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12 December 1979

West Europe Report

(FOUO 69/79)

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

RIISING VIOLENCE FROM FOREIGN POLITICAL GROUPS IN FRG

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Nov 79 pp 133-137

[Unattributed Article: "Foreign Legion"]

[Text] The secret civil wars in the Federal Republic--
The Office for the Protection of the Constitution [BFV]
is issuing alarming reports: Violence among foreigners
is getting out of hand; their domestic political problems
are being transferred to the FRG.

Last Saturday in Ruesselsheim, Mustafa M. was on his way to working the overtime shift, even though some of his leftist radical compatriots had announced that they would beat up anyone who would not stay away from the plant. The hoodlums were waiting at the factory gate. Mustafa the Turk tried to run, but he did not get far. When the police found him, he had two broken ribs and a black eye. But he would not press charges for bodily harm: He said he had fallen down a flight of stairs.

At 0300, shots rang out in Frankfurt's Balkan Grill. There had been a confrontation between exiled Croats and followers of Tito: one dead, two seriously wounded. One of the injured, probably an exiled Croat, had disappeared before the police arrived at the scene.

The dead person had no identity papers and has still not been identified--
an indication that he had been a special agent of the Yugoslav secret service.

West Berlin criminal police arrested an Arab last June. He had been identified as the head of a PLO group which had been apprehended 3 months earlier as it was about to make a bombing attempt upon the Jewish Community Center. The arrested individual was released immediately, since he had diplomatic status: He was a member of the PLO delegation in East Berlin, accredited by the GDR.

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The above are three examples of jungle warfare on German soil involving the FRG security services since foreign activism has escalated to new levels. Foreign national internal revolutionary controversies are being introduced into Germany, and they are being conducted the same as in Iran, Palestine or Turkey: with threats, beatings and murder.

These events in Bavaria, Hesse and also in North Rhine-Westphalia are meanwhile the subject of thick top-secret reports regularly sent by the BFV to the federal and Land governments. The trend of all these counterintelligence reports shows that the FRG is importing an amount of violence of barely imaginable proportions. In the opinion of the president of one BFV office: "We are aware of only a small fraction of the problem."

There are two primary reasons for this. On the one hand, Bonn is bothered by these counterintelligence reports from the standpoint of delicate foreign relations. Therefore, only tentative surveillance is permitted; contacts with foreign security services, designed to gain an insight into political movements, is considered undesirable. Contact with Turkish security services, for instance, recently had to be severed.

The other reason, complains the counterintelligence chief, is that the "social isolation, frequently encouraged officially," between foreigners and Germans has progressed to such an extent that surveillance (who, with whom and where) has become impossible: "They live in ghettos according to ghetto rules." "It is almost impossible to put agents or informers in these places and if and when it can be done, it occasionally means death for the informer. That is a deterrent."

That is why the BFV is forced to rely mostly on guesswork. According to its estimates, there are about 1,000 foreign organizations in the FRG, but only a small number have been identified. Those known to counterintelligence--for example, Iranian student clubs or Turkish workers' organizations--hardly warrant official intervention in their activities: proper bylaws, peaceful meetings and, in case of demonstrations, prior notification of police.

The problem is, however, that they have some radical and even terrorist groups as hangers-on. They surface and then disappear just as suddenly. No one admits to ever having seen demonstrators within their own ranks who use knuckle-dusters and tire irons on members of the opposition; victims of attacks almost always claim that their attackers were "unknown."

Permission for German counterintelligence even to place such foreigners under surveillance, with whatever modest results, stems from an increase in its authority granted in 1972. At that time it was charged, by way of a change in the BFV Law, with observing political movements within the guest workers' group. There were quite specific reasons for this. Bonn was worried that the increasingly powerful West European communist parties could mobilize their nationals working in the FRG for infiltration activities leading to disturbances in factories and residential quarters and to difficulties in relationships with friendly governments.

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The prognosis was correct, but the fear groundless. In point of fact, Spanish, Italian and French communists constitute the largest groups of foreigners in the FRG today, but as a whole they are peaceful and disciplined. Not even during last June's European elections were there any fights on German soil between Enrico Berlinguer's comrades and the members of the neo-fascist social movement, who are usually at each others' throats back home.

So as not to incur Bonn's displeasure, regional headquarters of West European communist parties residing in the FRG maintain contacts neither with the German Communist Party nor the GDR's SED. The only interesting thing is that the Eurocommunists, who officially keep a certain distance from the CDSU, are forever sending their high officials from Germany to Moscow for training. The Spaniards are an exception: Santiago Carillo's comrades go to Madrid for their training.

The communists who have for years created operational problems for counter-intelligence are the ones from Belgrade. Bloody warfare is raging on German soil between Tito's secret service and Yugoslav dissidents. This must not become public knowledge, so as not to impair Bonn's relationship with the ancient chief of state in Belgrade--unless this becomes inevitable. Just recently, the public learned by the way that a Yugoslav exile had been found dead "from bullet wounds" in a forest near the small Rhenish town of Horrem. The bullet was in the back of the neck and came from a weapon exclusively used by the Belgrade secret service.

Yugoslavs on Tito's hit list are mostly Croats, irrespective of whether they are anticommunist nationalists or escaped communists who were victims of the Croat purge in 1972. There is no communication between the two groups, and neither the nationalists nor the ex-communists look for protection to German counterintelligence, which could result in an end to the continuing murders.

Their reluctance is understandable: If the exiled Croats were to seek help from the BFV, they would of necessity have to make a clean breast of their activities and thereby risk prosecution or even extradition. Instead, as counterintelligence experts note with resignation, they "engage in a hopeless struggle with the Yugoslav Secret Police, which solves its problems with gun in hand." The incomplete casualty list for the last 2 years includes eight dead, two of whom are probably secret service agents.

Surveillance of the mostly illegal foreign organizations of Turks, Iranians, Afghans and Palestinians in the FRG is similarly complex, though operating on many levels and therefore more obscure. As one investigating official puts it: "It is like an ant heap; it is impossible to tell who belongs to what." The balance sheet for the current year: the perpetrators of violent crimes (more than 40 in a single Land): not identified; various acts of factory sabotage: not solved; connections with foreign secret services: not determined.

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It is, however, certain that three major groups are involved with these nationals: Moscow party-line communists, social revolutionary Maoists and Islamic nationalists. It is just as certain that communists as well as nationalists are being financed from outside the country, while the Maoists do not get one penny from Peking.

It is certain finally that the Moscow party-liners' contacts are centered in East Berlin. CP Turks are trained there; CP Palestinians find hideouts there. And the CP Iranians hold their conferences there: The seat of the communist Tudeh party, which is still illegal in Iran, was recently shifted from Soviet Tiflis to the GDR, probably to avoid any conflicts between the USSR with Ayatollah Khomeyni. But beyond these insights the counterintelligence efforts remain in the dark. As a result, the BFV, restricted to operating on FRG territory and made only dimly aware of internal politics in foreign countries, bases its conjectures on those facts to which it has access.

It has, for instance, been noted that communist and Maoist students who returned to Iran after the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi are rather hastily returning to the FRG, some of them even through underground channels. Within their organizations they call for "regarding the ideological schism between the opposition groups as being of secondary importance and giving priority to building a united front against the imperialists and their accomplices"--among whom they also list the Ayatollah Khomeyni, whose firing squads are no kinder to the anti-shah leftists than they are to the shah rightists. There seems to be good reason for suspecting that the Islamic Republic of Iran's new secret police has no trouble finding the answers it seeks.

Khomeyni's agents recently proved their heavy-handedness while interrogating an Iranian student to determine whether he had served as an informant for the shah's secret service. In seeking help from the German authorities, he immediately fell victim to the formalities of a democratic constitutional state. Inasmuch as it was impossible to prove the use of violence on the part of his interrogators from home, they could not be prosecuted. Their victim was the only individual to be the subject of legal action. The charge: intelligence activities. He had admitted to occasionally having furnished opinion reports on the mood of the university students to agents of the shah.

Potentially dangerous political unrest is occurring also among students in Iran's neighboring state of Afghanistan, where Moslem rebels are waging guerilla warfare against the pro-Soviet regime. The majority of Afghan part-time students in the FRG is in sympathy with the Kabul regime, while a minority, organized in secret clubs, declares itself ready "to combat Soviet repression of the Afghan people."

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Occasionally, secret agents of another of Iran's neighboring states, Iraq, leave their traces in the FRG. They are searching for the leaders of the orthodox Muslim fraternity which is suspected by the socialist Baath regime of Bagdad to be responsible for a massacre of cadets in the Aleppo officer training school. Vengeance against the fugitives, for whom the search continues in Syria and Western Europe, is yet to come. German counterintelligence has a great interest in Iraq: It suspects that this is the location of training camps for Palestinian pro-communists, while the training camps for followers of the official PLO head, Yasser Arafat, are obviously concentrated in Lebanon. One thing is certain: Since Arafat has aligned himself with Khomeyni, pro-communist Iranians are no longer receiving weapons training in Lebanon.

Both Palestinian groups are active in the FRG. Their objective: Jewish establishments. Ten members of three combat commandos are interned pending trial in Bavaria and Berlin. They were arrested on arrival on 3 April, carrying about 60 kg of explosives.

But until now it has been impossible to determine under whose orders they were--those of Iraq or Lebanon. Nor is it known from where they received their orders within Europe. There is a choice of two possibilities: Paris and East Berlin. Says a high security official: "The only way to exercise any control over events is to have detailed knowledge of Palestinian political movements. Since we do not have that knowledge, any successes we have are a matter of luck."

The latest problem facing the BFV is a matter of both quality and quantity: The approximately 1.2 million Turks in the FRG belong to a most diverse number of political subgroups. Just as in their homeland, where Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit declared martial law in 17 civil-war-torn provinces, members of the right and left are in deadly confrontation in Germany as well.

According to counterintelligence information, Moscow party-line communists predominate among them. In contrast to their Spanish and Italian comrades, they are firmly and militantly organized. They are in firm control of the majority of guest workers, as can be seen by the astonishingly great number of communist Turks in the workers' councils of German enterprises.

At the same time a new group is expanding which numbers among its followers members of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party. It is establishing cultural centers everywhere in the FRG, ostensibly devoted to "instruction in the Koran and promotion of the national language."

According to counterintelligence service estimates, "we are dealing here with a neo-Islamic offensive which will have its consequences: withdrawal of Muslim Turks from the German population and the establishment of new ghettos, whence a relentless battle will be waged against the infidels, the communists. We were prepared for almost anything, but not for the unrest imported along with Islam."

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Problem Cases

The law requires the BFV to maintain surveillance over foreigners' activities in the FRG. This is no small task, merely considering the numbers involved. There is no way of identifying newly arriving individuals. Be they guest workers or students, the FRG must admit them, partly because of the liberal European Community rules, partly as a result of treaties with third states. The following figures show the numbers of foreigners living in Germany:

Turks	1,165,000
Yugoslavs	610,000
Italians	572,500
Spaniards	188,900
Frenchmen	61,200
Iranians	19,500
[Others	1,364,000]

TOTAL: 3,981,100

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FDP SEEKS TO PRESERVE IDENTITY AS ELECTION DRIVE STARTS

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Nov 79 pp 12-13

[Text] FDP between Schmidt and Strauss. Since Franz Josef Strauss assumed the leadership of the Union [CDU/CSU], the liberals can no longer resort to a plausible threat of a change in coalition. If they nevertheless seek conflict, they do so in order not to be entirely disregarded in the upcoming heated election battle of confrontations.

Once a year ago, the Free Democrats were still in good shape. Only with difficulty had SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt succeeded in keeping the small proud group of liberals under control when the resolution of the anti-terrorist law was at issue. FDP chief Hans-Dietrich Genscher had implored the deputies of his party not to let the coalition break apart under any circumstances.

In order to demonstrate this unpleasant prospect to the Social-Democratic coalition partner in graphic terms, Genscher had even taken pen in hand and written a "confidential" letter to the officials of his party, which immediately, as expected, became known to the Social Democrats as well. SPD [Bundestag] Deputy Conrad Ahlers offered a sober view of the future: "We rate this as preparatory actions for a change in coalitions."

In the meantime, a defection by the liberals to the Union has become unthinkable. A poor showing in the elections to the European Parliament (6 percent) and the municipal elections in North Rhine-Westphalia (6.5 percent), as well as a minus of 2.3 percent in the city elections in Bremen, has not exactly strengthened the FDP. Above all, however, it became unstuck by the nomination of Franz Josef Strauss as the Union's candidate for chancellor.

Already the first appearances of the Union team captain in Essen and Cologne, the reactions to them with scenes in court (Strauss had pointed his finger at SPD Federal Executive Director Egon Bahr as the "initiator" of the riots directed at him) and the subsequent propaganda skirmishes showed what we are in for next year; namely, confrontation all along the line.

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A Bundestag election campaign in that style--in which, in addition, two political superstars like Schmidt and Strauss will engage each other in battle--does not leave much room for the liberals anymore. Their hope expressed on blue and yellow posters--that as "partners of the citizen" they would be in even greater demand--has not been confirmed in the elections thus far.

Their concern over being crushed between the two unwieldy millstones is joined by the doubt about whether they will still be able to extricate themselves on their own in the foreseeable future from their "Babylonian captivity" (Strauss)--the alliance with the SPD. The fact that Genscher long ago recognized the necessity of changing horses at some point could be heard as long as 2 years ago from his faithful paladin, FDP spokesman Josef Gerwald. "One of these days we will be finished with them," according to Gerwald, "but we, of course, will determine the time."

Today Genscher no longer is in a position to determine anything in this respect. The golden times are over when CDU Chairman Helmut Kohl called his friend "Dieter" in the Foreign Affairs Ministry every other day to feed his hopes a little with cordial and probably also sympathetic words.

For a very brief time this summer, to be sure, a gleam of hope appeared on the horizon: the nomination of Lower Saxony Minister President Ernst Albrecht as the CDU's candidate for chancellor, which was undertaken unilaterally by the CDU Presidium. (It became invalid after the nomination of Strauss by the CDU/CSU Bundestag caucus).

In contrast to played-out opposition leader Kohl, it would have been possible to make a show with Albrecht, who at least appears to be liberal: It would have been possible for the FDP to expect their voters to go along with a coalition with him as chancellor; possibly the FDP could even have entered the 1980 Bundestag election campaign with appropriate "statements of fact" as a substitute for the hitherto customary "coalition statements." Such a "statement of fact" would no longer have committed Genscher in a binding way to continuing the present coalition with the SPD--without precluding it, however.

Ernst Albrecht, moreover, offered the guarantee that in the future, too, the liberals would be treated honorably--something which is no longer taken for granted in the by now stale coalition marriage with the Social Democrats. The Lower Saxony liberals have never forgotten that, after his still inexplicable election as minority minister president, the man from Hanover solicited their confidence in a moving way for over a year, and when the liberals finally joined his cabinet he proved to be an extraordinarily loyal senior partner.

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Albrecht, without question, would have been an alternative for Genscher that could have been marketed in a credible way. Strauss, of course, is not that. Thus the Union itself--through the nomination of such an extremely controversial candidate for chancellor--forged the FDP and the SPD together for better or for worse.

Under such circumstances it is not very honest for the Christian Democrats to continue to depict the FDP as a "bloc party"--quite aside from the association with those pseudo-bourgeois "bloc parties" of the GDR, which without any kind of independence have to whistle the tune of the SED. On the other hand, there is sooner a comical effect to the attempt on the part of North Rhine-Westphalian Land Chairman Horst-Ludwig Riemer to make it appear that the FDP was "more of a bloc party" at the time of its coalition with Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard "than today." If it was, then it has, in its time, detached itself twice from a bloc.

Precisely this appears to be more impossible today than ever. Because of their small numbers, the liberals have always been strong only as a government party--in opposition they disappear into sheer invisibility. After 1980, however, they can govern--continue to govern--in any event only with their present partner, the SPD--unless the other side gives up Strauss.

The to such an extent insoluble marriage makes Genscher and his men stubborn and arrogant at the same time. Already he has himself had rencontres in the cabinet with Hulmut Schmidt. Both sides declare today that this has been overcome in a reasonable manner. Genscher adds: "Besides Josef Ertl and Egon Franke, Schmidt and I are the most senior members of the cabinet. We have been sitting at this table for 9-1/2 years. That means everybody knows how the other reacts and how one must weigh the reactions of the other."

But an irritation rarely comes alone. The dispute over security policy, touched off by Herbert Wehner's motto of the "defensively armed" Soviet Union and his attacks on the minister of foreign affairs, was followed by the discord over the German contribution to development assistance. If one would believe eyewitnesses, chancellor and vice-chancellor fell out over this matter with a degree of sharpness unknown up to that point.

That the liberals in the meantime are taking the liberty of criticizing their coalition partner in public was shown by the speech of FDP Bundestag Deputy Hans-Guenter Hoppe in the budget deliberations of the Bundestag during the summer. Hoppe, who already in connection with last year's budget had sneered at the deficit policy of the government, this time really raved and ranted in his criticism of the debt volume of the federal budget.

Forced into an alliance with their senior partner, the right-wingers and rank-and-file liberals in the FDP at least are attempting to make the best of it: They are cooking on the fire of smoldering conflicts. No opportunity

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is missed to demonstrate that they themselves represent a different, and better, political conception. They no longer show any regard for their own left wing, which feels extremely comfortable--to be sure, not with Schmidt--but with social democracy as a whole as a bed partner. In order not to be relegated to complete oblivion in the confrontation election battle, their motto is: "Attract attention at any price."

Confrontation Pressure

The FDP has always lost votes when confrontation took the big wind out of its sails. The consequence of the Adenauer-Schumacher row caused it to decrease in 1953 from 11.9 to 9.5 percent. During the time of the weak SPD leader Erich Ollenhauer it recovered to 12.8 percent; a strengthened SPD under Willy Brandt against weak CDU Chancellor Ludwig Erhard again lowered it to 9.5 percent; then--with the Brandt-Kiesinger situation--it dropped to 5.8 percent. The still stronger confrontation between Schmidt and Strauss could do it a similar bad turn in 1980.

FDP chief Franz Bluecher	FDP chief Erich Mende	FDP chief Walter Scheel
9.5%	12.8%	5.8%
1953	1961	1969

Thus, the SPD propagandists for a speed limit on the expressways failed, with Minister for Research and Technology Volker Hauff in the lead, owing to the rightist liberal phalanx. The same Hauff received a brush-off from the FDP in his attempt to demand savings of 5 percent next winter from the owners of oil-furnaces and to prohibit swimming in heated pools.

In the question of nuclear energy, Genscher even seeks to outdo the "atomic chancellor" (slang used by the Young Socialists) and, on the basis of the nuclear energy compromise reached by the Bremen Party Congress, to portray his party as the only absolute advocate of atomic energy among the established parties--of course, in a nice, non-committal form. Genscher's general secretary, Guenter Verheugen, explained in DER SPIEGEL the not-only-but-also line: "I believe that at the moment, if we want to make available as much energy as up to now, we cannot do without nuclear power. However, since we have recognized the quite unusual potential for danger of this energy, we must pursue a policy which enables us to give up nuclear energy as soon as possible."

Verheugen's first sentence plainly testifies to the political intention; the second--in order to mollify--covers up a little that which must not be advertised at the moment. Genscher does not contemplate for a moment being delicate with the left at a time when he cannot free himself from the Social Democrats anyhow.

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The only consideration which might have been able to keep the wheeler-dealer, the supertactician and interloper from presenting himself so exposed to the voter would be the respect for skeptical minorities which must be kept in line. In actual fact, however, the people at FDP headquarters, the Thomas Dehler Hause in Bonn, believe that those who oppose growth and prosperity have long since taken off in the "Green" direction anyway.

The election result in Bremen, where previously surveys rumored that the FDP clientele had been cut in half, proved he was right: The liberals remained relatively stable there--though they lost their sensational increase from the preceding Landtag election. The "Greens," however, entered parliament chiefly at the expense of the CDU.

And image-making continues: The taxpayers, according to a resolution of the Bremen Party Congress adopted in the summer of this year, are to be given relief to the extent of 3.6 billion. The state father figure is to refund the citizen the higher prices for gasoline and heating oil through wage and income tax reductions. Increases in contributions to pension insurance, as planned by the SPD, are rigorously rejected by the FDP.

This is how a person in normal times would resolutely catapult himself out of a government coalition. However, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who would like to have left the coalition--but only if it appeared that he was being driven out--knows that he may now, openly and undisturbed, go fishing for the voters of the other side.

Thus the FDP fares like a marriage partner who no longer likes the other one, but yet remains with him because a divorce would be too expensive. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, it appears, is preparing himself for a long marriage of convenience with the SPD.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

SERIOUS DISCORD AFFECTING PS, PCF MAYORS' OFFICES

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 20 Oct 79 pp 114-116

[Article by Michel Labro and Jacques Roure]

[Text] 1977: The united left wins the municipal elections. 1979: The situation is changed. From Angers to Lille, from Reims to Rennes, there is a battle in 20 mayors' offices between the PCF and the PS. The surprising thing is that there are not more battles.

Angers, Thursday, 11 October. The outmoded decor of the marriage chamber where in March 1977 the united left had drunk the champagne of an unexpected victory. A bit on the solemn side, the socialist mayor reads a brief statement: He has relieved his communist deputy mayors of their responsibilities.

The event went far beyond the city setting. The municipalities continued to be the only place where the left succeeded in having its divisions kept quiet. This considerable [political] capital--155 cities of over 300,000 inhabitants administered jointly, including 72 by a communist mayor--neither the PCF nor the PS wanted to lose. And there in Angers everything came apart. Next, in Paris, in the PCF's glass building, place du Colonel-Fabien, as well as in the PS headquarters, place Palais-Bourbon, there was alarm. What if this were contagious?

The mayors' offices are the last existing link between the two parties. These are the only places where the unitary spirit continues to draw breath, however haltingly. In some mayor's offices, relations are still good. "Here, we get along fine," says one socialist deputy mayor from Beziers, the fourth largest Provençal city administered by a communist mayor, Paul Balmigere, age 71. He is an almost historical figure of the party. He speaks of his past as an activist, rolling his "r's" like the streams of his native Corbieres roll pebbles. Ah! He was a hard one, "Balmi" [Balmigere]. Before the war, he did strong-arm work for his party in a region where, since 1920, communists and socialists have never spared one another. However,

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today, he is considered by his socialist partners or radicals of the left to be a "liberal." There is not a single municipal agenda that is not dissected and discussed until unanimity is reached. The only friendly reproach: the interminable length of the discussions, the inevitable price paid for democracy a la Beziers.

What is the recipe for this miraculous equilibrium? A well-balanced municipal council which gives the majority to no one. "It is not possible to decide all alone," the mayor says with a half smile. "Beziers mayonnaise has its limitations; it can still turn," a socialist confesses. "The interchanges between us are as lively today as they were a year ago."

In several cities, the idyll is said to have lasted only a single summer. After the shattering of the unity of the left in September 1977, communists and socialists are discovering that they are not in agreement on the great principles nor on the small details. Here, they refuse to call a plaza "Leon-Blum." There, they want nothing to do with a "Maurice-Thorez" boulevard. They quarrel about municipal democracy or local taxes. The PCF wants to vote for expenditures which are popular, but it finds the burden too heavy to bear when it comes to increasing revenues. That is, taxes. The situation is becoming bitter in several municipalities. In Reims, since October 1977, the socialists have been in conflict with the communist mayor, Claude Lamblin. The situation is deteriorating in Nantes also. In the north, irritations are increasing. In short order, Georges Marchais called a halt to prevent contagion. "In my opinion," he said, "the differences existing at the top should not call into question the municipal accomplishments [acquis]." The watchword is to preserve the municipalities at all costs. A line of conduct to which the party has adhered no matter what...up to now. For things are in the process of changing.

"No Blood for the Dying"

"Relations between our two parties are as bad as they can be," Pierre Mauroy admitted in Lille on 17 September 1979. "However, in the municipalities things are all right," Crash! One week later, the communists of Lille displayed an administrative note recommending that doctors avoid the practice of giving blood transfusions to patients whom they know to be terminal. In a shattering article entitled: "No Blood for the Dying," they attack indiscriminately Giscard, Barre and...the mayor of Lille. As for the president of the Regional Hospital Center, "He covered the government with his silence." Three days later, Mauroy was once again on the carpet, publicly accused this time of too often being "on the government's side" in his mayor's office. One of his communist deputy mayors impassively witnessed his ordeal. Another attack, finally, at the beginning of the month. On the first Sunday in October, in Quesnoy, about 50 km from Lille, with great pomp, the name of the former socialist minister, Eugene Thomas, was given to the city's secondary school. The mayor of Lille was present, as

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well as the minister of education. As for the communists, they demonstrated in front of the school. The next day they wrote: "Mauroy received Beullac. That tells how far the search for a consensus has gone." The accusation was carried directly to the Lille mayor's office this time by one of Mauroy's assistants.

Why these skirmishes? Because the party's position has changed. The change was obvious during the two meetings held recently by the mayors and the elected communists, one on 25 June, in Pantin, and the other on 26 September, in Saint-Denis. The focus of the discussions: relations with the socialists. In both cases, the same diagnosis: the differences between the two parties is penetrating the mayors' offices. It is time to show that the socialists are turning their backs on their municipal commitments. That they are ready to take over power to engage in a policy of austerity. For example, by accepting transfers of responsibilities or tax increases. From this came the change in communist strategy: we must, said the PCF, be present in the streets, demonstrate against the increase in assessments, taxes, etc. Translation in plain language: maintain external pressure on the socialists. That is the municipal version of unity at the grass roots.

Transcendental Meditation

The external pressure tactic at times gives the socialists a headache. On Tuesday, 25 September, at 1630 hours, in the Place de la Mairie, in Rennes, the socialist mayor, Edmond Herve, received a delegation of demonstrating textile workers. Their company, a bankrupt raincoat plant, is at the point of being bought up. The buyer, a Swiss holding company with a sect of Indian origin behind it, placed an incredible condition on the purchase: the employees will have to devote 20 minutes in the morning and afternoon to transcendental meditation. The indignant mayor promised to intervene. On this point, he was in full agreement with his communist deputy mayors who were also present at the demonstration. Were they not once again living in full unified harmony in Rennes? In the opinion of both camps, their clashes could be counted on the fingers of one hand. The mayor was stupefied when he read a pamphlet distributed by the communist federation: "Herve will parade at the head of the demonstration. He is deceiving you." And the pamphlet explains: "In Brussels the socialists approved the liquidation of the French textile industry."

The following Monday, the mayor demanded explanations from the municipal council. The communists refused: "We have agreed not to introduce our party differences here." In an aside, a deputy mayor confided: "As an elected official, I have solidarity with the municipal council in this matter. As a communist, I have nothing to retract from what was written." Another pamphlet was nevertheless distributed. This time without a personal attack on the mayor. The attitude of the Rennes communists derives naturally from the party's new strategy. It was up to the federation to make life difficult

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for the socialists. It was up to the elected officials to round off the sharp points so as not to pass the point of no return. But how far is it before the point of no return?

There have been clashes between the socialists and communists for the last 2 and 1/2 years in Angers, since the public transportation affair. The contract was granted by the old municipality to a private company, as in many other cities of France.

Everything went normally at the outset. And then, all of a sudden, the mayor discovered that the company's charge was exorbitant and that hiring had taken place in an ill-considered manner. The affair was so big that there was even talk of a sabotage attempt against the union of the left municipality. The buses are in the process of cutting a gaping hole in the city's finances: more than 2 billion centimes. A completely rotten dossier.

The mayor examined the problem from this side and that side: there was no way out without dismissals. A harsh blow for this former leader of the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]. Fifty years of age and greying, a fast and direct speaker, Jean Monnier is hale and hearty [de la gueule et de la poigne]. May 1968: he was the only one in Angers who had weight with the chief of police. March 1977: Angers remained a moderate city, with tortuous and peaceful streets which surround the cathedral and the chateau. The church had lost its influence in the region; but people continued to pray there and to have more children than anywhere else. No one here thinks much of the victory of the left. Only one man believes in it: Monnier.

He has another conviction, almost an obsession: the left to which he belongs viscerally must be credible in the economic sector. It will be unable to come to power until it has demonstrated its capability of managing.

There he is taken at his word with respect to an agenda which is a real headache for all municipalities; reconciliation of public transportation, public services and the necessarily limited budgetary resources of the municipalities. Is not the same problem posed in Valence where the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] and the elected socialists are confronting one another over the management of the bus network? The mayor of Angers does not wish to finance an alarming deficit by taking money from the pockets of the people of Angers. And the former trade unionist, who had taken the habit of using the same language in the office of the police chief and during a meeting, announced dismissals. Then came a tough strike. The demonstrators sat on the hood of his car, laid siege to the mayor's office. The mayor did not budge. He told the unionists: "You are doing your thing; I am doing mine."

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For him, the real confrontation is elsewhere, inside the mayor's office with the communists. They know him well, Jean Monnier. They know that he is not suspected of being a man of the right. They cut loose against this Rocardian, however, who behaves like a tough boss [patron de choc]. Angers is the turn to the right of the PS, Plus the movement back to the center of the CFDT.

In the Streets or in the Mayor's Office?

"He did not consult us," charges Marcel Paquereau, a former communist teacher, municipal councilor. "We refuse to approve the dismissals." Another solution was possible for the communists. The state had threatened to withdraw its aid if the city did not clear up the situation. It was necessary to mobilize the people, instead of making humiliating concessions [passer sous les Fourches Caudines] to the government. And the communists demonstrated in the streets beside the bus workers.

In the streets or in the mayor's office? "We must choose," said the mayor. He had practiced unity with the PCF for 20 years in union action. For him, the union of the left was not a principle, as it was for many socialists. It was a balance of power. Were the communists bringing back into question by their attitude the cohesiveness of the municipal council? He took away their delegations.

The technique was not new. It had already been used by other socialist mayors in Dreux and Besancon. And even in Saint-Priest Rhone, on two occasions, 1 month after the March 1977 elections. The communist group refused to approve the budget. The mayor's immediate reaction: withdrawal of the communist deputy mayors' delegations. They would be restored when they approved the budget. Then withdrawn when they again refused.

Angers is something else. The winning of the city was one of the biggest surprises of the last elections. More than an example, a symbol of the thrust of the left in the country.

With the union of the left buried, did not the crack up in Angers threaten to become another symbol? The first reaction of the elected socialists was to think that the mayor, over there, had been too quick and too far. A few days later, the municipal council of Nantes, with PS leadership, experienced the need to say that it was formed of a knit-together team [equipe soudee]. There is no lack of problems in Nantes, however, as elsewhere.

Should we be surprised today by the serious differences observed in the united municipalities--a total of 20?

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On the contrary, the surprising thing is that there are so few of them: that the communists are still able to manage the cities with allies accused daily of veering to the right; that the socialists can still work with partners suspected publicly of having premeditated the left's setback in 1978. For how long?

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

GROUND FORCES AIR SUPPORT REVIEWED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Oct 79 pp 18-19

[Article by Lt-Col Herve Mangin d'Ouince: "Conventional Firepower Air Support"]

[Text] In the eventuality of a mid-Europe conflict, our maneuver ground forces will need an important amount of air support. The following article will discuss the possibilities and mechanisms of such a support.

For 2 years as the head of the 13th fighter squadron based at Colmar, I have been led through a good number of exercises and drills to assess the main mission of my two tactical squadrons of Mirage VF's, in other words the conventional firepower air support of our divisions.

In case of a conventional air and ground conflict, air support will come under many forms. It can, for instance, translate itself into attack missions meant to harass, neutralize or destroy the enemy ground forces or into cover missions over the battlefield in order to obtain a local and temporary air superiority. I will deal here only with the air support realized through attack missions by spelling out the difficulties that come with the execution of such missions, then the improvements that one can bring to their implementation.

An Indispensable Dialog

There are two kinds of support: indirect and direct air support.

Indirect support is given beyond the line of fire between the two armies, in the depth of the enemy territory; its implementation does not present any special difficulties with the exception, of course, of the ground-to-air artillery and the fighter planes of the enemy. In this zone every target is an enemy target and our fighter squadrons can attack everything that

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justifiably invites their fire; these include the enemy's supply centers, the main lines of communication, his means of transmission, his radar and his ground and air infrastructure. Moreover, such missions only rarely are of immediate urgency, which generally allows for timely planning.

Direct support is an altogether different and delicate matter. It is done within the lines of fire of the two armies to protect armored or mechanized units. In this zone the air units intervene upon the request and agreement of the ground forces, they hit designated and easily identifiable targets. An example is a classic target like a concentration of some ten tanks which a large-size fighter patrol unit is expected to neutralize in the space of some hours.

The liaison here is indispensable between the friendly forces in contact with the enemy and the formations in flight; guiding must be provided by a forward air controller or a ground guidance officer in order to preserve the security of the friendly troops on the one hand and to facilitate the reassessment of the assigned target's geographical location.

In the course of this mission, the task of the one-seater pilot is extremely important because the enemy ground-to-air artillery is particularly dense and active; our pilots must therefore approach at very low altitude and at very great speed, get the target into sight as soon as possible and finally to pass to the firing.

In such a context where the limits become very clear as to the combined maneuver of ground and air, it is indispensable to have fully experienced forward air control or ground guidance personnel in order to succeed. This very specialized personnel has two very specific missions: to designate the target to the pilots, which entails very serious problems in this area of overlapping forces where well-characterized points are sometimes hard to find and where smoke spotting signals could be confused with any vehicle in fire; to give the go-ahead signal to the flight leader to shoot.

Finally near the line of contact between the two armies, the enemy also puts into massive utilization its electronic war means, which in a real situation would strongly impede the indispensable dialog between the pilots and the controllers.

Towards Greater Effectiveness

The analysis of the mechanisms of air support has allowed us to discern the difficulties of implementation of these tactical missions.

However, several steps have been taken recently in order to improve the effectiveness of our air support; these concern the personnel and the material.

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As regards the personnel a serious effort has been agreed upon and is expected to be enlarged upon. In addition to the ground guidance officer training programs, the army corps and divisions now require numerous training missions at the Tactical Air Command; thus the guidance officers have the opportunity to perfect themselves through relatively frequent drills.

The land army liaison officers who are placed in the fighter squadrons organize short information sessions where the ground guidance officers of the coupled division can visit the combat squadrons during 48 hours, make contact with the pilots and appreciate perfectly the difficulties of target identification while in flight, whether in one or several flights, in two-seaters of the type Fouga or T33.

Inversely, the pilots are invited to participate in the maneuvers of the divisions in camp or on free terrain and thus acquire a better knowledge of the material of the ground army; finally, in the course of "air drill" days in camp, they advise the ground guidance officers in the guiding of air patrols.

The coupling of fighter squadron and division, the men's will to learn and to understand each other's problems are essential points needed to increase the success and effectiveness of the close air support missions.

As regard the material the Tactical Air Command essentially has at its disposal the tactical fighter Jaguar which can carry up to 3.5 tons of bombs and the Mirage VF which, equipped with its 2 RPK external reserve drums, *can carry a total of ten 250-kilogram bombs.

These two planes constitute the essential material of the forces designed for air support. With their adapted weaponry (30-mm cannon, 68-mm rockets, and braked or smooth rolling bombs) these planes are very operational shooting platforms.

Nonetheless, since the battlefield targets are getting to be tougher and tougher targets, a special effort has been made in order to define and develop new weaponry: anti-silo bombs; anti-personnel or antitank bombs; 100-mm rockets.

The use of these new weapons which are recently perfected is expected to increase significantly the effectiveness of the tactical air support.

The Mirage 2000 and the Aladin Radar

During the next decade, the addition of the "support and penetration" version of the Mirage 2000 to the tactical squadrons is expected to increase even more the effectiveness of our air support.

* RPK drums: outside reserve drums to which bombs could be attached.

The fighter pilots of about 1985 will be able to use the tactical version of this new and polyvalent fighter plane, with the best chances of success. To wit: in independent mission: all-weather nuclear penetration; in secondary mission: direct or indirect conventional fire support.

In effect this fighter plane will be on the one hand very maniable and maneuverable thanks to its electrical fight command and its brilliant performances and on the other hand very formidable because of its new weapons system. Moreover, it will be very well-equipped in electronic self-protecting counteracting means; it will thus be less vulnerable to the anti-aircraft artillery or to the enemy ground-to-air rockets.

Thanks to the possibilities of his new weapons system, the pilot in conventional firepower support mission will: have an automatic firing adjustment system which will permit the continuous calculation of the impacting point, thus allowing for a very precise shooting run; have the possibility of designating and illuminating targets by laser and then by shooting the appropriate weaponry as guided by laser or television (1000-kilogram bombs or air-to-ground devices of the type AS 30). The present tests of the Pod Atlis and of the Arriel self-directing head are extremely promising.

At the present time, in the course of their tactical missions, the planes are often guided by mobile radar systems which follow the movement of the ground troops and allow for close control of the planes in flight up to the time that they get into the purview of the forward air controllers or the ground guidance officers. The performance of this material is no doubt satisfactory, but it will be even better yet when the Aladin low-altitude detection radar becomes operational.

As we conclude this brief study where we have underlined the difficulties of implementation of the air support missions, it becomes apparent that the squadrons of the Tactical Air Command are particularly fitted for fulfilling this delicate mission.

To render these missions more effective, important efforts have been made and will be taken: on the personnel plan to intensify the training of pilots for flying in heavy equipment, to develop the coupling of divisions and fighter squadrons, and to raise the importance of the "air drill" days for the benefit of troops maneuvering in camp; on the material plan to define and build better adapted weaponry.

Finally, the coming production of the Mirage 2000 in its tactical version and the setting in operation of the new low-altitude detection Aladin radars are the best middle-term guarantees of the effectiveness, ever improved upon, of the air support missions.

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Entering the Air Academy in 1958 (Bleriot promotion), Lt-Col Herve Mangin d'Ouince was licensed fighter pilot on 15 July 1960. After starting his career in the "Mousquetaire" squadron 212 in Algeria, he commanded a wing of Mirage III E of the Artois squadron 1/13. Licensed test pilot on 20 July 1969, he was during five years responsible for the perfecting of the Anglo-French "Jaguar" prototype. After having commanded the 13th squadron of fighter planes at Colmar (1976-1978), he is at the present time undergoing training at the Air War General Officer School.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

GENERAL CANNET DISCUSSES 1979-80 PLANS FOR ALAT

Paris ATR & COSMOS in French 27 Oct 79 pp 39, 56

[Article by Jean de Galard: "Ground Forces Light Aviation in 1979-1980"]

[Text] As the guest of honor of the Aviation and Space Public Relations Club, Brig Gen Maurice Cannet, CG, ALAT [Ground Forces Light Aviation], presented a very interesting briefing on that outfit, in terms of personnel and equipment. He outlined the organizational structure resulting from a reorganization order in 1976 and implemented in 1977; he also described the evolution of equipment employment doctrines.

Today, ALAT consists of some 6,000 men, including 2,800 regulars (500 officers and 2,300 NCOs); they are the pilots, the mechanics, the traffic controllers, and the weather specialists; logistics are handled by about 3,000 draftees. The organization has 700 aircraft, of which 600 are permanently available; 625 are SA-318 Alouette II, SA-316 Alouette III, SA-341 Gazelle, and SA-330 Puma helicopters; 75 are light liaison or reconnaissance aircraft (20 MH-1521 Broussard and 55 Cessna L19).

Calculating the manpower-equipment ratio, we find that the ALAT has 4.5 regulars per craft, in other words, 1.85 pilots, 1.60 mechanics, and 1.05 support personnel; in overall terms, this is one of the lowest ratios in any armed forces anywhere in the world. On the other hand, if we look at the "pilot ratio," this is undoubtedly one of the highest ratios.

After reviewing the broad outlines of the reorganization ordered in 1976 (establishment of liaison helicopter groups, with seven such groups in peacetime and nine in wartime; as well as attack helicopter regiments, with five in peacetime and six in wartime), General Cannet underscored the difference between the two major types of missions hereafter carried out by the ALAT helicopters; Assistance to the command and combat branches (isolated aircraft missions) and participation in combat, emphasizing the fact that one and the same unit cannot handle different types of missions.

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ALAT is an outfit that is completely available at any moment (50-hour work weeks are almost standard); it is capable of carrying out all of its missions without outside logistic support. It takes care of the complete training of its pilots as well as other pilots coming from the outside; the proportion of the latter however remains limited to 25 percent. The total monthly flying hours is on the order of 25 hours for 160 Gazelle craft and 421 hours for the 130 Puma craft. Total annual operations come to around 160,000 hours, with a low accident rate, in other words, one accident for every 50,000 hours or 0.2 per 10,000 hours. According to the ALAT commander, this is almost half of the accident rate in the air-ground outfits in foreign armies. The ALAT pilots fly about 10 hours per month and the Puma pilots put in about 20 hours in the flight simulator with 50 hours of flying time.

After outlining the operational specifications of the Gazelle-Hot helicopter, which will be issued in sufficient numbers to the ALAT units, General Cannet indicated the characteristics of the third-generation AT helicopter; It will have to be powerfully armed and it will have to emit a quantity of calories less than the sensitivity threshold of the IR-guided missiles of the future, which will work on band II; it will have to be designed with a view to the performances of tomorrow's armored forces which could easily operate at night and which will be accompanied by armed helicopters equipped with 30-mm automatic cannon. The helicopter always displayed an excellent capability for withstanding nonexplosive weapons fire. But these are not the helicopters that will stop the tanks, General Cannet concluded; instead, a well-handled air-mobile system will be able to stop an armored unit.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

TACTICAL AIR FORCE EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 27 Oct 79 p 39

[Text] Each year, a very special exercise, dubbed "Centaure" bombing strike, provides for high-spirited competition among the nuclear-mission squadrons of the Tactical Air Force. Exercise "Centaure" which always takes place under as realistic conditions as possible enables the command to measure the overall effectiveness of weapons systems.

So far, there have been four squadrons participating in this exercise: Two squadrons of Mirage III-E, from the 4th Fighter Wing, based at Luxeuil, and two squadrons of Jaguars from the 7th Fighter Wing, based at Saint-Dizier.

Soon there will be five of them since the establishment of the 5th squadron has been scheduled for 1980. The two nuclear squadrons of the 7th Wing will be joined by a third one to be based at Istres. Like the 11th Fighter Wing at Toul, the 7th thus will have four squadrons and, like the 11th, that fourth squadron will be outside the territory of the First Air Region. Like 4/11 [4th squadron, 11th wing], based at Bordeaux-- which is under the command of FATAAC [Tactical Air Force], in terms of employment but which is under the authority of HQ, Third RA [Air Region] concerning everything involving questions of a territorial nature--4/7, based at Istres, will be under FATAAC for operational employment and under HQ, Fourth RA for questions of a territorial nature. The range of FATAAC missions however will be broadened as the operational flexibility of its unit is increased.

It appeared that stationing four fighter squadrons at one base was not a wise thing to do and that it would be better to seek a certain degree of deconcentration. As for the selection of Istres in the Southeast region, it is explained by the fact that the base currently has a DAMS (Special Munitions Workshop and Depot) for the FAS [Strategic Air Forces].

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE DELAYS AROUSE CONTROVERSY

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 27 Oct 79 p 39

[Text] Mr Jacques Cressard presented the special report on the 1980 defense budget for the National Assembly's Finance, General Economy, and Planning Committee; in his report (page 35 [of original]), he introduced the following remarks reviewing the effort over the past three years.

Physical objectives

(1) All programs, which were to be carried out under the planning law during an initial interval, spring from decisions preceding those programs, although there was no followup action after those decisions were made. (2) The operational commissioning of France's nuclear submarines was accomplished at a rate which became increasingly slower: 13 months passed between the "Terrible" and the "Redoutable"; 17 months passed between the "Foudroyant" and the "Terrible"; 31 months separated the "Indomptable" from the "Foudroyant"; 42 months elapsed between the "Tonnant" and the "Indomptable"; about 60 months passed between the "Inflexible" and the "Tonnant" (review of commissioning dates: "Redoutable," 1 December 1971; "Terrible," 1 January 1975; "Foudroyant," 6 June 1974; "Indomptable", 31 December 1976; "Tonnant," June 1980; "Inflexible," 1985). (3) The power of France's strategic force will be doubled, not in three years, as indicated in the government report, but in four years (from the start of 1977 until the end of 1980). In the meantime, it is not so much the unit-power of payloads involved (to the extent that the effect grows about four or five times less than the power) but rather their number, in other words, this explains the importance of missiles with multiple warheads and a relatively large fleet of nuclear submarines.

In responding to these excerpts from the report by Mr Cressard, the defense ministry noted the following points: In order not to allow the idea to spread that the effort made in terms of modernization and thus in terms of the credibility of France's nuclear deterrent forces has been slowed down."

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"(1) There has been no delay in the construction of the nuclear submarine which, in the case of all of them, including "Inflexible," is going forward as scheduled;

"(2) The commissioning schedule for "Inflexible" is essentially determined by the production of the M-4 weapons (booster and nuclear missile). This is a decisive step in progress in French strategic weapons and staying within the schedule--delivery of 16 operational missiles in 1985--is already a remarkable achievement;

"(3) The time interval thus determined is being used in order profoundly to modify the characteristics of "Inflexible" which will be a new-type nuclear submarine. The fact that it will have increased performance (more accurate navigation systems, firing from greater depths, less noise, better detection, response capability, more reliable communications) would thus justify a comparison with the development intervals required for a prototype, rather than with the units of a series launched 15 years ago;

"(4) The commissioning of nuclear submarines, converted to the M-4 weapons, has been scheduled at the rate of one every 18 months over the next decade."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

'L'HUMANITE' LOSING READERS AS 'LIBERATION' GAINS

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 20 Oct 79 p 116

[Article by Christian Fauvet]

[Text] When a church confuses its faithful, the parish bulletin no longer sells. That is what is happening to the Communist Party. For the first time since its establishment--and for the fifth consecutive week--the daily newspaper, LIBERATION, is outselling L'HUMANITE in surface Paris (that is, the city of Paris without the metro and railway station kiosks): 16,371 copies on the average compared to 15,888.

It is L'HUMA, the beacon of leftists newspapers, which is continuing to lose readers. As for LIBERATION, its sales continue to increase: more than 4,000 copies in 1 year. For its part, LE MATIN has taken off: every day in Paris its circulation pushes 30,000 copies. For Roland Leroy, the editor of the communist daily newspaper, this is a harsh blow. Georges Marchais who was waiting for the opportunity did not miss his chance. At the end of September, in the Assembly, during a meeting of the communist group, he deplored even the inability of his former rival to disseminate the ideas of the 23d Congress in the Party's daily newspaper.

Strange diagnosis: if sales drop (2,000 copies in 1 year) it is precisely because these ideas are poorly understood by the activists. "It is true that they no longer follow us," a journalist of L'HUMANITE confides. "It is even probable that through all of France we have fallen below 100,000 copies."

The communist weekly press is not doing any better. The activist sales of L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE have dropped considerably. And publications designed for intellectuals, which had become sounding boards, have been forced to close their doors. LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE and FRANCE NOUVELLE will be replaced by another weekly, headed by Guy Hermier, a member of the Politburo. "This will be an open, combative newspaper," he explains, "destined to make its mark on French political and cultural life with its originality."

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The daily newspaper, L'HUMANITE, will not change its format. That has already been done. The introduction of offset printing and photocomposition in October 1978 had been accompanied by a formidable recovery effort. "We want to make our newspaper more alive, better written, free of all jargons," Roland Leroy then said. One year later the gamble was lost. On the other hand, LIBERATION had won its own: to outstrip L'HUMANITE in Paris.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

SDECE EMPLOYEES BENEFITED--Acting as middleman between the Ministries of Finance and Defense, [Prime Minister] Raymond Barre came out on the latter's side with respect to a ruling on SDECE personnel. The new ruling, to become effective in 2 years, is intended to provide civilian employees certain financial benefits to offset some of the disadvantages that go with their jobs (such as the prohibition on joining a union or striking). The cost of this change is put at 8 million francs, half of which is already included in the budget. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 12 Nov 79 p 31]

FUEL SHORTAGE EFFECTS--Military operations and training are being affected by the increase in fuel costs. The funds budgeted for fuel in 1980 may turn out to be insufficient and the military has been ordered to test all "fuel-saving devices suggested by private enterprise and verify their adaptability to military uses." [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 19 Nov 79 p 20]

FUEL SHORTAGE FORESEEN--There will be a shortage of fuel in France beginning early in 1980, according to several [unnamed] experts. Two alternatives are available: either accept the shortage and put the country in a vulnerable position, or build up stocks by limiting "i.e., rationing] consumption. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 30 Nov 79 p 43]

RECORDS MICROFILMING PLANNED--The Quai d'Orsay [French Foreign Office] has requested supplementary funds so as to be able to microfilm its records and construct a building to house them. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 30 Nov 79 p 43]

DEFECTION FROM PCF--Jean Lerede, co-author of the book "L'Entreprise des patrons rouges" [The Business Operations of the Red Bosses] which reveals the seamy side of communist party economic power, has written to [PCF leader] Marchais to let him know that he [Lerede] has quit the party. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 30 Nov 79 p 43]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

VENTURA'S REPORT ON TERRORISM IN ITALY

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 8 Oct 79 pp 62-67

[Text] When on Wednesday, 26 September, Angelo Ventura, 49, professor of contemporary history at the University of Padua, collaborator with the Veneto Institute for the History of the Resistance, socialist militant, was injured in the foot by a commando of the fighting communist front, PANORAMA had already received the article which we publish here and which was assigned to him 3 weeks ago.

Long before 7 April (the day on which District Attorney Pietro Calogero had issued arrest warrants for the leader of "Autonomia") Professor Ventura had tried to reconstruct the ideological and practical path taken in Italy by the groups dedicated to armed struggle. Practically alone, he dedicated several essays and articles to the reconstruction of that devastating itinerary which from the ashes of 1968 led, 11 years later, to systematic assassination by Front Line and the Red Brigades.

When a PANORAMA editor telephoned Ventura 3 weeks ago to contract for the article, he could not resist the temptation of asking him: "But professor why are you constantly studying the old texts of Potere Operaio [Workers Power] and the more recent ones of the Autonomists?" Ventura replies, "Because I am a professor of history, and studying the mechanisms of domination and fanaticism is part of my job." The newspaperman continued, "Has your life changed as a result of the position you take?" In a subdued and almost shameful tone, Professor Ventura added: "Considerably."

This shy tone also resurfaced on the morning of Wednesday, 26 September. Soon after he was taken to the hospital, Professor Ventura told newspapermen, "The first feeling I had was of profound humiliation over this absurd shooting which took place in a country which at one time was civil."

In the days before he was wounded, Angelo Ventura was the center of a double polemic. Two newspapermen from a weekly newspaper, violating a tacit agreement among newspapermen not to publish the names of persons whose testimony was gathered by the judges who conducted the investigation of "7 April," indicated him as one of the key witnesses of that investigation.

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Denying he had ever been a prosecution witness in that trial, Ventura had, however, sent, together with many other professors of Padva University, a letter to the daily LA REPUBBLICA in which he denounced the climate of intimidation and intolerable fascist violence engaged in by independents in the university.

His courageous stand, repeated despite the many threats against him, evidently prompted last week's attack.

Here is Professor Ventura's report.

An intellectual supper club, something like the Orti Oricellari in Machiavelli's day, where instead of the "histories" of Titus Livius they comment on the "Grundrisse" and they discuss the best possible revolution. This, more or less is the image of Autonomy's leaders to which many try to give credence. It is an image which seems far from that of the terrorist. Toni Negri says today, "The distance between terrorism and Autonomy is stellar." At this point it can seem natural to suspect that the judicial inquiry is a witch hunt, a trial of ideas. Let this be clear: It is not up to us to judge the guilt or innocence of the individual defendants. This is the job of the judges and the courts. But it is worth asking what, after all, these ideas are. Because it is surprising: A sort of blackout has fallen over these. And it is a shame because this means the absence of an essential condition for following the affair with the necessary objectivity.

The blackout has, in fact, served to remove the history of the party from the civil war and the armed struggle; has overturned the very identity of its leaders, doing them the injustice of passing them off as an intellectual club dedicated at most to innocuous revolutionary fantasies, an image which they are the first to reject decisively.

Let us then look at these ideas without losing sight of the real experience with which they pose a direct and constant dialectical relationship.

Since 1971, Workers Power openly and forcefully has posed a "fundamental distinguishing element": "That of the use of violence, and of the establishment of organizational instruments adequate for this level of conflict" (POTERE OPERAIO, No 37, 5-19 March 1971). In the following issue (17 April-1 May) the discussion was more explicit. Greeting with pleasure the actions of the GAP [Partisan Action Groups] and of the Red Brigades-- and particularly the robbery at the IACP [Autonomous Institute of Public Housing] of Genoa which ended in the murder of messenger Alessandro Floris--as "significant of the level of violence" achieved by conflict, the article found a reason to lament the "low level of organization": This "means for us, above all, the need to develop a self-critical dialog, to work to correct the situation, to modify it, to push it forward." The same issue ostentatiously published, among other things, the Red Brigade and GAP communiqués and significant passages from a work by Lenin going back to the revolution of 1905 (but entitled "Lenin 1971/On Armed Struggle"), in which it was

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maintained that terrorist actions, robbery to finance the party, and armed struggle were opportune and necessary, so long as they were tied to the mass movement.

How to Destroy the Adversary

Starting from original positions of worker extremism, moving to the attack on the historical organizations of the working class, the militants of Workers Power, mostly intellectuals and students of bourgeois origin, risk remaining officially without an army. Even the period 1971 to 1973, as Toni Negri will recall, "sees a strong revival of the trade union," which consolidates consensus. The attempt to force the will of the masses through a party organization is in a blind alley. The way out is found through the change of the "revolutionary subject." No longer the traditional working class, but the "social worker," a category which together with the working masses of the assembly lines also includes other "proletarian" levels: Domestic workers, the underemployed, technicians and, above all, students.

This theory, unilaterally developing some real elements of the ongoing processes of change, is inserted into a special interpretation of the economy and of contemporary society. According to Toni Negri, capitalistic development has led to a direct domination of capital over all of society in which the so-called "social factory" is extended. Therefore, capital is identified with the state, which becomes a function of the "command" of capital. The phase of political mediation thus collapses: Parties and trade unions are transformed into articulations of the state, instruments of the domination of capital. Economic struggle becomes immediately a political struggle, a proletarian counterpower which is carried out in a process of self-enrichment, that is, in the direct appropriation of wealth (which capitalism has produced abundantly for all), according to need, and in attacks against the state. The exercise of proletarian counterpower is thus a sort of creeping insurrection: "The concept of appropriation must include the art of insurrection," writes Toni Negri ["Worker Power against Labor," in "Crisis and Worker Organization, Milan, Feltrinelli, 1976, p 131). Rather, the present relationship of power between the classes "leads to a change in the concept of insurrection into that of permanent civil war: (The factory in Strategy, Padva, 1976, p 103, lectures given in 1972-1973).

This is a political and ideological road which, except for its greater cultural refinement, to some extent retraces the footsteps of revolutionary trade unionism. With its insurrectional impatiences, that movement nourished the cult of violence, the taste for action as an end in itself, and irrationalism, and it contributed so many men and so much experience to the antiworker and antisocialist reaction of Fascism. Fascism was able to triumph by mobilizing a restless and violent bourgeois youth similar to that which now supplies the cadres and most of the troops for independent squads and terrorism.

Thus, by accentuating the phase of subjectivity and of violence, passing through the esthetic throes of the D'Annunzio type of "Domination and Sabotage,"

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Toni Negri concludes his ideological parabola with the openly irrational conclusion of the recent "Marx beyond Marx": "To deny dialectics, this eternal formula of Judeo-Christian thought, this periphrasis to say--in the Western world--rationality...The end of dialectics? Yes, because the act of thinking here is not independent from collective strength, from collective modes of action which constitute the subject since it is dynamism against communism. The adversary is to be destroyed. Only the communist method can destroy it..."

It is not a matter of a simple theoretical exercise. These ideas penetrate into political action, they inspire programs, strategy and tactics, forms of organization and the militant activity of Workers Power and therefore of Workers Autonomy. After all, many political writings by Toni Negri issued to the press were born as internal party documents: Reports or congressional statements, contributions to debate, etc. From these statements of position emerge the distinguishing features of armed struggle, the strategy of long-term civil war, the structure of subversive organization.

Armed struggle probably was discussed at least as early as 1970 within the organization. In 1971, as we have seen, it was openly posed as the main distinguishing element which is still valid: On this side Workers Power, and then Autonomy, the Red Brigades, Front Line and any kind of terroristic formation; on the other side, the rest of the political universe, including the extra-parliamentary left. I abstain from quoting: A chance reading of any of their newspapers is sufficient.

The national organizing conference of Workers Power, at Turin (September 1971), proclaims: "Insurrection is the key to opening the revolutionary process," and forcefully states: "The armed party is the order of the day immediately." Armed struggle, insurrection (later replaced by the new concept of long-term civil war) were directives destined to be repeated ceaselessly until today.

The Time of the Myth of the Masses Is Past

Wishful fantasies? Everything is possible. They are in any case the directives of a party which has all the appearance of being serious. "If the highest form of the class struggle is armed struggle, the construction of the party...necessarily passes through the predisposition of instruments of armed struggle." (POTERE OPERAIO, No 49, June 1972). It must be understood that all is tied to the masses, rather, within the masses. For a Marxist to repeat it is almost banal. The difficult thing for a minority "vanguard," which arrogates to itself the representation of the "class" and therefore aspires to guide the masses, is to put it into practice. The action necessarily becomes exemplary and attractive.

The problem of terrorism is also dealt with in this perspective: "Terror and the mass movement cannot be disassociated in any way: Insurrection is the model of their composition together and any resort to terror must (in another time) either follow this model, or not take place."

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But do they take place anyway? It is difficult to say. Certainly at that time there were plenty of terroristic actions even though they were not bloody as they were in later years. Even the Red Brigades played the game. We cannot know the real internal relationship to the revolutionary movement. Certainly there was a relationship. Certainly Workers Power even then was considering Workers Autonomy as its legitimate heir with hegemonic ambition.

However that may be, armed struggle increasingly assumes a central function. "It represents the only fundamental strategic phase," says Toni Negri in a document dated 1 February 1974. "A new cycle of expansive and cumulative struggle is today unimaginable and can only be proposed if it is followed and supported by an armed proletarian force which would implacably attack the capitalist instruments, which puts the separate groups in a difficult situation..." Even the condition of the ties with the masses is now considered as a cumbersome prejudice which is annoying to get rid of: "It is time to stop making disquisitions on the more or less mass character of the arms struggle and to validate it on the basis of a thousand conditions (...). Here the problem is something else: Only the armed struggle in its progress, in its process of consolidation, in its expansion, can permit the mass struggle to attack the system." Here is a frank statement of the function of terrorism: To open the road to mass violence, to push it forward, to elevate the level of conflict. "Armed struggle is the red line of organization (...)." Toni Negri explains that the party's task, of the "Red Brigades of the worker and proletarian attack," (the definition, certainly not casual, is dated 1974), is "an action of attack which at times can and must become red terror," and "proletarian justice."

Why the Two Fighting Fronts Should Be Unified

Between 1972 and 1973 the organizational structure of Workers Power was being perfected and this was later inherited and further perfected by Workers Autonomy. Again Toni Negri illustrates this for us. It is articulated on two distinct levels: "The mass organization" and "the party organization as subject of the struggle of attack, of aggressive command." The mass organization functions by establishing the red bases, also defined as "political-military support bases within society": Their activity is carried out through appropriation [theft] and mass illegality. The party instead practices attack, true armed attack, terror, "a function of power, but separate, at times contradicting the process of self-enrichment," that is, contradicting the mass organization. This is the ingenious invention, the labyrinth in which for so many years those who tried to penetrate the secret of subversive organization have become lost. The various organizational levels (probably more than two) are not only separate as is normal in a compartmentalized organization that operates illegally at least in part, but also corresponds to the various degrees of maturity and initiative, and they, therefore, naturally find themselves in an ambiguous dialectical relationship. This is fiction and reality at the same time: Duplicity developed into a system and at the same time into a real contradiction, experienced at times in a very damaging way within the movement and even within the individual conscience:

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"To say how much suffering it cost to experience it is to merely tell the truth," confesses Toni Negri ("Domination and Sabotage," p 65).

A political document published in October 1976 in ROSSO [Red], the most authoritative publication of the movement, inspired directly by Toni Negri explains, "In the area of Workers Autonomy there has been a constant confrontation between a mass front and a fighting front. To build the movement of Workers Autonomy means to unify these two fighting fronts, not to confuse them, not to establish abstract subordination of one to the other or vice versa, but to unify in an overall project and in militant practice the functions that cannot be separated. The Workers Autonomy movement represents a never-completed dialectic, if not insurrection, in the exercise of mass counterpower and the development of party initiative.... The mass front is a movement with a great wealth of objectives: Wages, hours, the fight against capitalist administration of public expenditure, self-reduction, etc. The fighting front identifies the continually new problems of control of the state.... The fighting front considers these problems and cuts through them, constantly opening new pathways for organized proletarian action. This dialectic is to be concentrated, regulated and promoted within the unity of the theory and practice of the Workers Autonomy movement."

The period up to the beginning of 1978 is characterized by this obsession with the distinction between armed struggle and the erection of a counterpower to be exercised "directly against the power of the state." They are the years, especially starting with the crucial 1974, in which the identity of analysis, of strategy and language with the Red Brigades is impressive regardless of the status of actual relationships within the movement. One should try reading the Red Brigades documents substituting the term "attack party" for "Red Brigades" (which, as we have seen in a text by Toni Negri, are equivalent) or substituting "the proletarian movement of offensive resistance," and "fighting front," in the Red Brigades documents with "Autonomy." But new strategic requirements began to come to the fore as early as 1977.

What Changed After the Moro Crime

The new explosion of the movement in the streets, the big parades of the ultraleft in which the urban guerrillas move like fish in water, which open fire against the police and attack armories (as at Bologna or at Rome on 12 March), seem to open a new, more mature phase: Finally the armed struggle acquires a mass dimension and it is with this that we must now mainly concern ourselves. Thus the distinguishing feature of armed struggle remains. It functioned, it raised the level of the struggle, but precisely because of this it is no longer sufficient: The ties with the mass struggle, the constant leit-motif of Autonomy, which was somewhat obscured in earlier years, tends to become a second distinguishing feature so much so that by pushing too far forward the party of armed struggle risks isolating itself from the overall movement of the extreme left. Because "to cripple and execute the class enemy" is all right so long as in the meantime operations are carried out "within the experience of mass illegality and development

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of the organized communist movement" (editorial entitled "On the Firing Line," accompanied by photos of a masked militant with pistol in hand, published in AUTONOMIA on 15 February 1979, editor Emilio Vesce, executive committee: Piero Despali, Luciano Ferrari Bravo, Ivo Gallimberti, Gianni Rizzati, Marzio Sturaro).

The movement's internal subversive dialectic becomes more tense and complex, especially after the Moro crime which raised the struggle to a level that only with difficulty could be related to the need of putting the armed struggle on a mass basis. The line toward which Workers Autonomy moves is lucidly indicated by Franco Piperno in the first issue of PRE-PRINT, which appeared on the eve of his indictment: "To join together the terrible beauty of that 12 March 1977 in the streets of Rome with the geometric power deployed in Via Fani." Then, on 7 April 1979, the investigation by District Attorney Calogero triggered a crisis whose development still can be deciphered only with difficulty, and whose outcome is uncertain.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

MODUS OPERANDI OF 'FRONT LINE' TERRORIST GROUP

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 22 Oct 79 p 44

[Article: "This Is How 'Front Line' Operates"]

[Text] The armed party has already given its answer to the Fiat dismissals. "Anyone who fires workers will be dismissed forever by the revolutionary movement." This was the slogan of death launched Tuesday 9 October by the Red Brigades [RB] at Turin. Today more than ever the Red Brigades and Front Line, now practically locked into the Milan-Turin-Genoa industrial triangle, consider the plant the most important objective.

The central importance of the workers, stressed by the RB in the document of the historical group, was a fundamental subject of discussion at the conference organized last summer in the south by Front Line. After having admitted not having important ties with the workers and having established the need for a new type of guerrilla action capable of terrorizing plant leaders and cadres, Front Line took a big gamble on political intervention in the Piedmont streets. The objective of the armed group: To insert itself into the struggle; to make it more bitter; to recruit new sympathizers.

Today at Turin the Front Line organization, which is stronger than elsewhere, is divided into three operational levels.

--Neighborhood groups: They operate in a limited territorial area; carry out personal espionage, surveillance, intimidation, casual armed propaganda (burning the automobiles of leaders, setting fire to the homes of executives), they constitute the first step of guerrilla apprenticeship.

--Proletarian combat squads: Have as their targets businesses which often cannot be officially claimed by the organization, such as, bank robbery, robbery at post offices; they are formed by personnel with experience in neighborhood groups and underworld persons recruited in jail specializing in auto theft, in maintenance and supply of weapons; they have elementary logistical structures such as secret safe houses, small clandestine printing presses for false documents.

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--Front Line assault groups: This is the highest position. Selection is very difficult (to join, as happens in the RB, it is necessary to have carried out both political and military "actions"): The members have political and technical responsibilities and they participate in decisions on objectives of attack.

The Front Line moles are present mainly in the body shops and the environs of Mirafiori and at the Lancia plant at Chivasso (they total about 30 men). They often enter clandestinely, as in the RB, by registering in the trade union. They engage in plant espionage, carry out blanket investigations in various departments and on working conditions, keep files on department heads and leaders, and finally suggest guerrilla actions which might be supported to some extent by the more angry levels of the working class. The Front Line tendency in its propagandistic actions is to show that it is very well informed on every small dispute, and is omnipresent, thus terrorizing the company structure and creating a climate of terror for the so-called "class enemies."

In practice it is the same operational method used by the RB, a more shadowy organization, less involved than Front Line in daily conflicts, more careful about objectives to be attacked, more informed on what happens at the summit of the Fiat, of the trade union, of the courts, of the Communist Party. The Turin RB column, at one time commanded by Mara Cagol, the companion of Renato Curcio, even though it has no more than 20 regular full-time militants, after the recent arrests, can count upon a sizable organization of "mailmen" (plant propagandists, distributors of leaflets) and of informers.

The RB surveillance covers the police station, the court buildings, the summit of the CISL [Italian Confederation of Trade Unions], the Fiat executives, as well as those of the Confederation of Industrialists. In the Nichelino hide-away, discovered by the men of the special groups headed by Gen Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa in September, there was a small but significant part of the large RB file on Fiat. Alongside the individual file cards on many known executives (mostly taken out of GIORNALE DEI CAPI, a Fiat publication that is valuable to the information activities of the Red Brigades and of Front Line), there were parts of secret organization charts, development plans, rebuilding projects, probably taken from the desks of very important persons in Corso Marconi, the Fiat main office.

In recent months, the analyses and studies of the strategic leadership of the RB, based on a firsthand knowledge of problems, has even guessed at the possibility of a harsh plant repression (this led to the attack against Cesare Varetto, in charge of trade union relations in the Mirafiori body shop), considering it a very favorable event for the prospects of armed struggle.

Workers anger, a greater willingness to fight, disappointment with trade union and democratic practices, could bring guerrilla warfare--which today is isolated and condemned by the workers--to the more favorable times of 1973,

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the year of RB recruitment at Mirafiori (admitted to membership among others were Cristoforo Piancone and Vincenzo Guagliardo, two PCI members). On 12 February that year, many workers applauded or passed with conniving indifference before fascist trade unionist Bruno Labate, trained by the RB at Mirafiori.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

SIGNORILE COMMENTS ON PSI RELATIONS WITH DC

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 22 Oct 79 p 65

[Interview with PSI Deputy Secretary Claudio Signorile by Pasquale Nonno: "Alternative Yes, but with the DC"; date and place not given]

[Text] Do not worsen polemics and at the same time do not show signs of weakness. This was the rule adopted by Claudio Signorile in the battle unleashed within the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] in response to attacks against his followers and against his person.

Signorile still continues to refuse to engage in polemics with Bettino Craxi. He himself says, "But now that the fireworks have passed, we can think about giving the party an organization that would permit it the maximum of efficiency and the maximum of negotiating strength in negotiations with the DC [Christian Democratic Party]." In this spirit Signorile agreed to put aside his silence and to answer PANORAMA's questions.

Question: What is the new PSI organizational structure you are thinking about?

Answer: The criteria of assessment must be ability and an availability for teamwork. Using these criteria, the leadership group should be broadened to include old and new energy.

Question: What energy?

Answer: Young people who succeeded in suburban areas and in the recent elections, political leaders with prestige who for too long have been excluded from the decisional circuit.

Question: In addition to men, you spoke of new structures. Which?

Answer: An executive which would represent a center of coordination of all party activity without displacing the leadership.

Question: An executive of how many persons?

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Answer: Six or seven. Then we must go back to the old idea of creating permanent committees of the Central Committee chaired by persons with great prestige and political and intellectual authority.

Question: Persons like Norberto Bobbio, Francesco De Martino, Giacomo Mancini, Riccardo Lombardi?

Answer: I do not think it is the time to name names.

Question: And what about the congress proposed by Craxi?

Answer: To do what? The provincial congresses are taking place in a calm atmosphere.

Question: Does a counterposition between Craxi and the left emerge in these congresses?

Answer: No. In most cases the Turin majority is confirmed. Elsewhere the distinctions and differences arise due to local factors.

Question: But that is not the way it is at Milan.

Answer: It is nothing new that Milan is a special case.

Question: You are accused of having maintained a rigid structure among your followers.

Answer: A left organized as a group of followers does not exist. There exists in the party an area which feels it is the most convinced bearer of those values of alternative indispensable to the definition of the PSI political image.

Question: For a long time the PSI had an almost unified image. Almost as though you and Craxi had found a point of balance. On what?

Answer: On the establishment of a courageous and ambitious policy, on the establishment of a central role for the PSI.

Question: Has this balance been disturbed?

Answer: There are considerable differences of temperament, of training. But I believe that the ability of a political leader is not only in stating his own ideas, but also in subordinating his own personal pride to the interests of the party.

Question: What do you think of the constitutional reform proposed by Craxi?

Answer: I believe that the constitutional reform is not a primary problem. The socialist attempt to again launch a strong reformist tension is important:

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It is necessary to fly high, as Craxi says. But if we focus on constitutional reforms we will not fly very much.

Question: What then?

Answer: The card of state reform, of institutional reform, should be played in function of a political plan: Democratic solidarity.

Question: Is this Craxi's objective?

Answer: I believe that Craxi realizes that democratic solidarity will fail if it is based on little things. Because the results are not commensurate with the effort required of the parties and of the trade unions, with the sacrifices required of the people. A democratic solidarity that would tie small things to the grand design of reform can instead be the real prospect of the Eighth Legislature.

Question: Enrioc Berlinguer says that the true problem remains that of entrance of the communists into government...

Answer: Even though in a summary way, he says something that is right. In 1946 all the parties that drafted the constitution were in the government.

Question: How is reform strategy developed?

Answer: Not in research offices. The wind of economic and social difficulties, of terrorism, blows with great intensity: Serious problems are open which must be faced every day by inserting reform values into them. Steps must be taken in view of the prospect of a reform alternative.

Question: What does that mean?

Answer: A process of reform that day by day would build the social support and the political protagonists, opposing that which is to be reformed.

Question: For example?

Answer: The fight against terrorism, but at the same time the state must be rebuilt as a democratic authority.

Question: You do not know how to give up the term "alternative" which seems to exclude the DC, while at the same time you support national solidarity that includes it...

Answer: I do not at all exclude a DC which would put itself on the terrain of a reform policy.

Question: You have tried to develop a relationship with the DC right more than with the reform currents.

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Answer: I do not deny that. It was a defensive attitude at a time when more advanced DC groups gave the impression of wanting to broaden their political space by going so far as to suppress the PSI space. The DC-PCI bipolarism was invented by the DC left. But if the political debate shifts to an alternative of reform, the dialog with the more advanced part of the DC is obligatory. And in my judgment it will be much more concrete than that on government formulas.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PUBLIC PROTEST AGAINST MILITARY MANEUVERS IN FRIULI

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 5 Nov 79 pp 75-76

[Article by Luciano Santin: "Six Months of Snow, Six Months of Bombs"]

[Text] A firing range will destroy pastures and skiing areas, but eight Alpine communities are rebelling.

Some 8,000 hectares of pastures and woods in the high mountains around Sella di Razzo, the watershed between Friuli and Veneto dotted with Alpine dwellings and more than 1,500 head of cattle, are a protected reserve under the Friuli-Venezia Giulia urban plan, which recently spent a billion and a half lire there for environmental and tourism improvements.

According to a plan of the Northeast Region military command, this territory is to be transformed into the "Monte Bivera polygon," one of the hugest artillery training areas in the whole Alpine area.

This project is part of the plan to concentrate polygons in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region (which has 46 of them, a national record--together with 50 percent of the military servicemen in all Italy). In the Bivera zone, the artillery of the Julia and Cadore brigades had undertaken training exercises in the past, but only for brief periods. Now the installation is supposed to become permanent; "thus, there would be a hundred or more firing days in the spring-summer-autumn cycle, which would mean compromising the tourist development in all of Carnia and forcing the inhabitants of the towns nearest the firing zone to pack up and leave," says Giacomo Cortiula, a union member from Sochieve, one of the communities that the firing range extends into.

The territory that would be hardest hit is Sauris, 1,400 meters in altitude, 520 inhabitants, an economy based on agriculture, husbandry, and tourism. The perimeter of the firing range would come within 200 meters of its houses which were severely damaged by the 1976 earthquake.

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German Troops

The inhabitants say that during last spring's maneuvers, which German troops also took part in, the batteries were placed 150 meters from the elementary school and that the rounds from howitzers emplaced on a hillside flew all over the countryside. Delfino Schneider still remembers the hole dug up by a shell that landed a few feet from his house.

Frederico Plozzer says, "My son Dario found a strange plaything in the bushes last June. I shot at it from a distance and it exploded."

With some thousands of signatures gathered in the valleys and with the support of the mountain communities, the Organization for the Development of the Carnic Dolomites, Italia Nostra, the National Alpine Association, the CAI [Italian Alpine Club], the Husbandry Association, the Federaccia, the unions in the threatened communities (Ampezzo, Enemonzo, Forni di Sopra, Forni di Sotto, Prato Carnico, Sauris, Socchieve, Vigo, and Lorenzago), they have turned to the regional administration to ask the joint military-civilian committee responsible for redrawing the artillery range in Friuli to give up the Bivera zone.

"We received some general assurances. However, a few days ago in the Senate, Undersecretary of Defense Petrucci insisted that the firing range had to stay as it is," said Luca Petris, a union member from Sauris.

The military asked to explain: "We are quite ready to move," said General Benito Gavazza, commander of the Julia brigade, "provided the zone we receive in exchange is not too far away and has characteristics adapted to mountain artillery."

"In short, the maneuvers absolutely have to be held in Friuli," said Colonel Masciani, second in command at the Northeast Region headquarters. If the joint commission does not resolve the impasse, the final decision will be up to the Defense minister.

On 23 October, the day the autumn artillery school was to open, thousands of valley dwellers peacefully occupied the range. The military authorities avoided a confrontation for 24 hours. But on 24 October they began to fire regardless of the presence of some valley dwellers.

"We won't let them fire a single round," Fausto Schneider had sworn. "We will set up our tents next to the targets and we won't move till they go away. They have to understand that we can't live six months under the snow and six months under the bombs." Obviously, others think differently.

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ITALY

PCI'S PAJETTA ON RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 5 Nov 79 pp 100-103

[Interview of Gian Carlo Pajetta, top PCI foreign-policy official, by Fabrizio Coisson: "A Ticket To Peking"; date and place not given]

[Text] Berlinguer could go to China as early as next year to reestablish friendship and collaboration with the Chinese communists, Pajetta says. But there are some unknown factors, e.g. in Moscow.

China President Hua Guofeng in Italy. The missile debate in Europe. Moscow's broadside against Eurocommunism. And, in the background the big questions about the post-Brezhnev period. There will be no big events on the international political scene without Italy's attention being focused on the PCI. What are the communists' answers? PANORAMA asked the PCI's top foreign policy official, Gian Carlo Pajetta.

[Question] Hua Guofeng is coming to Italy. Do you think you will have meetings or contacts with him, even unofficial ones?

[Answer] We certainly won't have any clandestine meetings. Since it is a state visit and there are communists among the representatives of the Italian government, Hua will have the chance to talk with PCI leaders.

[Question] Are you aware of any particular interest Hua has in meeting with the PCI?

[Answer] I think the Chinese comrades are interested in knowing what we stand for as an autonomous, internationalist force, what we may say and do when we talk about detente, equilibrium, respect for independence, and rejection of any form of hegemony.

[Question] After 15 years on ice, relations between the PCI and Peking seem to be at a turning point. The Chinese ambassador has attended the PCI congress, two communist journalists have been invited to China, and Chinese journalists have come to Italy as guests of L'UNITA. Does this mean a renewal of relations?

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[Answer] This is a process that has been going on for a long time, that has taken and will take a long time. This is no dramatic reversal. But it is true that the Chinese ambassador had never gone from Rome to Milan to hear in person a speech by Berlinguer, as happened on 17 September at the close of the L'UNITA Festival.

[Question] All right, a certain kind of relationship has already been established. But will there be a better defined one, a formal one?

[Answer] On our part we think one could be established very soon.

[Question] So it is not unlikely that Enrico Berlinguer may soon pay a visit to Peking?

[Answer] I don't see why it should be considered improbable or impossible. I wouldn't be surprised if it were announced for as early as 1980. I can say it isn't on any of our appointment calendars at the moment.

[Question] Aren't your relations with the USSR the real obstacle to a formal renewal of relations between the PCI and the Chinese Communist Party?

[Answer] It is unthinkable to have a friendship whose purpose is to be directed against someone else and to break relations of understanding and cooperation with other communist parties. On the other hand, however, the Chinese comrades know we have never accepted political proposals that were presented in any way as acts or declarations of hostility against them.

[Question] Then the PCI might play a role of its own in bringing the USSR and China back together?

[Answer] Detente and coexistence won't be helped by pious blessings. None of us thinks of being the Pope Wojtyla of the new internationalism. But we do want to demonstrate that collaboration is possible even in diversity and in full respect for autonomous judgment.

- [Question] All of Hua's initial statements in Europe have been directed against the USSR.

[Answer] They certainly did not appear comforting at a time when everybody is anxious about new tensions and dangers in Europe.

- [Question] Are you alluding to the issues of missiles and the readjustment of forces in Europe?

[Answer] Certainly. It is a problem we think can be met only with an adjustment downward, with gradual and controlled disarmament. We intend to defend at all costs the continued process of detente.

[Question] Earlier, however, the PCI seemed to accept the position of Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt: yes to negotiations, but yes, too, to the readjustment of forces.

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[Answer] Schmidt has said he thinks negotiations are a central issue. He has been explicit about that with the Chinese, too. It is not a matter of positions identical to ours. But they are positions definitely quite different from the crude declarations heard even in Italy.

[Question] What do you mean?

[Answer] I mean that we must first decide to rearm and afterwards open negotiations.

[Question] But the PCI itself admits there is an imbalance of forces in favor of the USSR.

[Answer] The PCI asks that this issue too be discussed and negotiated. And it considers it to be a positive sign that the USSR does not exclude negotiations preceded by unilateral measures. Thus we should discuss the real extent and timing of these measures. The main thing is to seek to balance reduced forces, not engage in an arms race.

[Question] There is another argument: between the political decision to accept the new Pershing and Cruise missiles and their installation, at least three years would elapse.

[Answer] That is a childish argument. To hold that in three years there will be a return to parity, there would have to be an agreement that the USSR would be bound to keep for those three years, and it just won't work.

[Question] Another question about your relations with the USSR: since the meeting between Berlinguer and Brezhnev, there has been talk about a rapprochement between the PCI and Moscow. But then Boris Ponomarev made his violent attack on Eurocommunism.

[Answer] We always consider debate and criticism to be legitimate. We have criticized our Soviet comrades more than once. But we have always set forth the reasons for our criticism. What we have here is a criticism that is unreasoned and baseless. The things Ponomarev said are not in the least edifying. They do not serve a debate that would lead to mutual understanding of even merely to clarifying points of disagreement.

[Question] As a result, do you see in the Soviet leadership anybody opposing Ponomarev and looking kindly upon Eurocommunism?

[Answer] It doesn't seem to me that there is a debate taking place on this issue. I have always felt there would be respect for our strength and capacity for political achievement even beyond the doubts and difficulties that I think are quite useless to try to hide.

[Question] Are you concerned about what might happen in the USSR after Brezhnev?

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[Answer] You journalists are always concerned about what might happen "after something." I think it is already hard enough (and more productive) to understand the present situation and the way in which it has come about. This can help more than anything else to imagine what the future might bring.

[Question] But there is talk about the post-Brezhnev period. The names Chernenko, Kirilenko, and others are being bandied about. Do you think a continuation of the Brezhnev policy is most likely, or are we at a turning point?

[Answer] A turning point may come, as they have in the history of every country. I don't like to play the role of a prophet, but in this case I see no change in direction for the USSR.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

TREASURY MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON COMBATTING INFLATION

Milan IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 1 Nov 79 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Filippo Maria Pandolfi, minister of Treasury, by Alberto Mucci, of IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA: "Pandolfi: Combat Inflation by Protecting the Exchange of the Lira"; date and place not given]

[Text] "My determination is no less strong today than the one that in August 1978 induced me to formulate a proposal for constant growth"-- "Agreements between trade unions and entrepreneurs are necessary, with the backing of the government, for greater flexibility of labor utilization"-- "Increased public spending must be suspended"-- "Expenditures that exceed those that were anticipated will have to be covered by tax increases."

Rome--Minister of Treasury Filippo Maria Pandolfi comes out in the open. "Interpretations" on the economic and monetary policy abound like falling snow and polemics ensue. Has Pandolfi betrayed the "plan" that he presented in August 1978? Has the government abandoned the strategic objectives that revolve around the choices of a re-entry into Europe? Will we once more be obliged to adopt a painful credit hardship? And with what consequences? Minister Pandolfi does not avoid the "fire." "Well, he says, "let us begin immediately. I intend to give my frank opinion of the economic situation and to emphasize what, in my view, should be done, what the government specifically intends to do. We cannot evade our duties. I am not avoiding mine as minister of the treasury."

[Question] Very well, minister. But the difficulties of the Italian economy are increasing and now that new horizons beyond our borders have been opened up to you, as the ad interim chairman of the Ministerial Committee of the International Monetary Fund, some have made the hypothesis of a more defiladed position on your part concerning domestic matters, of a certain detachment, perhaps the fruit of frustration. Is this true?

[Answer] No. It is not true. My place above all is here; my responsibilities are, and remain, those of minister of the treasury. Furthermore, what little international activity I may be able to carry out will reflect the

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effects of the success or lack of success of my activity in the domestic field. Frankly I do not believe in hypothetical compensations from other sources. I am neither unconcerned, nor unmotivated.

[Question] How, then, do you view the country's economic situation in this difficult period that seems to envision still more difficult times?

[Answer] A look at international facts reveals a picture that is not reassuring. Inflation, recession, additional imbalances in the balance of payments dominate the world scene at the end of 1979 and predictably will do so in 1980. Italy is amply involved in this favorable [sic] evolution. My opinion? To say that I am preoccupied is not saying much. At any rate, it would be of little use. It is perhaps more useful to have it be known that my status is not that of a spectator, that I do not intend to stand on the river bank and look at a current that becomes increasingly impetuous and turbid. I am no less resolved today than I was a little more than a year ago when I was motivated to formulate my proposal for the stable growth of our economy.

[Question] But many things have changed since the time of your 31 August 1978 document, not only economically but also politically...

[Answer] Of course, but not to the point of upsetting the strategy that we delineated then. It is not in our power to change the course of world events, like the increase in prices of raw materials. But it is in our power to deal with the consequences and to control their effects. The problem is to adapt the strategy, not to change it. Since you referred to the 31 August 1978 document, I will say that if I were to rewrite it, I would write it differently. The criticisms and the lessons learned from experience convince me that much more attention should be devoted to the questions of "feasibility," especially in the field of public affairs. But I would not change the basic course. Besides, I believe that it can be said that there has been some positive effect from that proposal. Independently of the partial accomplishments that have taken place, the plan for the noninflationary development of the economy of the country was meant as a message. It seems that that in itself has caused a change in hopes regarding inflation.

[Question] But now hopes are in the opposite direction. A little on the part of everyone, but especially on the part of operators, whose decisions count for more in determining the climate. A prolonged period of great increases in prices is expected. There is a widespread impression that the political policy of the government has become more uncertain. What is your answer to that? Do not underestimate the importance of the line of the minister of the treasury at a time like this.

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[Answer] Precisely because I do not underestimate this, I should like to speak clearly, above all on inflation and the attitude that the government will pursue in dealing with it. Now there is general agreement on the fact that when there is 2-digit inflation, when the level of prices tends, as here at home, to increase between 1.5 and 2 percent a month, inflation becomes an inexorable factor of stagnation. Since everyone professes to support growth, it should be concluded that everyone is ready to do his part against inflation. But I have some doubt, not only on the conclusion, but also on the premise. The real significance of the damages of inflation is not yet understood. One does not yet fully realize that inflation destroys financial wealth; erodes family savings; sows uncertainty in all social strata; paralyzes investments, rendering the decisions of entrepreneurs uncertain in the presence of constant price changes; reduces actual overall expenditure of the system; ends in stagnation and unemployment; burdens society with high economic costs, with high human costs. There is theoretical agreement on all of this, but not enough practical agreement. A psychology of adaptation tends to prevail over a psychology of reaction.

[Question] But how does this psychology of adaptation to inflation specifically manifest itself? Are your fears generic, or do they relate to some fact or specific danger?

[Answer] I fear a propagation through contamination of improper attitudes on the part of entrepreneurs, workers, consumers, and thrifty persons. I particularly fear the undervaluation of additional inflationary stimuli of internal origin that accompany and heighten the outside impetus that I have mentioned. The internal stimuli are essentially connected with attitudes that are not consistent with those that a year ago we indicated as an administrative course for stable growth: containment of the public deficit, salary moderation, greater mobility and flexibility in the labor market. Some positive results were achieved by means of the first provisions contained in the 1979 financial law and, with respect to the cost of labor, by means of the conclusion of major contracts. But action on the public finances has suffered from the long interruption in legislative work. This is now being resumed with the 1980 financial law.

[Question] I seem to sense that this is where the dangers begin. Do you not believe that the political instability that characterizes this period may lead to parliamentary approval of amendments that will increase the deficit well beyond the limits set by the government?

[Answer] Parliament reflects the general situation. The instability of the political system, the limitation and the precariousness of agreement, the doubts that have been raised concerning the future of the eighth legislature are wrongs and dangers in themselves; but they are still more so in the face

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of matters that are becoming more serious. There can be no good economic policy without a good political policy. But please allow me to say two things. First: that this government--the prime minister is a resolute and authoritative guarantor of this--does not regard itself as having a diminished role--with respect to economic, or other, problems. Second: when one thinks about what will occur after this government, one should consider the fact that any "subsequent period," will be more difficult if the economic situation deteriorates in the meantime. These two things must be kept firmly in mind, in order to avoid illusions or errors in planning.

[Question] Now we've come to the matter of the financial law. The government attaches great importance to it. What does this law signify with regard to economic choices?

[Answer] With the financial law the government has set a first objective of containment of the public deficit; a second is an imminent one, the adjustment of public utility rates; a third objective regarding the financial law was the announcement of a reduction totalling 2,000 billion in the expenditures of the overall public sector. There is no doubt that the matter of costs is a factor in the present inflation. The government has been concerned and has therefore introduced additional tax measures. But inflation resulting from demand has also been noted, augmented by increased spending and the current deficit. We said this a year ago; we repeat it now: the way is to contain current spending, often the generator of an unhealthy demand, and to foster investments.

[Question] But one cannot escape the matter of agreement at this point. In the case of the financial law and of its parliamentary fate, it is a question of political agreement. But does it not seem to you that, for the struggle against inflation, there is the more general matter of social agreement, agreement on the part of trade unions and of entrepreneurs? Does it not seem to you that that is equally difficult?

[Answer] I fully agree with you. Besides, it was not by chance that I made my proposal a year ago, in an atmosphere of obvious and avowed greater agreement. The assent of the social parties to the strategy that we intend to develop for the purpose of overcoming inflation is no less important than that of the political parties.

[Question] Are you thinking of something in particular or something more urgent?

[Answer] Yes. An inflation resulting from demand is heightened to extremes by the fleecing of supply. The economic doctrine has recently been paying more attention to the fact that inflation remedies must also be sought in the field of supply. I am convinced that it is possible, and necessary, to

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have agreements between labor organizations and entrepreneurs, better still if with governmental impulse and backing, in the direction of creating greater flexibility and mobility in the utilization of labor. There is no time to lose nor, on the other hand, is there a lack of possibilities for important counterbalances and guarantees on points that are at the heart of the labor union movement.

[Question] I seem to understand that in the strategy outlined by the government for passage between the Scylla of galloping inflation and the Charybdis of recession many things depend on variables that are not easily controlled--the ones in the hands of political forces and social forces. At this point a question arises that I consider decisive. What will the government do if your policy is not supported? Will it defend your line with intransigence or will it resign itself to the worst?

[Answer] I, too, believe that the question is a decisive one. The government has the duty of making known in advance, without the possibility of any misunderstanding, what it proposes to do. I am not speaking of abstract programs. I am speaking of decisions to be made in the face of specific situations. It is necessary to send a message and that it be received in time by everyone.

[Question] Yes, we indeed need to know.

[Answer] The government has established its line and has made it known to parliament. I refer to the key point regarding public finances, which is the sector of the front where the strongest pressures and the greatest risk of collapse exist. It is essential that expenditures in the overall public sector not exceed the already very high sum of 40,000 billion. Increases in current spending are requested for this or that item from various directions. We do not deny that there is a basis for those requests, taken one by one. But we have the duty, I have the duty, to warn that a waiting period is necessary for the economic and social safety of the country. What is not possible today will be possible tomorrow, if we overcome the crisis, as we are in a position to overcome it. Limited compensations are possible within the overall figures indicated by the government. But I would be concealing the truth if I were to let it be believed that there is much leeway. In any case, the line that has been indicated is the one that the government is prepared to hold.

[Question] But what if, in spite of the resistance of the government, there should occur, as you say, a collapse? What means does the government have to do something about it? And if there are means, up to what point does the government intend to use them?

[Answer] That is a hypothesis that no one would want to suppose. So far we have avoided forcing the situation in an aggressive manner. This has

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been interpreted by some--even authoritative persons--as a sign of surrender. The case of the quarterly sliding scale for public employees is cited. I have spoken on this point at length and in documented terms, I believe, in the senate on 11 October. I do not intend to enter into polemics, preferring instead to allow facts to overcome them. The facts will be those that befit a government that fights to the utmost to persuade, but which does not withdraw from its responsibilities. I should like to establish three points. The first has to do with the covering of major circumstances that might occur independently of the desire of the government, or in any case based on a parliamentary judgment concerning the necessity of greater expenditures. In such a case additional taxes will be inevitable. Specifically, the greater yield from a more vigorous fight against tax evasion will not be enough. More revenue will be needed.

[Question] A difficult maneuver, as experience teaches, and not without negative secondary effects. And then it could be that this maneuver, too, might prove to be insufficient.

[Answer] In that case--and this is the second point that I wanted to clarify--a greater use of monetary stimulus will be inevitable. I am not among those who believe that the reduction of monetary increases obtained through administrative means is a necessary and sufficient condition leading to stabilization. The kind of actions that I have proposed shows how my understanding of the phenomena is substantially different. But this does not mean hesitation to intervene when economic safety requires it. In the past 12 months we have backed recovery through a moderately expansive monetary policy. The objectives that we announced in the estimated and programmatic report can still assure support to the productive system. This support would be fatally reduced if an unwanted increase in the public deficit should compel the treasury and the Banca d'Italia [Bank of Italy] to use their available administrative means to restrictively regulate money and credit.

[Question] In this case we would decisively head toward deflation, perhaps an uncontrollable deflation?

[Answer] We are not thinking of this. We only know that no harm would be worse than an inflationary upset that in a short time would compromise the premises of growth that have been laboriously built up during the past 3 years.

[Question] You mentioned a third point in the policy that you intend to follow, in the reply that you intend to give regarding the difficulties of this economic period...

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[Answer] Yes. I was referring to the exchange policy. Adherence to the EMS [European Monetary System] commits us to the objective of exchange stability. We intend to meet this commitment. The struggle against inflation requires the stability of the lira, especially in a situation in which the energetic measures of the American authorities seem to be leading to stabilization of the dollar. There are important retroactive elements in exchanges, costs, and prices. And the matter of how to avoid the price rises in oil that hang over our economy from becoming immediately incorporated into the domestic price system as a consequence of index mechanisms is not to be considered closed.

[Question] But an uninspired exchange policy in time could lessen the competitiveness of our enterprises. How do you think that the problem can be dealt with?

[Answer] Between 1978 and 1979 there has been a certain decline in competitiveness. According to OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] estimates, it has amounted to 3 percent, on the basis of the exportation prices of hand-manufactured articles. It must also be kept in mind that we had started from a substantially favorable situation. It is illusory to believe that it is possible to extinguish the price fever solely through maneuvering the exchange. In fact a basic dimension of the phenomenon has to do with the competitiveness of our economic system. That is why it is necessary to act simultaneously to reduce the direct stimuli of inflation resulting from a current excessive public deficit and from unbearable labor cost increases.

[Question] Once more it seems that it's all interdependent.

[Answer] Precisely. Why not look at the positive aims which, in spite of everything, are still within our reach? Let us not forget that some of the most significant improvements in the structural conditions of our economy have been obtained not in periods of expansion, but in those of readjustment. If in 1980 we succeed in implementing an economic policy associated with the containment of the current public deficit and a controlled evolution of credit and monetary totals, increases in production that are capable of neutralizing increases in salary costs, then the stability of the exchange, the decline in inflation, and the maintenance of a competitive position may be welded into a strong circle.

[Question] Mr. Minister, do you think this is possible?

[Answer] Yes. But what we need, of course, is great strength.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

LA MALFA OF PRI DISCUSSES INFLATION

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 22 Oct 79 p 215

[Interview with Giorgio La Malfa, president of the Chamber of Deputies Industry Committee, name of interviewer, place and date not given]

[Text] The Bank of Italy has sounded an alarm. As soon as monetary data for the month of September were analyzed, Paolo Baffi took defensive measures by increasing the discount rate by 1.5 points (it was his last decision as governor). But the measure was not sufficient by itself: Inflation and higher public expenditures begin to threaten the lira closely. This was stated by Giorgio La Malfa, president of the Chamber of Deputies Industry Committee, chief economist of the PRI [Italian Republican Party], in this interview.

Question: Why doesn't the PRI share the government's economic policy choices?

Answer: Because they are contradictory and alarming. On the one hand, public expenditures increased (and this generates inflation), on the other hand, we are forced to deal a blow to productive activity of enterprises through an increase in the cost of money.

Question: With the increase in the discount rate, therefore, was there an attempt to slow down a maneuver that was too expansive?

Answer: The Bank of Italy decision confirms the extreme seriousness of the situation. From what I have learned in fact, the Central Bank in September registered alarming symptoms regarding the monetary situation and took remedial steps.

Question: Therefore, you accuse the government of not having been fully committed to the fight against inflation?

Answer: Of having done it in words only. President Cossiga, when he appeared in the Chamber, went so far as to somehow adopt the proposal of sterilizing the sliding scale in relation to the increase in the price of petroleum products. Instead, the government's first steps should be in an entirely different direction.

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Question: What are you referring to?

Answer: To the negotiations on public employment, to certain fiscal measures, to the increase in prices and rates which, without changes in the sliding scale mechanism, create new inflation.

Question: However, the trade union's position on the sliding scale did not leave much room for negotiation.

Answer: That is not correct. One year ago ex-CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] Secretary Luigi Macario, talked of cost of living increases equal for everyone every 4 months. Cossiga himself, in a talk with PRI ex-secretary Oddo Biasini, had considered the proposal possible.

Question: Let us talk about fiscal measures. Was the reduction in withholdings from the workers' pay envelopes the right thing to do?

Answer: Yes, but this should not let us forget the problem of public expenditures. The Pandolfi plan, 1 year ago, indicated cuts totaling 5 trillion lire by 1980. Instead sliding scale provisions were extended to public workers, fiscal withdrawals were reduced.

Rumors have it that in 1980 public expenditures will increase by about 20 trillion lire.

Question: Are these signs of weakness or are they precise economic policy choices?

Answer: I believe that the somewhat obsessive concern of Budget Minister Nino Andreatta to insure support for income through public deficit weighed upon everything. A similar choice in the '70's was paid for by the devaluation of the lira, the collapse of currency reserves and increase in inflation.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

FEDERCONSORZI DENOUNCED TO EEC BY CONSUMER ADVOCATES

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 22 Oct 79 pp 217-218

[Article by Nicola Pressburger: "Holy EEC Grant Us Grace"]

[Text] "Stop the Federconsorzi": The request--rather what was really a denunciation--was from the Committee for Consumer Protection to the Executive Committee of the European Economic Community. The most important Italian organization in the agricultural sector, for 30 years a bastion of the Christian Democratic Party [DC], is nothing but a gigantic monopolistic enterprise, according to Fabio Fabbri, socialist senator, chairman of the Protection Committee, and Gustavo Ghidini, professor of industrial law, and [committee] secretary. They say it exercises unchallengeable domination over the farm products market, controlling prices, distribution and storage. And since Italian law does not supply instruments of consumer protection against monopolies, Fabbri and Ghidini ask the European Community to intervene, ordering cessation of monopoly practices.

According to a complaint recently presented at Brussels, the Federconsorzi holds an "absolutely dominant" position in at least five sectors and uses it in a distorting way: Fertilizers (95 percent of the market), agricultural machinery (70 percent), feed grain, storage facilities for grain, and the general sale of products when Federconsorzi acts for the government. In particular, exclusive agreements existing between Federconsorzi and major industries producing fertilizers (ANIC, Montedison), tractors and other agricultural machinery (Fiat) prevent other organizations, such as the cooperatives, from procuring farm labor, materials and equipment needed for work. Not only that: The policy of distribution and sale prices charged for these materials wound up damaging the farm workers themselves (and therefore indirectly the consumers) to the exclusive advantage of industry.

That the Federconsorzi enjoyed a privileged position in Italian agriculture had already been established in the past.

But it was useless. The large organization, which in theory should have been a union of agricultural cooperatives (the 75 provincial and inter-provincial farm groups who are members of the federation), marked by

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maximum internal democracy, in reality has always been governed from the summit without any possibility of intervention by farmers. It has progressively increased its empire. Today in all of Italy it controls 1,760 warehouses and storage silos, 1,580 gasoline storage facilities, 650 facilities for preserving and processing agricultural products, 12 fertilizer plants, two pest-control plants and one plant in which sacks are produced, 500 machine shops, 3,600 dealerships for the sale of machinery and material to farmers, 1,700 food sales outlets, with total gross sales last year of 1.2 trillion lire.

"It was impossible to break its exclusive contracts with ANIC [National Agency for Fuel Hydrogenation]," complains Luciano Bernardini, president of the agricultural section of the League Cooperatives. This is the organization that embraces the leftist agricultural organizations. "We tried many times to obtain supplies from these industries, but Federconsorzi was always preferred," he said. Last summer, finally, Federconsorzi's monopolistic position was once more officially accepted at the end of a parliamentary investigation of process of farm products. Agriculture and industry representatives were heard during the course of the investigation (the Montedison representative complained, for example, the Federconsorzi prevents any innovation in the field of fertilizers).

It was precisely on the basis of this investigation that the Committee for Consumer Protection presented its complaint to the EEC. Fabio Fabbri says, "It is a new attempt to somehow change the situation. In Parliament, in fact, every attempt to review the 1948 law which established the Federconsorzi, was nullified by angry resistance."

Draft law. Some months ago Federconsorzi President Mario Vetrone, a DC deputy, had actually spoken of the intention to open Federconsorzi to non-DC interests. But the leftist parties and the legal cooperatives considered this offer entirely insufficient. Rather, Fabbri, in the name of the Socialist Party, last week once more presented the draft legislation which aims to dismantle the Federconsorzi empire in the same way as any other monopolistic enterprise.

The draft law, together with that presented by the PCI, provides for handing over Federconsorzi plants to provincial (or regional) consortiums changing them into cooperatives accessible to all with no further discrimination. The outcome of the EEC complaint and of parliamentary initiatives, however, is very much in doubt. Among other things, Federconsorzi for years has had close relations with the EEC through its Brussels office. Ghidini explains, "With our complaint we tried again to raise the Federconsorzi issue and to spur political groups to act."

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

DEVELOPMENT OF, OUTLOOK FOR ALTERNATIVE ENERGY RESOURCES

Rome ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME in Italian May-Jun/Jul-Aug 79 pp 17-26

[Article by Felice Ippolito: "Italy's Development and Prospects of Alternate Petroleum Energy Sources"]

[Text] To the current electric power output of about 160 billion kwh we could add another 40 billions produced from alternate sources. How will we then cover the requirement of 350 billion kwh by 1990?

Introduction

On 16 March, the restricted seminar, held in Turin on the initiative of the CEEP, on which Giorgio La Malfa reported earlier, particularly pointed up, against the background of the energy crisis which has now been lasting for six years, the frailty of the current crude petroleum supply situation for Western Europe and in particular for Italy because there has been a rather abrupt political change in the domestic balance of one of the big petroleum producers and exporters in the Middle East, a change that was sufficient to unleash an emergency situation which has caused a considerable deterioration in the already precarious energy panorama.

While we were just beginning to try to restore the balance of Italy's energy policy, on other foundations and under different conditions, in medium-range terms, an entirely different event, a technological incident at a big nuclear electric power plant in the United States, the three Mile Island nower plant near Harrisburg, in Pennsylvania, triggered another chain reaction that was equally harmful and that provided further fuel for the already existing antinuclear campaign sustained--as I will point out shortly--by an almost totally alarmist, irresponsible, and misinformed press.

Although these two events, which I briefly wanted to outline here, are quite different, there is no doubt that our meeting here today comes at an opportune time because it forces us into an unbiased and complete

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examination of the overall Italian energy problem, while the presence of the most qualified personalities in this sector in Italy I hope will make the discussion, which is to follow our introductory reports, extremely significant so as to enable us to provide additional elements of judgment for those, on the technical-economic and political levels, are responsible for decisions to be made and the policy to be pursued. This is all the more important today while a polemical election campaign is beginning, a campaign in whose course we will undoubtedly see taken up also those arguments, from a purely electioneering angle, so that we will, so to speak, be forced certainly to listen to all kinds of stupidities which will confuse the minds of the voters even more, often playing on their emotions. In my opinion, it is therefore very important for this meeting to come out with an authoritative and carefully considered statement which perhaps will be the last before the start of the election campaign and which could instead be a firm reference point not only for those who do not want to hide the tiger but for the future parliament and the next administration.

Although everybody knows it, it seems a good idea to me here to review some of the facts that are behind any debate on Italy's energy situation that is not supposed to be purely qualitative. As far as energy in its various forms is concerned, Italy depends on exports to the extent of about 85 percent of its requirements and it is therefore self-sufficient only for the remaining 15 percent whereas the countries of Western Europe, overall, are self-sufficient to the extent of 30 percent. This fact must be considered together with another fact which tells us that Italy's annual per-capita electric power consumption is something like 2,000-2,300 kwh, in other words, a little more than half of the average consumption of the other industrialized countries in the same geographic area. If we want to express these data in terms of per-capital consumption of equivalent kilograms of coal, we find that Italy has an annual average per-capital consumption (1978) of 3,012 kg as against 5,345 kg for Germany, and 10,999 kg for the United States (average of industrialized countries: 6,295; world average: 2,028, as indicated in Table 1).

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Table 1. Total Per-Capital Energy Consumption in Equivalent Coal kg of Industrial Countries and Third World

1 Paesi	2 N. abitanti	3 Consumo equivalente pro-capite in kg/ab. di carb.	4 Consumi totali in milioni di kg di carb. equival.
5 Belgio	9.823.000	5.584	54.851
6 Cecoslovacchia	14.974.000	7.151	107.079
7 Francia	52.660.000	3.944	207.691
8 Germania D.	16.760.000	6.835	114.554
9 Germania F.	61.500.000	5.345	328.717
10 Italia	55.000.000	3.012	165.660
11 Paesi Bassi	13.814.000	5.784	79.900
12 Regno Unito	54.390.000	5.265	286.363
13 Urss	258.000.000	5.546	1.430.868
14 Giappone	110.000.000	3.622	398.420
Israele	3.580.000	2.806	10.045
15 Sud Africa	21.500.000	2.953	63.489
Canada	23.000.000	9.880	227.240
16 Usa	214.000.000	10.999	2.353.786
Argentina	24.000.000	1.754	42.096
Australia	13.500.000	6.485	87.547
17 Media paesi industr.	946.501.000	6.295	5.958.306
Media			
18 Terzo Mondo	3.076.499.000	715	2.200.338
19 Media mondiale	4.023.000.000	2.028	8.158.644

Key: 1--country; 2--population; 3--equivalent per-capita consumption in equivalent kg of coal per inhabitants; 4--total consumption in millions of kg of equivalent coal; 5--Belgium; 6--Czechoslovakia; 7--France; 8--East Germany; 9--West Germany; 10--Italy; 11--Holland; 12--United Kingdom; 13--USSR; 14--Japan; 15--South Africa; 16--United States of America; 17--average, industrial countries; 18--average, Third World; 19--worldwide average.

Although they may be numerically somewhat approximate these data certainly are valid in terms of their order of magnitude and spell out Italy's particular weakness within the contest of a geographic area which, overall, is having difficulty in getting energy supplies. But to those statistics we must add one other fact of life and that is that, even under these conditions, for objective and subjective reasons which would take us too far afield, Italy does enjoy primacy in another area: Italy has the highest domestic goods traffic percentage (beyond 75 percent) handled via highway, hence, it has a higher fuel consumption per kilogram hauled.

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The outlook for autochthonous energy sources, as we shall see in the course of this report and the following comments, is likewise one of the worst, if not absolutely the worst, as I think. No fossil carbon, not in the usual meaning of this term, and no possibility of finding any in terms of geology and mining (from this viewpoint, geology can supply us with a decisive answer); few, slim, and almost unexploitable deposits of poor lignite (with the only exception of the lignite of Sulcis which I will have more to say about later and which however, as I might note right away, is a source to be considered of limited scope, for Sardinia alone).

As far as hydrocarbons are concerned, our conversation here can be more articulated although the most optimistic considerations of a geological and deposit layout character demonstrate quite undeniably--and in the unanimous opinion of the experts (although in a slightly varying manner)--that, no matter how hard we push onshore and offshore prospecting, the results could never possibly give us anything remotely resembling self-sufficiency. As far as gas is concerned, exploration, which is now being pushed extensively, has produced results that are certainly encouraging from the technological and scientific viewpoint but those results also persuaded the government agency concerned to draw up long-term import contracts with foreign outfits, for example, imports from Algeria and the countries of the East. As far as petroleum is concerned, the new prospecting phase, going beyond 5,000 m, aimed at deep Mesozoic formations, down to the base of the Triassic, opened up interesting prospects in favorable places although they are not such as to bring about an abrupt change in the situation. The discoveries, handled by AGIP [National Italian Oil Company], in the deep deposits in the Po Valley, the discoveries in the Sicilian Channel [Strait of Messina], and the likewise probable discovery in the Adriatic may confirm the estimates which were given and repeated several times by the government agency's officials; but even at best, the maximum we can get out of that would be between 10 and 20 percent of our present requirements and that, certainly, for a not too long span of time.

I will touch on further hydroelectric possibilities later on but the recent official statements by the President of the ENEL [National Electric Power Company] do not deviate considerably but instead confirm and in part restrict what I myself on several occasions had an opportunity to state in several places, that is, that another 10 billion kwh per year of hydroelectric power would represent a ceiling which would be difficult to top.

From this objective situation, which we have briefly outlined here and which covers some of the aspects I will have an opportunity to take up now, springs the unavoidable needs--also beyond the recent decisions made on an international level by the Energy Agency in Paris--seriously to pursue an energy conservation and energy savings program in all directions.

I do not want to spend time on an examination of the steps which the Ministry of Industry is now studying; they are not yet well defined at the time I am writing this report and perhaps we will hear loud and clear from

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somebody who has some advance statements to make on this issue. Let me merely recall here the commitments undertaken by Italy on an international level; for 1979 (that is to say, for the next eight months) they obligate us to save at least 5 percent as compared to last year's consumption, as a consequence of the Iranian crisis which supposedly caused a shortage of 14 million t of crude for the current year (about 14 percent of the total) which, according to official statements by the appropriate ministry, can be reduced to 9 million.

I repeat that we do not deliberately want to get into the bitter debate raised by the certainly insufficient and vague statements of the Hon Nicolazzi but I cannot help but note that the elections before us persuade us to feel that this administration will not take any serious steps, regardless of the commitments assumed in Paris on 22 May because one cannot govern without making somebody dissatisfied and because therefore the two steps which in my opinion are indispensable right away will not be taken, that is, the step of modulating the way in which electrical energy is drawn out at various times throughout the day in order to modify the daily load diagram for the better and in a more efficient manner (a diagram which in Italy is among the most unbalanced) as well as the steps of drastically barring the highway transports of some goods or certain commodities which can be carried in some other way or which need not be transported at all (including some groups of economic [private-industry] operators).

The topic assigned to me for this report prevents me from dwelling any further on this cardinal argument of savings; I hope that the discussion will clearly bring out the terms and limitations of this complex problem.

Alternate Sources Replacing Petroleum

The issue which I must take up now causes me to go into a detailed examination of energy sources that would constitute alternatives to petroleum. I will therefore start with coal, a fuel for which we do not face the problem of an international shortage but which nevertheless does present technological problems in terms of its utilization and similar difficulties of a financial nature because of the repercussions on the balance of payments on account of the fact that it has to be purchased abroad. I am not even talking here about the ecological and environmental consequences deriving from the burning of coal, in massive doses, if we do not resort to expensive smoke elimination as well as radioactivity control systems. Coal as a matter of fact has an average content of about 1.5 ppm [parts per million] of uranium which is expelled into the atmosphere through combustion. It has been calculated that one radon, produced by uranium in the United States in one year, assuming that all electrical energy required is produced by coal-fired power plants, would produce about 1,000 deaths every million years, that is, a figure on the order of three times greater than what we would get from radioactive ash for an electric power system sustained only by nuclear power.

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In this connection it seems to me a good idea to recall--in order to come up with a better comparison between the ecological damage deriving from a 1,000-Mw power plant using coal and an electric nuclear power plant of equal capacity--that the waste from the latter will differ from the waste from the former in two important ways. First of all, the volume of ash to be stored and produced in 1 year by a nuclear reactor of 1,000 Mw is only about 2 m³. This relatively small quantity of radioactive materials makes it convenient to use highly sophisticated slag treatment processes whose cost can be compared to the price of electric energy generated which, for a power plant of this type, is on the order of magnitude of \$200 million per year (160 billion lire).

In second place, we must consider one feature of nuclear waste which is represented by the fact that its danger does not depend on its chemical properties but rather on the radiation emitted. Now--as B. L. Cohen of the University of Pittsburgh emphasized recently--there seems to be widespread confusion on that score: The effects of radiation on the human body are much better known than the effects deriving from numerous chemical products, such as, for example, the substances that pollute the air, whereas radiation can be measured with simplicity and precision through economical and highly sensitive instruments (and this is why radioactive isotopes are in wide use in biomedical research). On the other hand, a 1,000-Mw thermoelectric power plant, burning coal, every second expels from its smokestack 270 kg of carbonic anhydride whose harmful effects on the deleterious changes in the climate cause ever greater worry (Newell); now, 4.5 kg of sulfurous anhydride, according to a recent study by the National Academy of Science, every year and for every power plant causes about 25 deaths and 60,000 cases of respiratory illnesses and property damage amounting to \$12 million, as well as nitrogen oxide and benzopyrene (the chief cancer-causing agent in cigarettes).

Italian Coal, that is, Sulcis lignite, has been the subject of bitter debate for many years. The very fact that such bitter debate broke out in my opinion is direct confirmation of the fact that the problem is controversial (because we must rule out ostracism purely due to reasons that do not hold much water). That this coal, assuming equal calorific power, has double the sulfur content of the worst fuel oil is a fact that nobody disputes; that the quantity and the type of slag, which its combustion produces, are such as to necessitate extensive devices to prevent the blockage of furnace grates and other serious inconveniences is no longer being challenged; that its radioactive content is greater, by a factor of 10, than the average of the fossil coal types, but that, in the current emergency situation, this would represent a conspicuous resource, not to be overlooked, although it is far from decisive, is something that is no longer being debated by anybody either. It follows from a study accomplished by an outstanding expert (published in No 3 of this magazine) that, in the two areas of Seruci and Nuraxi Figus, we have 300 million t of extractable coal whereas, for the remaining portion of the basin--which has not yet been completely explored--"we can assume 800-1,000 million t as a ballpark

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figure." Concerning the time required to start mining there, the study concludes that we could, within a few years, achieve an output of 2 million t per year; but it does not conceal the serious ecological difficulties which the utilization of this resource would force us to overcome. However, even at best, this resource is limited to covering a modest share of the nation's energy requirements although, as I noted just now, it probably could relieve us of worry concerning electric power generation for Sardinia. The other lignite deposits in Italy are generally of poor quality, modest in volume, and difficult to get at; they can constitute only local resources which however can be used in the best possible fashion, although they obviously do not in any way at all modify the national energy panorama.

The energy source that could be an alternative to petroleum (or that could replace imported fossil coal) and that, in medium-range terms, that is to say, within 20 or 25 years, could make a decisive contribution, is and remains nuclear energy.

Talking at a restricted meeting of experts, I do not believe that we should waste too many words to convince each other of this inevitable necessity because we are already convinced of it. But it seems a good idea to me instead--also in order to get the discussion started--to dwell a little bit on the psychological problems raised by the utilization of electric nuclear energy not only in Italy. The Harrisburg incident has been a windfall for the Italian antinuclear group, triggering an uncontrolled reaction in the Italian daily and weekly press. It seems to me a good idea to call attention to this point. I am perfectly convinced that problems such as this one will be discussed at length, listening to all the pros and cons, concerning the argument on all of the various angles--scientific, technical, economic, political, and whatever--but I do not believe that a press that publishes headlines such as "The World Will Blow Up Soon" or phrases such as this one: "To understand the dimensions of this incident, one must realize that the explosion of the Hiroshima bomb produced about 1 kg of radioactive waste, against 1.5 t of slag that would be expelled by the fusion of a 1,000-Mw power plant such as the one at Caorso, for example, (L'ESPRESSO, No 14-15, 15 April 1979). I do not believe that this kind of press is a responsible press.

Statements such as this one--and I quoted it here simply by way of example --which out of malice or monumental ignorance persuade people to consider any incidence in a nuclear electric power plant as being the same as the explosion of a military device, statements such as these in my opinion shirk the limit of the permissible and could perhaps even be prosecuted under the law.

The antinuclear campaign--which in Italy, in recent days, went to extremes such as the ones outlined above--is underway a little bit everywhere in all countries for a series of reasons which are very complex and heavily intertwined and which I will now try to spell out.

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(a) It is rather well known that nuclear energy emerged from the wartime use of atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; it is therefore very easy for misinformed and emotionally aroused people to confuse the "wartime" atom with the atom "for peace"; consequently, it is easy for the antinuclear forces, through a series of captious arguments, to liken the hazards of a very serious incident or a case of sabotage in an electric nuclear power plant to the damage caused by a wartime explosion.

(b) In second place, there are legitimate worries, on the political level, that massive nuclear power development in all countries, with the switch to electric nuclear power plants operated by "fast" plutonium reactors could, without insuperable difficulties, deteriorate into a proliferation of nuclear arms which is something to be avoided; consequently--and this is the thesis recently maintained by R. Jungk--a country's nuclearization could fatally lead to a "police state" because of the necessary and drastic security measures that would have to be taken.

(c) Finally, the antinuclear movement has become part of a vaster ecological movement with a romantic background, aimed at the conservation of nature and the defense of the environment, which industrial civilization is rapidly compromising.

These are the main motives which are intertwined and which cross-fertilize each other in various ways; I will try to refute them with arguments dictated not by the a priori assumption of a position in favor of nuclear power plants but in the light of common sense and responsibility.

It is easy to reply to the arguments mentioned in paragraph (a), above, to the effect that, precisely because of the origin of its potential hazard, nuclear industry came up with extremely strict safety standards which distinguish it in all countries.

On the other hand, the chemical industry, petrochemistry, or the steel industry came up almost anarchically without safety regulations and devices; here as a matter of fact we record serious and deadly accidents daily either among the workers or among the population (it suffices to recall here the technically in itself ordinary incident at Seveso or the recent deaths in Marghera or other well-known disasters); on the other hand, the nuclear industry sprang up with "security incorporated in it." I will prove that with the help of two examples: In Italy we have been operating three water reactors for the past 15 years (of the type that would be constructed on the basis of the energy plan) and we have never had any incidents that caused damage or even alarm among the population, nor have we had a single death or serious injury among the personnel; worldwide, 160 power plants of the same type are in operation for a total of close to 2,000 years per operating reactor, without any major incidents and without any consequences of an environmental or ecological character. No other industrial activity can boast of a similar vine record and even the serious incident at Harrisburg only confirmed the validity of what I have just said in substance.

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The problem of the proliferation of plutonium and hence of nuclear arms, covered in point (b), however is a serious one indeed. But it is of no interest to us here at this moment; instead, it is of concern to the future whether and when one should switch to the use of fast plutonium reactors. Here, the antinuclear forces, deliberately or in good faith, confuse a present problem with a hypothetical problem of the future.

It is for these reasons that the Italian parliament, in its motion of 5 October 1977, approved the construction of eight plus four electric nuclear power plants of the proven type (that is, with enriched uranium and water), without committing itself on fast plutonium reactors for which only a continuation of studies and research has been provided (also in order to wait for the results of the first power plant of this type under construction in France with Italian participation). Now, 12 or even 20 nuclear power plants--which are indispensable for reasons I will give later--certainly are not going to get Italy caught in a deadend street, nor are they going to create the atomic police state envisioned by R. Jungk.

Let us now take up environmental damage covered in point (c). There is no discussion among qualified experts that the environmental damage, caused by combustion (of petroleum or coal) is much more serious, less controllable, and more insidious for the future of the human environment than the damage caused by an equivalent installation in an electric nuclear power plant. Here it is unthinkable that the antinuclear movement, which grew above all by mixing arguments of various kinds, could only be the fruit of a unilateral ecological view based on insufficient technical scientific information but rather that there are big interests involved which are fostering the campaign by playing on the ingenuousness and good faith of the most conspicuous segment of the followers. It must also be added that other problems raised by the antinuclear forces, such as the final disposal of the so-called radioactive state, are not placed within the confines of the current national energy plan and, even with sophisticated devices, can find a solution on the international level in due time. I would like to recall here the results of the so-called Polvani reports published in September 1977 by the OECD and drafted by a group of experts in the NEA [Nuclear Energy Agency] and the OECD itself: "Assuming that the recommendations listed (in the report) are acted on and that the necessary funds are made available, the group of experts is convinced that the solutions currently perfected for the disposal of radioactive wastes fully satisfy all safety requirements." B. L. Cohen arrived at the same conclusions in an article published in SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, July 1977, and LE SCIENZE, No 110, October 1977, from which I think it would be a good idea to quote the following passage. "Perhaps the best way to estimate the burden imposed upon our descendants as a result of the storage of nuclear waste is to compare this with other burdens which we are imposing upon them. The worst of these is probably the consumption of high-content mineral resources at this time. Within a few generations, all economically exploitable deposits of copper, tin, zinc, mercury, lead, and dozens of other elements will be exhausted and our descendants will be left with few possibilities of exploiting the deposits

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of these minerals. We are furthermore burning fuels, in the form of coal, petroleum, and gas, at the rate of millions of tons per day, depriving our descendants not only of fuels but also of raw materials for the manufacture of plastic substances, organic chemical substances, pharmaceuticals, and other products. These are burdens which are considerably heavier than any imaginable burden that could derive from the correct storage of nuclear wastes."

On the basis of the above, we can now examine the current Italian situation as regards the development of energy consumption and the production of electric energy.

According to some data processing by the WAES (Workshop on Alternative Energy Resources), the Italian energy consumption scenario, until 2000 based on a GNP growth rate (in terms of average percentages per year) of 2.5 percent until 1985 and 3 percent from 1986 until 2000, would imply a consumption for 1985 and for 2000, respectively, of 2000 and 283 million t petroleum equivalent per year (Mtep/yr), divided among the various energy sources as indicated in Figure 1 and an electric energy supply, likewise expressed in Mtep/yr of 48 in 1985 (equal to 26 percent of the total energy consumption) and 81 in 2000 (equal to 32 percent of the total energy consumption), as indicated in Figure 2. But let us take a somewhat closer look particularly on electric power generation.

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


Figure 1. Scenarios of Italian energy consumption development. The scenario is representative of the lower limit of the probable development of the Italian economy and is based on a GNP growth rate of 2.5 percent on the average per year for the period of 1977-1985 and 3.0 percent on the average per year for the period of 1986-2000. Key: 1--energy saving; 2--coal; 3--nuclear; 4--petroleum; 5--gas; 6--water power and geothermal energy; 7--solar; 8--millions of ton-equivalents of petroleum per year (Mtep/yr).

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


Figure 2. Electric energy supply in Italy expressed in primary energy. The scenario is representative of the lower limit of the Italian economy's probable growth and is based on a GNP growth rate of 2.5 percent on the average per year for the period of 1977-1985 and 3.0 percent on the average per year for the period of 1986-2000. Electric energy is evaluated here at the rate of 2,300 kEcal/kwh and with a conversion factor of 1 tep=10⁷kcal. In 1985 nuclear energy is considered here as having been produced by the four power plants now in operation, plus two new units. Key: 1--Percentage of total energy consumption; 2--coal; 3--nuclear; 4--petroleum; 5--gas and miscellaneous; 6--water power and geothermal energy; 7--millions of ton-equivalents of petroleum per year (Mtep/yr).

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In 1978, about 160 billion kwh were produced in Italy with an installed power of about 40,000 Mw. The minimum increase assumptions call for respective requirements for 1980 and 1985 of about 190 and 260 billion kwh ("low" estimate under the national energy plan). It is a good idea to keep in mind that the minimum estimates are far from the old 10-year doubling of electric power consumption and call for a minimum increase compatible with the country's population and economic growth and without increasing unemployment beyond tolerable limits. Extrapolating the statistics given above until 1990, I repeat, of course, assuming minimum growth, we already arrive at a requirement of about 350 billion kwh per year. Considering the current situation of installed power, amounting to about 40,000 Mw, we will have a shortage of about 10,000 Mw in 1985 and about 20,000 Mw in 1990. In other words, how are we going to cover the 350 billion kwh necessary for 1990?

To the current annual output (including hydroelectric, thermoelectric, nuclear-electric, and geothermal-electric), amounting to about 160 billion kwh, we can add the following in order to arrive at the minimum assumption of 350 billions in 1990 (190 difference):

Further hydroelectric energy	10 x 10 ⁹ kwh
Further geothermal energy	10 x 10 ⁹ kwh
Solar energy for domestic uses and other integrative sources (waste, wind, etc.)	20 x 10 ⁹ kwh
	<hr/>
	40 x 10 ⁹ kwh

The other 150 billions can be reasonably assumed to come only either from conventional thermal power plants or electric-nuclear power plants. If we were to implement the plan, building 12 power plants of 1,000-Mw, we would have another 80-90 billion kwh from that source and we would still be forced either to make massive savings or to produce another 60-70 billion kwh in conventional electrical energy, burning mostly imported fuel, with a further serious blow to Italy's balance of payments (we remember that the effect of imported fuel costs on the cost of each kilowatt hour produced is almost eight times the cost of nuclear fuel).

These are irrefutable figures--and they are based on minimum assumptions--which should have persuaded us without further delay to implement the national energy plan and to start the construction of the power plants provided for which--no matter what anybody else may say--cannot start to go into operation before the end of the eighties because this is already 1979.

Since for conventional power plants using turbogas or fuel oil or coal, construction times vary from 3 to 6 years at least, it must be realized that the country is, due to the lack of initiative at this time, heading toward an extremely serious crisis in terms of installed electric power deficiencies, as demonstrated by the frequent and repeated blackouts (including the extremely serious one at the end of November 1978). On the

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other hand, calculations obtained through the courtesy of the current president of ENES show that, assuming a small development of the demand (average growth rate 4 percent, electrical energy 6.4 percent) and the completion of plants under construction or authorized as of 31 December 1978 (hence, including the two electric-nuclear units of Montalto di Castro), the electric output shortage compared to the demand will, by the end of 1987 [sic; 1987!] amount to a total of 47.7 billion kwh, in other words, 16 percent, with peaks of 82.8 percent for the region of Marche, 60.2 percent for Piedmont, 74.3 percent for Campania, 36.8 percent for Tuscany, and 27.2 percent for Lombardy (Table 2).

Table 2. Electric Energy Produced and Demanded in Italy, by Regions, in 1987 (Assuming a low demand increase rate (1) and the completion of plants under construction or authorized as of 31 December 1978).

	2 Energia elettrica richiesta	3 Produzione netta destinata al consumo	4 Superi della produzione rispetto alla richiesta	5 Deficit della produzione rispetto alla richiesta	
	TWh	TWh	TWh	TWh	%
Piemonte	26,4	10,5	—	15,9	60,2
Valle d'Aosta	1,1	2,7	1,6	—	—
Lombardia	55,5	40,4	—	15,1	27,2
Trentino-Alto Adige	7,5	7,7	0,2	—	—
Veneto	24,4	27,4	3,0	—	—
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	8,0	7,6	—	0,4	5,0
Liguria	7,5	16,9	9,4	—	—
Emilia-Romagna	23,5	19,0	—	4,5	19,1
Toscana	17,4	11,0	—	6,4	36,8
Umbria	5,2	2,9	—	2,3	44,2
Marche	5,8	1,0	—	4,8	82,8
Lazio	23,6	37,4	13,8	—	—
Abruzzi	5,4	2,0	—	3,4	63,0
Molise	1,2	0,3	—	0,9	75,0
Campania	20,2	5,2	—	15,0	74,3
Puglia	17,9	13,2	—	4,7	26,3
Basilicata	2,6	1,0	—	1,6	61,5
Calabria	7,8	9,8	2,0	—	—
6 Totale Continente	261,0	216,0	—	45,0	17,2
7 Sicilia	23,0	23,0	—	—	—
8 Sardegna	13,5	10,8	—	2,7	20,0
9 Totale Italia	297,5	249,8	—	47,7	16,0

Key: (1) Average growth rate: GNP 4 percent, electric energy 6.4 percent; by electric energy demanded in each individual region, we mean the sum of consumption by final users plus losses in transmission and distribution;

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2--electric energy demanded; 3--net output earmarked for consumption; 4--output surplus over demand; 5--output shortage compared to demand; 6--continent, total; 7--Sicily; 8--Sardinia; 9--Italy, total.

Therefore, the objection raised by the antinuclear forces to the effect that we only build conventional thermopower plants or that we use only "alternative" energy sources do not hold water in the light of the following considerations:

In the brief calculation above, we already took into account to the maximum extent the integrative "alternative" sources for a good 40 billion kwh by 1990 which already represents a goal difficult to reach and which nevertheless would demand a massive research and development effort;

Achieving the entire increase through conventional means signified causing waste and losses in the environment much more serious than those caused by nuclear power plants, apart, of course, from two more factors: absolute dependence on petroleum producers; and further, in supportable deterioration in the balance of payments.

The nuclear choice made by the government and parliament, after so much discussion, therefore was and remains an obligatory choice in short-range and medium-range terms. Although we cannot be enthusiastic about the situation, there is no other feasible and concrete way out, other than the ranting and raving of those who are not familiar with the quantitative data of the problem.

This is what one must realize in contemplating the serious site problem. Everybody can agree that law No 393 is not a good law; everybody can agree that the approach to the local population and communities, by the ENES, the CNEN [National Nuclear Energy Center], and authorities of this kind, was not one of the best and most efficient; but there is no doubt that the site problem can and must be resolved, even if only through a different approach and by assigning the management of the entire operation to particularly qualified agencies and persons, certainly not by leaving the issue in the hands of agencies or industries interested in construction or government departments which are supposed to run that sector but which no longer have any credibility among public opinion. It is not through acts of authority, such as the recent decree for Molise, or, rather, it is not only with acts of authority, that this difficult problem will be solved. At the same time it is indispensable to make the country realize that the partial nuclear choice made so far is just for the present and cannot prejudice the future, if and to the extent that we make a massive effort in the meantime in the research and study sector for the full utilization of alternate renewable (solar and geothermal) energy sources and for the immediate establishment of a new energy development model which would involve substantial changes in our way of life in order somehow to avoid waste. Among other things, the following must be subjected to concrete studies:

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Savings in calorific energy through a new way of building and broad recourse to thermal sources represented by the sun and hot water in the sub-soil;

Energy savings for traction, to be achieved through a drastic reduction in consumption for auto travel (more mass transportation and less individual transportation, reevaluation of waterways, prohibition on useless or superfluous transports);

Integral utilization of low-enthalpy and high-enthalpy geothermal energy;

Complete utilization of major thermal energy waste from thermal power plants of any type;

Full utilization of hydroelectric energy and energy from waste;

Studies aimed at the direct conversion of solar energy into electric energy and energy using its biological effects.

In my opinion, we can sufficiently reduce the current opposition to the nuclear option in medium-range terms only by creating the clear feeling that we have consciously and necessarily embarked upon these new roads.

Question of Reactor Types

At this point we come to the serious problem of reactor type choice. As we know, the energy plan speaks not only of "proven" reactors of the boiling-water type (BWR) but also the pressurized-water type (PWR), as well as the Canadian line using natural uranium and heavy water (CANDU). But there is a generally widespread opinion in the scientific-technical world that, especially if one wishes to hold down the number of power plants to the indispensable minimum and at the same time revive national industry, also in terms of future export possibilities, a national industry which has already been slowed down entirely too much by the long decade from 1962 until 1972, it would be necessary to make a choice for a single type of reactor. Besides, considerations of safety, in terms of the standardization of controls also taking into account available personnel, and a whole series of other, lesser arguments, which I will leave aside now for coverage during the following discussion, likewise push us in that direction. But that brings us to the problem of the choice; this problem in itself is neither easy nor comfortable; here perhaps we find the reason why that decision was not made in the past. But today it is urgent and those who hold command responsibility must manage to assume responsibility for the decision.

I do not claim by myself to have either the technical competence or the responsibility to come up with any suggestions. But, in my capacity as reporter, I must make available the data I have, data which tell me that the cumulative market share, in percentages, as of 1 July 1978, in all countries of the world (excluding those of CEMA) shows that 70 percent, approximately,

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decided on the PWR type, of which, as of that date, 250 plants had been ordered, against a little more than 100 subdivided among the other types. The availability factors among the two main types using water vary, in Europe, between 76.5 and 81.7 percent (PWR) and between 51.4 and 72.9 percent (BWR). In Europe, the load factors are around 72-73 percent for the PWR and around 62 percent for the BWR, whereas in the United States they vary from 68.8 percent for the PWR-Westinghouse to 60.8 percent of the BWR-General Electric. Worldwide total electric-nuclear energy generation came to $1,100 \times 10^9$ kwh for the PWR type, 732×10^9 kwh for the BWR line, and about 800×10^9 kwh for the other types.

As far as CANDU is concerned, which parliament by the way did not comment on in the October 1977 motion, there are still some strong doubts, also within the CNEN regarding the timeliness of considering this alternative, specifically regarding the acceptance of safety standards, particularly from the earthquake angle. On the other hand, to those who support this reactor line, in order to avoid the so-called drawbacks of uranium enrichment (which, by the way, Italy is tending to rid itself of anyway through participation in the European EURODIF [European Diffusion Agency] plants), it is easy to say in reply that we would then be stuck with the drawback of heavy water.

Officials in charge must make their justified decisions on the basis of these objective data, with regard to the reliability of the various types, the advisability of not diversifying and increasing the number of safety controls, and promoting industrial standardization.

Increase in Domestic Energy Sources

As I said earlier, in my brief calculations, I do not think that, by 1990, we can expect to count on any further hydroelectric energy except perhaps to the extent of about 10 billion kwh per year. Recent public statements by the ENEL president confirmed this fact which I calculated roughly and which I published in my July 1977 report to the Convention of the PCI [Italian Communist Party] at Frattocchie and later on in No 1 of this issue, last year. Engineer Corbellini was then able very opportunely to point out that a first group of plants (about 16), with an annual output of about 3.5 billion kwh, at a cost of around 1.6 trillion lire, would be economically competitive with the thermoelectric and nuclear-electric power plants; a second group (15 plants), with an annual output capacity of 1.6 billion kwh and at a cost of 1.1 trillion lire, is in proportion to plants with higher per-unit costs up to twice the current minute of competitiveness, while a third and last group includes plants with very high costs and an output capacity of 0.7 billion kwh per year, so that there is no question at this time of thinking in terms of building them.

The difference between the two estimates--mine being rather rough, while the second one is the result of years of study--is only apparent if we take into account the output that can be obtained from smaller plants, the possible

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recovery of rather small, currently inactive plants, and the yield of obsolete plants which can be improved, and, I would like to add, the possibility of raising the top of some dams that were designed too timidly. But, if I may, I would also like to add that there are negotiations and mutual studies to be resumed with neighboring countries (France, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia) for plants astride the Alpine ridge, with geological and topographic conditions suitable for the construction of reservoirs and waterfalls being generally found on the Italian slope, with major hydrologic possibilities on the slopes located on foreign soil. Particularly in dealing with Austria, the diversion, into the Adriatic of waters that naturally flow toward the Black Sea, could furnish major volumes of hydroelectric energy.

For geothermal-electrical energy I likewise gave a rough indication above for the year 1990 when we would have a presumed output capacity of about 10 billion kwh per year. This figure was calculated on the assumption that, over the next 10 years, we quadruple the current output which, for another 10 years, will be about 2.5 billion kwh per year. I will not repeat here what has already been stated several times concerning the lack of interest demonstrated by ENEL, during the decade of 1962-1973, in research in this sector; nor will I repeat the criticisms which I expressed several times rather bitterly against the complete lack of interest in geothermal research not only on the part of that agency but also, until 1973, on the part of ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] and the scientific and technological research community in general, so much so that this sector was overlooked also in the first draft of the final "Energy" project of the CNR [National Research Council], as was emphasized by the critical remarks made by Marinelli, Barberi, and other researchers, as well as I myself, in various places and on various occasions. We had one major change as a result of the Chianciano conference on "geothermal resources and regions," organized upon the initiative of the region of Tuscany in April 1977. It was on that occasion that I at last heard, from the mouth of engineer Paris, of the ENEL, and Professor Barberi, of the University of Pisa, the first rough estimates of the geothermal potential of the hydrothermal systems of the three regions of Tuscany, Lazio, and Campania. On the basis of these estimates I expressed, for the year 1990, the above-mentioned forecast which many people considered somewhat optimistic. There is as a matter of fact no need to deny that--as demonstrated by the experience in Tuscany and the promising current search by the ENI in Campania--the utilization of geothermal energy, both with high and with low enthalpy, once the unknowns in the geological and hydrogeological studies have been overcome, presents major difficulties of a technological character, so that we are today paying the price for having neglected this kind of research for so many years or for having allocated ridiculously small amounts to it. As Franco Barberi concluded at Chianciano, we can say that Italy certainly has geothermal resources which can be used in short-range and medium-range terms, not only to increase the electric power output but above all for nonelectric energy uses. But for an estimate of these resources, we must have legislation

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which would provide incentives for prospecting and which would regulate the use of such resources, also in order to take into account the just rights of the regions over resources with low enthalpy. The bill submitted by the preceding administration--which was not devoid of defects but which could easily have been improved--however remained a dead letter at the end of the legislative term and we cannot anticipate today whether, when, and how it will be resubmitted and when it will be passed by the new parliament. But in the meantime we must step up the prospecting effort also with the help of current legislative instruments and we must speed up the process of training specialists in research and technological exploitation of geothermal fluids, while it is urgent to push a rigorous research program in order quickly to come up with an anticipated inventory of resources.

Other problems connected with geothermal research, that is, the utilization of hot, dry, rocks and the utilization of so-called magmatic chambers, going all the way to the exploitation of heat contained in the earth's crust (as proposed by G. Facca in the Fourth Report to the Club of Rome) cannot be designed for medium-range intervals because of the conspicuous research effort necessary, an effort which today is only in its beginnings. The problem therefore goes beyond the limits which we have placed upon ourselves for our discussion here today.

Solar Energy

All opponents of nuclear energy, all ecologists and antinuclear engineers easily, in their lively polemic, resort to a solar alternative which by itself and quickly is supposed to solve all energy problems, without using nuclear energy and without increasing our heavy dependence on imports of foreign oil and coal.

Allow me to say that these general remarks on solar energy are absolutely unacceptable at least in medium-range terms. If we want to move realistically and if we want to express the problem in quantitative terms, we must admit that much can be done today with solar energy for domestic heating and also for nondomestic purposes. But it is very dangerous to maintain that the sun can, all at once, solve all of our energy supply problems, completely changing our way of life; that statement is just as dangerous as the idea of comparing a serious accident in a nuclear-electric power plant with the explosion of an atomic bomb. Even the most competent and dedicated researchers in the field of solar energy, such as Vittorio Silvestrini, say that "the conversion of solar energy can, through an in-depth and well-organized research effort, become one of the significant ways of helping to solve the country's energy problems" and they stress the fact that direct conversion of solar energy into electrical energy through static devices in the solid state (the so-called photovoltaic cells or solar cells), although their costs declined over the past 15 years by a factor of 50 and more, still involves an overall cost that is too high by a factor of about 20 so that the energy produced in this way would not be competitive with other sources on the open market. In this sector likewise, as in the

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geothermal field, Italy is not making the kind of research effort that would be necessary in order not to fall seriously behind as compared to other countries and in order to obtain significant objectives in medium-range terms.

In conclusion, solar energy can, in the current state of affairs, make a noteworthy overall contribution to the production of heat; but here again, as in the geothermal field, we need incentives and coordination standards which the early dissolution of the legislature postponed in terms of time since this also marked the end of various bills aimed at achieving these goals.

Here are the reasons why it seems to be reasonable to estimate at a figure of 10 billion kwh, per year, the contribution which this source could make by 1990 for heating, although one must admit that other eminent scholars, such as, for example, Mario Silvestri, are very pessimistic on that score.

The Finalized 'Energy' Project

Other sources, on which we might dwell, in an overall estimate of energy resources available in short-range and medium-range terms would include energy from waste.

Studies and research on so-called biological methane in practice go back more than 30 years in Italy, whereas sanitary engineering research on the purification and utilization of sewage water was begun and while the possibility of producing fertilizer and combustible gas through these processes was investigated. I would also like to recall in this connection that some purification plants, planned and built before the last war, such as, for example, the one in Potenza, already produced so much methane as to be self-sufficient from the energy viewpoint. The studies on this subject were recently resumed in several places, for example, by the ENEL itself and, at Perugia, by the group of associated planners and researchers (RPI [Associated Researchers and Planners?]) who already can be credited with some achievements in the "pigsty" sector. This point however is included in the final "Energy" project of the CNR and Giancarlo Chiesa, director of the pertinent project subdivision, will be able to talk to us about that during the discussion.

This brings me to other sectors which I will review briefly, not only in order not to stretch the patience of those present too far but also because these are more long-range prospects, such as the biomass or so-called total energy systems, which, by the way, some of the experts present, such as my friend G. B. Zorzoli, will be able to talk to us about.

But I would like briefly to comment on the finalized "Energy" project of the CNR to bring out the point that, between 1976 and 1979, it involved a total of about 50 billions, distributed among the various project subsections, as indicated in Table 3.

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Table 3. Finalized "Energy" Program, CNE, 1976-1979 Financing Table

Sottoprogetto	1976		1977		1978		1979	
	Milioni di lire	%	Milioni di lire	%	Milioni di lire	%	Milioni di lire	%
Risparmio di energia nel riscaldamento degli edifici	1.977	31	2.753	25	3.239	23	4.515	27
Trazione	2.327	36	3.950	35	3.180	22,6	1.650	10
Tecnologie varie	1.169	18	2.374	21	2.440	17,3	2.100	13
Energia solare	230	4	669	6	2.424	17,2	3.841	23
Energia geotermica	140	2	368	3	915	6,5	1.224	7,5
Uso del metanolo	200	3	335	3	430	3	180	1
Utilizzazione energetica dei rifiuti	80	1,2	350	3	801	5,7	1.715	10,5
Normativa	30	0,5	50	0,5	74	0,5	118	0,7
Rapporti internazionali	20	0,3	50	0,5	114	0,8	215	1,3
Spese generali, borse, studi di fattibilità, divulgazione, varie	261	4	310	3	457	3,2	942	6
Totali (milioni di lire)	6.434		11.209		14.074		16.500	

Key: 1--project subdivision; 2--millions of lire; 3--energy savings in building heating; 4--traction; 5--miscellaneous technologies; 6--solar energy; 7--geothermal energy; 8--use of methanol; 9--energy utilization of waste; 10--standards; 11--international relations; 12--general expenses, scholarships, feasibility studies, publications, miscellaneous; 13--totals (millions of lire).

Project director Giacomo Elias will be able to provide further clarification on the project as a whole and on the results achieved so far, particularly with regard to the objectives that are of interest to us here, that is to say, not beyond medium-term intervals. I must only reveal--not to criticize the project and specifically with respect to the feasibility study which preceded it (now 6 years old), criticisms, by the way, which I made elsewhere and which in part did result in improvements both in the process itself and in its management--that the funds allocated, both in overall terms, and specifically for solar energy and geothermal energy, are highly insufficient for the purposes of this massive research effort, which I talked about earlier, and which are particularly disproportionate when compared to the expenditures the country faces in the nuclear sector. But I will touch on that shortly in concluding this report.

Conclusion

The overall picture which we get from what we have heard so far and which will emerge even more clearly, I hope, in the course of the discussion and the possible further additions to this report, in my opinion allows me to

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add some substantial conclusions on what Italy's energy policy should be in short-range and medium-range terms.

Two lines of action seem to me to be merging without the slightest shadow of a doubt. The first one is that we must seriously study an energy saving plan, specifically based on savings in the petroleum sector, which will enable us to cope not only with the new situation deriving from the Iranian crisis, but also to make provisions for the worst and, specifically, to be prepared for a further rise in crude prices on international markets and a further reduction in available volume. The strict policy deriving from this certainly cannot be based only on visible cutbacks, which have little in the way of deeper effects, and must definitely be aimed at gradually changing our development model regarding energy consumption in general and petroleum consumption in particular.

In the transportation sector, for example, we need overall planning which will enable us to tackle the problem of transporting goods by considerably reducing the percentage of highway shipments which, as I said earlier, is in Italy the highest for all of Western Europe. For this purpose, and without trying in these brief conclusions to go into a complete examination, hence talking only by way of example, it seems indispensable to me, in the regions where this is possible, to come up with a solution involving transportation by waterways, for cargo suitable for this kind of transportation, along with a reevaluation of coastal maritime transports and railroad transportation compatible with the capacity of the railroad network. The objection to the effect that transportation by waterway, with a little bit of coastal shipping and railroad, would always have an effect on oil consumption, is not valid if we take into account the decline in the consumption of fuel which these systems involve; nevertheless, the problem which I have outlined here must be studied and rapidly expressed in quantitative terms.

In this connection likewise it is indispensable in my opinion to achieve a drastic reduction in gasoline consumption, not only through the well-known and already criticized steps announced by the minister of industry, in terms of raising the price of gasoline, banning auto travel on certain days, and similar steps, but also the drastic reduction of urban travel through restrictions on private traffic in historical downtown sections and the replacement of individual travel with mass transportation which would be flexible and designed in modern ways. But I do not wish to get into any further details on these measures here; I will leave that to the remarks of others who are more competent in this field and to any further specific statement that might come out in the course of the discussion. But I must emphasize in this connection that this also brings us face to face with all of the problems of industrializing areas not yet industrialized in Italy, to which we must channel processing industries with a low energy content and a high manpower employment level, therefore discarding such Pharaonic projects as Gioia Tauro, the petrochemistry and petroleum sector, as well as, obviously, the metallurgical sectors with a high energy content, such as the electrochemical plant proposed at the time by EGAM [Agency for the Management of Mineral and Metallurgical Concerns] in Sicily.

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The second main line of action, which we can derive from the picture outlined above, is that we must have as broad diversification as possible in our energy sources. This diversification, on the one hand, means launching the nuclear program, on which parliament has expressed itself, as soon as possible; on the other hand, it means making every effort, both through a massive increase in scientific and technological research, and through adequate legislative provisions, through the upgrading of renewable sources in general, meaning hydroelectric, solar, and geothermal energy, as well as energy from waste, and, no longer in medium-range terms, the other sources which I reviewed above, all the way to nuclear fusion and the biomass.

But we must not forget, as I stressed in the beginning, that we are now in the midst of the election campaign and that a series of legislative steps, which were in a more or less advanced stage, therefore, on the one hand, was wiped out; on the other hand, it will be up to the new parliament to discuss and revive the energy action undertaken there. The new parliament and the new administration therefore will face a series of tasks that must be tackled with objectivity but as quickly as possible. Here I want to refer also to the proposal, advanced by the Hon Aniasi and a group of personalities, mostly found in PSI [Italian Socialist Party] circles, calling for a nuclear moratorium. A nuclear moratorium, passed into law by the new parliament, that is to say, during the second half of 1979, is absurd; the moratorium has already been in effect since 1973 and it therefore has lasted 6 years; we must not add another 3 years to that span of time because our survival is at stake. I hope that this proposal was advanced merely for electioneering reasons and that it will come to naught after the election. However one must also keep in mind that the dissolution of parliament and the election campaign in point of fact added a new moratorium of at least 6 months to the earlier 6 years because obviously no decision can be made by the new parliament before late autumn.

I would like to conclude here by quickly listing--also in order to provide further incentive for discussion--the arguments that will have to be debated and tackled after the election and that will certainly be the subject of discussion before the voters:

Revision and redrafting of national energy plan not so much, in my opinion, in order to reduce the contribution from nuclear energy but rather to provide greater emphasis and make a major effort in terms of research on other renewable sources;

Providing incentives for scientific and technological research in all energy sectors, without the disproportions currently existing in favor of one or the other source and regrouping the entire line of energy research in a single agency, for example, according to the proposals advanced from several quarters, also in the course of the debate we had in the magazine ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME (published in Issue No 2), in a transformed CNEN;

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Definite separation, for reasons known to everybody which I need not dwell on, between the control functions and the promotion and development functions, not only in the nuclear sector, where safety is the first commandment, but in the entire energy and industrial sector;

Reviving in-house production, breaking up--in modest capacities to be determined--the monopoly of the ENEL regarding electric energy generation from any source with the sole exception of imported and nuclear fuel;

Coordination of the entire energy policy by regrouping the authorities subdivided today in various apartments and various places, within one single headquarters, regardless of whether that would be an already existing ministry (and I would be particularly in favor of this solution if it were to involve the ministry of industry) or a high commission for energy, although in that case it should have the necessary authority and powers.

These, in my opinion, are the points of discussion which I wanted to submit for your consideration and I will now feel that my effort here today was well worthwhile if the debate to follow will produce new elements that in turn will enable us better to focus on the problems; I would like to make a brief response at the end of the discussion.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

ANARCHIST CNT TO HOLD SEVENTH CONGRESS IN DECEMBER

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Nov 79 pp 55, 56 WA

[Text] During their 69 years of history they have only met in a congress five times, but each time they did meet they changed the course of their history. This December they will meet for the sixth time in a marathon of more than 150 hours during which many people will lose their sleep. The CNT [National Confederation of Labor] is searching for new directions.

The outcry is unanimous: The National Confederation of Labor (CNT) must recover its identity. But which one? This is the problem that faces the historic, the 'renovated', integralists and 'apaches' (anarchosyndicalists), syndicalists and 'specifics', anarchosyndicalists and neo-anarchists, possibilists and radicals--and there are more of these groupings in the libertarian ranks. Nevertheless, for Miguel Inesta Urien, and Fidel Revilla Gonzalez, authors of "The CNT Seen Through Its Congresses", which is about to be published, all of these currents have reduced the CNT into two groups in the past. Before the 1931 congress pragmatism and serenity dominated with the presence of men such as Pestana and Segui. Afterwards, during the time of Garcia Oliver y Alberola, the congresses became tenser and more Maximilist.

Now, during the sixth congress, a decision on which of these two CNT's is the adequate one or, perhaps, the [creation] of a third CNT in which the revolutionary potential of marginal non-salaried groups can have a place. Some would prefer to hold a conference where they could discuss the more urgent matters and to free the young militants, who are in a majority in the confederation, from the responsibility of a congress.

The idea for holding a congress won out and the old militants from the Diaspora will retrace their steps. They will come from unsuspected places. Hardened members of FAI [Iberian Anarchist Federation], recalcitrant "Treintistas" [a group of 30 anarchists who supported an anti-Fai manifesto], former ministers, collectivists, militiamen, syndicalists, guerrillas and a never-ending list of nostalgic fellow travellers will converge on Madrid on the first Sunday of December to attend the Sixth Congress of their confederation. Along with these there will be 1,000 delegates representing 600 unions and about 85,000 militants--this according to the union federation's sources--

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many whom come from the center, Catalonia, and the Levante, will speak in the debates to be held from the 8th to the 15th. They all will converge on the offices of the former AISS [expansion unknown] in the Paseo del Prado in Madrid.

Nevertheless, many may be disenchanted. The CNT of 1979 does not follow in the footsteps of that other glorious one of "collectivity and the barricade" which had approximately 2 million workers and an immense revolutionary penchant that was its main characteristic. Now, 43 years after the Zaragoza congress of May 1936 that approved libertarian communism as a confederal desideratum, its imprint is minimal no matter that specific anarchist groups persist in the "revolutionary gymnastics" of their elders.

It is precisely the veterans who pine for the days when everything seemed to be within the organization's reach. "The men of that CNT were in reality much more modern than those of the republic," says 71 year old Eduardo de Guzman (he spent 9 years in jail), a journalist, former managing editor of CASTILLA LIBRE, recipient of the 1975 International Press Award, and one of those present at the Conservatory Congress.

Juan Gomez Casas is more optimistic. He is 58 years old (15 spent in jail), a writer and the first secretary general of the CNT since it was reorganized in 1976. "When the union bureaucracy represented by the Workers Commissions [CCOO] and the General Union of Workers [UGT] attempts to dominate all the negotiating capacity in the name of the workers," stresses Casas, "it becomes evident that an antipolitical and libertarian CNT still has much to say."

Nevertheless, the former anarchosindicalist leader cannot hide a certain amount of anticipation in the possibility that abstentionist positions will be successful in the congress.

"The CNT, through its labor sections and enterprise assemblies, must break the trilateral relationship of the UGT, CCOO and the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations]," he concludes in what is a clear allusion to his possible mediation between those who would have the CNT remain at the edge of collective bargaining moves and those who would like to see it active only in the labor sphere. During the events of the Libertarian Days (held in Barcelona in 1977), those that support the former position of anti-unionism gained a certain amount of renown. These persons wanted to renew anarchism within the labor movement and thus going beyond being a labor federation, because as a federation it has notoriously become integrated in the system--according to those who support this line--and searching for a new brotherhood with marginal sectors.

Presently the anti-official apparatus attitude is more prevalent among the anarchosindicalist youth. Carlos Ramos, 32 years old, has been a militant for 12 years and is a white collar worker. This CNT youth is hoping against hope but he does not dismiss the idea that the congress will be one of negotiation in which it "will limit itself to internal problems of exile and the correlation of forces among the dominant forces." This will occur if those

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real problems that have resulted in the organization seeing its membership reduced from 400,000 to the skimpy skeletal number of 85,000 currently enrolled are not handled responsibly. "We have to abandon the one-dimensional activism which has led us to dogmatism and into a 'ghetto'," insists Ramos. It is urgent that we revive a CNT that has a majority [when compared to other labor federations] and which is made up of anti-authoritarian workers. People such as students and businessmen must remain outside."

Conscious of the potential dangers posed by a confrontation that ends in a breakup, the organizers have left the more polemic points--of the 16 to be debated--for the end. Such things as "relations with other organizations and organisms" (point 14), "position to be taken when faced with problems that are not strictly confederal" (point 15), and "direction of the confederation since the last congress in 1936" (point 16) are in the minds of everyone.

But no one wishes to pursue unproductive discussion. This is unmentionable. It is bound in irreconcilable positions of those who would ask for action and a new accounting and "the explicit break in the historic union between the CNT and the FAI" (Carlos Ramos) and the more eclectic [position] of declaring "the incompatibility of double militancy of groups who attempt to obtain political power and to tolerate the FAI when it scrupulously respects the CNT's autonomy" (Juan Gomez Casas).

It is also fitting that these be last on the agenda. As Pedro Barrios, sixty years old, 10 years in prison, a white collar worker, secretary of the regional committee of the center, says in reference to the thorny problem of exile that it is "water under the bridge and it will not move those delegates attempting to give imaginative answers to the grave problems of the working class one iota."

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

ARIAS SALGADO INTERVIEWED ON SITUATION WITHIN UCD

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 4 Nov 79 pp 32, 33

[Interview with Rafael Arias Salgado, secretary general of the UCD (Democratic Center Union) and minister of relations with the Cortes; date and place not given]

[Text] One infers from the analysis that the blue faction has lost in nearly all the Spanish provinces during the long electoral process conducted by the Democratic Center Union.

A career diplomat, founding member of Francisco Fernandez Ordonez' Social Democratic Party, and currently minister in charge of relations with the Cortes, Arias Salgado, at the age of 37, is now one of the strong men in the government party which, in a year of difficult service as secretary general, he has succeeded in lending a minimal structure that may soon convert it into a genuine party of masses.

Arias Salgado says: "I think that this reference to the blue faction might actually be a conclusion after the analysis that I am attempting to make of the composition and age of the provincial committees. Those who have, indeed, been losing ground, although they have not actually been completely unseated, are certain political bossist forces. I shall not deny that there are in the party personages with provincial roots who relate to the cultural and socioeconomic structure germane to their respective provinces, and who are very closely associated with political bossism. This is one of the evils that must be combated. We must destroy those political bossist structures which existed here, and which we have inherited, by constantly incorporating new people into the party's consecutive electoral processes. At the present time, after an extensive internal electoral process, the UCD is a more complete and younger party, with some new executives who in many instances bear no relationship to the original movements that brought about the birth of the party. Our members now number nearly 150,000.

CAMBIO 16: To what extent do those militants not come from the Popular Alliance, as has been claimed? How much truth is there in the charge that 15 percent of the UCD's members are illiterate?

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Rafael Arias Salgado: Both charges appear to me to be totally gratuitous. There are not so many militants who have transferred, en masse, to the UCD; nor does that percentage of illiterates even correspond to the percentage of illiteracy in Spain.

C 16: What self-criticism would you make of the UCD?

RAS: I made a lengthy self-criticism at the last meeting of the Executive Committee, based mainly on the lack of internal information and of debate, and in some respects organizational flaws. The lack of information exists both from the bottom up and from the top down. The lack of organization is due, among other causes, to the absence of internal debate; although such internal debate does not affect the major issues which were debated in the Congress, and which will be the topic of debate by the Executive Committee. What concerns me is the lack of internal debate among the party's provincial and local organizations, because that is where our authentic reality lies. This is what we intend to promote systematically, after the renewal of the provincial entities, with short intensive training courses for our members, our councilmen and our leaders.

C 16: Are not these shortcomings desired and fostered at the top level?

RAS: The causes do not originate at the top, but rather are due to the long electoral process which our country has experienced. Since the UCD Congress, there has been one campaign for the referendum and two elections. For these reasons, for reasons of internal elections and reasons of external elections, the party could not help but be engaged in these tasks. Another important cause lies in the difficulty in institutionalizing a party in a society such as that of Spain, subject to a rapid process of change. Under these changing circumstances, it has proven extremely difficult to organize a party; because, understandably, everything which has repercussions on social life also has repercussions on the organizational process.

C 16: What has happened during the year of your administration as secretary general?

RAS: In my opinion, the party has improved enormously, as a result of the nation's electoral process and our own process. Little by little, we have been assuming the behavior of one living in a political organization. Moreover, the training effort that has been made is extensive. Between May and July alone, we have given short training courses in which over 7,000 councilmen have participated. The very process of internal renewal of local and provincial assemblies has been extremely educational.

C 16: Within the party, it is insisted that there has been a progressive shift to the right....

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RAS: The charges of a shift to the right have been so numerous that we have had to make a complete reversal. I think that the action of a party, and of a government in particular, must be judged in its entirety. If we are talking about the period from the March elections to the present, I really cannot see where there has been a shift to the right. It would have to materialize in certain types of action. And I do not know whether, in the major issues from the area of labor relations to the matter of the autonomies or the government's economic program, one could consider it a shift to the right. What I do know is that the country's right wing, what the right wing is in this country, is a very unique thing, without a par in the other European countries; and, of course, the right wing is not connected with the Democratic Center Union.

C 16: Is that good or bad?

RAS: I believe that it is a political reality germane to a pluralistic system. What I do know is that a government, whatever be its ideological hallmark, always has to reach an understanding with the real centers of power in the country. Whether it be a socialist, center or right wing government, it has to reach an understanding, and negotiate and converse with the power centers.

C 16: But is the government really governing? Is it not governing, and making decisions, only when the pressure and protest arise?

RAS: That is totally false. Not only is a new state being constructed here, but there is governing day by day. Now we are in the process of reforming the judicial branch, we are finishing the preparations on the bill to regulate the central state administration, there is a discussion in the Cortes of the framework for labor relations, an economic program has been put into operation, the intelligence services of the state security system have been improved considerably, effective police action has been taken in the pursuit and semi-dismantling of the GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary Group], the political dynamics in the Basque Country have been changed, there has been a complete agreement with the autonomous government of Catalonia, health reform is under way, and highly important measures have been adopted to reform social security, which will take shape in a draft of a General Law for Social Security.

Furthermore, three major bills are being discussed in the Cortes, which affect the organization of universities and of intermediate educational centers and the financing of compulsory education. The state budget has been prepared normally. In the area of the citizens' security, there are at present two very important bills in the Cortes, one of which curtails the opportunities for conditional or provisional release of a criminal based on the type of crime that has been committed, and a bill whereby what is called the monitory procedure is regulated. For the first time, the new penal code will enter the Cortes, one which challenges all the major principles on which the society is based and which will be subjected to

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discussion again. A penal code alone would justify the government's performance, and this has happened in history. If this, if all this daily work is not governing, then tell me what it is to govern....

C 16: Is Suarez still the undisputed leader of the party?

RAS: I think that he is, and this could be reasoned objectively. I believe that leadership is a sociological phenomenon which has been proven "x" number of times in elections and in the party's internal electoral process. And leadership is one sociological problem which entails another. So long as it exists in a party, it is an asset. And the party's assets include its leaders. From that standpoint, as secretary general I am dutybound to protect that asset; because what I cannot do as secretary general is, so to speak, lessen the value of the assets that a political party has; and, obviously, Suarez' leadership as a real, sociological phenomenon is included therein. Hence he has been made the undisputed leader of the UCD as an active asset of the party.

C 16: If Suarez should disappear, would the party be destroyed?

RAS: Everything depends on whether or not a democratic conduct is assumed. There is a statutory procedure for replacing the president of the party. If people behave democratically, and accept the results of the voting, obviously the party will survive. It is my impression that the party will hold up; because it is far more consolidated now than people think.

C 16: If the party is to be consolidated, it must first cross the Jordan of the opposition.

RAS: It will need the formative dimension involved in having experienced opposition, and until this occurs it will lack that dimension. But this does not mean that it cannot be a genuine political party. Isn't the Italian Christian Democratic Party one? And, insofar as I know, it has never experienced opposition. That statement is not correct. The UCD is already a party, and a party of masses, without any need to experience opposition.

C 16: In other words, what you are saying is that the UCD is something more than an electoral machine for winning elections....

RAS: Of course, it is at present far more than an electoral machine. But, in any event, what we need is to be given a little time; because the party came into existence a year ago, as a result of its first congress. Can more be asked in 1 year than to win two elections, hold a referendum, govern, renew itself internally, elect all its local and provincial committees and have 150,000 members? We lose track of time when we speak. But only a year has elapsed since our first congress. Four years from now, the UCD, which will win the elections again in 1983, will hold an election campaign with a truly spectacular party of masses.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

ARTICLE LOOKS AT ROLE OF WOMEN IN UCD

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 4 Nov 79 pp 37, 39, 41

[Article: "The Political Cloakroom"]

[Text] It was 4 December 1974. The then editor, Ignacio Camunas, was signing a circular letter addressed to 11 friends, summoning them to a meeting in Avila lasting the entire next weekend. He wrote: "Some of you have announced that you would attend accompanied by your wives. At this rate, we shall succeed in establishing the women's branch before we had planned. Bravo!"

The letter and the meeting were the seed for what would shortly thereafter become the PDI (Independent Democratic Party) and, later, the PDP (People's Democratic Party), a political group of a liberal nature which, at the time of its maximum success and prominence, had 119 members, which were sufficient to make its main promoter, Ignacio Camunas, a minister, after the PDP joined the Democratic Center Union [UCD].

But neither the PDP nor any of the parties affiliated with the original UCD was effective in creating the aforementioned "women's branch" of the UCD, a party which many Centrists label as "machista" [with male domination]. And perhaps the figures bear them out: of the 168 seats that the UCD has in Congress, only 10 are occupied by women. Somewhat the same holds true in the Senate: Out of 120 senators, only four are women.

Mere Window-Dressing

In the party's leadership entities, the contrast is even more painful: On the Executive Committee, the supreme decision-making entity between congresses, only the deputy from Madrid, Carmela Garcia Moreno, has the privilege of letting her female voice be heard; and the same holds true for the Political Council: Only five of the 60 members are women.

In the opinion of several deputies questioned by this magazine, the female presence in the UCD's administrative entities is considered by many Centrist leaders to be "mere window-dressing." One of the female deputies stated:

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"There can never be a women's branch of the UCD. There is too much of a bad conscience among some, and too many memories of the Francoist Women's Section, with all the pejorative significance that this holds." Carmela Garcia Moreno for her part, is categorical: "Although the situation is quite similar in the other parties, I expect things to change soon in the UCD, and that there will not be one woman on the Executive Committee, as there is now, but rather four or five, half, or even a majority."

Ability

Soledad Becerril, deputy from Seville and third secretary of the Congress, adds: "There may be women in the UCD's decision-making centers, but always on the basis of their ability, not their sex."

Meanwhile, the Centrist women, with more experience and based on effort, are already starting to rid themselves of that image of window-dressing that they have had within the political party, and to be taken more seriously.

A Woman on the Executive Committee

Carmela Garcia Moreno, 33 years of age, with a degree in political sciences, married and with two children, is one of the most outstanding women-politicians in the Centrist party. She chaired the agitated UCD assembly in Madrid, which she managed to contend with skillfully.

After her service as deputy from Madrid, she held an endless list of positions and functions, ranging from the chairmanship of the congressional committee on universities and research (serving in that chamber as a member of four other committees) to the coveted post of member of the UCD's national executive committee.

With the rank of secretary, she also heads the Center of Sociocultural Action, a Centrist entity which covers areas ranging from special planning programs for women or the elderly to the formation of associations for parents of students. From 0930 hours in the morning, when she leaves her house, after bidding her children goodbye, Carmela does not return to it until after 2400 hours at night.

It is too much. However, she thinks the opposite: "I feel quite dissatisfied. I do some things, but I could do far more. I have great hopes for everything that I do; and I am very ambitious and demanding of myself. I like politics, and I enjoy what I am doing; because if that were not the case, there would be no one who would put up with it."

Her husband, Esteban Artacho, an agronomical engineer, former colleague of Abril Martorell and president of Lactaria, an INI [National Institute of Industry] enterprise, although he does not think ill of his wife's job, does not seem so enthusiastic: "Understandably," the husband says, "Carmela does not concern herself with the household as she did before. If the children

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were younger, her dedication to politics would have been impossible; because our lives have changed considerably, particularly with regard to schedules. This is so because those of Spanish politicians are completely absurd. Generally speaking, and in conclusion, I must say that my wife's status as a politician now seems to me to be a normal activity, which I have accepted in its entirety."

Not all the spouses of politicians take it so lightly as the husband of Carmela Garcia Moreno. Maria Dolores Pelayo, 37 years of age, married, with two children, and a UCD deputy from Tenerife, has a husband who is her most unconditional defender; a role which he has assumed so enthusiastically that it has led him into confrontations with several Canary Island newsmen who, he claims, have not reflected the political assets of his wife with the proper accuracy.

Others have gone so far as to talk about the besiegement to which their wives are subjected in Madrid. One of them, who prefers to remain anonymous, comments: "My wife receives propositions nearly every day. There are in Congress about 150 men between the ages of 40 and 55, married to fat women living in provinces, who suffer from the so-called mature gallant syndrome, and when they see a young, attractive female deputy, you know what happens."

To the Right of Landelino

During the last legislative session, Soledad Becerril, a native of Madrid or a Sevillian by adoption, was one of the attractions in the semicircle. With blond hair, dressing with care and distinguished formality, like an Annie Hall visiting the Pope, she wears vests, silk blouses and wide flowered skirts.

During this legislature, however, Soledad, who is 35 years old, married, with two children, and holder of a degree in philosophy and letters, is more restrained. Her position as third secretary of the chair in Congress, seated to the right of Landelino, has perhaps caused the change.

Soledad who, in addition to her post as third secretary, is a member of the committees on culture and the presidency, spends from 3 to 4 days a week in Madrid, from Monday to Thursday, during which time she only leaves her office at night.

Bills for study, committee meetings, the planning of plenums, organization, and the follow-up on bills are some of the activities which typify the parliamentary work of Soledad, who must also concern herself with the party, particularly on weekends and in Seville, the province which elected her. She comments: "I like my work very much; I am learning; I think that we are all learning. It requires many hours; sometimes it is exhausting."

After studying philosophy, Soledad studied political science at Columbia University in New York. She founded an Andalusian magazine, ILUSTRACION REGIONAL; and subsequently joined the democratic party of Garrigues, whom she claims to

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be liberal and progressive. She believes in debating in depth within the UCD, remarking: "Avoiding political debate is bad for the UCD. I think that personal conflicts occur because there is no opportunity for political debate. There is no place nor location in which to express one's ideas."

Soledad's husband, Rafael Atienza, is an Andalusian lawyer who is not overly in favor of his wife's new profession either. He told CAMBIO 16: "Previously, my wife had more entertaining companions; it is not that I am unaccustomed to her working, that is not so. She has always worked. Besides, I go to Madrid quite often, and we enjoy ourselves. Man, if she were here, I would eat better meals, and the house would be in better order."

3 Days in Madrid

Maria Teresa Revilla, aged 43, married, with four children, and a deputy from Valladolid, obtained her seat almost by chance. In June 1977, she ranked third on the UCD's electoral tickets, and hence had little chance of being elected. But she won; and she won again in March 1979. She went to Congress totally unexperienced, and she is now chairman of the committee on culture and one of the Centrist deputies most respected by the opposition and, of course, by her own party.

Maria Teresa is a lawyer, although she never practiced the profession. "I have always liked politics, and the political change made me extremely enthusiastic. So, I decided to participate." She spends 3 days in Madrid. She is married to an engineer, who is a technical director of Fasa-Renault and does not have a very good reputation among its workers, because they consider him an inaccessible and intransigent negotiator. She says: "We are a very close couple, and the help from my husband, who has accompanied me and who accompanies me at many plenums in Madrid, has been essential."

Her Own Personality

Even outside of Parliament, Guadalupe Ruiz Gimenez, daughter of Joaquin, does not go unnoticed.

Receptive, dynamic and very kind, as she is described in the UCD, Guadalupe, 32 years of age, married and with three children, is the wife of Rafael Arias Salgado, secretary general of the UCD and minister of relations with the Cortes. She hates to be reminded of it. "When they ask for me as the wife of Arias Salgado, I do not answer the telephone. I don't want to play the role of a wife married to that gentleman. I have my own personality."

Guadalupe works in the Secretariat of International Relations, headed by Javier Ruiperez, and is responsible for relations with Latin America. She remarks: "I was here before they appointed my husband." Guadalupe is also an extraordinary professor at the School of Sociology of the Alcala de Henares University of Madrid, where she gives courses 3 days a week.

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However, what most attracts her is the UCD work. "I am very happy with my work in the party. I believe that the Latin American area is one of absolutely and totally priority concern to us."

The "Outsiders"

Nevertheless, the most influential women in the UCD are not in Parliament, in the party's organization or in the government. They are at home. This is what one gathers in the corners and corridors of the UCD where opinions are expressed. According to a statement made by a Centrist member of Parliament to this magazine: "In this party, it is almost always more productive from a political standpoint to 'work on' the wife of the one in command, rather than on her husband."

One of the women with the greatest reputation for influence is Marisa Abril, wife of the second vice-president of the government. A close friend of Amparo Illana, Suarez' wife, Marisa is a pretty woman, described by those who know her as "intuitive, intelligent, domineering and traditional." Everyone in the party places her far to the right of her husband.

She is a native of Segovia, where she met her husband, and studied law at the University of Madrid. Together with Suarez' wife, she occasionally visits an Opus Dei center, the Zayas Club, in the Madrid district of Salamanca.

And they both took courses in history from the Christian Democrat and member of Opus Dei, Javier Tussel, the current director of fine arts.

A friend of both is Carmen Rocamora, wife of Lamo de Espinosa, the present minister of agriculture.

As for Amparo Illana, she leads a very limited social life with few relationships. One of these few activities was to invite all the "cabinet wives" to a luncheon at Moncloa Palace after the formation of the present government.

On another subject, the influence that Maria Paz, wife of Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, wields over her husband is widely known within the party.

Immediately after every public address, the first person that the former finance minister consults, to ask her opinion, is his wife.

Another "cabinet wife," one whose name circulates in the inner chamber of the UCD, is Carmen Perez-Llorca, who, according to these sources, has considerable influence on her husband, the minister of the presidency.

During the last legislative session, when Perez-Llorca was spokesman for the parliamentary group, his wife attended all the plenums on the platform.

Carmen Perez-Llorca comments: "My interest in politics is merely that of a woman concerned about any occupation of her husband, which in this case is politics."

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