

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030032-1

**74767**  
**13 DECEMBER 1979**

**NO. 2057**

**1 OF 2**

JPRS 74767

13 December 1979

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2057

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

50277-1q1		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74767		2.		3. Recipient's Accession No.																																																																																																	
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		4. Title and Subtitle NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2057				5. Report Date 13 December 1979																																																																																																	
7. Author(s)		9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201				8. Performing Organization Rept. No.																																																																																																	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above		10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.				11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)																																																																																																	
13. Type of Report & Period Covered		14.				18. Supplementary Notes																																																																																																	
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words)  This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political, and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.																																																																																																							
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors <table border="0" style="width:100%"> <tr> <td>Political Science</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Inter-Arab Affairs</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Libya</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Sultanate</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sociology</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>North African</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Mauritania</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>of Oman</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Economics</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Affairs</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Morocco</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Syria</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Culture (Social Sciences)</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Afghanistan</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>People's Democratic Republic of Yemen</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Tunisia</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ethnology</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Bahrain</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Persian Gulf Area</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>United Arab Emirates</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Geography</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Egypt</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Qatar</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Western Sahara</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Techological</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Iran</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Saudi Arabia</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Yemen Arab Republic</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Military Sciences</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Iraq</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Spanish North Africa</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Israel</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Sudan</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Jordan</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Kuwait</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Lebanon</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> </table>								Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Inter-Arab Affairs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Libya	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sultanate	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sociology	<input type="checkbox"/>	North African	<input type="checkbox"/>	Mauritania	<input type="checkbox"/>	of Oman	<input type="checkbox"/>	Economics	<input type="checkbox"/>	Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/>	Morocco	<input type="checkbox"/>	Syria	<input type="checkbox"/>	Culture (Social Sciences)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Afghanistan	<input type="checkbox"/>	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Tunisia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Ethnology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Bahrain	<input type="checkbox"/>	Persian Gulf Area	<input type="checkbox"/>	United Arab Emirates	<input type="checkbox"/>	Geography	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Egypt	<input type="checkbox"/>	Qatar	<input type="checkbox"/>	Western Sahara	<input type="checkbox"/>	Techological	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Iran	<input type="checkbox"/>	Saudi Arabia	<input type="checkbox"/>	Yemen Arab Republic	<input type="checkbox"/>	Military Sciences	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Iraq	<input type="checkbox"/>	Spanish North Africa	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Israel	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sudan	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	Jordan	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Kuwait	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Lebanon	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>
Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Inter-Arab Affairs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Libya	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sultanate	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
Sociology	<input type="checkbox"/>	North African	<input type="checkbox"/>	Mauritania	<input type="checkbox"/>	of Oman	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
Economics	<input type="checkbox"/>	Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/>	Morocco	<input type="checkbox"/>	Syria	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
Culture (Social Sciences)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Afghanistan	<input type="checkbox"/>	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Tunisia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
Ethnology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Bahrain	<input type="checkbox"/>	Persian Gulf Area	<input type="checkbox"/>	United Arab Emirates	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
Geography	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Egypt	<input type="checkbox"/>	Qatar	<input type="checkbox"/>	Western Sahara	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
Techological	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Iran	<input type="checkbox"/>	Saudi Arabia	<input type="checkbox"/>	Yemen Arab Republic	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
Military Sciences	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Iraq	<input type="checkbox"/>	Spanish North Africa	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Israel	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sudan	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Jordan	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Kuwait	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Lebanon	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																																
b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms																																																																																																							
c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, 15																																																																																																							
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161				19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED		21. No. of Pages 102																																																																																																	
				20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED		22. Price																																																																																																	

(See ANSI-Z39.18)

See Instructions on Reverse

OPTIONAL FORM 272 (4-77)  
(Formerly NTIS-35)  
Department of Commerce

JPRS 74767

13 December 1979

### NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2057

#### CONTENTS

PAGE

##### INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Palestinian Role in Iran Seen as Unclear by Arabs (AL-DUSTUR, 8-14 Oct 79) .....	1
PLO Relations With Iran Examined (THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY, 3 Nov 79) .....	6
Khomeyni's Grandson Speaks Out on Arab Issues (Haseyn Khomeyni Interview; AL-DUSTUR, 5-11 Nov 79)	8
South Korean Workers in Gulf Seen as Enigmas (AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 4 Nov 79) .....	12
Kuwait To Receive Drinking, Irrigation Water From Iraq (Muhammad al-Hakim; AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, 13 Sep 79) ....	15
Briefs	
Antiregime Publications	18

##### AFGHANISTAN

Amin Comments on Brezhnev Proposal (Kabul Radio, 11 Nov 79) .....	19
Constitutional Committee Studying Citizens' Proposals (Kabul Domestic Service, 10 Nov 79) .....	21
Briefs	
Ministers Leave for Bulgaria	22
Economic Commission Meeting	22
Anti-Khomeyni Activities	22
Attacks on Japanese Tourist, Others	23
Return of Commerce Minister	23

- a -

[III - NE & A - 121]

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
<b>ALGERIA</b>	
Algeria Under Bendjedid Reported On (DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE, 22 Oct 79) .....	24
Changes After First Nine Months, by Bachir Rezzoug Profile of Chadli Bendjedid, by Roland Malet	
Government Reported To Be Rethinking Hydrocarbons Policy (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 12 Nov 79) .....	33
Briefs	
Algerians Versus Romanians	35
<b>EGYPT</b>	
Prosecution Case Against Communists Continues (AL-AKHBAR, 23 Oct 79) .....	36
Briefs	
NPUG Party Members Arrested	38
<b>IRAN</b>	
Attack on Embassy Seen as Blow Against U.S. Imperialism (KEYHAN, 6 Nov 79) .....	39
Shari'atmadari Reiterates Demand for Return of Shah (Shari'atmadari Interview; KEYHAN, 13 Nov 79) .....	42
Governor Warns of Internal Counterrevolution (KEYHAN, 16 Oct 79) .....	45
Khomeyni's Son States Views on Government (KEYHAN, 15 Oct 79) .....	47
Details of Afghan Plot To Kill Ayatollah Shari'atmadari Bared (KEYHAN, 16 Oct 79) .....	51
Turkish Paper on Events in Islamic World (Zafer Atay; TERCUMAN, 26 Nov 79) .....	54
Military Men May Retire After 20 Years (KEYHAN, 15 Oct 79) .....	55

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
IRAQ	
President Husayn, 'Arafat Discuss Arab Situation, Iraqi Aid (AL-HAWADITH, 9 Nov 79) .....	57
ISRAEL	
Arabs Urged To Use Experts To Influence U.S. Presidential Elections (Editorial; AL-QUDS, 6 Nov 79) .....	61
Uproar Over al-Shak'ah Statements Said Intentionally Fabricated (Editorial; AL-QUDS, 8 Nov 79) .....	63
Salfit Mayor Visits Amman (AL-QUDS, 31 Oct 79) .....	65
Editorial Believes Ending Occupation Will End Country's Economic Problems (Editorial; AL-QUDS, 5 Nov 79) .....	66
KUWAIT	
'AL-TALI'AH' Deplores Iranian-Arab Misunderstanding (Editorial; AL-TALI'AH, 10 Oct 79) .....	68
Kuwait Offers Proposals To End Gulf Financial Crisis (AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 18 Nov 79) .....	70
Editorial Comments on Egyptian Army Leadership (Editorial, Fu'ad Matar; AL-WATAN, 10 Oct 79) .....	73
Property Allocations Expanded for 1979 (AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, 10 Sep 79) .....	75
Private Sector Necessary to Petrochemical Process (AL-QABAS, 30 Sep 79) .....	77
Briefs	
Deportation Comment	80
LEBANON	
Lebanese Troop Leader Interviewed (Saad Haddad Interview; MONDAY MORNING, 19-25 Nov 79)	81

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
LIBYA	
Libyan Secretary of Foreign Affairs Comments on World, Arab Affairs ( 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki Interview; AL-SABAH, 16 Nov 79) .....	93
TUNISIA	
Envoys Reported To Ask Europeans for Aid Against Khomeyniism (AL-DUSTUR, 11 Nov 79) .....	97
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	
UAE-CONOCO Deal Yields Great Profits for Dubai Ruler (AL-HAWADITH, 2 Nov 79) .....	98



INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PALESTINIAN ROLE IN IRAN SEEN AS UNCLEAR BY ARABS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 8-14 Oct 79 pp 11-12

[Article: "Would Khomeyni Go to Mecca for Pilgrimage? Iran's Gulf Politics: Is Iran Strategically Right and Tactically Wrong? Does the PLO Have Any Role in Iran and the Gulf Incidents?"]

[Text] If the Iranian revolution is petroleum related, then it must be Arab and, particularly, Gulf related.

In the Gulf the battle began between the Iranian revolution and the Gulf and island's regimes. Ayatollah Ruhani keeps demanding that Bahrain be part of Iran; Kuwait and Bahrain arrest and deport Khomeyni's representatives; the Sultanate of Oman offers its "program" for the protection of the Strait of Hormuz; and Saudi Arabia sends two of its army brigades to Bahrain.

But what if Imam Khomeyni moves his battle inside the region and to its strongest ring, Saudi Arabia, where it is said he will conduct his pilgrimage to the holy lands; and what if he gave some of his touching speeches to the pilgrims, speeches which are against the policies of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf shaykhdoms?

What is the Iranian situation like as seen from within the Gulf; how do the progressive people of the region view it; and what political and social forces agree with it?

Many questions arise concerning the situation in the Gulf, which has become shaky since the Iranian revolution's victory. Some of these questions are answered by the following letter.

Our meeting in Beirut with a group of youths from the Gulf, mostly from Kuwait, gave us a suitable opportunity to examine a group of issues and problems discussed by some Arabic newspapers and magazines, especially concerning the nature of Gulf-Iranian relations with the Islamic revolution.

Discussion of the subject branched out so much that it sometimes reached back in history to the year 1776, "when the Persians took over Basrah,"

thus making "Kuwait" the main point of sea commerce between the Near and Far East. At the time the "East Indian Company," with its imperialist past, changed its sea mail route to Aleppo from Basrah to "Kuwait," thus attracting many Arab and Persian merchants from Basrah to that area south of Iraq.

Discussions grew wider, but the current political situation was always the focal point that brought our conversation and us back to the starting point: the Gulf and Iran after the revolution.

We had the opportunity to hear many different things about the Gulf in general and Kuwait in particular, ranging from analytical to informational, but all conversations centered around the dangerous situation in the Gulf and the Iranian revolution.

The story in Kuwait seems to begin with the incident involving Ahmad al-Mahri. After Ahmad al-Mahri, a relative of Khomeyni, gave a speech in one of Kuwait's mosques and was put in jail by the ruling family, the problems of Arab-Iranian relations and Sunni-Shi'ite relations began to appear, especially since the Kuwaiti incidents paralleled those of Bahrain and the Ayatollah Ruhani's statements.

During our sessions it seemed that some of the educated and progressive Kuwaitis were constantly reaffirming that many issues are confused or inflated. They said that there is a noticeable difference between Iranian strategy in general and some of its current tactics in relations to the Gulf.

What is happening in the Gulf--according to the above analysis--is a natural and inevitable outcome of the Iranian revolution. As the Arab nations were subjected to inevitable changes due to the Egyptian political situation and role, it is natural that the Gulf would be subjected to inevitable changes as a result of the Iranian changes. The political situation in the Gulf as originally established was based on the triangular balance between Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran. This meant that any change in any of these "central" Gulf countries would lead to changes involving the entire Gulf region.

#### Iran's Strategic Limits

The problem goes beyond what happened or may happen in Bahrain and Kuwait. Bahrain or Kuwait or other countries in the Gulf may become mere symbols of a changing relationship. In the light of this change, it is said that Iranian strategy balances two major matters in the Gulf.

The first matter is the replacement of the scattered Gulf situation with enough power to allow Iranian connections with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The repeated American threats after the Iranian revolution to take over the oil wells, U.S. moves in Gulf waters and U.S. hints at regional projects show that the Gulf is one of the weakest links in the Iranian chain. If we assumed that Khomeyni's leadership were to attempt more of

its basic steps on the political, petroleum or military levels, it would no doubt have its eyes set on the Gulf, since the Gulf presents an ideal situation for American penetration of Iran.

On the other hand, Iranian ambition, which the revolution uncovered early, to exercise a heavy central role in the conflict against Israel remains a mere wish, with no actual tools to allow this conflict to reach the battle-grounds. This will necessitate, according to the Iranians, transforming the Gulf into a field for Iranian penetration of the Arab-Israeli scene of conflict.

The second matter which Iranian strategy aims to materialize--according to this analysis--is to make an actual connection between petroleum and the fight against Israel in the region. It is known, for example, that the most prominent lesson learned by Henry Kissinger from the October War and the petroleum price increases that followed was the necessity of persistent work to separate petroleum from politics and to divert the centers of conflict from the petroleum supply lines within the Gulf fields and between Western European ports and the United States.

It is also known that Saudi politics, especially through Minister of Petroleum Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, have always insisted on the application of the above principle by exercising extreme conservatism against raising [petroleum] prices based on political justifications.

#### Negative Observations

The positive picture of Iranian strategy is paralleled by some negative observations of Iranian tactics, particularly as revealed by Ayatollah al-Ruhani's declarations.

In the context of negative observations, attention is directed to the fact that the Iranian Constitution specifies that the al-Ja'fari sect is the state sect in Iran; this conflicts with the current Arab situation and prevents the possibility of Iranian influence on the Arab situation. In fact, it is basically in conflict with the general Islamic sentiments toward the Iranian revolution as expressed in the overall declarations, actions and writings of Ayatollah Khomeyni and his associates, as well as by information sources, including the latest decree enforcing the obligatory teaching of Arabic in Iran because it is the language of the Koran. Some people focus on the following three tactical errors:

That the revolution presents a reason to depict the new Iranian situation as if it were a natural continuation of what it was during the Shah's regime (which, until recently, considered Bahrain as the 14th state in Iran, and treats the Gulf as its vital extension).

That it offers arguments acceptable to many Emirates and shaykhdoms to improve their relations with the other central Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia and Iraq), thus forming a Gulf core of cores.

That it helps emphasize sectarianism (besides nationalism) among Gulf Sunnis and Shi'ites, especially since some agencies benefit from supporting such sectarianism and loyalties to the Imam in order to build a barrier in the face of Islamic advancement of the Iranian revolution.

#### Two Phases Merged

There are those who explain what is called "Iranian tactical mistakes" as one of the results of the mergers of two phases in Iran:

The phase of Iran crossing its borders in defense of its political liberation against imperialism; and

The phase of the prolonged struggle for authority in Iran, which has not yet ended. It can therefore be said that "chaos," which is natural situation facing every revolution at the outset, is the main reason behind disorganized Iranian tactics relative to foreign policy in general and the Gulf area in particular.

The above commentators add that "Palestine" is the major corrective element in Iranian tactics. For example, when Khomeyni declared "Jerusalem Day," the whole Gulf became a big political celebration in which families, social forces and all sects joined in an atmosphere overwhelmingly sympathetic to the Iranian revolution, to the extent that no one mentioned the local regulations and Gulf rulers.

In commenting on the above or discussing the same subject, informational sources in the Gulf say that Ayatollah Khomeyni might go to Mecca for the pilgrimage. If this report proves to be true and Khomeyni gave some of his speeches in Saudi Arabia about Islamic unity on the issue of the Palestinian fight and what this means, what effect would such an incident have in the Gulf and Saudi areas?

It can be deduced from the above that minor adjustments in the Iranian tactics will definitely settle many of the matters that may be taking a negative and bad direction. Within the framework of "universal Islamic unity" in the struggle against "imperialism and Zionism," one finds many progressive Gulf people who demand better levels of relationship and coordination between the Iranian revolution and the political forces opposed to imperialism in the Gulf.

#### Sunnis--Arabs for the Revolution

It is said--particularly in the case of Kuwait--that there is a wide margin encircling the game of contradiction between Arab and Persian nationalism and the sectarian Sunni-Shi'ite contradiction. In Kuwait there are three forces (of a Sunni and Arab nature) that support the Iranian revolution. There is the "al-Tali'ah Group," named after the leftist AL-TALI'AH magazine that formed a progressive parliamentary group led by Dr Ahmad al-Khatib, who began his political career in the "Arab

Nationalist Movement" and then declared his Marxism as part of the movement's change to a Marxist-Leninist movement. Today Dr al-Khatib is one of the mosque speakers on Fridays calling for support for the Iranian revolution. There is also the "Social Reform Organization," which could almost be a Kuwaiti version of the "Moslem Brotherhood Movement," and it represents the Sunni religious situation in Kuwait. It has been clashing lately with the government, with the rise of youthful and more rooted elements to its leadership. In this context, it should be mentioned that the two magazines of this organization, AL-DA'WAH and AL-ISLAH, were suspended for one month after the incident at the Aleppo military college in Syria.

Talking about political Islamic awareness in Kuwait, we must mention that 5,000 copies of Khomeyni's book "The Islamic Government" were sold there, an almost legendary number compared with book consumption in Iran.

The third group is the Palestinian colony in Kuwait, which has its political and cultural impact on the country. Prior to Khomeyni's revolution, it constituted the Arab emigrant group that equaled the Iranian group in Kuwait. Today both colonies have a political coalition that finds its cohesion in the Iranian revolutionary stand in support of the Palestinian resistance. It is known that the Palestinian colony had been exposed to some problems in Kuwait, especially with the Lebanese war and the Palestinian resistance struggle with Syria.

In addition to all the above, the Kuwaiti regime, with the rise of inflation, was exposed to sharp social pressures directly reflected in the youth element of limited-income families. This crisis adds to the general crisis, which is the overall Gulf situation after the Iranian revolution. Ahmad al-Mahri's provoking was basically centered around social matters. The social crisis also caused a new vocabulary to develop, such as "al-Hawamir," which is the plural of Hamur, meaning the large fish that swallows small fish. It is a term equivalent to "fat cats" in Egypt, "high-class kids" in Lebanon, etc.

On the other hand, the big Iranian merchants in Kuwait do not take any political stands. Their stand is clearly conservative. They are caught between the anvil of being Iranian and the hammer of their businesses that make them members of the Kuwaiti business organization. If more stands were declared and these merchants finally declared their stand in support of the Kuwaiti regime or, otherwise, of the Iranian revolution, this would help dilute the nationalistic-sectarian character of what may become an open battle.

Talks about some Gulf anticipation, "especially in Bahrain," related to the role the PLO might have or be invited to take, being the sole organization that could establish, with everybody else's approval, a joint Iranian and Gulf conversational element, as one of the Gulf people puts it.

Could this role be performed? In what direction? This is what the future days and incidents will tell, especially since the PLO is the Arab political power most sensitive to the dangers of any unsafe political situation in that petroleum and strategic area.

It seems that those waiting to hear Palestine's word are many.

9455  
CS0: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO RELATIONS WITH IRAN EXAMINED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 3 Nov 79 pp 17-18

[Text] Relations between the new regime in Iran and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are not what they were expected to be, or even what they were at the downfall of the Shah and the reason of this change is the new turn that relations between the Arab states and the new Iranian regime have taken over the past few months.

The PLO, and the Palestinian resistance as a whole, which had won a powerful ally in the new Iranian regime, is now concerned over the turn Arab-Iranian relations have been taking, especially the Gulf states. It now fears that because of the change in relations the Iran-PLO alliance will not bring about the results it was expected to bring about in terms of moral, political, economic, financial and military support.

The Gulf. There are two reasons for this concern. On the one hand, the PLO has recently found itself in an embarrassing position following the threatening remarks made by certain religious leaders in Iran against Gulf states, and especially Bahrain, which is in close relations of cooperation with Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian resistance, which enjoys the backing of both the Iranian regime and Arab regimes found itself in the difficult situation brought about by the fact that it was supporting a regime which, in turn, was opposed to other regimes that support its cause.

A particularly difficult situation which has been further aggravated by the current state of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These relations are currently described by informed observers in Riyadh as being "cold" and immobile. The coldness resulted from the first Iranian statements indicating an intention to expand Iran's influence beyond the borders of Iran and also from anti-monarchist statements made by a number of Iranian religious leaders and which were seen as particularly directed against Arab monarchies. The strain was increased also by the fact that Saudi Arabia did not view with pleasure a competitive influence that might challenge its own influence on politics and religion in the Gulf. Iran's calls for the restoration of Jerusalem did not improve the situation, as Saudi Arabia considers itself the sponsor of the Jerusalem-retrieval movement.

Divisions. As THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY had pointed out in a recent issue (see AWW No 535) that there were divisions within the Iranian leadership on the situation in South Lebanon and especially on the support that Iran should give to the population, on the one hand, and to the Palestinian resistance in the South, on the other hand. The two Iranian officials who visited the South lately represented two different trends within the Iranian leadership. Foreign Minister Tabatabai came as the representative of the government of Mr Mehdi Bazargan which believes that Iranian support should go to the Shiite population of the South rather than to the Palestinian resistance at a time the two sides are at odds with one another.

It is interesting to note that this view is shared by the Iranian Defense Minister, Mr Mustafa Shamran. The religious leaders of Iran have called for achieving a compromise between the Shiite population and the Palestinians so as not to envenom relations between one and the other. In the government, there is also a trend which calls for all-out support for the Palestinian resistance and yet a third trend whose position is that Iran should not interfere at all with matters falling beyond the borders of Iran.

The malaise which has been reported in Iran-PLO relations was apparent, observers said, in the recent talks that a high level PLO delegation held with Iranian officials in Tehran. The delegation scolded the Iranian authorities on the reality of their position concerning South Lebanon and submitted a request for military and financial assistance. Informed observers said that Iran promised to help but the volume of this assistance was not disclosed, nor perhaps discussed yet.

The Kurds. In fact, one of the problems that the Palestinian resistance faced was the charge that Iran made against the rejectionist Palestinian organizations, which were accused of extending help and support for the Kurdish rebellion and the Iranian leaders expressed their unwillingness to extend support to movements that might hand over part of this assistance to Iran's opponents. Action has reportedly been taken on this aspect of question and informed sources said that during Mr Tabatabai's visit to Damascus, Syrian President Hafez Assad promised to ask Dr George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to put an end to his support for the Kurds.

In fact, the Kurdish question is a thorny one in view of the fact that no one can yet pinpoint for sure the side which is backing the Kurds and informed sources even said that the very same side may be simultaneously helping the Kurdish rebellion and encouraging the Iranian regime to crack down on the Kurds.

One thing is sure at present, the Iranian regime supports the Palestinian but what is yet to be determined is the extent, or rather the limits, of this support.

CSO: 4820

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

KHOMEYNI'S GRANDSON SPEAKS OUT ON ARAB ISSUES

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 5-11 Nov 79 p 23

[Interview with Hasseyn Khomeyni by Walid Nuwayhad: "Rohani's Statements Are Suspect and Commissioned; People of South Lebanon and Palestinians Have Same Question; Chamran Made Error; Those Responsible for Error Must Be Removed"]

[Text] It was in the context of the interest which Iran demonstrated in the Lebanese situation, in the situation of South Lebanon and in Shi'ite Palestinian relations in South Lebanon that Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Sadeq Tabataba'i (on the official side) and then Imam Khomeyni's grandson, an authority on Islam, Hasseyn Khomeyni (on the unofficial side) recently visited Beirut.

AL-DUSTUR met with Hasseyn Khomeyni and interviewed him about the situation in Iran and in the Arab homeland. The assertions made by the young man of religion were quite reminiscent of the positions taken by the late Imam Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani.

[Question] What do you think of the visit that Tabataba'i, the Iranian deputy prime minister made recently to Beirut and Damascus?

[Answer] There is a revolution and there is a government. The government thinks and functions within the framework of Iran, but the Islamic Revolution goes beyond this framework to all the Islamic nations and also to all the nations of the world. Therefore, we make a distinction between the revolution and the government because the positions that Imam Khomeyni takes call for assistance to the oppressed of the earth. In this sense these positions are international. Mr Tabataba'i merely represents the Iranian government, not the Iranian Revolution.

Bahrain Is Arab and Islamic

[Question] What about Rohani's statements?



[Answer] We in Iran cannot feel secure from Zionism. Zionism does exist in Iran also. These words and statements that disturb Arab-Iranian relations are suspect and commissioned even if they come from an ayatollah. This is because history has seen many ayatollahs who stood beside oppressors. We want ayatollahs who stand with the people and who look first, second, third and fourth to the masses. We want ayatollahs who believe in the masses. These statements are basically retrogressive. We believe that Bahrain is an Arab, Islamic state.

[Question] What are your impressions of Lebanon and South Lebanon which you have visited? Does the revolution have a special role with regard to Palestinian-South Lebanon relations?

[Answer] There is no doubt that Iran does have an effect on the Lebanese situation. But the question of South Lebanon is not merely a Lebanese question or an Arab question; it is rather an international question. All regional and international forces can be found in the South, and the presence of the resistance gives the problem a special nature. If the Lebanese army were dispatched [to South Lebanon], three matters can happen:

First, there would be sharp struggles between the resistance and the army.

Second, some of the people of South Lebanon will support the army.

Third, the liberation organization may oppose the army without seeking a clash with the people of South Lebanon because it does not harbor them any hostility. This may lead the organization to withdraw from there and to turn from a military organization to a political organization, and that would mean major success for Israel.

The people of South Lebanon have endured many hardships; they have allied themselves with the Palestinians, and they did protect them. But the increase in [the number of] difficulties and the slow pace in which the revolution finds itself have psychologically disturbed the people of South Lebanon and made them ready to accept the army. However, the charges that the people of South Lebanon are against the revolution are false charges, and we must work to find a common solution for the Palestinians and the people of South Lebanon. In my opinion, the solution lies outside Lebanon and especially with the Arab oil countries and with Iran who can use oil to exert pressure on Washington.

Our delegation is a preparatory delegation that wants to see the situation as it is, not as it is conveyed by the conflicting views of the numerous delegations that visit Iran.

The Iranian people are loyal friends of the Palestinian Revolution.

The Islamic Revolution thinks that the positions others take on Palestine are a standard for determining the position it takes on them.

[Question] What is the question of the al Ja'fari Doctrine in the new Iranian Constitution?

[Answer] The revolution is Islamic and its leader said; he sees no differences between the doctrines. The doctrinal questions are made up by colonialism to weaken us. The Islamic Revolution cannot grant others total freedom to apply any one of the doctrines in the areas of the law, prayer and civil status in accordance with the numerical majority in any one of the areas. Discussion about the al Ja'fari Doctrine is due to the fact that most of the Iranians are [followers of] al Ja'fari. But this does not mean any doctrinal coercion.

Relations With Egypt

Can the government--and government is one thing and the revolution another--re-establish relations with Egypt?

[Answer] This cannot take place as long as the Imam is alive. If he were to go, his plan will survive.

[Question] What is the Islamic proposition for confronting separatist movements in Iran?

[Answer] We oppose a military solution for Kordestan. Logic and a political solution must be adopted. The military solution is the logic of the weak. Political solutions must at least be exhausted before military solutions are resorted to. Minister of Defense Mostafa Chamran made an error by adopting a military solution. His action magnified the role of the Kordestan Democratic Party, which is a weak party. The Iranian Government, therefore, has to expel those officials who are responsible for the error and isolate the leaders who are negligent.

[Question] What about the fact that the intellectuals are accusing the Revolution of being lacking in democracy?

[Answer] You can find out about that if you go to Iran. When Eric Roleau, who works for the French Newspaper, LE MONDE, visited Iran, he said, "This is not democracy; this is absolute freedom!" And even as far as music is concerned, recorded tapes are sold everywhere, and the radio broadcasts music to the public in spite of the fact that the time allotted to music is less than the time that was allotted to it in the past. This is because of the educational and cultural programs [that are broadcast now] on the radio.

[Question] What has the revolution accomplished on the economic field? What solutions do you envision?

[Answer] So far everything is being studied, and there are several individual efforts that are interacting with each other. There are disagreements about the theories that must be followed concerning economic development. It is my belief that an Islamic economy will build the Iran of the future in spite of the fact that Iran did inherit numerous difficulties from the capitalist system.

8592  
CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SOUTH KOREAN WORKERS IN GULF SEEN AS ENIGMAS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 4 Nov 79 p 34

[Article: "The Koreans Are Coming"]

[Text] There is a great deal of talk about the South Koreans working in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As of today there are at least 100,000 of them, and it is expected that by the early 1980's there will be a quarter of a million!

It is commonly said in the Gulf that those Koreans are nothing more than soldiers brought to the region in the guise of workers, to don their military uniforms and take up arms in case of any armed attack threatening petroleum.

Other contrary statements say that the Gulf's experience with the labor force is behind this resort to yellow laborers.

Whenever any passenger plane lands at Bahrain Airport or one of the region's other airports, it is strange to see a number of workers in clean white clothes hurrying to enter the plane, cleaning it up in less than 5 minutes!

When I asked a Kuwaiti official about the "Korean invasion," he laughed and said, "You know the such and such hotel, where you usually stay?"

I said, "yes."

He said, "Well, haven't you noticed the change which has come over this hotel? The new 350-room wing attached to it was built by South Koreans in one year. If it had been assigned to Indian, Pakistani, Iranian or Baluchi (referring to Baluchistan) workers, it would not have been finished before 3 years at least."

Whoever lives in the Gulf has seen those Koreans, and marvels at their vitality and organization.

The South Korean company bids for a project at, say, \$500 million, a price at least \$100 million below those of international (even Arab) companies. In other words, the Koreans have been competitive, and have been successful.

This company promises to complete the job 3 months ahead of the deadline.

When the contract is signed, the importation of workers, engineers and supervisors from Seoul begins. They get off the planes or ships in single file, and head for the special camps which their company has prepared for them.

They have their clothing and everyday items with them, even their food. In the camps they go to sleep at certain times and wake up at certain times. They don't waste a single working minute during work hours. They smoke and drink tea or coffee only during the rest periods set aside for that, which are very few.

You don't hear them shout or laugh, and there is never a smile or scowl on their lips. You hear the sound of the needle among them, and you find that every job they complete is extraordinary and unquestionable.

Before the scheduled date, the project owner receives his project in silence, not having learned a thing about the workers. Who are they? How do they do their work? How do they eat and sleep? Nothing, nothing.

The Kuwaiti official said that Kuwait was and still is a country with hundreds of thousands of Arabs and tens of thousands of Indians, Pakistanis, Iranians and Baluchis.

Kuwait does not have the problem of "Arabism" among the labor force, but other Gulf states do, because of political circumstances in the region.

With respect to these countries the Kuwaiti official adds, "The Arab worker comes and after a while the host country discovers that he is an intelligence agent, or a saboteur, taking advantage of the country's circumstances to distribute secret publications or hold meetings--or attend demonstrations."

That was the problem, and it was decided to stop Arab immigration.

There remains the Indian-Pakistani-Baluchi-Iranian problem.

They are very numerous and not very productive. In addition, they are naturally lazy, which causes complaints among all who deal with them--in hotels, hospitals, restaurants, and official and non-official departments.

The question remains: Is it true that those workers are an "army?"

The Kuwaiti official replies, "South Korea practices compulsory conscription. Every young man there goes through a period of military service which "stamps its mark" on him. We take advantage of this "stamp" to complete our projects and save our money and time, which is wasted by workers of other nationalities."

[Question] Is there any surveillance of the Koreans?

[Answer] You should ask the concerned authorities about this.

[Question] Could they possibly be made use of to block a Soviet invasion of the region, for example?

[Answer] I can't answer this question because I don't know. The higher authorities in the region know more about it. If anyone would know, they would. And if not, then they ought to make inquiries so as to follow the course they feel is suitable.

Workers? Soldiers? Spies? The answer remains unknown, especially since the United States has disturbed, rather than reassured, the "disposition" of the Gulf by announcing the establishment of the "110,000-man American strike force."

8559  
CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

KUWAIT TO RECEIVE DRINKING, IRRIGATION WATER FROM IRAQ

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 13 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by Muhammad al-Hakim: "Agreement To Supply Kuwait With 300 Million Gallons of Water and To Resume Study To Complete Electrical Link Project"]

[Text] Kuwait and Iraq have agreed that Kuwait will obtain 200 million gallons of drinking water and 100 million gallons of water for agriculture. The necessary documents will be signed next week stipulating that the project to transfer water from Iraq to Kuwait be submitted to bidding and calling on the international advisory offices to study it and draw up the necessary plans.

This was revealed at a press conference held yesterday morning by the under secretary of the Ministry of Electricity and Water and head of the Kuwaiti delegation to the negotiations which took place 3 days ago in Kuwaiti, Zayd al-Fahd, after he had signed the protocol pertaining to cooperation between Kuwait and Iraq in the field of electrical power and water.

At 11:30 the Kuwaitis and Iraqis held the final session of the talks for the signing of the protocol between the two sister states. Under Secretary of the Ministry of Electricity and Water Zayd al-Fahd signed for the Kuwaitis, and Under Secretary of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals Subhi Yasin signed for the Iraqis. After the heads of the two delegations exchanged protocol documents, Zayd al-Fahd delivered the following speech:

"With the help of God, the signing took place at the third session of the meetings of the Iraqis-Kuwaiti Committee for Water and Electricity.

"As you know, these meetings came as a supplement to the two previous meetings held during the past year in Kuwait and Baghdad, during which it was agreed that Iraq would supply Kuwait with drinking water in stages: the first stage, 200 million gallons, to increase in the future according to studies conducted by the two parties during the period from 1985 to 1990.

"In the discussion by the two sides during this visit, the following points were agreed upon:

"With regard to the first stage for drinking water, the Kuwaities have completed a draft of an invitation to the consulting houses to study and design the project, and it will be sent to the Iraqis next week for study and approval.

"As for irrigation water, it was agreed that Kuwait would receive water for agricultural purposes, with the provision that the first stage would be 100 million gallons a day, to increase in the future subject to approval by both parties."

"As for electricity, I want to clear up some confusion on the part of some members of the press. Some have explained that the object of the talks between Kuwait and Iraq on water and electricity is an exchange operation to supply Kuwait with water in return for supplying Iraq with electricity. This is a mistaken description or impression. The main purpose of the electrical linkage project between the two countries is to increase the operating flexibility of both networks and to make it possible to exchange electricity power when necessary, according to the circumstances of each country.

"Consequently, I would like to assure you that the subject of supplying water from Iraq has no connection with the subject of the electrical link. As an indication of that, agreement was reached on all of the first steps to implement the water project when the subject of the electrical link was still in the stage of technical studies. Finally, I would like to thank Prof Subhi Yasin, head of the delegation, and the members of the delegation for the positive spirit which prevailed during the talks of the last 2 days."

Subhi Yasin then replied with a speech in which he said: "This is indeed a happy occasion as we conclude the meetings of the subcommittee of the Supreme Ministerial Committee for Iraqi-Kuwaiti Cooperation in the Fields of Electricity and Water here in Kuwait. I want to praise the atmosphere of true brotherhood and fruitful, constructive cooperation which prevailed during the talks to complete all of the steps necessary to reach the protocol which we signed a short time ago. In my opinion, this indicates the existence of a true desire for joint cooperation in the constructive steps we are trying to achieve. It is my hope that in the near future we will proceed in earnest with activities to put the agreement into effect, so that the citizen in Kuwait will feel the fruits of efforts exerted to achieve Iraqi-Kuwaiti cooperation."

Yasin added: "I would like to thank the Kuwaiti Government and the officials of the Ministry of Electricity and Water for their kind reception and the welcome they extended us throughout our visit, which had made us feel that we are at home with our families.

"I would like to pursue what Zayd al-Fahd said about the electrical tie between the two countries. It is a separate subject and has no direct connection with the other subject, that is, supplying Kuwait with the necessary water. The main purpose of cooperation in the field of electrical



power is to increase cooperation and coordination between the two countries so that power can be exchanged between the two. The tie between Kuwait and Iraq will lead to fewer of the customary difficulties and to the possibility of economic savings for both sides, and it will facilitate programs to establish generating stations to take advantage of seasonal disparities and electrical loads. I will state that the proposed project to link Kuwait and Iraq is part of a complete, ambitious program linking all of the Arab countries.

Zayd al-Fahd later held a press conference at which he discussed the protocol. He said:

"At our last meeting we agreed on 200 million gallons of drinking water as a first stage, and at our present meeting we agreed on 100 million gallons of water for irrigation, for a total of 300 million gallons. From the cost standpoint, Kuwait will benefit from the water drawn from Iraq, and consequently we will bear the expense of this project. As for electricity, both countries will benefit, and Kuwait and Iraq will share expenses. Next week we will ask the consultants to conduct studies and prepare plans, after sending them to Iraq for study and approval by the officials there. They will participate with us in selecting the necessary consultants, who will choose the source and method for drawing the water from Iraq to insure the quality and continuity of the flow of water to Kuwait. The invitation will be extended to the consultants by the Ministry of Planning, after we have obtained Iraq's approval of the draft of the invitation.

"Actually, we feel that we are all set on the subject of water, and everything is almost completed. As for the exchange of electrical power, we are still at the stage of preliminary technical talks, and the committees responsible for that sector will meet in the first quarter of 1980. On water, we will maintain constant contact between officials in the two countries to complete the steps necessary and contact the consultants and agree on the studies to be undertaken by the consulting companies. Note that in our new talks in the past year and this year we have relied on the previous agreement concluded between the two countries, in 1974, which gave us 120 million gallons. In view of the development of consumption since that time, we increased the quantity to 300 million gallons of water as a first stage.

7587  
CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ANTIREGIME PUBLICATIONS--It has recently been noticed that secret publications which are being distributed against some Arab regimes have been increasing abroad and that the writings on the wall have also increased. A special statement about the recent incidents in Aleppo was distributed with the recent issue of AL-NADHIR, [The Herald] which is published by a group that calls itself al-Mujahidin fi Suriyah [The freedom fighters in Syria]. Libyan dissidents saturated London with the recent issue of AL-JIHAD [The Holy War]. AL-JIHAD is published by a group that calls itself al-Harakah al-Wataniyah al-Libiyyah [the National Libyan Movement]. This group has adopted as its motto the noble words of the prophet, "The best holy war is a word of truth spoken in the presence of a tyrant." The groups which oppose the Iraqi regime publish more than one bulletin; those bulletins appear in different forms. It has also been noticed that all these publications are similar in form and in style so that it appears that their source is one. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 16 Nov 79 p 12] 8592

CSO: 4802

AFGHANISTAN

AMIN COMMENTS ON BREZHNEV PROPOSAL

LD120050 Kabul Radio in English to Europe GMT 11 Nov 79 LD

[Text] Comrade Hafizollah Amin, general secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister, in an interview with BAKHTAR correspondent said:

The capitalist countries of Western Europe, in particular members of NATO, by accepting the peaceful proposals of the Soviet Union will safeguard their soil as a target of the atomic weapons forever. [sentence as heard]

Comrade Amin received for an interview the BAKHTAR correspondent in the people's house. In relation to the Soviet initiative about peace and security in Europe, BAKHTAR correspondent asked: Comrade Amin, as you know Comrade Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, in an interview with PRAVDA daily has made a new proposal about the installation of atomic weapons in Western Europe. May we know your views about the foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in this respect?

Answer: The creative initiative of Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, about the unilateral decision of the Soviet Union pertaining to the evacuation of 20,000 soldiers, 1,000 tanks and a great number of other military equipment from the German Democratic Republic is a hopeful step toward the establishment of peace in Europe and is an important step toward world disarmament which not only concerns Europe but also all the peace-loving and progressive people who will warmly welcome it and evaluate it as the best example of the Soviet desire for peace in the world.

Comrade Amin added: The statement of Comrade Brezhnev, made in his interview, is also the evidence of the Soviet Union's interest in peace, which provides the best possibility for the security of Western Europe.

It is a commitment of philanthropy that the countries with no U.S. and Western European atomic weapons will never be the target of the Soviet Union's atomic weapons. The great commander of the victorious sawr revolution said: I am sure that the people of Western Europe will realize the good will of the Soviet Union in this respect and draw the attention of their governments to take advantage of this great opportunity and, with confidence in the assurance and commitment of the Soviet Union in this regard, maintain the secure life of their countries against the attack of atomic weapons. It is also quite understandable that the (?greater) reduction of the weapons by the Soviet Union, provided that the Western countries do not permit the installation of atomic weapons in their countries, is a very important step and it confirms the Soviet interest (?for) peace. Now it is for the Western Europe capitalist countries, particularly members of NATO, to safeguard their countries from the attacks by atomic weapons by refusing to allow the installation of the atomic weapons in their countries (?en masse). If they are interested in the reduction (?of) nuclear and nonnuclear weapons in Europe they will welcome this commitment and philanthropic assurance of the Soviet Union. (?The NATO) should also [word indistinct] and show its good will for peace, well being and reduce their atomic weapons in Europe.

CSO: 4920

AFGHANISTAN

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE STUDYING CITIZENS' PROPOSALS

LD102118 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 10 Nov 79 LD

[Text] The committee for the draft constitution of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA], in its meeting today considered the views, demands and proposals of our noble and toiling compatriots in light of the slogan immunity, legality and justice. The views, demands and proposals of thousands of our sensitive and noble compatriots, which have been edited by the secretariat, were distributed to the committee's members and were investigated, in accordance with the DRA's executive committee decision dated 3 November 1979.

Our noble and toiling compatriots emphasize in their letters and proposals that the DRA committee for the draft constitution--in view of the Khalqi message of Comrade Amin dated 17 September 1979 and so that the Muslims and workers of Afghanistan may accomplish the slogan immunity, legality and justice--should draft a constitution which will prepare the grounds for the building of a progressive society, lacking the exploitation of man by man.

The letters of the compatriots, after being sorted and edited, were put at the discretion of the work committee so that the hundreds of proposals contained in them could be utilized in drafting and compiling the chapters of the DRA's constitution. Our noble compatriots' letters cover the following topics: freedom of the observance of religious ceremonies; proposals about equal rights of tribes and nationalities in Afghanistan; the accomplishment of the democratic rights of the citizens; equal rights for men and women; the enhancing of the standard of living of workers, peasants, officials and other toilers; the accomplishing of true training and education; and proposals about our people's social, economic, political and cultural aspects.

Our compatriots' letters and propositions are continuing to be sent to the committee for the draft constitution and are being patiently and carefully considered. In today's work committee meeting the new parts of the draft constitution, which were translated and distributed by the committee's secretariat, were also discussed and investigated. In the executive committee's meeting today, discussions were held on those topics and materials which were prepared by some members of the work committee concerning the compilation of various chapters of the draft constitution.

CSO: 4211

21

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

MINISTERS LEAVE FOR BULGARIA--At the invitation of the government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Public Health Minister Dr Saleh Mohammad Ziray and Communications Minister Zarif departed today for Sofia for a friendly visit of that country. Some members of the council of ministers, high-ranking officials from the ministries of public health and communications, the chief of protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the ambassadors of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria were at Kabul International Airport to bid them farewell. [Text] [GF100504 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 8 Nov 79 GF]

ECONOMIC COMMISSION MEETING--The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Economic Commission met yesterday under the chairmanship of Dr Shah Wali, deputy prime minister and foreign minister. The meeting lasted from 1630-2200. The participants thoroughly discussed the trade activities of government trading organizations and private trading enterprises. As a result, the Ministry of Commerce was instructed to further activate and regularize the trading activities of the country. Utmost attention should be paid so that the 1979 estimated plan can be put into action. Specific proposals in this respect should be prepared and submitted to next Monday's meeting. [Text] [LD152219 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 15 Nov 79 LD]

ANTI-KHOMEYNI ACTIVITIES--In Iran anti-Khomeyni forces continue their struggle in Khuzestan and Kordestan at a time when in Tehran itself thousands of unemployed people have held demonstrations in front of the offices of Iran's Labor Ministry. According to another report, those who were demonstrating were fired on by the Khomeyni supporters and as a result several people were killed. In Khuzestan patriots have extended anti-Khomeyni struggles and the situation is similarly confused in Kordestan. The occupation of the American Embassy and holding of hostages which include more than 40 Indian and Italian diplomats entered its 11th day today. Observers believe that the Khomeyni government has completely lost its standing in the international arena. [Text] [LD152113 Kabul Radio in Pashto to Europe 1730 GMT 13 Nov 79 LD]

ATTACKS ON JAPANESE TOURIST, OTHERS--Tokyo Nov 14 KYODO--A young Japanese tourist was attacked and robbed by antigovernment bandits in Afghanistan earlier this month, the Foreign Ministry revealed Wednesday. A report received from the Japanese consulate general in Karachi identified the traveler as Takeshi Terajima, 21, a resident of the town of Ryuo, Shiga Prefecture. Terajima entered Afghanistan by way of Iran on November 1, and took one of the five buses going to Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, at Kandahar, near the Pakistani border, on November 3. On the way to Kabul, the five buses were attacked by Islamic bandits, and all of the some 300 passengers were captured, in spite of resistance offered by about 10 soldiers who were aboard the buses to guard the passengers. The Afghan passengers were released next day, but about 40 Pakistani passengers, the soldiers and Terajima were marched into Pakistani territory across a desert region. According to the report, the bandits treated the captives harshly, and two Pakistanis were shot for "walking too slowly." Of the captives who arrived in Pakistani territory, Terajima alone was released on November 4, deprived of a camera and other personal effects. He then managed to arrive in Karachi, and reported the incident to the Japanese consulate general. Terajima had resigned from a building company in Ibaraki Prefecture this spring, and went on a three-month overseas trip in the middle of June. In Afghanistan, Islamic antigovernment bandits have been increasingly active in the mountainous regions. [Text] [OW141151 Tokyo KYODO in English 1135 GMT 14 Nov 79 OW]

RETURN OF COMMERCE MINISTER--(Mohammad) Hakim Maliyar, the deputy minister of commerce, who had gone to participate at the head of an Afghan delegation at the congress of the consumers' goods cooperatives in the Soviet Union, returned home yesterday. The deputy minister of commerce signed a protocol for technical, scientific and equipment assistance between the Central Union of Cooperatives of the Soviet Union and the Ministry of Commerce of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. [Text] [LD160446 Kabul Radio in English to Europe 1900 GMT 15 Nov 79 LD]

CSO: 4920

ALGERIA

ALGERIA UNDER BENDJEDID REPORTED ON

Changes After First Nine Months

Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 22 Oct 79 pp 43, 45, 47-48

[Article by Bachir Rezzoug: "The Nine Months of Chadli"]

[Text] It is 1980, and Algeria is beginning a new change. Nearly nine months ago Chadli mobilized political leaders and economic experts to review past development experience in detail. All records were open. A five-year plan sets new priorities and gives the social a key position. All in a new frame of mind.

Ten months; this was the modest and perilous period set by the Algerian leaders for emerging from an acute "social crisis," taking stock of a frenzied industrialization, drawing up a new hydrocarbons strategy, putting agriculture back in the saddle, and, finally, "reviving" a party that little by little is regaining its own. A huge program. A change of course, too.

But, for all that, socialist Algeria is not repudiating what it has done. It is a matter of rearranging, not of challenging. Chadli has therefore built his theory on a political reality (the country's basic choices), economic reality (two four-year plans and their effects) and social reality (greatly disrupted). At the point of departure for his thinking is the drama of the land and the "life sickness" of the great majority of the Algerians. One thing seems quite clear to the Algerian leaders: it is not easy to "bring along" those who are ill housed, sometimes ill fed, and who above all are bored. To "explore" Algeria, then, was to discover that it appeared to be an encoded enigma: how could a country that was enjoying good economic health overall, be sinking into a "social swamp?" This colossal vessel, then must be directed outside the dangerous waters of discontent toward which it was drifting. The cascade of events sweeping through the country in recent months gives meaning to what can already be perceived as a "change of style."

First, it is being acknowledged--and this is new--that all was not for the best in the best of Algerian socialist worlds. The tone has changed. "A solid



revolution is one that is not afraid of self-criticism, silence is the source of evil," the FLN coordinator, Mr Yahiaoui, stated recently. A Party that seems to be having a rebirth from its ashes and from which a few miracles are still expected. Mr Yahiaoui did not fail to state, "We are going through a decisive phase." Another member of the Political Bureau, Affane Djillali, let it be known that the next elections--party, communal assemblies and regional assemblies--were to take place at a "decisive turning point." He said, "In most cases the political authorities have not played their true role."

"Decisive phase," "historic turning point," "inadequacies" are words heavy with meaning that speak volumes for the Algerian leaders' intentions. Is this excessive language from those who are charged with "driving from the field" a political apparatus which gets credit for existing, but which was showing serious signs of fatigue? Or is it the resolutely offensive attitude of a political leadership that really intends to take the bull by the horns? We must lean toward the second hypothesis, and there is no lack of signs attesting to the fact that what is being played is very certainly one episode of a history that has been abruptly accelerated in the last ten months.

There are really two Algerian miracles. The first, as will be seen, is allied with a fine economic success. It is largely acknowledged. The second is stranger, more troubling. Despite the deficiencies that have come to light, the weariness, despite "disorders" of a different kind, despite the Algerians themselves, who have sometimes ended up by despairing, Algeria, the country of "social ills," is beginning to resurface.

Some have continued to be on the lookout for signs that might reveal the intentions of the present team. To work with whom and for what? Every succession begins with this double question. All the more so in the case of Algeria because after 17 years of independence it has become socially "complicated." And the political unity necessary to any undertaking involving rearranging and "restarting" requires that the most contradictory aspirations of different social strata (or classes) be satisfied: the modernist technocrats, carried away by an accelerated industrialization; the peasants, manhandled between a sky that is not very clement and a stifling bureaucracy; the bourgeois consumers, afflicted by a curious desire to take all the credit; the middle classes, afflicted with a frantic hunger; the freelance-religious in their thinking, who are dangerous because they are above suspicion, while they wanted to go smoothly from moral doctrine to political activism; and finally, the main body of the troops, the youth and the workers, attentive, organized, their eye on all the indicators.

In the face of that scene, which was not well suited to reviving the old virtues of "solidarity" or "unity," the Algerian leaders take credit for not giving a false impression of "unanimity." The reality is what it is, forged by 17 years of social changes. At one time one could stigmatize the sheeplike behavior of the Algerians, the "aid recipients," they said, without getting to the bottom of things, without denouncing its socio-economic origins. Some people wanted to mark that rearrangement with the ineffable need for moralism, fed, as was suspected, by the sources of religion. The temptation to take a virtuous tough line, as it were. They exalted, with no attention to order, the family, honor, hygiene, freedom, thinking ethics would be strengthened as

difficulties appeared. To let it be known, at last, perniciously, that those difficulties sprang directly from the country's political choices. Moreover, the difficulties often took on the appearance of a separate crisis that upset habits and drove people crazy. Everyone worried, looked for a way, and many obviously lent an ear to the slightest murmur. Talk consisted of well-being or the solution to the problems. Then, some were sure to mount their favorite battle horse, liberalization, which they said was "ineluctable, because this is an impasse."

It is futile to speak a lot of hot air; liberalism, as it is spoken of in Algiers or elsewhere, has never been deeply rooted in this country. But today one hardly lingers over all these ups and downs. One does not believe any longer in the hasty syntheses between religion and revolution, between ethics and religion. Separation of types is desired. Lovers of clarity, and they are many, will not complain. Everyone wants to get to the bottom of the problem: an exact diagnosis before 1980.

In truth, the whole political edifice rests on an economic expansion that must be maintained, but also controlled, and on as broad a consensus as possible. The established program has the merit--in addition to existing--of dedramatizing relations, since all the political, technical and administrative authorities have been called upon to establish the diagnosis. "But it would be a mistake," they say in Algiers, "to think this pause can last long, and to think that the expansion of recent years can be maintained if nothing is done to further that end." A member of the Political Bureau recently admitted, "The situation we find ourselves in is entirely our own responsibility." A discreet veil is then pulled over the past. And no one dreams any longer of throwing former sins at anyone's head. It is suspected in Algiers that the mechanics of the dissension would be in danger of fouling the enthusiasm so necessary to this "revival" undertaking.

Another phenomenon: there is no more competition for the economic or administrative "powers," no one has any illusions about that any more. Communal and regional assemblies, the National Assembly, grassroots organizations of the FLN, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau; the political edifice covered by an ideologic text, the National Charter, is finally in place, which really shows that the country's fate is in its people's hands. Or in the hands of those who best represent its people.

However, certain observations reveal a party (basic texts give it a first-rank position) much less monolithic than a certain political mythology claims. If we really look at them we see, for example, that many Algerians, even leaders, were manifesting a certain suspicion in this respect, a suspicion that has been gradually eased, during weeks that saw meetings of the Political Bureau or national commissions, true centers of reflection, opening the hottest files: economic, social, education, etc. That is the main thing, in the eyes of the Algerian leaders. And the directing team was really counting on using these nine months to inventory the needs, the means of satisfying them, to propose a schedule and objectives to be introduced gradually, to rough out a new way of producing and consuming, to learn and to relax, to be housed and to live. All this is a united effort to transform the economy and society.

Without, however, minimizing the social "bad humor" in certain cases, it may be stated that the great majority of Algerians are cautious about this policy of reordering affairs. Many of them, often in difficult straits, are openly pleased with the soft pedal applied to an economic policy which they found was beginning to cost them dearly. This attitude does not come from a sharply felt progress or a sudden "detente." It is dictated by the feeling that one is going to begin with the essentials. It is also in the name of this realism that the country is going to begin a significant change: the first Algerian Five Year Plan (1980-1984), after two Four Year Plans (1969-1977) and two years of "pause:" 1978-1979.

For nine months balance sheets, reports, analyses and proposals have been arriving in great numbers on the desk of the president of the Republic. They are rough. But they are not embarrassing. They emanate from interministerial committees put in place to study sector-based problems, from long meetings of special committees of the Political Bureau, tours of the terrain by the government members most concerned. Thus they take the measure of the "social" peril in overpopulated cities, they feel the pulse of rural areas deserted by the peasants, they minutely examine the sometimes extravagant figures of the industrialization, in short they are taking a bearing on everything and for everything. To be divided up in 1980. When one observes the evolution of the Algerian situation over the nine months just past, one sees above all that the directing team has never stopped occupying the terrain. The economic commissions have mobilized their experts. With an expiration date: an overall document is to be established between now and the end of the year, to be submitted at the third meeting of the Central Committee. It will also be discussed by the National Assembly.

Its broad outlines are known. It will first propose cyclical remedies, while offering a "global strategy." It aims at the long term, but in a different spirit. It also adds that to revive the country's economy, economic agents (everyone who works and produces) must believe in the ability of those who lead the country to establish well-being permanently. Better still, they are going to be partners in the most important discussions. The calendar is then going to shed at a swift pace the reports and riders that are accumulating as the debates go forward.

The reports advise a relaxation of the industrial investment policy. The development is considerable: in 1973 Algeria's imports amounted to 8,800,000,000 dinars\* and her exports to 7,400,000,000 dinars. In 1977, at the end of the second Four Year Plan, these figures were, respectively, 29,500,000,000 and 24,100,000,000 dinars. And the effort did not let up in 1978, even though it was a "planless" year: credits were increased 70 percent in the budget and imports reached 34,000,000,000 dinars. If this effort has not yielded all the expected results, it is because adjustments need to be made and industrial development needs to be better organized. It is this reflection on the validity and the rate of investment that will determine the new directions of the Five Year Plan. It will be necessary at the same time to make up for time lost from realization and to review the earlier plans. Here and there, too, are pointed out "phenomena that constitute genuine

\*One Algerian dinar equals 1.12 French francs.

dangers to economic liberation and development: three or four years' time lost from realization of projects, if not more, cost overruns, disruptions of all kinds." "The consequences are all the more serious," another document points out, "because the development policy was conceived in such a way as to form a link between sector-based activities and to assure the highest integration rate in each branch and sector." In fact, the Algerian development pattern gives absolute priority to the heavy industrial sector. Which was supposed to have driving effects on the economy as a whole. That choice is dictated by a guiding principle: economic independence. The investment process was to lead to putting in place industries that would furnish agriculture with the means to increase its production level. Which was not always the case. At the same time the development of the metallurgic and steel industries was to create an industrial tissue capable of emerging into production of consumer goods.

Another debate is often revived: the natural gas development program. The cost of this program, beside the fact that it is going to lead to increased indebtedness (a situation not at all alarming to Algeria, which continues to enjoy the confidence of the international financiers), risks leading Algeria to "structure" its economy on exportation of gas, to the disadvantage of the other sectors.

Chadli wanted an open, lucid and calm debate on this question. His Energy Minister, Nabi Belkacem, prepared a voluminous report in which he tries, among other things, to answer the question "Should we export more or apply a strategy of reserve?" "This source of revenue," it was then indicated, "should be developed according to the indicators most responsive to the national interest." A formidable bone of contention.

The industrial apparatus has often pitted a heavy inertia against the various stimulating measures recommended. The effects of that industrialization, which generated distortions, inequities, frustrations and waste, were more-over "poisoned" by one of the most detestable social environments. If the last Four Year Plan experienced significant delays in realization (1,800,000 dinars, 50 percent for industry and hydrocarbons), we are told we need not blame those who inspired it, but the nature of the evil that is gnawing away at the productive apparatus--disorder, complacency. Someone intervened in the blow-by-blow when the pressure was such that it became impossible to evade it, while making state aid a systematic means of bailing out firms in trouble. And there was no lack of appeal. Often, too, one got the wrong remedy. An economy is driven with two pedals, the brake and the accelerator. The "managers" of Algerian industry are often blamed for having, by means of facility and/or intoxicated by the overall success, briskly carried out projects that required greater moderation and greater calm.

All the reports are instructive in that regard. What comes out of them is that investment growth has clearly been faster than production growth. The nearly general use of sophisticated equipment has not always complied with efficiency criteria. Great size was often a goal in itself, for reasons of national economic strategy. Also, Algerian leaders are seeking to set up new, more modest, more competitive and more profitable entities, hence structural

reforms. This involves not only reviving the activity of the existing productive apparatus, but also transforming it. It will also be necessary to bring off a "skimming" of the industrial fabric and eliminate the "lame ducks."

The counterattack was swift and impressive. It was announced clearly: "To allocate resources in accordance with a better investment-consumption equilibrium." And, as a priority, strengthening the housing and agriculture sectors. The planner has foreseen for the next decade construction of 100,000 housing units per year. A significant share of the national income will be devoted to this. Also provided for is the "catching up" of the food industry by setting a dual objective: self-sufficiency and full employment. But the fact remains that agriculture is taking on a character of urgency. One is persuaded that if nothing is done in that direction the most energetic and daring measures taken otherwise will have little impact.

"We must make agriculture one of the essential priorities," President Chadli indicated recently. He also stated that "it was of primary importance to go ahead with a reevaluation of the existing structures." "It is important for us," Chadli added, "to better exploit oil and gas to protect the permanent wealth on which Algeria must depend for the present and the future--the land and its agricultural products." There, too, restructuring is in sight. The minister of Agriculture, Salim Saadi, for his part has perfected short-term measures to deal with those who are most squeezed, and also a long-term program.

For the third consecutive year Algeria has recorded a bad grain harvest, but it is acknowledged that this situation is imputable not only to weather conditions, but also to "technical weaknesses." The peasants, who are unjustly condemned for all the ills, have often called the heavens to witness, but their resentment also says it all. When spare parts were supplied after the agriculture seasons, the limited financial credits, the greedy marketing services--"The peasant feels alone," one or two of them recently declared to the minister who came to listen to them. More autonomy, then, for agricultural developments? Dismemberment of the large developments into several small production farms? If they were adopted these two measures would constitute the essential axis of the agricultural restructuring in progress. For now, a number of decisions have been taken: to set up regional nuclei that will represent the agricultural bodies as a whole; to support developments permanently and effectively; to assign technical staff to the field with precise instructions; to establish a rigorous work schedule; to extend rural housing to solve the problem of the distance and instability of the peasants.

"The peasants have deserted the land; the manpower is made up of women and children...the peasants have left for remunerative jobs in industry:" this was the cry of alarm, or at least the alert, sounded the other day by a "president" of an Oranie agricultural development. Will he be heard? This is one of those natural and implacable laws that escape the stranglehold. A frightening whirlwind, the size of which may be measured by some figures. Between 1958 and 1978 the Algerian population doubled, going from 9,000,000 to 18,000,000, and projections indicate that it will have doubled again in 25 years from now: 36,000,000 persons. However Algeria, with 2,389,741 square km,

has no lack of space. But although the average density is 7.32 inhabitants per square km, in the north, mainly around the cities, it reaches 300 and sometimes more. Children from 0 to 17 years represent 52.8 percent. Three million households have been counted, but Algeria is a "many family" country. More than half have more than six persons. The urbanization rate exceeds 40 percent and 7,000,000 "city dwellers" are packed together; the average is 7.20 persons per housing unit. Although on the other hand the active population is estimated at 4,000,000 "hands" (2,309,000 in the nonagricultural sectors), this represents only 23.2 percent of the total population. Thus it is very obvious that to contribute to the national production the country has available only a quarter of its population.

"Would Algeria be too heavy for its own people to carry?" researchers wonder. It is against this backdrop that pictures are very often superimposed. The first of them recall this surprising country's victories: recovery of the national wealth, courageous agrarian reform among others. The second arise in a muted and tenacious interrogation: for what effects on everyday life? Everyday life--this is what is most embarrassing to those who are attempting a serious and overall approach to Algeria. Exigence has often given way to impatience. Surprised and vaguely worried, Algerians have observed their country. And they saw their cities and their rural areas change over a period of months into a parade ground for a revolution that went on forever stirring up hopes and fears at the same time. And paradoxically, this "social crisis" situation that no one today dreams of either concealing or denying has never lit the powder keg. Because everyone felt the danger and no one had a miracle solution.

To deal the final blow the Algerian leaders of course chose the social battlefield. They could not maneuver on a better field. All the country's resentments were accumulated there. A policy conducted with gusto and on the attack. And now here again is Algeria in one of those feverish conditions, which is exciting or worrying and which reveals the finality of all the "readjustments" that are going to be performed--to make everyday life sweeter and more supportable. For although the tidying up is clearly perceived and appears to have got off to a good start, it is being prepared on a social terrain in motion. And the difficulties, because they have not been cooled, take weeks to resolve. The slightest rumor made a racket that confused desires, illusions and reality. The expected offensive is going to be supported by reality, and one never loses sight of the fact that discontent over the crisis in "daily life" has increased. One is on the one hand persuaded that the Algerians will not accept for very long living in both austerity and inequality. An inequality that has itself experienced a "growth." After 12 years of considerable investment that for all that is not keeping Algeria from "food blackmail," if one takes into account the foreign exchange structure, has the time not come to begin to get back on its feet again?

That is what is clearly emerging today. A new level is being reached. Not an abrupt turn backwards, but a better equilibrium between several requirements: to maintain development while correcting the firing. All while determining whether months of "social tension" have not too seriously weakened Algerians' energy. That tension, increased by the production deficit, has been at the

gates for several years. It has reached its culminating point in the last few months. In an ambience of pleasant shambles everyone regained a keen sense of scheming and swindling. In a decomposing social universe.

To guarantee effectiveness for everything that was going to be undertaken, no one forgot to trigger the psychological mechanism necessary to any enterprise of this kind. The Algerian leaders made their choice: debate, where it is possible and necessary to do so, all the questions that engage the country for the coming decade; confront points of view, even the most divergent; examine the arguments closely, even when they involve questions as fundamental as hydrocarbons; and "unite" the workers in a genuine political pact.

That is what the future will be made of. Chadli, who has been at the head of the country for nine months, could--at the same time that he announced his economic and social program--snatch from the void a whole epoch, trembling with life, that one might have believed buried forever in the folds of history: November 1954. For all its meaning is still to be given back to the most devalued--wrongly devalued--of words: political commitment.

#### Profile of Chadli Bendjedid

Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 22 Oct 79 p 44

[Article by Roland Malet: "Loyalty and Light"]

"To govern is to see clearly, in order to give oneself the means to direct progress." That could be the motto of Chadli Bendjedid, the third president of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. He was elected to that office last 7 February. From that date to the 25th anniversary next 1 November of the start of the war of liberation, just 260 days, less than nine months, have gone by. In this short time the new chief of state has already succeeded in making his mark on Algerian policy. Careful as he is to be watchful of continuity in taking over the legacy left by Houari Boumediene, he has nevertheless assumed a different image.

Manifestly, Chadli Bendjedid intends to do nothing uncertainly or equivocally. First, no one will be in a position to reproach him one day for having sought power because of personal ambition. At the end of last January the fourth congress of the National Liberation Front (FLN) was on the lookout for the candidate most likely to conduct the country's policy in the path drawn by the revolution, even while protecting and consolidating national unity.

That is when the congress dared to turn to the commander of the second military region, Oran. Chadli Bendjedid enjoys great esteem in the whole army and among Party authorities. Born on 14 April 1929 in Bouteldja, he is nearing 50. Since his adolescence, in a confused political world where, under the influence of the ideology and machinations of the colonial apparatus, partisans of "assimilation" take pride of place, he shows no sign of doubt: to take its fate in its own hands, his people has no other choice but to fight for its independence. In any case, that is the objective he argues for.

Chadli does not decline the very high responsibility it is proposed that he assume. He does not ask for them, but neither does he turn them down. But, if the choice of the 3,290 people who attend the congress falls upon his person, he intends that no ambiguity shall mar the mandate that will be entrusted in him.

He has given constant proof that he is a man of his word, and a loyal man. Since 19 June 1965 he has been a member of the Council of the Revolution. He stood without flinching beside President Boumediene for 13 years. But he is also regarded as an organizer. In the military region he commanded, he ran public affairs with talent, he expressed valuable ideas on reconverting and modernizing the army. He also, according to those who knew him then, knew how to judge the competence and moral quality of men.

When on 31 January 1979 the congress elected him secretary general of the FLN and made him the single candidate for the presidency of the Republic, Chadli Bendjedid publicly laid his cards on the table. He will remain loyal to socialism, his people's option; he will apply the National Charter in the spirit and the letter; he will ensure independence without accepting "any pressure or bargaining with regard to the principles we believe in;" he will see to it that we confirm "our authenticity,...our membership in the Arab Muslim world and our openness to the world that surrounds us." So much for continuity.

But Chadli Bendjedid also states that he is resolved to reorganize all the political, economic and social structures. That is the only way the Algerian revolution will be assured of accomplishing progress, of putting down deeper roots in the country and of setting itself up as a solid citadel. He openly exposes his intentions, so everyone will know where he stands. He spreads everything out for everyone to see.

As for him, the "cornerstone" of the revolution fits into the "choice of men." He has put this plan into operation: integrity, competence, devotion to the people's cause are from now on the principal criteria for recruiting militants and cadres for the Party, for recruiting leaders for policy and the economy. Precisely, economic and financial independence is one of the principal foundations of "an independence that is not devoid of meaning." A series of watchwords follows from that: to draw up the inventory of the production apparatus; to establish the balance sheet of financial management; to revise the structures and the direction of certain branches of the industrial sector in order to provide better profitability; to improve the distribution channels and put agricultural development at the top of the list of priorities. To reach these objectives many measures have been taken that have disturbed routine and comfort. But it was also advisable to improve the cities, to preach to the citizens concerning their conduct, to fight corruption, without faltering. In a few weeks a thousand sentences were pronounced in the city of Algiers alone.

Thus, the Algerians are gathering their energies, developing new capacities, deploying forces atrophied by an organization that left something to be desired. Chadli Bendjedid is doing a good job at the helm at the risk of setting against himself the united interests of a national bourgeoisie that had really dug its hole in the revolution, and was busy for years furiously conducting economic development. A new stage has begun for Algeria.

8646  
CSO: 4400



ALGERIA

GOVERNMENT REPORTED TO BE RETHINKING HYDROCARBONS POLICY

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 12 Nov 79 pp 4, 5

[Text] A number of straws in the wind indicate that Algeria is rethinking its policy of mortgaging a major portion of its oil revenues to develop its natural gas resources. The policy, known as Valhyd (valorisation des hydrocarbures--development of hydrocarbons) was drawn up in 1976 with the assistance of American experts. It envisages expenditure of \$33.4 billion between now and the year 2005 to earn gross revenues of some \$222 billion at current prices. With oil exports likely to cease around 1995, Algeria has been staking its future on gas, with strong emphasis on LNG.

One indication of a forthcoming switch in policy was given last week by the Dutch Economics Ministry in a confidential report to Parliament which was leaked to the press. It said Sonatrach, the Algerian state oil and gas company, would prefer to make future deliveries of gas by pipeline across the Mediterranean because of the high cost of building as liquefaction plants. The Netherlands is currently building an LNG terminal at Eemshaven and extending port facilities there to process 80 billion cubic metres a year of Algerian LNG: Dutch and West German gas companies agreed last March, to buy the gas and Gasunie, which distributes gas in the Netherlands, said last week that it expected Sonatrach to honour its 20-year contract with them. Deliveries are due to begin in 1983.

The Dutch report said delivery by pipeline was likely to be written into future sales contracts and that Algeria was "reconsidering" its hydrocarbons investment policy. Reports from Algeria indicate that Sonatrach's heavy borrowing was acting as a brake upon the ability of other sectors of the economy to negotiate development loans. Sonatrach, meanwhile, is undergoing a reorganisation, which is expected to lead to the creation of a separate oil refining and distribution company.

These developments stem from the new look at Algeria being undertaken by President Chadli Bendjedid. The changes he is making are not revolutionary in themselves, but the shift in emphasis is nonetheless clearly visible. In his first official interview since he took over the Presidency following the death of Houari Boumedienne in February, President Bendjedid listed

his priorities. "Must one deduce that we are going to slow down growth in certain sectors or even neglect them in favour of other forms of activity? Are we, to speak in specific terms, going to sacrifice industry? This hypothesis does not conform with the truth," he told French correspondent Daniel Junqua.

"Our strategy and our plans for industry remain unchanged. But greater means will be allocated to other sectors. This is especially true for agriculture, water resources and housing. Education and vocational training will also continue to enjoy the priority that has been given to them for a long time," President Bendjedid declared.

"We are going to concentrate on developing agriculture and water resources because oil does not represent the future for Algeria. After a while, we will not have it any longer. We must learn to distinguish between permanent riches and those which are not renewable. Oil, a temporary resource, must serve to develop productive equipment for industry and agriculture. That is what we ought to bequeath to future generations. As far as this is possible, they should be able to feed themselves from our own land. These are the broad lines for debate at the next meeting of the Central Committee," the Algerian leader stated.

CSO: 4420

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

ALGERIANS VERSUS ROMANIANS--Algeria has just complained to Moscow about what it calls "Romanian duplicity." According to Algeria, Romania is secretly arming those opposed to Algeria's policies in the Maghreb. They are said to be supplying military materiel of Soviet origin to the Moroccans in large quantities, including portable missiles and light weapons. This materiel is said to be passing through Egypt. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 26 Nov 79 p 59]

CSO: 4400

EGYPT

PROSECUTION CASE AGAINST COMMUNISTS CONTINUES

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 23 Oct 79 p 8

[Article: "The Government's Case Against the Communists"]

[Text] The Supreme State Security Court yesterday continued to hear the attorney general's case against 176 defendants implicated in the largest communist conspiracy. Mr Yusif Darraz, chief attorney of the Supreme State Security Office presented new evidence pointing to the defendants' guilt. He said that the Egyptian people refuse to follow the political system of any foreign government, and are opposed to any imported political philosophy that is foreign to Egyptian thinking, such as the one espoused by the defendants. He added that the defendants had attempted to popularize communism and the communist system of government. He said further that prosecution witnesses, internal security intelligence reports, tape recordings, photographs and emblems found in the possession of the defendants will confirm that the accused were well organized and united under one leadership in the commission of their suspicious activities. The chief prosecutor described the Egyptian people as proud of their traditions and values, having been the first to believe in the existence of a divine power, to accept the idea of a single God, to reject atheism, and to be the recipients of a divine message which is the basis of their faith to this day. He added that the communist philosophy espoused by the defendants was an affront to Egypt's religious heritage. He described the communist system as being socially and economically at odds with Egypt's heritage, and castigated it as dictatorial government. Mr Darraz then presented specific evidence against 84 of the defendants.

The crimes attributed to the defendants include: creating an Egyptian communist organization, whose principal aim is the forceful overthrow of Egypt's economic, political and social system, and popularizing communist thought as evidenced by possession of pro-communist pamphlets and other printed matter.

Some of the defendants were accused of encouraging, cooperating with, offering financial support to, sheltering and aiding the communists to evade the authorities.

There is much objective evidence to substantiate the charges. Egyptian security agencies have been gathering information on the communist activity for 2 months prior to the actual incidents. The communists exploited every opportunity to instigate the public against the government. One example was the 25 November 1976 demonstration by university students, which was led by some of the defendants to spread communist ideas. The defendants were also responsible for spreading a variety of communist wall posters and pamphlets directed mainly at the working class. The inflammatory propaganda was intended to foment disorder and ultimately lead to a violent overthrow of the government. The defendants were charged with having instigated the January 1977 incidents. They reportedly encouraged the crowds to demonstrate, resist authority, and create anarchy. Many of the defendants were in possession of secret publications calling for revolution. Information gathered by the security agencies was corroborated by eyewitnesses.

The incidents were similar in many respects: the manner in which the crowds were aroused and directed against particular government policies, the banners and signs carried by the demonstrators, the slogans employed to fan anger, etc., suggest that the disturbances were centrally led and organized. The prosecutor placed in evidence before the court a large number of pamphlets calling for rebellion.

Prosecution witnesses also corroborated the charges. Their testimony left no doubt that the defendants did belong to the secret organization, that they were bent on fomenting revolution and that their ultimate goal was the violent overthrow of the government.

The testimony shows that the communists had planned a series of demonstrations and other disturbances to coincide with the government's announcement of new economic policies in November 1976. The communists' aim was to strike against the country's constitutional institutions and overthrow the existing government. The court today will continue to hear the prosecutor's case.

The trial proceedings were presided over by Justice Hakim Munir Salib with Justices 'Ali 'Abd al-Hakam and Ahmad Bakkar serving as members. Present at the proceedings were Chief Prosecutor Yusif Darraz, assisted by Ibrahim al-Hunaydi and Mohsin Mabruk. Acting as secretaries were Ahmad Muhammad Ramadan and Ramadan Nassar.

9063  
CSO: 4802

EGYPT

BRIEFS

NPUG PARTY MEMBERS ARRESTED--The al-Duqqi district attorney ordered the arrest of four NPUG party members on a charge of distributing inflammatory pamphlets. All four are candidates for election to the al-Duggi municipal council. They are: Muhammad Sayyid 'Ali, 'Omran Ahmad 'Omran, Muhammad 'Abd al-Mun'im Khalil, and Nadir al-'Annani. All four are members of the NPUG party. They were arrested by internal security officers, and charged with distributing inflammatory publications. Mr Yusif 'Abd al-Halim, al-Duggi district attorney, ordered that they be jailed without bail until their case is turned over to the Supreme State Security Court. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 30 Oct 79 p 12] 9063

CSO: 4802

IRAN

ATTACK ON EMBASSY SEEN AS BLOW AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 6 Nov 79 p 5

[Text] The clear and anti-imperialist policy of Iran's revolution, is once again sparked by occupying the United States' espionage nest. Therefore, the policy which was about to weaken after the 21 and 22 Bahman [10, 11 February] last year or at least was losing its color once again became a revolutionary topic and from the beginning, the revolution moved by identifying the main enemy, that is; the United States. Nothing could have stopped the motor of motivating the revolution which derived its power from several decades of the United States and imperialism in Iran. It was for this reason that [the revolution] achieved victory sooner than it had been expected, despite the conspiracies and plots made by imperialism which are still continued.

We owe all this to the Imam. We owe it to the Imam's direct and clear policy which from the years of his exile in Turkey, Iraq and then his departure to Paris and his return to his nation and up to this day and forever, everywhere and in any statement, he has introduced imperialism, and especially the United States, as the main enemy of the Iranian nation and our revolution. From the days that Khomeyni directly addressed the shah saying, "you have submitted the documentation of the nation's slavery to the parliament and brought down the value of the highest position in the country lower than an American cook." To the statements that he made in Tofel Chateau in presence of reporters in order that the world would hear his words, the reporters broadcast that the "ayatollah has refused the request of Jimmy Carter, the President of the United States for peace," pointing out that the superpowers should avoid interfering in Iran's internal affairs. Ayatollah Khomeyni said: It is not up to Carter to determine if Bakhtiar's government is legal or illegal. In an interview held by "Monday Morning" Khomeyni said: "The President of the United States is considered one of the enemies of Iran for his continued unconditional support for the shah of Iran and for insulting the Iranian nation."

After his return to his nation on the 12 Bahman [1 February] last year, he announced clearly in Behsht-e Zahra cemetery to millions of eager people:

"As long as we are alive, we will not allow America to swallow our possessions." The Imam has repeatedly emphasized that the United States is the head of the international world eaters. This statement which will remain forever is now the slogan of the students--followers of the Imam's policy--who have occupied the U.S. Embassy. "All the problems of the East are caused by foreigners, from this West, from the United States. All of the problems of the Moslems are caused by the United States. It is the United States that has strengthened Zionism in such a way that they kill our brothers in groups."

And we see that the Imam's irreconcilable position toward imperialism, especially the United States, has become tougher every day.

And then by looking deeply into the roots of Iran's revolution and the people's movements we feel the presence of imperialism and U.S. mercenaries in the roots and veins of our life. We see that for several decades we have been swallowed gradually by imperialism. We see that with the help of the government it had set up and its domestic and foreign mercenaries, and with the help of its greatest element in the Middle East, that is, the deposed shah, the United States has made us so dependent on it and metamorphosed and destroyed everything so that we could not stand on our own feet for even a few days. In order to cut off the tongue of the opposers and fill the mouth of the truthful with lead and gunpowder, the damned SAVAK was set up, with the help of the CIA, after the people's life. Suffocation and killings reached a point that brought the nation's anger to an explosive point. The flood of revolution crushed the shore and the strongest and the best equipped military forces could not control it.

Iran's poor people have known their main enemy and have moved by knowing who their enemy is. It is in repayment for years that it has struck a blow on the arms of imperialism in Iran whenever it has been able to do so and it has tried to cut off some parts of this cancerous tumor which is growing rapidly. We see that during the first days of the revolution, with the slogans of "Death to America," "Death to Imperialism" and "Yankee Go Home" written on the doors and walls of the city and villages, anti-imperialism slogans. So many times the U.S. Embassy--the base of American CIA conspiracies--was attacked and even a part of its building was set on fire and there had been involvements with American guards at the embassy. Most of the Americans who had seen the nation's anger and knew that there was no place for them in this country packed and left. Some of them even fled. The American employees of most organizations were discharged by Iranian employees. The nation's complete unity blocked the way for any conspiracy that America was preparing to deflect the course of the revolution. And, until victory the revolution moved in its main direction.

For this reason, when the shah left the country the people went to the streets with slogans such as "The final victory is to send out the Americans." "This American shah should be executed by the nation's court," "After the shah, it is America's turn," "American mercenaries should be



fired." After that, in every demonstration and parade, gathering, and in short, at every opportunity, the conspiracies and plots of American mercenaries were condemned and anti-imperialist slogans were given. The slogans say: "The Revolution Is Victorious," "Death to Zionism," "America and Israel are our bloodthirsty enemies," "Palestine, our brother and our friend."

Finally, several million anti-American people marched in Tehran and throughout the country. Because imperialist conspiracies against Iran's Islamic revolution still continues and America who apparently talks of friendship with Iran, has admitted the nation's biggest enemy, who for years had sucked the nation's blood, to their soil. Therefore, the United States has insulted the Iranian nation in the worst way. For this reason, anti-America demonstrations with the participation of millions of people will be held throughout the country. In Tehran, demonstrations were supposed to end in front of the U.S. Embassy where the resolution would be read. However, Shush Circle will be the destination and anti-American slogans will be exploded in the air like bombs.

Finally with the Emam's guidance and advice the U.S. Embassy whose doors were closed to Iranians for years--this nest of corruption, espionage, imperialist conspiracies against the Iranian nation and their bloody revolution--was occupied by Moslem students who follow the Emam's policy. The American employees except the charge'd'affaires who was out of the embassy, were held hostage by students. Many documents on conspiracy against Iran's revolution were found. Most of these documents were destroyed by embassy employees.

In this way the revolution once again returned to its main direction. The big enemy who was going to hide itself was pulled out of its nest. The nation, united, supported this brave and revolutionary action. Because if the strokes are not continuous and effective the enemy would not collapse. However, imperialism should know that the more it struggles in the nation's whirlpool of anger, the closer it will get to death.

9044  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

SHARI'ATMADARI REITERATES DEMAND FOR RETURN OF SHAH

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 13 Nov 79 p 2

/Interview with Ayatollah Shari'atmadari: "Whenever America Gives in to the Law, the Matter Will Be Resolved"/

/Excerpts/ Eric Rouleau, LE MONDE's well known reporter and political commentator, held an interview, along with the Washington POST correspondent, with Ayatollaholozma Shari'atmadari whose text is as follows:

Question: What is your eminence's view on the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran and the taking of workers and employees in this embassy hostage?

Answer: For many years, our people have sustained great pressure and misery from international imperialism, and today they feel great edginess toward imperialists. Our people's general belief is that America, throughout the history of its relations with Iran, has always helped the governments of Iran and that it was among the obstinate defenders of the corrupt, tyrannical regime in Iran in the past 30 years. This extensive, unstinting American support of the previous regime, and its support and reinforcement of his acts, occurred mostly at a time when America considered itself to be the greatest protector of human rights protested on the surface about any corner of the world where there were excesses and transgressions. However, in spite of the full knowledge and certitude it had of the innumerable transgressions and persecutions which occurred in this country in this era, it still protected the first and second Pahlavi, and, what is even stranger, Mr. Carter himself, at the time when he was engaged in the elections for the presidency, engaged in holding meetings and speeches in the various states of America, one day protested to Ford, America's former president, in a television interview or in fact television debate, "You are protecting four corrupt, inhuman countries in the world, and one of them is the corrupt, despotic government of Iran." Mr Carter did not accept any response Ford gave in this regard, but we have seen that once he himself was elected president, he protected the deposed Shah more than Ford did, and this is why our people today are well aware what the international

imperialists have done and are well aware that America has never paid heed to the oppressed, despotically ruled people of Iran but have always supported corrupt governments and backed corrupt regimes.

Question: What you have said is completely correct, and there is no doubt about it, but you have not answered the question on whether occupation of the American embassy in Tehran is a proper act.

Answer: First, this action was not taken by the Iranian government. Rather, a number of students carried it out and the government has supported them. Second, four diplomats from the Syrian, Algerian, Swedish and French embassies are to go to the American embassy, by the invitation of the students, to see the condition of the hostages, to see that they have not been harmed or bothered, and to see that their being hostages in their own embassy, unharmed and undisturbed, has only a political meaning. Third, if you say that this action is unlawful, this is nothing in comparison with the illegal acts against our people in the course of the past 30 years which the American government has considered lawful.

Question: In your eminence's view, is this action proper from the religious standpoint?

Answer: This action has a political more than a religious aspect but from the standpoint of Islam I must say that the provisions of Islam are linked and connected to one another and that one cannot examine and judge an Islamic act in isolation without taking its connection with other Islamic provisions and commands into consideration.

Islam is a complete system and structure and one must examine and respond to this matter in connection with other Islamic provisions, commands and laws, because the matter is interconnected. This act is a political process and one must seek its manifestation in its causative elements and factors.

Question: At the present time Iran is engaged in a test of strength with the biggest world power. In your opinion how may this matter be resolved?

Answer: We are not making war with America but we have a series of demands which are not only not outside the limits of the commands and laws of Islam but also conform with international laws and rights. Whenever America yields in the face of logic and the law, the matter will be resolved. Furthermore, to yield before right and to sanction reality never diminishes a person and is not proof of failure--rather, it is proof of humanity, greatness and magnanimity of spirit, and on the other hand imparts greater confidence and character. After the resolution of this matter, America will certainly be given consideration by Iran in the same measure as it respects the independence of Iran and is disposed to establish good relations.

Question: The situation which has come about at the present time has turned the American people against Iran.

Answer: We have no differences or quarrels with the people of America-- rather, our criticisms and differences are with the American government because of its previous acts in Iran.

Question: Excellence, you have often stated in your interviews that Islamic provisions have not yet been put into practice in Iran, whereas the people outside Iran believe that an Islamic system has.

Answer: Of course the governmental system in Iran is an Islamic republic and, in this system, conduct and action must be totally Islamic. Unfortunately, so far /only/ a small percentage of Islam has been implemented; most of the commands and provisions of Islam have not yet been implemented.

Now our situation is such that a building has been destroyed and a new building has not yet been built on top of it, and we are situated on the ruins of the past, while there are numerous problems and inadequacies and power is in the hands of numerous groups. We do not have a powerful, strong government which can dominate conditions and oversee the construction of Iran in the precise context of the laws of Islam. All right, all this is because of the transitional stage and God willing it will gradually be rectified. Moreover, when the French revolution occurred did the condition of the French nation quickly improve and were affairs rapidly set in order?

Question: When do you think affairs will be set in order?

Answer: When a powerful Islamic government comes to power reforms will be possible and affairs will fall into order. The meaning of reform is that all affairs must fall into the channel of social justice, but I do not know when such a government will come to power--I just can give an example for you in this sphere, namely that when Iran came under the occupation of three foreign governments, the question was raised in a newspaper as to when Iran's situation would be rectified, and the answer was "When the occupation is over." The question was then asked "when will the occupation be over" and the answer was "When Iran's situation is rectified."

Question: In the course of the past 18 months, I have visited your eminence several times and this is the first time I see you in despair.

Answer: We are not in despair; with the grace of God, the problems will be solved. Of course, there have been problems following the revolution and I hope we will soon emerge from them.

Question: You know that more than two thirds of the constitution has been rectified; in your eminence's view, are there no contradictions or inconsistencies in that?

Answer: People are still engaged in the investigation and it has not been completely ratified so that one can judge it; however, of course, if there are inconsistencies and contradictions, they must be corrected.

11887  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

GOVERNOR WARNS OF INTERNAL COUNTERREVOLUTION

Tehran KAYHAN in Persian 16 Oct 79 p 11

[Text] Kermanshah--Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Hosseyn Kermani, Eman Khomeyni's representative in the west, accompanied by Ahmad Sepehri-Pur, governor of Kermanshah, regional chief of Qasr-e Shirin and other officials met with thousands of people from Qasr-e Shirin in the Mehdiéh mosque. At this gathering Sheykh Mohammad Aziz Hosseyn declared on behalf of the people of Qasr-e Shirin the adherence of the people to the Islamic republic. According to the PARS NEWS AGENCY, a group of youths entered the mosque and shouted the slogan "show ceremonies must go, announce the wages of the underprivileged." One of them enumerated the needs of the people of Qasr-e Shirin.

The governor of Kermanshah said in this regard: "The problems you have stated are out of hundreds that are not expressed. By forming a city council and development staff we can, going hand-in-hand, remove these difficulties. In commenting on the Islamic revolution and the efforts of counterrevolutionaries and foreign and domestic plotters he said: they want to take the weapon of unity from us and by sowing enmity and discord make differences between religious and political groups. We might think that they threaten us from over the border but I must say that this sowing of discord is from within the country like termites eating at the foundations of our unity."

The governor asked that the people tell him their needs so that they could be met.

Hojjatoleslam Kermani, representative of Eman Khomeyni in the west, remarked on the need for unity and said, the revolution is a model home which is easy to spoil. Living in it is difficult and to live in it we must have plans and cooperation to meet our needs.

He added: "Our Islamic revolution astonished the world because we threw out 50,000 American workers and all other foreign workers. We asked for liberty and we must protect it because our revolution is a revolution of the underprivileged of the world. The land grabbers who see us liberate

the underprivileged of the world are determined to smash our revolution. You people, and especially the tribes, must not be deceived by this intrigue."

According to a report from PARS NEWS AGENCY the Imam's representative with the governor, commanders of district gendarmerie units of Kermanshah, commanders of gendarmerie regiments and border guards of Qasr-e Shirin, the district governors of Sarpol Zahab in Bazmirabad located in the mountainous area, and Suq al-Jayshi, assembled in the presence of thousands of Qolkhani tribesmen. The tribesmen proclaimed their adherence to the Islamic Republic. Bahram Soltan Asperi, head of the Qolkhani, announced seven requests of the tribe. These requests relate to tranquillity of the tribe, aid to agriculture and animal husbandry, improving health facilities and the number of doctors, building schools, removal of weapons and compensation for those taken from the tribe and building roads throughout rural areas. It was said that these requests would be presented to Eman Khomeyni by Seyyed Naseldin Hosseyni leader of the Ahl-e-Haq mosque.

The governor of Kermanshah said to the tribe: "We are in a state of war and you must be patient until, God willing, security will be restored and your requests can be met and some of the tribe who have left the border area can return." The Imam's representative also said to the tribesmen: "The Imam has assured that anyone who has repented his past sins and has taken the road of defending the revolution and the land will be forgiven and will have mercy. You must also guard the Iranian border and be friends with your brothers of the army, gendarmerie and guards."

The Imam's representative with his companions then went by helicopter to the area of Gardeh No. There Mohammad Khonsari, district governor of Sarpol Zahab said that the tribesmen of the area had assembled to announce their adherence to the Islamic revolution. Clergymen of the area also spoke. The Imam's spokesman praised their feelings and said: "We expect you to defend the western area of the country because officer Shirazi or guard Isfahani cannot defend the area." The Imam's representative, the governor of Kermanshah and officials of the area went to the mosque at Sarpol Zahab. The governor said in the mosque: "We have reached this conclusion in our journey, that in spite of the suffering of the people and tribes of the area, they must defend the area by their own efforts."

Hojjatoleslam Kermani commented in regard to the programs of the fallen regime that they did not know the social maturity of our people and said: "They made their plans behind closed doors and gave away oil and gas and bought weapons and gave nothing to the people." He asked the people to compare the unity of word and deed with neighboring countries. Hojjatoleslam Kermani, the governor, and his companions inspected the Abuzar 3rd armored brigade of Sarpol Zahab.

9448  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

KHOMAYNI'S SON STATES VIEWS ON GOVERNMENT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni, son of the Emam, explained his views at a radio television press conference on various problems, such as the authority of Islamic jurists and the council of experts.

He recognized the importance to Islam and religion of the religious jurists as they affect a number of other problems, political, educational, social, military, economic and so forth. He said: "If a person supposes that he is an expert in political problems, that is, in the traffic of judgments and orders, and on the subject of Islamic police and does not have specialization in other studies, he has no right to interfere in those affairs in which others have specialized. The opposite is also true that 'analysis' in holy writ is by those people said to be 'analysts' but they are only imitation 'analysts.'"

Khomeyni said during an explanation of various specializations and degrees of religious commentary: "An Islamic jurist can only say in regard to military problems that if America or another pagan country attacks Iran it would be necessary that in all confines of the Islamic nation that moslems appear to be armed (it is possible there would be no arms). We would give the enemy leave, come on, so that we could better get at them. If there are weapons we would have to defend ourselves and those that are killed would merit the title of martyr.

"But in choice of weapons and method of defense for the good of the people the jurist is all one with a grocer. A military man or a politician would want to look into this jurist or that problem. The jurist would say that military men and politicians must not be traitors, is Nasseris a traitor or not, is Hoveyda a traitor or not. Experts know this. This is not related to jurists. That the jurist himself may know still has no relation to the interpretation itself. The jurist, based on the laws of God, must choose the most expert people and religious people because they can better suffer for other moslems. If other than this is done, guardianship will fail and the people rebel. One of the best politicians is picked for political problems. One of the best social scientists is picked for social problems

and so forth. The condition for leading this assembly, which has in its hands the governing of the nation, would be a person who would cast aside any member of the assembly who turned traitorous and American. This is another problem that is not difficult. Being American and doing its treachery is also not for the jurist but for those experts, specialists and the millions of others who understand, to ask, is this treason or not? The jurist only says treason must not be. Americanism must not be. If the leader of this assembly would be a person who is a real leader would it not be better if a condition pertained such as I will explain. Would it be better for this person to run the nation or have it done in the same old intolerant way? Was the shah only removed to have his place taken by a president? The same prime minister's palace, the same mechanism, the same show of operating ministries, the same old cliques in the midst of the Islamic Republic and ruled by every American dollar? We want a consultative nation and an Islamic jurist whose qualifications God has determined to head it. What are American dollars? If this jurist lies then his stewardship will be taken from him. When his stewardship is taken away he will acknowledge his own deviation. We do not want a jurist otherwise. Another jurist who is not a liar could come to replace him but if he also lies he too would be put aside. If you do not do this, then what fundamental difference have you made? Economic rule as before, military government also as before, all the military as before so that we are eternally under the shahinshah. Until yesterday the shah's chief of police held sway, today the chief of police of the Islamic Republic holds sway. Two other things should be said, one about the guards and the other about the committee. Father, people have become sinful recently. You must make a change.

"The best specialist from Islamic jurists must be appointed. The best jurist is not for his own appointment but would accept it. The jurist does not put himself in and does not elect himself because he is not an expert. After appointing experts one of them will emerge as the jurist and will accept it if he is the most expert.

And what should we do afterward to determine if this is the best expert or not? This is also not the concern of the jurist either because we must ask experts in all fields. I said this is not the job of the jurist, but the job of the experts. A jurist says only that the most expert in political affairs be found, not that he be Hosseyn or Hassan. This is not the job of the jurist. The jurist is one among the rest of the people in that situation and it is up to the experts. They must sit down and select the best of them and give them leadership in economic, social, educational and military problems and put the entire job in their hands. The jurist has no right to select anyone else. A good jurist has no right to select anyone but the best, most expert and responsible people in all fields. This is better than an American lackey who is not responsible to God. Now you want to hear the name of the president or the prime minister. This does not matter. It is true that if we keep the same system that now exists and do not change it, a division of power will emerge. That is if we have no assembly things will remain as at present. But in the



same way, the authority of the jurist will emerge and that of the prime minister and president will be nullified. Why? Because a jurist cannot be chosen except from the purest people. If he is not, his stewardship will be taken away.

"Now the president. If the best people are to be selected it is in the way that the jurist has. The jurist did not select himself, the experts selected him. If they also do not choose the best man, the most expert and responsible man, it is the right of the jurist to nullify it. Another problem is the right of jurist in subjects that the people have not settled. If I have settled that this subject about which the jurist speaks is an offense, for example, Mirzai Shirazi has forbidden tobacco, and I have settled that this opinion is void, then the jurist has the right to settle it. The authority of the jurist is in regard to subjects that common people and experts have not settled. If the experts in the leadership decide that an opinion of the jurist is not correct then it is the right of the jurist to decide his own qualifications in the matter."

#### Affairs not Connected to the Jurist

"Another problem is one that I have already mentioned. For example, a religious authority gives his opinion in the political field regarding the conditions of a treaty. He has no right to interfere in these matters. The experts must sit down, look into the matter and decide. Recognizing obstruction and intrigue and neutralizing them is also in the hands of the experts. This again is not the affair of the jurist. A jurist has no right to amend the right of selection. That is, if a person has more expertise in a subject, for example, he is the greatest economist, or another is the greatest in social problems, or another in military, then the jurist has no right to select another with less qualifications and stretch his own competence."

Hojjatolislam Khomeyni said at another point: "We must arrange things so that a president does not get involved. An assembly should be created to run the country. That assembly will be an Islamic one and a jurist will be involved so that we can judge its qualifications. Its qualifications should be directed by the Emam Sadeq. What I mean is that we do not want to carry the burden of a prime minister and president who are partisans of America and are not of Islamic principles. Islam says that a jurist must accept the most expert in all fields, not select them.

"After the experts have selected the best in all fields those that are not "Americans," not thieves, are experts, the best, the jurist will accept them. Should the jurist tell a single lie he must step aside. In summary, brothers, do not carry the burden of a president, but come and talk about the nation. The assembly must rule. Gather an assembly of experts to lead, that is the best economist, the best social scientist, the best politician, the best who know the educational problems of our country, one that knows military problems, those who do not have America on their backs. After that we will pick one to lead who will not lie.

America wants to create the same president, same prime minister, the same old setup in the Islamic Republic. We cannot carry the burden. We choose the assembly of experts with an Islamic jurist to lead who, I say again, if he does not have the qualifications that Emam Sadeq ordered, is sinful and will be put aside. The Assembly of Experts will correct the deviations of the nation. We must all rise up and say that we do not want a president or prime minister. We want an assembly of experts. The assembly must run the country. This is the only Islamic way of government."

Khomeyni then described the qualifications of a jurist: "The Emam said in one of his speeches that if a scholar does not tell the truth his authority will be taken and will be told to leave, just for one lie. Such attributes are not possessed by many. Not many ordinary people have them. We must look for a man who is not corrupt, one who does not give one's rights to another, a person who does not play politics, one who has many good qualities and a sound foundation. We must imitate those that have no unworthy traits."

Another part of Hojjatoleslam's press conference will be printed in subsequent issues.

9448  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

DETAILS OF AFGHAN PLOT TO KILL AYATOLLAH SHARI'ATMADARI BARED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Oct 79 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] The Foreign Ministry, Gendarmerie, and police of the Islamic Republic informed Ayatollah Shariatmadari about the incident.

Several of the Afghan agents who had come to Iran to carry out the assassination plan have been arrested.

Mohammed Taraki drafted the plot to assassinate Ayatollah Shariatmadari one month ago in Kabul, and his successor followed through with this plot.

Ayatollah Shariatmadari said: "Martyrdom for justice and truth is the greatest honor for all Moslems, and we do not fear this affair."

Those arrested confessed that they had a special assignment from the leaders of the Afghan regime to assassinate Ayatollah Shariatmadari.

One of the assassination agents fell into a trap several days ago in Qom.

The Afghan Moslem people's support of Ayatollah Shariatmadari's manifesto was disclosed to be the motive for the agents of that country's regime's decision to assassinate him.

After the conspiracy was uncovered, strict security measures were taken to protect Ayatollah Shariatmadari's life.

One of the biggest conspiracies by a foreign country for carrying out a treacherous plot in the world of Islam, especially Iran, i.e., the assassination of His Eminence Ayatollah Shariatmadari, was uncovered.

This conspiracy was planned in the neighboring country of Afghanistan and was planned by its leaders. The original planner of that conspiracy was Mohammed Taraki, the first president of the Republic of Afghanistan following

the establishment of the Marxist regime in that country. Last night, KEYHAN correspondents succeeded in obtaining this news from very reliable sources, and, in the contact that was made immediately with Ayatollah Shariatmadari's office, this news was confirmed by His Eminence.

His Eminence Ayatollah Shariatmadari's spokesman, who is also one of his close relatives, reported the details of this unislamic and inhumane conspiracy to KEYHAN reporters as follows: "The conspiracy to assassinate His Eminence Ayatollah Shariatmadari had been planned since about one month ago in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and, later, it was learned that Mohammed Taraki, a few days before his overthrow and the coming to power of Hafizollah Amin, had planned the plot to assassinate His Eminence Ayatollah Shariatmadari, and he despatched several Afghan citizens to Iran to carry out his treacherous aim."

Ayatollah Shariatmadari's spokesman added, "Several of those people who had been sent to Iran by leaders of the Afghan regime to carry out this unislamic and inhumane assignment were arrested on the Iran-Afghan border, and one of those who, by some means, had been able to get to Qom along with several of his cohorts in order to carry out his devilish plan at a suitable opportunity was trapped by security agents a few days ago. The man, who had been arrested in Qom, confessed during the preliminary interrogations that he had been assigned by the Afghan regime to assassinate His Eminence Ayatollah Shariatmadari."

Ayatollah Shariatmadari's spokesman continued, "A little while ago, the Foreign Ministry, the National Police, and the National Gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran had been informed about the plan of this treacherous conspiracy by the agents of the Afghan regime; therefore, they made Ayatollah Shariatmadari completely au courant. In the report submitted to Ayatollah Shariatmadari by the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic and the national police and gendarmerie, it was stressed that several Afghans who had been arrested in connection with this matter confessed to Iranian agents that they had a special assignment from the leaders of the Afghan regime to assassinate His Eminence Ayatollah Shariatmadari."

Ayatollah Shariatmadari's spokesman also said, "Ever since the question of a conspiracy to assassinate His Eminence Ayatollah Shariatmadari was reported to us by the Foreign Ministry, gendarmerie and police of the Islamic Republic, the necessary precautionary and security measures have been taken to protect the life of Ayatollah Shariatmadari although the Ayatollah Shariatmadari, himself, believed that such a matter should not bring about any kind of change in his situation and he is even ready for martyrdom for the sake of justice and truth and does not fear this matter at all."

Ayatollah Shariatmadari's spokesman added, "The steps taken by the Afghan regime to plan the conspiracy to assassinate His Eminence the Ayatollah are not unrelated to the manifestos he has issued and the interviews he has given in support of the people of Afghanistan, especially since he has many followers in the Moslem country of Afghanistan, and he also has representatives in that country who are engaged in spreading and teaching the holy goals of the true religion of Islam."

Contact With Ayatollah Shariatmadari

Considering the importance of the matter, last night, KEYHAN reporters made contact with Ayatollah Shariatmadari himself and asked his opinion regarding the cowardly, unislamic, and inhumane conspiracy of the agents of the Afghan regime. His Eminence Ayatollah Shariatmadari confirmed what had been said to KEYHAN reporters by his spokesman, saying, "We completely endorse the statements of our spokesman on this matter."

After the Marxist regime of Mohammed Taraki came to power in Afghanistan, which encountered the strong opposition of the Moslem people of that country and led to the martyrdom of thousands of them, His Eminence Ayatollah Shariatmadari frequently, by issuing manifestos, condemned the slaughter of the Moslem people of Afghanistan and demanded of the leaders of that country that they heed the legitimate, Islamic, and humane demands of our Moslem brothers and sisters in that country.

The significant point in this matter is that, in spite of the removal of Mohammed Taraki in Afghanistan and the coming to power of Hafizollah Amin, no change occurred in the basic policy of that country, i.e., the conspiracy to assassinate His Eminence Ayatollah Shariatmadari had been planned during the term of power of Mohammed Taraki and, although Taraki was removed and reportedly killed, the implementation of this plan was not halted and those people who had been assigned to carry out this conspiracy continued their work. A reliable report states that one of those people who had been assigned to carry out this conspiracy was arrested a few days ago in Qom.

8514  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

TURKISH PAPER ON EVENTS IN ISLAMIC WORLD

NC270959 Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 26 Nov 79 p 5 NC

[Article by Zafer Atay: "Preposterous Happenings"]

[Excerpts] The events in Tehran have proved that a handful of irresponsible, ignorant and undignified people will not hesitate to set the whole world aflame out of their own personal spite.

No one is obliged to love the United States. Millions of people hate the ousted shah as well. It is even possible to declare war on imperialism. No one would object to the expression of love or hatred in street demonstrations.

But detaining people and tying their hands in their own embassy--which, according to international tradition and rule of law, is considered to be their own property--such an act can only be termed "barbaric." It is unfortunate that Khomeyni has allowed the Iranians, who possess a 2,500-year-old state tradition and are one of the fundamental guardians of eastern art and culture, to be branded as "barbarians."

Undoubtedly spying is an offense. Even in the most primitive states a diplomat accused of spying is deported within 24 hours. But attempting to try a diplomat because he is a spy, and announcing this to the world as if you were doing something clever, you will soon discover that no one supports you. Khomeyni is now in this predicament. Even Syria and Libya, known to be the most extreme in the Islamic world, want the hostages to be released. When it was suggested during the preparations for the Arab summit in Tunis to support Iran, even 'Arafat--Khomeyni's closest friend--could not say "yes."

The release of the hostages who have been imprisoned within the four walls of the impressive American Embassy and who are by now in a psychologically terrible state can resolve the issue.

We still believe that neither Khomeyni nor Carter have lost their common sense to the extent of hurling all of mankind into a disastrous war. For the place of the warmongering leaders in history is the bottom of the garbage heap. Both Hitler and Mussolini are still remembered with detest.

IRAN

MILITARY MEN MAY RETIRE AFTER 20 YEARS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] Sadeq Tabatabai, government spokesman and deputy prime minister, announced that a new law was under consideration by the Council of Ministers concerning the armed forces of the Islamic Republic, retirement of personnel, compensation for service, hiring of 100 veterinarians, and 117 diplomaed veterinary technicians. Also, the law would build houses for the martyrs of the armed forces and revolutionary guards killed in the latest fighting.

On the basis of a clause in the law about reorganization of the Islamic Republic's armed forces and retirement and compensation of personnel, the ministries of defense and interior can, with a view toward reorganizing the armed forces, gendarmerie and police, study these organizations and at their discretion can retire officers, technicians, NCOs, workers and other personnel who have at least 20 years' service. Those with less than 20 years can be given severance pay.

Note 1--In computing retirement pay those responsible for the law will use in each case 5-year periods without fractions and will add these up for retirement pay based on total length of service. This will come from the retirement fund and any amount needed to make the total will be paid into the budgets of the Ministry of Defense, gendarmerie and police.

Note 2--Those responsible for administering the law will decide the amount to be paid in lieu of length-of-service pay. In regard to every level of personnel the amount will be fixed and paid based on prior approval.

Hiring in the Ministry of Agriculture

The Provisional Council of Ministers of the Islamic Republic have agreed to a suggestion by the minister of agriculture and rural affairs that the ministry be authorized to hire 100 doctors of veterinary medicine and 117 diplomaed technicians in veterinary medicine to meet the needs of the ministry in rural areas. The hiring contract will take the form of purchase of personal services of doctors to work in the provinces rather than Tehran and for technicians in rural areas.

Based on a proposal from the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs the Council of Ministers agreed to provide the necessary funds to plan construction by the Ministry of Housing of a house for the family of every member of the armed forces and revolutionary guards martyred in the recent fighting. The houses will have four rooms and cost at most 2 million rials. Fifty houses will be built in the provinces and given to the families free of charge.

The Council of Ministers also accepted the proposal of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce that the crop protection agency of the Ministry of Agriculture be authorized to permit importation of 603,847 apple, pear, nectarine and peach tree seedlings for the cultivation and vegetable companies.

The government spokesman said the Council of Ministers accepted a proposal of the Plan and Budget Organization that 2.6 billion rials be paid to the organization to make up the balance of the account to compensate for hardship service in the armed forces and guarantee special expenses of operational units in the account of the organization so that hardship pay for the armed forces can be made in the current year.

9448  
GSO: 4906



IRAQ

PRESIDENT HUSAYN, 'ARAFAT DISCUSS ARAB SITUATION, IRAQI AID

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 9 Nov 79 p 22

[Article: "Saddam Husayn Promises Abu-'Ammar to Improve Relations with Syria"]

[Text] Yasir 'Arafat's latest visit to Iraq was not an ordinary visit but a prominent one. The Palestinian-Iraqi relations were conservative previously but are now harmonious. This is largely due to the flexibility demonstrated by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and to the psychological enthusiasm displayed by the PLC chairman. Previously, Abu-'Ammar opened his mind to the Iraqi leadership. But this time he has opened his heart to the Iraqi President and has touched a sensitive vein in him, thus opening the doors wide for firm relations between the two sides and the two men.

After assuming power last July, President Saddam Husayn invited Yasir 'Arafat to visit Iraq. At the end of last month, Abu-'Ammar ['Arafat's alias] responded to the invitation and found the Iraqi President very friendly, having postponed some important official meetings, not having let his guest go through preliminary meetings and having received him on the same evening of his arrival. They held a meeting which lasted from 2000 until 0400 after midnight.

At the outset of the meeting, 'Arafat reviewed that "political penetration operation" which he had conducted in a number of West European countries, including Austria, Spain and Turkey, and which constituted a guerrilla-type siege of a number of Europe's cities and parts of its rural areas. But it was a political siege this time. 'Arafat also reviewed the PLO movement in the United States in the wake of the resignation of Andrew Young, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and of the outcome of the visit of Jessie Jackson, the black U.S. leader, to the area. In this regard, 'Arafat said that the last President 'Abd-al-Nasir had tried to win the support of the U.S. blacks. 'Arafat also expressed the belief that the official U.S. position toward the [Palestinian] issue remains unchanged.

On his part, President Saddam Husayn reviewed Iraq's movements in Africa and Latin America in the wake of the Havana nonalignment conference held last month and in the light of their bilateral meeting during that conference-- a meeting in which Abu-'Ammar urged Abu-'Adi [Husayn] to reward the African and Latin American countries which supported the Palestinian and Arab cause during the conference. The Iraqi President said that in the wake of the conference, Baghdad sent messages and invitations to the heads of state in the two continents and that an economic delegation led by Hikmat Ibrahim, the Revolution Command Council member, toured the East African countries, concluding a number of economic agreements and advancing aid to Mozambique, Malagasi [sic], Tanzania and Zambia. The delegation concluded with these countries loans at a symbolic interest rate of two percent, agreements to implement a number of projects which entail providing Iraqi technicians and trade exchange agreements. The Iraqi President said that his country will continue to advance such aid to the third world countries that support the Palestinian and Arab cause, adding that his country has also advanced aid to the world's national liberation movements.

'Arafat expressed his satisfaction with this Iraqi role and noted that his visit coincided with the visit of the Jamaican prime minister.

The two sides expressed the hope that the other Arab oil producing countries will perform a role similar to Iraq's in this regard.

The two delegations, which included Na'im Haddad on the Iraqi side and 'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad, the secretary general of the ALF [Arab Liberation Front], and Muhammad Abu-Mayzar, the official in charge of Fatah's foreign relations department, [on the Palestinian side], then discussed the two following main questions: What do we want from Europe and how do we employ our capabilities to wrench better positions from it in the interest of our cause?

Here, Europe's position and stance were reviewed. It was noticed that the West European countries are trying to achieve a formula that reduces the damage they have incurred as a result of their support for the Camp David accords and to serve their interests in the Arab countries by recognizing the PLO. The degree to which the position of these countries is distinctive from that of the United States was also discussed.

Speaking on the issue, the Iraqi President supported the Palestinian movement in West Europe and underlined Iraq's readiness to employ its political and oil capabilities to support the organization in getting the recognition of the Western European states. He said that Baghdad is exerting its efforts to bolster the Palestinian movement in France at present, as it has exerted similar efforts in Spain in the recent past. He expressed the hope that in return, the organization will familiarize Iraq step by step with its movement in the "old world."

Even though Saddam Husayn supported the efforts to push the Western European states toward positions more distinctly different from their conventional ones, he did not attach hopes in this regard to regaining the Palestinian rights. He considered the Palestinian movement in this sphere a part of the movement required of the Palestinian action and required for keeping the PLO under the spotlights.

In this regard, the Iraqi President embarked on an important step by agreeing to the Palestinian leader's request to supply Spain with an oil shipment valued at 18 million dollars, provided that Baghdad notify Madrid that the deal was approved in return for Madrid's position vis-a-vis recognition of the PLO. The Iraqi President also approved a request by 'Arafat to supply an oil shipment valued at nearly 10 million dollars to Mozambique and smaller shipments to other African countries. The importance of this development lies in underlining the Palestinian issue's connection with oil, something to which 'Arafat refers when he points out that all the initials of the liberation organization, namely P.L.O., are found in the Latin word petroleum [printed Petroleum in the Arabic text] (oil).

The issue of southern Lebanon was also on the agenda and the two sides agreed on the need to avoid division between the Lebanese and Palestinian Arabs on this issue so that it may not turn into a loophole for penetration by the two Camp David accords. They also agreed that this issue should be discussed by the next Arab summit in Tunis as part of the Arab situation generally and of the comprehensive situation in the area and that no pretexts should be provided for this issue to move within other frameworks.

The two sides discussed the call for the convocation of an Arab summit in Tunis on the 20th of this month. They noted that 6 days separate the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs from the Arab kings and presidents conference and expressed the fear that this time difference may torpedo the summit conference if some forces fail to include what they want in the conference agenda.

The two sides stressed the importance of entrenching the Baghdad summit resolutions which were adopted a year ago and the importance of vigilance in the face of attempts that may be made by some Arab states to abandon the minimal limit for the Arab position [set by the Baghdad summit]. It was decided that the two sides will formulate a joint visualization to prevent backing down on the Baghdad summit resolutions and to encourage the Arab states to rally behind the basis on which it [the minimal limit] was established. It was therefore decided that the two sides will exert efforts in the Arab states before convocation of the coming summit to prepare the climate for this summit to secure its success and to guarantee preservation of the Palestinian resistance and of its freedom of action. Contrary to the expectations of some media circles, the Iraqi President affirmed that he is ready to attend the meetings of the forthcoming Arab summit conference.

'Arafat called for the preservation of distinctive relations between Iraq and Syria and said that the deterioration of their relations will lead to the collapse of the Arab situation. Saddam Husayn replied that Iraq will take no step toward negative intensification vis-a-vis Syria and that it will exert efforts to keep the relationship between the two countries under control out of appreciation for the general Arab situation. He said that the Iraqi-Syrian coordination was fruitful in the Havana conference and that he is ready to establish coordination with the Syrian leadership on matters that the PLO deems fit. He said that the cooler the issue of the latest plot in Iraq becomes, the more opportune the time becomes for improving and developing the relations with Syria.

On the other hand, 'Arafat hinted critically at the firm relations between Iraq and Jordan. Even though he supported the Iraqi aid for the Jordanian army, he requested that this aid be employed to serve the PLO's demands from the Jordanian authorities.

Insofar as aid is concerned, the Iraqi President agreed to supply a new weapon shipment to the PLO, to receive Palestinian militarists for training in Iraq and to provide additional aid to Fatah on top of the 5 million dollars that Hayil 'Abd-al-Hamid, the member of Fatah Central Committee, received during his latest visit to Baghdad last month in the wake of two messages exchanged by the Iraqi President and the Palestinian leader. The Iraqi President also said that Baghdad is prepared to meet all of 'Arafat's military and financial aid requests without any conditions or restrictions as long as the organization maintains its national and pan-Arab strategy.

This Iraqi position pleased Abu-'Ammar who recently said in a moment of serenity: The Palestinian revolution needs the compassion of the Arab states before their financial and military aid.

8494  
CSO: 4802

ISRAEL

ARABS URGED TO USE EXPERTS TO INFLUENCE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Jersalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 6 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial: "We and U.S. Elections"]

[Text] The message of support and commitment to backing Israel and its demands sent by Senator Edward Kennedy to Menahem Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister, is nothing new in the U.S. elections. This has rather become a tradition followed by those aspiring for the presidency, as if the way to the White House passes first by the Israeli prime minister's office.

Even though several U.S. presidents got to the White House despite the Jewish opposition to their election, the strong position enjoyed by the Zionist organizations in the United States makes every presidential candidate avoid confronting those organizations. Any candidate who cannot benefit from the backing of these organizations (still wins something by not having them oppose him) at least. In both cases, the candidate feels that he has to take the Jewish influence into consideration.

The Jewish organizations, which control the information centers and which influence the nomination and the elections for the presidency, are aware of their role and exploit it to the maximum. They spare no means to reach their goals, beginning with personal messages and parties and ending with digging up the past history of any candidate and trying to destroy a candidate [that they do not like] with the information power that they possess and with the psychological war that they launch "coast to coast," i.e. throughout the United States.

What is new in the U.S. election campaign is that a seeker of the presidency, such as Senator John Connolly, declares at the outset of his campaign a comprehensive plan to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict in which he calls for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, thus opposing and even challenging the Israeli and Jewish positions. Connolly may have to pay dearly for this daring. However, this daring indicates that the U.S. public opinion has begun to change and has become more prepared to understand the Arab positions.

So what have we done to exploit the situation and to employ our capabilities and resources in the U.S. election campaign in order to serve our interests and rights and to support those who support our causes, such as Senator Connolly?

The U.S. election campaign is at its beginning and our capabilities to exert influence are large. The only thing we lack is to form a team of "experts and specialists" to perform the Arab role in these elections. Let us try to imagine how positive the results will be if the Saudi oil enters the U.S. campaign with the intelligence and finesse of the experts and the specialists. Oil is only one of the Arab aspects of influence. We wonder, will we be content with the role of spectator, as we have been so far?

8494  
CSO: 4802

ISRAEL

UPROAR OVER AL-SHAK'AH STATEMENTS SAID INTENTIONALLY FABRICATED

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 8 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Fabricated Uproar"]

[Text] The endeavor of some Israeli radicals to distort and to twist a statement attributed to Bassam al-Shak'ah, the mayor of Nabulus, and to exploit this statement to incite against al-Shak'ah and to demand his deportation or trial is something that makes us say that such action is unacceptable, especially that it emanates from those who are filling the occupied territories with provocations, law violations and aggressions with words, deeds and intentions against the Arab rights and the Arab citizens.

The issue is a general issue of principle that affects every citizen in the occupied territories and that reflects one aspect of the ceaseless radical Israeli campaign against the citizens. The concerned statement attributed to al-Shak'ah was not made secretly or stealthily. Al-Shak'ah addressed it to the Israeli militarists and to Dani Matt, the coordinator of the occupied territories affairs who is the highest military official in the Bank and the Strip.

Therefore, the distortion, twisting, exaggeration and omission made regarding the statement and the attempt to exploit this statement do not really reflect a reaction to the statement as much as they reflect radical provocative intentions that have been hidden in the hearts of those who have created this uproar and who have found in the distorted statements an outlet to express their hatred and their intentions.

The inhabitants of the occupied territories have suffered for long years and continue to suffer from the provocations of the Israeli radicals who legalize confiscating Arab lands and settling in them, who consider the owners of these lands strangers in their own homeland and who proceed to the Arab cities, especially Nabulus, demanding that the Arab citizens be denied their rights, deprived of their properties and deported.

We have not heard throughout these long years anybody demanding that these radicals be deterred or tried. The sole "hobby" of these radicals has become that of harassing the Arab citizens and of fabricating incidents to gain their ends. Therefore, the fabricated uproar concerning al-Shak'ah's statements must be brought to an end quickly because al-Shak'ah is first and foremost a citizen in his own land and country and nobody is entitled to threaten his right or to try to undermine this right.

8494

CSO: 4802



ISRAEL

SALFIT MAYOR VISITS AMMAN

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 31 Oct 79 p 2

[Article: "Salfit Mayor Returns After Talks in Amman"]

[Text] Salfit--Hasan al-Zir, the town mayor, returned here yesterday from Amman after a several-day visit during which he held talks with the Jordanian officials on aiding the development of Salfit.

The [development] projects include the electricity and water project, the construction of a water reservoir with a capacity of 500 cubic meters, building additional classrooms, asphaltting the roads opened recently, discarding the old cemetery and building a new one, beginning implementation of the public sewers project and building housing units for civil servants with a limited income.

These projects will be studied in the light of the presented plans.

The Jordanian government has decided to disburse 29,000 dinars to supply the village of Farkhah with electric power from the Salfit Electricity Project. This sum is designated to cover the expenses of extending the high-tension powerline and of installing the transformers. The Jordanian government has also decided to disburse 13,000 dinars to pave the road leading from the village of Qays to Salfit.

8494  
CSO: 4802

ISRAEL

EDITORIAL BELIEVES ENDING OCCUPATION WILL END COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 5 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Economic Bankruptcy and Real Solution"]

[Text] When Simha Ehrlich, the Israeli minister of finance, assumed his post, he promised the Israelis to improve the economic situation and to wipe out inflation. He criticized the economic policy of the previous government, promising good to all. In his time, he tried to float the [Israeli] pound which was in the phase of (progressive) devaluation, thus sinking it. The current value of the pound is equal to 10 Jordanian fils. Inflation intensified and its indicator rose madly. The inflation rate exceeded 100 percent and the interval separating one inflationary leap from another did not exceed a few hours at times. Abnormal economic chaos dominated the markets and further escalated the hardships of the middle and poor classes.

Horowitz, Ehrlich's successor, has come reluctantly. He has before him a legacy filled with problems. He has also made it a condition that painful austerity be imposed to deal with the economic catastrophe. He has had what he wants and he has indirectly declared the government's bankruptcy, acknowledging that this government does not have what the Israeli people are asking it for, that all it possesses is several billion banknotes produced by the mints and that these notes have lost their value. He has also underlined his resolution to reduce government spending and ministerial budgets, to get rid of large numbers of civil servants and to levy more taxes. The new minister of finance believes that these measures will contribute toward improving the economic situation. But in fact, the measures are no more than an artificial breather that will not help the Israeli economy to get rid of its stifling crisis because the causes that have led to this crisis are still extant. Military spending consumes most of the production and of the foreign aid given to Israel. Moreover, Horowitz' measures will multiply the number of domestic problems. Strikes will escalate and spread at a larger scale as soon as the decision not to raise the wages is implemented and this will lead to a tense confrontation between the government, led by the Likud, and the Histadrut which supports the Labor Party. Abolition of the system of subsidizing the essential commodities

will enrage the poor class. Raising the taxes, especially the added value tax, will turn the stagnation in the market into total paralysis and, who knows, the ailing economy may perhaps die on the hands of the new "surgeon."

As for us the inhabitants of the occupied territories, our hardships and suffering will double. Our economy is tied, despite our will, and doomed to full subservience to Israel's economy and we have been forced to endure this situation, its consequences and its ramifications.

The U.S. Department of State has told Israel frankly that the only solution to all its problems lies in ending its military occupation of all the Arab territories. A spokesman of the Department of State in Washington has expressed his dissatisfaction with the U.S. participation in shouldering the burden of the enormous military spending in Israel. Will they understand this fact in Israel and do they know what "fed up" means and what it entails?

8494  
CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

'AL-TALI'AH' DEPLORES IRANIAN-ARAB MISUNDERSTANDING

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 10 Oct 79 p 3

[Editorial: "What should Relations with Iran Be Like?"]

[Text] An important and worthwhile observation is that the Iranian revolution, while building to its climax and later defeating the shah, created a cheerful and relaxed atmosphere among the people of the Gulf region, and their hearts were for the Iranian people's revolution against the oldest pro-American regime in the region.

This cheerfulness was based on the new Iranian political trend, anticipated by everybody, in Iran's relations with both the Arabs and the world in general; a trend that would erase the picture of the shah, the protector of American interests, the cause of racial conflicts and the most enthusiastic pro-Israel petroleum producer, and replace it with the picture of the Iranian revolution, whose policy is based on serving the peoples' interests, especially in the Gulf region, where Iranian-Arab relations were characterized by antagonism because of the shah's greed.

However, after the defeat of the shah of Iran some anti-Arab declarations were made in Iran, especially by Ruhani, declarations that reiterated the Shah government's views. These declarations and their repercussions created a psychologically disturbed atmosphere that overwhelmed our region until recently. Iran's unclear official stand, dubious news agency reports, and several antirevolution and anti-Gulf people and elements helped aggravate this disturbed situation.

The situation thus required a firm reply and clear stands in the face of this media and official muddle. The tour of the deputy prime minister of Iran helped get things back to normal. The mysterious and uneasy atmosphere of the [Iranian] declarations was beginning to clear.

When the prime minister of Iran, Engineer Mahdi Bazarghan, gave assurances that Iran had no interest in lands of its neighbors, he also said that there was a conspiracy aimed at causing disputes between Iran and these countries.

At the same time, Mr 'Abdul-Aziz Husayn, minister of state for cabinet affairs in Kuwait, praised the Iranina Government and denied the existence of any problems between Kuwait and Iran.

It could then be deduced from this Iranian gesture to remove the animosity fabricated by unofficial declarations and some convulsive repercussions that the foreign policy clarifications of all sides and continuous communications at all levels are a positive and required step in a sensitive region such as ours.

It is also necessary, however, that Iranian-Arab relations, both at the Gulf level and at the level of the entire Arab region, should be taken very seriously by the Iranian Government.

9455  
CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

KUWAIT OFFERS PROPOSALS TO END GULF FINANCIAL CRISIS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 18 Nov 79 p 37

[Article by J. D.: "Money Market Chaos Threatens Economic Unity"]

[Text] In the past few weeks there has been an important change in the policy of financial cooperation among Gulf states, which started with a Kuwaiti financial crisis when fluidity in the banks dried up and the state intervened, through the Central Bank, to finance them. The matter ended with Kuwaiti proposals calling on the Gulf states to put a limit to the chaos in the Gulf money markets.

For the first time, it has become impossible for any state to continue a policy of economic liberalism without there being a single governmental supervisory agency for all the Gulf countries, regulating their money markets.

The crisis began with the flight of large amounts of money abroad, to the amount of 500 million Kuwaiti dinars over a period of 6 months. It is said that this figure was much less than the actual volume of fugitive money; during the past 3 months, such money has amounted to between 500 and 700 million dinars.

The money smuggling has taken two forms. In the first one, two Kuwaitis proceed to take out a short-term loan in dinars and then convert it into dollars, encouraged to do so by the difference in interest rates between the dinar and the dollar. While the interest rate for the dinar has remained at 8.5 percent, the interest rate for the dollar has risen continually to 14 percent.

The second form is for Gulf companies to circulate shares in the secondary Kuwaiti money market--a market which is outside the government control which is ordinarily applied to the stock exchange, and which absorbs the greater part of Kuwaiti investments. These exchange operations were aimed at withdrawing the Kuwaiti dinar and converting it into dollars, for the purpose of investing them in short-term deposits.

Kuwaiti officials have estimated the number of Kuwaiti shareholders in Gulf companies to be 80,000 a figure which far surpasses the number of shareholders in local companies, which indicates the increasing seriousness of the volume of money smuggled out for the purpose of speculation.

The first result of this situation is the dwindling of fluidity, which has forced the Central Bank to step in to finance commercial banks.

The second result is the weakening of dealings in Kuwaiti bonds valued in dinars; the value of such bonds, in 18 denominations, is no more than 154 million Kuwaiti dinars.

The third result is that the drop in fluidity has led to major changes in interest rates. While they rose 50 percent in January, after two months they dropped, with respect to themselves, and the rate stabilized at 8 percent. This made bonds valued in dinars unprofitable for subscribers, who preferred to invest their money by converting it to dollars, the interest rate for which has risen rapidly.

Here the psychological element has played its part in the Kuwaitis' conversion of their money into dollars, for they are convinced that the Kuwaiti government will not act to raise the dinar's interest rate.

But the situation has begun to decline, and the Kuwaiti government has been forced to prohibit the circulation of Gulf company shares on the Kuwaiti stock exchange and in the secondary money market.

Government measures have not stopped here, but are affecting Kuwait's financial position, and are causing a loss in its Gulf and international importance. Therefore, Kuwait has gone to other Gulf countries and asked them to take unanimous measures, including the establishment of a Gulf common money market. According to the statements of its officials, Kuwait is not opposed in principle to the Gulf peoples' exchanging Gulf company shares, but has stipulated that this be done within the framework of a general agreement among the states concerned.

Kuwait is proposing the principal of reciprocity, along with maintaining government methods currently in effect in all the countries with respect to ownership, and which pertain to membership in corporate boards. Also, Kuwait has proposed that the shareholders retain the right to convert their capital and profits into any currency they choose and invest them in any country they wish.

Kuwait has requested that a limit be put to the excesses of the Gulf companies, by applying the principle of registering Kuwaiti and Gulf companies on the stock exchange if 3 years have passed since their establishment and if they were established by decree of the head of state, and that their registration be in accordance with the laws and regulations, and that the reasons for their establishment be made clear.

In addition, so that the companies may be permitted to deal on the stock exchange, their capital must be at least 50 million Kuwaiti dinars, and their profits must exceed 5 percent. The final new condition is that the main headquarters of the company be in a Gulf country, and that they have a branch in Kuwait licensed by the foreign ministers, so that they can be accredited by the securities commission.

After these proposals were acknowledged, and Gulf company shares were prohibited from circulating in the Kuwaiti money markets, a delegation from the companies was formed which requested the Kuwaiti minister of commerce and industry to explain the closing of their offices; these companies were not licensed to perform Gulf share conversion operations. After consultation, these companies decided to adhere to the new measures.

Practically speaking, there is a strong fear that these measures will have negative repercussions on economic unity among the Gulf states. They will doubtless delay the establishment of the Gulf common market.

So far the other Gulf countries have not responded to the Kuwaiti memorandum containing the proposals.

This in itself indicates that there is no loss of harmony on the Gulf level. Apparently the competition among Gulf money markets is the only law regulating dealings among them.

8559  
CSO: 4802



KUWAIT

EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON EGYPTIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 10 Oct 79 p 1

[Editorial by Fu'ad Matar: "The Trial of the Egyptian Army"]

[Text] Had President Anwar Sadat allowed the broadcasting and publication in Egypt of Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhili's speeches, the situation [in Egypt] would have been different from what it is now. President Sadat withheld from the Egyptians their right to read what their chief of general staff, who achieved glittering victories during the October 1973 war, had to say. In addition to this, the president decided to hold a trial of al-Shadhili in absentia, accusing him of disclosing secrets, and it all seemed as though President Sadat was dealing with a normal matter.

It is certain that President Sadat would not have held al-Shadhili's trial in absentia had al-Shadhili's declarations and writings not influenced public opinion in Egypt. These declaration and writings, reaching Egypt via radio stations and through word of mouth, were beginning to affect both military and civilian groups in Egypt. Faced with this, President Sadat had to either disprove al-Shadhili's arguments, a thing he was unable to do because there was an operations room observing and recordings confirming, as well as general staff surviving whose military honor would allow them to say nothing but the truth; or he had to divert attention [from al-Shadhili's words]. He diverted attention by announcing that al-Shadhili's trial would be held in absentia, and he sought that through legal authority and not rightfully and logically.

A question arises: Had al-Shadhili already said what he said before President Sadat's treaty with Israel, or did that occur after the treaty?

Al-Shadhili exercised control to the last moment. It is certain that he would not have written and made such statements had President Sadat not proceeded with his plan to sign a treaty with Israel. He preferred to keep quiet after President Sadat sent him away on the grounds that Egypt's battle was not over and that it was his duty to accept any measures.

At the same time, he was preparing all Egyptian officers who visited London while he was ambassador there. This was one of the reasons he was assigned as ambassador to Lisbon, since there was no reason for Egyptian officers to visit that area except for medical treatment and special

assignments. His preparation of the army officers in the direction of Egypt's military honor was the solution for maintaining the army's morale and protecting Egypt's Arab and international roles.

After President Sadat signed the treaty with Israel, it was natural for al-Shadhili to bring out certain facts, the most important of which was that President Sadat had forbidden Egyptian forces from attacking Israeli fortifications and Ras al-Harbah, which was erected by the Israelis west of the Suez Canal during the October War, "and thus he spared the Israelis a definite defeat".

The above incident, which President Sadat cannot deny because his orders are registered and known by several persons, is becoming a growing burden to the Egyptian officers and a subject of discussion for a broad part of the public sector.

The burden and the discussion will not be eased by President Sadat's trial of al-Shadhili in absentia.

One more word remains to be said: Al-Shadhili's trial is, in fact, a trial of the Egyptian army that achieved great victories during the 1973 October War. But these victories were directed toward a treaty that would never be really implemented in the area.

9455  
CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

PROPERTY ALLOCATIONS EXPANDED FOR 1979

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 10 Sep 79 p 3

[Article: "Property Allocations Raised to 73 Million Dinars, Covering 164 Transactions in al-Salimiyah, Khaytan and al-Firwaniyah"]

[Text] The Expropriation Committee in the municipality of Kuwait held its meeting under the chairmanship of Mayor 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-'Adsani, with the director of the Expropriation Administration, Turki al-'Ali, present. At this meeting the committee discussed distributing the new acquisition budget among the various areas of the country and set a group of new conditions for expropriation in three particular areas.

After the end of the meeting, Turki al-'Ali announced that he had agreed to the phases in which the sums allocated for expropriation will be distributed. The formulas for expropriation and payment of the necessary sums will be determined on the principle of sequence. Also, several conditions for this approval were set for three areas only: al-Salimiyah, al-Firwaniyah and Khaytan. The most importance of these conditions is that the acreage of expropriated real estate is not to exceed 2,500 square meters. The Expropriation Committee must approve if this acreage is exceeded slightly, by no more than 100 square meters; that is, the area of the entire piece of property may not exceed 2,600 square meters.

Turki al-'Ali added: "The second important condition is that the appraisal operation is not conducted more than once for one person or one organization in these three areas. The reason is that the committee will try this time to cover the greatest possible number of forms of expropriation originating in al-Salimiyah, al-Firwaniyah and Khaytan by appraising small properties only. Thus, a person will obtain an appraisal of only one property, and this time the appraisal operation will include as many citizens as possible."

Turki al-'Ali added: "We have set aside about 30 million dinars for the al-Salimiyah region to cover its allotment of expropriations. Al-Firwaniyah's share is about 5 million dinars, and Khaytan has about 8 million."

He added: "The rest of the money in the expropriation budget is distributed as follows: al-Balaj No 7 and al-Balaj No 8, which contain 9 pieces of real estate, for which the sum of about 9.25 million dinars has been set aside."

"A group of developed properties of which the state had taken possession without issuing expropriation forms. The sum of 9.75 million dinars has been allocated.

"A group of expropriated properties from the budget of the Public Housing Authority located in two areas: first, the suburb of Sabah al-Salim (al-Masilah), and second, part of a property within the city. About 5.5 million dinars have been allocated for these properties.

"A group from the organizational sectors distributed through four areas: al-Manqif, the Seventh Commercial District, al-Jabariyah and Khaytan. There are 266 properties in this group, for which about 5.25 million dinars have been allocated."

The director of the Expropriations Administration said: "Thus, the sums allocated for the expropriations budget this year amount to about 73 million dinars. It should be noted that it had been decided to spend only 45 million dinars in this field. The increase occurred in order to have the expropriations this year include the greatest possible number of citizens. The number of expropriation transactions which will be included in the appraisal of real estate in the three areas we mentioned are as follows: 84 in al-Salimiyah, 45 in Khaytan and 35 in al-Firwaniyah."

He added: "The Appraisal Committee will meet later after the Expropriations Administration has made the necessary adjustments in the names of the owners of the expropriated properties, because it will trace certificates of ownership for all of these properties until it reaches the final document and the financial owner for each property, in cooperation with the Land Registry Administration."

7587  
CSO: 4602

KUWAIT

PRIVATE SECTOR NECESSARY TO PETROCHEMICAL PROCESS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 30 Sep 79 p 15

[Article: "Two Stages in Petrochemical Industry Require Private Sector Participation"]

[Text] The assistant under secretary for industrial affairs of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Mu'ayyid al-Rashid, told AL-QABAS yesterday that the intermediate and final stage of the petrochemical industry must let the private sector invest in it.

In an interview with AL-QABAS, al-Rashid stressed that a policy must be established calling for lowering the price of fuel granted to the industries, so that we may obtain the required balance between the negative factors surrounding Kuwaiti industry, such as the labor shortage and the high cost of importing technology, and the positive factors.

New Ideas

Al-Rashid discussed new trends in Kuwaiti industry and said that we are willing to enter new industrial sectors, such as the plastics industry, which is growing in many semi-industrial states. We are considering supporting the trend toward manufacturing a number of products which can replace some imports, in addition to encouraging the trend toward unconventional products, such as the plastics and PVC industries, by importing the raw materials from abroad, either in the form of sheets or plastics, provided that we produce them according to our local needs.

Al-Rashid revealed that thought is being given to building a plant to produce a specific quantity of PVC in keeping with our economy and the needs of the country for semimanufactured materials. He said that this project will be implemented in the future.

Development of Industries

Al-Rashid said that we are also studying the development of some industries to produce some traditional products which do not require a great deal of extraordinary experience and technology. These industries include the

manufacture of water meters, which is under development, the manufacture of locks for doors, and development of the fiberglass industry to manufacture the large industrial lockers which Kuwaiti industry requires.

#### Support of Industrial Exports

Al-Rashid mentioned that capital directed toward industry has recorded an increase in the past few years; this has caused us to form a committee to support industrial exports of Kuwaiti origin. The Ministry of Commerce is now studying trends of capital and the role of local banks in strengthening it.

#### Industrial Bank

He said that during the past 5 years the industrial bank has loaned 100 million Kuwaiti dinars for industrial projects, in addition to 300 million dinars in capital burden which the holders of this capital invested.

#### Labor

Al-Rashid discussed the subject of labor. He said that the percentage of Kuwaiti labor in the public sector ranges from 30 to 50 percent. In the petrochemical sector it is about 30 percent. We have submitted our proposals concerning the labor required in Kuwaiti industry until the year 2000 as part of the complete report which was submitted to the Council of Ministers.

He expressed his belief that Kuwaiti labor will fill the administrative, technical and semitechnical positions in industrial projects, provided that imported labor fills the remaining positions. The minimum for Kuwaiti labor in the year 2000 is expected to be 25 percent.

#### Proposals

The assistant under secretary of the Ministry of Commerce reviewed the report submitted to the Council of Ministers, which includes specific proposals concerning the fields of industry available to the private, common and public sectors. He said that we have defined the industries which suit each group.

In this regard, he mentioned that the state will take over strategic industries, such as the extraction and refining of petroleum and the manufacture of petroleum products, but there are fields which the private sector can enter, such as the manufacture of the plastic products and intermediate products, and other similar products which the state must leave to the private sector.

#### Common Projects

Al-Rashid confirmed the importance of the private sector in setting up common projects on the Gulf level. He mentioned that there is an advanced project which is being implemented on the Gulf level, the "Darfilah

Aluminum" project to manufacture aluminum sheets. These sheets will be used for roofs, for doors, to cover offices, and in the furniture industry.

Al-Rashid said that the Gulf Organization for Industrial Investment in which all of the Arab Gulf states are participating has studied the project. The organization's council approved the project last May. In accordance with that, we called upon the Kuwaiti private sector to participate in this project, and we found it ready and willing.

#### Development of Apparatus and Difficulties of Implementation

Al-Rashid discussed the difficulties of implementing projects and said that they concern investors, since most of them are not familiar with industry, in addition to the problem of a shortage of technicians and industrial administrators. All of these factors play a role in delaying implementation of the projects.

He added that local experience is limited, and apparatus concerned with industry requires development. He said that he has submitted proposals to develop apparatus on a strategic level in stages. He confirmed that development of the apparatus alone will not solve the problem, and industry will remain in need of some foreign expertise.

7587  
CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

DEPORTATION COMMENT--A responsible official source assured AL-QABAS that "Kuwait will remain open to all brothers, friends and all who want a respectable life on our land within the limits of the law." The source said: "The recent steps taken against a number of people came after conclusive proof that they were not loyal to the nation." The source added: "The state will restrain anyone who lets himself be seduced into destructive activities, kills the good spirit of security and tries to fragment the spirit of one family, because Kuwait since its founding has lived and still lives in the spirit of unity of its people as one family devoted to the interests of this beloved nation." [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 1] 7587

CSO: 4802



LEBANON

LEBANESE TROOP LEADER INTERVIEWED

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 19-25 Nov 79 pp 18-28

[Report on interview with Saad Haddad, no date or place given]

[Text]

**"When Lebanon returns to the Lebanese," says Saad Haddad, the Southern border strip will return to Lebanon.**

**When the Syrians and the Palestinians leave the country, he adds, "we won't think of Israel or anyone else" anymore.**

**And "when Lebanon becomes independent again," he will be ready to stand trial on charges of desertion and hostile action against the Lebanese Army.**

**Saad Haddad is the major in whose name the Lebanese Army has issued an arrest warrant, and whose men, backed by Israel, are refusing to allow the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to deploy in a strip of Lebanese territory bordering the Jewish state.**

**He made those statements to me when, after months of trying, I succeeded in visiting him in Marjeyoun, the major town in the border strip, which is sometimes known as "Haddadland," sometimes as "Israeli-occupied Lebanon" and sometimes as "Free Lebanon."**

**To Haddad and his men, there's no doubt as to what that territory should be called.**

**"You can keep that expression — 'border strip,' " the fugitive officer told me. "Here we have only two expressions: Free Lebanon and Occupied Lebanon. Over here, it's Free Lebanon; where you come from, it's Occupied Lebanon."**

**The fact that "Free Lebanon" depends on Israel for its defense and part of its livelihood doesn't make it any less free, Haddad informed me.**

**• Yes, around 1,000 border strip residents work in Israel regularly.**

**• Yes, the border strip exports some of its agricultural products to Israel.**

**• Yes, the border strip buys what it doesn't have from Israel.**

**• Yes, the border strip gets "all kinds of assistance, military or**

advisory," from Israel. "Whatever we ask for we get. *Carte blanche*, as they say. There are no more secrets, darling."

But:

- "We depend on no one but God and the homeland."
- "We are our own masters."
- "We're cooperating with Israel as equals."
- "If we wanted to, we could cut our relations with Israel in five minutes."
- "We're not tied to anything. We can go with China."

As for his resistance to the return of Lebanese government authority to "Free Lebanon," Haddad pointed out that only last month, he had talks with the Lebanese Army and agreed to the deployment of some of its units in and around Marjeyoun on November 5.

Army Commander General Victor Khoury denied the talks and the agreement initially, Haddad conceded, but he fell silent when Haddad produced a television film strip showing his meeting with a Lebanese Army officer in the Marjeyoun barracks.

The film strip, which was shown on Israeli television, is backed by a series of photographs which Haddad says he took on the occasion — just as a precaution against denials from Beirut.

The Army officer who appeared in the film strip, Haddad told me, has been jailed. "This is not likely to encourage other officers and soldiers to obey official orders in future... What kind of superior is this who can't protect his men, he's so frightened of this and that?"

The Lebanese Army changed its mind about deploying in the border strip because it came under pressure from the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Lebanese leftists, Haddad charged.

Still, whenever the Army decides to deploy in the border strip, "I'm still ready, despite everything. Whenever they want to come, *ahlan wa sahlan*."

- On what terms?

"Certain things were agreed upon."

- Would he and his men lay down their arms when the Army came in?

"The answer to that would have come at the appropriate time, when the agreement was implemented... If (my men) were soldiers, they're still soldiers. No discharge decision has been taken against them... As for me, there's no problem involved... When I find that Lebanon is all right, Saad Haddad will no longer be a problem. He can stay or leave — it doesn't matter."

- Would he close the "Good Fence" on the Lebanese-Israeli borders?

"That question is premature."

As we talked, we were surrounded by a group of Haddad's militiamen, who offered their views on the various subjects discussed when they felt the occasion demanded it, and often applauded their leader's answers.

Among their leader's answers, I would mention the following:

-- He has had meetings with American officials -- not in the U.S., "maybe in Cyprus," -- "and they understood our point of view. We and they are moving along the same lines, thank God." He supports any American initiative in Lebanon, "because the Americans are against communism, and so are we."

-- Western Europe is under the thumb of the Arab oil-producing countries, and "no good can come from them."

-- The West should help the Lebanese people and not worry about Arab oil. "Let them stop their wheat supplies to the Arabs and tell the Arabs to drink their oil."

-- The Arab summit conference, which is expected to deal with the South Lebanese problem this week, "is useless." President Elias Sarkis, Premier Selim Hoss and Foreign Minister Fuad Butros "will return from it as they went to it."

-- UNIFIL's information policy "is terrorist-oriented." This may be because "the terrorists are paying (U.N. Secretary General Kurt) Waldheim."

So "terrorist-oriented" is UNIFIL, in fact, that Haddad feels that if he gives it "one more centimeter" of Lebanese territory, he will be "giving it to the terrorists."

He adds, "Our confidence in UNIFIL is being reduced by the passage of time."

This, however, has done nothing to reduce the man's special brand of humor.

When he saw the *Monday Morning* photographer, he put on a fierce face and snapped: "No! There's a new law in Free Lebanon now. No photographs of me."

This was followed by a belly laugh and the assurance that we could take as many photographs as our little hearts desired.

"You want me to pose like a cowboy?" he asked, springing up and holding his arms away from his body, fingers rigid, ready for a quick draw.

The interview was conducted outside Haddad's home, in somewhat rickety armchairs overlooking the road, and it was frequently interrupted by the jovial greetings Haddad threw at passers-by.

"Sorry to receive you in the street," he grinned, "but this is where I receive all my guests. I'm a simple man."

When he had answered the last question, he grabbed his hat and drove off in his old Mercedes, explaining that he had to attend the funeral of one of his men.

The militiamen who had driven us to Haddad's home from the edge of the UNIFIL zone drove us back to "Occupied Lebanon."

On the way, they gave us a tour of Marjeyoun. As in the rest of the border strip, tanks were visible everywhere -- all with cedars painted on them.

We stopped at a small house peeking out at us from behind a mountain of sandbags. The family that greeted us there told us that their "real" house had been destroyed.

As they served us coffee, I noticed that every member of the family was wearing a cross. Come to think of it, there were crosses all over the border strip, including the cars.

"What do they say about us in Beirut?" the husband asked me. "Do they say we're savages, inhuman people? Believe me, it's not easy to live here. We're being shelled constantly. My son and my wife have been injured. But we're with the Major. He's more than a military man; he's a man with feelings; he feels for his people; he's close to them. And at least we're in a free Lebanon here."

We also dropped in on "The Voice of Hope," the radio station which a U.S.-Canadian mission has started in Marjeyoun, to the delight of Haddad, who has been using it to make his various pronouncements.

The two Canadians and one American who run the station are in Tel Aviv, we were told. It's their day off.

As we drove by the Israeli border, Haddad's men waved at the drivers of the Israeli trucks and jeeps coming into Lebanon and leaving it.

"This one," one militiaman explained, pointing at an Israeli truck, "is bringing in sand to pave our roads."

I saw the famous "Good Fence" gate. It was closed at the time, but Israeli soldiers were chatting with Lebanese villagers.

"We can take you to Jerusalem if you want," said one militiaman.

But we headed north instead.

Sunset was a few minutes away, and the countryside was flushing a pretty pink.

A beautiful sight, I thought, an exhilarating sight.

So why was I so depressed?

Never mind. My interview with Saad Haddad went like this:

You have announced that you have had talks with the Lebanese Army and agreed to the deployment of an Army unit in and around Marjeyoun. General Victor Khoury has denied that any of this has happened. Who are we to believe?

You can believe the television film strip (about the meeting between Haddad and a Lebanese Army officer in Marjeyoun,

shown recently on Israeli television). I also have a lot of photographs on the meeting in the barracks. I'll bring them out and show them to you, if you want.

It's unfortunate to see the level they've sunk to: they don't dare tell the truth. First they raise a big fuss about Major Haddad being the obstacle which is blocking the deployment of the Army, and then...

It wasn't out of love for them or out of weakness on my part. I wanted to take a step which might bring peace to Lebanon, because my goal is peace in Lebanon and people living in peace of mind. So I told them to come.

If they had gone on talking (denying the meeting), I was going to reveal the names of the officers who have come here. But they stopped talking, so I didn't expose them. They know themselves — from Victor Khoury down. They know who talked to us and contacted us and contacted Israel. We have documents proving everything. They can't play any games with us.

**You don't want to reveal any names?**

No. As I said, if they had gone on that way, I would have exposed them. But they sensed that I was going to, and they stopped talking. Then, of course, there was irrefutable proof: I'm sorry I had to use that TV film strip, but I had learned my lesson from past experience.

Everyone knows that our forces were all legitimate, and our dealings were with the legitimate authorities. I came here on official orders. Our relations with them (*the authorities*) remained normal until the Syrians came and grabbed them by the throat. That's when they started denying everything. They started saying: "No, no, we didn't tell Major Haddad to do this; we didn't send Major Haddad."

I'm sorry I took photographs, but I did it to dot the i's and cross the t's. You will notice that I didn't use the TV film to begin with. We just announced on the radio that such and such had happened. But one just can't... I mean, a step that would have changed the course of events — one couldn't have kept it a secret. The Army was supposed to come here on November 5. We had to announce it.

Then Abu Iyad and Abu al-Walid and Klailat and all that watermelon crowd exerted pressure on them. We had nothing to do with it. It's regrettable that we have come to this — that a man can't say what he wants, or rather, what he's doing.

If the officials really want to rebuild Lebanon, I wish they would be frank and say what they want, what they're planning, what they want to do: "We want to take such and such a step." If I want to get to that house, I should say I want to get to that house. But no — everything has to be done in hiding; we're afraid so and so will do such and such. What is this? At any rate, I believe this question is done with. They all stopped talking when they saw the television film. I'm sorry about Captain Bou Hammin (*who appeared in the film*). They tell me they took him to Sarba and slapped him in jail and so on. This is not likely to encourage other officers and soldiers to obey official orders in future, because they know now that the authorities are so weak that they can't defend them. What kind of authorities are these? What kind of superior is this who can't protect his men, he's so frightened of this and that?

At any rate, since we're on the subject, I would like to address an invitation to all the officers who consider themselves free men. I say to them: don't pin too many hopes on that area; if you want to live in dignity, come over here; you'll all be welcome.

**You say you agreed with the Army to have the deployment take place in this area on November 5?**

That's what I said. It didn't happen. Nevertheless, I made a statement on the radio; I told them if they want to come in, I'm still ready, despite everything. Whenever they want to come, *ahlan wa sahlam*, even though the first attempt has failed.

You were once against the deployment of the Army in the border strip; now you say you're all for it...

I answered that in my answer to your first question. My aim is to bring peace back to Lebanon — if this step will bring peace, which it won't. Developments have established that the terrorists are very attached to the land which is under their control now, and they're not going to let it go. All the rest is blah blah. They're trying to pull the wool over people's eyes. "We want the Army," they say. "We want to strengthen the Lebanese authorities." Nobody wants to strengthen the Lebanese authorities. They're all liars and sons of liars.

So anyway, it's only my love for Lebanon that made me change my position.

And does this change mean that you have changed your attitude toward the Lebanese Army — the Army which you opened fire on on several occasions, to block its deployment in the areas under your control? If so, what's behind this change of attitude?

I told you what's behind the change. Furthermore, we never pointed our guns at the Army. We gave them a warning, and when we fired — yes, we did fire — we fired around them. We had warned them. They knew ahead of time.

They should thank us for this, actually, first because all the officers who were there got medals and promotions — all because of the shells we dropped around them. They should send us a letter of thanks, all these officers. Had it not been for us, they wouldn't have gotten anything.

Secondly, we spared them a huge massacre in that operation. Maybe on your way here you saw the hills overlooking that area (where the Lebanese battalion passed when it was deployed in the zone of the

*U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon — UNIFIL — earlier this year*). The militias could have set up (*untranslatable*) ambushes for them. They had them in a mortar and they could have easily been the pestle; they could have pounded them in that mortar and there wouldn't have been one man left to tell the tale.

But we didn't want a massacre. That's why we warned them. We told them in advance: "Listen guys, don't come." We had talks with Adib Saad and others. We held several meetings with Adib Saad and an intelligence officer that followed him — Ahmad I-don't-know-what. We told them: "Listen guys, watch out." But they wouldn't listen. The Army commander insisted that "everyone must bear his responsibilities." But we still have humanitarian feelings which won't allow us to undertake a massacre or to let anyone else undertake one. That's the only thing that stopped us from... Otherwise, it would have been the biggest blow ever. Not one of the 600 soldiers would have lived to tell the tale. Nothing could have been easier.

You have been quoted as saying that it was Israeli pressure that made you change your position against your will.

What that newspaper published was a lie. I'm disappointed in the reporter, who came here and interviewed me and then distorted my statements. I'm not accustomed to her distorting my statements. Why did she do it? I don't know.

She wrote, quoting me, that America exerted pressure on Israel and Israel exerted pressure on me. Let's assume I'm a child; even if I were, I wouldn't declare that. It was so stupid of them to put out such a thing in my name.

I'm really sorry she attributed that statement to me, because I didn't make it.

She asked me just about the same question you did. She put it this way: "The people don't understand why you've

changed your position." I said to her: "Why, since when have the people understood anything?" I said to her: "Had the Lebanese people been capable of understanding, all this wouldn't have happened to Lebanon. Unfortunately, the Lebanese people, for all their learning and culture, lack a great deal of awareness, and that is what has destroyed our country."

So Israel has nothing to do with this matter. We are our own masters. It is true that we are cooperating with Israel — there's no doubt about that — but we're cooperating as equals. If we wanted to, we could cut our relations with Israel in five minutes. No problem. The choice is ours. We're not tied to anything. We can go with China.

**Is it possible that the change in your position means that the Army had changed its attitude toward you and was going to deploy in this area on your terms? If so, what were those terms?**

Certain things were agreed upon, but unfortunately, everything fell apart.

If they (*the authorities*) really wanted a solution, they wouldn't care about Yaser Arafat or anyone else. Imagine the foreign ministry justifying itself to Yaser Arafat and saying, "No we didn't send a cable, no we didn't send a cable to Waldheim"! (*The reference is to a statement issued by the Lebanese foreign ministry two weeks ago denying a statement attributed to Arafat to the effect that the Lebanese authorities presented a memorandum to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in 1978 recognizing the "legitimacy" of Haddad and his militias.*)

**So the deployment of the Army in this area has been called off. What next?**

It's going to be a long story, a long story yet.

**If the Army is deployed in the border strip, are you and your men ready to lay down your arms?**

The answer to that would have come at the appropriate time, when the agreement reached was implemented.

"You and your men"! Who are my men? If they were soldiers, they're still soldiers. No discharge decision has been taken against them. They are still legitimacy, and no one can discharge them.

As for me, there's no problem involved. My only concern is Lebanon — nothing else. When I find that Lebanon is all right, Saad Haddad will no longer be a problem. He can stay or leave — it doesn't matter.

**If the Army were to come in, would you and your men take your orders from it?**

If the Army corrects its course, we will be ready to take orders from it. But as long as it remains under the terrorists' domination, let it handle its affairs with the terrorists.

**If the Army were to deploy in the border strip, would you sever your relations with Israel and close the "Good Fence"?**

That question is premature. Okay?

**There is an arrest warrant out in your name on charges of desertion and hostile action against the Army. In what circumstances, if any, would you be ready to stand trial on those charges?**

I've said it before, and I'll say it again: When Lebanon becomes independent again, when it returns to the Lebanese, I will be ready to stand trial. We will then see who was right and who wasn't.

**The general impression is that since you depend on Israel for your weapons, your salary and the salaries of your men, you are under total Israeli control. Do you challenge this view? If so, on what grounds?**

As I told you, we are free men, and we're dealing with Israel as equals. The (Lebanese) authorities knew this a long time ago. Why didn't they say anything about this cooperation before we expanded it?

At one point, when we were in trouble, in danger of annihilation, we asked them to send us the Army. They said, "Have pity! We can't! We have no road to use!" and so on. Is this the first time they've noticed Israel? May they all be gored!

We are under no one's control. We are free men, and we are fighting not only for ourselves but also for Lebanon. You all know it. Had it not been for this area here, no one would have been left in Lebanon — no Christians and no Moslems. The Moslems would have still been there, it's true, but they would have been there under alien boots. And the Christians? They were supposed to either emigrate or live here like dogs. They would not have been entitled to the Presidency. There would have been no Sarkis, no Victor Khoury, no Selim Hoss, nobody.

We understand that a large number of Lebanese in this area are earning their livelihood in Israel. How many of the border strip's residents are working in Israel right now?

Around a thousand people are working in Israel now. But the rest are all working here — farming, construction, commerce. There are a lot of work opportunities in our area now. If you have anyone, send him over. We need workers.

We also understand that Israel is keeping you supplied with your needs — food and other consumer products — and buying much of your production. Could you give us any figures about what you're getting from Israel, and what Israel is getting from you?

We have expenses like any other people. We haven't changed. Our needs are anyone's needs. What we don't find here we buy from Israel, and what we do have here we don't need to buy from Israel. As for Israel, it may get some of our

agricultural production if we don't have anywhere else to export it to. Whatever we find difficulty exporting to other places we sell to Israel, and our products are mostly agricultural.

It has often been said that there are Israeli military "advisors" in the border strip. May we have your comments on these reports?

To begin with, you can keep that expression — "border strip." We're neither a border strip nor a watermelon strip. Leave those expressions for domestic consumption in occupied Lebanon. Here, we have only two expressions: Free Lebanon and Occupied Lebanon. Over here, it's Free Lebanon; where you come from, it's Occupied Lebanon.

As for the advisors, we get them when we need them. In times of need, we can get all kinds of assistance — military or advisory. Whatever we ask for we get. *Carte blanche*, as they say. There are no more secrets, darling.

Many politicians, including Premier Selim Hoss, believe that Israel's ultimate aim is to annex the South if it can, and that you are making that goal more accessible to the Israelis by cooperating with them. Your comments?

What prevented Israel from occupying South Lebanon in 1967? Was it the artillery of Rashid Karami or the army of Rashid Karami that prevented it? Had it wanted to, it would have occupied the South a long time ago. It doesn't need Saad Haddad or anyone else to help it. Let Selim Hoss save Lebanon from the Syrians, and he will have our thanks. But what does he control over there? He controls his underpants.

You have been quoted as saying that your goal is the unity, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. How does your



total dependence on Israel serve the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon? And how does your declaration of "Free Lebanon" serve Lebanon's unity?

These questions are really shameful. I'm really disappointed that you are asking such questions. Or maybe you haven't understood the situation yet.

To begin with, Free Lebanon is not secessionist, but unfortunately — and you know it, since you're living it — the rest of Lebanon is under the occupation of the Syrians or the terrorists. Did you see any checkpoints in this area on your way here? Not one. But wherever there are alien forces, there are occupation forces. This is the only part of Lebanon that remains free — in the hope that we will liberate the rest or see it liberated. When all of Lebanon is liberated, that's it: we'll be finished; we'll return to the one Lebanon. We have said and we still say that our capital is Beirut; we will not let our capital go.

Our dependence on Israel? We depend on no one but God and the homeland. We're working for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. No one else is. Everyone else is working to sell Lebanon. We're working to put Lebanon on its feet again. In return for what? Money? There's no money here. This is a poor area, and none of us is after money: there's no theft, no looting. We're fighting the others because we have faith in this country. Unfortunately, few are willing to work for nothing.

You have said that you want the Palestinians out of Lebanon, and yet you have allied yourselves with Israel, which is blocking the Palestinians' efforts to return to their own homes. How do you explain this?

If Lebanon alone must bear the burden of the Palestinians, forget it. Why doesn't beloved, fraternal Syria, which supports the Palestinians, allow them to go to the Golan and work from there. Why doesn't it allow

them to wear military uniforms in Syria, when here they're considered sacred? Why must Lebanon bear their burden?

We have allied ourselves with Israel to drive out the Palestinians, the Syrians and every other alien. Is that a sacrilege? Are we married to them? Do we and the Palestinians have a Maronite marriage? No divorce possible? We want a divorce. Or do you want them here forever?

You want the Syrians out. If they do go out, are you ready to sever your relations with Israel — keeping in mind that those relations are one of the major obstacles blocking national accord?

First get the Syrians out of Lebanon. Then you'll see Ibrahim Klailat come to us — to Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel. The same goes for Walid Junblatt. There'd be no problem then. When Lebanon returns to the Lebanese, there will be no problem. We won't think of Israel or anyone else then. Let them get out and the Lebanese will be fine; we'll get back together. There won't be any national accord as long as the Syrians remain in the country, because the others don't have freedom of opinion. When they get that freedom, we can start talking about national accord and any other accord.

Could you tell us why you closed all roads in this area to UNIFIL traffic last week?

What happens between us and them — we consider it *cuisine intérieure*; an internal problem, in other words. We sometimes have differences of view, and we settle them immediately, internally. We had a problem, and we settled it. In my last meeting with them, they made a commitment to fight with us in the event of an attack on us by infiltrators inside the UNIFIL lines. They promised to open fire on the terrorists in the event of such an attack. So far, they haven't been opening fire; from now on, they will.

UNIFIL spokesmen have been talking

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030032-1

13 DECEMBER 1979

NO. 2057

2 OF 2

about an escalation in your men's military operations against U.N. positions in your area and the UNIFIL zone. Could you tell us why you're attacking those positions?

Two days ago, one Dutch soldier was killed and another wounded in a mine explosion. That mine was planted by the terrorists south of Tyre. So far, 37 (UNIFIL troops) have died — or maybe 33; I don't know exactly. They were all killed by the terrorists.

There's your answer as to who's responsible for the violations and who's blocking the efforts. It's not enough for Yaser Arafat to say, "We're cooperating with the U.N. forces" for the world to believe him.

Around 20 months have passed since the deployment of UNIFIL in South Lebanon. Are you more prepared today to consider the possibility of a UNIFIL take-over of the border strip, as a first step toward the return of government authority to the area?

There are now 40 terrorist bases inside UNIFIL lines. If we give UNIFIL one more centimeter, we'll be giving it to the terrorists. So you see, our confidence in UNIFIL is being reduced with the passage of time. In other words, nothing can scratch our itch like our own fingernails.

What is your attitude toward the U.N.-U.S. peace plan, which is supported by the Lebanese government and which calls for the withdrawal of all armed elements — including your men, the Lebanese Arab Army, the National Movement and the Palestinian guerillas — from the area south of the Litani and the deployment of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army in that area?

We have invited the Lebanese Army to come in, but it hasn't come. Furthermore, they must clear the area north of the Litani, not south of it. When they get them

out of the area north of the Litani, those who are south of it will get out immediately.

You have accused UNIFIL of cooperating with the Palestinians and the leftists. The leftists are meanwhile accusing UNIFIL of cooperating with you. Don't you see in this evidence of UNIFIL's neutrality?

No. Because whenever an incident occurs, the first statement that is made by the UNIFIL spokesman over there blames us for it. Later, when we protest, he recognizes the facts and apologizes. But his first reaction, his instinctive reaction, is to blame us

This may be because the terrorists are paying Waldheim. The terrorists pay out a lot of money. They have it. They're paying Waldheim. Here, they (UNIFIL) tell us that they're acting on orders from New York.

I'll give you a small example: I've forbidden UNIFIL helicopter overflights. Whenever they ask me, I tell them to fly over the terrorists' positions. They say they don't trust the terrorists. "So why do you want to fly over my territory?" I ask, and they say, "Because we trust you." So I tell them: "Go tell that to Waldheim and have him declare it before the Security Council. Then I'll give you much more than overflight permission." But they won't say it. They have the facts, but they won't reveal them. Their information policy is terrorist-oriented.

A few weeks ago, you demanded talks with the PLO and Syria. Does this mean that you're ready to reach an understanding with them? If so, on what terms?

I have the door open to negotiations with anyone. I am ready, without prior conditions, to enter into negotiations with anyone who says: "I want to work for peace in Lebanon and would like to see peace restored in Lebanon." Because our goal is clear: Lebanon for the Lebanese. On that basis, we will talk to anyone.

Raymond Edde has suggested the deployment of non-Syrian Arab troops with UNIFIL in the South. Would you accept that?

Arab troops were deployed with the Syrians once, and what did they accomplish? If it was going to rain, we would have seen some clouds. Raymond Edde — let him stay in Paris. He doesn't know what's going on anymore. Maybe he's senile now. I wonder how old he is. God help him. There was a time when he had some understanding, but now he's lost it. We're trying to get rid of the Arabs' dirt; so he wants to get us more Arabs?

The Arab summit conference which will discuss the South Lebanese problem is scheduled to be held on November 20. You've heard what the Lebanese government hopes to achieve at that conference: support for the implementation of Security Council resolutions in all parts of the South and help in the regulation of Palestinian armed presence and military activities in and from this area. Do you approve of these goals?

To begin with, the summit is useless; they'll return from it as they went to it. They've had a hundred thousand summits, and they're not ever going to achieve anything. Watch them disagree tomorrow. It's all a waste of time. They're trying to get people's minds off the real problem. Every once in a while, they come up with something like this.

And also, they (*the Lebanese government*) say they want to go to the summit in total agreement (*with the PLO and Syria*). If the Lebanese, the Syrians and the Palestinians reach an agreement, there won't be any problems left, so why should they go to the summit?

How do you evaluate your present attitude toward the United States? Do you support the so-called "American initiative" in South Lebanon?

Yes, we're with the American initiative.

Why?

Because the Americans are against communism, and so are we. America is not going to give us a homeland ruled by leftists, and we are fighting those (*leftist*) currents.

Did you meet with Philip Habib when he visited this region last month?

No.

We hear you've visited the United States. Is it true? If so, what was the purpose of the visit, and did you meet with any U.S. officials?

No, it isn't true. We have met with U.S. officials, but not in the United States.

Where then?

What do you care? Not in the United States. Maybe in Cyprus.

What happened at the meeting?

They understood our point of view. We and they are moving along the same line, thank God.

How do you evaluate the West European position on the Lebanese problem in general and the Southern problem in particular?

The West European countries are under the influence of Arab oil. No good can come from them. They won't adopt anything but the position of the terrorists and the Arabs.

What do you want the U.S. and Western Europe to do to help Lebanon solve its problem?

They must help the people who are with them and not be afraid of petroleum. Let them stop their wheat supplies to the Arabs and tell the Arabs to drink their oil. Then you'll see how all problems will be solved. At any rate, I see this coming. The day will come when this will happen, no doubt about it.

Do you have any contacts with the

**Phalangist Party and the National Liberal Party in Beirut?**

Yes.

**Do you coordinate your actions with them?**

Not always, but the contacts are there.

**Do you expect an early solution of the Lebanese problem?**

No.

**What is the solution that you envisage?**

The withdrawal of all aliens from Lebanon and the return of Lebanon to the Lebanese.

There's one more thing I'd like to say:

I hear that eight (*Lebanese Army*) officers have filed suit in protest against the recent Army promotions — including Elias Khalil and Hanna Jaara and I don't know who. They've filed suit — hear this — because they weren't promoted. It's okay to file suit with the Advisory Council, but they know that there are no courts and no authorities. It would have been more appropriate for them to complain to the Zahrani court, which recently sentenced two people to death. That court can give them their rights, maybe, but the Lebanese State? ... Let them go to the Zahrani court. At any rate, they're all my friends and I value them.

Another thing: I can tell Elias Khalil why he wasn't promoted, although he's an excellent officer. He wasn't promoted because he worked with the Phalangists at Socomex (*a building in Saifi, East Beirut, where the Phalangist Party had offices during the two-year war*) and there's a witness against him: (*Armed Intelligence*

*Director*) Johnny Abdo. But Johnny Abdo has forgotten himself. He was chief of the Phalangist Deuxieme Bureau at the time. Right? But he promoted himself and stood against the others. The least he could have done would have been to equate himself with that guy.

**Do you have any messages to relay to the Lebanese people?**

There are no Lebanese people, but I will send a message to the people of East Beirut, the free people:

My advice to them is to agree among each other and stop fighting over who's the *za'im* (boss) while they're sitting on the shaft. The Lebanese loves to be the *za'im* even when he's sitting on the shaft. This is not the time to fight over *za'imship*. This is the time for them all to agree so that we can get out of this mess. When we get out of it, they can play *za'im* all they want. Whoever wants to can be a *za'im* then, but not now. I appeal to them to forget their rivalries, put their *za'imships* in the fridge for now, and fish them out later. All the in-fighting that's going on is over who's the *za'im*.

Second: I advise them to watch out for the shafts which the Deuxieme Bureau and the Syrians are preparing for them, because these too are behind the differences that are occurring between them. Certain elements are infiltrating their ranks to get them fighting among each other and bring their houses down over their heads.

Tell them that the Lebanese have no one to depend on but the Lebanese. Tell them not to run after money, because you can't take it with you.

CSO: 4820

LIBYA

LIBYAN SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMENTS ON WORLD, ARAB AFFAIRS

Tunis AL-SABAH in Arabic 16 Nov 79 pp 6, 7

[Interview with 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki by 'Abd al Hamid al Qasibi and Muhammad ibn Salih: "It is an Error to Say That Palestinian Presence in Lebanon is Reason for Lebanese Crisis; There Are No Problems Between al Jamahiriyah and Tunisia; Question of Continental Shelf is Proceeding Normally; Carter's Decision to Freeze all Iranian Funds Sets Dangerous Precedent in International Relations; Summit May Take New Measures to Strengthen Arab Boycott Against Egyptian Regime"]

[Text] We met yesterday morning before the opening of the Conference of Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs with Dr 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki, the secretary of foreign affairs of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah. It was a coincidence that 2 years ago to the day we had conducted a similar interview with him, and he had indicated to us at that time that it was necessary to isolate the Egyptian regime from the rest of the Arabs. (This came about less than half a year later).

At the outset of his interview with us Dr al-Turayki was careful to praise and to commend the positions that AL-SABAH Newspaper had taken in the past 2 years vis a vis different Arab questions. He offered special praise for yesterday's editorial which dealt with the question of the Iranian funds that were frozen by the U.S. government.

Commenting on what is happening in Iran, Dr al-Turayki said in this regard. "The Islamic Revolution that has broken out in this country must be considered a historical event throughout the Islamic and the Arab world. Iran had been a threat to the safety of the Arab nation, and the shah's regime had dealt with the Israeli enemy and with South Africa; but the situation has changed overnight. Iran has become an inseparable part of the Arab and Islamic struggle against Zionism and imperialism, and the Iranian Revolution has turned into a genuine [source of] support for the Arab nation. It was natural that Iran pay dearly for this change. There is nothing curious about the hostilities we are experiencing these days. These hostilities are directed against the Iranian people by imperialist forces. These hostilities include infamous attempts to create problems for this revolution inside the country and abroad in an effort to liquidate it."

Dr al-Turayki added, "The fact that the United States has admitted the shah into the United States as a guest is only one link in a series of conspiracies against the Iranian Revolution. We must consider the measure that Carter took in this regard a dangerous precedent in international relations. We can still remember what the U.S. government did against Dr Musaddaq in 1953 when he tried to nationalize [Iran's] oil. What the United States did then postponed the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution.

"The measure requiring that Iranian funds be frozen in U.S. banks may fall under the category of international terrorism that is carried out by a major state against a fraternal nation whose only guilt is the fact that it got rid of dictatorship and imperialist hegemony. We must draw the attention of weak nations, and especially Arab nations, to this matter because the subject in fact is not that of hostages, but it is rather an integrated plan to starve the Iranian people and plunder their wealth. The Arabs have to declare full solidarity with Iran. They must also not increase oil production so as not to become victims of such terror, on the one hand, and not to betray the Arab and the Islamic nation, on the other."

[Question] Do you expect the Arab Summit Conference to produce concrete results that would be advantageous to the Arab cause?

[Answer] This is a regular meeting. The notion that the Arabs meet regularly to study their concerns and their issues is in itself good. This meeting is taking place at the end of a full year of integrated political activity which followed the Baghdad Conference. The Arabs were able during this year to achieve concrete results in foiling the alarming imperialist Zionist plot which is exemplified specifically in the Camp David Treaty.

Throughout this year the Arabs did in fact rise to the level of responsibility, and a serious change did take place [in their midst]. This change led to the departure of the largest Arab state from the Arab line following its alignment with the enemy. I believe that the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and from the Islamic Conference; the condemnation of the outcome of Camp David expressed at the Monrovia Meeting and at the Havana Meeting, where a committee was formed to look into suspending Egypt's membership in the Organization of Non-Aligned Countries; and the bilateral actions taken by the Arab countries in this regard in particular constitute a firm response to the positions of the Egyptian regime.

[Question] Will the Tunis Summit confirm the penalties that were imposed against Egypt by the Baghdad Summit Conference so that the penalties can actually be carried out? Will new measures to that effect be taken?

[Answer] I believe that the Tunis Summit will evaluate the penalties that have so far been accomplished. It may devote itself to studying a new formula for strengthening the Arab boycott against the Egyptian regime and for taking new measures towards that boycott, such as, for example, blocking any Arab investment in Egypt, even if it were an individual investment, and also closing Arab air space to Egyptian aircraft.

It is truly regrettable that Egypt should become a tool which Israel is using to break the economic blockade that has been imposed on South Africa. This is a very serious matter about which we cannot be silent. We have recently learned that Israel has persuaded Egypt to sell part of the Sinai oil to South Africa which, it is also being said, will be able to sail its commercial ships through the Suez Canal.

[Question] The Egyptian regime has been saying for some time that the Arab boycott has not and will not affect it regardless of the measures that are to be taken to strengthen it. What do you think about this?

[Answer] This is not true. The Egyptian regime is assuming that Egyptian and Arab public opinion is stupid. If this boycott continues, the Egyptian regime will collapse. At any rate the vital historical point that we must make a note of is that for the first time the Arab League is playing its national role in the best way. In the past it had been a center for bureaucracy and for impeding Arab action. Thank God that it is now performing significant actions in its new position and situation. But we are noticing that some Arab countries are not adhering fully to the boycott measures and have not yet clarified their positions, not to mention the fact that they sometimes attend [the meetings of] Muhammad Riyad's League and sometimes those of the Arab League in Tunisia. I believe that the Tunis Summit has to settle this matter and to ask these countries to explain their positions once and for all.

[Question] Will the problem of South Lebanon be a basic item [on the agenda] of the summit?

[Answer] The Lebanese problem is not actually, as is being said in some circles, a Lebanese-Palestinian problem. We must not read into this matter more than what does in fact exist. The basis of this problem lies in the existing social struggle in Lebanon which began in 1958 when the Palestinians were not there. The matter, then, does not go beyond being a dispute among the Lebanese people themselves. Consequently, it is the Lebanese people themselves who have to settle this dispute. The organized Palestinian presence in Lebanon cannot be the subject of debate. On the contrary, the Palestinians must be everywhere and on all fronts. There is no doubt that Lebanon is carrying a major responsibility in this regard, but it must not carry this responsibility alone because the problem is ultimately an Arab-Israeli problem. If Lebanon were to submit any proposal to the summit requesting material and military support, al-Jamahiriyyah will be quite willing to offer this support. I do not think that the remaining Arab countries will lag behind in fulfilling this duty. To put it briefly at this point, the problem is not that of the presence of Palestinians in South Lebanon; the matter rather pertains to an alarming plot which resulted from the Camp David Accords and is ultimately being manifested in the creation of problems for Syria in view of the fact that it is a confrontation country. It has been noticed that these problems have increased after Egypt and Israel signed the recent Sinai Agreement.



[Question] Can you tell us something on this occasion about the latest in Tunisian-Libyan relations and about the problem of the Continental Shelf? (The actual time for opening the meeting had gone by, and we were still with him).

[Answer] There is no problem pending with regard to the question of the Continental Shelf because an agreement has been reached to turn the matter over to the International Court. The matter has actually been turned over to the International Court, and it is now proceeding normally, and the court will look into it in due course when it completes its measures.

In general, our relations with the fraternal country of Tunisia have also been proceeding normally. We are always trying to develop these relations because of the historical ties that bind us to the Tunisian people and in spite of what is being done against us by hostile, outside forces. In my opinion it is an exaggeration to say that these relations are now the best that they can be. But we would like for them to improve from good to better. I believe, therefore, that our relations must be ideal relations that would be a model for others to follow.

8592  
CSO: 4802

TUNISIA

ENVOYS REPORTED TO ASK EUROPEANS FOR AID AGAINST KHOMEYNIISM

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 11 Nov 79 p 6

[Text] Informed sources have reported that some Tunisian government and party officials have recently made a number of visits to the countries of Western Europe, the purpose of which was to persuade them to increase their assistance to Tunisia.

These sources said that the tenor of what was said between the Tunisian envoys and the representatives of the Western European countries can be summarized as follows: "Help us to protect you from a Khomeyniite Tunisia."

These sources point out that these words are inspired by the anxiety felt by the regime in Tunisia towards the growth, in recent months, of the politicized religious surge.

CSO: 4402

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UAE-CONOCO DEAL YIELDS GREAT PROFITS FOR DUBAI RULER

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 2 Nov 79 p 11

[Article: "Fantastic Deal Concluded by Mahdi al-Tajir for the Ruler of Dubai"]

[Text] UAE Ambassador to London Muhammad Mahdi al-Tajir, who still holds the post of special advisor to Ruler of Dubai Shaykh Rashid ibn Sa'id, has succeeded in making a deal, considered the deal of the year, with the American Continental Oil Company, which is exploiting the offshore oil fields of Dubai. He negotiated with the company--in the name of the ruler, naturally--for the emirate of Dubai to obtain 100,000 barrels of oil a day, out of the 400,000 barrels which the company produces, in order to sell it to some Third World countries at reduced prices. After the negotiations were finished, al-Tajir sold the same amount of oil to the company at the Rotterdam free market price. The profits from the operation were estimated at US\$17 per barrel, and the oil might be resold at a higher price. Thus Shaykh Rashid has increased his income by \$1.7 million a day, or about \$650 million each year.

Some persons with long tongues affirm that Ambassador Muhammad Mahdi al-Tajir might sell the amounts set aside for the emirate directly on the free market in Rotterdam. If so, the profits might double!

8559  
CSO: 4802

END