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West Europe Report

(FOUO 70/79)

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FRG'S VOIGT SEES ENERGY POLICY AS CSCE TOPIC

Bonn EUROPA ARCHIV in German 10 Nov 79 pp 645-652

[Article by Karsten D. Voigt, SPD Bundestag member, Bonn: "Cooperation by CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) in the Energy Sector"]

[Text] On Tuesday, 11 November 1980, delegates of 35 countries will meet in Madrid to discuss the continued pursuit of detente. At this second successor conference of the CSCE we will have an opportunity to provide new impetus to East-West cooperation and prepare constructive proposals for that purpose. Possible topics for the expansion of detente may be found at all levels of CSCE agreements: In the area of building confidence in military matters as much as that of human rights and economic cooperation. The scope for the reduction of restrictive practices is not even fully exploited in areas which are most subject to political controversy--such as freedom of movement or the exchange of information and opinion. That it is possible even here to arrive at some settlements is demonstrated by the improvements in the field of family reunions, the easing of West-East marriages, the greater freedom of movement enjoyed by Western reporters in some East European countries (despite the setbacks suffered in some others), and so on and so forth.

Of course it will not do to overestimate these advances. The agreements concluded up to now are unsatisfactory in many respects: They still refer to far too small a group of people, continue to be far from Western concepts of freedom and freedom of movement. Nor can anybody deny that setbacks occurred and will continue to occur in this rather difficult process. Nevertheless efforts at agreement are meaningful even in small dimensions. It would in any case be quite unrealistic to expect detente to wipe out all antagonism between East and West insofar as fundamental ideas are concerned. The social orders, the governments and political interests in the respective systems are far too different, in fact quite hostile to one another. Confronted with this fact detente sets out gradually to defuse the conflicts in Europe. It assumes that the opportunities for agreement on particularly difficult problems--for example in the defense and humanitarian areas--are bound to increase if contractually settled relations are entered into in as many areas as possible, and if the European countries are more closely related by long-term and intensive types of cooperation. Reciprocal relations

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create common interests, and common interests are a good foundation for reducing the threat of military confrontation as well as for dealing with such politically explosive topics as human rights or freedom of movement.

Though the antagonism between the systems is not directly removed thereby, it is easier to check its security-threatening effects. For this policy to succeed it is important that the various levels of cooperation should be constantly extended. One of the sectors which might be suitable has become particularly topical in recent months: The energy sector.

Starting Situation: Energy Shortage

Here we have the following starting situation:

The shortage of energy raw materials, especially oil, has increasingly confronted all CSCE countries with serious problems. The shortage has different dimensions and different causes in Eastern and Western Europe. While the Council for Economic Mutual Aid (CEMA), for example, lacks the investment resources to develop and exploit existing but fairly inaccessible oil deposits, the West European countries--with the exception of Norway and Britain--have either no domestic reserves at all or reserves which are seriously limited.

The consequent energy gap compels all CSCE countries to develop energy conservation techniques and to seek alternative possibilities for producing energy. This in turn calls for an enormous investment expenditure.

The development of nuclear power is inadequate to meet the long-term energy needs in either East or West.² The reservations especially prevalent in Western Europe with regard to the expansion of nuclear energy have made the search for alternative energy sources even more urgent.

Even with respect to less scarce traditional types of energy (such as coal) the European countries are confronted with common and as yet unsolved problems. In addition to the need for developing new technologies we are here concerned especially with having to reconcile the demands of energy production and those of environmental control and health preservation.

The rising foreign exchange costs of energy imports are adding to the difficulties of the European economies: They obstruct the development of products and consumption, make it harder to maintain the various peoples standard of living and absorb resources which, to a large extent, would be needed to restructure energy supplies.

It follows from this situation that the problems and tasks related to the preservation of energy supplies in East and West are quite similar and that, consequently, all CSCE countries have about the same interest in resolving the energy issue. To realize this interest we might consider various approaches, including two which deserve particular attention from the political aspect:

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1. The various governments could try to improve their countries energy situation by going it alone. Such a decision would be bound to initiate a serious struggle for the distribution of increasingly scarce resources--especially in the oil sector. Added to this would be the risk that the economically more powerful countries might carry their demands without consideration for the needs of the weaker nations. Nor could we exclude the possibility that the struggle for the remaining oil reserves might be fought out by military means--either to compel the producing countries to yield their oil or eliminate the competition.

2. The governments may decide to cooperate in the expectation that it would be easier to find a way out of the energy bottleneck if the parties affected were to join to pursue their interests. The energy sector is particularly suitable for cooperation between East and West not only because ideological factors and ideological differences are relatively unimportant in this context, but also because the material conditions for cooperation are relatively favorable, and the various countries may meaningfully complement one another by deploying their various resources. One look at the raw material situation in CEMA illuminates the fields where opportunities for a joint approach could arise.

Currently Eastern Europe is still one of the energy exporters. This is due primarily to the Soviet Union which sells 14 percent of its energy production abroad, including 25 percent of its entire oil production. Half its oil exports go to its allies, the other half earns foreign exchange from the West. Despite this starting situation which is so much better than that of Western Europe, the energy problem is causing increasing anxiety in CEMA. The reasons are as follows:

Per capita consumption of energy is well above the average, in fact it is 9 percent above that of the European Communities. According to estimates Soviet reserves of coal will last more than 100 years, natural gas 80 years and oil 20 years. But CEMA energy consumption is rising faster than output and--unless the industrial and consumer attitudes of East European countries were to change by then--the current surplus will have turned into a deficit by 1990. An indication of this trend is the fact that, according to the Office for Statistics, the daily production of oil has been stagnating or even slightly declining in the Soviet Union for a little more than 6 months.

At the same time investment costs of energy production are steadily rising, especially for oil and natural gas; by now they absorb nearly a third of all Soviet industrial investments. The reason: Soviet oil and natural gas deposits are located in inaccessible regions and deep below ground.

The more investments the Soviet Union must deploy in the energy sector to maintain its current production volume, the less money is available for other branches of the economy. This sets quite rigid limits to any further increase in oil and natural gas production, because in that case even more

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additional resources would be needed and then unavailable to other and also important industries. The result would be serious losses in total Soviet economic growth.

On the other hand the curtailment of energy investments is not a way out of the dilemma either, because without increased energy use the Soviet planned economy would also stagnate. Even now the forecasts for the Soviet Union's economic development in the 1980's are based on obviously reduced growth rates (below 4 percent).³

A slow down of oil and natural gas development would also have the disadvantage that the Soviet Union would be unable to meet the growing needs of its allies. Although this expectation is occasionally heard, it would be a mistake for the West to assume that any exacerbation of the energy conflict within Eastern Europe might fuel the efforts at autonomy of the smaller CEMA countries now dependent on the Soviet Union. These countries lack the foreign exchange to purchase the necessary raw materials on the world market. (Even Romania which has its own natural gas and oil deposits, must increasingly rely on oil imports).

Any neglect of Soviet energy investments would also mean that the Soviets would be less able than hitherto to pay by energy supplies for imports from the West (for example pipes for natural gas). Currently the Soviet Union obtains 50 percent of its foreign exchange from the sale of oil and natural gas.⁴

The Soviet Union also uses its purchases in the West to build up a more efficient export industry. It thereby pursues the aim in future increasingly to earn Western currencies by the sale of products other than oil and gas. If it were to be compelled to reduce its energy exports to the West in the next few years, it would no longer be able to finance the appropriate imports. Consequently the planned restructuring of Soviet exports would be even more difficult than it is already. It is quite possible that the Soviet Union might react to such a situation by a renewal of isolationist policies. A decline in contacts with the West, however, would do more than deepen internal bloc dependencies: It would also threaten the progress of détente.

The problems of East European energy developments here touched upon are particularly acute as long as the Soviet Union and its allies are left to their own devices. That is why we have here a suitable starting point for the actual cooperation of all CSCE countries. If the East European shortage of foreign exchange and investment resources were less acute, broader cooperation in the energy sector would not really have a proper base.

In the conditions now prevailing East and West could help one another at least in some fundamental points: More than ever now the West is interested in the expansion of the worldwide energy supply, and Eastern resources might

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contribute thereto to a substantial extent. On the other hand the East needs technologies to conserve energy, loans to meet the existing trade deficits and capital to develop the raw material sources. All this could be made available by the Western countries.

Reducing the Shortage of Energy by Cooperation

Such a cooperative approach would therefore provide several benefits: 1. The available volume of energy would be increased; 2. international competition for scarce resources would be reduced; 3. the inclination to protectionist isolation would lessen and the market kept open to all--including the countries poor in energy resources; 4. cooperation between the antagonistic systems would be strengthened; 5. economic interests would be linked to detente; 6. readiness to long-range considerations and steadiness in East-West relations would be encouraged.

In addition a cooperative resolution of the energy problem would lessen the danger of renewed hostility between the systems and help avoid the competition for oil from becoming a confrontation threatening world peace.

Moreover detente could do with some new impetus. That applies especially to the field of economic cooperation which has tended to slow down in recent years, if not actually to reverse. In 1976, for example, firms in the Federal Republic of Germany sold the CEMA member countries 1.1 percent and in 1977 2.1 percent less goods than in the respective previous year, nor did the 0.5 percent growth achieved in 1978 indicate a real change in exports to the East.⁵ Mainly responsible for this negative trend is the import restraint exercised by the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union and Poland especially have very large debts in the West and are trying to reduce their trade and balance of payments deficits by lowering imports and raising exports. Yet this policy also puts a brake on reciprocal exchange, a trend which affects not only trade but is likely also to exert an adverse influence on detente in general.

It is therefore in the interest of all CSCE countries in fact to use all the potential available to reverse this stagnating trend. The energy sector provides one of these opportunities, especially because the first preparatory steps toward cooperation have already been taken. In May 1978, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union negotiated an "agreement on the development and deepening of long-range cooperation in the field of business and industry" with a term of 25 years, which also involves cooperation in the energy sector and the grant of government guarantees for loans extended. This agreement was intended primarily to ensure the continuity of exchange relations and the opportunities for communication resulting therefrom; it might well become the basis for a more comprehensive all-European settlement.

The involvement of all European countries would be desirable, because a problem such as the security of energy supplies extends well beyond the scope of

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bilateral agreements. Multilateral cooperation in the energy sector could draw on the experiences and preparations of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in Geneva. At the same time it would be advisable not rigidly to confine ourselves to the organizational framework of the ECE but also to study other possibilities for multilateral discussions and subsequent potentially more binding methods of cooperation.

On the other hand, though, some objections are raised in Western Europe regarding an unduly great commitment in this matter. The most important refers to the fear that the West might become dependent on Eastern energy supplies and consequently suffer restriction of its foreign political scope. In fact no meaningful cooperation is feasible unless both parties are prepared for an intensive exchange, that is long-range agreements. It is impossible jointly to develop major fuel and energy complexes, create new international systems for the transportation of oil and natural gas, install trans-Continental high-voltage lines and agree on a comprehensive financial program calculated in decades--only for short-term political considerations later to decide on rescinding everything. Insofar it is true that an effective all-European energy cooperation presumes the will to long-range cooperation and calls on us to be ready for and interested in steady long-range cooperation.

Matters take on a different aspect if the argument of the risk of dependence relates to the defense situation of the West. Here any Eastern prospects for exerting political pressure on the West would be exceedingly small. Currently the countries of the European Community obtain from the Soviet Union only 3.9 percent of their oil needs and 4.3 percent of their natural gas requirements.⁶ Even if these percentages were to double, the critical limit would be far from reached; experts have calculated this limit at 13-15 percent for oil and 15-20 percent for natural gas. Incidentally, the member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA) have made compensatory provisions for the case that one of them should not receive any oil deliveries for any length of time.

The danger of dependence has so far emerged mainly in relations with the OPEC countries which cover more than 50 percent of West European oil consumption.⁷ An expansion in the Eastern share of energy imports would in fact have the advantage that there would be more suppliers, thus reducing the unilateral dependence on the OPEC cartel. Moreover we should not forget that any disruption of East-West cooperation would hit the CEMA countries at least as hard if not harder. Central planning would be upset, leading to serious supply problems and major investment gaps.

An oil embargo by the Soviet Union, while not crippling West European supplies, would therefore have serious implications for Eastern Europe. At the same time, for defense political reasons, we must reject any reservations about more intensive economic cooperation. Reciprocal interlocking provides a stabilizing factor which should not be underrated, especially if economic relations are so beneficial to both parties that the short-term profit of a supply boycott would in every case be substantially less than the long-term

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loss consequent upon a break in these relations. Interlocking may clearly strengthen the interest in the continuity of the exchange, and that in turn is likely to have beneficial effects on the readiness to defuse potential conflict situations.

We must also consider that it is precisely long-range and more comprehensive types of cooperation (reasonable in the energy sector), which encourage the evolution of confidence. That also is a positive security factor. Parallel to the corresponding measures at military level (such as the exchange of observers at military exercises) and in tourism and culture (such as the exchange of youth groups, scientists, artists, and so on), economic cooperation contributes to greater transparency and more information about the social reality in East and West. An intensive exchange requires both parties to acquire greater knowledge of the partner's economic decisionmaking processes, his economic aims and his potential for carrying them out. This presumes that the systems open up to one another, that they are more ready to communicate and overcome the current "fear of touching." At the embassy level, for example, the trade promotion offices in Moscow, Warsaw, Bucharest and lately Budapest are important aids for such more intensive types of communication in the realm of economic exchange.

By developing this kind of basis for confidence we will also take a step forward to the development of East-West partnership in defense matters. Among the various types of cooperation some are particularly suitable for the further pursuit of this goal. They include:

1. Cooperation by firms: Involved here is cooperation in the development, manufacture and sale of products. The closer and longer such business relations, the more necessary do personal contacts become at all levels of the common operations.
2. Direct investments abroad (joint ventures): Here Western firms invest capital in East European enterprises, for example for the modernization of some products or manufacturing processes. This requires the extensive exchange of data and the expansion of freedom of movement for all those involved.
3. Cooperation in basic research: Joint commissions would handle supra-enterprise research tasks (such as environmental control, raw material development or earthquake prediction).

The dimension of the reciprocal communication to be achieved by these types of cooperation will largely depend on the volume, duration and comprehensiveness of the respective agreement as well as on the personnel involved, the kind of know-how required and the difficulties of the assignment.

Increased cooperation in the energy sector would be particularly promising from all these aspects. Of course no intensive commitment on the level of economic cooperation can possibly replace needed agreements in the sectors of defense security and human rights. All the "baskets" agree at the

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Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation to strengthen detente have equal value, and their problems cannot be removed by undue emphasis on a particular basket. Nevertheless, progress in the economic sector may well have beneficial effects on other areas of negotiations--especially if such progress promotes not only business but also reciprocal confidence, security and communication.

Further efforts at cooperation will need largely to follow up general declarations of intent by practical application--for example in the energy sector. The CSCE Conference set for November 1980 in Madrid might provide a good opportunity in the coming months to use all three baskets to develop cooperative proposals and projects in the interest of all those involved in the CSCE process.

FOOTNOTES

1. Friedemann Mueller, "Die Sowjetische Energiesituation als Ausgangspunkt fuer Gesamteuropaeische Kooperationsmoeglichkeiten--Ueberlegungen Nach der Belgrader Konferenz" [The Soviet Energy Situation as the Starting Point for Possible All-European Cooperation--Reflections Following the Belgrade Conference], Ebenhausen 1978 (SWP-AP 2186), pp 13 f.
2. In the Soviet Union also nuclear technology, especially mastery of the fast breeder reactor, has not advanced far enough for its long-term industrial use to be considered certain at this stage. A prototype of the fast breeder reactor is currently being tested in Shevchenko, another one is under construction in Beloyarsk. See DIW [German Institute for Economic Research], "The Expansion of Nuclear Energy To Secure the Self-Sufficiency of CEMA Energy Supplies," DIW-WOCHENBERICHT No 35/1979, p 368.
3. Friedemann Mueller, "All-European Cooperation in the Energy Sector," EUROPA ARCHIV No 11/1979, p 317.
4. Friedemann Mueller, "Produktion und Aussenwirtschaftsbeziehungen der RGW-Laender im Energiesektor bis 1990--Voraussetzungen Einer Ost-West Zusammenarbeit" [Production and Foreign Trade Relations of the CEMA Countries in the Energy Sector Through 1990--Prerequisites for East-West Cooperation], Ebenhause 1979 (SWP-AP 2201), p 14.
5. DIW, "Stagnation of Exports to the CEMA Countries Continues," DIW-WOCHENBERICHT No 13/1979, p 149. The data on exports to the CEMA countries do not take inner-German trade into account.
6. See United Nations, "World Energy Supplies 1972-1976," New York 1978.

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7. In fact the Federal Republic obtains more than 75 percent of its oil imports from the five major OPEC countries. See Achim von Heynitz, "Strukturentwicklung der Internationalen Energiebeziehungen und Ihre Konsequenzen fuer die Sicherheit der Energieversorgung" [Structural Development of International Energy Relations and Their Consequences for the Security of Energy Supplies], Ebenhausen 1979 (SWP-F 271), p 180.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MARCHAIS' PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN TACTICS DISCUSSED

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 29 Oct 79 pp 34-35

[Article by Andre Lesueur: "Marchais' Standard"]

[Text] Everything is ready: the man, the campaign, the strategy. The communist party, which willingly denounces in others the "presidential obsession" thus becomes the first party already prepared to face the 1981 elections.

The candidate is obvious. It will be Georges Marchais. Of course, on several occasions, the communist party secretary general has disclosed that he was not the only person who could represent his party in a competition on such a scale. Yet no one, neither in his circle nor in the preceding generation could hope to achieve a better score. Georges Seguy alone could have aspired to play this role but the difficulties he is facing in ensuring the cohesion of the CGT are arguing him out of it.

For the past three years, first allied to the socialists and then fighting them, Marchais has gained the stature of a star. Thanks to intensive training provided by television technicians close to the communist party, he has become one of the most watched attractions on the small screen, to the point that, after a particularly spectacular performance, in February 1978, one of his "coaches" told him that, "a little more effort, Georges, and you would be ready for a variety show."

This is true: Mr Marchais is making a part of France laugh, a part which has definitively stopped considering him a serious man. However, his performance is aimed at the other part of the country, with his silent mimic, broad gestures, exclamations, and ungrammatical speech as much as political arguments.

Considered the star of an electorate which identifies itself with Gui Lux's customers, Marchais has finally become a leader. In effect, his party's 23rd congress noted by the removal of Roland Leroy as secretary general, established his authority over the communist party. Hence we have witnessed a personalizing of power within the party, comparable to that of Maurice Thorez in the past.

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This could be illustrated by the "Notebooks of the Struggle" operation. With the help of these notebooks, whose distribution was announced on 8 October by Charles Fiterman, the communist party intends to learn "the needs, claims, and suggestions" of the workers. It is a question of making an extensive inventory of discontent, in the light of which the communist candidate would be able, subsequently, to formulate his speeches.

These "notebooks" come from a file bearing the name of Georges Marchais. Mr Fiterman himself acknowledged that this detail had been conceived with an eye to the 1981 elections.

Finally, these "notebooks" ask their recipients questions covering three topics which, undoubtedly, will be the axis of Marchais' campaign. First, "the struggle against injustice and inequality;" then, "struggle against real waste;" finally, "the struggle against the selling of France and for "produce French."

This third topic would extend the rather nationalistic campaign waged by the communist party on the occasion of the European elections. At that time the party had balanced its losses in its traditional strongholds by taking over a national electorate which it had lacked until then.

Actually, the diversification of its electorate faces the communist party with a problem. It is not certain that the new voters who joined it in its fight against European integration would follow suit, specifically in the case of a presidential election. That is the reason for the efforts undertaken in the course of a national council (a mini-congress) attended by the leaders on 20 and 21 October in Bagneux to put the party back on the basis of its traditional electorate.

Cautioning the workers as much against the "supporters of class cooperation" (meaning the socialists) as against "the class opponents," Marchais claimed that the purpose of the communist party was to be more than ever before the "only party of the working people." Jean Colpin, in charge of the Enterprises Sector, was to make the following remark:

"The strengthening of our activities in enterprises will be of great importance to the success of a party candidate in the 1981 presidential elections."

Therefore, in 1981 Marchais will be the candidate of the workers and the "neglected." This implies an aggressive strategy toward those who try to fight on the old grounds, i.e., the socialists.

The communists have made their choice among the possible candidates of the socialist party for the presidential elections. They prefer Michel Rocard. His image as a social democrat will enable them, actually, to benefit from the workers' vote.

Conversely, Francois Mitterrand has been twice the sole candidate of the left (in 1965 and 1974). The communist voters have become used to voting

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for him. Furthermore, the political line which Mitterrand has imposed on the socialist party, which unanimously voted, last Wednesday, in favor of the "socialist plan" clearly puts him on the left. Therefore, in the first round he will be a more feared opponent of the communist party, whatever his chances in the second round might be.

The purpose of the communists in the next few months, therefore, will be to destroy the good image of the socialist party and, above all, that of Mr Mitterrand. Hence, the personal attacks launched against him. Thus, on 26 September Mr Fiterman stated on the subject of Europe the following in L'HUMANITE: "Would Francois Mitterrand like to take France back to the time of the cold war policy practiced 30 years ago by the governments of which he was a part?" Again, on 1 October, reporting on a meeting of the board of the socialist party, L'HUMANITE stated: "We were taken back 25 years, to the time of the cold war, the time when Francois Mitterrand, together with the socialist party and the right, within the government, was waging the war in Algeria."

The socialists retaliated by focusing on the topic of freedoms. On 16 October Mr Mitterrand, speaking at the Porte de Pantin, hurled the following at the communist party:

"It is impossible to build freedom starting with concentration camps."

This explains the clarity with which the communist party denounced on Wednesday the "iniquitous sentences" passed at the trial of the dissidents in Prague. Yet, it did not question the legitimacy of those who passed this verdict.

This aggressive strategy on the part of Mr Marchais is accompanied by an effort to recapture the party on the ideological level.

The weekly which the party is planning to start (see below) is part of an effort to regain the objecting intellectuals. The emphasis put on the idea of self-management, previously rejected by the communist party, aims at seducing this fringe of critical intellectuals which has developed to the left of the party, as a reaction to the pragmatism of the political line followed for the past three years.

In this respect, the purpose of a book by Felix Damette, Central Committee member, and titled "Pour une strategie autogestionnaire" [For a Self-Management Strategy] (Editions sociales) is to explain that the "union at the basic level" promoted by the communist party is nothing but a call to the workers to "self-manage" the union of the left.

The CGT has been assigned a role in the campaign already launched by the communist party. Marchais pointed out at the national council in Bagneux that, "It is not the role of the trade union to explain in the enterprises the socialists' turn to the right."

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This was an appeal for activism by the party members in enterprises. It was also, and above all, an acknowledgment of the specific mission of the CGT.

Whereas the communist party rejects the unification of the left, the CGT, conversely, should seek an agreement with the other unions, in order to "rake more widely." In this sense Georges Seguy explained in Bagneux the need to open more the leaders of the CGT to political currents other than the communist party, it being understood that, at the proper time, the CGT will know how to choose its candidate, as was the case in 1978.

All the parts of this machinery are not aimed, clearly, to take Mr Marchais to the Elysee Palace. It is simply a question of press closely the socialist candidate in the first round or even to outstrip him. This way, should Giscard d'Estaing be reelected as president of the republic, and the socialist party left to the centrifugal forces which would tear it apart, leftist unity could be reborn in a new ratio of forces which, naturally, would favor the communist party.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FORMER PCF MEMBER GARAUDY CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENCY

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 29 Oct 79 pp 111-112, 122-123, 130, 132, 138, 146, 152, 154.

[Interview of Roger Garaudy conducted by Catherine David: "Garaudy, One Who Has No Regrets. . ."]

[Text] Philosopher, professor, art historian, for the past eight years Roger Garaudy has stood on the margin of active political life. All of a sudden he has now announced his candidacy for the presidency of the republic. Expelled from the PCF [French Communist Party], he claims to have been vaccinated against the temptations of intolerance. It is true that his last book "l'Apel aux vivants" [Call to the Living] (Seuil) could be considered an impassioned indictment of all dogmatisms. Yet--as will be seen from the interview he granted to Catherine David--this beautiful thrust does not lead him to self-criticism. Stalinist purges, the German-Soviet pact, or the events in Hungary? No, he has no regrets. His certainties were shaken up only by the attitude taken by the communist party in May 1968. Here is, therefore, what this confusing witness is: Marxist, Christian, ecologist, and zealous defender. . . of Ayatollah Khomeini.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Your entire book is a defense of modern prophesy. Then, in your last page, you announce your intention: to be a candidate at the 1981 presidential elections. Would you be, therefore, the prophet of France of the year 2000?

ROGER GARAUDY: No, naturally, one should not play fast and loose with words. Mohammed, Zarathoustra, and Jesus Christ were prophets. . . Actually, my book pleads for a new growth. To me prophesy is an attempt to provide answers to a problem which cannot be encompassed either by politics or economics but which applies to man in his entirety and which goes beyond the limits of a specific time. We are currently following such a way that any drifting of the system would be suicidal.

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We are being told that the cost of energy will double every eight years. This means that even if we were to find an amount of oil equal to the one discovered since the beginning of mankind this would postpone the end by no more than eight years. We will have used up uranium even faster than petroleum. All curves showing food shortages in the Third World converge around the years 2020 or 2030: only 40 years! That is why, entering the fray, I claim that any continuance of the growth system under which we live would mean the assassination of our grandchildren. I have three of them, aged 2, 5 and 8. I ask myself whether they would be able to live to be 50. Yet, should matters continue in the current direction and with the current rhythm, I would be forced to answer in the negative. What does prophesy have to do here? It is an act of faith, of trust as such, even if the facts seem to contradict.

N.O.: Your first chapter describes an apocalypse. . .

R. GARAUDY: Yes. Yet, it is the shortest in my book. In my view, the critical part is the least important. It is a question of showing the direction in which the drifts of our age would be taking us should we do nothing to avoid this. However, I am an optimist: This is not to say that everything is alright but that we must find the means to surmount a given situation. All the criticism I hear is pertinent but I see no solution emerging. Unquestionably, this is because this model of growth is linked with a cultural model which I have actually described as Faustian, since it is based on individualism and on the narrow scientific concept of reason as a means of power, as a means for dominating nature and other people.

It is within this Faustian perspective that we are marching to catastrophe. We are very far from Marlowe's hopes for the Renaissance, as expressed in his initial "Faustus:" "Become a God through your powerful mind." This model has perverted the ties between man and nature considered a reservoir of raw materials and a dump for our offal. From this viewpoint, exhausting resources or polluting one and the same. From the birth of Faustian man to the Renaissance our societies have vacillated between a jungle individualism and an ant heap totalitarianism. However, we have never proceeded from the idea of the community. We have never tried to conceive of another relation with divinity in which the divine would appear as an addition of strength in the world.

Yet, cultural model and modus of development are connected. The reason for which our system is suicidal is that we have become attached to this Faustian, this Western model. In the first part of my book I try to perceive the wisdoms of three worlds, wisdoms which we have rejected when we have not destroyed them: that of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. I then ask myself what could such wisdoms teach us, i.e., essentially the establishment of a different link between man and nature. A similar impression is gained by a Chinese painting of the song age, a Persian carpet, or an African dance: Nature does not belong to me, it is I who belong to nature. As to ties among people, such countries have had real communities which were not based on domination, rivalry, or power. . . .

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N. O.: However, domination, rivalry, and power are not Western monopolies. . .

R. GARAUDY: Essentially, they are Western, if we consider that the mind is an instrument for domination. A concept is a way for manipulating objects and people to the extent to which they are assimilated with these objects. I consider the term "human science" very dangerous: The only science is that of the alienated man. Science could teach us a great deal of things about man except for the essential, what makes him avoid the laws governing objects. A person who makes a free choice is no longer the object of this type of observation. Naturally, he could be used and manipulated through economic, psychological, and sociological techniques, but only to the extent to which one has the concept of reducing what one is. It is true that in daily behavior everything takes place as though man were merely a consumer, a user, a worker, or vacationer; these are an entire series of functions which could be reduced to relations among objects. They want to make a science out of that. However, should such a person exercise his right to regain control over his own destiny, this could be predicted by no science.

N. O.: That is what you describe as the "presence of the divine in man". .

R. GARAUDY: Yes, it is this additional force which allows us to outstrip our conditioning, and our alienations, and to open us to a transcendence in terms of nature, and to possibilities which are not the extension of our former determinisms. . .

N. O.: You are rushing ahead, you are moving without transition from transcendence and philosophy to urban matters, to problems of employment or petroleum. You mix everything together, as though there had been no separation between church and state. . .

R. GARAUDY: It is not a question of the church. The church, no more than political parties, could resolve our problems. If it is a question of philosophy, throughout the world philosophy is a style of life. It is only in the West that it has been reduced to merely a way of thinking, to a conceptual phenomenon. A way of life? If so, it is a strictly human way of life. What is strictly human in man is what is divine in him: the possibility to not be burdened by his past. Hence my criticism of the positive concepts of specialists who tell us, each one in his own area, that we are the prisoners of our determinisms, whether biological, instinctual, or cultural. . . . Naturally, all this has a great influence on my life. However, what makes a man out of me is the possibility to break with all this.

You are still speaking of transcendence. Actually, I believe that the most concrete point is achieved by tearing ourselves loose. It is in this sense that growth is not simply an economic or political phenomenon but, above all, a phenomenon of faith, in the broadest meaning of the term. I do not regret the separation of the church from the state but wish for the reintroduction of the transcendental dimension in economic and political life. Political

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economy is based on the postulate that society is a working body and that man is here to work and consume. This is the definition of the alienated man.

That which is called scientific socialism is the extension of this alienated economy. However, the reasons for which I am a socialist, ready to give my life for socialism, are outside such reductions. I cannot force you to share them through demonstrations. Actually, all of us stem from a postulate, both positivists and mystics. The only difference is that the believers are aware of their postulates. The others, unaware of them, go into dogmatism.

N. O.: You know quite a lot about dogmatism, after all these years spent in the communist party in the most Stalinist period. . . .

R. GARAUDY: Yes, precisely. The reason that I can understand faith is that I have lived dogmatism. I could not have crossed this step had I been a skeptic. One does not switch from skepticism to faith. Dogmatism and faith share the will to rest one's entire life on one's belief.

N. O.: Yet, is it not because of faith that one is immune to dogmatism?

R. GARAUDY: The danger is that faith degenerates into religion. I do not identify Christianity with any shape it may assume at a given time in its history. Faith is a means for making things relative. To be a dogmatic means to settle within the being, to state what it is, to formulate an absolute, definitive, complete truth. It is at that point that inquisition begins to grow. If you do not share my opinion, it is either because you are sick for which reason you should be sent to a mental hospital; or else, it is because you are malevolent, and you will end your days in prison or on the scaffold. Inquisition is engendered by dogmatism.

N. O.: You have been quite a conscientious inquisitor. . . .

R. GARAUDY: I could have been. All this is based on a postulate. It is not illogical to support Hitler. It is not illogical to wish for nuclear extermination. It is not a question of logic but of a primitive choice. One could very well be an absolute nihilist and consider that any destruction is worthwhile. It depends on the concept one has of man.

N. O.: Is this temptation you once had to engage in dogmatism that is a safeguard for you today?

R. GARAUDY: This was more than a temptation. I was in it up to my neck. . . .

N. O.: . . .Which helps you to determine the risk of faith. However, the others, those to whom you would like to impart faith, they have no such background to protect them. . . .

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R. GARAUDY: You know, faith does not come when one wishes it, the way one could call a dog. All I can do is feel that all my certainties are relative. In my youth I was impressed by the following statement made by Protestant theologian Karl Barth: "All that I tell God is told by a man." What is dangerous is slogans such as "Gott mit uns". . . Currently the same problem is found in Islam. . .

N. O.: In your book you say a great deal of good things about Ayatollah Khomeini. . .

R. GARAUDY: Yes, I acknowledge that we owe him a tremendous debt. He had the merit of questioning the Western growth system which was not only destroying the cultural traditions of his country but also was leading it to bankruptcy, a system which was profitable only for an infinitesimal minority of the population. His second merit is to have seen that this questioning would have a validity only if it was based on a religious point of view. . .

N.O.: Actually, he is converting his religion into ideology, for which you congratulate him. However, this is a stance which is even more "dogmatic," to use your own term, than that which consists of converting an ideology--Marxist for instance--into a religion. . . This enables the Ayatollah to convert the mixing of spiritual with temporal powers into a basic principle. . .

R. GARAUDY: No, a few weeks ago he passed the word to his komitehs that, in the future, he would no longer deal with problems pertaining to governmental activities. . .

N. O.: He has said many other things as well. . .

R. GARAUDY: But this is something he has just said. No, his contribution has been considerable: His objection to the model of growth and his prophetic role. . . Furthermore, it is no longer possible, thanks to him, to analyze force ratios as in the past. It is no longer sufficient to count the number of rifles and cannons. Already Lenin mistrusted this kind of reasoning, and when Trotsky was telling him that objective conditions had not developed in Russia for a revolution, he answered that one can easily become an opportunist by being too objective. Iran had an untra-sophisticated army, the fifth most powerful in the world, which had at its disposal all the means of repression, ranging from torture to missiles. It was faced with a people with bare hands. Yet, until the time of the seizure of power it was a non-violent revolution. After that things occurred, some of which may be deplorable. There is mention of 500 dead. This is too much, even one would be too much. In the final account, however, I do not see in past history a revolution which has cost so little. . .

N. O.: In the beginning of your book you give a vibrant praise to feminism. It would be somewhat embarrassing to praise Khomeini to the skies after that.

R. GARAUDY: This does not bother me in the least. We must not judge other cultures through our Western glasses. The wearing of the chador is the business of Iranian women. During the war in Algeria a number of women were

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wearing the veil as a sign of rebellion against the West. It is not a question of imposing the veil to French women. Actually, no one is forced the chador, it is simply recommended. It is said that women must dress decently. However, this could apply to a mini-skirt.

Hearing Chapour Bakhtiar say, "The mullahs to the mosque! It means that he is only transposing in Iran a slogan of the Third Republic." In the Moslem perspective, in which the Koran dictates a way of life, this idea has no meaning whatever. Man is an entity. One cannot slice him into parts, here the spiritual and there the material. That is what I describe as the introduction of a transcendental dimension in political and economic life.

N. O.: Specifically, what would the introduction of such a transcendental dimension mean in France in 1981?

R. GARAUDY: First, position oneself outside the four big parties which, regardless of apparent divergences, reason everything on the basis of a few common denominators. All of them agree on a concept of growth which presumes an endless growth of production and consumption. The right emphasizes production more. . .

N. O.: Yet, Giscard d'Estaing has sounded the alarm on the subject of a consumer society. . .

R. GARAUDY: Yes, I have heard him say so; he says a great deal of good things which are not seen in his politics. . . Well, the left emphasizes distribution. However, the principles remain the same. The difference between Mr Barre's Blois program and the "Common Program" was that of one percent in the evaluation of the growth rate! Furthermore, they all agree on the need for nuclear armaments, including the communist party. Last night I pointed out to Marchais that the fact of accepting nuclear armaments, if one bears in mind that French missiles have a range not exceeding 2,800 kilometers, means to align oneself in the camp of those who consider the USSR the only possible enemy. On the other hand, the missiles would not go beyond the Azores. . . . It is not very serious to talk of defense from all sides under such conditions. . . .

N. O.: Your relations with Marchais seem to have improved since you left his ranks. . .

R. GARAUDY: Oh, they are quite intermittent. I have seen him only twice, once at a Theodorakis concert and the second time at the Algerian Embassy. I am not dead set against the communist party. In my view it is not the main enemy. However, I have no desire whatever to rejoin it. To me parties are a form of obsolete organization. They were very progressive in the 18th and 19th centuries. Today, however, they are merely machines for ciphoning off the initiatives of the masses. They proceed on the basis of the organization of classes like a parliament operates on the national level: through the delegation of power. All of them agree on growth, nuclear armaments, and nuclear energy, which is an aberration: A country with nuclear power plants is militarily indefensible.

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What enemy would make himself hated by launching atom bombs when the same result could be obtained with conventional bombs aimed at a nuclear power plant--two or three times more powerful than Hiroshima? All this is illusory. I was startled to read in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR the debate between General Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti, two men I know and hold in esteem. However, saying crazy things such as "If Cambrai is destroyed we could bomb Kharkov," may be the truth but they forget to add that if we bomb Kharkov there would be no Paris, no France! Then, one of them answers "We would have nuclear submarines left." This vengeance of a dead man is poor consolation.

The basic error is the same which was committed in the past with the Maginot line: the belief that a people could be defended without this people. The only true dissuasion is to make the opponent understand that he could rely on any cooperation of the people. In 1968, in Czechoslovakia, before that poor Dubcek lost everything through naivete, the people wanted to resist. They proved it for a few days. What matters is consensus. Even Michel Debre writes in his white paper on defense that there are no "possible defenses without popular consensus." What I say on the subject of defense I also say on the subject of the parties which, I am afraid, are nothing but the technocratic form of politics. I vote, I delegate. . . One speaks in my name. That is what must be changed urgently.

N. O.: Do you have an alternative?

R. GARAUDY: The only source of power is popular consent. It could be achieved through force. Such was Hitler's technique. That is not what we are looking for. The problem is how to obtain this consent on the basis of a common project. If France is indefensible the reason is not because it is short of one or another weapon but because every Frenchman asks himself what is it that he must defend. In the old agrarian society this was very simple. The peasant was defending his land. The 19th century bourgeoisie had its markets to defend. Today, however, there is such an economic breakdown, such a disintegration of the social fabric, that were France to be attacked, the situation would be far worse than in 1940.

What I suggest instead? Basic communities, economic, political, and spiritual units sufficiently small to ensure the participation of everyone. It is being said that this is impossible in large-scale industry. Yet, look at the cooperative in Montdragon, in the Basque country. It is one of the biggest Spanish enterprises with 25,000 workers, manufacturing household equipment. Its structure is interlinked. One workshop supplies another so that each has its share of responsibility. This is working quite well. We also have the example of the Migros enterprises in Switzerland, which account for 40 percent of the Swiss food output. They have existed for the past 30 years as federated independent units. It is not a question of abolishing the representative system but of eliminating outside, professional representations.

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I was in parliament for 14 years. For 14 years I have looked at the same people, those who make the political caste, alienated from the population, but which make decisions in its behalf. This is a caricature of democracy. The party in power is elected with a small majority. In all liberal democracies there is a tremendous political entropy, everything is being decided on the basis of confused laws. There is no resulting project, there is no reason, basically, to vote for the left rather than for the right. Their plan is the same: to preserve the status quo.

N. O.: Is it from your seat in the Elysee Palace that you will organize such base communities in the enterprises?

R. GARAUDY: Self-management cannot be granted, it must originate at the base. All that one could do is to eliminate the obstacles. The essential task of a president of the republic is to abolish as quickly as possible the presidential system. He must restore the power to its true repository: the basic communities. It is always believed that there is nothing between private enterprise and nationalization. Yet, there are other formulas such as municipal and regional systems. . . . The essential is for the workers, rather than the owners of capital, to answer the four basic questions in the enterprise: final output, organization, responsibility, and distribution of results. However, in the age of multinationals the problem of nationalization does not seem to me essential. The problem is to know who sets world prices.

In Dakar colonialism imposed a monopoly on peanuts. President Senghor nationalized the peanuts. But who sets the prices? The Huiles Lesieur. For a long time the United States used the following means of blackmail in Cuba: to overthrow a government it lowered the price of sugar. Marx could not have conceived of such problems. Today to be a Marxist does not mean to repeat what Marx said quite accurately when he studied 19th century English capitalism. . . .

N. O.: Do you remain a Marxist?

R. GARAUDY: I should hope so! Only it is not a question of repeating after Marx but of using his method for the sake of discovering the contradictions of our age and for developing a plan capable of surmounting them. That is what Marxism is. It is entirely alive, it is a methodology for historical initiative.

N. O.: Before reaching Marxism you went through Christianity. . . .

R. GARAUDY: Neither my father nor my mother were religious. In my youth I wanted life to have a meaning. From this point of view I was, perhaps, somewhat of a Boy Scout. I still am. I continue to believe that life has a meaning. The day I shall no longer believe this I shall kill myself. I found this meaning in Christianity first and, subsequently, in Marxism. I have always been concerned with holding both ends of the chain. Even at the peak of my dogmatism, in 1948, at the peak of Stalinism, I was engaged in

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writing a book entitled "Church, Communism, and Christians." As member of the communist party politburo I wrote "From Anatheme to Dialogue," prefaced by a German theologian. Friction develops only when a party tends to become a church and when a church claims to turn into politics.

I came to Christianity as a result of meeting exceptional people. I knew several ministers who radiated joy. I have always been impressed by joy and it is the only thing which could be taught. I taught philosophy for a long time and all that I could teach my students on the subject of Kant or the ontological argument is of no great importance. The only thing one could share is joy. Several days ago I visited Father de Foucauld's retreat in the Hoggar. Those people, who had been living up there for 28 years were radiant. . . .

As to Marxism, it took place through writings. I read Romain Rolland and Jaures. I then plunged into Marx, systematically. Having reached the 22nd volume of the old Coste edition, I went to the party to become a member. Actually, I warned them that, "I am the president of the Christian students." That was in 1933 and I was 20 years old. They accepted me as I was. It was my Christian friends who asked me to make a choice. However, I have preserved very profound bonds of friendship with them.

In 1933 the choice was obvious. It was a time when the crisis which had come from the United States had hit Europe. It was the time of the success of the first five-year plans in the Soviet Union. It was the assumption of power by Hitler and the apotheosis of Mussolini. There were 80 million unemployed in Europe, milk cows were being butchered, and one could drown in coffee while, at the same time, people were fighting for bread in the port of Genova. Facing us, there was hope. We did not know the cost of such accomplishments. We became Manicheans, seeing the world in two colors. That is the way one becomes a Stalinist. Subsequently, there came 1936 with the Popular Front, and the first vacations. One took one's bike and pedaled to the Riviera. It was stupendous.

N. O.: Did you have a bike?

R. GARAUDY: Oh, I was graduating in philosophy. But in my family. . . my mother was a milliner and my father was a low-level white collar worker. All my uncles were workers. All of them experienced this. It was extraordinary. One cannot imagine the enthusiasm of that time, and its culture. . . All French intellectuals were on the side of the Popular Front from Gide to Malraux. Looking back this seems funny. Then, there was Munich. The communist party was the only one to oppose this surrender. This enthusiasm was justified. . . .

N. O.: Had you not heard about the Moscow trials?

R. GARAUDY: We heard echoes. However, it was so clear that they had been falsified. . . I infinitely admired Bukharin, for example. However, far

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later, reading Arthur Koestler's "Zero and Infinity," I was able to compare the novel with the minutes of the trial. Everything that Koestler says about it is loaded with cuts and he says the opposite of what was factually said. . . . After the war there were books manufactured from A to Z by the CIA. . .

N. O.: Nevertheless, after Munich there was the German-Soviet pact. Did this leave you stone cold as well? . . .

R. GARAUDY: At that time I was an army private stationed in Toulouse. I remember people spitting on me. I was asked to denounce this pact. Yet, those who asked me to do so had been my perennial enemies. Even had I been worried, this fact alone would have reassured me. . .

N. O.: Yet, there were also people who were not on the other side. There were socialists, democrats, and all the true antifascists of the time, who were overwhelmed by the fact, who were indignant. Above all, there were some communists such as Nizan who considered the USSR the last bulwark against Hitler. For them it was the world turned upside down. . .

R. GARAUDY: Nizan is dead. I do not want to discuss him too much. Yet, while I was mobilized, he went to see my wife to ask her to make me sign a repudiation. She threw him out. Back home, I told her that she had acted properly. . .

N. O.: Why?

R. GARAUDY: It seemed evident to me that those are really to blame were the people who had set the trap of the Moscow agreements with France and Great Britain. They demanded of the USSR to assume obligations while forbidding it to cross Poland. It was scary. The German-Soviet pact was the only possible answer left the USSR. Actually both the memoirs of Churchill and Paul Reynaud, who are crypto-bolsheviks, clearly state that the Soviets had no other solution. No, this did not bother me. At that time I was fighting quite willingly, I must say, I liked that, I volunteered for all missions. . .

N. O.: This is again the Boy Scout talking. . .

R. GARAUDY: No, no, it was for the love of it, to cross the German lines and come back at dawn bringing people back, I liked that. I was always a simple private but quite properly decorated considering my rank. It was then that I was able to gain a close view of treason. On the Somme front there were untouched units who were forbidden to fight. . . This strengthened my belief that the traitors were indeed facing us.

Then, in the midst of the war I was arrested. In September 1940 I had set up the first resistance group. . . I was detained on the basis of a two-year old decree promulgated by Daladier, considered "an individual dangerous to national defense and public safety," even though I had earned my military cross and several stars. . . At the Djelfa (Algeria) camp, where I was interned, a passing general asked me, yet once again, to denounce the

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pact: "After all, however, you, a veteran, with your citations, are you going to remain in prison for the rest of your days!" This general strengthened my belief even further. To us, in the camps, it was obvious that when the Red Army was advancing freedom was advancing with it. Later I spent one year in the USSR, after Stalin's death.

N. O.: How did you accept it?

R. GARAUDY: As a great tragedy. However, the tragedy became even greater when Khrushchev denounced Stalin. I went home thinking, "Thermidor all over again." Then I had to accept the truth. The report had been drafted badly. It was a display, a settlement of accounts. Basically, however, he was right. Yet, I have never felt for Khrushchev the admiration I felt for Stalin. I had known Stalin closely, I had shared a meal with him. He did not give the impression of being a dictator. He did not wear his decorations. He kept wearing his old soldier's overcoat and the fatigues. He was surrounded by his comrades who were thumping him in the back. He looked like a Cantal peasant. I could not conceive of him as a dictator.

Krushchev's speech was what killed the dreams. It was not the personality cult which was at the bottom of the matter, the tragedy was deeper. If all the evil comes from the fact that a person is bad, it would suffice to replace him with someone else for everything to go well. Yet, Stalin was more a consequence than a cause. When Lenin started the revolution, the working class accounted for no more than three percent of the active population. The number declined to one percent after the civil war and foreign invasion. The dictatorship of the proletariat started with one percent proletarians! A party began to speak for a class which was not existent yet. The apparatus began to speak in the name of a party and, finally, one man began to speak in the name of all others. That is what Stalinism is. Stalin's personal faults did play a role but a secondary one. All this led me to a global view. . . .

N.O.: Did the 1956 events in Hungary make you think?

R. GARAUDY: They bothered me less than Krushchev's speech. I could hear Admiral Horthy, this old dictator who had sought refuge in Salazar's Portugal, applauding loudly. Then, seeing LE FIGARO praise the "Budapest Commune," I found this suspicious... At that time I was as cautious as de Gaulle. He did not protest either. In Czechoslovakia, in 1968, the worst was a return to a Masaryk-type democracy, whereas in Hungary what was at stake was the return of real fascism.

N.O.: Actually, assuming that it was truly a question of a return to fascism, which is more than doubtful, to this day you deny to the Hungarians of 1956 the right to choose their own nationalism, whereas you grant the same right to the Iranians in 1979, displaying an inexhaustible tolerance. As to Czechoslovakia, actually, what was new was your way of looking at things: The Soviet tanks were the same in both 1956 and 1968. . .

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d. GARAUDY: No, in my case everything became clear in 1968, when the communist party rejected as a whole everything which was coming out in the streets, when Marchais wrote the famous article in which he spoke of Cohn-Bendit in terms of a "German anarchist," and considered that everything that was going on in the streets was absolutely alien to the workers' struggle. He was entrapped by the old systems. At that point the communist party began to tumble out of history. History does not forgive anyone who is one revolution too late.

Then, there was Czechoslovakia, and the Dubcek-Brezhnev dialogue. Dubcek, very poor and very naive, told Brezhnev that, "You are not omnipotent. We are supported by the Western parties, the Italian, French, Spanish, . . ." While Brezhnev answered, "We have the means to crush them." Then Dubcek: "Then will there ever be socialism in Western Europe?" Brezhnev: "There will not be, there must not be. . . ." Everything became clear to me. . . .

N. O.: Yet, you did not slam the door. You let yourself, as you say, "be expelled." . . .

R. GARAUDY: I had told the politburo that I will never resign. This would have been an acknowledgment that I was not following the party line. Yet, I continued to believe that I was following the right line, even though I may have been the only one to think so. Actually, I was not alone, as 15 percent of the communist party shared my thoughts. This lasted two years. . . .

N. O.: Your lifelong friend Aragon did not help you very much at that point. . . .

R. GARAUDY: My relations with him were excellent and have remained so. On the eve of the day when the congress removed me from the politburo and from all my functions, Aragon telephoned me saying that he agreed with me on everything but that I had put myself in an untenable position, for I had been published by the external press and that, consequently, he would be forced to oppose me. While later he sent me one of his books inscribed Louis to Roger, as always. . . . He is now a very old man who has lived through a major disappointment. He has thrown terrible fits against the communist party, absolutely terrible. . . . Furthermore, this man who, like many others, was looking for a way out, found it in stiffening. He began to sculpt his own statue wishing to see it as the statue of loyalty. This is an attitude which I understand and I do not blame Aragon. A thousand attempts have been made to make me speak out against him. However, I would do this today less than ever. Considering his state he would be unable to answer.

In "Word of Honor," I address myself directly to him on the subject of a sentence in his "Theater-Novel:" "Any woman I have loved I have loved her only as a mirror of myself." I wrote to him: "But, Louis, that means that you have been misleading us throughout your life. Are you so despairing

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because of politics that you are transferring your disappointments to the personal level." . . . In such a case, all that he had written about Elsa would be totally meaningless. . . .

After writing "Du surrealisme au monde reel" [From Surrealism to the Real World], a book on Aragon, I had given him the manuscript to read and he had told me two things: "Discussing me, you always speak of hope. You must delete this word. I have no hope other than a historical hope but not for this life." This occurred some 15 years ago. . . . And then he added: "Elsa plays in my life a far greater role than you mention it in your book." He took me to his windmill and for seven consecutive hours he talked to me about Elsa the way I had never heard a man speak about a woman. . . . At that time he was almost 70 years old. . . . Then, he ended with a statement that, "I have told you all this knowing that you would not use it, but I would like you to know it." This was not a literary pose. It was infinitely moving, respectable. No, I shall never say a word against Aragon. . . .

N. O.: Do you believe that you have a chance of being elected in 1981?

R. GARAUDY: It does not depend on me. . . .

N. O.: Essentially, why are you a candidate?

R. GARAUDY: To do what I say in my book. To do it specifically. This is not utopia. It is a set of very specific measures which range from setting the price of leeks to the function of the president. . . . Consider unemployment. Two million additional jobs could be opened in three years. Assume that we abandon the use of nuclear energy. Using all types of geothermal energy we could heat the entire France. It is not I who is saying this but Haroun Tazieff. For example, the entire requirement of French agriculture for energy (four percent) could be met through biomass, through the manufacturing of methane based on organic waste, without burning down forests. There is also wind and hydraulic power. . . . There are all these types of energy which we neglect. Their utilization would make it possible to create jobs spread throughout the territory and at all skill levels, from the manual worker to the engineer.

Take food prices, inflated by advertising. In five years they could be reduced by 20 percent through the use of the railroads and by establishing cooperatives, short-circuiting the middlemen.

Take social security. Discussions are useless as long as the question is how to raise payments. The real problem is how to lower expenditures. We have pharmaceutical companies which have more money than they know what to do with, and are forced to postdate some of their revenue. Let us not consider advertising costs, cruises taken by doctors, or conditioning costs. . . . Such prices could be lowered by 20 percent. The cost of medical certificates could be reduced. This would be too bad for the physicians but what matters is not the privilege of a caste but the health of a nation. The

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same could be said of hospitalization and clinical costs. The problem could be resolved within one year without increasing payments. As to the enterprises, legislation could be passed which would make it possible to set up community companies, regardless of size. These are merely a few examples. . . .

N. O.: All such measures assume a president with a great deal of power. . . .

R. GARAUDY: This power could be retained only if he is not elected by a party or a group but by a big movement of public opinion. Without this all he could do would be to handle current affairs, as is the case with the current president.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF PURGES PARTY PRESS; NEW WEEKLY TO APPEAR

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 29 Oct 79 p 36

[Article by Andre Lesueur: "The Party Cover; The Creation by the Communist Party of a New Weekly Also Corresponds to a Purge of the Entire Party Press"]

[Text] "We want to create a true weekly. Not a journal in which communists would be talking about communists." It was thus that Francois Hincker, former editor in chief of LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE (the theoretical review of the communist party) describes this publication which will be started by his party in November. It will replace FRANCE NOUVELLE, the currently weekly of the Central Committee, and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE. Its planned edition will be 100,000 copies.

The fact that Mr Hincker has accepted to be associate editor in chief of this periodical reveals, by itself, the intentions of the political bureau.

In the last congress he lost his seat in the Central Committee because of the sympathy with which he had considered the criticism of questioning intellectuals within the communist party last spring.

However, the fact that the administrative management and the political management of this weekly were assigned, respectively, to Jean-Michel Catala and Gui Hermier outlines the boundaries of the opening of the party toward its intellectuals.

Former secretary general of the Communist Youths and Central Committee member, Catala is loyal to Marchais. As to Hermier, formerly promoted by Roland Leroy (the present director of L'HUMANITE and dropped from the party secretariat at the last congress), he has been able to serve adequately the present leadership to make his way in the political bureau and be assigned, as of the autumn of 1978, the heavy responsibility of reorganizing the publications sector of the communist party.

It was he who closed down the Center for the Distribution of Books and the Press (CDLP), the distribution organ of the party, and the regrouping of the Editions sociales du Livre Club Diderot (the sales department of the CDLP).

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It was this, in fact, that led to the resignations of Antoine Spire and Lucien Seve, the directors of Editions sociales.

Yet, the communist intellectuals welcomed quite favorably the project of launching a new weekly. After some reticence, most of the old objectionists accepted to collaborate. This included, for example, Jean Elleinstein, Marcel Bluwal, Francis Cohen, and Claude Frioux (co-authors of the book "L'Urss et nous" [The USSR and We]), and the writer Raymond Jean, of the opposition cell in Aix-en-Provence.

However, many of them admit that they agreed only providing that the entire official party press would be changed. One of them stated:

"That which we intend to do in this periodical could not fail to affect the line of L'HUMANITE."

Within the communist daily a major reorganization has already been undertaken. On 18 September, addressing the party deputies, Marchais voiced the following harsh criticism:

"At the highest level of L'HUMANITE, there has not been, there is no, and there will not be any desire to implement the entire orientation of the 23rd congress."

This was a condemnation of the role which Mr Leroy plays in guiding the communist daily. The appointment of Francois Hilsum, formerly in the Communist Youths, and a Marchais loyalist, at the end of September, as associate director of L'HUMANITE, confirmed the threat which is currently menacing Mr Leroy: Having been removed from the communist party secretariat, he could now lose the directorship of the daily.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

VIEWS ON SOVIET EUROBANK OPERATIONS, GOALS REPORTED

Paris L'EXPANSION in French 5 Oct 79 pp 97-99

[Article by Pierre Beaudeau: "Incursion by the Red Bank"]

[Text] When Guy de Boysson crossed the threshold of the Commercial Bank for Northern Europe (BCEN) in 1952, he was quite aware that he was penetrating into a veritable Fort Chabrol. The virulent attacks of Jules Moch, minister of the interior at that time, accusing the Soviet bank of financing the Communist Party, were succeeded by permanent guerrilla warfare with the authorities and the parties of the right. A Parisian banker recalled "The BCEN Reds were like lepers as far as we were concerned. They were never invited to professional meetings." The Soviet bank more or less kept body and soul together through funds it got from some Eastern European central banks and then loaned back.

Total assets in 1952: 12 billion old francs. Poverty level. In 1978 the total was 18 billion, a 150 percent multiplication in current francs! The hole in the wall office has become a first rank foreign bank in Paris with an enviable reputation as an international bank. It is still accused of being Moscow's major financier by French Communist Party and in the world of international finance. In March 1979, Jean Montaldo's book "The Secrets of the Soviet Bank in France," restates the polemic about the role of the BCEN in financing the PCF and its satellites, especially in the media. Indignation from communist leaders and the Soviet bank directors--but in the world of finance? Not much stir--the French bankers have seen it all before and hurry to do business with the BCEN as usual.

"This is certainly one of the biggest financial successes of the past 20 years," a French banking official in international finance stated. "In the early sixties, BCEN directors were wanting to get out of their ghetto: at that moment when East-West exchanges were developing they were well placed to finance exchanges on their private grounds." Then, divine surprise, it was not militants wanting to gobble everything up that appeared on the scene, but knowledgeable bankers who told us: 'There is a place for you in our financial operations--we'll be happy with 10 or 15 percent.'" Gilbert Lasfargues, deputy director general, summed it up laconically: "We rejected monopoly."

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But that's not to say that in-house this policy was unanimous. But 61-year old Guy de Boysson, succeeding President Charles Hilsum in 1965, was able to override the "hardliners."

Boysson's team showed its calculations to be paying off in a profession where it's the rule "to send the elevator back down." Little by little the BCEN appeared modestly but regularly in the tallies of credit-export of equipment where it was not the initiator. These credits themselves gave BCEN an opportunity to set up finance deals more remunerative than the traditional export credits guaranteed by COFACE [expansion unknown].

The other Soviet breakthrough with its diversification of financial sources, was the development of a considerable and traditional "commercial base": fund management for the central banks of socialist countries.

Already by 1953 it had tripled its money base by 'inventing' Eurodollars. The banks of the socialist countries transferred their dollar holdings to BCEN, dollar holdings that they didn't want to return to the U.S. for political and financial reasons (the American banks do not pay interest). The BCEN loaned the money in the west in the peak period of the 'dollar gap' at a comfortable margin.

Thanks to operations of this sort, the Parisian money managers of the BCEN quickly carved out enviable reputations for themselves with their colleagues of the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank, Gosbank (its principle shareholders) and other central banks of Eastern Europe. Dollars, marks, and Swiss francs came flowing into Paris and were put into longer term placements on the international financial markets. The whole talent of BCEN directors is to play in various ways on their reputation as knowledgeable money market technicians, on the French bank statutes (the discipline imposed by the Banque de France inspires confidence) and sometimes on the Soviet nationality of the backers, to enlarge the clientele of banks depositing a part of their reserves in foreign exchange. So, first, the central banks of developing countries began beating a path to their door, then, later, commercial banks of the industrialized nations followed.

Still today the majority of the bank's resources come from these deposits, usually at short term. But the socialist countries are no longer the principle source. The USSR represents 20 percent of the resources, other socialist countries 12 percent, the Third World 5 percent, industrialized countries 41 percent, and France 22 percent. The BCEN thus receives almost two-thirds of its funds from the capitalist world: cash reserves are 60 percent in dollars, 20 percent in marks and Swiss francs together, and French francs only 20 percent. An extraordinary strategic turnabout which has its counterpart in loan activity: in diversifying its sources, the Soviet bank can multiply its loans, lengthen the term, and thus realize more sizeable margins.

Principle borrowers are banks. This is why Guy de Boysson, who applied the rule of "non-monopoly," formulated the second rule of his policy: "We are a bank for banks. We do not seek to compete with other banks for their clients."

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"Basically, we favor banking consortiums," it was affirmed at Blvd. Hausmann. "We almost always operate with others, without demanding to be the more remunerative leader of the group." And by inaugurating such new activities as commodity financing, brokering barter operations or compensation, facilitating the work of industrials exporting to Eastern Europe, BCEN is opening the way, which doesn't offend anyone.

Among their clients are banks and governments, but in spite of a few bad risks (Zaire, North Korea, Peru) the profitability of BCEN is such as to make some Parisian colleagues pale with envy: 40 million francs net profit for 1978, earnings which the shareholders have wholly reinvested during the past years. The secret of this profitability: the BCEN deals "wholesale." Yes, its gross is a tenth that of the BNP [Banque National de Paris] but with a hundredth fewer personnel.

And how do the very prudent high Soviet officials view this financial team which as seen from Moscow must appear somewhat like a dance of apprentice sorcerers. Guy de Boysson replies: "Our backers place great confidence in us. We probably have greater freedom of action than the American and English bank subsidiaries in France."

This idea of "great freedom of action," warring with the theory of "the hand of Moscow," nevertheless has, within limits, some credibility. It seems that some of these limits seem to have been set by the current management group themselves. For example, they deal only with countries which have relations with both France and the USSR. "There is no question of cabling Moscow about every move," they said at BCEN. "Every one of us is an expert in Sovietology and pretty well knows what they can aim for. This is why we have ourselves held back a little on Egypt." A sign of this attitude: the Soviet frowns when they learned of BCEN's involvement in the troubling Zaire affair. "Our big risks in the Third World," said Gilbert Lasfargues, "are Brazil, Mexico, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco." With the exception of Algeria, nothing in these commitments reveals a policy of systematic support for countries 'friendly' to the Soviet Union. "Political banking," concluded Lasfargues, "is the worst way of doing banking."

The theory of 'interior control', meaning through Vice President Vladimir Ponomarev, and full-time Soviet directors sent by the backers, has a more solid basis. "However," Guy de Boysson told us, "our shareholders have never ordered us to take action against our will. Things are evaluated better when on the spot."

But autonomy of decision is not complete where the socialist countries of CEMA are concerned. The French banks are well aware that Moscow sets limits. "The BCEN is our pilot fish there," a French banker declared. "If it hesitates on credit to some socialist country, then we know Moscow's position."

For the rest, for those who find the "sleeping partner" theory hard to swallow, the international director of a major French bank has this to

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say: "Very simply, the Soviets know that a bank is only an instrument for the equalization of short-term money and for transforming short to intermediate and long-terms,"

In this respect, the interests of the Soviet backers clearly are satisfied. Socialist countries, the USSR included, loan the BCEN 32 percent of their resources at short term, and get back equivalent loans of which two-thirds are intermediate and long term--about 20 percent of the total loans. No question but that this 'transformation' is one of the services most appreciated by the backers who have a sizeable need for western funds supplied in a stable and sure fashion. Wouldn't this be one of the true secrets of the "Red bank"?

But in spite of the advantages of the French subsidiary, nothing indicates that one day the Soviet bankers will play it off against other considerations just as "strategic." In this respect, the misfortunes of another of their banks, the Singapore subsidiary, insufficiently supervised, which plunged into real estate speculation and lost, it is said, \$400 million, rang like the Kremlin clocks through the vaulted rooms of Gosbank. Even more than their Western colleagues, the Soviet bankers are impressed by the perils of the international money markets increasing since 1974. Guy de Boysson's analysis is certainly not much different from that of the backers: "Many banks," he said, "have plunged into international operations, but their profitability decreases while their risks go up. Those countries which since 1974 have borrowed to cover their oil costs, are beginning to reach their limits in commercial banks, and with the new price increases in oil these countries will want to borrow more. The risks will thus go up...."

And high Soviet officials have a panic fear of risks! They have already intervened, exhorting the BCEN management to more moderation in the risky game of "transformations" (those not directly profitable to them). They could be tempted to tighten controls until now fairly loose.

Though the Soviets have let the BCEN internationalize its operations on a large scale and without special selectivity, their bilateralist penchants are known: it is a constant temptation to increase use of this tool for the development of East-West relations. This could come to replacing the BCEN locomotive on the narrow Paris-Moscow track. And the consequence could be to break the commercial position of the BCEN, seated on the rule of "non-monopoly," a minor consequence as seen from Moscow. It does seem that current French management would not accept such a strategy well. Will it happen like this? The 61-year old president de Boysson must be re-elected each year. "A Russian president at the BCEN? I don't dare even imagine it," shuddered a French banker. "A bank is made with money, but even more so with men."

Comrade Banker

During 4 long hours of the interview, there were a few confidences, but no cracks: at no time did Guy de Boysson lose his calm. Sidestepping elegantly

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questions he wished to avoid, he played marvelously on half-tones and an incontestable gift for persuasiveness and charm. As to the winding road that led him to the presidency of the BCEN, Guy de Boysson remains discreetly silent. For example, what crisis of conscience led the scion of an old southwest Catholic conservative family to the FTP? What ambition pushed him to get elected deputy from Aveyron under the communist banner? Then why did he suddenly abandon politics, where a brilliant career seemed in the cards, for an obscure role in a then marginal bank?

These zones of shadow make more precious those rare moments when he lifts a corner of the veil. "Yes, there was an ideological commitment associated with my entry into the bank. Those who say they are apolitical are childish and hypocritical. But it's been years since I engaged in any militant activity. My current political convictions? I am against the defense of privilege.

"What makes quality in life? It's the quality of human relationships. I like for people to express themselves in good faith.

"As for my profession, it's not just a means of earning a living. My activities support my convictions.

"What have I been reading lately? "Les 30 Glorieuses" by Jean Fourastie. My favorite authors? (A long silence). Montaigne, Montesquieu, Bertrand de Jouvenal. Marx? Yes, I discovered Marx and read him during the Occupation." The tone was not that of an enthusiastic reader.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

CLANDESTINE STATIONS PLANNED--The CGT is planning some 30 clandestine radio stations [radios libres] for the end of the year; they will broadcast beginning with the [trade-union] year-end struggles. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 26 Nov 79 p 6]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

UNIDENTIFIED TERRORIST LEADER INTERVIEWED

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 1 Oct 79 pp 60-74

[Report on interview: "Who I Am and Why I Kill" by PANORAMA editor Chiara Beria in Rome 7 September 1979; name of interviewee not given]

[Text] How To Read This Interview

A new armed party exists in Italy. It coordinates the terrorist groups that are scattered throughout the country, which have operated independently of each other in the past under the most disparate identifying symbols. Unlike the Red Brigades, this party does not have a strictly vertical structure: Rather than issuing orders, the central executive limits itself to supplying "services" ranging from information to weapons. It does not even have a name. But its membership is numerically comparable to that of the Red Brigades, according to the affirmations of one of its leaders; and its openly declared aim is to establish itself as a central checkpoint for the entire area of diffuse terrorism.

This is the most significant and disturbing of the revelations contained in the interview PANORAMA publishes on the following pages. Up to now, armed struggle in Italy has been the appropriated privilege of the Red Brigades, undisputedly the leading terrorist organization; the other groups have either confined their activities within localized limits or, when they have tried to expand them, have been unable to withstand the state's counteroffensive. A new terrorist organization is now displaying its credentials by revealing that the stage setting behind seemingly unconnected actions is in fact one and the same, and claiming credit for the "fireworks nights" and barracks attacks; and it would appear, from the murder of Fiat executive Carlo Chiglieno on Friday 21 September for which a Prima Linea [Front Line] commando claims credit,

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that "competition" with the Red Brigades is likely to develop along more bloody lines over the coming months than heretofore.

The interview's significance, however, does not end there. It includes also a number of details concerning the most tragic episodes in the terrorist escalation: The murders of Aldo Moro, Emilio Alessandrini and Antonio Varisco. According to the anonymous leader interviewed by PANORAMA, the timing of the Christian Democratic Party chairman's assassination was advanced by a practical consideration, namely, the Red Brigades fear that the forces of order were on the verge of discovering Moro's prison; and similarly concrete concerns were behind the killings of Varisco and Alessandrini, not as symbols of a powerful enemy but as dangerous adversaries in their own right. These affirmations can contribute substantially to the deciphering of acts of bloodshed that are still shrouded in mystery, and can be of some use to the investigating magistrates concerned.

The question arises as to why the mysterious "guerrilla" sought to reveal these details; as does also the question as to why he alludes, in purposely general and hence more disturbing terms, to the fact that the membership of his terrorist organization includes representatives of Autonomia as well as persons in contact with the traditional leftist parties. These questions are not easily answered. It is probably in the crisis the armed movement appears to have been undergoing the past several months, and in the spiral of internal polemics, reciprocal disownings, and low blows generated by that crisis, that an explanation is to be sought.

Unexpectedly, a "guerrilla" comes out of hiding just long enough to say what is on his mind. The result: the first interview in the history of terrorism, given to PANORAMA by one of the underground leaders of the armed struggle.

It all started with a telephone call received by editor Chiara Beria on the internal system in the head office of PANORAMA in Rome. A question: "Are you the one handling the story of the Asinara document and of Scalzone's response?" A request: An appointment, for a few hours later, in the early afternoon of Friday 7 September, near the Villa Borghese zoo. Purpose: "Revelations on the 7 April arrest," in other words, on the inquiry opened by Judge Pietro Calogero at Padua.

Arriving at the appointed place in her metallic blue Renault, as agreed (the interviewee had refused to give her any indications by which he might be recognized), Chiara Beria found herself before a thin blonde man, about 35,

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In a blue waistcoat sweater despite the oppressive heat, and Ray-Ban sunglasses, who in a slight Milanese accent (or at least with a Milanese open "e"), and without the slightest hesitation, offered her an exclusive interview with a leader of the armed struggle, "one whom Curcio knows well." In other words: himself. And to prove that he was not a mythomaniac he suggested that the content and details of the story he proposed to tell be thoroughly checked out, absolutely refusing, at the same time, to set up a new appointment: "It is now or never," he said, asking the PANORAMA reporter to hurry up and take her notes.

Thus began the conversation, by the end of which, some 2 hours later, Chiara Beria had filled many pages with explosive statements, but also with silences, deliberate reticences and ambiguous allusions--a genuine report on the political and military situation of the armed struggle in Italy issued from the shadows of the underground--an interview that opens a new chapter in the tragic story of terrorism and that signals a breakdown in the conspiracy of silence in a universe that appears more and more in crisis and more and more to be hitting out wildly.

[Question] Who are you, what is your name?

[Answer] I can only tell you that I am a physician and that, politically, I am a laborite.

[Question] Are you in hiding?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Since when?

[Answer] Do you recall when the Carabinieri circulated the story of the Red Brigades surgical operating room and Sergio Adamoli was named as the doctor who had equipped the Red Brigades hospital? I will tell you the whole story. The police, the Carabinieri, I am not sure why, circulated the name of Adamoli, either because they suspected him of terrorism, or because he is a big name and conjures up the PCI [Italian Communist Party] family album, or perhaps because they wanted to lull the real doctor: meaning myself. At least, that is the way I have thought of it. Thus, when I learned that someone had been asking about me at the hospital, I made my decision; in 12 hours I went into complete hiding. I abandoned everything: home, work, sentimental and social relationships...

[Question] But this would indicate you belong to the Red Brigades.

[Answer] That is not entirely true. I only cooperated with the Red Brigades as an irregular, as a fellow-traveler, to use your terminology. But for some years now, I have been a member and leader of another underground organization. And from the time I went into total hiding, I have broken off my relations with the Red Brigades and devoted myself entirely to the activities of my own organization.

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[Question] Which one is that?

[Answer] We have used several "trade names." Sometimes that of Front Line, sometimes other names containing the term "workers." We have sought in this manner to underscore our ties to the working class, and to press our polemic against those who, like the Red Brigades, insist more on the concept of being a political party, a revolutionary vanguard, external to, distinct and, if necessary, remote from the working class.

[Question] Why, then, did you cooperate with the Red Brigades?

[Answer] Because they are comrades, they are revolutionaries, because I feel bound to them by a form of militant and communist solidarity. And because I believed and still believe in the unity of the communist fighters.

[Question] In talking with me, in granting me this interview, are you not breaking that solidarity of which you speak?

[Answer] That solidarity has certainly not been broken by me. We have certainly not been the first. I would never have talked with a bourgeois reporter 2 years ago, not even 6 months ago. But everybody has now started blathering, from Curcio to Morucci, from Negri to Piperno. At this point, I do not see why we should let them monopolize information and debate.

[Question] But in whose name do you speak? In that of Front Line?

[Answer] Front Line no longer exists. What I mean is that Front Line is virtually routed. The organization was already decapitated with the arrest of Corrado Alunni; then came the arrests in Florence and others here and there. Front Line no longer exists as a structured and articulated organization. It could still claim credit for actions because there are still some of its members at large, but the organization as such is finished.

[Question] In whose name then do you speak?

[Answer] In that of a clandestine executive that coordinates--I say coordinates, and not commands--numerous local armed organizations.

[Question] Which ones?

[Answer] The list is very long: Armed Struggle for Communism, Workers Organization for Communism, Armed Workers Brigades, Armed Communist Proletarians, Fighting Communist Cells, Armed Proletarian Squads, and then other organizations that have grown out of the activities, the splits and in some cases the collapse of the NAP [Armed Proletarian Nuclei], the Front Line, and the Red Brigades.

[Question] In substance, are these organizations now federated?

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[Answer] No. These organizations decided about 1 year ago to coordinate and link their forces, to unify some services and some structures, to plan some actions jointly: genuine joint political campaigns.

[Question] For example?

[Answer] We are building and will soon have in operation an articulated network linking various cities to help the regular underground militants, as well as those who are not regulars but who find it necessary occasionally to go into hiding. In sum, common supply channels for the provision of passports, identity cards and personal documents. A centralized file of information that can be consulted by the various groups and enriched by their contributions, and a centralized arsenal...

[Question] An arsenal?

[Answer] Yes, jointly owned weapons available for their use.

[Question] But is the executive a centralized command?

[Answer] No, I repeat. It is a group of persons that administers this resource, that suggests and counsels, that links the various groups to enable them to operate in the most homogeneous manner possible, and that proposes and coordinates joint actions.

[Question] Which, for example?

[Answer] The Veneto "fireworks nights" were concerted actions repeated on at least two occasions, the second of which, I should point out, was after 7 April when the presumed leaders of the scattered terrorist groups were already in prison.

[Question] And which others?

[Answer] Targets like those hit 1 year ago. Men and headquarters of the Carabinieri.

[Question] Who, together with you, forms part of this executive?

[Answer] Six others besides myself. And only one of them, besides me, lives in absolute hiding. He is habitually thought of as a member of the Red Brigades, and cited by the press and the Carabinieri as a member of that organization's strategic executive, but, on the contrary, he left the Red Brigades 5 or 6 years ago. Still another one may be considered the only survivor of the NAP. I assume you are familiar with the story of the NAP. Between mistakes, trustfulness, delations and infiltrations (like that which cost Martino Zichitella his life in December 1976), traps, arrests and unsuccessful escape actions, the NAP has been completely routed. Those who survived and are under arrest joined the Red Brigades (Abatangelo, Delli

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Veneri, Panizzari, Mauro, Sofia, De Laurentiis). The very few (three or four) who remained free have dispersed. One of them has organized other underground groups and, as their representative, is part of our executive.

[Question] And who else?

[Answer] Four other comrades.

[Question] Yes, but who are they?

[Answer] I can only tell you that one of them is a lawyer. But he is not one of those you are thinking of, that is, not a member of Red Assistance, nor is he a member of the more influential colleges for the defense of the political processes. He is simply a young progressive lawyer.

[Question] Go on, who else...

[Answer] I cannot tell you any more because they are persons living within the law. Within their environment they are considered extreme leftists, but they have never been in the limelight. They live and operate unobtrusively. One of these three is a registered member of the PCI...

[Question] But does he hold a position of importance in the PCI?

[Answer] I know he has been a member for 10 or 12 years. But only a member with no important role, and in fact treated with a certain distrust. Within the party, I mean. For reasons of security which it would be useless to explain, I can say nothing about the other two.

[Question] And what is the numerical strength of this coordinating organization for underground groups?

[Answer] I must first say something about the situation of the armed struggle in Italy. I can say that the present picture is extremely simple, or, better yet, is now "simplified." First, let us take the Red Brigades. The Red Brigades have taken some hard blows, but their strength is substantially unchanged. I shall clarify, and it is an extremely important clarification: The Red Brigades have not been set back, nor have they pulled back; they have not suffered any decisive blows nor any irreversible defeats. But they have not advanced, have not grown, have not strengthened themselves, and have not further radicalized themselves. And this is the point. In the field of armed struggle, this is at least the equivalent of a serious defeat. To remain at a standstill is like falling back. Therefore, it can be said that this is a pullback phase for the Red Brigades. This is not to say that Red Brigades actions are to be excluded from further consideration, and even actions on a major scale and of major political and emotional impact. On the contrary, in the absence of any sign of self-criticism on their part concerning past actions and the ideology that has sustained them to date, it is to be expected that they will intensify, even more than now, the antistatal thrust of their program and that their militaristic tendencies will also be intensified.

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[Question] You were saying that the Red Brigades are in a pullback phase...

[Answer] Yes, but it must not be forgotten also that the Moro action was carried out during a phase that for the Red Brigades was anything but an offensive. The action had the effect, among others, of masking and almost of overcoming their difficulties, considering that for the Red Brigades the publicity aspects of their actions are their determinant factor. Since then, the situation of the Red Brigades has not improved, even though there have been no defeats nor any truly lost battles. So much then for the Red Brigades. I have already spoken summarily of the NAP and the Front Line. Revolutionary Action was already virtually routed even before Faina's arrest, and by now can be considered nonexistent. This leaves only us, then, with the advantage of being mobile, unpredictable, fluid, decentralized, scattered and diffuse.

[Question] Yes, but how many are you?

[Answer] I believe this will be the first time anyone in my position will have responded to a question like yours. We, on the one hand, have always exaggerated, until now, to convey the impression of power, while the government, on the other has always scaled down its estimates in an effort to convey the impression of an inevitable and even imminent extinction of terrorism. Well, for the first time, here is a figure you can take as being absolutely reliable.

[Question] Well, go ahead...

[Answer] The militants operating within the coordination orb of our groups total between 150 and 180, probably closer to 150. A more exact figure would be impossible for anyone to give you. These militants are spread out over some 10 localities. Some of them live in absolute hiding, meaning with false identity documents and living entirely outside the law; others live habitually in a semilegal kind of status, and still others enjoy an absolute and irreproachable cover. They are laborers, students, employees, and members of professions who engage in no political activity publicly, and who clandestinely take part in armed struggle actions. The latter are a minority. The majority consists of comrades who are linked to the masses and who engage publicly in political activities, some taking part in the activities of the reformist left, and others in the sphere of Autonomia.

[Question] And, in your opinion, what is the membership of the Red Brigades?

[Answer] About the same as ours.

[Question] Do you mean that the two armed parties have about equal forces?

[Answer] As regards regular members, meaning those ready at all times to take up arms, yes: We have about 150, and they have about 150. But the Red Brigades also have many irregulars and fellow-travelers; these, when added in, double or triple their total, which we can say then reaches 450 and even 500.

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[Question] Besides your organization and the Red brigades, how many others would you say are engaged in armed struggle?

[Answer] Impossible to say. There is an untold number of unorganized, unsystematic, dispersed communist fighters: those--so that we understand each other--who arm themselves in a bungling way for a one-time action. They do it alone or together with a close friend, schoolmates, fellow workers, street companions or bar companions. After completing their action they put their weapon away and go back to their pinball machines or to their job on the production line.

[Question] There has been a split in the Red Brigades. How many dissidents have followed Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda?

[Answer] Only a few, a very few. Perhaps five or six, perhaps one or two more. In any case a very small minority.

[Question] But the document sent to RADIO ONDA ROSSA in Rome indicates the existence of a dissidence that is not limited to Morucci and Faranda, as Curico tried to make believe...

[Answer] Not at all! In our opinion, that document is false.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] We are convinced it was written by some member of Autonomia who shares Morucci's views and who thought this would help the "workers movement and activism" wing of the Red Brigades. In my opinion, its results were poor and its credibility nil.

[Question] Meaning?

[Answer] The overwhelming majority of the Red Brigades are and will remain close-knit. The notion of splitting them is a pile of manure that could occur only in the minds of Morucci and his companions. The Red Brigades' own fundamental natures prevent them from indulging in positional dialectics, or in a diversification or even a classification of sectorial viewpoints, or a disaggregation as decentralized groups. One can leave the Red Brigades only as an individual, as Morucci and Faranda have done, trying, even though weakly, to invest it with the dimensions of a split. And please note carefully that I am in agreement with many of Morucci's reproofs against the Red Brigades, but it is a mistake for anyone to think the Red Brigades can be defeated by nurturing or inventing possible internal cracks. It is a simpleminded illusion.

[Question] How is it that you know so much about the internal situation of the Red Brigades?

[Answer] I know what you are driving at. I repeat: Until some months ago, I had contact, personally and as a nonregular, with the leaders of the Red

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Brigades. Then, when I went underground, and by a joint decision, I interrupted my relations with them. Moreover, political relations among the various organizations have deteriorated since then, the climate has become bitter, and the ideological struggle has intensified. The brigatisti have now maximized their precautionary measures; they have become extremely discreet and extremely suspicious; they are accusing us all of fickleness and superficiality. They prefer to err all alone.

[Question] You insist that you have had contact with the leaders of the Red Brigades. Do you know who they are and which of them are members of the strategic executive?

[Answer] I know the names of some of them, not all of them, and I do not know exactly how many they are. However, I can say that, generally speaking, they are those named in the press...

[Question] Namely, Mario Moretti?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] ...Prospero Gallinari?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Susanna Ronconi?

[Answer] Absolutely not! In no way!

[Question] And who else?

[Answer] You will have to find that out yourselves.

[Question] Let us change the subject. Can you talk about some of the armed party's most recent actions that might appear to be based on any rationale whatever, even the most twisted? I refer, for example, to the Piazza Fontana murder of Judge Emilio Alessandrini. Was he perhaps a "class-war enemy symbol" that had to be eliminated?

[Answer] By executing Alessandrini, in my opinion, Front Line eliminated a personal enemy of its own, an obstacle to the unfolding of its own activities. Not a class-war enemy, therefore, but someone who concretely and for a precise and specific represented an immediate danger: There was something that Alessandrini knew or was about to discover.

[Question] What?

[Answer] I will not answer that. However, a similar rationale applies in the case of Varisco's elimination...

[Question] In what sense?

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[Answer] He was not the cruel jailer the Red Brigades portrayed in their document, nor was he the meek servant of the state the newspapers wrote him up to be. He was an active, expert, intelligent man of the counterrevolution, assigned to the highly significant and sensitive tasks of verifying informers' reports and coordinating infiltrations and delations. Varisco had discovered something of major importance and was eliminated for this reason.

[Question] Several times and on many occasions, members of the PCI, in particular, have spoken of sanctuaries, of places or persons that have protected or are protecting the armed struggle. Can you say something on this point?

[Answer] Neither Cefis nor Sindona have protected or financed the underground groups; these are idiocies, good only for election campaigns. But let us be clear, and I do not think I am making some stunning revelation or delation when I say that there are representatives of the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] and the PCI who help us.

[Question] But these allusions have all the flavor of a provocation...

[Answer] Not at all! What makes you think so? I have only said, and it does not seem to me there should be anything astounding about it, that there are some members, local leaders and representatives having limited public prestige, more intellectual than political, who provide us marginal aid in the form of essential facilities for hiding and expatriation: living quarters, shelters, documents. But there is no godfather, no major figure, no backer of high public standing.

[Question] Let us talk about Moro's assassination. Can you tell us something about that?

[Answer] I know for a fact that a factor that has not been considered until now actually entered into the decision to kill Moro...

[Question] Which one?

[Answer] Haste and the fear of imminent discovery. On the Saturday before 9 May, the Red Brigades had decided to postpone the execution, not by a few hours but by several weeks. They had also decided to suspend all communications with the outside world, to effect a real news blackout. They wanted to create an atmosphere of total suspense conducive to anticipation of the worst, in which the politicians, they hoped, would make their final and definitive offers, clarifying their real intentions. Not only that. They also wanted to draw up an alternate strategy, a set of objectives to replace that of obtaining the freedom of the political prisoners. They further had in mind demanding the suspension of all current search activities and investigations.

[Question] What happened instead?

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[Answer] What happened that search activities were intensified at just about that time. The police succeeded, without even realizing it, in searching an apartment that was the headquarters of a Red Brigades nonregular forces base and was on the verge of discovering the zone in which Moro was being held prisoner. It was this, rather than a clearly thought out decision, that impelled the Red Brigades to take hasty action.

[Question] But was there or was there not a clash within the ranks as to the success or failure of the kidnaping?

[Answer] There was, but it did not concern Moro after the state's refusal to free the political prisoners. Rather, it concerned the desirability of setting forth a substitute objective. Of course, in the event of a refusal of this second objective as well, Moro's fate would have been sealed.

[Question] During the Moro kidnaping, as well as in other cases, suspicions were voiced regarding intervention by foreign secret services...

[Answer] In the Moro case, I would say absolutely not. In the past--I speak now of the early beginnings, I speak of the GAP [Partisan Action Group] and of the Red Brigades' first steps--there was a form of indirect support from the Soviet secret service in Italy. By indirect support I mean facilitations and advice on lines of action, on proposed links and infiltrations within the trade unions and within the PCI; and, in sum, facilitations with respect to international links, principally with the Palestinians, to the supply of weapons and other needs. But there it ended. Now it is nonexistent. It is quite possible, however, that some of the effects of the armed struggle will coincide marginally with the effects being sought by the secret services of the Eastern countries in their own operations aimed at destabilization. This could lead them to support certain actions, even though in an extremely secondary manner and in any case without the leaders of the armed struggle being aware of it.

[Question] Let us now discuss the question of relations between the crime underworld and terrorism. Have you also had help from that underworld?

[Answer] I would say, no. Let me explain: Some individuals have, by personal choice, come over from criminal activities to join the armed struggle, generally after having gone through a prison experience. This was the case many years ago with out NAP comrades and more recently with persons like Carlo Casirati and Guistino De Vuono, who came from organized crime who have since then followed other pursuits that have differentiated them from their earlier environment. This has certainly created some doubts and has actually led some militants to believe their relations with organized common criminal gangs were justified. I repeat: only marginally and by way of personal decisions. Only Revolutionary Action thought for a time it could have stable relations with common criminality, but paid dearly for this mistake. As far as we ourselves are concerned, things have gone differently and more tritely. The weapons and false documents were there, and there they had to be procured; it was a compulsory choice. Recently we

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have decided we made a mistake in accepting that choice and that we will now do everything possible to abandon it. We have similarly decided to cease all self-financing actions from now on, that is, robberies and kidnappings, both because they create doubts and are incomprehensible to the working class and because they require one to have close working relations with organized crime.

[Question] What do you, rather all of you, think of the amnesty proposal advanced by the representatives of METROPOLI, Franco Piperno and Lanfranco Pace, as well as by Marco Boata, representative of Lotta Continua and elected deputy by the radicals? Do you share the contempt shown for it by the Curcio group?

[Answer] The proposal in no way concerns the sectors and areas of primary interest to the party and the armed movement! Certainly the most inane response to this proposal was that of Curcio: he rejects and scorns it only because it is evident that never and forever not can an amnesty be granted to people like him and ourselves. How stupid is his understanding of the role of the vanguard! The real danger is that the amnesty could end up transformed into a cage that could limit the initiative of the armed movement.

[Question] Listen, there is something that continues to prevent me from being convinced: Why have you, rather all of you, decided to talk, to tell so many things...

[Answer] It was certainly not we who broke the tacit understanding whereby these matters were discussed only in certain environments. And PANORAMA is certainly not part of those environments. Furthermore, three considerations are uppermost. First: We think it necessary to put a stop to the circulation of false images of the armed struggle, such as mythical organizations similar to shadowy secret services, made up of supermen and infiltrated by agents of all kinds. Secondly: We have become tired of Scalzone, Negri and Piperno being the only ones talking, in the manner of academic bonzes, about this broad and highly differentiable area. I want to be very clear on this point: Our attitude toward them is not the same as that of Curcio and his companions. They are for us not class-war enemies. We do not seek their death, not even their arrest; we want all arrested communists to be freed. But neither do we want them to represent us, on the one hand, because to assume to themselves this representation is an undue appropriation of authority, and, on the other, because they represent us in a false manner...

[Question] A nice way to exonerate them...

[Answer] Let me be clearer. Scalzone is a very fine fellow, he is impetuous and he can get as hot under the collar as a manager at a meeting of new arrivals, but this does not make a political leader. Piperno is a mediocre physics professor; I say this because I know physics and I have listened to some of his lectures at the university. Negri is too vain to be even a sworn patrolman; imagine him as a military political commander! These persons

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should remain silent and let the directly involved persons talk. Modestly speaking, I am one of the directly involved ones. This is why I am talking and why, in so doing, I am challenging others to talk...

[Question] Whom?

[Answer] Other leaders and members of the armed struggle. Because--and this is the third point--there can be no question about it that the political and ideological struggle within the armed-party sphere has now been joined. We cannot escape it. It is a struggle that pits all of us, the sphere of the diffused armed struggle and of the workers, against the Red Brigades and their retrograde Leninism. We too must fight in this struggle, with clarity and modesty. To do this, we must change style and method...

[Question] Just what does this signify? What is your program of action?

[Answer] I am previewing nothing; we are not the RADIOCORRIERE program guide! Our actions will flow from the class-war itself, in step with its developments, meeting its requirements, supporting its struggles. We will return to the factory, to the social factory. But enough for now; we shall talk about this another time, if your boss, and above all General Dalla Chiesa, will allow it.

[Interview ends above]

The 'Who's Who' of the Armed Struggle

As a supplement to the foregoing interview with a leader of the armed struggle, PANORAMA publishes below a brief glossary of the "trade names" and persons' names cited during the interview.

Sergio Adamoli: Surgeon, 43, son of Senator Gelasio, communist, first mayor of Genoa after the Liberation. According to the DIGOS [Directorate for General Operations and Special Operations], he is one of the masterminds of the Genoa branch of the Red Brigades. He disappeared in April.

"Fireworks Night": A series of similar attacks carried out reiteratively (eight times since January 1978) in the Veneto. The last and worst of them took place in April of this year, 22 days after the capture of the Negri group. Twenty-seven explosive devices were set off against Carabinieri barracks and vehicles, and against party premises and headquarters, in 17 different localities, with epicenter in Padua.

Martion Zichitella: Arrested for common-law offenses, he joined the Nap while still in prison. In August 1976, he escaped from the Lecce prison with Graziano Mesina and others. Four months later he was killed during the ambush laid by the NAP for Alfonso Noce, director of antiterrorism in Rome.

Pasquale Abatangelo, Domenico Delli Veneri, Giorgio Panizzar, Aldo Mauro, Pietro Sofia, Pasquale De Laurentiis: The NAP'S original leader group which

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transferred over as a body to the Red Brigades in 1976. The ex-Nappisti being held in the Asinara prison signed the Curcio document of August, couched in orthodox Leninist terms.

Revolutionary Action: An anarchist guerrilla faction. It has operated mostly in Tuscany, Piedmont and Liguria, with attacks, kidnappings and the wounding of UNITA reporter Nino Ferrero. It is made up mostly of former "comunisti," a group whose program was "criminal struggle against capital."

Gianfranco Faina: Considered the ideologue and leader of Revolutionary Action. Forty-three years of age, former schoolteacher. Under two orders of capture issued in 1977, he was arrested in May of this year in Bologna. He is accused of wounding Ferrero and of other crimes. His name appears also in the inquiry into the murder of worker Guido Rossa.

RADIO ONDA ROSSA: The Autonomia broadcast station in Rome. On 2 September, it broadcast a document from the "Moruccian" wing of the Red Brigades, in which strong positions are taken in disagreement with the Red Brigades leadership.

Mario Moretti: Organizer and putative father of the Rome branch, and most wanted of the Red Brigades, he escaped arrest by a hairbreadth at the printing-establishment hideout discovered in Rome in the Spring of 1978. He is believed to be a member of the hard core.

Prospero Gallinari: One of the founders of the Red Brigades, he was the last of the original nucleus to go into hiding. Captured in 1974, he escaped from the Vicenza prison 2 years later. He is being sought, among other things, as a prime suspect in the Via Fani massacre.

Susanna Ronconi: An early member of the Red Brigades, she is believed by many to have left the organization with Corrado Alunni, opting for Front Line. She is also being sought in connection with the Via Fani massacre.

GAP: Founded by Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, it was the first major clandestine group. It had proven ties with the Eastern European countries and those of the communist Third World, particularly Cuba. It was routed after the death of the publisher-guerrilla in the Spring of 1972. The remains of the GAP found their way into the Red Brigades for the most part, mainly the Genovese branch, strengthening its Stalinist, neoresistance and "third worldist" rigidities.

Carlo Casirati: With previous convictions for common-law offenses, he was one of the leading culprits in the kidnaping and murder of Carlo Saronio, which was planned in political extremist circles of the left.

Giustino De Vuono: With the Red Brigades in hiding, he is considered one of the organization's high-ranking leaders. His capture has been ordered for common-law (double homicide attempt during a quarrel) and political (kidnaping and murder of Saronio, kidnaping and murder of Moro) offenses.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

MILAN UNION LEADERS AGAINST FACTORY TERRORISM, VIOLENCE

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 13 Nov 79 p 15

[Interview with FLM-CISL's Pier Giorgio Tiboni and CGIL's Sergio Soave by Giancarlo Pertegato on terrorism in the factory; in Milan; date not given]

[Text] Pier Giorgio Tiboni (FLM-CISL) [Federation of Metalworkers-Italian Confederation of Labor Unions]: "Dismissals do not serve to restore control; the target is the union." "There is a desire to deny the right to make a mistake." "Institutions should concern themselves with the fight against terrorism." "Even Seveso is violence." Sergio Soave (CGIL) [Italian General Confederation of Labor]: "Excesses are not justifiable." "Traveling the path of the law." "No to one-way guarantees." "The police are on the side of the union."

Milan--Why are the BR [Red Brigades] mailmen ringing at the door of Milanese factories such as Alfa Romeo? This question is addressed to Pier Giorgio Tiboni, secretary of CISL and FLM. Tiboni was an operator at Falk di Vobarno in Brescian Province and became a full-time union leader after 6 years on the shop committee. Now, at 41 years of age, he directs one of CISL's largest provincial federations; his voice is rather often the primary element in confrontations with the CGIL, but there is no lack of discussion as a result of his critical interventions even at the top of the union corporate structure to which he belongs.

"The mailmen are returning," Tiboni says, "because the BR are trying to get back into the factory. It may be an attempt at survival after the setbacks suffered and even the indication of a plan: that of taking part in plant discussions. In Turin the BR reappeared at a critical moment. Open contractual problems are not being resolved, four workers are being dismissed and the union lacks the initiative to see that they are taken back; this is what the BR members are bringing up. Companies are not taking this situation into consideration; they are trying to make the union the focal point of discussion, thus paving the way for dangerous initiatives."

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[Pertegato] However, Fiat has indicated that it must dismiss 61 employees; it explained that this action is being taken to make the factory controllable again.

[Tiboni] Fiat entered a crisis stage 10 years ago. A certain amount of organization died. The role of the department head or supervisor is finished. And there is no other role for those heads; this is the crisis.

[Pertegato] But there are violent episodes. No one has denied the existence of excesses, particularly in internal procedures. In any case, there was discussion about the actual degree of responsibility of those who were discharged. The union offered legal assistance to those individuals on condition that they sign a statement condemning violence.

[Tiboni] I do not agree with the condition imposed. In this manner, condemnation and discrimination are made on the basis of opinion.

[Pertegato] Let us return to the cause of the Fiat case. How do you think factory control can be restored?

[Tiboni] I admit that this is the objective, but I do not believe that dismissals serve the purpose.

[Pertegato] Do you think that the purpose of the firings was different from what was stated?

[Tiboni] Yes indeed. I believe that the real target is the union's role. If that role is made insignificant or if there is a tendency to reduce union representation, the way is paved for terrorism. After the Fiat firings in Milan, there were other signs. Supervisors who walk around in given departments, regardless of its having been forbidden to do so by the workers' statute, and union publications being placed within the plant. What does this have to do with the fight against terrorism?

[Pertegato] According to statements made by some workers, there is at least one department at Alfa Romeo where production is going on at a reduced rate. This is occurring because of the atmosphere of violence created by an extremist group. Whoever sees what is going on closes his eyes; whoever known about it keeps quiet. In this specific case, what can the union do?

[Tiboni] We are not aware of a situation of that kind at Alfa Romeo. I do not think such a situation exists. Instead, I maintain that there are homogeneous groups of workers who, with their company counterparts, determine a given production level through bargaining.

[Pertegato] Let us approach the discussion from another angle. You said recently that certain excesses in confrontations with supervisors are up to you to settle. There are things, you said, which Agnelli must not resolve; you are resolving them within the labor movement. How?

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[Tiboni] Certainly not with the definitive condemnation which occurs with the firing of a worker, a measure which is not aimed at rehabilitating or correcting the one who errs in a plant. Rather, it tends to expel, efface and alienate. That is why I have maintained and maintain that it should be the labor movement in general and, in particular, the union movement which should assume the responsibility for the political discussion which might ensue and, with persuasion and discussion, crack the hard nuts of which we are speaking.

[Pertegato] In your opinion, what can be done to restore stability? What is the dividing line at which, if crossed, violence should be handled by institutions and not just discussed within the labor movement?

[Tiboni] One of the significances of the Fiat firings is a desire to deny a right which belongs to all citizens, except the producer who works in a factory. I am speaking of the right to make a mistake. Therefore, I am speaking of error. Moreover, I think that institutions should concern themselves with the fight against terrorism, if only because the union cannot do its job and, at the same time, replace the police or courts.

[Pertegato] But you include the excesses perpetrated against the supervisors among the problems whose onus is traceable to the union. Is this not violence?

[Tiboni] Violence, violence. Certainly it is. But would it not be better to set aside a week to speak of violence in stadiums, the following week of violence against women, still another of violence in the metropolis, like the massacre in Moncucco, and then, a week later, of violence in the factory? Do we want to bear in mind that it is an entire social fabric which produces violence? If a worker dies in the factory, is this not violence? Seveso, the highly productive plant which gave us dioxide poisoning; was this not violence perpetrated on the workers and the Seveso area? And forbidding the operator to calculate the amount of his production; is this not violence? I say that one cannot consider the problem a one-way street; even the department head who will not strike is committing a sort of violence compared with one who is struggling, that is, participating, paying with his own wages for a battle which is advantageous also to the one who remains at the window.

[Pertegato] How then do you think you can tackle the problem of violence as a whole?

[Tiboni] I do not have the answer to that; we do not have the answers. But to return to the union's role, I say that only one labor organization which does its job well, and not others, can gather marginal social strata around itself and prevent them from becoming "water for terrorist fish" or fertile ground for maneuvering or recruiting individuals for destruction.

[Pertegato] What do you mean by a union which does its job?

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[Tiboni] That is perhaps an oversimplified expression used by Bentivogli, national secretary of the FLM: "The union must be in the social sphere what the lawyer is in judicial proceedings, institutionally guaranteed defense." The inebriation of sacrifices to be supported is passing; on the so-called EUR [Universal Exposition of Rome] line many are considering that we are right in maintaining that it was in error. There you have the union reestablishing its own identity.

[Pertegato] A final question. You associated the Fiat event with that of the individuals imprisoned on 7 April. Why?

[Tiboni] First, I recalled some facts; second, I interpreted the signs. I believe we are experiencing a great restorative wave. There is a tendency to reduce the amount of freedom in factories, while in the country, again due to the ineffectiveness of institutions, Negri and the others have been in prison for months without knowing when they will have the court trial to which they are entitled. And let me say that our system of guarantees is not just coming into being; we have been concerned about freedom in factories for years, when it was not the autonomists who were defendants in the courtroom but, rather, the communists. And I add that we, unlike the others, have neither a guilty conscience nor an embarrassing family album to hide, in terms of terrorism.

The BR Member Should Not be Fired but Arrested

"To expect a declaration like that which the unions requested from those who were fired by Fiat means to use discrimination and prosecute ideas. Certain excesses, of which we obviously do not approve, are traceable to us." These and other statements made by Pier Giorgio Tiboni involve the CGIL directly or indirectly. Sergio Soave, 32 years old, was union leader in the Alfa Romeo area, worked a few years in the engineering office at the Corso di Porta Vittoria branch and, for the last few months, has been a part of the union headquarters Provincial Secretariat. We questioned him about some of Tiboni's answers. This is what he told us.

Free Association

"With regard to the employees discharged by Fiat, I find Tiboni's concept of the union somewhat disconcerting. We are not a neutral organization. We are not an institution which has the duty of indiscriminately assuring everyone's official defense. The union is a free association. Whoever is not in agreement with its policy belongs to other organizations. Because we are a force with specific objectives and also with an ideal heritage which associates itself with the Constitution and which does not share our positions, one can very well choose other representative associations. This is the gist of the declaration made to the employees fired by Fiat as a condition to assure them the union's legal defense. Whoever has not approved or subscribed to this declaration has made a choice: he is not in agreement with us; he has preferred another type of policy and defense neither of which is ours."

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[Pertegato] In your opinion, is there a problem of control in the factory?

[Soave] Ten years ago the plant structure was based on a hierarchy, one backed up by the role of the supervisors; this no longer exists. But at the same time there is still no other kind of structure. And it is unthinkable that this situation could be maintained over the long term. We are concerned about this, because we are not just the workers' union but also that of the clerical employees and therefore of the supervisors. In the case of the supervisors, we do not have, as the saying goes, "any bone to pick." It would be absurd for us to have problems of this type with workers who, moreover, are union members. If we want to be everyone's union but not a relief organization which provides welfare protection in the way INAM [National Health Insurance Institute] supplies medical and medicinal services, we must be the full-fledged union of the workers, clerical employees and also supervisors. What does this mean? That, among other things, we are concerned about the fact that the purchasing power of industry's clerical employees and supervisors has, for the first time, declined during the first 7 months of 1979. This is one of the accounts with which we should reckon. Moreover, that is why we are concerned about control in the factory, which is also a problem of agreement and role playing.

[Pertegato] And also of situations of violence.

[Soave] I want to be very clear on this point. If there is a terrorist in a factory, his place is neither inside nor outside the plant. The BR member must not be fired; he must be arrested. If Fiat is to justify its firings on the basis of terrorism and violence, it must pursue the path of the law. One is denounced for an offense; a perpetrator of violence or a terrorist is not transferred from inside the factory to the outside. I rid my plant of violent individuals, presumed or real; for the remainder I do not concern myself. This is not right. I repeat, the path to use is that of the law. This must be valid for everyone. Just as it is not fair to associate people who have been dismissed with an attack on society.

The Problem of the Youth

[Pertegato] What do you mean by attack on society?

[Soave] The large number of assumptions. What do the jobless have to do with those whom Fiat accuses of violence? What does it mean that companies want to keep the young generation out of the factory? Here you have another problem: the conflict between reality in the plant and the external reality.

Discipline and Consumption

[Pertegato] What conflict?

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[Soave] They want productive discipline in the factory and, at the same time, unlimited consumption outside. The first condition, plant discipline, to support the second. But there is danger that the second condition might make the achievement of the first difficult. On the contrary, we say that it does make it difficult.

[Pertegato] But there is also the question of control of union conflicts. What do you think of internal processions during which episodes of violence sometimes occur? There are those who say that even supervisors who do not strike are committing violence.

[Soave] This is bad sociological literature and I am amazed that such things would be said. The union controversy is an instance of conflict and tension. A strike is the most acute phase of the controversy. Whoever supports the demands and stays away from work is paying for his participation in the union conflict from his own pocket. There are various levels of tension. Excesses can occur more easily when the one involved in the conflict is on his own, or else, when the problems are of a more serious nature. Being excesses, they are not only unjustifiable but also should be counteracted on the basis of policy. We cannot accept the contention that they are a part of our history, for, among other things, they do not pay and are an indication of another line, not that of the union. I am not speaking of an isolated case. I am speaking of violence perpetrated where it is preached and practiced.

Reflections on Agreement

[Pertegato] Therefore, we can consider that there are two types of situations. The first is the isolation which surrounds one who strikes because the controversy has been imposed in a defective manner. The other, that of resorting to violence, is a matter of choice. In the first case, what can the union do?

[Soave] It must ask itself and, in fact, it does ask itself to what extent it should reexamine the mechanism of agreement on which the union is based. I mean that no one should close his eyes to the danger of the parliamentarization of the shop committee, of the repetitiveness of assemblies and of insufficient representation by the delegates. Shop committees arose as exponents of a reality, of a situation: that which they are experiencing in the factory. But if during the meetings little is spoken, if 80 percent of the delegates remain silent, what does the one who speaks know of the reality of which those who remain silent should be speaking? These are some necessary reflections. This is different from equating violence with "one who does not strike." The union must not place the problem of agreement in superficial terms, precisely because it must do its job thoroughly.

Constitutional System

[Pertegato] And when violence is a matter of choice, what does the union say?

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[Soave] That is a question to be asked: Does Italy have a constitutional system which can resolve genuine questions without resorting to violence? I say it does; the union says it does. But we must be very clear; no room can be given to the ideology of subversion.

Union Members Threatened

[Pertegato] What action can be taken by the labor organization against terrorism?

[Soave] There is a saying which goes: "A terrorist in the plant says it better than an innocent person who has been fired." This is an incorrect way to state the problem. There should be no terrorists in the plant and likewise no innocent people fired. The problem of guarantees exists but certainly not as a one-way street. At Alfa Romeo, union leaders and departmental delegates are being threatened; threatening telephone calls are not lacking. Unfortunately, in that factory there has not yet been a unified expression of solidarity for the union members threatened by terrorists. Nevertheless, Alfa Romeo is a plant which has isolated its small number of violent persons and where awareness of the need to combat subversion and its ramifications has obtained noteworthy results. I ask: If we do not give a guarantee of solidarity to one who is attacked by subversive blows, who will protect the union leader, the departmental delegate, "guilty" of doing their job? We give assurance that whoever is accused of terrorism will obtain the guarantees which our law provides; but meanwhile, let us not forget that terrorism is trying to reduce the physical presence of the union in the factory. Do we want to be safeguarded? Very well, but let us not forget who is at the front line.

And finally, a few words to the effect that the union must not play the role of policeman. Quite clear is the tone with which some individuals utter these words with a mixture of self-sufficiency and scorn. I ask: Are the police not on the side of the union? Are they not the ones who, more than anyone else, receive on their hides many of the blows terrorism inflicts on the forces which are defending the republic? Let us imagine what would happen in Italy the moment the police forces would be deprived of solidarity with other workers; would they collapse morally as is happening in the aspirations of terrorism? Is not this also a guarantee with which we should be concerned, without, to be sure, forgetting the others?

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BRIEFS

KOREA TO BUY AIRCRAFT--South Korea has shown an interest in purchasing several C-212 Aviocar airplanes being built by the Spanish firm CASA (Aircraft Construction Company, Inc). As of now two aircraft have been sold to Malta and three to Indonesia. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 2 Dec 79 p 7]

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