11)	11	Venezuela	463,5	11,7	2,2	Pétrole (37)		
(12)	12	Irak	355,5	9	1,7	Pétrole. (38)		
(13)	13	Suisse	5,3	7,4	1,4	Machines (2,1). Produits chimiques (insecticides 0,5) Peintures et vernis. Fer, fonte, acier Optique (39)		
(14)	14	Sénégal	91,4	7,2	1,4	Poissons frais (1,9) Farine de blé (1,4). Sel. Cotonnades (40)		
(15)	15	Taiwan	8,7	6,6	1,3	Cotonnades et tissus (3,9). Articles de voyage Machines à coudre Ventilateurs Radio Chaussures Métiers à tisser. (41)		
(16)	16	Autriche	5,4	6,0	1,1	Matières plastiques (2,1) Tubes, tuyaux et canalisations (plastiques et métal). (42)		
(17)	17	Chine	58,9	5,8	1,1	Riz (2,4) Cotonnades (1,1). (43)		
(18)	18	Canada	43,6	5,3	1	Rails et tubes métal (1,7). Super et gas oil (1,2). Pompes Convoyeurs Véhicules auto (44)		
		Total	3 502	470,4	90			

Key:
(1) France
(2) Japan
(3) Fed. Rep. of Germany
(4) U.S.
(5) Italy
(6) Netherlands
(7) Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union
(8) Spain
(9) Nigeria
(10) United Kingdom
(11) Venezuela
(12) Iraq
(13) Switzerland
(14) Senegal
(15) Taiwan
(16) Austria
(17) China
(18) Canada
(19) Rank
(20) Country
(21) Tonnage (1,000 tons)
(22) Value (billions CFA)
(23) Percentage of the total
(24) Main supplies
(25) Percentage of the total
(26) Rank
(27) (See below)
(28) Vehicles (16.8), Boats (12.5), Radio-television
(29) Machinery (12), Vehicles (6), Chemical products, iron, cast iron, steel
(30) Machinery (8.1), Rice (3.9), Vehicles (3.8), Electrical Apparatus, Paper, Cardboard
(31) Machinery (4.2), Shoes (2.1), Iron, Cast Iron, Steel, Vehicles, Petroleum, Electrical Apparatus, Tomato Puree.
(32) Milk (5.2), Cotton foods (2.8), Machinery (1.8), Vehicles Radio-television.
(33) Machinery (6.3), Iron, Cast Iron, Steels (2.7), Radio-television (1.9)
(34) Cargo ships (8), Cement and Clinkers (2.9), Iron, Cast Iron, Steels, Glassware, Aluminum Materiel, Tires, Canned Sardines.

(35) Petroleum
(36) Machinery (3.2), Vehicles (2.7), Cigarettes, Iron, Cast Iron, Steel, Paints and Varnish, Beverages.
(37) Petroleum
(38) Petroleum
(39) Machinery (2.1). Chemical Products (insecticides: 0.5), Paints and Varnish, Iron, Cast Iron, Steel, Optical Goods.
(40) Fresh fish (1.9), Wheat Flour (1.4), Salt, Cotton Goods.
(41) Cotton goods and cloths (3.9), Travel articles, Sewing machines, Fans, Radios, Shoes, Looms
(42) Plastics (2.1), Pipe, tubes, and drains (plastic and metal).
(43) Rice (3.4). Cotton goods (1.1)
(44) Metal rails and tubes (1.7), High-test gasoline and kerosene (1.2), Pumps, Conveyors, Automobiles.

- Electrical materials (85). - Strong rise: 36.8 billion against 26.3 in 1977, or a coefficient of increase of 139.8.

- Iron, cast iron, steel. - Also a strong increase in this category (73), which rose from 33.5 (1977) to 46.6 billion, or a coefficient of 139, for a tonnage of 247,000 tons (1977: 192,000 tons), the quantity coefficient being 129.

The prices for the three last items rose quite considerably: 7.5 percent (84), 17 percent (85), and 8 percent (73) respectively.

- Transportation materials. - Imports of transportation materials are shown thus: (T = tons, V = billions of CFA):

	Imports 1977		Imports 1978	
	T	V	T	V
Railway (86)	2,361	5.5	1,385	2.5
Automobile (87)	60,751	60.8	61,052	60.5
Aircraft (88)	88	1.5	74	1.7
Navigational (89)	21,407	3.5	30,811	23.2
Total	84,607	71.3	93,322	87.9
Coefficient of increase	100	100	110	123

For these four items the prices rose by an average of 11.6 percent. One will note the stability of item 87 (automobile vehicles, tractors, etc.). In the category of "navigational materials, it must be remembered that for 1978 the purchase of cargo ships represented 20.6 billion out of 23.2.

- Chemical products and fertilizers. - Imports developed as follows (T = tons; V = millions of CFA francs):

	Imports 1977		Imports 1978	
	T	V	T	V
Chemical products (28-29-38)	59,444	11.3	65,451	16.2
Fertilizers (31)	55,667	1.7	83,970	2.8
Total	115,111	13	149,511	19
Coefficient of increase	100	100	130	146

Price increase: 12 percent.

- Rubber and tires (40). - They represented 6.3 billion CFA (1977: 8.1).

- Plastics (39). - 11.8 billion (1977: 9.3)

- Aluminum and aluminum products. - 7.9 billion (1977: 5.4).

- The elements of the living standards. - We have kept for this item the categories 24, 30, 33, 34, 37, 42, 49, 58, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, and 67 of the Brussels Nomenclature, which include products as diverse as tobacco, pharmaceutical products, perfumes, Morocco leather, shoes, hats, table linen, etc., which reflect well enough in our opinion the development of modern societies.

This group rose from 25.6 billion CFA in 1977 to 33 billion in 1978 for quantities of 24,000 tons (1977) and 29,000 tons (1978), respectively. The increase was 29 percent in value, and 20 percent in quantity. The proportion of these products to total imports rose from 5.96 percent in 1977 to 6.32 percent in 1978.

E x p o r t s

The Products

The proportion of coffee and cocoa rose again, increasing from 62.8 percent in 1977 to 63.2 percent in 1979. And this proportion would have been larger still without the drop in coffee prices, a drop which nevertheless made possible a revival of demand, after a disturbing drop.

All conditions being equal, moreover, the drop in coffee production can only be confirmed, since after having reached the figure of 300,000 tons of green coffee exported in 1976, it fell back to 233,000 tons in 1977, and then 230,000 tons in 1978, the corresponding incomes just exceeding those of 1976 (131 billion CFA, against 124 in 1976).

On the other hand the rise in cocoa is spectacular: it rises by 96,000 tons, yielding 66 billion more. It now holds first place by far, and without it, a deficit in the balance of trade would have occurred starting in 1978.

Exports of wood in the form of timber shrank by 500,000 tons, causing a loss in receipts of 15 billion CFA. It should be noted here that those appeared in the customs statistics a certain number of new species of trees amounting to 234,000 tons with a value of 4.3 billion CFA, which corresponds to a value per ton of 18,360 CFA against a value of 27,460 for the old species. But, while the effort expended on the new species has yielded acceptable income, all things considered, the fact remains that on the whole it has resulted in a drop in the average value per ton, which thus fell from 26,680 CFA francs in 1977 to 26,400 CFA francs in 1978.

One example among others: in 1977 exports of tiama had represented 92,400 tons with a value of 3,232 million CFA, or a price per ton of 34,980 CFA francs. In 1978 there appeared the kondroti, or false tiama, and the two species combined resulted in exports of: tiama: 62,020 tons with a value of 2,133 million (34,390 per ton); kondroti: 18,340 tons with a value of 498 million (27,154 per ton); total 80,360 tons with a value of 2,631 million or an average value of 32,740 CFA francs per ton.

Therefore not only does the exploitation of the forest supply lower tonnages, but the average quality is shrinking, and consequently demand and prices as well. And finally to sum it up, its profitability is declining, which makes it less attractive.

All this could be a good thing overall if the loss occurred to the benefit of the rest of item 44 (millwork), but this is not the case, since the overall loss is 15.6 billion, which means that the hopes placed in recent times on the wood industries are slow to be realized. This fact appears still more clearly when one confirms that the exports of item 94 (furniture), which moreover includes products made of all materials, remains weak, rising only from 0.059 to 0.12 billion.

Main Exports of the Ivory Coast

(1) (T : 1 000 t; V : milliards CFA)

	1977 T	1977 V	1977 % total	1978 T	1978 V	1978 % total	Indice 78 (1977 ; 100)
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
(2) Cacao	189	134,2	25 3	284,7	200,6	39,2	149
dont : fèves	158.5	98 8		244	160 9		
masse	12,7	14.1		25.4	24 5		
beurre	11.2	15.3		14,3	14.3		
(3) Café vert	233,1	198,6	37.5	229,8	130,9	25	66
(4) Bois	2 850,7	85,9	16,4	2 300,6	71,3	13.6	82
dont grumes	2 533.2	67 6		2 003	52 9		
(5) Produits pétroliers	504,2	20,1	3.8	494,7	19,4	3.7	96
(6) Coton	23,6	14,4	2,7	33,2	16,5	3,1	115
dont : masse	14,9	5.1		25 5	8,1		
tissus	8,7	9.3		7,7	8 4		
(7) Huiles	77,9	10,3	1.9	95,5	13,4	2,6	130
dont : palme	77,4	10.3		75,1	10.5		
palmiste	8	8		13.9	1,9		
coprah	0.2	–		6,5	1		
(8) Conserves et jus de fruits	63,8	8,3	1,6	69,9	9,8	1.9	118
dont : jus d'ananas	11,7	0,7		8	0.6		
(9) Bananes et ananas frais	165,6	6	1,1	232,1	8,2	1.6	137
dont : bananes	106,1	3,3		142,5	4,1		
ananas	59,5	2,7		89,6	4,1		
(10) Thon	19,1	5,1	1	20,3	5,5	1	108
dont : frais	7,6	0.4		10,6	0.6		
conserve	11,5	4,7		9,7	4.9		
(11) Caoutchouc	16.8	3,1	0.6	17,5	3.6	0,7	116
(12) Palmistes	16,5	1,3	0,2	4	0.4	0,1	31

Key:

(1) (T=1000 tons;
V = billion CFA)

(2) Cocoa
Including: beans
bulk
butter

(3) Green coffee

(4) Wood
Including: timber

(5) Petroleum products

(6) Cotton
Including: bulk
cloth

(7) Oils
Including: palm
palmetto
copra

(8) Fruit preserves and juices
Including: pineapple juice

(9) Bananas and fresh pineapple
Including: bananas
pineapple

(10) Tuna Fish
Including: fresh
canned

(11) Rubber

(12) Palmettos.

Exports of item 55 (cotton) increased by 2.1 billion, but this increase comes from bulk cotton (8.1 against 5.1 billion) while exports of cloth dropped from 9.3 to 8.4 billion.

On the other hand a promising item is oils (+3.1 billion), this increase being due to the oils of palmetto and copra entering the lists.

Bananas and fresh pineapple are rising strongly in tonnage (+66,000 tons) and are securing a gain in value of 2.2 billion.*

Tuna (fresh and canned) is progressing modestly, as well as rubber.

* This rise should expand over the short term for bananas, for Africa will be impelled to push exports of bananas to compensate for the destruction of the Antilles banana plantations.

Client countries

While some variations may be noted in the order of importance of client countries, the concentration remained the same in 1977 and 1978. In both cases they reached: 80 percent of the total to 9 countries, 90 percent of the total to 17 countries, and 95 percent of the total to 25 countries.

Particularly noteworthy is the appearance of the USSR in the vanguard, where it occupies 6th place (instead of 14th as in 1977) with very large purchases of cocoa. One may also note that Algeria advanced from 29th to 14th place, Nigeria from 30th to 20th place, the Federal Republic of Germany from 31st to 23d place, Portugal declined from 17th to 22d place, and Yugoslavia from 16th to 30th place.

Comparison of Exports from Ivory Coast in 1977 and 1978 by Client Countries, Values and Variations

(32) Position	(33) Pays clients	1978 (34) Mds CFA	1978 % total	1977 Mds CFA	1977 % total	Variations 78-77 % total	(35) Valeur	(32) Position	(36) Position en 1977
1	France	172.5	23.4	135.9	25.7	- 2.3	- 13.4	0	1
2	Pays-Bas	98.1	18.7	75	15.1	+ 3.6	+ 19.1	0	2
3	USA	76.3	14.5	62.1	11.7	+ 2.8	+ 14.2	0	3
4	Italie	29.8	5.7	45.2	8.5	- 2.8	- 15.4	0	4
5	RFA	25.5	4.9	28.4	5.4	- 0.5	- 2.9	+ 1	6
6	URSS	19.7	3.7	5.9	1.1	+ 2.6	+ 13.8	+ 8	14
7	Royaume-Uni	19.8	3.7	19.6	3.7	0	0	0	7
8	Espagne	16.9	3.2	30.4	5.7	- 2.5	- 13.5	- 3	5
9	Mali	10.8	2.1	12.5	2.3	0.2	- 1.7	0	9
10	Japon	10.3	2	14.8	2.8	0.8	- 4.5	2	8
			(81.9)		(82)				
11	Haute Volta	9.9	2	11	2.1	- 0.1	- 1.1	- 1	10
12	UEBL	7.4	1.4	7	1.3	+ 0.1	+ 0.4	- 1	11
13	Sénégal	7.1	1.4	6.4	1.2	- 0.2	+ 0.7	0	13
14	Algérie	6.8	1.3	1.4	0.3	+ 1	+ 5.4	+ 15	19
15	Pologne	5.4	1	4.3	0.8	+ 0.2	+ 1.1	+ 4	19
16	Grèce	4.9	0.9	6.4	1.2	- 0.3	- 1.5	- 4	12
17	Afrique du Sud	4.6	0.9	5.6	1.1	- 0.2	- 1.2	- 2	15
18	Niger	4.5	0.9	4.2	0.8	+ 0.1	+ 0.3	+ 2	20
			(91.7)		(90.8)				
19	Maroc	3.8	0.7	4.6	0.9	- 0.2	- 0.8	- 1	18
20	Nigeria	3.2	0.6	1.4	0.3	- 0.3	+ 1.8	+ 10	30
21	Israël	2.6	0.5	2.6	0.5	0	0	0	21
22	Portugal	2.2	0.4	5	0.9	- 0.4	- 2.8	- 5	17
23	RDA	2	0.4	1.4	0.3	- 0.1	- 0.6	+ 8	31
24	Tchécoslovaquie	1.9	0.3	1.8	0.3	0	+ 0.3	+ 3	27
25	Ghana	1.8	0.3	1.6	0.3	0	+ 0.2	+ 1	26
26	Cameroun	1.2	0.2	2	0.4	- 0.2	- 0.5	- 4	22
27	Liberia	1.2	0.2	1.7	0.3	- 0.1	- 0.5	- 2	25
28	Danemark	1.2	0.2	1.8	0.3	- 0.1	- 0.6	- 4	24
29	Benin	1	0.2	1.5	0.3	- 0.1	- 0.5	- 1	28
30	Yougoslavie	0.7	0.1	5.2	1	- 0.9	- 4.5	- 14	16
31	Gabon	0.5	0.1	1.9	0.4	- 0.3	- 1.4	- 8	23
			(95.9)		(97)				
	TOTAL EXPORTÉ	524.4	100	525.2	100				

Key:
(1) France
(2) Netherlands
(3) U.S.
(4) Italy
(5) Federal Republic of Germany
(6) USSR
(7) United Kingdom
(8) Spain
(9) Mali
(10) Japan
(11) Upper Volta
(12) Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union
(13) Senegal
(14) Algeria
(15) Poland
(16) Greece
(17) South Africa
(18) Niger
(19) Morocco
(20) Nigeria
(21) Israel
(22) Portugal
(23) GDR
(24) Czechoslovakia
(25) Chana
(26) Cameroon
(27) Liberia
(28) Denmark

(29) Benin
(30) Yugoslavia
(31) Gabon
(32) Position
(33) Client countries
(34) Billions CFA
(35) Value
(36) Position in 1977
(37) Total exported

The 10 Main Clients of the Ivory Coast and their purchases in 1978

(T = 1000 tons; V = billions CFA)

	Country	T	V	Main products exported (V)
1.	France	899	122.5	Coffee (41.6). Cocoa (33.8). Wood (13.3). Canned fruit (4.2) Cotton and cotton cloth (4). Bananas (3). Pineapple (2.4). Chocolate (2.3). Oils (1.8) Rubber (1.4)
2.	Netherlands	280	98.1	Cocoa (72.5). Wood (1.6)
3.	U.S.	155	76.3	Cocoa (48.9). Coffee (24)
4.	Italy	672	29.8	Wood (16.1). Coffee (7.5) Oils (1.3). Canned fruit (1).
5.	Federal Republic of Germany	256	25.5	Cocoa (8.9). Wood (6.5). Canned fruit (2.5). Coffee (1.9)
6.	USSR	77	19.7	Cocoa (17.6). Wood (1.6)
7.	United Kingdom	146	19.6	Coffee (4.2). Cocoa (4).
8.	Spain	339	16.9	Wood (7.5. Coffee (4.1). Cocoa (3.8)
9.	Mali	133	10.8	Petroleum products (4.5). Cotton goods (2.3)
10.	Japan	40	10.3	Coffee (7.7. Bulk cotton (1.3)

(1) **Les échanges de la Côte d'Ivoire avec les pays membres de la CEE en 1978**

(2) – 59,5 % des échanges totaux avec le monde
(3) – 58,3 % des exportations totales
(4) – 60,7 % des importations totales

(5) (T : 1 000 t; V : milliards CFA)

	(6) Exportations			(7) Importations			(8) Balance	(9) Échanges totaux	
	T	V	(20) % CEE	T	V	(20) % CEE	V	V	(20) % CEE
(10) France	898,7	122,5	40,07	1 297,8	205,2	64,69	– 82,7	327,7	52,61
(11) Royaume-Uni	146,2	19,6	6,41	15,3	12,4	3,91	+ 7,2	32	5,13
(12) Irlande	32,5	1,6	0,52	4,7	1	0,31	+ 0,6	2,6	0,42
(13) UEBL	83	7,4	2,42	114,3	17,5	5,52	– 10,1	24,9	4
(14) Pays-Bas	279,8	98,1	32,09	72,4	20,3	6,40	+ 77,8	118,4	19,01
(15) RFA	256,2	25,5	8,34	70,1	37,7	11,88	– 12,2	63,2	10,15
(16) Italie	672	29,8	9,75	96,1	22,1	6,97	+ 7,7	51,9	8,33
(17) Danemark	30	1,2	0,39	7	1	0,31	+ 0,2	2,2	0,35
(18) Total CEE	2 398,4	305,7	100	1 677,7	317,2	100	– 11,5	622,9	100
(19) Total monde	4 041,1	524,4		4 627,4	522,5		+ 1,9	1 046,9	

Key:
(1) Trade of the Ivory Coast With Member Countries of the EEC in 1978
(2) -59.5 percent of total trade with the world
(3) -58.3 percent of total exports
(4) -60.7 percent of total imports
(5) (T = 1000 tons; V = billions CFA)
(6) Exports
(7) Imports
(8) Balance
(9) Total trade
(10) France
(11) United Kingdom
(12) Ireland
(13) Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union
(14) Netherlands
(15) Federal Republic of Germany
(16) Italy
(17) Denmark
(18) Total EEC
(19) World total
(20) Percent EEC

Among the first 10 clients it should be noted that the Federal Republic of Germany gained one place, while Spain lost three. The Netherlands and the U.S. took a clearly more important position while one notes a marked decline of Italy.

Trade with the EEC

Trade with the EEC represented in 1978 almost 60 percent in value of the total Ivorian trade with the world. Exports to the EEC were 58.3 percent of the total for the world (59.3 percent of the tonnage). Imports from the EEC represented 60.7 percent of the value (36.3 percent of the tonnage) of the total for the world, which reflect the importance of the EEC in purchases of the more elaborated products.

Within the EEC, France (40 percent) and the Netherlands (32 percent) together absorbed 72 percent of the exports. France (65 percent) and the Federal Republic of Germany (12 percent) together supplied 77 percent of the imported products.

The balance with the Netherlands is strongly in surplus (+78 billion), while on the other hand it is heavily in deficit with France (-83 billion).

Trade With Africa

Trade with Africa represented only 9 percent of trade with the world as a whole in 1978, this continent accounting for 11.4 percent of exports and 6.6 percent of imports. Within the figures for Africa, the CEAO [West African Economic Community] accounted for 45.6 percent of total trade, with 54.6 percent of exports and 30 percent of imports, the balance being in surplus by 22.3 billion CFA, a figure which corresponds to 88 percent of the overall balance with Africa as a whole (+25.2 billion).

(1) **Les échanges de la Côte d'Ivoire avec l'Afrique en 1978**

(2) **– 9 % des échanges avec le monde**
(3) **– 11,4 % des exportations totales**
(4) **– 6,6 % des importations totales**
(5) *(T : 1 000 t; V : milliards CFA)*

	(6) Exportations – T	V	(7) Importations – T	V	(8) Balance – V	(9) Échanges totaux – V
Mauritanie (10)	3,3	0,4	–	1	– 0,6	1,4
Mali (11)	132,7	10,8	11,4	1,9	+ 8,9	12,7
Haute-Volta (12)	139,8	9,9	–	0,3	+ 9,6	10,2
Niger (13)	13,8	4,5	–	–	+ 4,5	4,5
Sénégal (14)	50,2	7,1	91,4	7,2	– 0,1	14,3
Total CEAO (15)	–	(32,7)	–	(10,4)	(+ 22,3)	(43,1)
Bénin (16)	2,8	1	–	–	+ 1	1
Togo (17)	4,8	1,4	–	0,3	+ 1,1	1,7
Cameroun (18)	2,7	1,2	5,4	2	– 0,8	3,2
Congo (19)	–	–	0,1	0,1	– 0,1	0,1
Gabon (20)	2,2	0,5	2	0,5	0	1
Centrafrique (21)	0,2	0,2	–	–	+ 0,2	0,2
Total UDEAC (22)	·	(1,9)	(2,6)	(– 0,7)	(4,5)	
Tchad (23)	0,4	0,2	–	–	+ 0,2	0,2
Algérie (24)	75,7	6,8	58,6	3,2	+ 3,6	10
Tunisie (25)	3,8	0,6	8,5	0,5	+ 0,1	1,1
Maroc (26)	69	3,8	27,4	1,8	+ 2	5,6
Nigeria (27)	15,6	3,2	538,9	13,9	– 10,7	17,1
Liberia (28)	17,4	1,2	0,5	0,2	+ 1	1,4
Ghana (29)	7,1	1,8	0,7	0,1	+ 1,7	1,9
Zaïre (30)	6,9	0,4	0,1	0,2	+ 0,2	0,6
Angola (31)	–	–	11,6	0,2	– 0,2	0,2
Afrique du Sud (32)	23,6	4,6	5,4	0,7	+ 3,9	5,3
Divers (33)	1,8	0,3	9	0,6	– 0,3	0,9
Total Afrique (34)	–	**59,9**		**34,7**	**+ 25,2**	**94,6**
Total Monde (35)		**524,4**		**522,5**		**1 046,9**

1. Ivory Coast Trade With Africa in 1978
2. - 9 percent of trade with the world
3. - 11.4 percent of total exports
4. - 6.6 percent of total imports
5. (T = 1000 tons; V = billion CFA)
6. Exports
7. Imports
8. Balance
9. Total trade
10. Mauritania
11. Mali
12. Upper Volta
13. Niger
14. Senegal
15. Total CEAO [West African Economic Community]
16. Benin
17. Toto
18. Cameroon
19. Congo
20. Gabon
21. Central Africa
22. Total UDEAC [Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa
23. Chad
24. Algeria
25. Tunisia
26. Morocco
27. Nigeria
28. Liberia
29. Ghana
30. Zaire
31. Angola
32. South Africa
33. Miscellaneous
34. Africa total
35. World total

6108
CSO: 4400

MADAGASCAR

GROWING INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 pp 2969-70

[Article: "Industrial Projects Which Could Involve French Partners"]

[Text] By the year 2000 the Malagasy planners envision a gradual industrialization of the country that would have to be done in three stages:

1978 to 1984: Development of light industry (consumer goods, foodstuffs, textiles and leather, publishing) and the setting up of basic industry.

1985 to 1992: Consolidation and expansion of basic industry (intermediate goods, basic chemical industry, fertilizers, construction materials, metallurgy, paper, and so on).

1993 to 2000: Expansion of light industry, normal operating conditions of basic industry, consolidation of heavy industry.

In this context the Malagasy Ministry of Economy and Commerce has drawn up various industrial plans which could involve French firms susceptible to participating in them. Here is the outline of some of them.

1. Instant coffee plant at Mananjary. This plant would process 4,800 tons of green coffee (grades 2, 3, and 4 as well as residues) in order to produce annually 1,500 tons of instant coffee slated almost exclusively for export. The technique used would be extraction by beating and crushing with blast pipes. The plant would be supplied by the regions of Mananjary and Manakara. A foreign partner is sought by the Malagasy ministry.

2. Industrial alcohol. Madagascar has undertaken the study of the production of industrial alcohol from molasses or other starchy agricultural products (maize or manioc). The needs of Madagascar, now in the order of 34,000 hectoliters a year, could later reach 534,000 hectoliters including 250,000 hectoliters for use in fuels and 250,000 hectoliters as raw material for the plastic materials industry.

Presently the sugar mills of Madagascar are in a position to produce 34,000 hectoliters a year out of molasses covering the country's needs. In future production of 152,000 hectoliters from molasses thanks to the expansion of the sugar mills is planned.

As far as manioc is concerned, it would be available in any amount desired if a market is guaranteed, particularly in northern, eastern, central, and southwestern Madagascar. Manioc could be processed in the sugar mills with the addition of a few units.

3. Processing of fruits (juice and essential oils). The project involves the orange groves of Bezezika in the Morondava region which has a production capacity of 17,000 tons which could be increased to 25,000 tons in 10 years (6,000 tons of lemons, 9,000 tons of oranges, and 10,000 tons of grapefruits). The plan calls for the building of two plants: (1) A processing plant for oranges and lemons (juice concentrates and essential oils) in the Antsirabe region; processing capacity, 6,000 tons a year; (2) a grapefruit processing plant on the Mahabo-Morondava national highway; processing capacity, 10,000 tons of fruit a year.

On the other hand, the other regions of Madagascar could supply a large variety of fruits, tropical or temperate, and a certain number of processing plants could be envisioned, production being earmarked to both local consumption and exports.

4. Fruit vinegar. The Malagasy vinegar market is fairly open: There is consumption of about 7,000 hectoliters compared to local production of only 1,000 hectoliters, the balance being imported. It would thus be appropriate to improve the available local raw materials (apples, pineapples, grapes, and so on) in order to produce vinegar. What is involved is especially to set up small regional units.

5. Paper pulp and lumber industry. Madagascar plans to exploit the pine tree plantations of the upper Matsiatra region (30,000 hectares) especially in order to satisfy local needs in large-capacity bags. What would be involved then would be to plan an industrial complex including an integrated paper pulp plant of from 10,000 to 20,000 tons a year and a mechanical lumber processing unit (sawmill, carpentry shop, veneered-plywood items, unit panels). A portion of the products should be exported. Two plant sites are proposed on the bank of the Matsiatra River.

6. Industrial carpentry shop. The purposes of the plan bear on the creation of small units slated to satisfy the carpentry and furniture needs of buildings connected with the program to build 20,000 housing units. More than half of these units would be built in the Antananarivo region. A standard industrial carpentry shop in Madagascar would use 1,375 cubic meters of lumber annually.

7. Packaging materials. Presently Madagascar produces on the average each year 5 million cardboard cartons, 15 million bottles, 450,000 medicine bottles, 5 million jute or sisal bags, and 7.5 million metallic containers.

One unit is envisioned for the production of 5 million bags in woven polypropylene near the Tamatave fertilizer plant. For wooden packaging many sawmills are available. Packaging capacity is clearly insufficient because of the projects which will increase needs significantly (fertilizers, rice, flour, edible oil, beer, canned fish, instant coffee, cement, and so on) between now and 1985. There is thus room for the expansion of existing installations or for new units.

8. Construction materials and construction hardware. The reactivation of the construction sector and the program for building 20,000 housing units have suggested plans for the manufacture of construction materials and construction articles, namely,

a. Sheet glass plant (mirrors, corrugated glass, plate glass) of a capacity of 2,000 to 3,000 tons a year. Raw materials are available locally and the plant could be built in the Toamasina (Tamatave) region, that is, at Moramanga or Ampasipotsy.

b. Lime plant. Limestone deposits are sizable and may call for a preliminary examination for the installation of an air-slaked lime plant which would meet the needs of Madagascar. The unit would be built in one of the producing regions (Soalara, Amboanio, Diego, Antsirabe). The plant's capacity should be in the order of 45,000 tons a year.

c. Asbestos-cement products. The projected plant should produce asbestos-cement slabs, pressure and drainage pipes, and miscellaneous products. It should have a minimum capacity of 800 tons a year. The building site will have to be determined as a function of the raw materials, several asbestos deposits existing in Madagascar.

d. Construction hardware. The market has been supplied so far especially from imports (about 200 tons a year in locks and 150 to 200 tons of metal piping, hinges, and so on), small local production already existing for locks. Average consumption a year is estimated at 270,000 locks (local production of 32,000 only), 40,000 metal pipes, and 600,500 hinges. With the housing programs it is anticipated that this consumption will be raised to 410,000 locks, 80,000 metal pipes, and 1.6 million hinges. The major raw materials will have to be imported.

e. Screws, bolts, brass founding. Annual imports are in the order of 400 tons for screws and bolts and 150 tons for brass founding. An increase in consumption is projected which would double these figures (800 and 300 tons a year). The choice of the building site for a plant will have to be a function of the ease of access of raw materials to be imported.

f. Revetment tiles. Future needs could stand at some 3,000 tons a year. Presently the market is supplied entirely from imports. The necessary raw material is available locally (materials of volcanic origin).

g. Granite polishing plant. The potential is 70,000 square meters a year including for export. Enormous granite reserves are available in the environs of the capital.

h. Other products. It is also possible to envision the production of revetments from so-called "Dalami" clay and also of roofing units in tarred felt.

--Ready-to-wear clothing workshop. The building of a pilot unit of a ready-to-wear industrial clothing plant in each "faritany" (province) may help to solve some social problems (employment and the supply of decent clothing). The local production fabrics is now estimated at about 100 million meters a year and 115 million meters are projected for 1980. A ready-to-wear clothing plant in each "faritany" would improve this production, either for the local market or for export.

--Complex fertilizers. A nitrogenized fertilizer (urea) plant is now being built at Toamasina (Tamatave). It will be able to produce 100,000 tons a year. To complement this plant there are plans to build one or several complex fertilizer units near the places of use or the ports. Possible raw materials are the urea from the above-mentioned plant, phosphates from the islands, and dolomite. Involved would be the production of 50,000 tons of binary fertilizers to complement the urea.

--Caustic soda. Madagascar imports about 2,500 tons of caustic soda annually. Its needs for 1980-85 are estimated at 4,000 tons a year. The raw materials necessary for its manufacture are available locally (sea salt, charcoal).

--Exploitation of phosphorites. Madagascar now has unused tricalcic phosphates available which could easily be exploited for producing fertilizers. A processing plant would include warehousing, crushing, drying, bagging, and other facilities. The analyses of the phosphorites of the Barren islands disclosed phosphate content ranging from 12 to 22 percent.

2662
CSO: 4400

MALI

SURVEY OF PRODUCTION STATISTICS PUBLISHED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2635

[Text] For the first time since the "return to a normal constitutional life" took place in July with the dissolution of the Military National Liberation Committee (CMLN), Malians celebrated the anniversary of Mali's independence on 22 September. The CMLN had governed the country since the coup d'etat of 19 November 1968.

In the context of this 19th anniversary, a radio team interviewed officials and militants of the sole constitutional party, the "Malian People's Democratic Union" (UDPM). All of their statements indicate that there are still evils in the country such as "corruption, nepotism, favoritism," distortions of democracy and especially an "endemic famine."

Regional party officials have asked government authorities for tractors and motor-driven pumps for farmers, who are most in need.

According to recent statistics, 62,898 tons of rice and 46,901 tons of millet were marketed prior to 30 June 1979. According to estimates, sales should reach 94,362 and 58,715 tons.

Peanuts marketed as of the same date amounted to 37,218 tons in comparison to 46,019 tons for the previous season and were 2,522 tons short of estimates.

Marketing of cotton, an income crop representing 60 percent of the country's exports and produced in the area supervised by the mixed French-Malian company, CDMT [expansion unknown], amounted to 127,690 tons as opposed to 113,760 tons in 1977-78; estimates were set at 125,000 tons.

Malians complain particularly about the dizzying rise of rice and millet prices. In comparison to prevailing prices in Bamako, "that of rice is 67 percent above the official price and that of millet is 54 percent" higher in consumer cooperatives.

This increase in the price of the two principal grains, staple foods of the population, is accompanied by the even more dizzying rise of meat prices.

Although the size of the country's cattle herds dropped from 5.5 million heads (1971 estimate) to about 3.6 million heads in 1974 because of the drought, it is now estimated that there are 3.9 million heads of cattle and more than 11 million heads of sheep-goats.

However, the large number of livestock, the amount of fish production (100,000 tons of fish annually), the Kalana gold being mined and a promising, emerging industry are reasons for Malians to be optimistic about their future.

And despite all the problems aggravated by the effects of persistent drought in the Sahel and inflation, most regional party officials think that their country, agriculturally oriented but also possessing unsuspected mineral wealth, can achieve its goal of self-sufficiency in food if its leaders manage to arrest its social ills.

11915
CSO: 4400

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MALI

BRIEFS

FAD WATER SUPPLY LOAN--Malian Minister of Industrial Development Lamine Keita and G.E. Gondwe, interim president of the African Development Fund (FAD), an affiliate of the African Development Bank, signed on 20 November in Abidjan a loan agreement according to which the FAD grants Mali a loan totaling 174.2 million CFA. The loan is aimed at financing technical and pre-investment studies to supply water to 5 Malian cities: Kayes, Bougouni, Markala, Gao and San. Reimbursement will be effected over a 13-year period, including a 3-year deferred amortization period. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3331]

FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENTS--Five loan agreements totaling 1,135 billion Malian francs were signed on 21 November between Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alioune Blondin Beye and the French ambassador in Bamako. These financing agreements are aimed at an oil factory in Koutiala, two rural development projects, the Malian National Museum and assistance for the Malian important endemic diseases services. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3331]

CSO: 4400

MAURITIUS

LEFT, RIGHT SEEN PRESSURING PRIME MINISTER

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE 29 Oct-11 Nov 79 pp 24-25

[Article by Herve Masson: "Seewosagur's Great Fear"]

[Text] The Mauritian prime minister sees himself pressured on the left by the strike and the murmurings of a popular uprising, and on the right by his own ministers.

Since Mauritius gained independence in 1968, the hesitations, reversals, about-faces and contradictions of its leaders have continued to confuse diplomacy in the southwest Indian Ocean. A member of the OAU, Mauritius enjoys excellent relations with South Africa (while still refusing to establish diplomatic ties with that country). On the other hand, the Mauritian representative to the United Nations continually lambasts Pretoria, each time receiving stinging denials from his government.

After a trip to Libya and the signing of economic aid accords (not, it is true, supported by the Tripoli government), Prime Minister Seewosagur Ramgoolam and his ineffable minister of foreign affairs, H. Walter, swear they will aline themselves with the Libyan position within the OAU. But in Monrovia, the Mauritian delegate praises President Sadat's defeatist policies, refrains from condemning Morocco in the Western Sahara affair, and votes against the return to Madagascar of the tiny islands wrongly occupied by France. In short, it seems as though Mauritius' foreign policy oscillates according to the promises for foreign aid it receives.

Mauritius has many debts. Its foreign debt is equal to half its GNP, and its reserves of hard currency have melted away (they are indispensable, moreover, for supplying food to a country which, for years, has put off a needed agricultural diversification policy). The IMF and the World Bank have to be prodded to continue aiding this near-bankrupt regime.

Tea for Pretoria

So, Mauritius goes pleading first to the socialist Arab countries and then turns around and tries to convince the Western powers that the island's strategic position, on the petroleum route, could be very valuable to them. Mauritian diplomacy swings with the pendulum--but with a marked leaning toward the west.

In July, several weeks before the strikes and violence of August, the left wing of the Labor Party in power had succeeded in convincing the acting prime minister, Ringadoo (ruling in the absence of Ramgoolam, who was out trying to drum up loans), to make some startling statements of intention: a PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] office would be opened in Port-Louis; the government would from now on recognize the POLISARIO; and an embassy would be opened in Madagascar, serving as an antenna for socialist regimes in the region. None of these things came to pass.

In fact, just the opposite has occurred. Returning from the OAU summit, Minister Walter deemed it appropriate to publicly praise President Sadat. This same minister and his colleague from the Labor Party (the future ambassador to Cairo) continually reprimand the Madagascar and Seychelles governments, described as "totalitarian" and "undemocratic." To top that, an official delegation will soon go to Pretoria to entreat South Africa to buy Mauritian tea at a preferential price. This delegation will be headed by three ministers, including the minister of foreign affairs and the minister (white, of course) of regional administration.

In addition, the Mauritian ambassador to the United Nations, Radha Ramphul, had his hand slapped for stating that Mayotte was an integral part of the Comoros. Mayotte has every right to self-determination as long as that means belonging to French colonialism, or so thinks the Port-Louis government. There is no longer question of demanding American withdrawal from Diego Garcia, or of taking back Tromelin Island from France, which took it by military force.

What has happened? Quite simply, Prime Minister Ramgoolam (79 years old) is scared, very scared. He has been in power now for over 30 years, first under the British colonial regime and then as an independent republic. He has become a monarch. However, the August events in Mauritius seem to have seriously shaken his throne. He himself confided to Paul Berenger, secretary general of the MMM (Mauritian Militant Movement) and chief negotiator for the strikers, that his ministers were going to "get rid of him." He is pressured on the left by the strike and the murmurings of a popular uprising, and on the right by his own ministers. What will finally happen is anyone's guess. "Sir, you must watch out for the left and for the right," his faithful Walter must have advised him. For if Ramgoolam were deposed, Walter would have to pack his bags. Immediately after concluding an agreement with the strikers, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam got on a plane and left the country for a week.

Ostensibly, he was going to the conference of nonalined countries in Havana. But he never set foot there. It was impossible to get a flight, or so he claimed on his return. Where did he go? Not far--just to Paris, to see President Giscard d'Estaing. The chief of state did not hide his worries from the French president. He told him what he knew about the establishment of a "combined fleet" of the Indian Ocean region socialist countries, a small fleet composed of Malagasy, Mozambique, Tanzanian and Seychelles ships! The aim of this naval unit, he said, is supposedly to resist interventionist threats from the imperialist powers in the region. But it seems that during the August strikes and social unrest in Mauritius, the Mauritian prime minister feared a commando landing force which would have provided support for a coup d'etat by the opposing MMM.

A Stop-Off in Reunion

Of course, Ramgoolam did not tell the French president that he had above all been frightened by the prospect of a sudden attack by the rightist elements of his own government, the PMSD (Mauritian Social Democratic Party). The PMSD has a reputation for being in the pay of France and South Africa. Seewoosagur Ramgoolam thus hoped for military aid from the French paratroopers stationed at Reunion, less than half an hour away by plane.

It is not the first time he has done something like this. In 1973, he offered the Mahebourg port, in the southern part of the island, and the Plaisance airport to Pompidou in exchange for help in obtaining food and in constructing a large modern airport in the north. A French delegation secretly came to study the area, led by a minister. But Pompidou decided not to go through with it.

And this time, once again, a reliable source tells us that Giscard politely refused, explaining that Mauritius was not within France's sphere of influence.

Ramgoolam was not completely discouraged. On his way back to Mauritius, he stopped in Reunion, probably trying to make contact with certain adventurist elements which might take action without consulting Paris. In Mauritius, people are made to think that the French Government has agreed to Ramgoolam's requests.

Meanwhile, an imaginary plot to overthrow the regime, supposedly organized by MMM deputy Darga, has been concocted. Pressure is being put on the West, which prefers the status quo to a possible nonalined socialist power.

11935
CSO: 4400

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL--Mozambique president Samora Machel has reportedly suggested to Portuguese president Gen Antonio Ramalho Eanes to meet with him "on neutral ground" to study ways to normalize relations between Portugal and its former colony in east Africa. The two statesmen met in the Angolan capital at the time of President Agostinho Neto's funeral. They reportedly agreed that it was not the place to hold detailed talks. Possibilities for normalization of relations between Lisbon and Maputo have increased in recent weeks, particularly after Mozambique's release of 27 Portuguese nationals imprisoned since the colony acquired independence in 1975. The former prisoners returned to Portugal on 11 September. There is also a possibility that about 20 other Portuguese being held in Mozambique will also be released, bringing to about 100 the number of Portuguese citizens released within several months. It should be noted that the possibility of a meeting between the Portuguese and Mozambique chiefs of state had already been mentioned, as General Eanes had planned a visit to Africa for next winter. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2658] 11915

PORT TRAFFIC STATISTICS--During the first quarter of this year, goods traffic from the port of Maputo amounted to 814,000 tons, as opposed to 667,000 tons during the same period in 1978. In the case of Matola, the ore-tanker port, the corresponding figures were 848,000 and 632,000 tons, respectively. Overall, goods traffic of the two ports increased 28 percent from January to March 1979 in comparison to the same period last year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2658] 11915

AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO GDR--Mozambique expects to export 5,000 tons of citrus fruits to the GDR this year, or three times last year's amount, which was 1,600 tons. At the end of the first half of the year, orange, lemon and grapefruit exports totaled nearly 3,000 tons. However, last spring production was severely affected by climatic factors (drought and hail). A storm destroyed 2,000 tons in the province of Maputo. The goal for citrus fruit exportation, set by the Third FRELIMO Congress in February 1977, is 6,000 tons for 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2658] 11915

CSO: 4400

NIGER

BUDGET FOR 1980 TOPS 72 BILLION CFA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2827

[Text] The Niger cabinet met from 17 to 20 September 1979, with Col Senyi Kountche, head of state, presiding, to examine the proposed 1980 budget bill (which we reported briefly in MTM for 28 September, p 2642).

The proposed budget has been set at more than 72,145 million CFA francs for both revenues and expenditures, which is a rise of more than 12,831 million.

Revenues

Predicted revenues will call for no increase in taxes. The Niger government will even grant a share of its tax revenues to the communities (its contribution toward housing construction, licences, and permits), and abolish taxes on those communities for education and health services; this will cost the government some 500 million CFA in tax monies.

Revenue distribution predicted for 1980shapes up like this:

Tax revenues	82.05%
Miscellaneous earnings	14.26%
One-time resources	3.69%

Tax revenues as calculated for 1980 come to 55,169.4 million CFA, up 26 percent. Miscellaneous earnings come to 10,289.23 million CFA, in 1,040 million (+ 11%). One-time resources will come to 2,660.1 million CFA, as compared with 439.92 million in 1978, six times as much.

Tax revenues, which will account for 82.05 percent of income in the 1980 budget, are distributed as follows, in billions CFA:

	1978	1979	1980	1979-1980 Increase
Direct taxes	11	16.5	21	+ 27%
Indirect taxes	6.2	10.4	12.8	+ 24%
Customs revenues	14.1	17	22.1	+ 30%

Registry fees will be up a predicted 2.75 percent over the 1979 level.

Expenditures

The rise in standard expenditures stem partly from welfare measures taken by the Niger government (increased rental rate ceilings, higher wages for auxiliaries, eyc.) in the course of this year, particularly since October (increased salaries and benefits for teachers, raises and improved working conditions for cadres, and an across-the-board hike in retirement and pension payments). The sum of 3 billion CFA has been earmarked to cover all these.

Some government ministries will be getting bigger budgets than they had in 1979.

BUDGET INCREASES FOR MAJOR MINISTRIES

	Increase in billions CFA	Percentage Increase
Education	1,808	+ 31%
Public Health	623	+ 23%
Rural Development	477	+ 29%
Planning	340	+ 30%

DISTRIBUTION OF 1980 BUDGETED EXPENDITURES

	in millions of CFA francs	in percent of total
Public debt	4,212	5.84
Government operations	403	0.56
Public services	29,680	41.14
Government interventions	37,850	52.46
TOTAL	72,145	100.00

Niger's public debt, which was 2,750 million CFA in 1979, has risen by more than 53 percent. Domestic debt, which was 2,166.93 million in 1979, has risen to 2,790.23 for 1980, while the foreign debt is up from 586.72 million to 1,502.05 million for 1980.

Appropriations for public services are up 25 percent for 1980 over 1979. Public interventions account for more than half all appropriations, mainly because of the National Investment Fund's (NFI) bite out of the budget.

Wages and salaries for civil servants (carried under both government operations and public services), which ran to 10.3 billion CFA in 1978, then 12.5 billion in 1979, will hit 18.2 billion in 1980, an increase of 46 percent. In 1980's budget, they will account for a quarter of all expenditures and for 61 percent of those in the two areas concerned.

Out of this total of 18.2 billion, education will get more than a fourth (5,229.1 million CFA), while Public Health will get 8 percent.

Expenditures on equipment, dwon from current budget levels, will come to 13 percent of total expenditures in 1980.

National Investment Fund

The National Investment Fund, with its 26 billion CFA in 1980, will account for 36 percent of the total budget for investment programs. It will get 5 billion CFA more than in 1979, for an increase of around 23.8 percent.

FNI appropriations have been rising steadily for a good many years now: 1,558 million in 1971; 2,176.3 million in 1972; 2,671.6 million in 1973; 3,164.2 million in 1974; 2,523.7 million in 1975; 5,532.6 million in 1976; 8,423 million in 1977; and 13,996 million CFA for 1978.

The appropriation from Niger's general budget for the National Investment Fund was set under the 1979 budget at 21 billion CFA. In fact, it climbed to 21,925 million CFA after the special ordinance of 9 March 1979 boosted the ceiling on Niger's budget for 1979 from 56,747 to 59,314 million CFA.

FNI Gets 2 Appropriations

The first of these is earmarked for rural development, the highway infrastructure, and the social sector. It comes to 18,556.82 million CFA, up from 3,620.12 million, or 24.2 percent more than in 1979.

The sectors of agriculture, cattleraising, mining, and energy get 1,966.5 million CFA, up from 558.9 million (+ 42.74 percent). For bridges and roads, the 1980 package will hold 1,628.86 million, up from 487.36 million CFA (+ 34.4 percent).

Education, vocational training, and public health get 8,603.6 million CFA, or a 3,272.3-million (61.37 percent) increase. Primary and secondary school appropriations will go up by 1,896.5 million to hit 3,522.5 million (up 116.63 percent); while the appropriation for higher education rises from 105.3 million CFA in 1979 to 1,689.4 million, sixteen times as much.

The FNI plans to spend 1,268.7 million CFA in 1980 as against 973 million in 1979, an increase of 295.7 million.

The second part of the budget totals 7,443.18 million CFA as compared with 1,379.88 million more than in 1979 (up 23.7 percent), and itself has two parts.

The first consists of subsidies to government-owned corporations and offset and startup subsidies. It will get 2,530.7 million CFA in 1980, as against 2,238.5 in 1979.

The other part of this half of FNI's budget goes for creating industrial plants and for encouraging Niger's small and medium industry. It totals 3,965.39 million CFA for 1980, up by 1,263.59 million over 1979 (up 46.59 percent).

Out of this appropriation, Niger will support the planned Gaweye hotel and the Tillaberi sugar refinery, as well as OPEN (the Office for the Promotion of Nigerien Enterprise).

NOTE: Niger's fiscal year runs from 1 October to 30 September.

6182
CSO: 4400

'THE TIMES' PRAISES CARRINGTON STRATEGY

LD061139 London THE TIMES in English 6 Dec 79 p 15 LD

[Editorial: "All Aboard"]

[Text] It can hardly be denied that the agreement announced last night at the Lancaster House Conference is a triumphant vindication of the strategy pursued by Lord Carrington in dealing with the Rhodesia problem since he took office. Unlike his predecessor he has been able to get concessions from the Salisbury government by giving them something to hope for, and from the Patriotic Front by giving them something to fear. He was prepared to take the risk of involving Britain in a "second-class" settlement, i.e., one to which the Patriotic Front would not be a party, in order to give himself the leverage with which to bring about a "first-class" settlement, i.e., one involving a ceasefire and the cooperation of all parties. On several occasions in the past three months the Patriotic Front have seemed ready to call his bluff. But in the end they have not done so, presumably because they knew he was not bluffing.

Yet the agreement is certainly not a defeat or a humiliation for them. Their anxieties about the successive stages of Britain's proposals were at least in part justified, and the clarifications they have obtained are on the whole improvements. It must be assumed also that the time they have gained was time they needed, and that they have used it to prepare their somewhat disorganized forces for a new kind of political action. They have played their hand with skill, maintaining doubt to the last about their intentions.

The detailed implementation of the ceasefire agreement still has to be worked out with the military commanders on both sides, but now that political agreement is there there seems no reason why this should take more than a few days. Very shortly, therefore, a British governor should be on his way out to Salisbury. The task he faces there is one of formidable difficulty, perhaps comparable only to that of Lord Mountbatten as viceroy of India in the last days of the Raj, when he had to guide India to independence in the midst of heavy fighting between the communities. In one way at least, the present task will be even more formidable. Lord Mountbatten could rely on the unhesitating loyalty of a highly trained civil service. But the new governor of Zimbabwe Rhodesia will have to take over the administrative apparatus of a state which for fourteen years has been in rebellion against the crown and inspired by hatred and contempt for the British Government. The cooperation of this still essentially white-run state is indispensable, and will not be easy to obtain. The only hope of getting it lies in the active support of Mr Ian Smith. He has the opportunity to perform a last, redeeming service to his country if he will go all out to make the settlement work. This is certainly not the time to indulge in any recrimination against him or gloating.

The governor's most important task will be to ensure the disengagement of the two sides on the ground--not along a definable front or in a particular theatre but almost throughout the country. The way has to be cleared for ZANU and ZAPU to campaign openly and peacefully--though it would be utopian to suppose that all intimidation on either side could be eliminated. It is unhappily true that the conference has done nothing to soften the bitter hostility between the rival African parties. There are found to be local breaches of the ceasefire here and there, and a big part of the governor's task will be to contain these and prevent them from escalating, though he will have no real coercive force at his disposal. He may well be glad of the assistance of officers with experience of United Nations peacekeeping operations, in Lebanon and elsewhere.

To have any chance of success he will need the full cooperation of all parties to the agreement. Bishop Muzorewa is perhaps the one who has sacrificed most, and he will still have a very important contribution to make in calming his followers and keeping the peace. The frontline presidents too, to whom much credit for the conference's success is due, will have to continue to exercise a moderating influence behind the scenes. But the governor himself will have to exhibit quite extraordinary personal qualities.

CSO: 4420

SENEGAL

ISLAMIC FORCES SEEN AS SOLE TOOL ABLE TO ASSURE UNITY

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 12-25 Nov 79 pp 23, 24

[Article by Mamadou Samb: "Maraboutism and the Government"]

[Text] A long tradition of political and economic bargaining between the state and the religious institutions relegated to secondary importance.

Islam has again become one of Senegal's major political preoccupations. Of course, its population is very largely Moslem (about 80 percent), but this historical and sociological fact alone does not explain this revival of the people's inclination, which also includes competition, indeed a latent confrontation, between the various obediences, confessional or other, and between the latter and the government.

When he received Imans of the Cape Verde area this past 1 February, President Senghor forcefully reaffirmed one of the themes of the official policy of the past 20 years: "Your concerns are those of the government." But the unofficial commentary of the newspaper, LE SOLEIL, gave a special, and even new, dimension to this constant attitude of the outstretched hand: for both the Imans and President Senghor, public administrations and religion must be complementary. And religious ministers must essentially specify: "It is the duty of the public authorities to enable the citizens in the best possible way to meet their religious obligations; the religious leaders must exercise an eminent role in moral and civic education, for the consolidation of the state and the unity of the nation."

This official audience with the high ranking officials of the confraternity ("tidjane," and "mouride") in any case reflects the awareness of the strictly ideological demands and needs of the Islam Senegalese and in part relegates to secondary importance the long tradition of political and economic bargaining in existence since the colonial period between the government and the institutions and the religious groups.

We are witnessing a big movement for the reaffirmation of Islamic identity and autonomy, which is manifested in many ways. The situation is such, moreover, that the government, itself, feels obliged to intervene, including in the matter of the propagation of moral and religious values, which had practically never occurred since independence. It was one thing, in fact, to utilize to its advantage the Marabout dynamism and framework (by assimilating to the limit a form of humanistic socialism). It is another thing to recognize that the hegemony of the Islamic religion must be channelled, indeed divided, in order to prevent it from being transformed into a legal political hegemony, and no longer one that is solely of fact and of influence.

"Tidjanes and Mourides"

In his third letter on "The Reasons for Engagement,"[1] Mamadou Dia, former president of the Senegalese Council and founder of the opposition monthly, ANDE SOPI, observes that, "in the various spheres of opinion, one discusses and sometimes even argues, especially since the recent events in Iran, in order to determine if it is not advisable to grant an eminent place to Islam, the religion of the majority. in our institutions. Should the Senegalese state continue to be a lay state or, on the contrary, should it not be raised to an Islamic state? Is it not advisable to at least establish Islam as the state religion? This is the current debate, regardless of whether or not the government wants it, whether it knows it, or whether it pretends not to know it."

In order to properly understand the meaning of these various questions and movements, it is necessary to briefly indicate the place and the role of the Islamic forces in the various economic, political, cultural, and religious domains.

Senegal's main wealth, the principal revenue of the state, still comes from peanuts. The overwhelming mass of peasant producers are Moslems, either Tidjanes or Mourides. The big producers in the main are the Marabouts. This supremacy moreover explains the role of the guild hierarchies with respect to the management of the agricultural crisis that has been prevalent for about 10 years. The guilds, with their peasant masses, for a time have served as an echo chamber for peasant unrest and, in this economic situation, the principal Marabouts have seemed to be able to head a movement that challenges the state: abandonment of commercial agriculture, refusal to yield to compulsory modernization and to go into debt, fair distribution of food allowances, etc. This pressure group policy has borne fruit, but one may think that the peasants have often served as a mass maneuver of the Marabout leaders who first and foremost protect their own socio-economic interests.

And the policy, itself, is taken in this context. The multipartite facade has not given rise to the creation of an Islamic party[2]. There are of course formal divisions of the left, center, and right, but each group has "its" Moslem clients and the affiliations have little to do with distinctions between the different guilds.

Things go on appreciably in the same manner in the opposition groups. Naturally, one is aware of the privileged ties that exist between the RND (Democratic National Rally) of Sheik Anta Diop and certain dignitaries of the Mouride guild; or the Tidjane affiliation of Mamadou Dia. But the guilds, as in the case of these organizations, have always carefully avoided any more official rapprochement that might play into the hands of the government. Further, they have never been monolithic and the "united front" policies up to now have shown more of a reaffirmation of an Islamic ecumenism than a political desire for an electoral or partisan governmental contestation.

But, in the absence of openly criticizing the official policy, the growing recourse to the moral and social values of Islam expresses a more effective ideological mobilization. For about the past 2 years, this has sometimes involved Islamic institutes, libraries, and schools and sometimes important associations and meetings. The Mouride activities are the most typical of this movement. Touba (the holy city of the Mourides) and Touba Bedel (residence of the Khalife general of the Mourides) are becoming centers of contemplation to an extent never before seen. In addition,modernization is becoming more and more an integral part of the distinctive image of the guild: mechanized exploitation, chemicals, or dispensaries are now acceptable. A Mouride students association has been formed, whereas up to then there was no confessional association in this particularly politicized environment[3]. A big evening performance of religious songs was organized in Dakar's largest stadium, an event that had never occurred before. The choice of the date, 24 December, (the Christian Christmas Eve) last year was doubtless fraught with significance if one recalls that President Senghor is a Catholic.

But, at the same time, another trend emerges: that of a guild-type Islam (that is, an Islam that is simply that and nothing else[4]). And hardly a week goes by that LE SOLEIL does nct offer lectures on Islam. The Moslem Cultural Union, the Union of Arab Language Teachers and Students of the Socialist Party, the Federation of the Islamic Associations of Senegal, and above all the Union For Islamic Advancement are organizations that are trying to spread the Islamic good word without, however, referring to guilds. The Arab-Islamic culture of course is recognized as an integral part of the Senegalese patrimony. One insists, moreover, on the spreading of the Arab language, the establishment of Islamic schools. But, at the same time, those in charge of these groups call attention to the refusal to convert the problem of Islam into a political and electoral stake.

The Tool of the Union

Senegal is in a state of crisis. An agricultural crisis, and thus an economic one (there was a severe drought again this year and there is likely to be a sharp decline in the peanut crop); an institutional crisis (succession of Senghor, limitation of multipartism and of political freedom[5]) are the bases of an equally significant unrest, that of ideology and the dominant culture. The excesses of Westernization (consumer society, tourism and their effects: crimes, prostitution, and alcoholism); and the continuation of the use of French by a large number of people call for other solutions.

And it is not by chance that the Islamic forces, largely identified with a tradition of anticolonial resistance (Mamadou Lamine, Ma Ba, Amadou Bamba), with a deep implantation in peasantry, present themselves as a rampart in the face of the degrading effects of dependence and as the only tool capable of assuring national union. The refusal to translate these aspirations into an organized political movement is explained by the existence of an Islam that is already organized in the form of guilds, but also by the consubstantial ambiguity of an Islam that is both a social movement and a religion inspired by divine revelation.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Ande Sopi," No 26, July 1979.

]. Ahmed Khalifa Niass, a Marabout in Kaolack, attempted to launch such a party.

3. An Amadou Bamba (founder of the Mouride guild) Week was organized by the Mouride students and trainees, this past July, at UNESCO, in Paris.

4. The film, "Ceddo," by Sembene Ousmane, is a very anti-Islamic film. It definitely reflects the qualms of the intellectual petite bourgeoisie in the face of this religious revival.

5. A legal inquiry has just been started with respect to certain legislative infractions concerning the creation of political parties, doubtless aimed at the RND.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

ONCAD DIRECTOR GENERAL -- ONCAD (National Office for Development Cooperation and Assistance), where auditors recently found a shortage of 1 billion CFA francs, has a new director general. The new director, named at the 9 October cabinet meeting, is Mr Abdourahmane Toure, formerly director of SIDEC, a mixed-capital corporation in charge of motion picture distribution. He replaces Mr Tydian Ly at the head of ONCAD, with its budget of 100 billion CFA, which handles all marketing of peanuts and soy beans, the main source of export earnings and of income for Senegal's farmers, as well as farmer training. At the same time, the Senegalese government is busy on reforms which will streamline ONCAD's structures. Two national councils of the governing Socialist Party will be devoted to ONCAD reorganization and to Senegal's cooperative movement over the next 6 months. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2823] 6182

FRG COOPERATION AGREEMENTS SIGNED -- The FRG and Senegal have reached two agreements for cooperation calling for German loans amounting to 148.95 million DM, or 17,450 million CFA. The conventions, signed in Dakar on 15 October by Senegal's Finance and Economic Affairs Minister Ousmane Seck and FRG Ambassador Tanker Torok, deals with drinking water and irrigation supplies, construction of silos, slaughterhouses and roads, deliveries of industrial equipment, chemical products, and pharmaceuticals. [Text] Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2823] 6182

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TOGO

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE--Gen Gnassingbe Eyadema, president of the Togolese Republic, carried out a slight ministerial reorganization on 20 September. This change is characterized mainly by the elimination of the Ministry of Public Works, Posts and Telecommunications, which was headed by Mr Issa-Gnon Barre. The presidential decree published on 20 September in Lome states that the public works sector has been attached to the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Hydraulic Resources, headed by Mr Barry Moussa Barque. The decree states that posts and telecommunications are temporarily being placed under the office of the president of the republic. Mr Kwassivi Kpetigo has also been appointed minister of commerce and transportation, replacing Mr Kossi Adorgloh. Mr Kpetigo was formerly general director of the National Investment Company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2643] 11915

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ZAIRE

DETAILS CONCERNING ZAIRE'S ECONOMIC MEASURES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 pp 2835-2836

[Text] In our 14 September issue (p 2520), we gave a very sketchy account of administrative economic measures taken subsequent to the devaluation in Zaire last 24 August. We have since received detailed information on these "administrative measures" [measures d'encadrement], and we feel it is useful to return to them, several weeks before the meetings of Zaire's Western trading partners dealing with the application of Zaire's economic recovery plan.

General Measures

1. Price Freeze--All prices remain frozen, except in case of specific authorization by the Executive Council. Relative to this price freeze, the Executive Council has decided upon the following administrative measures:

a) Acceleration of the Procedure for Fixing Prices. Henceforth, the Department of National Economy, Industry and Commerce will fix the price structures to be submitted to the Executive Council after advice from the Committee on Wages and Prices. The Executive Council has instructed the State Commissary in charge of National Economy, Industry and Commerce to rescind the decree of 7 September 1978 relative to fixing cost prices of industrial producers, and to replace it by a new decree indicating the new procedure.

b) The Executive Council will keep close tab on the price of the following Essential and Strategic Products: meat, fresh and salted fish, corn, cooking bananas, potatoes, green beans, rice, bread, canned fish and meat, sugar, beverages, tobacco, flour, construction materials.

c) Within the framework of decentralization, the regional commissaries have been assigned the task of fixing local prices. The Executive Council has instructed the Department of National Economy, Industry and Commerce to create a commission of counterverification entrusted with overseeing the proper carrying out of the inspection of regional services.

d) Merchants dealing on the public market must obtain new licenses from the regional authorities and indicate their supply sources.

e) Producers, Importers and Wholesalers are responsible for distribution conditions of their products and observance of legal margins.

f) Any merchant caught red-handed in speculation will be very severely punished. The punishment will range from the abolition of any access to the advantage of assistance and quotas for producers of pure and simple removal from the Trade Register. Farm prices will be set before each season. These prices are to be minimal for off-farm production and should encourage initiative. For coffee, tea, and quinquina the prices are maximums.

2. Supply Sector

a) The supervision of the arrival of merchandise is strict and every merchant is obliged to use the following forwarding agents: AMIZA, AGETRAF, SOCOPAO, DELMAS, Zaire Containers, COMEXAS, TMK, with the exception of large enterprises which have ad hoc services.

b) All current inventory of producers, distributers and cold vaults will be inspected.

c) The Executive Council has decided upon the creation of a commission composed of representatives from the economy, the ONPV (National Office of Food Products), the ECOP (People's Economat), transporters and ANEZA (National Association of Zairian Enterprises). This commission is entrusted with supplying alimentary products to urban centers and trade articles and products of prime necessity to rural centers.

d) The Executive Council has decided upon the Radical Elimination of Middlemen. Merchandise will go from producer to consumer. Affected are cantines, hospitals, boarding schools, military camps, hotels, parishes and other private institutions. In the country the circuit will be as follows: distributer-retailer-consumer.

Beer-shops must have relay depots run by themselves which can supply the bars directly with no middleman. Manufacturing industries such as sugar mills must meet regional quotas. The profits from these quotas are to be designated in agreement with regional authorities. The quota beneficiaries must have commercial activities in the regions where they are designated. In the case of flour, MIDEMA will deal directly with bakers.

e) Within the framework of Special Allocations, the Executive Council has decided the following:

--the presentation by each bank to the Bank of Zaire (Department of the Regulation of Currency Exchange and International Agreements) of a List of Clients who have filled out declarations for it which indicate the amount registered by each client as well as the reference of the foreign correspondent to whom the funds will be transferred in order to cover the documentary credits opened for this purpose. At the time of opening the documentary credits relating to this operation, the importers must deposit a provision of zaires representing 100 percent of the value of the CREDOC; these provisions must be transferred immediately to the Bank of Zaire. The banks will do everything within their power to insure that the sums placed at their disposal for the correspondents be used exclusively to pay for the imports involved.

--The Daily Filing of Tabs [volets] intended for the Bank of Zaire, enclosed in a docket marked "Special Supply Operation 1979." A permanent office will be set up both in the Bank of Zaire and in approved banks to accelerate the procedure of issuing special licenses, within the framework of the special allocation of 100 million dollars. Each week, the Bank of Zaire must make a report to the Executive Council in order to keep it informed of the progress of the operation.

--The Exemption from OZAC Inspection at Embarkation, in order to speed up operations. Notwithstanding, the designated import enterprises must compulsorily send a copy of billing invoices and importation declarations to OZAC-Kinshasa for a subsequent appraisal of the level of actual prices. A minutely detailed report to be sent to the Bank of Zaire will be created for this purpose.

f) All Wholesale or Small Lot Wholesale transactions involving products intended for commercialization, to wit, alimentary and pharmaceutical products, fuel and trade articles must be carried out exclusively by certified check or bank draft. The references to means of payment will be reproduced on invoices, in order to facilitate subsequent auditing.

g) The regional commissaries are obliged to establish Reception Committees entrusted with verifying that merchandise intended for the regions has indeed been delivered to consumers.

h) The Executive Council has also decided to set up a Supply Program based, on the one hand, on the airlift and on a road-river operation, road-rail for heavy food products coming from the following sub-regions: Ituri, Nord-Kivu, Tanganika, Maniema, Haut-Uele, Mongala, Kasai, Kabinda, Sankuru, Kwilu and Cataractes; on the other hand the ONPV is to organize collection convoys in high productivity zones.

j) [As published] At the time of the next allocations instituted by the banking system channel, 50 percent of the season's credits will be reserved for food production. A commission grouping the Bank of Zaire, the Department of National Economy, industry and commerce, the General Commissariat for the Plan, will meet to prepare the allotment elements.

k) A distribution plan of Petroleum Products for the whole country will be put into place.

3. Agricultural Imports--The Executive Council has decided to make available to the Bank of Zaire $8 million for imports of fertilizer by the Department of Agricultural and Rural Development and the utilization from available funds of about 6 million zaires for the purchase and sale of local seed: 2,500 tons of corn seed for an enclosure of 82,000 hectares; paddy rice seed in Bumba, Kikwit, Mbanza-Ngungu; manioc cuttings in M'Vuazi; punga seed in Bandundu and in Bas-Zaire, as well as the purchase and sale of cotton seed.

For this purpose, the Executive Council announces the sale of a large quantity of small tools by UMAZ and CHANIMETAL which will be equitably distributed among the regions by ONPV, agricultural projects, churches, public and private sector agricultural enterprises.

The calendar of agricultural seasons has been fixed by the Executive Council. Two months before each season, the Executive Council will take necessary measures to guarantee its success.

4. Public Finances--Concerning public finances, the Executive Council has taken the following decisions:

a) To exclude public enterprises, with commercial or industrial activities, from state budgetary subsidy and to present, for them, supplementary budgets.

b) Strict observance to Budgetary Orthodoxy must be paid by all managers of credits. Every expenditure or receipt must fall within the framework of the budget.

c) Concerning the Execution of the Budget, state accountants of the regions and sub-regions entrusted with expenditures are placed under the direct supervision of regional commissaries.

d) Accounts of receipts must give monthly accounts to the regional commissaries on the progress of receipts collected and their payment into the treasury.

e) To vigorously repress all financial infringements.

f) To Reinforce Permanent Supervision of Personnel by the Pay Office; an administrative directory will be published for this purpose.

g) Strict observance must be paid to the administrative staffing of the departments.

h) No transfer of personnel will be carried out until their salary has been reassigned by the Pay Office.

i) The Pay Office will pay only the personnel of the administrative staff and each month will furnish the department head the computer printout list.

j) Subsidized auxiliary agencies must present detailed budgetary forecasts.

k) The Payment of Suppliers will be Made in all Departments Through Bank Channels; auditing will be carried out every 3 months.

l) To prevent the Bank of Zaire from continuing, as state cashier, to make disbursements which have not been sanctioned by the Department of Finance, and to revise, accordingly, the convention of the state cashier, in keeping with the statutes of the Bank of Zaire and the general regulation on public sector bookkeeping.

m) To make obligatory the payment into the Public Treasury of all stock and investment earnings.

n) To pursue attempts already underway to improve the execution of tax assessments relative to real tax on vehicles. For this purpose, the Executive Council has decided to decentralize the sale of licenses and special tax stickers to the level of jurisdiction of zonal taxes.

o) To prohibit recycling by companies and enterprises of workers' payroll deductions.

p) To hold personally responsible for the non-payment of the CPR the directors of offices, companies and enterprises which carry out this recycling.

q) To abolish the granting of fiscal advantages which fall outside the investment code, laws, and regulations in force.

r) The Executive Council has taken the decision to extend to other neighboring countries the currency exchange agreement which was recently concluded within the framework of the CEPGL (Great Lakes Countries Economic Community). For this purpose the Executive Council has instructed the Bank of Zaire to seek ways and means of accomplishing this.

s) To prohibit importers from passing on customs penalties to cost price and to oblige price inspectors to take strict account of this.

5. Money and Credit--In this matter, the Executive Council has decided (1) to establish Quarterly Ceilings which will be imposed on net domestic holdings of the banking system and on the outstanding total of net claims on the state; (2) to reexamine the structure and level of Interest Rates which have been revised in order to encourage domestic saving and to promote the efficient use of resources; (3) to oblige banks, by means of a coefficient of reserves presently pegged at 24 percent, to constitute nonwithdrawable Credit Accounts at the Bank of Zaire.

6. Fraud--The population is strongly invited to support efficaciously the action of the Executive Council in its struggle against fraud.

Specific Measures

1) Mines--The Executive Council has decided to accelerate the revision of conventions governing commercialization of mining enterprises and the retrocession to the latter of an installment [volet] of 15 percent in currency.

2) Energy--a) Concerning petroleum products, the Executive Council has taken the decision to allocate to the Department of Energy, 21 million dollars a month to cover the minimal and essential needs of the country. b) The Executive Council will leave no stone unturned so that henceforth the purchase of petroleum products may be made under contracts negotiated between governments.

3) Transportation--a) For emergency orders, special convoys accompanied by guards until delivery is made will be organized. b) The Executive Council will make sure that roads serving farming interests will be kept up in all weather. It has, moreover, decided to regroup road brigades around important roads serving farming interests, with a view to facilitating the flow of food stuffs towards the centers of consumption. In order to facilitate the untrammeled circulation of goods, the Executive Council has decided to abolish useless barriers.

4) Investments--The Executive Council has decided to reinforce action tending to further strengthen state enterprises in order to render them more productive and capable of making substantial contributions to public receipts. In order to accomplish this, it would be necessary to: reinforce support of exporting enterprises other than GECAMINES; establish a system of periodic review of enterprises' rates permitting them to fully meet their fiscal obligations and get along without state subsidies; establish obligatory insurance of all merchandise imported into the country. Seventy-five percent of receipts thus earned could be paid into high priority development projects.

--Department of the Environment, Preservation of Nature and Tourism--
The Executive Council has decided to create a commission entrusted with setting market prices for wood.

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END