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No. 2059

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ISLAMIC CONGRESS SECRETARY INTERVIEWED ON IRAN, ISLAMIC ISSUES

LD101003 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 6 Dec 79 pp 1, 2 LD

[Interview with Habib Chatti, general secretary of the Islamic Congress Organization, by 'Irfan Nizam al-Din and Diyab Wafa'i in London--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] What action plan has the Islamic Congress Organization laid down for the coming stage in the light of the present critical conditions in the area?

[Answer] In fact I took up my post in the organization only a week ago, and I am now busy studying the organization's files and position from all aspects. I cannot at the moment define the plan that I have drawn up to manage its affairs, but I am fully aware of the role the organization is expected to play in serving Islam and the Arabs, particularly in the present conditions. I hope to be able to achieve results that will satisfy everybody.

[Question] What are the first steps that you will take in this regard?

[Answer] The first step in my opinion is to make Islamic solidarity a reality. We are now in constant contact with the Islamic countries in order to coordinate their policies toward world problems, such as the problem of Islamic minorities in some outside countries and the race issue in black Africa. This is in addition to helping to consolidate the nonaligned movement, which is considered the Third World power standing between the two other blocs.

[Question] What role have you played with regard to the situation in Iran?

[Answer] We have played a role in this regard. I personally contacted the Iranian authorities during the first week of the present crisis. I told the Iranian officials that, as head of an organization of which Iran is a leading member, I place myself at their service for anything they want me to do. During the Arab summit conference in Tunis an Iranian delegation visited us, and I repeated the same offer.

[Question] Do you mean by this: playing the role of a mediator?

[Answer] No, not mediation. As a Muslim and member of the Islamic congress which includes Iran I have the duty to work for this cause. I belong to the same family to which Iran belongs and I am prepared to help it overcome this crisis in a manner satisfactory to the other Islamic countries. I believe that the Iranian authorities made a mistake on the issue of holding the hostages, but the blame mainly falls on the Zionist lobby which brought the shah back to the United States at a time when U.S.-Iranian relations were showing clear improvement. I would recall that adviser Brzezinski twice met with former prime minister Mehdi Bazargan, and both agreed on most of the points of common interest to both countries. But the Zionist lobby came in to play its game and sabotaged these relations. It was able to bring the shah to the United States and to disturb relations between the two countries. I believe that there was foul play in the matter and that the shah was not ill, as was claimed, because his house in Mexico was closed up before his departure for New York.

[Question] Hostility to Islam in the West has been on the increase. What is the organization's role in replying to such campaigns?

[Answer] That is true. I am very pained by the reaction in the West, and I am following events closely. I was recently in France, where I made important contacts. The West's attitude toward Islam is wrong and unjustifiable. The question of Iran is one thing and Islam is another. With regard to Iran there is a crisis of relations with the United States. It is an acute, ramified and major crisis but it is a political, not an Islamic crisis. Before anyone defines his stand on the embassy incident he must define his stand on the events that preceded it, because if someone understands a problem from its roots, then he can solve it. If we say that this was a violation of international law and the immunity of embassies and are satisfied with that, we will not achieve a practical result. Another point is that some people describe the Iranian revolution as an Islamic revolution, thus giving it this purely religious character. But in fact it is a political revolution inspired by the Islamic religion. We now see many similar examples in Europe and many associations that call themselves Christian Democrats. Those people too are inspired by Christianity in their political methods. As I said, the Iranian Revolution is a political revolution based on the rejection of a certain political, economic and social system, which the Iranian people expressed in a manner aimed at creating a new regime based on principles inspired by Islam.

[LD101605] [Question] Jerusalem, as everybody agrees, is an Islamic responsibility. What have we offered on this issue so far, and what is the organization's role in it?

[Answer] I believe that the resolution adopted on this subject at previous [Islamic] conferences had positive effects. Had it not been for these resolutions and the clear Islamic stand on this problem, Israel would have committed greater acts of destruction against Islamic landmarks.

This is a positive result which may not be perceptible but does deter Israel from doing what it wants. We succeeded in preventing the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv from moving to Jerusalem thanks to Islamic solidarity. The question of liberating Jerusalem requires further planning and falls within the Middle East problem. The Palestinian problem and the problem of Jerusalem are one. The Arabs have their own strategy in this regard. What is important is that we stick to our demand for the return of Jerusalem and continue to express our dissatisfaction with any action that does not help to restore the Holy City to Islamic legality. Eventually we must restore Jerusalem either by war or by any other means. I am not calling for war, but we must move when conditions arise for war or peace. The Camp David agreements will never bring peace. However, I would not be surprised to see significant changes occurring in the world which could bring a peaceful solution. Until that time comes we must adhere to our stand and continuously seek to achieve our objectives.

[Question] Does this mean that in your view peace will be coming shortly?

[Answer] I do not believe that it will happen shortly. As I said, the Camp David agreement harmed the Arab cause, changed its course and divided the Arabs into two camps, which has given the Israeli side the strength it was seeking. But everybody must understand that this agreement will never bring peace. Whoever really wants peace must understand that it comes only through negotiations between all the parties, particularly the PLO, and through a comprehensive solution satisfactory to all the Arabs.

The decision to reject Camp David is a unified Islamic decision. It is also a universal rejection by the West. The Americans have now begun to reconsider their stand and to wonder whether they have made a mistake. The Camp David policy is bankrupt, and I challenge anybody except for the few parties involved to say that he is with the Camp David policy.

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

KUWAITI PAPER CITES PLO'S ABU IYAD ON MIDEAST DEVELOPMENTS, ISSUES

LDO61601 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 4 Dec 79 p 13 LD

[Dispatch by Michel al-Nimri: "Abu Iyad at a Closed Session: Kreisky Is Wise; We Summoned al-Sartawi To Try Him"]

[Text] Beirut--When Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf] talks to the press, he tells one-tenth of the truth. When he talks at a general meeting, he tells one-fifth of the truth, but when he finds someone to debate his statements with him, he will either tell the truth or remain silent.

A few days ago, Abu Iyad met with a group of Jordanian students in a quasi-closed meeting. He wanted to tell all but retreated when he observed that some journalists were present. When he was asked to speak frankly, he feared that his statements would leak to the press. Therefore, he could tell but half of the truth. However, he asked the journalists to forget their profession and consider themselves listeners only. But can a journalist be a mere listener? Personally, I do not think so. I do not believe that Abu Iyad would be upset if a journalist was true to himself. For this reason, we decided to publish some of Abu Iyad's statements--because not everything Salah Khalaf says is publishable.

The Summit and Lebanon

Commenting on the Arab summit conference, Abu Iyad said that the results of the Tunis summit were more advanced than the results of the Baghdad summit, because this is the first time such clear resolutions against U.S. imperialism have been adopted. Abu Iyad regards the [Tunis] summit results as tantamount to a victory for the Palestinian revolution because the plot to hit the Palestinian revolution by having the Arab leaders issue a resolution calling on the Palestinian fighters to withdraw from south Lebanon was completely defeated.

Abu Iyad revealed that [Lebanese] President Sarkis came [to the Tunis summit] with a 100-percent "isolationist" working paper--the same working paper which was drawn up by U.S. envoy Philip Habib and which provides for clearing the south of Palestinian fighters and cramming them in the area north of Al-Litani River.

Abu Iyad cited [PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir] 'Arafat as having said at the conference that he refuses to give up through political maneuvers what "Israel" has failed to achieve militarily in over 10 years of war. He added: "The adamant Palestinian stand at the summit frustrated the suspicious plot to hit and liquidate the Palestinian revolution."

The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front

Regarding the front of steadfastness and confrontation, Abu Iyad said: We are aware of the reality and size of the steadfastness front but we are faced with two choices only: We either accept this "front" with its weaknesses and limited effectiveness and work from then on at developing and strengthening it, or wash our hands of it. I do not believe that the latter step would serve the cause of the national struggle.

Abu Iyad disclosed how this front materialized at the Tripoli conference when the Palestinian revolution leaders entered the conference--after the participants had agreed on the famous Tripoli document on Palestine--and demanded that the front leaders reach a mutual agreement. Abu Iyad said that, were it not for this step and the moral pressure it generated, the front would not have materialized.

We Are Not a Salaried Revolution

Abu Iyad attacked the [Libyan] Jamahiriya and said: "We are not a salaried revolution." While the Jamahiriya gives aid to this or that Palestinian organization, it refrains from giving support to the liberation organization. Abu Iyad added: "We refuse to turn ourselves into a salaried revolution. We refuse to be tamed by the monthly salary they want to pay us."

Iran and the Palestinian Revolution

On the Iranian Revolution, Abu Iyad expressed his astonishment at the attitude of some Arab states which are adopting a stand hostile to Iran. He said: "This is a questionable matter indeed, The Arabs appear to have become aware of Lesser Tunb and Greater Tunb only now whereas during the shah's era none of them uttered a word."

Abu Iyad strongly denied what has been said about Palestinian mediation between Iran and the United States. He said that Brigadier Sa'd Sayil's visit to Teheran was to see what was happening on the spot and to convey the Palestinian revolution's solidarity with the Iranian Revolution.

Abu Iyad expressed his conviction that the United States will not risk launching a military aggression against Iran. He said that if the United States embarks on such a desperate adventure, then "we in the Palestinian revolution would not hesitate to participate in the battle and would commit all our military and political capabilities alongside it" [Iran].

Abu Iyad regards the Iranian-American confrontation as the most serious confrontation since the nationalization of the Suez Canal. He disclosed how the Iranian delegation to the Tunis summit was not received properly and how the Palestinian delegation received it in its own quarters and arranged for it a series of meetings with some Arab delegations to the summit, thus enabling it to meet with the Arab League secretary general and the Syrian and PDRY delegations.

[LD061603] The Jordanian-Palestinian Dialog

Commenting on the Jordanian-Palestinian dialog, Abu Iyad defended the work of the joint committee but protested at some loopholes. He said that this dialog is bound by its objective circumstances to confront Al-Sadat's capitulation and the Camp David conference [as published] and to consolidate the Palestinian people's struggle in the occupied territories.

Abu Iyad also defended the role of the Palestinian side in the joint Jordanian-Palestinian committee, particularly the role of Abu Mazin, Fatah Central Committee member and head of the Palestinian side.

Abu Iyad, however, strongly attacked Jordanian intelligence, which, he said, is indirectly working to explode Jordanian-Palestinian relations by continuing to harass the Palestinians. Abu Iyad revealed how Jordanian intelligence lets no opportunity slip for attacking Palestinian officials in the ugliest words. He said: "We do not know what this double dealing means."

The Situation in Syria

Regarding the situation in Syria, Abu Iyad strongly attacked the subversive groups which try to distract Syria from its national battle against the Zionist enemy and Al-Sadat's regime.

Abu Iyad said: I can understand it when political opponents of Al-Asad's government assassinate Ba'thist elements and personalities, but when a person is killed merely because he belongs to a particular creed, it is the depths of political and moral degradation.

He accused the American Central Intelligence [Agency] and Egyptian intelligence of organizing sabotage operations against Syria from Turkey and from across Syria's northern border. Abu Iyad said: Irrespective of whether it is the "Muslim Brotherhood" or others who carry out these operations, we believe that their aim is to distract Syria from its national battle.

Relations With America

Abu Iyad again strongly denied the existence of overt or covert contacts with the United States. He said: "We would be very happy if we could secure U.S. recognition of the liberation organization as the sole

legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but this, however, would not prevent us from continuing to confront U.S. imperialism as the archenemy of our Palestinian people and the Arab nation."

Kreisky Is Wise and We Will Try Al-Sartawi

Abu Iyad welcomed the Palestinian-European dialog. He said: "'Arafat's meeting with Kreisky is considered a victory for the revolution." But he warned of Kreisky's intentions, "without this meaning that we agree with him" [as published]. He said: "Kreisky is a wise Zionist but Begin is a hypocrite and an extremist Zionist. Despite our complete awareness of what Kreisky represents, we used to meet with him and debate with him on clear grounds. We know exactly what we want from him, without relinquishing our objectives." Abu Iyad expressed his respect for Kreisky because of his clear stands, even "those with which we do not agree."

Abu Iyad disclosed that the resistance command has summoned Isam al-Sartawi and decided to put him on trial because he had agreed to share an Austrian medal with an Israeli personality.

The Lebanese Army Is 23,000 Strong

Discussing the Lebanese situation, Abu Iyad said that he will meet with President Ilyas Sarkis in the near future. He emphasized the strong alliance with the Lebanese national and patriotic movement.

Replying to a question on the condition of the Lebanese Army, Abu Iyad said that it now musters about 23,000 soldiers and that two-thirds of them directly belong to the isolationist Lebanese front. He expressed doubt about the possibility of a cohesive Lebanese Army ever emerging in view of the nature of the divisions in Lebanon.

Abu Iyad revealed that it is Israel which is objecting to the Lebanese Army's deployment in the south because of the truce agreement signed between the two countries, which does not permit the presence of more than 2,000 soldiers in the border areas. He added: "We do not know if now there are new agreements with Israel that permit an increase in the size of the Lebanese Army in [the] south."

Abu Iyad concluded his talk by emphasizing that the Palestinian revolution will strongly continue its struggle, stressing the importance of national unity among the revolution groups.

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTING TUNIS SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED

LD060933 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 3 Dec 79 p 1 LD

[Excerpt] London, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT--Arab diplomatic sources emphasized to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT yesterday that the contacts which took place among Arab capitals last week have resulted in the adoption of a timetable for the implementation of the secret resolutions adopted at the tenth Arab summit conference convened in Tunis last month.

The sources said that these steps consist of strengthening the eastern front, achieving Jordanian-Palestinian understanding on various current issues and starting to find a solution to the problem of south Lebanon in the light of the resolutions issued by the summit.

It has been learned that Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi will personally supervise the implementation of these steps on the authorization of the Arab leaders. It has also been learned that Klibi's upcoming visit to Beirut is aimed at reviving the Arab followup committee and at bringing the Lebanese and Palestinian sides into line with the inter-Arab agreement.

Meanwhile, an official Jordanian source yesterday confirmed the report AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT published on Saturday to the effect that PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat will arrive in Amman on Wednesday on a brief official visit to Jordan during which he will meet with King Husayn.

It has been learned that King Husayn's discussions with 'Arafat will deal in particular with PLO-Jordanian relations and the strengthening of the steadfastness of the Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories.

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

KLIBI COMMENTS ON PLO MEDIATION OF IRANIAN CRISIS

LD062215 Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 6 Dec 79 LD

[Excerpt] Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi answered journalists questions at a luncheon organized in Paris today by the French society for the diplomatic press. His answers dealt with the Arab perspective following the 10th summit conference. In this context he said: The latest Arab summit was a very important event for two reasons. First, there were some fears resulting from rumors about splits in the Arab ranks. The Tunis summit proved that the Arab countries represented at the highest level did not leave the ranks of the united front formed at the Baghdad meeting. Second, for the first time an Arab summit has agreed on a unified action plan and not merely on general measures. This plan takes into consideration the political and economic reality of the Arab world.

The Tunis summit also recommended the opening up of Arab action to information. The matter concerns a coordinated action toward friendly countries, toward Europe and America in particular, especially now that Europe has an important role to play in influencing world opinion. Ours is to be a decisive information action.

As regards southern Lebanon, Klibi said the 10th Arab summit conference reached positive results, although they did not fully satisfy the two parties to the problem. He described the steps achieved along the road of reconciling requirements of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese state as important steps. Klibi spoke about the Arab-European dialog and said in particular that he studied with the head of the French state and with the foreign minister during his visit [words indistinct] the possibility of resuming the dialog between the EEC and the Arab League countries. He added that Arab countries hope to resume this dialog in a comprehensive way, without separating political and economic matters. He said that if we looked at our attitude in a comprehensive way, our interests could lie in the same direction.

Answering a question on the Western Sahara, Klibi said: Each time tension is created among Arab countries the Arab League moves quickly and this is what happened when Mauritania called for a meeting of the league's council to discuss the withdrawal of the Moroccan forces from Mauritania. The

Arab League sent a special envoy to Rabat and Nouakchott. The consultations carried out by this envoy led to Mauritania revoking its request. Morocco presented Mauritania with written outlines of arrangements for withdrawing its forces. The problem is thus on its way to solution. As to the possibility of the league's mediation in the conflict, Klibi said we did not receive any request for intervention with the parties to the dispute. The league, however, is making great efforts to avoid tensions and to countenance all possibilities. The situation seems quiet, and with the passage of time attitudes will mature.

Klibi was asked his opinion on the American hostages in Teheran. He said: We hope that this regrettable matter is solved thanks to the mediation of the PLO. Had the PLO's first mediation attempt been successful, its results would have been positive in relation to all parties and Iran would have come out of this predicament and the American diplomats would have been freed and the Iranian revolution would have rendered an important service to the Palestinian cause, which is that the PLO would become, in the eyes of Washington, a capable speaker. I hope that this solution will enjoy the support of Iran.

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO'S AHMAD 'AZARI GRANTS INTERVIEW TO UK PAPER

LD071525 London MORNING STAR in English 7 Dec 79 p 4 LD

[Interview with Ahmad 'Azari of the PLO by Pater Avis in London--no date given]

[Text] Palestine's liberation movement cannot compete equally on the battlefield with the armadas mounted by American imperialism and its allies in the Middle East "but on the political field we have made many gains in the last two years," says Ahmad 'Azari of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Mr. 'Azari, judicial adviser to PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat, was in London to attend the 36th congress of the British Communist Party as a fraternal delegate. He is an optimist for the future of his people.

"I could not be a revolutionary if I was not optimistic that our just cause will triumph," he says.

Mr. 'Azari recognises that the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty represents a blow to Arab unity by taking Egypt out of the struggle for the liberation of all Middle East lands from imperialist domination.

Those agreements have emboldened the leaders of Israel, armed with the most sophisticated U.S. weapons, to increase their attacks on Palestinian refugee camps and bases in southern Lebanon in the hope of killing off the liberation movement.

But, says Ahmad 'Azari, continued Palestinian resistance has made it more clear to the world that it is an absurdity to believe there can be a Middle East solution without recognition of Palestinian national rights.

Even the U.S. now has to take into account the Palestinian reality--while seeking to impose a phoney autonomy on the Palestinian people that would leave them bereft of sovereign rights over their own country.

Mr. 'Azari maintains that international solidarity with the Palestinian cause has increased in the last two years--as witness the recent meeting in Lisbon which gathered 1,000 representatives from over 300 countries and organisations.

He points also to the evolution of thinking within the socialist international. When Harold Wilson in Britain and Golda Meir in Israel were in power all social democratic parties supported Israel's position up to the hilt.

Now, social democratic leaders like Willy Brandt in West Germany, Bruno Kreisky in Austria and Bulent Ecevit in Turkey have indicated the growing acceptance within the socialist international of the PLO's case for a free and independent Palestinian state.

The recent reception of Yasir 'Arafat by Premier Suarez of Spain is another sign of the PLO's increased prestige.

"We can also say that the fall of the shah of Iran is a political victory for the Palestinian revolution," says Mr. 'Azari.

"Israel and the U.S. have lost a fortress in the Middle East, and the imperialists have been obliged to withdraw in silence from the Cento Pact."

Mr. 'Azari said it would be [a] mistake to write off Egypt--historically, the main force in advancing Arab liberation--as a definite loss to the national liberation movement.

"We must not forget that the Egyptian people have already made revolutionary gains in their struggle for progress," he says. "Such a tradition cannot be cancelled in 24 hours just because President Sadat has done a separate deal with Israel."

Mr. 'Azari is confident that the development of the progressive forces in Egypt will sooner or later lead to a clash between the masses and the present reactionary regime.

"They can deceive the people for some of the time, but not for all time," he said.

"Economic crisis and inflation are now suffocating the Egyptian people. The trade unions have found that the working class is not ready to go on living under these conditions, and the student movements and the peasants are being organized.

"The unified progressive party led by Khaled Moheiddin is gaining more members and the Egyptian Communist Party--which is illegal--has doubled its membership in six months.

"When you think that those who join the communist party are liable to be sacked from their work or put in prison, you can see how important that increase is."

Mr. 'Azari said Britain had a special responsibility to work for a solution of the Palestinian question.

"British forces were in India and they left, and India is an independent country," he says; "they were in Egypt and they left, and Egypt is independent.

"The only country that was under British mandate and is not independent is Palestine.

"I am sure that the British people understand the realities, but they must influence more those who speak in the name of their country. I am sure that, if there is a continuous campaign, the British Government can at least be made to recognise the PLO as the French Government has done."

Mr. 'Azari said that relations between a future Palestinian state and Israel must depend on the attitude of Israel toward Palestinian rights now.

"We cannot talk of recognition of Israel before the Palestinian state exists. At present the Israeli leaders are continuing to ignore, not only Palestinian rights, but the mere Palestinian existence."

Mr. 'Azari said nobody at this stage could decree what type of government and social system the Palestinian people would choose when they established their state--"anywhere on Palestinian land."

"But I am an optimist," he says. "I am sure it will be a democratic and progressive state, with good relations with at least all those who have stood with us in our long fight."

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ARAB COMMUNIST PARTIES' ANNUAL CONFERENCE--The Arab communist parties are to hold their annual conference next month but the precise venue of the meeting is not yet known, while some sources say that it will be held in Beirut, other sources assert that it will be held in Europe. Communist sources say that the conference will issue a political statement on the present Arab situation. A similar statement was issued by the previous conference which contained the first attack on the ruling Iraqi Ba'th Party. [Unattributed report] [Text] [LD301605 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 30 Nov 79 p 8]

LIBYA PAYS CYPRIOT PRESS--Cairo, 6 Dec--The weekly magazine AL-MUSAWWAR publishes photostat copies of six checks which Libyan President Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi gave to the Cypriot Socialist Party which is led by Lyssaridis. In its Friday issue, AL-MUSAWWAR says that Lyssaridis and his party played a disgraceful role in the assassination of Yusuf al-Siba'i. The magazine further reports that the checks were given to the TA NEA newspaper, the organ of the Lyssaridis party to be spent on attacks against Egypt and the United States which do not approve of al-Qadhafi's theories. [Text] [NC060950 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0900 GMT 6 Dec 79 NC]

AL-SADAT, IRAN, MECCA EVENTS--In reply to questions asked by members of the French Diplomatic Press Association Thursday, 6 December, Arab League Secretary General Klibi welcomed some of "President Al-Sadat's courageous gestures" and expressed the view that "the reproach which can be leveled at him is that he has persisted in following a path which leads nowhere." According to Klibi "the Arab League can operate without Egypt" although it is suffering from the absence of this "great country," while "Egypt is nothing without the Arab world." The Arab League secretary general, who is making his first visit to France, said he thinks what is happening in Iran is not in keeping with Islamic reason." [quotation marks as published] He expressed the hope that PLO mediation will be accepted in the hostages affair. It would be "a good thing" for everybody, he said. Finally he said he thinks the events in Mecca "are far removed from what is happening in Iran. This is a local irritation which must be stopped quickly, but it does not have deep popular roots." [Text] [LD110907 Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Dec 79 p 3 LD]

AFGHANISTAN

REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHAN DISSIDENT GROUP INTERVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 12-18 Nov 79 pp 31-33

[Interview with Representative of Afghanistan Islamic Society: "Representative of Afghanistan Islamic Society Tells AL-DUSTUR: 'Iran Is Not Helping Us and Government Is Harassing Us; Islam Is Guarantee for Independence from East and West'"]

[Text] When one arrives to Iran coming from the Arab countries, one feels that one's proximity to Afghanistan is not only geographical. Although there is a news blackout or at least a lack of interest in the Arab countries on the question of Afghanistan, one hears discussion about Afghanistan everywhere in Iran: in the press, on the radio, on television, in public meetings and in people's conversations.

The coup that Hafizullah Amin carried out in Afghanistan aroused broad interest in Iran. But this interest declined after it was clearly affirmed that there would be no significant change in Afghan policy and specifically in the Afghan position on the Islamic Movement there.

The Iranians are praying for the victory of Islamic Afghanistan in their Friday prayers. They consider participation in the Islamic Movement in Afghanistan to be participation in a holy war. Thousands of people have actually signed their names [to express] their willingness to volunteer. None of this, however, means that there is official support for the Afghan insurgents.

AL-DUSTUR took advantage of the opportunity of the presence in Tehran of the representative of the Afghanistan Islamic Society. It interviewed him about the most recent developments in the Afghan question, and the following interview took place:

We began our interview with a question about the history of the Afghanistan Islamic Society and the beginning of the armed struggle.

[Answer] The history of Islamic Afghanistan is an ancient history. Buddhism and Zoroastrianism were widespread in Afghanistan before Islam. After the victory of Islam and the liberation of our country Afghanistan became strongly

attached to the Islamic religion and to the Arabic Islamic culture. Some Moslem Arabs lost their lives in the battles that took place to liberate Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan are still keeping up the tombs of those martyrs and are upholding their dear memory, whereas they have forgotten their ancestors who had fought against the Moslem Arabs. After that our country became the point from which Islam was spread to India, to (Turkumanistan) and to other countries as well. The Afghans contributed to building the Islamic civilization, and there is a large number of scientists and writers whose origins are Afghan. Everybody remembers Jamal al Din al-Afghani who played a prominent role in the awakening of Egypt and of other Islamic countries during the latter of the last century.

In spite of the barriers that British colonialism tried to build between Afghanistan and the Arab countries, the Afghans remained careful of maintaining their relations with the Arabs and the Moslems. Al-Azhar continued to be an important center for Afghan students. From there, [knowledge] was radiated to us again. During the fifties strong ties developed between some Moslem Afghans who were studying at al-Azhar and the Islamic Movement in Egypt. The most prominent of those Afghans were Muhammad Niyazi, Burhan al-Din Rabani and Sayyid Muhammad Musa Tawana. After completing their studies in al-Azhar, they returned to Afghanistan to teach in the University of Kabul, and there they established in 1957 the Afghanistan Islamic Society under the leadership of Muhammad Niyazi, who is still a prisoner.

The society's activity was secret because of the dictatorship of King Muhammad Zahir Shah. But the society stepped up its activities in the sixties, and especially since 1963 when there was openness in the political climate and the activities of the opposition were stepped up in general. This opposition was Islamic and leftist, and it was opposed to the government of King Zahir Shah. These activities weakened the government and prepared the climate for Daud Khan's coup in 1973.

Independence First

[Question] What is your judgment of Daud Khan's coup?

[Answer] In the latter days of King Zahir Shah there were two forces vying for control of the mainstream. There was the leftist movement, on the one hand, and the Islamic forces, on the other. The Russians sensed the danger of the Islamic Movement, so they planned a military coup that was supported by the two leftist parties that had always been vying with each other in their loyalty to the Russians: The Khalaq Party (the People) and the Barjam Party (al-Rayah [the Flag]). Except for one minister, the first cabinet that Daud formed was made up of members of these two parties. But in the end, Daud did not accept playing the part of a puppet. While he continued striking at the Islamic forces, he also began liquidating the positions of the leftists. This was an attempt to establish autocracy, so the Russians took action again and engineered the coup which brought the Khalaq Party to power.

A few days went by, and it became evident that the principal target of Taraki's government was to liquidate the Islamic forces. Therefore, we had no alternative but to begin organizing the armed resistance.

[Question] You are always talking about the Russians and about Russian influence. Can you define this Russian influence for us in specific terms?

[Answer] The army is the most important seat for Russian influence.

Most of the army officers received their training in Russia. You can see that all the coups and the changes are brought about by this subordinate institution. It was also for this reason that our only alternative was to turn to the people and to begin the armed struggle because the upper echelons of the army have become hopeless. They take no action unless such action is part of a foreign plan.

There are more than 10,000 Russian experts and advisers in the armed forces. Three thousand of them are working in the air force. In general, the number of Russians working in the economic and educational institutions in our country exceeds 150,000. Russian advisers are distinguished in the 19 ministries which make up the government, in all the public departments and in all the responsible agencies. In the city of Mazar Sharif alone there are approximately 120,000 Russian experts and technicians working in the extraction of oil and gas.

If you wanted an example of the economic exploitation that our people are subjected to, there is the example of the oil and the gas which the Russians are plundering in the form of raw materials. For every cubic meter of natural gas they pay 75 Afghani (less than half a French franc), and then they sell us the refined oil and gas at world prices.

In addition, they take the gold and the emeralds that are mined out of our country at trifling prices. They also take cotton, our most important agricultural product. They get it at a price that is much lower than the world price. To a certain extent, they also monopolize grain imports from Afghanistan.

The other aspect--and perhaps the most important one--in the Russian interest in Afghanistan is its strategic location and its proximity to China, Iran and Pakistan as well as Russia itself. Therefore, the advent of any independent government in Afghanistan would be considered a threat to Soviet security in the judgment of the Russians who want Afghanistan to be a bridge they can use to cross to the other countries where they can achieve the Kaiser's old dream of reaching warm waters.

[Question] What is your basic goal, and what policy will you adopt if the Islamic Movement came to power?

[Answer] Islam itself is the armor that protects independence. Our goal is to achieve the independence of Afghanistan from the superpowers and to

establish strong relations with the Islamic world. We are certain that these relations will give our country the strong bases for preserving its independence. Islamic Afghanistan will become part of the Third World and of the Non-aligned Movement in the world.

We want our country--just as Khomeyni wants Iran--to be neither eastern nor western. The application of Islam will not be a step backwards for Afghanistan. We have no plans to impede progress, but we rather want Islam to be a tool of awareness and awakening for the people and an incentive for progress. We know that Islam has certain applications, just as is the case in some subordinate countries, but we are as far as we can be from such Islam.

[Question] What is your relationship to the other political forces? How do you regulate life in the areas that you control?

[Answer] There are other Islamic organizations besides ours. The most important of them are the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, the Afghan Islamic Party and the National Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan. At the present time the Afghan Islamic Party is suffering from a split.

Our efforts so far have yielded the unification of the efforts of these basic organizations into the Islamic Alliance which is a framework for coordinating activities in the liberated areas and for planning operations. We hope that this will develop into full unity among the organizations.

There are efforts to bring together other organizations such as al-Ra'd [Thunder], al-Nasr [Victory] and the Islamic Afghan Movement. These organizations were originally formed in Iran, under the influence of the Iranian Revolution which is working basically among the Shi'ite minority in Afghanistan.

[Question] Are the other basic organizations Sunni organizations?

[Answer] They do not have a sectarian character, but the majority of the Afghan people belong to the Sunni sect. Out of 15 million, which is the number of Afghanistan's population, for example, there are a number of Shi'ites.

The Islamic Alliance, which represents the basic fighting organizations, directs the struggle and regulates public life in the liberated areas. Local authorities and courts have been formed to look into disputes and to regulate the different aspects of life. These committees and authorities are guided in their activities by the charter of the Islamic Alliance which all parties signed.

[Question] Are there non-Islamic parties that are participating in the Revolution?

[Answer] There were other parties, but they were swept away by the tide of the Islamic Movement. The New Democracy Party, for example, which is known as the Jawid Flame-the Eternal Flame, was active in the struggle that preceded

Taraki's coup. But its members were subjected to severe oppression afterwards, and they were weakened considerably. There were other organizations that were formed on a national or on a patriotic basis. The most important of these organizations is the Afghan Malat Party. It had socialist, democratic tendencies, and it was tied to Western Europe. But this trend has also been weakened. The infrastructure of these organizations rallied around the banner of the Islamic Movement which became the movement of the entire nation.

On the other hand, there are at present forces that have been left over from the regime of King Zahir Shah (he himself is now living in Italy), and there are western efforts to revive these forces. However, the effect they have is not worth mentioning.

The Rescue Coup

[Question] What is your judgment of the recent coup, and who is Hafizullah Amin? It is being said that the fact that he belongs to the Pushtu tribes may give him a popular base. Is this true?

[Answer] Hafizullah Amin is the son of one of the major feudal Pushtu families. His family lives in a luxurious mansion near Kabul.

He began his political life cooperating with Daud Khan, and he had a strong relationship with the Shahi family. He benefited from this relationship, and he had an opportunity to complete his studies in the United States. He was known at that time to be influenced by U.S. culture. When the U.S. president visited Afghanistan, Hafizullah organized a major demonstration to welcome him. Then he joined the Khalaq Party, and after a while became the second man after Taraki, or rather his competitor.

The fact that he is a member of a certain tribe does not mean that he has its support. His family has removed itself from the tribal environment and has no influence on the tribe.

But in my judgment the recent coup was an attempt to play the last hand and to salvage whatever can be salvaged from the deposed regime. It was exactly like [the coup which] removed the Shah and brought Shahpur Bakhtiar. In other words, it was an attempt to keep the same merchandise under a different facade, with the knowledge that the facade here (Hafiz) had been used up from the very beginning. However, he was considered stronger and firmer than Taraki.

No Assistance from Iran or from China

[Question] Let us get to a discussion about Iran, the Iranian Revolution and about what is being said about Iranian support for you or what is called Iranian interference.

[Answer] The prospects of our being affected by the Iranian Revolution are broader than the discussion about interference and support. They are even

broader than the relationship with the Iranian government. Regardless of the format of the relationship, the Iranian Revolution remains a major event in our area; in fact, it is a major event in the world. It gave the struggle of the Afghan people a new thrust. We learned that by depending on the powers of our own people, it was possible to achieve victory over a regime that is supported by a major power. The Iranian people were also able to annihilate the Shah's regime which was supported by the United States.

It is in our interest that the Iranian Revolution remain strong and invincible. We would consider this a victory for us even though Iran has not offered us any assistance.

Regarding assistance, we have not been receiving any financial support from the government so far. The people here are collecting contributions for us and are helping us. But we did not receive anything from the government. Ayatollah Khomeyni has expressed his support for us more than once, and this is great moral and political support.

Thousands of persons have expressed their willingness to volunteer with us, but we do not need manpower; we do need weapons, ammunition, and financial assistance. The liberated areas are suffering from economic difficulties since we have to make plans for the food and the livelihoods of the population in the shadow of an economic blockade that was set up by the government of Kabul.

Officials in the Iranian government have stated that the borders with Afghanistan must be checked. They did actually place restrictions on activities across the borders, and these measures impede our work.

At any rate, the historical ties between Iran and Afghanistan are too deep to be separated. There is no doubt that a major change, such as what happened in Iran, will affect Afghanistan. This effect is ongoing and I am affirming that there is no Iranian interference. In fact, the support that we are seeking does not exist; were it to materialize, we would not consider it interference.

[Question] What about what is being said about Chinese support?

[Answer] This is what the regime in Kabul is trying to connect to us. In order for the regime to conceal its subordination to foreigners, it is trying to portray the opposition movement as the handwork of foreigners. The Kabul regime is saying that we are being trained in China and that we are utilizing Chinese territory as a background base. The fact is that we are not receiving material support from China. China took a strong position against the coup that was planned by the Soviets, and this was beneficial to the Afghan Revolution, but this does not signify that we benefited directly from this position.

We Support Independent Movements

[Question] How are your relations with the liberation movements in the world, and especially the Palestinian Revolution?

[Answer] We have good relations with all the Islamic Movements in the world. Some of these movements offered us material and moral support. And they offered to send us volunteers, but as I said we do not need manpower.

We support all liberation movements whose origins are independent and those which seek liberation from colonialism and foreign control. But it fills our hearts with grief to see that some of these movements are not aware of the danger of the Russians; nor are they aware of the importance of preserving the independence of their movements and their countries. The result, therefore, is that they become liberated from one foreign country and fall under the control of another major foreign country. Therefore, all the sacrifices of the people are ultimately made in the interests of a foreign power. This erroneous position of some liberation movements impedes the establishment of relations of solidarity between us and them.

Let us take, for example, the Palestinian Revolution. Our support for this revolution is unlimited. We consider the liberation of Palestine the question of all Moslems in the world. Some Palestinian leaders, however, have considered Taraki's coup to be a progressive revolution. They are still favoring the Afghan regime which is hostile to the people, and they are adopting an unfavorable position towards us. These positions are misled by false, leftist slogans and are oblivious to the most important matter of the revolution, which is independence.

What happened in Afghanistan has also happened in Arab and African countries where the Russians organized a coup within the national governments and brought their direct agents [into power] by means of bloody, violent operations. In spite of this, we find some people insisting on considering the new regimes of change to be revolutionary and progressive changes.

[Question] On your part, can you guarantee the independence of your movement so that the Americans and the West would not benefit from your struggle against the Soviets?

[Answer] I want you to be certain that we are careful about our independence. I told you that Western colonialist forces want to revive the remnants of the old regime and to establish a foothold for themselves. But the Islamic Movement in Afghanistan is an independent movement and will never permit another colonialist power to impose its influence on our country.

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EGYPT

FEATURES OF NEW PRESS BILL EXAMINED

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 12 Nov 79 pp 8-11

[Article by Mahmud al-Maraghi: "After 60 Days of Work, These Are New Press Laws; Private Papers Permitted To Be Published After Long Absence; Press Committee Wonders: How Do We Avoid Phenomenon of Political Boutiques; Partisan Papers in Heated Argument Until Midnight; National Papers and New System of Self Rule"]

[Text] After 60 days of work, the Press Committee has completed studying the issues presented to it. During this period, the General Committee held 14 meetings and the subcommittees held more than 30 meetings. The work to draft the bills started after the members had completed 140 hours of work. When the bills which will be discussed by the People's Assembly are drafted, these figures will rise and the urgent question will become: What have all these efforts produced?

Journalists' Concerns and Readers' Concerns

The answer to the question "what has the committee accomplished" might be a matter of form. The committee has accomplished a constitutional amendment, has drawn up a bill regulating the press and has proposed something new insofar as the journalists' rights and duties and insofar as the guarantees that should be included in their union law are concerned. The committee has also formulated its visualization concerning ownership of the papers left behind by the Socialist Union. The committee has also formulated its visualization concerning the Supreme Press Council.

The committee has completed all this. This is the form. As for the content, it is determined by the committee's goals.

There have been numerous interpretations from the outset. Some have said: The most important thing facing us is the Supreme Press Council and ownership of the national papers. Others have said: Rather, the most important thing is to translate what the constitution contains regarding the freedom of the press. Some talked about the means to bring journalists to account and others spoke about the journalists' concerns.

Interpretations have been numerous but the fundamental question continues to be: What does all this mean insofar as the written word is concerned? Will the reader find a greater expression of his concerns through new organizations of the Egyptian press? How will the reader find this? With greater freedom, which is something on which a popular referendum has agreed, with more papers and opinions or with both, as a paper submitted by the Journalists Union indicates?

Once again, what do we mean by freedom? Is it freedom with no limits, i.e., a liberal western-style freedom, or a restricted eastern-style freedom? If freedom is one of the two sides of the press, then how will the other side, namely responsibility, be?

Another question is: How is the slogan of freedom realized? With the multiplicity of press platforms and, consequently, the multiplicity of press owners or with the people's ownership of the press and with ridding the press of private interests?

Freedom and Press Ownership

The proposed constitutional amendments include a clear provision concerning the freedom of the press.

In the first meeting, a member proposed the formation of a subcommittee for the freedom of the press. The answer was: The issue of freedom is the responsibility of all the committees.

The paper submitted by the Journalists Union Council contains 10 principles concerning the freedom of the press as part of the public liberties and as a fundamental means of expressing a democratic life.

The paper contains an endeavor to define the concept and framework of freedom: Where it begins and where it ends. The paper says that the right of the freedom of the press belongs to society and that "the journalist has no right to relinquish this freedom and must not be pressured to do so." The paper adds:

The rule in freedom is generality and the exception if restriction.

The journalist's basic commitment is the constitution. Anything else may be a subject of disagreement. Disagreement with some public policies cannot be considered to undermine the state or its fundamental components. Moreover, criticism, suggestion and disagreement are the instrument of development and of overcoming stagnation. Safeguarding the right to criticism and to disagreement is evidence of democracy. But for this to happen, the discussion must extend to the details that embody the principles: The laws, the predominant form of press ownership, the journalist's rights and duties, the press relationship with the state and the meaning of having the press as a popular authority,

Regardless of the major significance of the legal framework governing the press, the organizational framework is no less important. When it was decided in 1960 that the National Union would own the papers and when this situation persisted under the Socialist Union, the organization became the law.

Until a few years ago the state did not, for example, resort to the penal code or to the section concerning publication crimes. Everybody was within the same framework because there was a single owner and because the owner was a political organization.

The question is: Will this situation persist or will it change?

Some people discussed the issue and could imagine no situation other than the existing one. Others discussed the matter and could not imagine but that freedom would be synonymous to termination of public ownership. The committee has ended up with a compromise. Those saying "nothing better than what has been is possible" had been defeated and those calling for a western-style liberal press have been defeated. The third inclination, that of acknowledging the real situation "and trying to improve it" has triumphed.

At the outset, the question was: Who should own [the press]? The committee rejected a specific proposal calling for ownership of the existing papers, representing the Socialist Union's legacy, to be distributed among three sides: The press workers to own 50 percent of the shares, the Consultative Council--or the Supreme Press Council--to own 30 percent of the shares and the rest to be offered for subscription "by whoever wishes."

Some people said: This would provide the opportunity to those with various political purposes to be owners.

Others answered: And what harm is there?

The discussion persisted but within a different framework, namely: 51 percent for the Consultative Council and 49 percent for the workers. The Journalists Union said: We do not want a superficial ownership. Every side must exercise its ownership right, as is happening in the various projects. A general assembly representing the two sides of the ownership should be formed and each side should have its voting strength commensurate with what it owns. The general assembly should be the supreme authority within each press establishment, should elect the board of directors, should watch the work, should issue the budget, should approve the final accounts, etc.

Some were apprehensive and so they suggested that the general assembly include the workers only "but through appointment." The subcommittee discussing this matter rejected this proposal. The members resorted to the general committee where the surprise was waiting.

The discussion was predominated by a general acceptance of the idea that the press establishments should have, for the first time, general assemblies running them and boards of directors whose membership is shared by the workers and the public ownership representatives, provided that the selection is restricted and consists mainly of people within the press establishments.

Thus, a kind of self-rule has been realized by the papers and the question has become: This being the case, will this situation lead to improving the conditions of the press? Will the press enjoy greater freedom and will the economic and administrative independence be reflected on their intellectual and journalistic independence?

It is agreed that the press should be free of any governmental influence. When formation of the Supreme Press Council was discussed, Mansur Hasan 'Ali objected to a proposal on which some people insisted, namely the proposal that the minister of information be a member of the council.

Also, when the rights and duties document was discussed, the committee agreed that the national papers should be independent and should not reflect the opinion of a party or of a government.

When the powers of the Supreme Press Council--which will begin its work at the level of the entire press--were defined afterwards, not a single provision giving the council the right to political guidance was included.

But are provisions enough to achieve greater press freedom?

This is what will be answered by practice.

Will Balance Change?

The national papers will thus continue to exist. The development is in the form of their management.

The question is: What about the other papers?

One of the members said: We know that we cannot change the form of ownership decisively. However, we want to keep our eyes on the future. Another balance must rise between public papers owned by the people and private papers owned by partisan organizations, private publishing houses or cultural or non-cultural groups. Prosperity of the press and prosperity of opinion require more papers and more sources from which such papers emanate.

Some people underlined some of the contents of the Journalists Union paper, namely: More than 50 papers and magazines were shut down in the past 30 years and no other papers or magazines emerged to replace them; the readers' needs have increased; the level of education and of culture has risen and the number of journalists has increased. But the number of papers has not increased by the same proportion.

The committee discussed this situation and said: The principle is that of the freedom of publishing papers and this freedom is stipulated by a constitutional provision.

In practice and when the role of the law came into the picture, the committee ended up with restrictions:

Individually-owned papers are not permitted and when the owners of the existing individually-owned papers die, their licenses shall be withdrawn.

Collectively owned papers shall be permitted, provided that they take the form of joint-stock companies or cooperative associations and provided that the capital of a daily is no less than 250,000 pounds and that of a weekly no less than 100,000 pounds. Some people objected, saying: What is required is to facilitate things. Others countered this objection by saying: "A minimal financial commitment is necessary to guarantee seriousness." There is no need for the press to turn into "political boutiques."

The latter inclination prevailed and those advocating the first inclination demanded more deliberations on the issue of the individually-owned press, saying: "It is unreasonable for a paper to shut down because its owner has died. If the publication of a paper constitutes an extension of a situation preceding the proposed law, then let this situation persist or let it be the power of the Supreme Press Council to discuss such an extension."

The committee turned down this proposal with a majority of one vote.

It has thus become possible, in accordance with the law that is being drafted, to publish new papers with such financial commitments or to have papers published by associations, unions and clubs--papers within the sphere of the interests of such organizations, i.e., specialized papers.

A history paper prepared by a committee of university professors deals with two press theories: The theory of licensing and the theory of notification. In the first case, the paper needs to have a license from an executive authority to be published, as happens in the case of a commercial or an industrial business. In the second case, the paper needs no such measure and it is enough for it to notify the authority concerned. This strengthens the idea of the freedom of the press.

The discussions on this issue in the subcommittees were long. Some people cannot imagine the publication of a newspaper "without advance licensing" and others see in the law the only required restriction. The General Committee approves a report which puts the power in the hand of the Supreme Press Council, but according to the notification, and not the licensing, theory. This means that for a paper to be published, it need not apply for a license and is only required to submit a notification to the Sypreme Press Council which examines the degree by which the notification meets the legal requirements. If the requirements are met, then the council has no right to object.

This constitutes an advanced point in the proposed law.

And Partisan Papers?

Does this also apply to the partisan papers?

The parties law contains a provision that releases the freedom of publishing partisan papers. An amendment introduced into this law this year contains a provision that stipulates that a party should have 10 seats [in the People's Assembly] to be able to publish a paper or to continue to publish a paper.

A proposal was made in the Press Codification Committee to discuss this issue. More than one half the committee members signed the proposal. The last part of the 14th meeting was set aside for this important discussion. A working paper for this proposal was prepared by representative of AL-AHRAR newspaper.

The Journalists Union representative said:

We demand that what was introduced into the law this year, namely meeting the 10-seat requirement, be abolished. It is unreasonable that the law should facilitate the formation of a party, should exempt it from the People's Assembly membership quorum and should then require this quorum for founding the party's newspaper. It is unreasonable to assume the presence of a party without a newspaper or to assume the success of a party in elections without contact with the public opinion through a newspaper or a magazine. Other addresses in the same vein followed.

Some proposed that the membership quorum be replaced by a quorum of the votes received by a party in elections. Others replied: What if a party is founded after the elections? Does it have to wait for a full parliamentary term? What if a party boycotts the elections? Should it be denied having a paper?

Some people wondered about the status of AL-AHRAR and AL-AHALI newspapers. Safwat al-Sharif, the Information Authority chairman, said that their status "is no longer legal."

The discussion went on until 2300. The committee then decided to be content with the deliberations and the minister said: "The representatives of the parties have expressed their views on this issue. This is enough to be taken into consideration by those who will discuss the matter in the People's Assembly. The committee includes more than a People's Assembly member."

There Remains Issue of Journalist

Throughout all this, the subcommittees and the General Committee were engaged in a constant discussion on the issue of the journalist. How can he be freer and more responsible? What are his rights and his responsibilities? How

does the law deal with him and how should it deal with him? When do we say this is freedom of expression and when do we say this is violation of the law? If the committee has decided that the Journalists Union will remain the vessel including those engaged in this profession, then what are the union's powers vis-a-vis its members? Can the union bring them to account for a political matter or for a violation of the public law?

This is the subject of another discussion.

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EGYPT

SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT CHAIRMAN EXPLAINS COURT STRUCTURE, JURISDICTION

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 12 Nov 79 pp 12-13

[Interview With Counsellor Ahmad Mamduh 'Atiyah, Chairman of Supreme Constitutional Court, by 'Isam Hiram and Suhayr Shamardal; "First Interview With Supreme Constitutional Court Chairman; We Have Chosen System of Subsequent Control So That Laws May not be Hampered; Court Decisions Are Binding to All State Authorities With Retroactive Effect"]

[Text] Nobody can deny the gains achieved by the people since the correction revolution.

We can even assert decisively that we have accomplished under the canopy of the supremacy of the law achievements that even old-established democratic countries have not been able to accomplish.

On the Judiciary Day this year, the Supreme Constitutional Court became a reality. Its chairman and members took the constitutional oath before President al-Sadat after 8 years of study and discussion until the law establishing the court was issued. It is a law that keeps up pace with the latest democratic laws in the world.

In an interview with Counsellor Ahmad Mamduh 'Atiyah, the Supreme Constitutional Court chairman, our discussion centered on the role of the Constitutional Court in serving democracy and entrenching the supremacy of the law.

Supremacy of Law Is Basis of Government

Counsellor 'Atiyah began the dialogue by talking about the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and why it was agreed to give it this name. He said:

Constitutional provisions have defined the jurisdictions of the Supreme Constitutional Court. The court's main jurisdiction is judiciary control over the constitutionality of laws and statutes so as to prevent violation of any constitutional provision, especially the provisions concerning liberties, rights and fundamental components of the Egyptian society.

The court is thus considered a guardian of the constitution and the top authority in safeguarding the supremacy of the law. Article 64 of the constitution stipulates that supremacy of the law is the basis of government in the state.

The court is also empowered to settle the cases involving the dispute of jurisdiction and to interpret the legislative provisions. But considering that its main jurisdiction is to observe the constitutionality of laws and statutes, as I have already pointed out, this court has been called the Supreme Constitutional Court to highlight and stress this meaning.

Here I would like to explain a point concerning the court's jurisdiction in interpreting laws. When the court issues a decision which contains in a general and abstract manner an interpretation concerning a certain ruling in a legislative provision, then this interpretation becomes binding to all after it is published in the Official Gazette and with a retroactive effect dating back to the time when the provision became operational.

[Question] So what is the difference between the abolished Supreme Court and the Supreme Constitutional Court?

[Answer] Our permanent constitution, which was issued in September 1971, devotes a special section--namely section five of chapter four concerning the system of government--to the Supreme Constitutional Court. The law pertaining to this court was issued recently in implementation of the provisions of the constitution.

The Supreme Court was formed on the basis of law by decree No 81 of 1969. The 1964 provisional constitution made no provisions for that court.

It is obvious from this that the Supreme Constitutional Court has no connection whatsoever with the previous Supreme Court, not to mention the fundamental differences between the two insofar as structure and jurisdiction are concerned. For example, the Supreme Court consisted of a chairman, his deputies and counsellors for only a term of 3 years--a term that was renewable--whereas the structure of the Supreme Constitutional Court insofar as its chairman and members are concerned is permanent and until they reach the age of retirement. Moreover, the previous Supreme Court exercised the right to interpret the provisions of the constitution whereas the new law of the Supreme Constitutional Court stipulates that this court shall only undertake to interpret the provisions of the laws and laws by decree. The People's Assembly Legislative Committee has stated in [one of] its reports that this is compatible with the sound implementation of the constitution which cannot be interpreted or amended except with the will of the people only and in accordance with the measures stipulated by the constitution itself.

[Question] How does the Supreme Constitutional Court exercise its control over the constitutionality of the laws and the statutes?

[Answer] In the past and under the previous law pertaining to the Supreme Court, control was restricted to appeals presented to any judiciary authority contesting the constitutionality of a provision necessary for settling a court case. If the authority concerned considered the appeal sufficiently serious, it suspended the court case and instructed the plaintiff to present his case to the Supreme Court.

The new law pertaining to the Supreme Constitutional Court has added two new channels. The first is that of having any court or judiciary authority refer to the Supreme Constitutional Court, without any fees, the question of deciding the constitutionality of a provision necessary for settling a dispute and yet seeming to be unconstitutional to the referring court.

The other channel is that of having the Supreme Constitutional Court deal with any provision presented to it while exercising its jurisdiction if the provision is connected with the matters with which the court is dealing so that this court may pronounce it unconstitutional if it becomes evident that the provision violates the constitution.

[Question] What are the effects of a decision pronouncing the unconstitutionality of a provision in a law or a statute and does the power of such a decision extend to all cases or is it confined to the case in question?

[Answer] A decision pronouncing the unconstitutionality of any provision means that it is not permissible to apply the provision as of the day following publication of the decision so that the courts may refrain from applying it not only in the future but also retroactively, provided that this retroactive effect exclude the legal positions [marakiz] established earlier.

If the decision of unconstitutionality pertains to a penal provision, then all the sentences issued in reliance on this provision are considered null and void, even if they have gained the force of a fait accompli.

The decision of unconstitutionality, like all the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court, is binding to everybody and to all the state authorities and its impact is not confined to the case in question alone.

Advance and Subsequent Control

[Question] Does the Supreme Constitutional Court have the power of advance control over laws and statutes?

[Answer] Some countries, including France, follow the system of advance constitutional control which requires that important laws be submitted to a constitutional council, which is similar to a supreme constitutional court, and that they be approved by this council before they are promulgated.

However, this jurisdiction has received criticism, even in France itself, because of the delay it causes in promulgating laws and because it assumes that the legislative authority does not possess the legal skill and experience to avoid violation of the constitution.

This is why we have not adopted in Egypt the system of the advance constitutional control and why we have followed the subsequent control system which is founded on watching over the legislative activity by abolishing the laws and legislations violating the constitution after they are promulgated. This kind of control is often undertaken by an independent judiciary authority, namely the Supreme Constitutional Court.

[Question] What is the court's role insofar as the dispute of jurisdiction is concerned?

[Answer] The Supreme Constitutional Court is the authority empowered to settle the dispute of jurisdiction by appointing the judiciary authority with the jurisdiction if the same legal case is presented to two judiciary authorities and if neither relinquishes the case--this is known as the positive dispute--or if both relinquish the case--this is known as a negative dispute.

The dispute of jurisdiction passed through more than one phase before it was undertaken by the previous Supreme Court. Such dispute had come previously under the power of the Appellate Court, meeting in the form of a general assembly. When it was pointed out that the administrative judiciary was not represented in this assembly and could not, therefore, present its view, the judiciary authority law promulgated in 1959 was amended and so the assembly came to consist of chairman of the Appellate Court or one of his deputies, of three counsellors of the Appellate Court and three counsellors of the Supreme Administrative Court of the State Council--all counsellors were selected by the general assembly annually--as members.

However, this structure also aroused criticism because the majority in it came from the Appellate Court and because the members were changed annually, thus precluding the stability of principles.

For these reasons, it was deemed that a neutral authority not coming from either the ordinary or the administrative judiciary should be entrusted with the power to settle the dispute of jurisdiction. The Supreme Constitutional Court meets this requirement.

[Question] Can the court stop the implementation of two final and conflicting sentences?

[Answer] The Supreme Constitutional Court has the power to determine the sentence to be carried out. The court chairman has the power to instruct, at the request of those concerned, that one or both sentences be suspended until the dispute is settled.

[Question] There were numerous observations on the previous bill prepared last year for the Supreme Constitutional Court law. Various symposiums were held to express those observations. What is your opinion of these observations?

[Answer] I would like to point out a fact, namely that the observations focused not only on the previous bill but on all eight preceding bills throughout the past 8 years and until the new law saw the light in its new form. I would like to stress that all the observations were the subject of detailed and alert study. Many of them were taken into consideration in the new law which was issued after being discussed in three sessions held by the Supreme Council of the Judiciary Authorities. The law was also discussed by the legal and legislative committees of the People's Assembly before it was issued in its final form, free of all impurities.

[Question] The Supreme Constitutional Court is followed by an assisting agency, namely the Council of Commissioners. Can we know what this agency is and what its powers are?

[Answer] The Council of Commissioners is empowered to examine the court cases before they are presented to the court. As of the moment the case is presented, the Clerical Office registers it and notifies the other side in the dispute which has the right to a rebuttal within 15 days. The plaintiff then has the right to counter the rebuttal within 15 more days. Another rebuttal to the counter rebuttal is permitted within 15 more days. As soon as these procedural steps are completed, the Clerical Office presents the case to the Council of Commissioners which is comprised of a chairman, counsellors and assistant counsellors whose task is to prepare a full report containing the statements and arguments of both sides, as well as the council's legal opinion on the dispute.

I would like to stress that the report of the Council of Commissioners is not binding to the court and that it is tantamount to some sort of assistance to the court. This system is not new but is rather in operation in the State Council. In the Appellate Court, the appellate prosecution undertakes this task.

[Question] (Because the man's time is precious and because he and his court members, have numerous tasks facing them, we asked him our final question) What is the authority under whose control the Supreme Constitutional Court comes?

[Answer] The court is an independent judiciary authority that does not come under the control of any other authority. Its budget is independent even of that of the Ministry of Justice. Insofar as its budget is concerned, the court chairman and General Assembly have the powers of the minister of finance, the minister of administrative development and of the chairman of the Central Organization and Management Agency.

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EGYPT

LIBERAL PARTY OFFICIAL RESIGNS

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 13 Nov 79 p 1

[Article: "'Abd-al-Shafi Resigns From Liberal Party"]

[Text] Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi, the deputy chairman of the Liberal Party, has submitted his resignation from the party. The resignation has its causes and will be presented today to a meeting of the party secretariat.

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi has resigned for three reasons:

The unclear positions of the party on undertaking the task of the national opposition in this phase.

The inability of the party and its leadership to exploit some situations to declare its opinion to the masses.

The party paper which does not express the party leadership's opinions truthfully and which is governed by whims.

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EGYPT

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS TO ELECT UNIONS THIS MONTH

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 9 Nov 79 p 10

[Article by Labib Siba'i: "Elections of University and College Student Unions During This Month; Council for Coordination of Activities in Each University and New Policy for Leadership System"]

[Text] It has been decided to hold the elections of the student union councils in the colleges and universities before the end of the current month of November. The president of each university will issue next week a decision setting the dates for elections at the various levels. Only students registered in the election lists and having paid the union fees will have the right to vote.

Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, the vice president of Cairo University, has stated that it is required for the elections of the student union committees in the colleges and institutes to be valid that at least 50 percent of the students entitled to vote to be present. If the figure is not met, the elections will be postponed until a later date within the following 3 days. In this case, for the elections to be valid, it is required that at least (30 percent) of the students to be present. If the figure is not met, then the student group which fails to show up for the elections with the required number of votes will be excluded from representation.

It has been decided that as of this year, each committee will be formed under the leadership [riyadah] of a faculty member appointed by the college or institute dean and with the membership of two students from each study group [discipline] elected annually by the students in their study group.

It has also been decided to form the student union council in each college or institute under the leadership of the dean, the membership of the leaders of the various committees, the chairman of the technical youth welfare outfit in each college and the student secretaries of the union council committees.

It has also been decided for the first time this year that a council for the coordination of student activities will be formed in each university

section will have a faculty member as a leader who will be assisted by an instructor or a tutor who meets with the students of his group periodically to familiarize himself with their educational problems, to provide the students with guidance and to exert efforts to solve the problems.

To be nominated for membership of the union council committees, a student is required to be Egyptian, of good character and regular [presumably in terms of attendance]. He is required to be new [mustajid] to his group and not to have repeated for any reason (connected with the work) of the committee for which he nominates himself. He is also required not to have been sentenced to any punishment restricting freedom and not to have had his membership in a student union or committee dropped or suspended.

It has also been decided to hold the elections in each college and institute to form five committees: The Family [al-usar] Committee, the Cultural and Artistic Activity Committee, the Scouting [al-jawwalah] and Public Service Committee and the Social Activities and Trips Committee [no fifth committee].

The Family Committee encourages the formation of families in the college and coordinates their activities. The Athletic Activity Committee encourages and develops athletic talents and organizes athletic events in the college. The Cultural Activity Committee familiarizes the students with the characteristics of the society and with its development needs. The Scouting and Public Service Committee organizes the scout movement activities and carries out the environmental service programs approved by the college council and aimed at contributing toward society's development and at having the students participate in these programs and in the national public service projects. The Social Activity and Trips Committee undertakes to develop the social relations between the students, the faculty members and the workers and to spread a spirit of cooperation and the spirit of university [fraternity] and to organize trips and social, cultural and recreational camps.

The Alexandria University Council has decided to hold the student union elections on 29 November.

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EGYPT

LABOR UNIONS ELECT EXECUTIVE COUNCILS

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 12 Nov 79 p 3

[Article: "Results of Elections for Executive Councils of General Unions"]

[Text] Most of the general unions completed the formation of their executive councils in the past few days, except for the Educational Services Union and the Commerce Workers Union which formed their councils at a late hour last night when the paper was all set for printing.

Following are the names of [chairmen and members] of the executive councils of the general unions:

The General Textile Workers Union: This union's executive council has been formed as follows:

'Ali Mahmud Difda', chairman of the general union; Ibrahim Muhammad Shalabi and Sami 'Izz-al-'Arab, deputy chairmen; Hasan Tulbah Marzuq, general secretary; Ahmad Sulayman Kashshaf, assistant secretary general; 'Abd-al-Latif Mahmud Abu-al-'Aynayn, treasurer; 'Asim 'Abd-al-Haqq Salih, assistant treasurer; Khayriyah 'Abd-al-Karim Muhammad, Fathi Hamid 'Abdrabbuh, Anwar Salim al-Shamma', Kamil Riyad Taha, 'Abdallah Mahmud al-Nizami, Lutfi 'Ali Husayn, al-Sayyid Muhammad Rashid, Sa'd Ibrahim al-Jayyar, Tharwat Makkawi Sayyid Ahmad, Abu-al-Su'ud Mahmud Subul, 'Abd-al-Sabur 'Abd-al-Mun'im Ahmad, Ibrahim Muhammad al-Anwar, Muhammad al-Sayyid Badawi and 'Ali Hafiz 'Ammar, members.

Executive Council of General Union of Food Industry Workers: This union's executive council has been formed as follows:

Sa'd Muhammad Ahmad, union chairman; Mahmud Muhammad al-'Askari, first deputy chairman; Bakir Khalil Ibrahim, second deputy chairman; 'Adli Tanyus Ibrahim, general secretary; 'Abd-al-Latif Muhammad Mustafa 'Aysh, assistant secretary general; Muhammad Shafiq Mustafa, treasurer; Hasan Muhammad Hasan, assistant treasurer; Ahmad Salih Ahmad, secretary for social security; 'Ali Yusuf Abu-Yusuf, secretary labor services; Fuli Mahmud Hanafi, plan and production secretary; Ahmad Shams-al-Din Baghaghhu, membership and organization secretary; Sayyid Hasan Darwah, secretary for education; 'Abd-al-Sattar

Sa'd Musa and Muhammad 'Abd-al-Latif Rayyan Mukhluf, union commissioners, [wakil]; 'Abd-al-Sattar Barakat, Jalal Ahmad Rawtan, 'Abd-al-Wahhab Hasan 'Abd-al-Majid; 'Imran Mustafa Badri, 'Ali Shahatah Radwan, Hajjaji Hasan 'Abdallah and 'Abd-al-'Azim 'Abd-al-Hafiz al-Sughayyar, members.

General Union of Banks and Insurance:

Mahmud Dabbur, chairman and member of the General Federation of Workers; Muhammad al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Al, Khalid al-Sayyid Muhammad and al-Sayyid Abu-al-'Izz Kishkah, deputy chairmen; 'Abduh Husayn Muhammad 'Ali, general secretary; 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad Shuman, treasurer; 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Hadidi, assistant secretary general; Muhsin Ghazi 'Abd-al-Ghani, financial comptroller; Rif'at Salim Muhammad, assistant treasurer, Amin 'Ali al-Sa'id, Hamdi Amin Aub-al-Dana, 'Abd-al-Mun'im Musa Ibrahim, Muhammad Mahmud Kaylani, Nabil Muhammad Labib 'Abd-al-Hamid, Na'im 'Abd-al-'Alim, Husayn 'Uthman 'Abd-al-Rahim, 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Awad 'Abd-al-'Aziz, Muhammad Mahmud Abu-Sudayrah, Mustafa Muhammad Abu Shiffai, Khalil 'Abd-al-'Aziz Khalil and 'Ali 'Abd-al-Latif 'Ali, members of the union's executive council.

Council of Press, Printing and Information General Union:

Muhammad 'Ali al-Faqi, chairman; Muhammad Amin al-Sayyid, Ahmad Hassan, Salah-al-Din Husayn, Fathi 'Abd-al-'Al and 'Abdrubbuh 'Abd-al-Khaliq, deputy chairmen; Sayyid Mahmud Farahat, general secretary; Mahmud Muhammad Khalil and Ibrahim Dawud, assistant secretaries; Muhammad Qutub Ibrahim, treasurer; Ahmad Muhammad Disuqi, financial comptroller; 'Abd-al-'Aziz Qansuh al-'Alami and Salah 'Abd-al-Khaliq 'Abdrubbuh, assistant treasurers; Ahmad Ibrahim Hirik, Muhammad Ahmad Hamzah, al-Sayyid Mansur Ibrahim, Ahmad Hasan Hasan, Muhammad Mahjub Sa'id, Ahmad 'Abd-al-Wanis 'Abd-al-'Alim and 'Abd-al-Mu'izz 'Abd-al-Badi' 'Abd-al-'Ati, members of the executive council.

General Union of Health Services:

Abu-Bakr Jad-al-Mawla, chairman and member of the General Federation [of Workers]; Muhammad Mukhtar 'Azzam, deputy chairman for Lower Egypt; Rajab Muhammad Almad al-'Attar, deputy chairman for Upper Egypt; Wahbi 'Abd-al-Mawjud, commissioner [wakil] for Upper Egypt; Muhammad Ahmad Adam, counsellor for Lower Egypt; Ahmad 'Abd-al-Latif Salim, general secretary; Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Ibrahim, assistant general secretary; 'Abd-al-Hamid Ibrahim Radwan, treasurer; Ramadan Muhammad Ibrahim, assistant treasurer; Yusuf Najati Ahmad, financial comptroller; Ibrahim Abu-al-Ma'ati, Mustafa Salamah Muhammad, Kamal-al-Din 'Abdallah Mahmud, Kamal Hasan 'Umar, Tulbah 'Abd-al-Wahid Tulbah; al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Rahman Abazah, 'Abd-al-Hamid Muhammad Ibrahim, Muhammad Muhammad Salam, Ibrahim al-Nubi, Muhammad Hasan 'Abdallah and Ibrahim Ghalib 'Abd-al-Nasir, members.

Executive Council of Maritime Transport General Union:

Muhammad Abu-Tur, chairman and member of the General Federation of Workers.

Salamah 'Abd-al-Hamid, Muhammad Abu-al-Su'ud, 'Adi Subhi and Sa'id Muhammad 'Abdallah, deputy chairmen.

'Abd-al-Munim Muhammad Ibrahim, general secretary.

Jabir 'Abd-al-Muhaymin al-Siba'i, assistant general secretary.

'Awad Muhammad Sa'd, treasurer.

Muhammad al-Sayyid Samahah, assistant treasurer.

Umm Kalthum 'Abduh Shalabi, Widad Shalabi, Hamdi 'Abd-al-Wahid, Muhammad Mahmud Hadid, 'Uthman Ahmad, 'Izzat 'Abd-al-Hadi, Jabir al-Sayyid, Ahmad al-Qadi, Sayyid Ahmad Muhammad, Sayyid al-Rifa'i Muhammad, Hasan Hamadah and al-Sayyid Muhammad Sayf al-Sandubi, members.

Executive Council of General Union of Land Transport:

Muhammad Muhammad Ahmad al-'Aqili, chairman and member of the General Federation of Workers; Muhammad Ahmad al-Mihrath, Isma'il al-Damlawi, Salih Muhammad Salih and Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jawad Mas'ud, deputy chairmen; Muhammad Kamil Labib, general secretary; Sulayman 'Abd-al-Tawwab, assistant general secretary; Munir Bade Shata, treasurer; 'Ali 'Ali Mustafa, assistant treasurer; Diyab Qasim 'Ali, 'Afaf Hamid Isma'il, Ahmad Muhammad al-Sughayyar, 'Awad al-Sayyid 'Awad 'Ashur, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abbadallah, Badran 'Abd-al-'Ati Badran, Muhammad al-Sayyid al-Sananiri, Isma'il Ahmad Faraj, Kamil al-Sayyid Hasanayn, Muhammad Muhammad Hilal, Muhmud Amin 'Ali and Khudari Hamid Hammam, members.

General Union of Construction and Lumber Workers:

'Abd-al-Muttali' al-Sayyid Salim, chairman; Muhammad Fahmi Badr, first deputy chairman; 'Abd-al-Ghaffar Muhammad al-Faqi, second deputy chairman; Muhammad Munir al-Dirghami, general secretary; al-Sayyid Taha Husayn, assistant general secretary; Muhammad Ahmad 'Umar, treasurer; 'Atif Muhammad Tahir, assistant treasurer; Nu'man Muhammad Nu'man; Hamid Mahmud Sha'ban, al-Tuhami Sa'id, 'Abd-al-Rahman Tal'at Ibrahim, George Zarifah; Muhammad Taj Nushur, 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Ashmawi 'Amir, Mahir Sanusi, Kamal Wasif, Muhammad Muhammad al-Khayyat, Muhammad Yahya 'Abd-al-Fattah, Husayn Shahin 'Abd-al-'Aziz, Jabir Ahmad Wahbi and al-Sayyid Muhammad Hassanayn 'Amarah, members of the executive council.

Muhammad Ahmad 'Umar and Fahmi Badr members of the federation also.

PTT General Union:

Muhammad Khayri Hashim, chairman; Hasan Muhammad 'Id, first deputy chairman and official in charge of labor and social security services; Subhi Taha Muhammad, second deputy chairman and the official in charge of membership,

organization and the engineering branch; Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ra'uf Darraz, general secretary and the official in charge of labor relations and wages; Muhammad Mahmud Kishshik, assistant general secretary; Lutfi Mahmud Hammudah, assistant general secretary; 'Ali Badawi Ahmad, treasurer; Sami Muhammad Qabil, assistant treasurer and the official in charge of the radio branch; Muhammad Ahmad Mahmud, the official in charge of the mail branch; Hamdi Mursi Mahmud, the official in charge of education and information; Khadijah Hasan 'Abd-al-Rahman, the official in charge of the affairs of working women; Husni Muhammad 'Abduh, the official in charge of the Lower Egypt telephone sector; Mahmud al-Sadiq Mahmud, the official in charge of Alexandria and Lower Egypt mail; Sayyid Mahmud Mansur, official in charge of Upper Egypt telephone sector; Abu-Zayd Muhammad 'Isa, official in charge of Upper Egypt telephone sector [sic]; 'Abd-al-Fadil Ahmad Husayn, official in charge of Upper Egypt mail.

General Union of Railroad Workers:

Mahmud [middle name indistinct] Ahmad, chairman; 'Abd-al-Hamid Isma'il Sadiq and Muhammad 'Azab Muhammad Badawi, deputy chairmen; Muhammad Sha'rawi Muhammad, general secretary; Ibrahim Imam Salman, treasurer; Muhammad al-Sayyid Mursi, assistant general secretary; Yasin Sulayman 'Ali Salamah, assistant treasurer; Shihatah 'Ali Diyab; Muhammad Hamid Sa'id, Ibrahim Hashim 'Abd-al-'Aziz, Ibrahim Abu-al-Su'ud 'Abduh, Kamal Ibrahim 'Atiyah, Muhammad al-Fuli Sharif, Sabir Ahmad Husayn, Muhammad 'Ali Abu-al-Nur, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad Mansur and Muhammad Ahmad Yusuf, deputy chairmen for the various departments and technical areas and affairs; Ahmad Sabri Muhammad Mu'awwad, Muhammad Mustafa al-Jayyar, Muhandis 'Abdallah al-Gharbawi and Ahmad Abu-al-Fadl Ahmad, members.

Petrochemicals General Union:

Ahmad Muhammad al-'Amawi, chairman; Ahmad Disuqi Khalil and Anwar 'Ashmawi, deputy chairmen; 'Abd-al-Qadir Hasan, general secretary; Ibrahim Lutfi al-Azhari, treasurer; 'Abd-al-Zahir Sayyid Ahmad, deputy chairman for Alexandria; Muhammad al-Sayyid Sulayman, treasurer [isc]; Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahim, assistant general secretary; Rashad Fikri, Ahmad al-Jamal, Muhammad Salah Maghazi, 'A'ishah 'Abd-al-Hadi, Muhammad Zad-al-Din, Ibrahim Ayyub, Ahmad Mahmud 'Idah, Muhammad Shawqi 'Abd-al-Fattah, Muhammad Thabit Ahmad, Isma'il Abu-al-Hawayil, Muhammad Muhmud al-Batiti, Muhammad Muhammad al-Tuni and Ja'far 'Abd-al-Mun'im, members.

General Union of Tourism and Hotel Workers:

Amin Mu'awwad 'Ali, chairman; 'Ali Mahrus Ghanim and Samir Taha al-'Asqalani, deputy chairmen; Muhammad al-Bandari Kamil, Shawqi Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jawad, Muhammad 'Abdallah and Muhammad Sukkari, commissioners [wukala']; Mustafa Ibrahim Mustafa, general secretary; Ahmad Lutfi al-Shal and Fathiyah Ahmad al-Sayyid, assistant secretaries; Sa'id Muhammad Husayn al-Jabiri and al-Sa'id al-Sayyid al-Sayyid, treasurers; Amin Muhammad Abu-Bakr al-Sharif, administrative comptroller; Subhi Ahmad al-Ghazali, financial comptroller;

al-Nubi Yusuf Jawhar, Sa'd Bayyumi Mutawalli, Shawqi Muhammad al-Ashqar, 'Abd-al-Majid Bashir Makki, 'Awad 'Abduh 'Isa, Muhammad Hamid 'Awad, Farruj 'Abdrabbuh al-Qallini and Nafisah Mustafa Kamil, members.

General Union of Utility Workers:

Mansur 'Abd-al-Mun'im, chairman; Mustafa al-Shurbaji, Salim al-Faqi, Faruq Husayn and Hasan Siddiq, deputy chairmen; Muhammad Tal'at Hasan, general secretary; Muhammad al-Sayyid Mursi, assistant general secretary; 'Abd-al-Mun'im Farid, treasurer; Ahmad Mahir, assistant treasurer; Jamal Hasan, accounts comptroller; Zaydan al-Imami al-Basyuni, Sayyid Muhammad Salihayn, Yusuf 'Abd-al-Muttalib, Jabir Makki, Muhammad Rif'at Husayn, 'Abd-al-Wahid 'Izzat, Tawfiq al-Sharqawi, Muhammad Amin Abu-al-Layl, 'Abd-al-Razzaq Qindii and 'Abd-al-Karim Sidqi, members.

General Union of Agriculture and Irrigation Workers:

Mukhtar 'Abd-al-Hamid, chairman; Ahmad Hashim Badr, Muhammad Isma'il Jawdah and Ahmad Ahmad Yunis, deputy chairmen; Amin al-'Ashri and Muhammad Abu-Talib, commissioners; Muhammad 'Abd-al-Khaliq Jawdah, general secretary; Fahim 'Abd-al-Samad, assistant treasurer; Muhammad Fahmi Qammurah, 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Salam 'Awad, Anwar Qasim al-Balahi, Mamduh Ibrahim Hasan, al-Badri 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam, Muhammad Mahmud Isma'il, 'Abd-al-Hamid Muhammad Ibrahim, Ibrahim al-Sayyid Nassar, 'Abd-al-Halim Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hafiz, Sa'id 'Abd-al-Qadir Isma'il and 'Abd-al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Baradi'i, members.

General Union of War Production Workers:

Mustafa Munji, chairman; Muhammad Ahmad Kamil and Zaki al-Shadhili, deputy chairmen; Ibrahim Lutfi Zanati, general secretary; Muhammad al-Burudi, assistant secretary; Muhammad Murjan, treasurer; Imam 'Uthman, assistant treasurer; 'Abd-al-Ghani Ahmad 'Abd-al-Ghani, Fathi al-Tukhi, Ahmad Yusuf, Muhammad Ahmad Mursi, Hilmi Khalil, 'Abd-al-Rahman Sulayman, Ibrahim al-Zayyat, Ahmad 'Amarah, Fikri Imam, 'Abd-al-Hakim Muhammad 'Ali, Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Rahman, 'Ali Darraz, Kamil 'Abd-al-'Alim and 'Abd-al-Raziq Muhammad Ibrahim, members.

General Union of Administrative Service Workers

'Abd-al-Rahman Khadr, chairman; Yusra Abu-al-Wafa Naji and Isma'il Thabit Rashwan, deputy chairmen; Mahmud 'Abd-al-Khaliq Nada, general secretary; Yasin Hamid al-Dib, assistant general secretary; Ibrahim 'Ammar, treasurer; Mukhtar Hammudah Lama'i, assistant treasurer; Ahmad 'Abd-al-Zahir 'Uthman, Mahdi al-Sayyid Ahmad, al-Sayyid Quman Salim, Ibrahim Abu-al-Khayr Dayf, Salah-al-Din al-'Ashmawi, Subhi Muhammad al-Sayyid, Fathi 'Ali 'Ali Shihatah, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Jushi, Muhammad Ibrahim Mustafa, Mustafa Muhammad 'Uthman, Ahmad Rabi' 'Abd-al-Ghaffar, Badawi Sayyid Mustafa, Muhammad Maghazi Mahmud Mahmud 'Allam and Kamil Ahmad 'Ali [presumably members].

General Union of Air Transport Workers:

'Abd-al-Mun'im Faraj, chairman; Ahmad 'Atiyah Qurtam, Isma'il Ibrahim Fahmi, al-Hadi Ahmad Rajab, Jawhar Muhammad Ahmad Jawhar, Shihatah 'Abd-al-Hamid Shuman, 'Ali Sayyid Ramadan, Amin 'Ali Nassar, Fikri Habib Sa'id, Mustafa al-Sayyid Ahmad Yusuf, Shakir Husayn Mahmud 'Ali, Shihatah Muhammad Shihatah, Mahfuz Sadiq al-Misri, Hamid 'Abd-al-Rahmad Idris, 'Abd-al-Raziq al-Sayyid Dhahab, Ibrahim Sulayman 'Umar, Zakariya Salah-al-Din Mabruk, Zakariya Mahmud Muhammad al-Shahhat, Nabil Muhammad Hashim, Faruq Habib Askarus and Muhammad Muhammad Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Mu'ti [no identification given].

Executive Council of Engineering Industries Union:

Sa'id Jum'ah, chairman; Sulayman Idris, first deputy chairman; 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-Hawlah, deputy chairman for unionist committees affairs; Kamal Jabr, deputy chairman for central activities; Jamal al-Tarabishi, general secretary; 'Isa al-Mahdi, assistant secretary; Muhammad Faris, treasurer; Jalal Husayn, assistant treasurer; Ahmad Zayyan Sultan, Rajab 'Abd-al-Hadi Surur, Faruq Ahmad Harun, Muhammad 'Abdallah Najm, Fathi 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Burmawi, Faruq Sayyid 'Ali, Shawqi Farghali Muhammad, Salah al-Ansari Muhammad, Niyazi Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Aziz, Fathi 'Abd-al-Latif Ahmad, Fayiz al-Karatah, Farahat Khalil Zaydan and Ibrahim Mahmud Khattab, members.

General Union of Mines and Quarries:

'Abbas Mahmud, chairman and member of the Federation; Yusuf Mansur and [first name indistinct] Hasan 'Amir, deputy chairmen; Sa'd al-Imam and 'Abd-al-Hafiz Bakr, deputies [deputy chairmen] for provincial affairs; Muhammad Fu'ad Darahim, general secretary; Hamid Sabbaq, assistant secretary; Abu-al-Majd Rifa'i Ahmad, treasurer; Muhammad Fathi Mutawi', assistant treasurer; Husayn Ibrahim, Muhammad Zaydan 'Isawi, Muhammad Fathi Basyuni, Muhammad 'Ali 'Abd-al-Karim, Muhammad Ahmad 'Abd-al-Fattah, Muhammad Mahmud 'Awadallah, Mahmud 'Abd-al-Wahid al-Jirmani, 'Atif Rabi', Mubarak 'Azzam, 'Umar 'Ali Abu-al-Hasan, Muhammad al-Sayyid Zaydan and Bakhit Jad-al-Mawla, members.

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EGYPT

CHARACTERISTICS, POTENTIAL OF AL-SADAT'S POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS ANALYZED

London, AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 15-21 Oct 79 pp 8-12

[Article: "What Is the Truth About the Struggle Within the Government in Egypt? Who Will Succeed al-Sadat? Disagreement Between al-Sadat and Egyptian Diplomats Threatens To Become More Grave; Husni Mubarak Plays Same Game al-Sadat Played with 'Abd-el-Nasir; Maj Gen Ahmad Badawi Is Army's Strong Candidate Because Current Defense Minister Is an Intelligence Man and a Gentleman; the Wafd Party Is Closest to Power and the Most Serious in Asking for It; Dr Hilmi Murad Will Be Prime Minister of Next Wafd Cabinet; The Moslem Brotherhood Has the Strongest and the Most Widely Spread Organization; 'Umar al-Talmasani Complains About al-Sadat to God; the Left Is Divided and Khalid Muhi al-Din Is Trying To Unify It; Zakariyya Muhi al-Din Is Iron Man and the Army's Devoted Son"]

[Text] Those who are close to Egyptian diplomats have begun to sense that there are limited disagreements between President al-Sadat and Egyptian diplomatic circles and that these disagreements are likely to become more grave. Stories are gathered from here and there, and they ultimately converge toward the following narrative:

When President al-Sadat announced that he was fully prepared to support the Moroccan regime in the battle of the Western Sahara, he was contradicting statements made by Dr Butrus Butrus Ghali, the minister of state for foreign affairs, to some chairmen of African delegations at the Morocco Conference. Dr Ghali had told them that Egypt would contribute no more than moral support to the war.

At that time Ghali's statements constituted a prelude to an Egyptian-African negotiating effort, according to which the African states would soften their position on al-Sadat's policy, especially since the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Havana was looming over the horizon. Egypt urgently needed African support with which it could confront the Arab-socialist opposition. But President al-Sadat made the statement that he did make, and all Africans and non-Africans took his remarks to mean that he had become involved in the battle over the Sahara. The negotiating effort that Butrus Ghali had put together collapsed.

There was an outcry in the Gulf states that paralleled the Moroccan outcry, lamenting the level of interference in Oman or the level of the statements made on the Gulf states by Vice President Husni Mubarak. These statements gave an adequate impression that Egypt was preparing itself for a role in the Gulf that would be separate from and perhaps even against Saudi policy.

It is worth noting that despite the disagreements that had broken out between al-Sadat and Saudi Arabia and despite the Egyptian president's attacks on the kingdom, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been careful to maintain a moderate tone and to make well considered statements regarding the Saudi family and its policy.

Information leaked from Egyptian diplomatic circles indicates that al-Sadat's propensity to showmanship and to publicity in [the questions of] Morocco and the Gulf states will have negative effects on Egyptian policy and primarily on the prospects for a settlement.

Al-Sadat is behaving as though political considerations and details were of inconsequential. Egyptian diplomacy, however, is placing all its bets on such considerations and details. Egyptian diplomats are not absolutely opposed to interference, just as they are not opposed to inflicting some kind of "limited harm" on Saudi Arabia and Algeria. But their "preferential" logic proceeds according to the following sequence.

1. According to their analysis Syria is facing one of two alternatives: either its regime will fall under the pressure of its domestic and foreign crises, or it will join the cavalcade of the treaty. Egyptian diplomats are not taking into account any considerations for the possibility that the Syrian leadership may hold out and overcome the crises--something which the Syrian leadership has so far proved it can do.

2. For this reason [Egyptian diplomats find that] the focus in this period must fall on Syria's allies or on Syria's provisional allies more than on Syria itself. It was in this sense that al-Sadat's recent interview with Anis Mansur in the magazine, OCTOBER conveyed a harsh attack on Saudi Arabia, on Libya, Iraq, Iran and on Algeria more than it did on Syria, which is supposed to be Egypt's bitter enemy. (Al-Sadat, however, did not to a large extent abide by this priority in his subsequent statements.)

3. [Egyptian diplomats think] that such a focus must not reach a state that would complicate conditions for Syria's joining the treaty. Egyptian diplomats think, for example, that priority must be given to applying political pressure rather than military pressure on Algeria. But in case military pressure is adopted, it would be more useful for such pressure to remain limited in scope and confidential so that the Algerian position may be defeated before it becomes public, thereby leading to the severance of the last frail link between Egypt and Algeria. The effect of such a degree of tension in the Egyptian-Algerian crisis will make [the position

of] Algeria, which is a partner in the Defiance and Opposition Front, more hostile and intransigent to the treaty, and this would place more difficulties for Syria's joining the treaty out of fear of "Algerian oneupmanship."

The same matter applies to relations with Saudi Arabia. With its economic and political influence, Saudi Arabia is capable of placing serious obstacles to counter Syria's joining the treaty.

But it seems that al-Sadat's thoughts are turning in another direction where convulsions and reactions predominate. This not only explains the current disagreement, but it also explains all of al-Sadat's disagreements with his former ministers of foreign affairs even though those former ministers did not deviate from the general strategic boundaries of the settlement. Isma'il Fahmi, to use one example and not to list all, was one of the architects of the settlement policy. He did, however, resign on the eve of the Jerusalem visit which overstepped "the details and the considerations." Will the disagreement over tactics within the single strategy recur once again?

The best explanation one can find for this disagreement is that which one finds after re-reading an outline of the political struggle in Egypt in the light of the reactions of different powers regarding the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations and the Camp David Accords and in the context of the deteriorating domestic socio-economic crisis which several groups are trying to exploit to jump up to the forefront of events and to seize the helm of government.

The question that directly thrusts itself now before one goes into the details of the struggle within and outside the government is this:

Why Has the Struggle Over Power in Egypt Been Delayed?

Al-Sadat came to power after 'Abd-al-Nasir's death under the slogan of "collective leadership." At the beginning of his administration he governed but did not exercise power. But this situation did not continue for long, and the subdued struggle over power between him and 'Ali Sabri and his group broke out on 15 May 1971. Al-Sadat thus terminated the duality in government, and he rearranged his house, threatening everyone with "the meatgrinder"-- [in effect, with annihilation]--as he said [at that time].

Afterwards some unsuccessful attempts to overthrow al-Sadat surfaced, and Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq was ousted from the Ministry of War. Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal was kept away from the limelight and from positions where political decisions in Egypt are made. Before October 1973 circumstances were quite ripe for an open struggle for power. At that time the government was weak and in disgrace to the point that in 1972 university students had insisted on summoning al-Sadat in person for public questioning after having refused the testimony delivered to them by his representatives,

Sayyid Mar'i and Dr Ahmad Kamal Abu Majid who was the minister of youth at that time. It was to this level and more that the government in Egypt had sunk. But no one dared to stretch out his hand and pick the fruit.

The left was gathering its scattered parts together so it could build its organizations which had been disbanded in 1965. The Moslem Brotherhood was still in a state of "perceived weakness." But this alone was not sufficient reason to explain what was happening. The truth is that all the forces that were proclaiming their rejection of al-Sadat and his policy did not basically have the desire to take over the government or to remove him from power.

Anwar al-Sadat was the only candidate to play the role of "the dirty missions man." He would fight; he would negotiate; he would surrender. Ultimately, he would go, and the status quo would remain. And thus it was that the serious struggle for power continued to be postponed or was only confined to spheres of public condemnation beyond which it did not go. But there are some new changes that are taking shape now even though they have not yet been crystallized or ripened; all these changes foreshadow that the struggle will be reopened.

Who Will Be the Winner of the New Variables?

Many people believe that al-Sadat is about to end his historical missions in spite of the fact that he suggests and continues to suggest that there are new strategic missions. There is a number of variables whose results are not quite to his advantage.

Several powers in Egypt have overcome the dangers of the stage of birth and are now completing the stages of their disorderly growth. There is also an increasing rapprochement for coordination between these forces. Some of them have proposed political ideas around "a united national front" in Egypt.

On the international scene, it seems that Western Europe, acting under pressure of its urgent interests in the area, has begun efforts to establish another "solution" that may go beyond the treaty, thereby dealing a severe blow to al-Sadat's strategy. European visits to the Arab area recurred, and Cairo was not one of the stopping points. The French position which has reservations about the treaty is being crystallized, and as Kreisky and Brandt meet with Abu 'Ammar, al-Sadat's project crumbles. Al-Sadat is searching for a basis for the completion of this project; the search is directing him to break the isolation that the Arabs imposed on him.

Even within the U.S. administration there is a trend--albeit still weak--to establish a course of action that would parallel that of the treaty and would open the circle that has been closed around al-Sadat and Begin. Through its envoy, Bob Strauss, the United States offered a proposal that would amend the well-known UN Resolution 242, but al-Sadat turned it down

quickly. For him the U.S. proposal signified the existence of unsettling indications that the United States was abandoning its support for his project and his plan. In this light we can understand al-Sadat's maneuver of approaching the Soviets again. It seems that his approach has been favorably received as is suggested by news that has been leaked about secret meetings between him and his assistants and the Soviet ambassador in Cairo.

Saudi Arabia heads the list of moderate countries in the area which forsook al-Sadat's policy with its regional and pan-Arab parallels. In addition, al-Sadat launched public campaigns against the rulers of these countries. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Kuwait are playing a role that is influencing Egypt's policy. In fact, it was al-Sadat himself who gave them the opportunity to play this role which is now running counter to his interests.

The outcome of these new and hitherto immature variables has merged with the goals of the opposition policy in Egypt at several junctures, and the struggle continues over who will win over these variables for the power elements that he controls.

Let us now review the political forces that are candidates for taking over power in Egypt.

Wait for Husni Mubarak

The list begins with the strongest of the candidates despite all the reservations that some people may put forth to keep [the name of] Husni Mubarak off the list. Some hide behind the Egyptians' sarcastic spirit which called Husni Mubarak, "La Vache qui rit"--[the laughing cow]. But what Egyptian has not made fun of al-Sadat when he was vice president and today when he is president? There is an answer to this argument also. One cannot judge Husni Mubarak now while he is the second man in power. 'Abd-al-Nasir was the vice president of President Najib, and al-Sadat stood for a long time behind 'Abd-al-Nasir. These are the characteristics of every vice president, and anyone who deviates from them jeopardizes his political future.

Husni Mubarak will be the next president "legally" and constitutionally if God were to take al-Sadat close to Him or if others were to send al-Sadat to God. Moreover, he is the actual commander of the air force, and he regularly visits the air bases. He has strong relations with all the crews and navigators of the airplanes at these bases all of whom still show him due appreciation and respect. Husni Mubarak has begun to show his brilliance as a speaker and an orator. This became evident in front of the Parliamentary Committee of the National Party. He also delivered the address of the anniversary of the revolution this year. He stands ahead of all his civilian competitors, and the army, which can always weigh the scales in his favor, backs him up.

Or...Maj Gen Ahmad Badawi

It was 'Abd-al-Nasir who brought the age of military coups in Egypt to an end. The composition and the size of the army no longer allow the repetition of another 23 July. But al-Sadat is forever trying to prevent the recurrence of the phenomenon of al-Mushir [Field Marshal 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir] who was killed or committed suicide. Although it seems to be removed from politics, the Egyptian army continues to be the primary institution of actual power and it cannot be overlooked. This fact is firmly established in the consciousness of the youngest lieutenant in the army.

There are several factors which promote Maj Gen Ahmad Badawi's candidacy to take over power in Egypt by means of one of two possibilities. The preponderance of one of the two possibilities will depend on the development of events and the balances of power in Egypt.

1. Maj Gen Ahmad Badawi may come to power by means of a military coup within the government. Al-Sadat will resort to this matter as the last card he can use against the opposition inside the country so as to bring an end to the corruption of the new party life. There may be outside attempts to overthrow al-Sadat by favoring a civilian competitor. The candidate for carrying out this mission is Maj Gen Ahman Badawi or the commander of the presidential guard of the Central Region (Dahshur, al-Haram [the Pyramids] and Hudstep). In all cases the door will be open to remove al-Sadat after [removing] the opposition.

2. [Maj Gen Badawi may come to power as a result of] a direct military initiative. Direct action by the army is one of several possibilities. Among these possibilities is a general popular uprising which the police cannot oppose; the army would then interfere to quell the uprising and would take over the government directly. This would follow a war that Israel launch against the Arabs. Al-Sadat would prevent the army from participating in the war, or he would weaken politically in opposing Israel. Furthermore, "humiliating" the army [by assigning it to] civilian action and expanding this action would be unacceptable to the army and would encourage a direct military initiative against al-Sadat.

These and other possibilities remain open to the army. But why are we nominating Maj Gen Badawi in particular?

Maj Gen Ahmad Badawi was a brigadier general in October 1973, and he was chief of staff for the entire armed forces in 1978. He succeeded his official commander, Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Mun'im Wasil, to the command of the Third Army that was surrounded in Sinai and Suez. Al-Sadat promoted Badawi's command role during the siege. Maj Gen Badawi is known for his combat capability and for his military firmness. He is also known for moral courage. This made Minister of War al-Jamasi tell him in 1976 during a meeting of the officers of the Third Army at the Cultural House in Suez, "Badawi, are you going to create an opposition in the army similar to that in the People's Assembly?" He also demonstrated severe cruelty and prompt

decisiveness in confronting the uprising in the Governorate of Suez where the masses were the most violent during the 1977 riots of January 18 and 19. Dressed in battle fatigues, he personally led his troops where they surrounded the workers in the fertilizer plants in 'Ataqah and in the oil refineries in al-Zaytiyah. He prevented the workers from joining the rioting masses in the city.

He continued to climb above the members of his class and above those who were his military superiors. Fu'ad 'Aziz Ghali, commander of the Second Army; Maj Gen Fu'ad Zikri, commander of the navy; Maj Gen Muhammad 'Ali Fahmi, commander of the air force; Maj Gen Sa'd al-Din Ma'mun, the current governor of Cairo; and scores of others were removed from their positions while he continued to climb upwards. Badawi is the one whom al-Sadat personally trust the most. His wife, who is a graduate student at the Girls' College at 'Ayn Shams [University], had a close relationship with Egypt's First Lady, Jihan al-Sadat.

Moreover, it is Ahmad Badawi who remains the army's first man because Kamal Hasan 'Ali, the current minister of defense is a military intelligence man and, ultimately, a gentleman when compared with the militant army man, Ahmad Badawi.

The Stern Mustafa Khalil

Dr Mustafa Khalil, the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs is forever alluding to the American card that he holds. He is the Middle East representative of the well-known telephone company, ITT. Before that he was a graduate of the well-known American MIT University which is known for its contributions to the development of the U.S. arms industry and for having a strong relationship with the Pentagon and with the Central Intelligence Agency. The university maintains a permanent relationship with its graduates.

During a television interview in Cairo former U.S. Ambassador Herman Eilts praised Mustafa Khalil in particular and said that he was certain of the continued growth and development of U.S.-Egyptian relations as long as "our friend, Khalil in whom we have much confidence, is at the head of the Egyptian government." This pressure [from the United States] preceded al-Sadat's [decision] to charge Khalil with the task of presiding over the cabinet again.

But the secret behind Khalil's political sternness and indisposition during Begin's visit was to avoid meeting Begin. It was, on the one hand, part of his clever tactics to leave al-Sadat uncovered and, on the other hand, to present himself as an Egyptian figure that would be acceptable to the Arabs. But despite its strong appearance the card that Khalil holds in his hand is the weakest of cards. He is a civilian, and the army does

not support him. His relationship with the Americans is at odds with his supposed personal loyalty to the president. Furthermore, Egypt's economic problems and the crisis of autonomy are greater than he is and greater than the card that he holds.

The Prime Minister of the Future Wafd Cabinet

The Wafd Party is the party that is closest to power; it is the party that is asking for power most earnestly. In 1954 the revolution disbanded the Wafd Party and confiscated its funds, its motto and its newspaper, etc. In 1965 all of Cairo was moved by the funeral of Mustafa al-Nahhas; the funeral turned into a wafd demonstration with people chanting, "There is no leader after you, Nahhas!" This was when 'Abd-al-Nasir was alive, was strong and was presiding over the government which did at that time arrest the leaders of the demonstration.

The Wafd Party has resumed its political activity in public. Ibrahim Tal'at published his memoirs in the magazine, ROSE AL-YUSUF wherein he expressed a political defense of the history of the Wafd Party and its leaders. During the days of its former president, the late Mustafa al-Baradi'i, the Lawyers' Union had been the starting point for the return of the Wafd. The union had hosted the Secretary of the Wafd, Fu'ad Siraj al-Din who delivered a lengthy address that was later printed in a book.

The Wafd Party was able "to take away" 36 members of the People's Assembly, most of whom were members of the government's party, so as to ensure the legal provisions for practicing its political rights. There were scores of other representatives who tried to join the Wafd Party, but were turned away. Wafd sources spoke about broad Egyptian membership in the party that amounted to 1 year to 1 million members. The Wafd Party was careful to make its return to political life surrounded with manifestations of the fact that it had struggled for that right, that it was independent of the government, that its representation of the nation was broad and that it was in principle defending democratic freedoms. From his palace located on 7 al-Birjas Street in Garden City, Fu'ad Siraj al-Din used to manage the plans of the Wafd to penetrate the heart of the organizations and institutions [of government].

The Wafd was preparing a democratic plan whose purpose was to bring about a silent coup in the makeup of government. The Wafd Party advocated a parliamentary republic and an amendment to the constitution that would abolish the presidential system. This would practically signify taking away all of al-Sadat's mandatory powers and placing them in the hands of the partisan cabinet that would win a parliamentary majority. When al-Sadat sensed danger, he initiated an attack on the Wafd Party. In a superficial referendum, he issued laws for the political isolation of most of the Wafd's historical leaders and especially Siraj al-Din.

But the Wafd Party decided to withdraw [from the political scene] temporarily and announced that it was disbanding itself voluntarily to protest the violation of democracy and political freedoms. But the fact that the party was disbanded did not prevent it from influencing political life. In practice, the party does exist, and 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shurbaji did nominate himself for the position of president of the Lawyers' Union. He partially entered the recent electoral battle.

And so it is that the Wafd--despite the decision to disband--remains the party that is closest to power and the one that is asking for it most seriously. The man of the Wafd Party is indisputably Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad who had opposed 'Abd-al-Nasir in the past and either resigned or was removed. In either case the masses appreciated him, and he won a victory over his opponents in the parliamentary elections in 1976. After the return of the Wafd he became the leader of the parliamentary opposition which won the sympathy and attention of the people. Hilmi Murad opposed the Camp David Accords, and he also opposed the peace treaty afterwards. He refused to nominate himself again to the People's Assembly to protest the undemocratic laws that were brought about by al-Sadat's referendum. Hilmi Murad objected strongly to the ridiculous proposals that were made by a majority of al-Sadat's party to amend the constitution, and he gave many press interviews about that subject.

Hilmi Murad is therefore the most likely candidate to preside over the next Wafd cabinet.

Will Egypt Be Ruled by the Supreme Guide of the Moslem Brotherhood?

The Moslem Brotherhood Group has the strongest organization and is the most widely spread group in Egypt now. There is hardly a location in Egypt now where a Moslem Brotherhood group or one of its chiefs cannot be found. AL-DA'WAH, the group's mouthpiece is published biweekly and disappears [from the newsstands] in a matter of days [after publication]. Religious groups control the vast majority of the student associations in all of Egypt's universities and institutions of higher learning. The activities of the Moslem Brotherhood extend now to the armed forces and to the army where the group had the strongest organization before 1952.

There is more than one indication to prove that the organizational structures of the Moslem Brotherhood--from the smallest group in the villages of Egypt to the General Guidance Office--have been completed. There is evidence that the secret military agency has returned to action and to activity. The infiltration of the Moslem Brotherhood within the fabric of Egyptian society is spreading. The brotherhood has several economic and commercial projects, some clubs and social organizations, popular hospitals and charitable societies and schools for teaching the Koran. More than 10 publishers are disseminating the ideas of the Moslem Brotherhood. Among these publishers, for example, are Dar al-Da'wah [the Da'wah House] for Printing and Publishing; SAWT AL-HAQQ [the Voice of Truth], which is a monthly periodical published by the Islamic Group at

Cairo University; Dar al-Ansar [the House of Protectors] for Printing and Publishing; Dar al-Kilafah [the House of Succession] for Printing and Publishing in Alexandria; and the International Company for Printing and Publishing, which is one of the firms of the International Islamic Center for Investments. And there are many others. It is also known that the Moslem Brotherhood has more than one public store authorized to sell and to trade in weapons.

But who is the grand master of the Moslem Brotherhood? Some people are nominating one of three persons living outside Egypt. They are Sa'id Ramadan, al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali or Dr Yusuf al-Qardawi. We think it more likely that it will be al-Shaykh and Dr al-Qardawi who is responsible for the missionary activity and for the missionaries in the Guidance Office.

But within Egypt the candidates are confined to these names:

'Umar al-Talmasani who is the director and the managing [editor] of the magazine, AL-DA'WAH. He is the one who always writes its editorial and has spoken repeatedly on behalf of the Moslem Brotherhood. Most recently he spoke in front of President al-Sadat at the end of last Ramadan.

Salih 'Ashmawi is one of the brotherhood's strongest men and a former member of the General Guidance Office.

Rumors had nominated former vice president Husayn al-Shafi'i as a grand master for the brotherhood, but he denied those rumors, and the brotherhood in turn denied this rumor.

At any rate it is al-Talmasani who so far is the prominent figure [to serve as] the grand master for the brotherhood. What remains to be affirmed is that the Moslem Brotherhood may soon cross over from the stage of "perceived weakness" to that of a "holy war."

But the brotherhood's struggle for power is tied to the group's ability to overcome its political crisis, which means its ability to lead the masses of Moslem brothers under slogans and under a political program and its ability to escape the heritage of the past which used to represent a recurring cycle of haughtiness leading to liquidation. Al-Sadat sensed the danger of the brotherhood, and especially after the thrust of Iran which revived the spirit of religious tendencies and encouraged the Moslem brothers to oppose the Camp David Accords and the treaty. Al-Sadat suspended publication of the magazine AL-DA'WAH, and then permitted its publication and launched a broad media campaign against the brotherhood. [The last such example of this campaign] was a confrontation between him and al-Talmasani in an attempt to make the brotherhood subject to censorship by what al-Sadat called the Supreme Islamic Council. Al-Talmasani thought it was sufficient to refute the charge against himself and to express his grievance against al-Sadat to God.

The Revolutionary Islamic Societies

If the Moslem Brotherhood Group does not seem to be in a hurry regarding the question of power in Egypt, this is not the case with the secret revolutionary religious societies.

The first attempt [by a secret, revolutionary religious society] came to be known at that time as the "Conspiracy [of the College of] Military Technology." It was led by Salih Sariyyah who is known for actively advocating the ideas of the Islamic Liberation Party. In the confessions made by Sariyyah and by the organization's prominent member, the student Karim al-Anaduli, the plan that had been devised to contact the Moslem Brotherhood and specifically the elderly matron Zaynab al-Ghazali, was revealed. Briefly, the plan called for Salih Sariyyah's small armed group to take over the building of the College of Military Technology. Members of the organization who were students at the college were to assist Sariyyah's group. They were to gain control of the experimental radio station that is located in the college and is known as the Umm Kulthum Station, and they were to proclaim the Islamic Movement from that radio station. They were to call upon the brotherhood to support the movement in the mosques and to try to get the masses out into the street under the slogans and the cheers of the brotherhood so as to support the movement and to prevent the police or the army from crushing it. In spite of these confessions which are documented in the investigative reports, al-Sadat decided not to expand the blow and not to drag the brotherhood into it. He was satisfied with exiling al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, one of the leaders of the brotherhood and the Imam of the 'Amr ibn al-'As Mosque, to Saudi Arabia, and he issued a warning to the rest of the brotherhood. But Sariyyah and the leaders of his group who had dared to ask for power were executed by hanging.

Al-Takfir Wa al-Hijrah [Atonement and Retreat]

The kidnapping and murder of al-Shaykh Dr Al-Dhahabi in 1977 created a broad outcry that revealed [the existence] of a secret Islamic organization which was called the Atonement and Retreat [Group]. The real name of the group is "the Community of God," and it was led by Shukri Mustafa who had originally been a member of the brotherhood. He was arrested with them in 1965, and then he dissociated himself from them after his release from jail. He led his highly structured organization, and he was popular among young people. The Moslem Brothers sympathized with the organization of Atonement and Retreat in spite of the disagreement that existed between them. The magazine AL-DA'WAH denounced the trial of Shukri and his group by special military courts, and then condemned the death sentences that were issued against the leaders of the organization.

It seems that the organization was not totally liquidated and that it regained its strength and renewed its activity especially in Asyut in Upper Egypt where Shukri Mustafa had begun his new mission.

Almost during the same period another religious organization that is more extreme surfaced in Alexandria. The name of the organization is al-Jihad, and most of its members are university students. In addition, [its membership includes] some officers and non-commissioned officers as well as soldiers in the navy [who are stationed] in the city. The investigation with these individuals revealed the relationship between this organization and the murder of a guard at the Greek Consulate in Alexandria for the purpose of taking his gun. [The investigation also revealed] that the group was responsible for a number of explosions that took place in some of the city's recreational facilities.

There is another organization called Jund Allah [the Soldiers of God].

Its name indicates its semi-military nature even though it has not had military activities.

An organization called Shabab Sayidna Muhammad [the Youth of Our Lord Muhammad] has spread in the universities. It controlled for a long time the religious community at Cairo University and at its colleges.

The fact that there are some differences among the religious groups did not prevent them from uniting into one major Islamic group for each university and electing a chief for each group. The religious group at Cairo University chose the student Hilmi al-Jazzar as its chief. The student Ahmad 'Umar is the chief of the Islamic Group at the University of Alexandria. In al-Minya the chief of the Islamic group is the student Abu al-'Ila Madi. But in Asyut a young, religious leadership emerged and led the demonstrations and the sit-ins at the university and among the people prior to al-Sadat's visit to Asyut last June. The student Ahmad Naji emerged as a prominent figure from these activities, and it is likely that he will succeed Shukri Mustafa in leading the group of Atonement and Retreat. There is other information that has not been confirmed about the establishment of a new religious organization among young people called the Ansar al-Khomeini [the supporters of Khomeini].

In spite of the scarcity of accessible information about these organizations, it is possible because of their nature and in spite of their multiplicity to list three phenomena that they have in common. These phenomena are:

1. The Islamic groups charge the ruler and those he rules equally with infidelity.
2. They adopt a method of direct action and armed violence against their enemies.
3. Most of the leaders of these groups are young Islamic elements who have an advanced religious education and superior courage.

It remains to be said in this brief review that there are other religious factions which carry significant prestige and weight and which constitute along with the movements which we summarized briefly, the general religious orientation [in Egypt]. These factions are:

1. Al-Jam'iyah al-Shar'iyah [the Legal Society] publishes the magazine AL-I'TISAM. This group has previously revealed a hard-line approach and has violently attacked the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. The government quickly confiscated the magazine. This society has broad influence in the northern parts of Egypt and especially in al-Mahallah al-Kubra, the center of Egyptian textiles.
2. Al-Turuq al-Sufiyyah [Sufi Ways]--al-Ahmadiyah al-Sadhiliyah, al-Barahimiyah al-Rafi'iyah and al-Disuqiyah--constitute a huge religious bloc that has its own organization which extends deep into the hearts of most Egyptian villages. These groups are still remote or are kept away from the scene of political struggle.

The Left Is Divided and Has One Candidate

Every object can be divided into two parts, but not every two objects can be united into one. This was how the Egyptian Left was born; it was born with the disability of division, and it is still divided.

The organized communist movement in Egypt began in 1921 and was liquidated with a general blow to the movement in 1924. The second wave of communism began late in the thirties and received two strong blows in 1948 and in 1954, but it grew after that until it experienced the first broad unity among its factions in 1958. One year later, however, the government arrested most of the members of the Egyptian communist organizations for a period of 5 years (1959-1964), and the communists who proclaimed the dissolution of their communist organizations were released.

The third contemporary movement began approximately in 1969. There is now in Egypt a legitimate, open, leftist organization which is the Unionist Progressive National Coalition Party and is led by Khalid Muhi alin. It includes several national movements: Marxists, Nasirists and enlightened religious persons. The party had turned from a platform into a party, and it had four members in the last session of parliament. One of them, 'Ali 'Abd-al-Khaliq resigned from the party and joined the government's party. The membership of the second prominent representative, Abu al-'Izz al-Hariri, was suspended. The two other members, Qabari 'Abdallah and Khalid Muhi al-Din failed to win re-election in the new parliament. Those elections took place under the most violent campaign of terror and falsification.

The party used to publish a widely popular weekly newspaper called AL-AHALI [the People]. It was confiscated several times by the government. The party [now] publishes a house bulletin called AL-TAQQADUM [Progress] which has now replaced the confiscated AL-AHALI.

There is another semi-public organization which calls itself al-Tayyar al-Thawri [the Revolutionary Movement]. Most of the leftists in Egypt consider it to be to the right of the Egyptian Marxist Movement. After al-Sadat's visit to occupied Jerusalem, several of its members dissociated themselves from the Revolutionary Movement and formed a new organization.

The Marxist Leninist parties include the Egyptian Communist Party. It is rumored that the Egyptian Communist Party won recognition for being an international party by representing the Egyptian Communist Movement. The party publishes a public bulletin called AL-WA'YI [Awareness]. The Egyptian Communist Party--the Congress grew out of the Egyptian Communist Party and separated itself from it. The new organization publishes two bulletins: one is public, AL-'AMIL [the Worker]; and the other is AL-UFUQ AL-AHMAR [the Red Horizon].

There is also the Egyptian Communist Labor Party which publishes a public bulletin called AL-INTIFAD [the Uprising] and a theoretical, organizational bulletin, AL-SHUYU'I AL-MASRI [the Egyptian Communist]. This party has also been subject to division in its ranks, and it generated the Revolutionary Communist Labor Party. There is a bloc within the party which carries weight and prestige.

There is the Egyptian Communist Party--8 January. It chose this date [for a name] as an indication of the fact that it exemplified the unification of the Communist Party on 8 January 1958. It is proud of the fact that its leaders were the ones who refused to disband the party. It publishes a public bulletin and an organizational bulletin called HAYAH AL-HIZB [the History of the Party]. In addition, there is a small Trotskyite organization that has limited influence, and another small circular group.

The Egyptian Left has never been close to power in spite of its radical opposition to it. The Egyptian Left has always paid for this opposition in the form of oppressive blows and broad arrests inflicted upon its ranks. Most of the factions of the Left are now in agreement on their opposition to al-Sadat about the slogan of overthrowing him. But no suitable, practical tactics have yet appeared that would make this slogan materialize.

In spite of the fact that popular leaders do exist in some locations-- university colleges, labor and union command posts and the command posts of popular districts--they remain confined to their limited sectors. Unfortunately, the Egyptian Left has not yet produced a national leading figure who enjoys the popularity that would qualify him to have the confidence of the Egyptian people in presenting an alternative to al-Sadat and his policy. The Coalition Party is trying to rally its efforts behind its leader Mr Khalid Muhi al-Din whose national history and long struggle have earned him the respect and the appreciation of many of the national forces.

It seems that the absence of public popular leaders for action among the masses is one of the features of the problematic nature of the secret and open action which the Egyptian Left has not yet resolved. Some Leftist factions are calling for the establishment of a front along the Egyptian political forces to confront al-Sadat. But this is also one of the problems of the Egyptian National Movement for which no one has yet come up with a realistic solution.

Zahariyyah Muhi al-Din or Kamal al-Din Husayn?

Zahariyyah Muhi al-Din, 'Abd-al-Latif al-Bughdadi, Kamal al-Din Husayn and Husayn al-Shafi'i announced their national position in opposition to the Camp David Accords in the memorandum they sent to al-Sadat and to the People's Assembly. Their action signaled their reappearance on the political scene and demonstrated the spirit of coordination that their signatures on the statement implied.

Zahariyyah Muhi al-Din had disappeared from political life after 'Abd-al-Nasir had "stepped aside" on 8 June 1967. Ever since that time he preferred to raise poultry and to tend to agricultural affairs rather than political affairs and responsibilities. His first practical appearance was in the parliamentary elections in 1976 when he supported Khalid Muhi al-Din in their village of Kafr Shukr despite their well-known ideological differences. He supported his colleague in the Revolutionary Command Council, Kamal al-Din Husayn in the district of Banha, and then he signed their well-known statement.

In spite of his absence Zakariyyah remains the candidate of those forces that may need a strong man of government. If he comes very close to power, the army may not oppose one of its own. Kamal al-Din Husayn had won a sweeping victory over his governmental opponent in the 1976 parliamentary elections, and he appeared among the ranks of the independent opposition. But then the parliamentary government majority suspended his membership in the People's Assembly because of the well-known telegram he had sent to al-Sadat in which he condemned the laws that al-Sadat had issued after the people's uprising in 1977. Husayn had said in that telegram, "The worst kinds of injustice are those which establish injustice into the law.

Kamal al-Din Husayn nominated himself again for the recent parliamentary elections. In spite of the forgery, he was able to have a runoff election with his opponent. Then he issued a statement in which he condemned the government and al-Sadat's party for their blatant falsification of the elections results and told his constituents, "I promise you that I will continue to preserve the course of freedom that we began together." This meant that he will continue his political activity. Kamal al-Din Husayn is trying to gather together many political cards in his hands: he is fighting for power; he is an army man; and he is one of the leaders of July. He is defending democratic freedoms now; he is working among the

masses, and he is coloring this movement with Islamic religious tendencies.

The one who is left is Husayn al-Shafi'i, and he was the last vice president before Husni Mubarak. During the last days of his term as vice president al-Shafi'i used to be sharply critical of al-Sadat's policy on religious occasions in front of crowds of worshipers. Some rumors nominated him as a candidate to serve as the grand master of the Moslem Brotherhood, but he denied those rumors and so did the brotherhood. Many questions remain: those people cannot come to power individually or in a group unless they can answer those questions. The most important questions deal with their domestic relations and with the comprehensive view that looks upon the army one way and upon the political mainstream another way.

The Official Opposition

Ibrahim Shukri, who has been the son of the Socialist Party since the forties, is the governor of al-Wadi al-Jadid, the former minister of agriculture and the leader of the Socialist Labor Party which al-Sadat has now recently adopted and turned into "the serious official opposition." It seems that Ibrahim Shukri intends to enter the game of competing for power. After his success [in the elections] the party issued the weekly newspaper AL-SHA'B [the People] which criticized the government severely for falsifying many elections results and for interfering [in the elections process] to prevent his party from obtaining a parliamentary majority. Shukri asked al-Sadat to give up the chairmanship of the National Party so he can maintain his neutrality as patriarch of the family. He criticized al-Sadat's decision to invite the former Shah of Iran to reside in Egypt and to give him political asylum there.

Will these critical remarks be confined to the superficial context of the majority and the opposition? This appears to be the case so far, but there is nothing to prevent the opposition from aspiring to majority rule if changing circumstances coincide with its influence in organizations and its activities in popular circles.

What remains for us to mention are some of the other forces that have recently come upon the scene of political struggle in Egypt. The most prominent of those is the National Front Party which has two characteristics:

First, the National Front Party believes in national front action.

Second, its leaders carry real weight among the people; they are appreciated by the people and respected by other political forces. Among those leaders is Judge Muntaz Nassar, a former member of parliament, one of the founders of the party, and the only member of the former parliamentary opposition who was able to return as a representative to the People's Assembly in

spite of the vicious electoral campaign in which his supporters used gunfire to respond to the provocations of the government and to its attempts to falsify the results of the elections in his district of Asyut, which is south of Cairo.

Among those leaders also is Dr Mahmud al-Qadi, the former representative from Alexandria for three consecutive sessions. He was a pioneer of the national opposition in the People's Assembly. He is very popular in Alexandria, and is respected by the broad masses throughout Egypt. There is Attorney Ahmad Nasir, former member of the People's Assembly for the district of Imbahah in the Governorate of al-Jizah. The recent electoral battle [in which he was engaged] resulted in two casualties and injuries to 10 persons. This indicates the intensity of the competition despite the government's blatant interference on behalf of his opponent.

There is Attorney Abu al-Fadl al-Jizawi. He is a member of the second line of leaders of the July Revolution. His popular support in the Governorate of al-Jizah was passionate and caused him to enter two run-off elections against his government opponents. There is also the former representative Mahmud Zaynahum, representative of the popular district of al-Jamaliyah in Cairo. The members of the party had proclaimed their rejection and their opposition to the Camp David Accords and to the treaty.

There is another party called al-Tali'ah al-Wafdiyyah [the Wafd Vanguard]. It was established by Engineer Dr 'Abd-al-Muhsin Hammudah. He is a prominent union figure who always participates in union and professional activities. It is being widely circulated that Mr Fathi Radwan, the chairman of the Supreme Committee of the old National Party intends to revive the party as the legitimate extension of its national leaders--Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid. It is being said that he filed a lawsuit against al-Sadat for usurping the name and the history of the National Party.

It remains for us to affirm that power will not descend upon any one of these figures overnight. If al-Sadat does not give up power because he will succumb to his old heart disease, no one has the right to dream of another peaceful method by which he will give up power.

Soon many heads will roll. He who wants power has to keep his head away from the slogan which al-Sadat had proclaimed in 1971: "If they want to remove me, I will bring destruction to all."

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IRAN

NATIONAL GUIDANCE MINISTER BARES AMERICAN ESPIONAGE SECRETS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Nov 79 p 9

/Article: "Dr Minachi, Minister of National Guidance, Has Declared that Savak Center and American Embassy Documents Will Reveal Important Secrets"/

/Text/ At a press conference attended by domestic and foreign correspondents, Dr Naser Minachi, minister of national guidance, stated "An important disclosure will be made with the use of documents and evidence obtained from the Savak Center as well as the American Embassy in Tehran." He said, "A special commission is to be formed to collect and organize the documents."

The minister of national guidance invited correspondents to pay a visit to the National Documentation Center and see pictures, posters and evidence regarding torture which establish the role of American CIA and Israeli Mossad intelligence officers.

In last Thursday's press conference 250 international press and television correspondents, photographers and cameramen took part. Following Dr Minachi, Abolhasan Banisadr, the supervisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also spoke.

In this conference Dr Minachi requested the correspondents who had come to Iran from abroad to observe the professional newsman's standards of truth, fact and conscience in reporting Iran's news. Dr Minachi once again mentioned the regulations which have been set down for all newsmen and said "If falsified, distorted reports are sent from one place in the world to people in another place, isn't this treason?"

The Smell of Separatism and Discord

He said, "Newsmen who want to come to Iran from foreign countries must refer to the Iranian embassy; the embassy will just investigate to make sure that they really are newsmen and have no other objective or goal, such as espionage. Included in the articles in the regulations which have been set out for foreign newsmen by the Ministry of National Guidance is the swearing of the oath only to report the truth and the facts. In spite of

this, some foreign newspapers have made an uproar to the effect that the free dissemination of news has been avoided through this oath."

Dr Minachi said, "Some foreign correspondents want to go to sensitive areas as soon as they enter Iran, such as the border area of Kordestan, which is in a state of combat, instead of visiting news centers and news sources; unfortunately they transmit news and materials which emit the odor of separatism, discord, war and violence."

As an example, the minister of national guidance referred to an article which stated how and by what resources one could blow up oil pipelines in Iran. He also said "In several cases where contrary, falsified reports in regard to Iran were published in foreign newspapers, the Minister of National Guidance requested these publications to publish descriptions of Iran according to the regulations in their first subsequent issue, but they unfortunately refrained from including the facts."

In his talk the minister of national guidance said "Some people who lived under the government of the tyrants the last 50 years said 'Would that we had no oil and lived off our natural agricultural resources.' Evidence shows that in the time of the government of Dr Mosaddeq, Iran's trade balance was very high and agricultural products were also exported--exports exceeded imports for the first time. However, unfortunately, with the coup d'etat of 19 August /1953/ and the fall of Mosaddeq, the imperialists gave the good news 'With the arrival of imported technology we will bring you to the gates of world civilization.' But see how far we have gone back since that date--not only were the promises not carried out, the Iranian people were further subjected to oppression and tyranny every day. The economy reached the point where if the Shah had not fled the basis of the economy would have been overturned in 2 months /anyway/, since we were paying the \$20 billion in oil revenues directly for state expenditures which were expanding without justification; \$150 billion were deducted from the development plan budget and it was not known where that was to come from.

"Bear in mind that we had oil income from 6 million barrels of production a day at our disposal whereas today, with half that output, we are able to administer the country and coordinate development projects more rapidly."

In the Process of Being Laid Out

Dr Minachi stressed "America, in order to be able to profit from its interference, put the security, political, espionage and secret police organizations of the CIA into operation in Iran in conjunction with the Mossad and Savak. A plan was set out by the former American ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms; all the activities of intellectuals and religious fighting men were translated and obtained by Helms so that the anti-national, police and security policy of Iran could be set out."

Dr Minachi said, "We have much proof to establish this interference and this is in the process of being laid out in the National Documents Center."

In the course of his talk, the minister of national guidance laid bare a project in which it is blatantly apparent that Sadat's representative, with security consultation from the CIA, has been charged with combatting the activities of Moslem militants and that Israeli prime minister Begin's advisor is also cooperating with them on Islamic matters.

"The plan has been prepared in such a way that Egypt will have a role very close to Iran's.

"The main outlines of the plan are as follows:

- "1. Brainwashing the young.
- "2. Arrangements for disrupting the relationship between religion and politics.
- "3. Reviewing Islamic history materials in schools.
- "4. Spreading corruption in the schools and universities.
- "5. Spreading rumors and defaming religious leaders and spiritual persons.
- "6. Introducing girls and women into schools so that their genuine religious beliefs may be destroyed.
- "7. Destroying confidence among people by writing reports in their handwriting against one another.
- "8. Keeping spiritualism remote from politics and keeping people busy struggling against Communists.

"According to this report, which was prepared in Arabic and whose text was published in London, Begin's representative says that he accepts the recommendations of the American embassy in Cairo and recommended that one must not ignore the experience of the Shah of Iran in this regard. The Shah also used Bahais and Jews in sensitive positions, and they kept his secrets to the last moment."

In answer to one American correspondent, who asked what evidence there was to prove espionage by members of the American embassy during the Iranian revolution, Dr Minachi said "Even if we assume that what has been seen so far is inadequate, I will raise one point.

"You remember that in the last 2 years the Shah of Iran sent a large number of Savak agents to fight with Iranian students. They all went with diplomatic passports. Under pressure from Iranians living in America,

Kissinger expressly requested that the Savak agents be expelled from America; in return, the deposed Shah threatened that if the Savak diplomats were expelled from America Iran would also expel CIA agents from Iran.

"Under what title and position did these CIA officers work in Iran? Wasn't part of /their cover/ to work under the title of political officers in the embassy? Therefore if Iran is to be bound to observe the Vienna Agreement and the Geneva Protocol regarding political officers, are espionage officers also included in these regulations?"

"Going by Kissinger's statements and the words of the deposed Shah, American security officers had programs for the overt government in Iran.

"Going by the precedent where America has tried and arrested foreign spies in the past, can Iran do the same thing? Iran's complaint in no way concerns political officers, but Iran will nonetheless waive its legal and legitimate rights on condition that the deposed Shah be returned to Iran."

The Human Conscience Rules

Dr Minachi requested the newsmen to talk to the Iranian leaders of today who in the era of the deposed Shah were tortured and kept in terrible prisons for years; a number of them are in the Revolutionary Council.

He said, "Although it is a source of self-deprecation for me to talk about myself, I was in prison and tortured under the worst conditions in the years 1974-75. So realize with what emotions I am addressing today's words to you. Human conscience decrees that the American government return the deposed Shah."

One foreign correspondent said, "The Iranian government has not yet presented any evidence on international Zionism's role in the events of Kordestan."

Dr Minachi said, "When the time comes we will present the evidence and documents on the table of the court."

The minister of national guidance disclosed that someone went to the area of Kordestan in the guise of a correspondent but was arrested in possession of a military map of Kordestan.

He mentioned that Moshe Dayan, the Israeli, is always announcing that the only solution is the military one. On the other hand, one must note whether these missions--examples of which are not to be found in Iran--are taking place in Kordestan, and where the eruptions and plots are coming from.

Concerning the reception of the deposed Shah in America, Dr Minachi then

stated, "With the wealth which he has, the deposed Shah can take all the hospital equipment from New York to Mexico, but you do not even have the permission to take one photograph of the deposed Shah's operation. Don't you think that 35 million Iranians are suspicious of this matter?"

11887
CSO: 4906

IRAN

IRAQI GOVERNMENT BEGINS EXPELLING IRANIANS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Nov 79 p 11

/Article: "After Demonstrations against the Ba'thist Government and Saddam Husayn, Iraq Begins Expelling Iranians"/

/Text/ Extensive demonstrations were carried out against the Ba'thist government of Iraq and Saddam Husayn, president of Iraq, in the Iraqi areas of Kordestan yesterday."

Mohammad Sepehripur, governor general of Kermanshahan, stated, in an interview with KEYHAN, as he discussed this subject, "Reports which have been obtained on these demonstrations state that a number of Iranian Kurds who were also in this section of the border participated in these demonstrations." He then added, "The Iraqis have also recently started expelling Iranians resident in Iraq, in response to these demonstrations, because of the unfavorable condition in Iraqi Kordestan and the fact that the demands of the Iraqi Kurds have not been realized.

"Two days ago 20 Iranians were dispatched onto our soil from the border at Khosravi and other Iranians were dispatched from the border at Ilam several days earlier." The governor general added, "This action by the Iraqis and the expulsion of Iranians living in Iraq is the same Iraqi scenario of several years ago when a flood of Iranians living in Iraq were poured into our border camps. Of course we are adequately prepared to receive these brothers of ours."

Concerning encroachments and military movements by Iraqis in the western borders of Iran, Sepehripur said "It is to be taken for granted that we do not have good, proper relations with Iraq, but we are not at fault in this matter and no kind of encroachment or movement has occurred from our side.

"Since Iraq is a neighboring Moslem country, we seek good neighborly relations and hope that finally one day that country will also proceed along the path of Islam." He then referred to disturbances in the vicinity of the town of Paveh and said, "Recently a number of armed people arrived to

enter this town. So far, however, the people of Paveh have not agreed to let them in. These people are from various groups and their goal is to settle in various areas of the town."

On the subject of Shakva'ieh, the leader of the People of Truth of Kermanshah, the governor general said, "I have often asked the leader of this group to guarantee the security of the area under his protection through his agents but he has not met with much success in this field, because of rifts and splits within this group." The governor general of Kermanshah added, "With respect to the failure to apportion agricultural lands, I must also say that this is to some extent correct and until a review is made of the matter of farm land in the Kermanshahan area in accordance with Islamic criteria, and until some of the feudalists of the area are divested of their land and a just distribution of the wealth takes place in proper fashion, this situation will remain as it is."

In conclusion, the governor general said "In any event purges of disruptive persons have not yet been properly carried out in the border area of Kordestan and Kermanshahan, and some armed groups and brigands are busy spreading terror, insecurity and brigandage throughout this area. However, we have great hopes that with the continuation of the goodwill delegation's talks in Kordestan and the expansion of talks in the Kurdish populated areas of Kermanshah, the Kurds in this area will be conciliated and the ground will also be laid for an agreement in all fields with all groups in this border ostan."

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IRAN

SHEIKH MONTAZERI DISCUSSES HIS POLITICAL VIEWS

Tehran ENQELAB-E ESLAMI in Persian 10 Oct 79 p 3

[Text] An ENQELAB-E ESLAMI reporter held an interview three days ago with Sheikh Mohammad Montazeri. Now, because of the limitation on news print, we are printing only a portion of this interview. We hope that we can make the full text of this interview available to our readers in the future.

Question: Mr Montazeri, these days your name is on the tip of many people's tongue because of the manifesto that your great father issued regarding you, because of your summons to the public prosecutor's office, and also because of your riot-inciting travels within the country and abroad. The people know you only in this connection and because of your relationship to Ayatollah Montazeri. If possible, would you explain a little more about your life, activities and struggles?

Answer: My father and I became involved in the struggle during the same month and on the same day, i.e., the year 1341 [21 March 1962-20 March 1963] when the Imam began his struggles. In that year, I was a very young man. Of course, during his life, my father had gained a series of experiences that I had not had. During the first year of the struggle, I began by writing manifestos; then, I devoted myself to organizational problems and the building up of personnel for the struggle. I was arrested in the year 1345 [21 March 1966-20 March 1967] and I was sentenced to three years in prison. Prison was very useful to me, i.e., as a result of analysis and examination, I reached the conclusion that, in political and revolutionary affairs, it is necessary that I behave like a professional in regard to ideological affairs. Of course, by that time, it had been approximately four and a half years since I had gone abroad to study where I had completed superficial studies. After my release, I became involved in a series of organizational activities, and I drafted a plan for armed action and cadre building. At this point, I encountered a series of problems, i.e., I saw that those who are religious usually do not have any political insight and those who have political insight do not follow the Islamic route. They are Moslems, but they raise questions that do not fit in with Islam. I told myself that it was necessary to start at the beginning.

On this very basis, I began cadre building and we had made advances in this direction, too, until, in the year 1350 [21 March 1971-20 March 1972], I was betrayed and I had to flee. I went to Pakistan, Iraq, and later to the Arab countries. Then I went to Afghanistan, and later to Europe to expose the regime. Of course, I did not believe in the value of disclosure and political affairs; rather, I believed that it was necessary to take military action against Imperialism, reactionary elements, and the Shah because this struggle is the struggle against the priests of blasphemy. Consequently, I embarked on guerrilla affairs and began assisting any Moslem force which wanted to take action in this regard.

During the struggle, I realized that the question of having discipline does not matter to militants, i.e., the problems of flattery, talking bombastically and having collusion usually are among the problems that threaten revolutions. Consequently, I was worried that these problems would be repeated in Iran's Islamic revolution in the name of Islam. For example, in Paris, when the Imam was in Neufel Le Chateau, I encountered these very same problems, that is to say, America tried to launch in Iran, in another form, the same policy that it had from 1954 until just before the victory of the revolution; but, fortunately, with the help of our brothers and sisters, we prevented that to some extent. We were no match for them, however, because many of these things had taken place beforehand.

In short, as the result of the activities of millions of human beings, one struggle had become victorious, and this, too, had been achieved in the name of Islam and it did not have any material and economic motive, but, usually, little by little, the discipline is forgotten, relationships replace it, and the revolution yields to western democracy.

Tumult and uproar, minority and majority, 49 percent of the vote and 51 percent of the vote, party politics, and power plays are replacing discipline. Having titles, like having a doctorate or being an expert in religious jurisprudence, replaces the revolutionary discipline of Islam, and, instead of having revolutionary insight and fully accepting Islamic ideology and refusing to compromise it, little by little, other ideas will dominate society. Regarding compromising ideology, it is necessary to explain that, unfortunately, from the first appearance of Islam, Greek philosophy occasionally passed itself off as Islam and recently western democracy, Marxism, or the views of Jean-Paul Sartre have been presented in place of Islam. When discipline is at issue, however, the matter becomes a humane and Islamic matter. Just as I have said several times in my speeches, some of the verses of the Koran are addressed to the people in general, i.e., the human masses, and some are addressed to Moslems and Moslem beliefs or believers and orthodox beliefs. If we take action within the human and Islamic sphere, as a result, we will not flatter ourselves to a few people; rather, in regard to the weak, we will take care of four billion human beings on earth and one billion Moslems, and, if we think and act along these lines, this will become revolutionary insight.

In Iran's revolution, I realized that a series of opportunists and people, who, perhaps, do not have any revolutionary insight, who do not grasp and have knowledge of the revolution and its problems, who are inexperienced, whose insight is either western or eastern, and whose ideas were shaped in the Shah's universities so that it is necessary to be aware of this manner of thinking and to try to put aside this manner of thinking, have siezed power after the revolution.

8514
CSO: 4906

IRAN

BRIEFS

OPPOSITION TO BASES AGAINST IRAN--Ankara--Sener Battal, National Salvation Party deputy for Konya, made an off-the-agenda speech in the National Assembly yesterday in which he said: "No concessions must be made to the United States in relation to Iran. With God's help, we will severely punish those who dare allow the NATO bases and military airfields to be used against Iran." Stating that those determining the foreign policy for Turkey have to be very cautious, Sener Battal added: "We deem it our duty to forewarn them. Neither the Incirlik base, the territorial waters, nor Turkish air space can be used against Iran. Let us not be an instrument of the intimidation policy of the United States." [Text] [NC070755 Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 6 Dec 79 p 1 NC]

CSO: 4907

ISRAEL

NRP ROLE IN GOVERNMENT COALITION VIEWED

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 19 Oct 79 p 2

[Editorial: "The Government's New Line-Up"]

[Text] The discussion in the National Religious Party (NRP) executive on the government's position, and on the assignments of the NRL representatives to improve its functioning, is the first clarification of the taking of an unequivocal stand in domestic and foreign policies and the taking of energetic and diligent means in the implementation steps.

In the government coalition NRP represents doctrinal beliefs, great discretion, and mature leadership. In its favor are its great experience in state functions, its constructive and unifying character, and its responsibility for the people and the entire state.

Against a background of internal friction here and weakness there, the absence of conservative participation in government work, and a lack of suitable timely application, one may point to the efforts of the NRP representatives to encourage a trend in social and economic policies that is most vital for the orderly continuation of the government, and to implement an administrative emergency program that will be painful for everyone, but will decisively put the brakes on galloping inflation and even push it back some distance. This is the right time for NRP to reveal its full power to extract the political, economic, and social possibilities of this government, so that the coming 2 years will guarantee a steadily increasing improvement in leadership.

This government has no alternative. In its present condition the Alinement, involved at its summit in internal conflict, without authoritative leadership, and containing manifestations of the defeatism of the extreme Left, cannot be considered for leading the government after early elections. There is no prospect whatsoever of establishing a united national emergency government. It can be seen that this government will stay in power until the end of its term. This conclusion requires all its partners to stop playing games of alienation among themselves, to place their best men in

key positions, to "open a new road" in substantial activities, immediately and without foot-dragging, so that in its new line-up the government may conduct a program that arouses confidence, laying the burden on both government and people, and with the authority of emergency leadership.

The coalition partners, headed by the Liberals and Herut, must certainly know well, without any illusions, that if they fail, it will be a failure for the state and a deep disappointment for the people. In the coming elections they will suffer hard blows because they were concerned with incidentals instead of fundamentals, with personal and factional quarrels instead of managing the state, healing its economy, and improving its society. All the coalition partners without exception must bear responsibility for any deficiencies, if they do not repair what needs repair within a very short time.

By an economic policy of extreme limitation of service expenses in order to save many billions in lira in the budget; by lowering the standard of living so that we can support ourselves without contributions and grants from abroad; by cleaning out parasitism and substantially increasing productivity; and essentially by efforts to remove the plagues of exhibitionism, profiteering, and permissiveness, they will be able to change the quality of life in the state.

With the will to live willing to rise above routine as it has risen during hard-fought battles, with a wise, resourceful, and authentic leadership, it will have great power to overcome inflation, to increase the productivity of labor, and to significantly purify the streets of dealings in violence and crime.

The NRP is called on to become an enterprising and active movement to change the government structure and create new trends in the community. It must be mobilized for this incomparably urgent mission in order to prevent administrative and social collapse. Our enemies abroad are examining our internal life, seeking its weak points, and exploiting them in order to push us down.

We must stop scratching wounds, forecasting the fall of the government, and preparing for a change of power. In the present circumstances we must concentrate fully on rescuing the government from its partly-frozen condition; energetically renewing thought and action; and making it a mighty instrument of leadership for change in functioning and organization, in readiness to do its share, and in the spiritual orientation of the Israeli people.

"The day is short and there is much work." [Well-known quotation from the Mishna.] There is only one way, not two ways; a way that will change and reinforce the government, and we must travel it and approach our objectives with diligence.

9045
CSO: 4005

ISRAEL

INTERPRETATION OF AUTONOMY PROGRAM TO BE CLARIFIED

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 19 Oct 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Fundamental Positions"]

[Text] On the eve of next week's autonomy talks in London, the Prime Minister of Egypt. Dr Mustafa Khalil, has renewed his criticism of Israel, whose interpretation of the autonomy program is opposed to the position of the U.S., the European countries, and world opinion. In his opinion a completely Arab administration should be set up, that would make self determination possible for the Palestinians on the basis of their legitimate rights.

Does he think the talks are entering a blind alley? Matters have not reached that stage. However, he expresses the opinion that there is room for a summit conference of Carter, Begin, and Sadat in order to advance the program and its subdivisions in the direction that seems correct to him.

The American envoy, Robert Straus, in the coming meeting in London will express fundamental principles in order to advance the negotiations. It is reported that at the meeting he will bring up the subject of the right of the Arabs of east Jerusalem to vote for the institutions of autonomy.

This is a point on which there is an antipodal gap between Israel and the Arabs, and between Israel and the American government. Raising this subject in the talks will be a difficult test for the orderly continuation of the peace negotiations. For the united city of Jerusalem as capital of the state of Israel is a fact, and whoever challenges it is conspiring against the very sovereignty of Israel.

The prime minister of Egypt strongly rejects what he calls "Israeli demands based on religious doctrines or historic rights." This basis is the essence of the bond between the Jewish people and its land. The autonomy program confers local administrative rights on the Arab inhabitants of the area,

- who will in no way be deprived of the right to manage their own services; but it will in no way be a renunciation of the soil of the land of Israel, for no people renounces any part of its historic land. Certainly it will resist the scheme to tear Jerusalem again in two.

There is total opposition between the demand to attach the old city of Jerusalem to the autonomy program and the aim to normalize relations between Egypt and Israel.

The Israeli delegation at the London meeting will certainly present our position on Jerusalem in the clearest possible manner.

9045
CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

EFFECT OF ESCALATION IN LEBANON ANALYZED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 Aug 79 pp 5, 6

[Article by Yhoshua' Tadmor: "Escalation in Lebanon--Pressure for General Negotiations"]

[Text] The Syrian-Soviet announcement that was issued following Assad's talks in Moscow; the report of Philip Habib's coming visit to Beirut and probably also to Damascus, Riyad, and Jerusalem; the increased blaming of the terrorists by the Christian enclaves, and the Syrian threats against escalation--all these tell us how complex is the peacemaking process in this region; the more so since the Soviets and their allies have definitely decided not to let Washington exclude them from the regional negotiations this time.

Through its diplomatic representatives in Beirut and Damascus, Washington has been working for these 2 months, directly and indirectly, to achieve a stable cease-fire in southern Lebanon, in the hope that this step would be the first in a series of more comprehensive efforts to restore normal conditions to Lebanon. Assad has agreed and has not agreed, as he maneuvers between Washington and Moscow. President Sarkis for his part has not been hesitant, but has turned personally to every Western statesman of world-wide influence, from the Pope to the U.S. President, asking them to act to rescue Lebanon and to neutralize the thousands of terrorists inside her borders. Sarkis' cries for help have become more frequent lately, ever since it became clear to him that all his appeals to the Arab states (headed by Saudi Arabia) to convene an Arab summit conference that would take the responsibility for achieving a cease-fire and stabilizing the situation, were in vain. The Saudis, after exploring the subject in Damascus and the other Arab capitals and also with the heads of the PLO, reached the general conclusion that it was better for them not to stick their heads into a sick-room. [Literally, sick bed.] They preferred to work in coordination with Washington, who repeatedly aligns its moves with Riyad.

Attempts to Avoid Deterioration

At this stage it is hard to know what Philip Habib will achieve or what directives he will receive in Washington. It should be remembered, however, that he belongs to the most senior administrative echelon in Washington, he comes from Lebanon, his daughter is married to King Husein, and he is known and accepted among the foremost influential Arabs. His visit therefore is dovetailed with the persistent American efforts in recent months to guarantee a stable cease-fire as the first stage of a much broader effort. Only a little has been published on the almost daily contacts that the U.S. representatives have established in Beirut to advance this objective. They have met for talks with President Sarkis and his aides, or with influential senior Syrians, or with the heads of the PLO. Likewise the visits of Reverend Lowry and his delegation, and then that of Jesse Jackson and his black associates, who concentrated on achieving a cease-fire in southern Lebanon, were part of this over-all effort.

And indeed 2 weeks ago it seemed that their objective had been achieved. The PLO representatives announced a unilateral cease-fire in the presence of Jesse Jackson. But the Soviets, the Syrians, and the fanatical influences within the PLO at once began to torpedo this move, which they saw as part of the American peace that to them is inadmissible and defective. The U.S. diplomatic representatives in Beirut already understand that this sort of unilateral declaration is not a matter for Yasir 'Arafat alone; he must get confirmation for such a decision from the central governing bodies of PLO. These consist of the leaders of all the terrorist organizations, each of which has its own protected territory, sources of funds, and varied interests. They do not always fall in line with the objectives of 'Arafat or the central stream of PLO, which is seeking a way to negotiations without blowing the framework apart.

The U.S. representatives in Beirut have therefore decided to carry on a combined operation. First they probed to find out who are the influential Palestinians who fix policy at the PLO summit, who are the forces that disagree with them and what are their motives. After they had learned the subject properly, they began to operate in Saudi Arabia, Damascus, Amman and even Libya and Baghdad. Their goals were integrated: first of all to probe ways of achieving a stable cease-fire in Lebanon, and in parallel to promote ideas on advancing a general agreement in Lebanon and on bringing the PLO closer to the conference table.

The immediate motive for these moves by the American administration was the desire to prevent a new outbreak in southern Lebanon; in the Americans' opinion this would be liable to deteriorate into a major conflict, as a result of Israeli-Syrian air battles, or of the general heating up of the region, even if the Syrians do not penetrate so far at this stage due to their isolation in the inter-Arab scene and the annulment of the balance of power to their detriment. Damascus has been thrown into a disturbed

situation due to internal weakness and to what it sees as a far-reaching Israeli attempt to undermine its authority and bring it to its knees. Since the Syrians are powerless to shape their own policy, they decided to act--especially after Assad's last visit to Moscow--in close alliance with the Soviets to prevent any partial arrangement in the Lebanese sector. They are pressing hard to impose a policy for reducing the forces in southern Lebanon, the withdrawal routes, and the boundary lines within which framework the terrorist forces will remain, far exceeding those of Lebanon in numbers and arms. This is a reliable way to prevent a stable cease-fire, the more so since within PLO there are those who are generally postponing 'Arafat's efforts to focus at this stage on intensive political activity that basically relies on Washington.

Very likely the subject of the cease-fire in southern Lebanon has been postponed lately in favor of a subject that touches the Syrians directly, and which the Soviets are not prepared to interrupt in their sensitivity to their own non-participation on the over-all political processes. They have many ways to sabotage the limited attempts to pacify the sector. They are openly raising their price for an arrangement, and are demanding advance assurance of the establishment of a Palestinian state, dissociation of the negotiations on southern Lebanon and the whole Palestinian subject from the framework of the Camp David agreements, and other demands, not to speak of general withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries.

Attempts to Conciliate the Soviets

It is therefore no accident that American representatives have recently been trying various ideas on conciliating the heads of PLO, the Syrians, and even the Soviets, within the framework of the effort to achieve a cease-fire and an arrangement in Lebanon. Already, to be sure in non-binding fashion, various of these proposals have been considered, including the possibility of convening a small international commission on this subject, with the participation of Lebanon, Syria, and the PLO, with the approval and perhaps even the participation of the Soviet Union. For the present Washington has put off the proposal--it is not yet ready to accept Moscow as a recognized participant in an alternative agreement to the Camp David agreement. The radical Arab influences, headed by the Syrians and the PLO, are trying to extort the maximum out of Washington by strengthening their dialogue with Moscow.

In spite of these efforts there is no doubt that in the near term Philip Habib will return from his mission without having accomplished anything. There will not be any kind of breakthrough, nor even a partial agreement on a cease-fire. The PLO and the radical states, who are deeply involved in these matters, are deeply fragmented, and Moscow is playing the radicals' game and tearing apart any attempt, even in part, to quiet the northern sector. What is distressing is Israel's attitude during this latest development. All those Israel "experts" who have constantly "depended" on Arab fanaticism and Soviet rigidity, have again been held in hackneyed and

dangerous thought patterns. Instead of supporting the achieving of agreements, even if partial, with bold and original ideas, they still "depend" on the blind alley of Arab fanaticism, even though the Palestinian state is already at our front door, and every escalation plays into the hands of the PLO and their supporters.

9045
CSO: 4805

LEBANON

IRANIAN TAKEOVER OF AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT DESCRIBED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Nov 79 p 9

/Interview with Sadeq Musavi, Leader of Embassy Takeover Operations, Declared How American Embassy in Lebanon Was Occupied by Iranians"/

/Text/ Seyyed Sadeq Musavi, an Iranian spiritual figure residing in Lebanon, who assumed charge of the operations of taking over the American embassy in Beirut, is now in Tehran. In disclosing American plots in Lebanon against the Islamic revolution of Iran, he stated, in an interview with KEYHAN, "All the American embassies in the world are nests of espionage. We wanted to prove this point to the world by occupying the American embassy in Beirut and obtaining the documents and evidence present in the embassy. We did not attain this goal, although our movement met an extensive reaction on the domestic and international level which is still going on." Let us read the text of the interview together:

Musavi, referring to the past history of the spiritual leaders' activity against imperialism in Lebanon and the necessary aid for ending the Lebanese crisis, said:

"With the publication of the weekly AL-HAQQ, which is engaged primarily in matters of the Islamic revolution and the instructive sayings of Imam Khomeyni, we have made extensive efforts to frustrate these plots and thus managed to reflect the real issues of the Islamic revolution in the Lebanese media, as well as having foreign news agencies convey news to the world by quoting materials from AL-HAQQ magazine."

/Question/ Why did you take over the American embassy in Beirut?

/Answer/ Usually every small event which occurs in the Middle East is reflected very sharply in Lebanon, especially Beirut. The Lebanese publications, which enjoy freedom, generally pursue these kinds of subjects tirelessly and stir up public opinion. What however was surprising was that the issue of the occupation of the American house of espionage in Tehran did not cause the slightest impact in Lebanese society and, even more amazingly, the Lebanese press contented itself with just publishing this news.

Therefore we, with the cooperation of some revolutionary Iranian brethren, decided to break this silence and make Lebanese public opinion take note of this great revolutionary action. In conjunction with Seyyed Isa Tabataba'i, who is a fighting Iranian spiritual man living in Lebanon, and with the cooperation of ardent youths, I decided to carry out the plan of occupying the American embassy in Beirut and thus prove to the world that the American embassy in Lebanon, as in Tehran, is a house of espionage. Since the American embassy in Beirut is situated outside residential areas, we were faced with the problem of carrying out our plan without drawing the attention of the Lebanese security forces. To this end we chose Sunday, which is a public holiday in Lebanon, for this action and the personnel who were to cooperate with us in this revolutionary act placed themselves in a scattered fashion around the American embassy, which is located on the waterfront. Sunday at noon I went there with some spiritual figures. Although our going to the seashore, where everyone was busy swimming, created some doubt and suspicion, nonetheless, when we became convinced that all the young people who were to cooperate with us were around the embassy, I went toward the embassy with Mr Isa Tabataba'i. I asked a policeman who was standing guard by the door to the embassy where his commanding officer was. He engaged in conversation with us and when we signalled a Lebanese who was also in the area, by previous plan, started saying "Allahu Akbar" and thus notified the other mobilized personnel. By the time the police tried to react we were inside the embassy. The American Marines who were on guard inside the embassy immediately proceeded to mount a resistance but, since we had known in advance that America never would dare to create another big problem for itself, they refrained from firing at us and we then pulled down the American flag and on setting fire to part of it raised it again as it was burning. We were thus able to take over the embassy for a period of several hours. The Lebanese security forces and the Arab peace supervisory forces stationed in Lebanon immediately established a blockade wall around that area on hearing the news of the occupation of the American embassy and established total control over traffic in that area. We managed to perform the noon and afternoon prayers in that embassy. In the afternoon, toward dusk, the Lebanese and peace supervisory forces entered into discussions with us. At first they asked us to leave the embassy but we told them that we would /only/ do so in two cases--if either the revolutionary demands of the students following the imam's way were realized and the American government handed the treasonous Shah over to the revolutionary court of Iran, or Emam Khomeyni personally ordered us to cease occupying the embassy. The attack forces, which could not attain results through discussion, resorted to savage actions. One attack officer, who, from his actions, was obviously drunk, started using foul language and threatening terror. The Lebanese forces, which consisted mostly of Shiites, complained to this officer and declared their solidarity with us, but the truce supervisory forces, observing this situation entered the act themselves and resorted to excessive and unlimited brutality, to the extent that one of our brothers, named Mr Abolfazi Rahimi, was seriously injured and lost consciousness as a result of a severe blow delivered to his head. In this

manner, these forces succeeded in taking the embassy from us. Of the group of 23 people who had occupied the embassy, 20 of us were wounded.

/Question/ What was the first reaction which this occupation created in public opinion?

/Answer/ As soon as the embassy was occupied, the revolutionary personnel who were connected with us announced this news to the areas near the American embassy over loudspeakers which had been installed on cars, and a large group of the Moslem people of Lebanon set out to declare their solidarity with us. However, they came up against the blockade by the Lebanese and Arab truce observation forces and could not proceed to the site of the embassy. The Lebanese National Movement then held an extraordinary session and described ours as a revolutionary act and supported it. In an announcement it published on this occasion, this movement requested all Lebanese university and high school students to go on strike the following day in solidarity with the occupation of the American houses of espionage in Tehran and Lebanon. To this end the university and high school students did not attend classes the following day but held meetings in the universities and the schools, supporting this revolutionary action of ours. On Tuesday of that week the American University of Beirut, which is adjacent to the American embassy, declared its solidarity with the revolutionary action of the students' following the emam's way and the action of occupying the American embassy in Beirut. On that day a large meeting was also held inside the American embassy as a measure of solidarity. The other universities in Beirut, including the Arab University of Beirut, in which mostly zealous Arab revolutionary youths are studying, supported the Iranian students' revolutionary measure and the act of occupying the American embassy in Beirut by holding meetings and parades.

Therefore the silence which had settled upon the Lebanese scene was broken and from that day on demonstrations and meetings began against American imperialism throughout Lebanon and the southern regions, especially Sur and Sayda. Up to yesterday, when I left Lebanon, these demonstrations and strikes were going on.

/Question/ What consequences and reactions did this measure of yours create in Lebanese society?

/Answer/ The question of the occupation of the American embassy in Beirut created a great uproar in Lebanese society, with the result that first of all the Lebanese progressive forces asked themselves after this incident why they had not embarked on this measure. Moslem public opinion in Lebanon also asked the same question of the leaders of the progressive movements of Lebanon. Another upshot of this act was that we showed that we could even perform great acts barehanded--that is, just as our Moslem brothers and sisters in Iran succeeded with their bare hands, shouting "Allahu Akbar" and sacrificing their blood, so did this act of ours have an extensive impact on the international level. The American Department of State

published an announcement in this regard and discussed this action with great anxiety. The Lebanese government has also deployed significant forces around the American embassy in order to avert the repetition of this revolutionary act and have even clad the forces in bulletproof vests because it too fears that the progressive forces of Lebanon will once again occupy the embassy and take its American employees hostage. Ilyas Sarkis, the president, has also ordered a special force consisting of Lebanese armed forces, police and Arab peacekeeping forces to be formed to look after the sensitive embassies in Beirut, especially the American one.

/Question/ In your opinion what was Arab public opinion's reaction to the occupation of the American house of espionage in Tehran?

/Answer/ I can confidently say that the people in the Arab countries view this revolutionary act with approval and esteem. For example, when I was in Syria a few days ago an ordinary Syrian told me that no one in the world could humiliate the arrogant, conceited America to this degree, except for the Islamic revolution and its leader Emam Khomeyni. I have much information to the effect that this revolutionary act has had extensive repercussions in Arab societies in Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, the Persian Gulf emirates and other Arab countries and that the Arab people are following news concerning the occupation of the American spy house in Tehran moment by moment. Some Arab foreign ministers who have considered this action reprehensible are now meeting with the general disdain of their public opinion.

The hopeful eyes of all the Moslems in the world are riveted to the Islamic revolution of Iran and they are hoping that the Islamic revolution will also attain greater victories through a united voice.

11337
CSO: 4906

LEBANON

MAJOR HADDAD COMMENTS ON IRANIAN VOLUNTEERS

Request for Israeli Intervention

TA061858 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 6 Dec 79 TA

[Text] The commander of the Christian Militias in southern Lebanon, Major Haddad, said that about 100 Iranian volunteers will enter southern Lebanon shortly and by the end of the month their number will reach about 6,000. According to Haddad the Iranians will enter Tyre, al-Nabatiyah and Hasbayya. He asked the Israeli Government to intervene and to help the southern Lebanese residents fight against the impending disaster.

Arrival of Iranian Troops Uncertain

TA070814 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Dec 79 p 1 TA

[Report by correspondent in Upper Galilee Bat-'ami Hamizrahi]

[Text] In spite of recurrent reports on the imminent arrival of "Iranian volunteers" to southern Lebanon there is still no evidence of this in the field, Major Haddad said last night.

However, the major emphasized that the reports themselves are worrisome and indicates a trend which may be realized at any moment "because there is an alliance between Khomeyni's and 'Arafat's extremism."

Major Haddad delivered letters on this issue to UN Secretary General Dr Kurt Waldheim and asked the U.S. Government to prevent such a trend. Haddad also discussed the issue with UNIFIL officers.

It has also been learned that UNIFIL Commander Gen Emmanuel Erskine held some contacts on this issue with Lebanese administration officials. Travelers arriving from Beirut insist on claiming that preparations to receive the Iranians are continuing in the PLO-controlled areas. One of the possibilities is that the Iranians land in the airfield near the village of Ansar. This airfield, in the vicinity of al-Nabatiyah, was rehabilitated by the PLO in 1977.

CSO: 4805

LEBANON

CP SECRETARY GENERAL HAWI VIEWS POLITICAL SITUATION

LD051457 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 20 Nov 79 p 8 LD

[Unattributed report: "Camp David's Objective: 'To Break' the Palestinian Resistance"]

[Text] Since the signing of the Camp David agreements the Lebanese crisis--an integral part of the overall Middle East crisis, has grown considerably worse. It will be one of the subjects debated at the Arab summit which opens in Tunis today.

A Lebanese Communist Party delegation headed by party Secretary General Georges Hawi visited Paris at the PCF's invitation. In an interview to L'HUMANITE Georges Hawi explained that the aggravation of the crisis is connected with the Israeli-U.S.-Egyptian treaty in which Lebanon constitutes the second stage of the plan drawn up at Camp David. The main aim is to liquidate the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon.

"Three elements must be considered in order to better understand the development of the situation over the past few months," Georges Hawi explained.

"The first is the deadlock in which the Camp David agreements are stalled.

"The second element concerns the success achieved by the PLO at international level.

"In this connection I would like to recall the important meeting in Algiers between Georges Marchais and Yasir 'Arafat and the French communists' action to have the PLO leader officially invited to Paris.

"The third element is the escalation of the Israeli aggression in southern Lebanon and the aggravation of Lebanese military, political and ideological pressure aimed at liquidating the Palestinian resistance."

Southern Lebanon's Problem: The Israeli Occupation

"It is in this context that we must place the U.S., French and other 'initiatives.'

"It is also in this context that the Lebanese authorities are trying to deflect the forthcoming Arab summit due to open in Tunis from its main task which is to consolidate common Arab positions against the Camp David agreements. On the contrary they are counting on placing the PLO in the stand and questioning its presence in southern Lebanon instead of raising the real problem which is that of the Israeli occupation and the formation of a puppet 'state' allied to Israel on our territory.

"The Lebanese national movement and our party have adopted a very firm stance on this question. The problem of the south is that of the Israeli occupation which, with its local allies, is hindering the execution of the UN forces' mission laid down in Security Council Resolution 425 and hindering the establishment of legal government throughout Lebanese territory.

"Our positions are determined not only by the support which must be given to the Palestinian resistance, they are based on the national interest, in other words the maintenance of our country's unity, its territorial integrity and its independence and on safeguarding the Lebanese people's right to democratic development.

"A just settlement of the Lebanese problem necessarily requires an end to the Israeli occupation of the southern part of our country."

With regard to the role played by the Lebanese Army, Georges Hawi said:

"At present it is acting as a shield to protect the militia of Pierre Jummayal's and Camille Sha'mun's extreme rightwing parties.

"Steps have been taken by the Lebanese reactionaries to go further and make the army an instrument for carrying out the plans which the militia cannot carry out themselves.

"In certain circles there are plans to make the army play a more important political role and there are moves to establish a military dictatorship as a 'solution' to the Lebanese 'problem.' This is a real danger."

Questioned on the divisions which are apparently appearing within the extreme right, Georges Hawi replied:

"In fact the differences are growing as these reactionaries are increasingly isolated among the people and on the political plane. The overwhelming majority of the Lebanese population and especially the people

living in the regions under the rightwing forces' domination, realize that these forces are responsible for Lebanon's tragedy. Even major sections of the big bourgeoisie--which initially supported the reactionary forces' plan--are starting to move away from them and to oppose this 'suicidal plan.'

"The alliance with Israel, religious fanaticism taken to extremes, even going all the way to racism, and dominant fascism, mean that the extreme right is no longer just up against the progressive forces and the Muslim majority but also against the majority of Christians who are also attached to the country's unity, independence and democracy. That is true of people such as Raymond Iddih and Sulayman Franjiyah, the Armenians and others..."

For a Front of All Progressive Arab Forces

Georges Hawi then stressed the importance of the Fourth Lebanese Communist Party Congress both for the party and Lebanon and for the whole Arab national liberation movement.

Despite the very complex political conditions and the extremely delicate situation on the security plane our party succeeded in successfully convening its fourth congress with the active participation of all its organizations and all its members.

On the domestic plane the congress stressed the special importance of cooperation between the broadest Lebanese political forces with a view to safeguarding the country's unity, its national independence, its Arabism and its democratic development.

[LD051459] This cooperation is necessary on the one hand to thwart the fascist and racist hegemony plan of the forces allied to Israel and, on the other hand, to prevent the Lebanese reactionaries from imposing a military dictatorship as an alternative solution which would resemble the fascist solution in content, differing only in form and means.

On the Arab plane the congress considered that the most essential task now is to defeat the Camp David agreements. That is a sine qua non if the Middle East crisis is to move toward a just and lasting settlement. Having made a detailed analysis of the content, significance and implications of these agreements our congress has put forward a program of struggle on the basis of which it would be possible to form a front of all Arab progressive forces on a democratic basis which would enable the broadest popular energies to be mobilized.

Furthermore in its analysis of the situation in the Arab world the fourth congress highlighted the painful fact that the Arab peoples' liberation movement continues to mark time if not to regress and suffer defeats: This movement is passing through a crisis period which the

congress diagnosed as a leadership crisis due to the class nature--petite bourgeoisie--of the leadership forces in most so-called progressive Arab regimes. This class nature results in a policy of irresolute delays in all spheres both in domestic and in foreign policy and which consequently is not capable of successfully withstanding the fierce onslaught of imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The fourth congress also studied the role of Arab communists and the responsibility they are assuming in this crisis. It pointed out that the objective conditions for revolutionary change had developed more than the subjective conditions. Therefore our party called for a "new Arab revolutionary movement" capable of providing a leadership able to insure that the Arab national liberation movement makes successful progress in order to accomplish its current tasks and attain its strategic goals. In our times national liberation revolution is an integral part of socialist revolution--a phase in its development. This confirms the leadership role of the working class and its vanguard party in the framework of the broadest political and class alliance in this national liberation revolution.

CSO: 4800

LIBYA

CONSTRUCTION OF 'GREAT WALL' ON BORDER WITH EGYPT REPORTED

LD301625 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 30 Nov 79 p 9 LD

[Unattributed report: "Libyan Wall Similar to China's Great Wall"]

[Text] Libya is building a "great wall" similar to the Great Wall of China along the border with Egypt from the Mediterranean to Jaghbug oasis.

Information received by military quarters in Cairo affirms that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, not satisfied with the defense line which the Libyan Jamahiriyyah forces are building on the borders "in order to repel any potential attack by Egyptian forces," has ordered the building of a high wall capable of repulsing any attack, regardless of its size and strength.

The idea of this barrier, according to the same information, stems from advice by Soviet experts who believe that a line of defenses is no longer useful with the development of modern weapons, particularly in view of the fall of the Israeli Bar-Lev line within a few hours despite the existence of a water barrier. They also believe that the building of an impregnable wall capable of standing against air and artillery bombardment and even against tactical nuclear weapons is alone capable of forming a strong barrier against any Egyptian advance if Egypt were to contemplate invading Libya.

Therefore, work has begun to build a wall of great height and width. The length, as we said, extends from the Mediterranean to Jaghbug oasis and the depth is no less than the Wall of China. It includes fortified positions for observation and fighting.

Preliminary estimates of the cost of building the wall exceed \$1 billion, the lion's share of which, according to official information, will fall to the Soviet Union. Apparently the idea is a concomitant of the phenomenon of the accumulation of arms of all types in Libya to an extent exceeding the requirements of the Libyan forces or any mercenary forces which the Jamahiriyyah might utilize.

CSO: 4802

MAURITANIA

FRG FINANCIAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT SIGNED

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 13-14 Oct 79 p 1

[Article: "416 Ouguiyas for the 'Gorgol Noir'"]

[Text] Major Moulaye O. Boukhreiss, member of the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] and minister of plan and fishing, and His Excellency the ambassador of the FRG, Dr Burghart Nagel, signed yesterday a governmental agreement on financial cooperation involving a total of 16 million DM (416 million ouguiyas) for the "Gorgol Noir Irrigation Program" project.

The purpose of this project is the preparation for farming of an area of 3,600 hectares in the Gorgol Noir. This project will benefit 4,640 families, or about 25,000 persons.

The parcel preparation work, with the populations participating, will extend over a period of 5 years, from 1980 to 1985, at the rate of 400 hectares in the first year and 800 hectares per year in the following years.

The infrastructure work will be completed in 1980. The full production capacity of 15,000 tons of rice, 2,200 tons of sorghum, 2,300 tons of maize and 2,000 tons of vegetables will be reached as of the winter of 1989.

At the conclusion of the ceremony, the ambassador of the FRG noted that this agreement is an additional proof of the desire of the two governments to deepen their friendly relations and to encourage agricultural development.

11267
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MAURITANIA

FRENCH LANGUAGE EDUCATION RETAINED TEMPORARILY

Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Oct 79 p 5

[Article: "Mauritania--The Authorities Are Retaining the Teaching of French Temporarily"]

[Text] Dakar (AFP)--The Mauritanian Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) made public on Tuesday 23 October a reform providing for temporary retention of education in French for those pupils whose mother tongue is not Arabic, Radio Nouakchott has announced.

In its quarterly meeting (LE MONDE of 12 October), the CMSN, the supreme political body, decided to retain the role of French as a language of education for a transitional period of 6 years, while at the same time reasserting the preeminence of Arabic, designated to become the "unitary national language."

These measures amend a preceding reform which made the teaching of Arabic mandatory for the black community of southern Mauritania, which had demonstrated its discontent.

The program proposed by the CMSN also provides for decentralization of administration, creation of regional councils, and a restructuring of the judicial apparatus, which will henceforth base its decisions on Moslem law.

11267
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MOROCCO

MADRID PAPER INTERVIEWS BOUABID ON SAHARA, TIES WITH SPAIN

LD071029 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 30 Nov 79 pp 1, 4 LD

[MAP report on Madrid EL IMPARCIAL interview with Moroccan Prime Minister Maati Bouabid: "Morocco Is Open to Any Dialog for Peace in the Region"]

[Text] Madrid, 30 November--The Madrid daily newspaper EL IMPARCIAL published Thursday an interview given by Prime Minister and Justice Minister Maati Bouabid to Arturo de Sienes, the paper's special correspondent in Rabat.

Mr Bouabid answered a number of questions put to him by the Spanish journalist on Spanish-Moroccan relations, his coming visit to Madrid, the objectives of the "Ouhoud operation," the role of the Royal Armed Forces and the Moroccan people's unanimous determination to protect their territorial integrity.

The prime minister and justice minister stated first that Morocco is open to any dialog for peace in the region but that it will never agree to negotiate its territorial integrity from La Uera to Tangiers.

"Having said this," he added, "we are in favor of fair and fruitful cooperation with all our neighbors. We have opened the way to a solution of the conflict with a view to achieving real economic integration of the African continent. This is the meaning of His Majesty the King's proposal to the OCAM chairman, President William Tolbert of Liberia."

Referring to the objectives of the "Ouhoud operation," Mr Matti Bouabid emphasized that "It is not directed against any neighboring country." "It is merely a question," he stated, "of strengthening our military system in order to insure the security of our territory and its inhabitants."

Replying to a question concerning the Moroccan people's feelings toward the Sahara conflict, the prime minister stated, recalling a statement by His Majesty King Hassan II during a press conference in Fez in August 1979; "You can ask any Moroccan irrespective of his origin. His answer will always be: 'Sahara is Moroccan.'"

Mr Bouabid added that the Moroccan people "have Sahara in their blood" and that "Morocco's enemies have always unsuccessfully tried to make a dent in the Moroccan people's unity round their sovereign."

Replying to a question about a military parade in Kenitra on 17 November, Mr Bouabid stated that "Morocco has no intention whatever of displaying its forces. This in no way lessens its determination to defend its territorial integrity by any means. The Kenitra military parade was a tribute to an army united round its king and determined to face up to any external threats, whether of a military or a subversive nature, a tribute to its perfect organization, discipline and devotion to duty."

Referring to Moroccan-Spanish relations, the prime minister stated that they are "excellent despite some unimportant incidents." "Our joint wish," he added, "is to further consolidate them at all levels. They should always truly reflect the ties existing between our two heads of state-- His Majesty King Juan Carlos and His Majesty King Hassan II--and our two peoples, who share a great past."

In conclusion, Mr Bouabid stated that he will soon be going to Madrid and that his coming visit to the Spanish capital will "further strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two nations and help to increase our privileged cooperation."

CSO: 4400

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

FRENCH LOAN AGREEMENT--Paris, 1 December--Finance Minister Abdelkamel Reghaye and French Economy Minister Rene Monory signed a new financial aid protocol in Paris Thursday afternoon whereby treasury loans and guaranteed private credits will be placed at the disposal of the Kingdom of Morocco, according to an official French source. These public and private funds will be used to buy durables from France with a view to carrying out the Moroccan development plan. The main projects chosen concern the phosphorus and cement industries, the merchant navy sector and the oils, lubricants and telecommunications industries. [Excerpt] [LD1071027 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 1 Dec 79 pp 1, 4 LD]

GRAIN PRODUCTION DROP--Casablanca, 27 November--According to AFRIQUE AGRICULTURE, a monthly magazine on agricultural matters, Morocco's grain production for 1978-1979 amounted to 36 million quintals. Citing the statistics provided by the Agriculture Ministry, [words indistinct] that this represents a 21-percent drop compared with the amount harvested in the previous year and comprises: 12 million quintals of durum wheat 5 million quintals of soft wheat, 16 million quintals of barley and 3 million quintals of corn. Unfavorable weather conditions have been responsible for this drop in production. In addition, troublesome birds have caused damage amounting to 10-15 percent of output. The ministry estimated that the country needs 60 million quintals grain and this means that we are 24 million quintals short. Furthermore, any importation of grain to cover the country's needs will be carried out under conditions prevailing on the world market and, as a result, we will probably have to pay 120 billion-150 billion centimes for them. [Text] [LD101017 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 27 Nov 79 p 1 LD]

CSO: 4400

SUDAN

POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGE IN COUNTRY EXPLORED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 5-11 Nov 79 p 30

[Article: "Either Reconciliation or the Military"]

[Text] Khartoum--For years, Sudan has been going from crisis to crisis, the opposition has been growing stronger and all the future possibilities are revolving around change.

The opponents within the Sudanese regime expect changes that have been described as "necessary" to establish stability in Sudan.

These opposition sources believe that there are three possibilities of change in the near future:

The first possibility lies in having President Ja'far Numayri accept the formula presented by the opposition at home and abroad. This formula focuses on reducing the individual powers, on reorganizing the Socialist Union on democratic bases and on re-examining the economic policy.

The opposition sources say that what is required in this case is a national reconciliation government that includes the various inclinations and that reduces, moreover, the religious exaggeration that is beginning to emerge, keeping in mind that Sudan is well-known for its moderation in this regard.

The second possibility lies in the occurrence of a military coup within the regime, especially since President Numayri has, according to what the opponents say, played a dangerous game when he involved the army in politics and appointed [Army] Commander 'Abd-al-Majid Hamid Khalil as his first deputy.

The third possibility, and this is what the opposition is trying to avert, is the possibility of the occurrence of a military movement similar to the Ethiopian or Ghanian movement, i.e., the staging of a coup by junior officers with no known and definite affiliations.

The opponents within the regime ascribe the fears they express to the continued deterioration of the economic and political conditions in the past 2 years, especially in the wake of the disappointment caused by the failure of the open-door policy started 2 years ago when al-Sadiq al-Mahdi agreed to deal with the regime on the basis of the creation of a national unity government that would solve the problems of the south and that would exclude nobody from within its ranks, not even the communists--as made evident by the amnesty decisions that were issued and that included the communists. However, the situation remained unchanged and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, despite returning to Sudan and becoming a member of the [Socialist Union] Political Bureau, started his opposition anew after 6 months. The signs of division in the south also began to appear after the appointment of a number of ministers, the dismissal of others and the ouster of certain southern elements from the Political Bureau.

The opponents complain that President Numayri tried at a joint meeting of the political and executive leaderships a month ago to place the blame on his aides, thus ousting his first deputy, Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim, from power and making him the sacrificial lamb whereas they believe that the crisis is bigger and deeper than to be solved with a sacrificial lamb, keeping in mind that a number of the political sectors are convinced that Numayri is responsible personally.

The opponents also say that the written agreement with al-Sharif al-Hindi stipulated that the constitution be re-examined so that all the provisions restricting public liberties may be eliminated and so that absolute powers may be eliminated to make the executive apparatus more democratic. They point out that nothing of the sort has happened and that the principle of adopting decisions through consultation, discussions and voting underwent the test of the Camp David accords during which President Numayri adopted an individualistic position without consulting with any of the political leaders. This is what motivated al-Sadiq al-Mahdi to submit his resignation.

The opponents add that the same thing was repeated insofar as southern Sudan is concerned where, the agreement stipulates, the regional authorities should have their autonomy. But Numayri, according to the opponents, supported Joseph Lago, the chairman of the south, even in measures conflicting with the constitution, thus compelling a number of southern ministers, including some who participated in the Addis Ababa agreement, to quit the government.

It seems that there are two schools in the Socialist Union. The first is prepared to support the regime and the steps taken by President Numayri, even if they violate or overstep the constitution. The second school believes that it is necessary to bolster the concept of national unity, to entrench democracy and, consequently, to curtail the president's powers and to put an end to some violations. The elements of this school have been compelled to resign and some of them have even left the country.

The opposition circles point out the phenomenon of the Muslim Brotherhood's support for President Numayri--support given on the grounds that President

Numayri has begun to follow Islamic directions and that he takes strong positions against the communists. But these circles focus on the danger of cooperation between Numayri and the Muslim Brotherhood and believe that the Brotherhood has exploited him to take radical religious positions that have caused reactions among the southern Sudanese because they are in conflict with the Addis Ababa agreement and with the provisions of the constitution.

As a result, the opponents say, social riots started and the strikes of workers, professionals, doctors, accountants and bank employees followed one another in succession. Even the farmers in al-Jazirah Agricultural Project went on strike. The opponents here say that there is no truth in Numayri's charge that the communists are behind the troubles because most of the organizations that staged strikes are organizations that follow the government.

Economically, the opponents point out the deteriorating conditions. The World Bank has assessed Sudan's debts at 2.7 billion dollars. They believe that the main causes of the deterioration are not due to the fact that the plans are not sound but are rather due to the emergence of the corruption that has exceeded all limits in the past 2 years and has led to the emergence of international middlemen. All this has caused the government to adopt harsh economic decisions compatible with the IMF resolutions which call for devaluing the currency, levying high taxes and reducing government spending. These measures have had a heavy impact on the development projects, the services and the availability of consumer commodities.

The opponents believe that the current issue in Sudan is not so much the issue of "protecting the regime" as it is that of "saving the homeland." They believe that it is no longer possible for one individual or one political organization to save the homeland. This is why they stress the need to achieve the national reconciliation and to restore the regime's credibility.

Perhaps the opponents' more important objection concerning President Numayri is his extreme reliance on Egypt--a reliance which they attribute to "security reasons more than anything else." They accuse Egypt of scaring Numayri with information on dangers coming from Ethiopia, South Yemen and Iraq to push him toward stronger and stronger reliance on Egypt. Analyzing the positions of the Arab states toward Numayri's regime, the opponents say that these positions are alienating Sudan currently. They believe that Saudi Arabia could have rescued Sudan economically because Saudi Arabia knows that a part of the Sudanese problems is due to mismanagement, corruption and the lack of desire on Numayri's part to cooperate with the patriotic elements, such as al-Mahdi and al-Hindi. The opponents also believe that Iraq's position is hostile. Despite Libya's lack of trust in Numayri, it adopts an outwardly neutral position toward him. But what explains the truth of the Libyan position is the presence of followers of Idi Amin, the ex-Ugandan president, in southern Sudan [sic].

midst this turbulent picture of the political and economic conditions in Sudan, no change seems to be imminent, even though the three possibilities that the opponents take into their account are not far from the reality. No possibility can be given precedence, considering that Numayri has succeeded so far in keeping Sudan out of the heat of the inter-Arab conflicts.

8494
CSO: 4802

SUDAN

MALTREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS CITED, RIOTS DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 12 Nov 79 p 32

[Article: "What Is Happening in Numayri's Prisons; 500 Political Detainees in Sudan"]

[Text] "...The regime of the second dictatorship in Sudan is trying to prolong its life through more oppression, torture and persecution of the Sudanese nationalists and progressives, relying on the imperialist countries and on the parties to Camp David. This regime, headed by Numayri, forgets that Emperor Haile Selassie who used to live next door has ended in history's garbage dump, that the shah of Iran has followed him and that the beads of the reactionary string of beads are falling one after the other.

"Sudan, which Numayri has turned into a country of starvation, financial deficits and of political and economic subservience, is still rising with its democratic forces to overthrow the dictatorship and to build the authority of the popular democracy. From Khartoum, the capital, we have the details of the torture in a report we have received from there--details that show that the life of the dictatorship is about to end." [Quotation marks as published]

Khartoum--Exclusive Dispatch to AL-HURRIYAH--In one of the jails, colleague Qasim Amin (one of the founders of the Communist Party and of the Sudanese unionist movement and chairman of the World Textile Workers Federation) suffered a heart attack which caused at the outset a complete paralysis which then developed to semi-paralysis. The heart attack occurred on 1 September [1979] but the prison authorities did not transfer the colleague to the hospital until 3 September on the pretext that they have neither orders nor powers insofar as the prisoners are concerned. The authorities did not move until the colleague developed complete paralysis. Only then was he taken to the armed forces hospital. In view of the wave of anger and grief that developed as a result of what the colleague suffered, the government withdrew the guard watching the colleague (even when completely paralyzed). The colleague has been now transferred to the Khartoum Hospital Clinic.

There is a large number of sick colleagues among the detainees and their ailments have gotten worse as a result of the long periods of detention.

It is well-known that colleagues Qasim Amin, Sulayman Hamid, Salāh Madhiri, Dr Muhammad Sulayman, al-Sirr Najib, Khalil Ilyas, Sabri Jasur, 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Rifa'i, al-Sirr Shabbu, Taha Sa'udi Darraj, 'Ali Idris, Bakhit Musa'id and others have been arrested repeatedly and kept in detention for long years without any trial since the July 1971 retrogression.

The number of detainees amounts to nearly 500 currently: 120 in Khartoum, more than 100 in (Malaga) al-Jadidah, more than 60 in Port Sudan, nearly 50 in Karimah/(Harwa), 25 in ('Atbarah) and around it, 20 in Sannar, 21 in al-Abyad and Kaduqli, 18 in Sabkhah, 16 in al-Qadarif, 17 in Kusti, 5 in al-Duwaym, 7 in Juba and 30 in Kasala. The overwhelming majority of the detainees are communists, including a number of unionists, workers, teachers and employees. There is also a number of democrats, including a member of the Regional People's Assembly in Juba. The detainees also include a number of Ba'thists from Khartoum, Madani and al-Abyad. On 8 September, the families of the detainees (their mothers, wives, sisters and children) marched in a procession which included nearly 200 women and a number of children. The procession presented a plea to the head of the judiciary. The government confronted the procession with more than 600 policemen who used tear gas to disperse the procession and the crowds gathered around it. The police beat the women painfully, tearing their clothes and injuring a number of them.

The police then arrested Samirah al-Bahr, Fa'izah Abu-Bakr and 'Alawiyah Thabir. A total of 45 women and a number of children were kept under detention for a time and then released at 2400 on bail. The police took statements from each of the women separately and refused to sue them collectively. The barbaric treatment of the procession aroused the anger and threats of the (crowds). In all these cities, the governors and the security officials were making contacts and saying that the orders came from Khartoum directly, accompanied by names [sentence as published].

The students staged big demonstrations which included the three cities (Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North) in the wake of the announcement of the latest increases in gasoline prices. The demonstrations were staged mainly by high school students and were characterized by violent clashes between the security men and the students. The demonstrations demanded:

1. Democratic freedom for the masses.
2. Improvement of the economic conditions.
3. The downfall of the murderer's regime.

As a result of the violence and of the ferocious attack [presumably by the security men], a number of students were martyred and others were injured. They are:

1. Kamal Faruq Khiraj, 15 years: Martyred as a result of fractured skull bones and brain hemorrhage.

2. Yasir Hasan, 15 years: Martyred as a result of a skull fracture and brain hemorrhage.
3. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ghani Harith: Killed as a result of a broken neck.
4. Two other students were run over by an army car.
5. One homeless person [Eritrean refugee] was shot to death.

In the wake of the recent riots and of the union strikes, especially the Doctors Union strike, the [authorities] retired a number of doctors without explaining the reasons. The number reached 20 doctors recently (50 are expected to be retired). Most of the retired doctors are members of the administrative councils of the unions [sic] who supported the doctors' demands firmly. The dismissals were concentrated on the communist and democratic doctors. We expect further measures against the other unions.

The retired doctors include:

1. Ahmad al-Tijani, general surgeon.
2. Kamal 'Arabi, bone surgeon.
3. Al-Shaykh Kunaysh, internal medicine.
4. 'Uthman Easan Surakni, dermatologist.
5. 'Umar Hasan Amin, internal medicine.
6. Ja'far Muhammad Salih, neurologist.
7. Hummudah Fatah-al-Rahman, general practitioner.
8. 'Umar Muhammad 'Abbas, general practitioner.
9. Ahmad Zakariya, general practitioner.
10. 'Adli Ahmad Sa'd, general practitioner.
11. 'Adli Ya'qub Iskandar, general practitioner.
12. Shaddad [no other name given], dentist.
13. Yasin Makki, dentist.
14. Ba'hara [no other name given], dentist.
15. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sitanni, eye specialist.
16. Hamid al-Na'im, gynecologist.

It is well-known that the Doctors Union staged an open strike until reinstatement of the doctors dismissed from their positions. In view of the broad support from the workers, teachers and professional unions and from the popular movement generally, the government backed down and reinstated the dismissed doctors. Thus, the unionist and popular movement has taught the government of the bloody retrogression another lesson in how it defends its democratic rights despite all the government's oppression agencies and all its fascist laws.

8494
CSO: 4802

SUDAN

BRIEFS

RECOMMENDATION FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC--Dr Hasan al-Turabi, the Sudanese minister of justice and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, is exerting efforts for re-examination of the Sudanese laws to make them compatible with the dictates of Islam. It is said in Khartoum that he is doing this in accordance with a high-level recommendation for the declaration of an Islamic republic in Sudan. President Ja'far Numayri had earlier dispatched al-Turabi to Tehran to meet Ayatollah Khomeini and to familiarize himself closely with the progress of affairs in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sudanese sources have said that this proposal has not received the support of southern Sudan, considering that Sudan is a state that includes both Muslims and Christians and is founded on respecting the freedom of religion. The criticism levelled at this attempt is not confined to the southern Christian leaders but also comes from Islamic groups in the north that are not happy with this inclination, especially the Islamic Republicans Group which is led by Mahum Muhammad Taha. The final word on the issue remains with President Ja'far Numayri who is trying to find a formula that will be acceptable to all and will preserve his alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 12 Oct 79 p 8] 8494

CSO: 4802

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

EARTH TREMOR REGISTERED--The seismographic center at Sidi Bou Said at 0507 today recorded an earth tremor. A preliminary analysis indicates that the epicenter of the tremor was in the sea at a distance of 18 km north of Sidi Said. It is estimated to have had a force of 3.5 degrees on the Richter Scale. It is noted that there were 10 tremors in Italy during the past 24 hours. The strongest tremor was on the western coast of Sicily, but it did not cause any real damage, because according to the seismographic center in Italy, its epicenter was 40 km under the crust of the earth. The tremors continued until this morning. [Text]
[Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 8 Dec 79 LD]

CSO: 4402

WESTERN SAHARA

POLISARIO LEADER REPORTS ON OAU COMMITTEE RESOLUTIONS

LD081032 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 0001 GMT 8 Dec 79 LD

[Excerpts] Polisario Front Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz, at the end of the work of the OAU Reconciliation Committee, held a press conference in which he explained the Saharan viewpoint on the resolutions adopted by the committee.

The committee's achievements represent an advanced stage of African contribution and efforts to restore rights to the Western Sahara's rightful owner, the Saharan people. This contribution is appreciated and makes clear that Africa understands the real nature of the Western Saharan problem, the most important of which is the problem of decolonization, which is connected with the expulsion of foreign forces occupying the Western Sahara and the efforts to prevent its people from exercising their right to self-determination and independence enjoyed by the rest of the people of the world.

The Polisario secretary general said that the special African committee fully understands that one of the basic conditions which gives the Saharan people the right to self-determination is the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. He said that the Saharan people appeal to the states which actually encourage Morocco to pursue its policy of intransigence and expansion which in turn encourages Morocco to be a source of tension and instability in northwest Africa and to reject international resolutions, primarily the OAU and UN resolutions. The Saharan people appeal to these states to heed the call of Africa via the special committee, which represents all of Africa, that the decision of Africa be implemented and that rights be restored to the rightful owner, the Saharan people. The Saharan people appeal to these states to end their support for Morocco. He added that the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic is convinced that Africa--via the special committee--will continue efforts to implement the African decision on respecting the right of the Saharan people to self-determination, independence and sovereignty over all their soil.

CSO: 4402

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