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West Europe Report

(FOUO 67/79)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ESTABLISHED PARTIES LOSE VOTES TO GREEN MOVEMENT

Hamburg STERN in German 31 Oct 79 pp 88-94

[Article by Emanuel Eckardt: "A Greening in the Fall"]

[Text] Representatives of the Greens are moving into the parliaments. The environmentalists are getting ready for an assault on Bonn. STERN correspondent Emanuel Eckardt reports on the reasons why more and more citizens are turning away from the established parties and fighting against destruction of the environment and unchecked economic growth.

Hans Koschnik, the SPD head of government in Germany's smallest Land, called it a "surprise for Bremen and for me." For the first time in an election in a Land, the "Greens" had managed to hurdle the 5-percent mark and to move into the parliament. They did so with 5.14 percent of the vote--that is, representing as many as 20,911 inhabitants of Bremen.

The second surprise went almost unnoticed. More persons entitled to vote than had done so in any Land at any time previously turned their backs, one way or another, on the established parties in Bremen, either by voting for small parties or by not going to the polls in the first place.

"As a party," says Erhard Eppler, SPD chairman in Baden-Wuerttemberg and the party's ecological expert, "the Greens are not the kind of interlocutors that need to be taken seriously, but as an intellectual trend they are of great significance." Green is not just a fashionable political color in the solid middle-class suburbs of Bremen. Eppler: "In my estimation 30 percent of all young voters can be motivated by questions addressed by the Greens."

Actually the suddenly strengthened Green movement has a long tradition. The idea of flight germinated as early as at the turn of the century, when citizens living in somber rental barracks sought a way out of the gray city walls which they regarded as the root of all evil. Life Leaguers [Lebensbuendler], nature healers and nutrition reformers, nudists

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and housing pioneers were all drawn to nature. The Wandervoegel [German hiking association] fled civilization just as the hippies and flower children did 60 years later. In many German towns suburban vegetable garden developments were established--a sea of bowers as a contribution to humanizing the residential environment intended to give workers a way of life that was closer to nature and more wholesome.

Nevertheless, particularly in the years of development after World War II, economic growth remained the guideline of the consumer society. The price for this in almost all industrialized countries was the same--growing encroachment of the environment. The PRG balance sheet looks like this:

--Since 1970, the European year of the protection of nature, 100,000 km of streets and industrial roads have been built in the countryside, and 400,000 hectares of nature have been built over, never to be seen again.

--A total of 15,000 habitats ("biotopes") for animals and plants have fallen victim to reallocation of arable land; irreplaceable valuable areas of moisture, moors, meadows and ponds were drained and turned into areas for operating big agricultural machines.

--In the past 9 years the number of chemical preparations in the FRG has risen from 45,000 to 60,000, and 35 million liters of waste oil have vanished just as mysteriously as have medicaments to a value of DM 18 billion.

The chemist and former SPD deputy Dr Frank Haenschke draws up a sad balance sheet of Bonn environmental policy: "A miserable sewage tax law. Insufficient taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the food and waste removal law. Protection of nature without plaintiffs and at the pleasure of the agriculturists. A traffic noise law for which the minister for the environment refuses responsibility and in which the minister of finance fixes the limits."

Ecologist Frank Haenschke resigned his Bundestag seat in 1978. He had been part of a minority of SPC and FDP deputies in Bonn (not even a dozen people) that thought it was the task of environmental policy not only to eliminate any damage in whatever way possible but to see to it that such damage did not occur in the first place. As far as they are concerned, protection of the natural environmental living conditions is a "comprehensive (political) criterion" which must not be subjected to the whims of economic trends.

The overwhelming majority of deputies in Bonn counters this by stating that protection of the environment costs money. And this money can be raised only if industry makes a profit, if it comes up with surpluses which can yield funds for the protection of the environment. If there is no profit, environmental protection ruins industry and destroys jobs. "According to this philosophy," warns Social Democrat Haenschke, "protection of the environment remains a political luxury which we can afford only if we have some money left for it."

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The Council of Experts for Environmental Questions, an independent body of professors certifying to the environmental state of affairs in periodic reports on behalf of the federal government, deploras not only the inadequacy of laws (such as the watered-down environmental chemicals law) but, above all, a "lag in execution," noticeable everywhere, which prevents decisions in favor of environmental protection. A shying away from ecological measures is noticeable above all in the offices of district administrators and all the lower level authorities who exercise an influence on the shaping of the landscape and on the handling of it. It is not in the Bundestag but on district and municipal boards that decisions are made on such things as a district highway, deforestation of a small wood in a community, the draining of meadows and supervision of munitions plants.

But even decisions at the lowest level, as far as the affected citizen is concerned, are decisions from above, not with him but without him and against him. Not having shared in the decisionmaking, the affected people banded together in citizen's initiatives. And these often went to the barricades with such force that the trade unions became frightened and made common cause with business, being afraid that the protection of the environment being demanded everywhere in the countryside would operate as a brake on growth and as a stop against economic prosperity, threatening big business and thus also jobs. After a survey by the federal government, objections by citizen's initiatives led to the freezing of investments of more than DM 26 billion in 1976.

Actually there is not a single question in which there exists as great agreement between social bodies--churches, parties, trade unions--and their representatives on the one hand, and the citizens, on the other, as in the case of "protection of the environment." Everyone is for it. In an Allensbach poll in 1977, 75 percent of all Germans supported the need of protecting the environment. According to the poll, 45 percent would even put up with the risk of becoming unemployed if a healthy environment could not be attained otherwise.

In the meantime, an environmental attitude has also been adopted by circles of people on whom protection of the environment had previously been imposed. "We must not saw off the branch on which we are sitting," says Peter von Siemens, builder of power plants and Germany's biggest employer. Having come to ponder the situation on his walks along the Isar near Munich, the industrial leader addresses a serious warning to his fellow industrial tycoons, saying: "We must not impose a burden on our environment with the argument that we will not be able to compete otherwise. I am definitely of the opinion that in the final analysis only whatever is ecologically defensible can be implemented economically."

An out-and-out supporter of the ideas of anthroposophy, Siemens warns: "We must cease regarding our soil as a grain factory. We must not use chemical fertilizers if there is a possibility of attaining yields through

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biological-dynamic cultivation." Only the builders of power plants (of whom he is one), Siemens thinks, need not be admonished by him. "We are a clean industry," he says.

It is true that the industry cleans the Rhine by building biological wastewater purification plants and cleans the air with filters and fume desulfurizers. It has come up with more than half of the DM 100 billion being spent on protection of the environment until 1980.

The public relations offices of the large concerns keep pointing out what a great contribution they are making to creating a new clean Germany--as though it was not these very industries that produced the dirt polluting the environment.

Conservative, liberal and social democratic politicians are as confident as ever in the ability of the market economy to steer itself. They point to the clean air law passed as early as in 1964, to the laws and regulations which have gone into effect since and to the achievements of ecological technology, which they say has been able to handle a great many problems. They argue that by international standards the environmental policy of the nation and the Laender has nothing to be ashamed of. And many of them warn that even greater protection of the environment would mean even more government, even more controls, even more bureaucracy.

But are the controls adequate? Can the market really control what it institutes? Does it protect the citizens from radiation? Does it prevent destructive exploitation of the earth's natural raw materials? Does the principle of supply and demand insure the basis of our existence or not rather its sellout?

It is not only the Greens who demand a reorientation of the way we live, a new environmental ethic; so do philosophers and biologists, behavioral scientists and clerics, conservative environmentalists and Marxist professors.

Almost all drafts for a better future on this planet, one making it worth living on it, have one basic trend in common--the thesis "Small is beautiful" formulated by the Englishman Friedrich Schumacher. Better to proceed small than to perish big. Is it not possible to make do with fewer giant airports, mammoth schools and highrises, with fewer super highways and big department stores? Is it not better to ride a bicycle than to rush down a super highway in an air conditioned six-cylinder car on the weekend? In fact, what is this type of forward motion which one survives only wearing seat belts?

The fact that the Greens are not impressed by the material constraints of realpolitik has not been shown better by anyone than by former CDU Bundestag Deputy Herbert Gruhl, who last year founded the "Grüne Aktion Zukunft" [Green Action for the Future] and demanded in his "Green Manifesto" that "everything must become simpler--man, government, technology, transport." Simply that.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CSU LEADERSHIP DIVIDED ON STRAUSS CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

Hamburg STERN in German 31 Oct 79 pp 141-142

[Article by Werner D'hein: "Wrong Advice From the Provinces--CSU Deputy Chairman Friedrich Zimmermann and Secretary General Edmund Stoiber at Odds About Proper Election Campaign Strategy for Franz Josef Strauss"]

[Text] More than 3 months after Franz Josef Strauss was named candidate for chancellor, things became too much even for the MUENCHNER MERKUR, an organ loyal to the CSU. "What we see of the CSU chairman," said editor-in-chief Paul Pucher angrily, "has been improvised rather strenuously and poorly; there is no noticeable strategic line."

In Bonn, CSU Deputy Chairman Friedrich Zimmermann enjoyed reading the charges by Strauss fan Pucher. They coincide with his criticisms of the campaign tactics which he had offered his "dear Franz Josef" in a tete-a-tete a few days earlier. The main point was that Strauss would have a chance in 1980 only if "at long last" he detached himself from the haze of his provincial advisers in Munich and performed as a statesman on the stage in Bonn. "Otherwise we can forget about the election," Zimmermann said.

The "people in Bonn" (that is, CSU Bundestag leader Zimmermann and his well-oiled machine) charge that the "people in Munich" in the Bavarian government and party headquarters are amateurs. "The people in Munich have no proper feel at all for what is at issue in Bonn," a CSU deputy complains. "They do not feel the pulse and have no sense of nuance."

The main target of criticism is CSU Secretary General Edmund Stoiber. Zimmermann accuses him of the following:

--He is "dangerously oversimplifying by lumping Social Democrats and Nazis together."

--He threatened with a split in the unitary trade union at an inopportune time.

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--He gave his boss bad advice about Brezhnev's latest disarmament initiative. (Strauss was enthusiastic about the plan despite the fact that the reaction of NATO and the FRG government was one skeptical reservation.)

--He gave party spokesman Godel Rosenberg the green light to go after DGB [German Labor Union Federation] head Heinz Vetter, although Strauss had embraced the union chief a few days earlier.

--He did not miss any opportunity to thrash the press, particularly of radio and television, because of its allegedly untoward reporting about the candidate for chancellor.

Zimmermann demands that Stoiber be kept on a tight rein, but his problem is that Strauss, while realizing that "Edmund occasionally overdoes things," actually does not really mind--because Strauss too occasionally exaggerates.

On the other hand, Zimmermann and Strauss agreed about a greater presence in Bonn of the candidate for chancellor. In the future, Strauss plans to cheer the Christian Democratic Bundestag deputies every month with "topical analyses of the situation and perspectives for the future." According to a Strauss confidant in Bonn, "this is urgently needed, because the team feels shaky; they want to know where they are going."

Every 4 weeks, the Bavarian minister-president also wants to use the stage of the Bundesrat [FRG upper house] for performances pregnant with headlines. In addition, he intends to put in an appearance at Bonn official receptions rather than wait until official guests such as China's Hua Guofeng call on him in Munich.

Strauss even let himself be convinced that attending the Bonn press ball in mid-November would pay off better than visiting a people's fair in Upper Bavaria.

Finally, the CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor plans to call more often on newspapers' offices and to get his chief at the Munich government offices, Wilhelm Knittel, out of the habit of regarding "counterpresentations" as the sole effective means of handling the press.

Actually, the disturbed relations with the press were to have been smoothed out long ago by a friend of Strauss, CSU Deputy Hans ("Jonny") Klein. But so far the former PR manager of the Munich Olympics has been unable to sell Strauss because he has lacked the physical capacity to do so. He is still waiting for a chair and desk for his new election campaign office in Fritz-Schaeffer-Strasse in Bonn. There is a delay in delivery. The furniture is coming from Munich.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PRIME MINISTER BARRE'S HEALTH DISCUSSED

Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 22 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] As always, the prime minister's health problems are fostering some rather fantastic rumors. According to information we obtained from a reliable source, the following sequence of events took place. Raymond Barre has suffered from gout for a long time (which explains why he has been seen limping on several occasions, in particular last Monday evening at the Elysee during the reception for Hua Guofeng). But he neglected to take proper care of himself. "I look after myself in my own way," he told friends. His reputation for having a huge appetite, his slight interest in long walks (he scarcely ever goes out into the park at Matignon), his taste for late conversations with friends and late-evening television shows are well-known.

This unhealthy lifestyle added to the weight of his responsibilities, has induced extreme fatigue. When he was getting up last Thursday morning, Barre suddenly experienced a tightness in his chest. His family was very upset. The nearest doctor was called (since he doesn't seem to have a family doctor who cares for him on a regular basis); after having found that Mr Barre's blood pressure was very high, the doctor called in a cardiologist who recommended that the patient be admitted to Val-de-Grace for more extensive tests. By the end of the week, having received care and rest, Barre felt better and wanted to resume his activities. He was dissuaded from doing so in order that the tests could be completed. One of his friends had this comment: "If he is put on a diet, he will be out of sorts." However, by the end of the week, his family was convinced that he could soon resume his activities, on condition that he practise more self-discipline, because the treatment which he must follow will inevitably be tiring for him.

Nothing is more reassuring than truth and clarity. This seems to have been forgotten by some over-zealous colleagues of the prime minister. Thus, persons responsible for making decisions in the mass media were asked, as early as Thursday morning, to prohibit the use of the word "hypertension" in their newspapers and news bulletins.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF CRITICIZED FOR POSITION ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA, CFDT'S MAIRE

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 8-14 Oct 79 pp 51-52

[Interview with communist dissident Jean Elleinstein by Georges Mamy--
date and place not given]

[Text] Last May, the communist historian Jean Elleinstein approved of the conclusions reached at the 23d French Communist Party congress. Such an attitude could seem like a rally or a sign of submission on the part of an intellectual who had harshly denounced his party's responsibilities for the left's failure in the March 1978 legislature. Furthermore, last month, Elleinstein took part in one of the debates at the party for L'HUMANITE. But today he feels the need to express his new fears, which are also those of other intellectuals (and militants) of the PCF: the party is not applying, he says, the decisions of the 23d congress, and what it "does practice" is opposed to the achievement of "unity," which he still sees as indispensable.

[Question] Since 1976, you have often mentioned the "necessary historical alliance between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party." But it is just when the PCF is becoming most hostile toward the PS that you are approaching the direction that you had kept your distance from before. Doesn't that bother you? Do you find that the case?

[Answer] First of all, I still hold that an historical alliance between the PCF and the PS is necessary in order to bring about the changes which our society demands and to face the crisis. There can be no solution without that historical alliance. Of course, I have never felt that such an alliance could only be brought about by an agreement at the top; but it cannot get by without that agreement. In fact, there are two mistakes which must not be made: only to see the unity at the top, which was somewhat the case of the "common program," and one of its weaknesses: or else only to speak of unity "at base level." They both have to be there at the same time. As I see it, the concern of our party's 23d congress is in affirming the need to rebuild unity upon new bases, but a unity which will ultimately require agreements at the top.

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[Question] For the moment, pursuit of "unity at base level" is actually met with an intense hostility at the top.

[Answer] That is a real problem. Besides, it is not a one-way street. The leaders of the two main parties of the left are engaged in a very dangerous verbal assault. That the PCF criticizes the PS, that's legitimate enough. I share that criticism on many points because I still have more reason for being a communist than for not being one. But there is a certain way of doing things, and political debate must be carried on differently. You have to present the public with information on problems under discussion in a clear, serious and responsible manner. The criticism must be made with a concern for setting up the conditions for a new agreement. That's not being done when, for the socialist side, Jean Poperen-- whom I respect as a person--decides to do his own criticizing and says that the PCF is a vassal of Moscow. That's not being serious....

[Question] Is it more serious practically to call the PS a vassal of Giscard?

[Answer] I'd have to criticize both attitudes. And it will take a great effort to avoid that web of mistrust. Not only on the part of the leaders, but all those who make up the people of the left, who are very aware that there can be no progress or changes in the country without unity. The appeal must be made to all of them, militants and nonmilitants alike, all those who still hope for that unity. And in that sense I had an interest in the 23d Congress. Yet I must admit that there are contradictions in my party's practices. And these contradictions worry many communists, as they have worried me.

[Question] Exactly: is it in keeping with the unity of what you call the people of the left to have such an ill-founded suspicion about Edmond Maire and the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation Labor]? Here, we're not talking about the political leaders, but about coming to an agreement among the workers.

[Answer] Right. The way Edmond Maire was criticized in L'HUMANITE for several days to me was unacceptable. It's possible for someone not to agree with the CFDT, and I don't on every point. But you can't say in all seriousness, expecting to be believed, that Maire is an agent of Giscard, or that he is striving toward "consensus," as L'HUMANITE did. That pertains to a process of intention, which I criticize. Whether he was right or not in going to the colloquium on information, that's one thing. But to talk about the problem of the joint production committee's right to know and control the use of the information in their undertaking like he did, that's another thing. And if the president of the republic insists on making that claim, I am led to believe it's a victory for the workers. Are there ulterior motives in the head of state's behavior? Obviously. But these motives can first of all be attributed to the real disunity in the left's political organizations. Besides, in a more general sense, the lack of a clear political alternative has disastrous consequences for the social struggles themselves. And when the government adopts a position that you agree with, I don't see shy you can't express that agreement. Personally, therefore, I don't

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think the government's Middle East policy is bad. Why can't you say so without being suspected of working for the "consensus" of the right? Trying to reach an agreement between Israel and the PLO aimed at creating a Palestinian state is something to be desired. When you say that, it doesn't mean you approve of all of Discard's diplomacy.

[Question] But that's the kind of behavior your party is always denouncing in others.

[Answer] There are many French people, many workers for that matter, who are now very critical of the left's political structures; because they find that for one reason or another they aren't able to provide an answer to the real problems facing the French people. Thus, as our congress stated, we need to struggle, besides the fact that the danger of a "consensus" of the right is a real one, and there is always that temptation to settle for some "national union" which, as a general rule, is a cover-up for the politics of the right. And the French Communist Party has the capacity for coming out against this danger and basing its policy on classes: you can't confuse Eurocommunism and social democracy. But by attacking Edmond Maire the way he was just attacked, you're not advancing "unity at base level."

[Question] You'll admit then that the practices of the PCF counteracts the optimistic vein in which you interpret the 23d Congress?

[Answer] That's the issue. There are some decisions of that Congress with which I have shown my agreement, and there is their practical application. And I must say in all honesty that there are misunderstandings between the two. I would like to mention two recent examples with regard to the communist intellectuals. The first is the appeal made by some of them against the trial in Czechoslovakia, against the lawyers and the ones responsible for "Charter 77." That appeal was published in LE MONDE and elsewhere. The lawyers have since that time received several hundred signatures. L'HUMANITE only made one mention of it.

[Question] Shouldn't the party itself have intervened?

[Answer] Of course. It's true that Georges Marchais said that he had intervened directly with the Czech Communist Party. But obviously that is not enough. There should have been a public intervention. And not only about Czechoslovakia, but also against the anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. There, the French Communist Party didn't intervene forcefully enough either and condemn that country's anti-Semitism. On the other hand, very typical is, unfortunately, the way that the PCF tried to forbid the communists from signing the appeal on behalf of the participants of "Charter 77" who were arrested and convicted in Czechoslovakia, and even to convince some of those who signed to retract their signatures.

[Question] It came to that?

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[Answer] Sure. And those are the practices that are absolutely opposed to the decisions of the 23d Congress and the Central Committee meeting for the intellectuals which followed. And if I've approved of the congress, as far as I'm concerned, it's mainly because of the decisions made regarding the intellectuals: the congress's tribunal for preliminary discussion; the special Central Committee meeting; the creation of a new, more open, weekly newspaper; and the creation of an institute for free research. All that was in keeping with my wishes. But with respect to Czechoslovakia, what is being done contradicts what is being said. Just like the assassination of Pierre Goldman.

[Question] Is that the second "fact" that you want to give as an example?

[Answer] Yes, You know that there was no party delegation to the Goldman funeral. There was one from the CGT. But there was no official party position taken and no representative. And I can't understand that. I can't see how such an attitude can be justified in light of the 23d congress. It's completely against....

[Question] Except if you were mistaken about the real sense of those decisions.

[Answer] I don't think so. The texts are all there. And it's because this "law" of the party exists that I'm trying to cooperate as a loyal member to make it have a true bearing on reality. But it goes without saying that this endeavor requires vigilance and a spirit of criticism. And it seems that with the examples just mentioned--excessive criticisms of Edmond Maire, trial in Czechoslovakia, Pierre Goldman's funeral, we're biting the leash, we're getting away from the 23d congress. And that's what causes confusion and anxiety among communists.

[Question] In your opinion, why didn't the PCF want to be present at Goldman's funeral?

[Answer] That's the question that thousands of communists have asked and are asking. Was it because of the victim's personality? Or was it due to a refusal to take part in a public display with the socialist leaders? In any event, the absence is subject to criticism--no matter what you think about the Socialist Party, we really need to get back as soon as possible to more unified practices. We can't be satisfied with practices which, if allowed to develop, would look like those of the German PCF in 1932 instead of building a new unity. Likewise, the PS should not adopt a behavior similar to the German SD party of the same period

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ARMED FORCES INFORMATION, PR SERVICE DUTIES OUTLINED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Oct 79 pp 7-9

[Article by Pierre-Charles Guillemot: "The Armed Forces, Secrets and Information"]

[Text] I got off at the small station of Diss near Norwich, in that part of England called East Anglia, one evening in December 1944. A USAF car was waiting for me to drive me to the base occupied by the 100th bomber group, Eighth Air Force, consisting of B-17 Flying Fortresses, and I could not have imagined the welcome that was given me.

A proud and militant team spirit had earned the group the nickname of "Bloody 100th." Pilots, navigators and machine gunners were all deeply convinced of the fact that their feats had gained them such a reputation with the enemy that the German fighters made it a rule to go after them especially among the bomber formations which were then attacking the Third Reich on a daily basis.

With my green badge of war correspondent on my uniform, I was then doing my first reportage. I was requested in a friendly way to contribute to the legend of the 100th and the PIO (Public Information Officer) did not refuse me a thing. Even and up to the two or three missions in which I participated, I was able to discover the smallest details, both through the group and the 8th Air Force, including the conception and the implementation of the air war against Germany.

Enthusiastically I made publicity for the Bloody 100th and contributed generously to the "Press Book" which was lovingly kept by Captain Bowers, in the form of press clippings. I was then too young to be able to analyze the philosophy of public relations of the 8th Air Force. Since then, I have written many other "papers." I have had contact with many other military persons and especially, of course, with French military personnel. And I understood that the behavior of my American friends of 1944-45 was that of a "dominant and self-confident" army, which was not only certain to be walking on the road to victory but which was fired up by the unanimous and unstinted support of its people given to the crusade that it was leading.

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Inglorious Wars

Not all wars are like that which the armed forces are called on to conduct in serving the government and the nation. Conflicts which engage the army as a consequence of historical circumstances or political mistakes put the army to hard tests. It must pay the price of blood while the political class, the parties and public opinion tear one another to pieces on issues at stake. While the civilians are negotiating, the army still must accept its sacrifices in battle.

Is it then hard to understand that the army thus withdraws unto itself and that its members now search within their own family the same aims of defending a common ideal, armed with a clear suspicion of everything that is not of itself?

Yet never more than in our time, the army has been the expression of the people from which it comes and which insures its continued existence. After the vast brewing process of the World War I, the army has been opened throughout its hierarchy to all the classes in French society. Coming out of the painful conflicts in Indochina and Algeria, it could see itself now in a clearly defined philosophy of national independence and a clearly expressed defense doctrine. It could finally dream now of Ho Chi Minh's sentence which is much admired by the psychological action specialists: "The army must be of the people like a fish in water."

To Do and To Inform

It remains necessary, however, that the people know about and understand what the army is doing. Nothing illustrates this idea better than the creation in 1926 of the "Press Information" service in the navy, decreed by Georges Leygues, then minister of the navy, who had wished to obtain a more substantial budget.

Since then, for more than half a century, the extraordinary development of information ranges through the written press, radio and television, has put public opinion directly and immediately in contact with events through the printed word, sounds and images. Not only does the citizen of today who is bathing in a sea of information no longer admit that one can hide this or that element of a national question, the internationalization of communications would totally negate such an attempt. Would one wish for a proof? Leaving aside the first experimental shots of our nuclear weapons in the Sahara, the government and the Defense Ministry have always kept secret the tests conducted since 1966 in the Polynesian atolls of Fangatofa and Mururoa. Nonetheless their dates and the nature of the tests are known thanks to--or because of--the watchfulness of the Australians and the New Zealanders who regularly announced them. The antinuclear campaigns which have developed in these two countries, in particular, have fostered the utilization of the subterranean shooting method.

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For an Information Doctrine

If the "information" operation of Georges Leygues in 1926 had to do with a concern for punctuality of sorts, it was the awareness of both the necessity and indispensable character of the information which brought Michel Debre to create by ministerial decree on 7 October 1969 the SIRPA [Armed Forces Information and Public Relations Service], which this year is celebrating its 10th anniversary. SIRPA's objectives have to do with the same search for national consensus which I had found in my American friends in 1944:

- to make known and explain the defense and military policies of France;
- to present the activities and evolution of our armies under all their different aspects;
- to expand the relations between the various armies and the different social groups in the nation.

Like all military objectives, the realization of the above has involved many a difficulty and contradiction. For if a geographically localized conflict affects in dramatic fashion, no doubt but only in a limited sense, one part of the national territory and of the population, when one comes to the first objective assigned to SIRPA we are talking about the fate of the entire nation. For one cannot conceive of a defense policy or elaborate a military policy without bringing into play the future of each one of our citizens.

The Idea of Independence

The obsession of the national independence idea which had marked the life and work of General De Gaulle has in one stroke guided the major drawings of our defense policy. Founded upon the constitution of a nuclear deterrence force freed from all foreign subordination, it has implied our disengagement from the integrated defense system of NATO. It was a question here of two fundamental and irreversible options which could only be taken in the perspective, at least in middle range term, of agreement by almost the total body of national opinion.

For at the beginning, the principle of a "force de frappe" was to say the least controversial in spite of the fact that the Fourth Republic had taken measures not to leave France outside of the great power dialogue in terms of nuclear weaponry.

From as early as 8 October 1945, the Atomic Energy Commission, created at the instigation of General De Gaulle, had among its functions the mission of studying atomic energy for the purpose of national defense.

At the end of 1952, the Pinay administration decided to build the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission] Center at Marcoule for the production of plutonium so as to have the fissionable matter needed for the fabrication of the atomic bomb.

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On 30 November 1956, the Mollet administration decided on a 4-year program which assigned

- to the CEA the preparatory studies for the explosion of experimental atomic testings, plus the scientific part of the testings; and
- to the Armed Forces the preparations for and the support needed to explode the nuclear devices.

On 15 July 1957, the construction of the Experimental Center of Reggane was decided upon and in January 1958 the Felix Gaillard administration ordered that necessary dispositions be taken to realize a first series of experimental testings of military purpose atomic devices starting in the first quarter of 1960. As a consequence, on 15 February 1969, under the Fifth Republic, the first French nuclear explosion took place which had a power of 60 to 70 kilotons, or three times the power of the Hiroshima bomb.

Three Censuring Motions

Middle term consensus... That was the objective to aim at. After three censuring motions at the National Assembly on 24 October, 22 November and 6 December 1960, the Debre administration resorted to Article 44 of the Constitution and to the blocked vote to get adopted the 1960-64 project and program-law which foresaw notably the realization of a first operational nuclear weaponry system: a fission bomb to be launched by Mirage IV's.

Thus, the French deterrence force as it is found today in its three main components was underway: second program-law of 1965-70 with, on 29 March 1967, the launching of the first nuclear submarine and the first explosions in 1968 of uranium 235 experimental devices which came from the isotopic separation plant of Pierrelatte. Third program-law of 1971-75 which the putting into operation of 2 units of 9 SSBS missiles at the Albion plateau, without taking into consideration the development and manufacturing of middle range ballistic vectors for the Land Army (Pluton System) and of tactical nuclear bombs for the Air Army.

A logical consequence of such a defense policy: on 1 March 1966 France withdrew from the integrated command of NATO and gave notice to the 14 Atlantic Alliance partners that this decision would bring with it the transfer outside of French territory of the command headquarters of Allied forces in Europe.

More than 20 years after the first program-law has public opinion come to perceive the sense of a national independence policy which has been followed in defense matters under three presidents of the republic? The answers given to 12 questions submitted to the four great political formations in France at the beginning of 1978, in view of legislative decisions, by the National Committee of Liaison Defense-Army-Nation, can give us the proof: on the two opinions dealt with above (deterrence force and rejection of dependence on an integrated military system) the Communist Party, the

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Socialist Party, the Republican Party and the Rally for the Republic were unanimous, even if the Socialist Party which was fundamentally hostile to nuclear weapons pronounced itself in favor of keeping the deterrence force at its present level in the expectation of negotiations in view of general disarmament.

The wished-for national consensus has thus been realized, at least in middle term, on the fundamental questions which engage the destiny of the national for several generations to come.

In All Honesty

The mission cannot for that reason be considered completed. On the contrary, defense and military policies and living realities which evolve together with our technologies and demand constant explanations. This could be done only through the media which are unavoidable intermediaries between the responsible parties at the Defense Ministry and its instrument, the military establishment, on the one hand, and their various targets as they say in publicity work, which one seeks to reach, on the other. And these targets, one is not always aware, are of an extraordinary variety. They go from the French grassroots taxpayer, whose cotisation will serve to feed a constantly increasing defense budget, to a television viewer of some Third World country, of the Atlantic Alliance, or of the Warsaw Pact. For information, whether one wishes it or not, is a consumption good thrown into the world market where each journalist would take according to the needs and concerns of the human community which he serves.

It is here that the military person finds himself torn between two absolutely contradictory conceptions, that of the military secret which historically has guaranteed the effectiveness and success of his mission and the conception of information resulting from a necessity at once diplomatic, political and technical:

- diplomatic/ because the philosophy of French defense policies rests on a deterrence force and because this force would be a deterrence factor only to the degree that its main components are known;
- political/ because as we have seen, the consensus of a highly developed national opinion is indispensable;
- technical/ because one cannot hide anything in our days for very long, especially when our armament industry is the object of a yearly salon visited by buyers coming from all over the world.

At any rate, the zone covered by the notion of "military secret" has been considerably reduced during the last few years. The officers of the Albion Plateau who organized guided tours or the sailors of Longue Island, who were requested to put up a kiosk on their SNLE clearly know something about this. To respond to this triple requirement there is only one solution: to act in all honesty with the serenity of conviction.

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Media Relations

The media, or more generally "the opinion relays," are in the language of Aesop the best and the worst there is. One can deplore and curse them; wisdom and common sense would tell us to come to terms with them. My personal experience of relations between the Armed Forces and the press all along a lengthy career permits me to approach this problem with all the more frankness since their evolution in the last few years cannot but satisfy me.

The general information journalist is not by nature fired with hostile or perfidious intentions in regard to the military establishment (or any other state institution). He simply has the duty to inform as objectively and also as rapidly--and this is the tragedy sometimes--as possible. Between the agencies and the radio stations, television and the newspapers, the competition is stimulating but implacable. Leaving aside the happy specialist who can afford to dig at his own pace into a question and to refine his article as a consequence, the information journalist is a little the foot soldier of the profession, the one who fights everyday on the battlefield and must confront the immediate requirements. And the immediate requirements are the newspaper's windup time and, worse still, the hourly bulletin of a radio station.

He is besieged with news coming from various and not always disinterested sources. They come from correspondents who sometimes have only a local perspective, fragmentary or passionate, on this or that question. It happens also that they come from rumors or simply some wide circulation tidbits. In every case one must verify them, and quick, before the competition would come out with the news. Experience has told me that it is infinitely more simple to spread an information than it is to retain it until one has found irrefutable confirmation.

As far as military affairs are concerned, it is relatively simple to give to the journalists the means to verify them. First of all through an immediate telephone call to a service and a known correspondent from whom one can expect a frank and precise answer to the question put to him. Then, in a larger perspective, through documentation notes, press conferences, visits and information trips, which will give him the necessary understanding of the topic; and from there he will know how to place this or that information in context, give it a sense which is correct or to reject it knowingly if it happens to be false.

"To make known and explain the defense and military policies of France," it is in fact in that way that the mission of SIRPA is defined. In each information bureau, the journalist in charge of this rubric has taken to the habit of calling his correspondents party SIRPA, at the national or regional level, each time that he needs to check back on a piece of news or each time that objectivity makes it necessary to make known the viewpoint of the military establishment.

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On its part, the military establishment can expect from the journalist that he utilize the information given him with prudence and clearheadedness. The Anglo-Americans have an expression for designating the information that one provides to a journalist for his comprehension of the event. Such information are "off the record." It is extremely rare that this rule of the game, freely accepted by all, would be overstepped.

The national consensus on our defense policy, the place occupied by the Armed Forces in the nation's life, and the unanimity acquired in regard to the national service as well as concerning our deterrence force have resulted in large measure from the new climate which has been established in the last few years between the Armed Forces and the opinion relays.

It is a climate that needs to be developed through direct, confident and friendly human relations, even at the executive level. More than one officer put in the Information and Public Relations Service has had to fight hard to win over the prejudices and preconceived ideas in order to go to the discovery of the complex and sometimes worrisome world of the media. I know of few cases in which experience has disappointed them.

I believe that one can say the same thing about the immense majority of journalists. All things counted, both sides have one essential thing in common: both in their way are at the service of France and of the French people.

Pierre-Charles Guillemot, chief editor of the CENTRAL PRESS AGENCY (ACP), was born in 1920 in Paris where he completed his primary and secondary studies. He has made his debut in journalism right after the Liberation of Paris and has been war correspondent for LIBE-SOIR. In 1948 he went to work for MAROC-PRESSE in Casablanca, then became bureau chief of the Maroc bureau of ACP in Rabat. From 1960 to 1963 he represented his agency in Brussels, accredited to the European Communities, before coming back to Paris as secretary general of the editing board. He has also been correspondent for TIME AND LIFE, of the DAILY EXPRESS and of several radio and television stations.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

'REALISTIC' NAVAL CONSTRUCTION POLICY DESCRIBED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Oct 79 pp 40, 45

[Article by Vice Admiral Jean Schweitzer: "A Realistic Naval Construction Policy"]

[Text] To project and build the navy of tomorrow consists first of all to make a judicious choice and put into operation combat vessels which are in step with the country's ambitions and resources. This is a long-haul task and it has always been that way. The life of a vessel, from its birth to its retirement, often comes to and may even go beyond 30 years. This should tell us about the need for a long-term conception.

For that reason the naval policy is decided at the highest levels of the government. The guidelines for the formation of our fleet in about the year 2000 have been approved last year by the president of the republic. In application of the policy which is thus defined and of a general program of action submitted to parliament, the minister of defense has taken the decisions needed to launch the programs of construction.

To bring in to bear on these choices which are function of our budget capabilities our evolving operational needs and the potential threat of the enemy as well as the changing possibilities of our technology and industry implies that we must make compromises which are sometimes difficult.

A big combat vessel is a big complex of several weapon systems. In the debate, ever so fresh, between quality and quantity, between polyvalence specialization, one must guard against the tendency to perfectionism. The temptation is great for operational people as well as for the engineers to conceive of marvelous ships equipped with the latest technical innovations. But in doing so, the escalation of costs risks strongly to end up in a sample navy in the face of budget constraints. There are some examples from the past which, one must say, are still there to tell us.

It is for this reason that starting from a realistic standpoint--made necessary both by the economic situation and by a reasonable strategic ambition which first of all stresses the number of units--the navy has

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deliberately committed itself to a policy of building series of ships whose sophistication is voluntarily kept limited. Such is to this day the presiding idea which in particular relates to the construction of the A69 sloops, of C70 corvettes and of nuclear attack submarines. The progresses necessary for operational effectiveness are introduced by stages starting with the high priority areas. Nuclear propulsion, for instance, which at the beginning was developed for the nuclear subs launchers of nuclear devices, will from now on be installed in the attack submarines and is scheduled to be placed in the future in the large surface vessels, first of all on the aircraft-carriers.

The complexity of the choices that are linked to the conception and to the construction of ships calls for a sound concert of efforts between the naval command and the building service which in the case of the Navy is the Technical Direction for Naval Construction, itself an organization located within the General Delegation for Armaments. Each organ has its own responsibilities such as the elaboration of the operational needs and of the military programme of the Navy headquarters, the determination of technical and building solutions for the DTCN [Technical Direction for Naval Construction]. However, a close dialog must be established from the very conception phase between the "customer" and "supplier." This must continue all through the construction period and intensify at the moment of trial runs conducted together before the operational phase. The dialog is kept on also during the lifetime of the vessel on the occasion of modernizations and rebuilds which allow for the renewal of weaponry and equipment the evolution of which is faster than that of the hulls and of ship propulsion.

Vice Admiral Jean Schweitzer was born on 20 January 1920 in Strasbourg. Enrolled in the Naval School in 1938, he had participated in the Norwegian and Mediterranean operations on board the Montclan. After diverse tours and commands on ships, he was admitted in 1955 to the Ecole superieure of Naval Warfare. He then commanded the Casablanca, then the De Grasse. Named in 1973 to the command of sea forces in the Indian Ocean, he took in 1975 the functions of under chief of staff for operations, Naval Headquarters, before being named navy major general on 1 September 1976. Since 1 January 1979 Admiral Schweitzer has been squadron vice admiral.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FUNDING CONSIDERED FOR SUCCESSOR TO MIRAGE IV

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 20 Oct 79 p 9

[Text] The Defense Ministry's draft budget for 1980 contains an important innovation: credits are provided for the adaptation of 15 Mirage IV's and giving them new armament that would permit them to carry out long-range penetration missions at low altitude.

This initiative comes at a time when we learn that the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air Force has decided to assign some 80 B-52D bombers for NATO support. It is known that part of the B-52 fleet is now going to be modified to permit them to transport cruise missiles.

But whereas these modifications have scarcely begun, the U.S. experts are uneasy about the future. There are those who favor the modernization of the F-111, but more and more we note a trend in favor of designing a modern aircraft capable of long-range penetration at low altitude, one that could profit from the experience attained with the B-1's.

The modified Mirage IVs will have a useful life of only a few years. These aircraft were actually built in the late 1950's and should not be considered operational for more than 7-8 years in a new mission subjecting their structure to a harsh test.

The mission of engagement in a theatre or tactical action at long range will continue beyond the new lease on life of the modified Mirage IV's, whose replacement must now be contemplated. In any event, it is not a question of using for this mission an aircraft like the Mirage 2000 whose capacity is very inadequate to accommodate the equipment and missiles required to perform the long-range, low-altitude mission.

Certain aeronautical experts and parliamentarians believe that the Mirage 4000, whose aeronautical qualities have now been largely demonstrated, would be the best solution, permitting the development of a successor to the modified Mirage IV's within a reasonable time, and this prospect will probably be raised at the upcoming budgetary deliberations.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

APPROACH TO SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL BUDGET EXAMINED

Paris LA RECHERCHE in French Oct 79 pp 1030-1031

[Interview with Parliament members Jean-Pierre Chevenement and Jacques Descours-Desacre, by Martine Borrely: "Parliament and Science"---date and place not given]

[Text] As Parliament is now preparing to approve the 1980 research budget, it seemed of interest to question the two special budget reporters about the members' approach to scientific and technical problems.

Forty-year-old Jean-Pierre Chevenement, socialist deputy from Belfort, is the National Assembly's special reporter to the Finance Commission.

Sixty-five-year-old Jacques Descours-Desacre, UREI (Union of Republicans and Independents) senator from Calvados, does the same job for the Senate.

[Question] In the area of research, is the role of Parliament restricted to approving the budget?

[Chevenement] At present, yes. That is why the first resolution written into the Finance Commission's report last year was that during the first 1979 session there be organized a public debate on research policy. Unfortunately, this debate did not take place, for the European elections slowed our work too much.

Concerning that subject, in principle the reporters have very extensive powers, because they exercise complete control over registration and position of all administrative and public documents. Moreover, I had the intention of putting myself "on the spot" by insisting that the inspector general of finances send a report about the distribution of public aid to businesses, if I had not received this transmission, requested since last May. But in reality reporters have very few powers; while in the United States, for example, the commissions have many civil servant assistants, I have one administrative assistant who must deal with several budgets.

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[Descours-Desacre] Parliament's role is never limited to approving a budget, whichever it is, because the voting is the occasion for a debate in which every member can take part. As for the research budget, the senators are not deficient. However, it is true that the conditions under which the budget is examined leave limited time to study each item. Thus a few colleagues requested a research policy debate last year, which was to have taken place at the last session, if we had not been occupied with text examinations.

[Question] Doesn't Parliament have any means to influence the major orientations of research? Will you discuss the options of the secretary of state's 10-year plan?

[Chevenement] In my last annual questionnaire to the government, I ask precisely what is the 10-year plan's significance, and on what prospective research is it based. I can meet with Mr Aigrain and the heads of the large organizations, but I do not claim that I influence them through official channels. My role is to keep myself informed and to inform the country through Parliament, and to control the use of public funds. In this capacity I can ask the Commission and the Assembly to refuse to approve money for research, which may or may not be respected by my colleagues. As for the recommendations approved by the Commission and written into the annual report, they may influence the orientation, provided of course that the government applies them; in addition, an evaluation with discussion could be done after one year.

[Descours-Desacre] Parliament's role is rather difficult, because the initiative for expenses belongs to the government. We can only urge the review of its choices to obtain funding for this or that action from the total funding in the next budget, as seen in the amended finances bill. We can also rearrange the order in some sectors where there is underutilization of funds, and even ask for decreases when there is a glaring discrepancy between an approved budget and its application.

[Question] If one judges by the small number of their written and oral questions, the members are not very interested in scientific and technical questions. Is this apparent lack of interest real?

[Chevenement] Yes and no. I imagine that there are enough deputies who are interested in these problems, whatever their positions, to activate a core group to a reflection on research. In effect, I believe that the scientific and technical stakes are poorly perceived in our country and it's up to Parliament, but also the scientific community and the political parties, to measure them and make the public aware of them.

When lack of interest is present, it doubtless represents a large area of public opinion; which seems to me to portend great danger for the future. After having expected everything from science, opinion distresses it and displays a kind of opposition to progress by challenging all research

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efforts. The crisis over the worth of reason is certainly one of our civilization's basic problems.

[Descours-Desacre] Certainly the members show more enthusiasm in the industrial budget discussion, for example, than in that for research. In the first case each one has very concrete facts in mind, such as a factory in difficulty or a family concerned. In the other case the subject primarily concerns the spirit. However, I think that we all feel that research is a factor in the country's progress. It's only that the area is so vast and so diverse that each one is interested in a particular sector, so a problem must be especially acute to gain the concern of several speakers.

[Question] Don't you think that it is incumbent upon Parliament to propose laws on all problems concerning scientific ethics?

[Chevenement] There is a scientific responsibility problem and it should be the subject of a democratic debate. It's not a question of controlling scientific activity down to the least detail, which would cause inertia. But posing the problem publicly appears to me the prerequisite for reaching a new positive for the long term scientific stakes.

[Descours-Deacre] It's a serious question. Should morals be intimate to the individual, or can law replace morals? I'm afraid that law can't replace morals, but I believe that the law is desirable when morals are being degraded. However, I think that it is very difficult for a parliament member to legislate very technical problems, and when not all the implications are known. The time when the regulatory power can intervene more quickly and efficaciously is, for example, when it authorizes drugs to be placed on the market.

[Question] What communication do you have with the scientific community?

[Chevenement] Communication does not come from it. It's necessary to know the people who are doing the research. I know some of them and I devote 2 or 3 days a month to visiting laboratories and organizations, which allows me to establish contacts. However, some scientists still have a tendency to believe that their specialty's problems interest only themselves. In my opinion this attitude is excessive and dangerous, for it hinders an awareness of the great possibilities for the future, such as the development of new energy sources, genetic engineering, etc.

[Descours-Desacre] I am accosted more frequently by researchers in administrative, material, credit, and law problems than in scientific problems. This is quite normal, as I am Finance Commission reporter. I bring an appreciation of the financial aspect of research, but I have not taken a position on the occasion of this or that proposal. In addition, I maintain constant and close friendly contacts with several research scientists, and I must say that it's easier for me to form an opinion by talking with them than by reading reports, which, for those who receive them, have an anonymous character.

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[Question] Don't you think that Parliament members, who are rarely researchers or engineers, would be better intellectually "armed" to discuss scientific and technical problems, if they were assisted by experts?

[Chevenement] I agree so thoroughly that I recently obtained from the president of the Finance Commission a full time research aide, who I am going to recruit. I also want a mixed commission to be created, made up of scientists and Parliament members; a science and technology evaluation committee, comparable to that in the United States, would be very useful. For the moment however, it is a matter of only setting up groups to evaluate the government's technical options on the energy policy issue, and these groups will include only Parliament members.

[Descours-Desacre] We have the freedom to consult whomever we want, but the experts often have conflicting opinions, and sometimes one has to feel that they are prejudiced to this or that school of thought. There is certainly not a tenth, or perhaps even a hundredth of the senators who are familiar with all the subjects touched upon in the annual report on research. But I think that the politician should combine his personal reactions with the information which he receives here and there; and using common sense, a sort of intuition which may or may not be useful to him, finally determine his position.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

COMMENTARY COMPLAINS DETENTE LOSING CREDIBILITY

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 29 Oct 79, p 5

[Article by Nino Milazzo: "Detente? A Lost Code"]

[Text] About a year ago, we were already asking if the second cold war had not broken out. Today, that same question, in light of new facts and attitudes, is posed with even more emphasis. But today, as then, there is in us a sort of superstitious reluctance in recognizing that which Macchiavelli defined as the "effective reality of events": like refusing to examine the last phase of an analysis in order to negate the validity of the results thus far attained. And yet, this "unmentionable" synthesis is no longer hidden to anyone; nor is it possible to rely any more on certain exorcisms to hide the factual evidence.

No matter how bitter, even painful, it is to admit, the world no longer follows the code of detente. Everything changes or threatens to change beyond any control mechanism and against every rule of solidarity. And by that we do not imply that detente be a rigid instrument of conservation, capable only of maintaining the status quo. On the contrary, it had been conceived of and used in a dynamic sense, in such a way, that is, that the forward movement of the international scene, if not totally in agreement, at least was compatible with its general interests. Or, better said, in agreement with the interests of the main protagonists, those which definitely hold the keys to peace.

In other words, detente did not signify justice, but it did guarantee security. It was not the best of choices. It was, however, the best possible in a reality characterized by divisions between capitalist and socialist societies, between North and South, industrialized countries and less developed countries.

Now, those same security safeguards have been found to be lacking. Unilateral acts occur more and more frequently. And the mutations no longer respect equilibriums, for the simple reason that they come in contact with conflict situations and produce destabilizing effects.

This tendency began to manifest itself following the American defeat in Viet Nam. It has become even more noticeable as it paralleled the foundering of western economies. Examining these general data, two fundamental questions come to the

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foreground. First: the inadequacy of American leadership. Second: the will, on the part of the Soviet leadership, to utilize to their benefit the unfavorable economic condition of their adversaries and their capacity to take advantage of a situation with a promptness of reflexes characteristic of very centralized power systems. All of the events in recent times, in fact, are characterized by this double, constant trademark: Soviet expansionism, and the American inability to put a halt to it.

Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen are many such milestones in Moscow's drive toward the acquisition of new positions of strength. These in turn are followed, in time as in logic, by the Euromissile affair and the encircling maneuver attempted against the whole of the Third World.

Between blandishments and threats, the Kremlin's strategy reveals an ambitious as well as dangerous objective: that of politically subjugating (Finlandizing) Europe, capitalizing on its fears, uncertainties and divisions. In this design, the warheads of the SS-20's and the generic promises of a far-off German reunification are sides of the same coin.

Even more widespread is the operation the Soviets are conducting aimed at engulfing the Third World and organically incorporating it in the socialist bloc while availing themselves of Cuba's good offices. The first attack, as is known, took place at the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana, where Castro attempted to impose his line but was rebuffed by Tito in no uncertain terms. However, the endeavor did not stop there. Moscow will continue in its attempts at penetration: no one can doubt that. On this front, in fact, the Soviets can bring back into play a weapon which, with the diminishing role of ideology, had gotten rusty. If their socialism, in fact, has lost its appeal to industrial societies, by now resistant to myths and influences of "foreign" marxism, the situation in the Third World is rather different. There, amid the delays of an ever more difficult development, or the despair of an underdevelopment without outlets, the authoritarian "real socialism" model could bring about that seduction which was lost to those socially and economically developed countries. [All this] despite the last example of Prague.

Therefore, why insist on a theatrical fiction of a detente lacking in credibility? The international scenario is one of conflict, East against West, North against South. And communists against communists: from Sinkiang to Vladivostok, from Kampuchea to Viet Nam. In these conditions, even events that are in themselves positive such as the fall of the regimes of the Shah and Somoza run the risk of regenerating, becoming opportunities for conflicts.

No end-of-the-world sermons. Only the awareness of a danger that can still be avoided: upon condition that faith in international legality be reestablished. Fear never was a giver of good advice. This is also shown by the South African atomic bomb which, if it does not really exist, then it almost does: which is par for the times.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

MEZZOGIORNO MINISTER OPPOSES 'SPECIAL FUND' FOR CALABRIA

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 24 Oct 79 p 16

[Interview of Michele Di Giesi, minister for the Mezzogiorno, by Demetrio De Stefano: "Di Giesi Does Not Agree With Lombardini; No to a 'Special Fund' for Calabria"; in Rome, date not given]

[Text] A hundred billion in superincentives; a "fundlet for the South" that would supersede normal legislation. The problem of Gioia Tauro. Participation planned by EFIM [Manufacturing Industry Holding and Financial Company] should increase jobs.

Rome--Mezzogiorno Minister Michele Di Giesi considers "useless duplication" the establishment of a 100-billion lire special fund for the industrialization of Calabria. The fund was proposed by Siro Lombardini, minister of government participation. Lombardini also suggested to Council President Cossiga the constitution of a mixed company of government participation and private capital (with the participation of the Fund for Regional Assistance) to promote industry and tourism in Calabria. Di Giesi is also perplexed at this initiative. Why? We asked whether it might be due to a political difference between the Social Democratic minister for the Mezzogiorno and the minister for government participation. The latter is a "technician" but nonetheless a former Christian Democratic senator.

[Answer] Party politics doesn't enter into it. I don't think the Calabria special fund is useful because it is an administrative outgrowth to grant superincentives above and beyond those provided for in normal legislation on the South. In a word, it is a kind of "fundlet" attached to the Fund for the Mezzogiorno. In this way it basically risks creating conflict among the various regions of the South, while the problems to be resolved in order to stimulate industrial initiative in the South and in Calabria in particular do not need superincentives, at least as far as private enterprise is concerned.

[Question] What does private enterprise want, then?

[Answer] They mostly want the territory to be organized in such a way as to allow the optimal undertaking of new initiatives. Also, as far as incentives are concerned, they don't want incentives for capital but at the final phase of the productive process, i.e. in profits. We may therefore have to allow

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for some kinds of income tax relief. I have met with the leaders of the industrial sector in order to get a clear idea of the requirements of private enterprise.

All these businessmen confirmed to me that financial problems are somehow secondary to new initiatives in Calabria and the South in general. On the other hand, there are financial problems for the initiatives of the IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute]. But there is no need for the special fund and the mixed society to make up for the IRI. I'll explain: if the IRI has to support improperly documented undertakings, it will be ready to intervene institutionally.

[Question] Next Friday you will be discussing the problem of Gioia Tauro and the unions with Lombardini and Budget Minister Andreotta. In view of this meeting, will you speak for the government in opposing Lombardini's proposals?

[Answer] It is not a matter of opposing or favoring them but of getting to the bottom of the problem so that the people in Calabria won't continue to have illusions. The discussion will have to be undertaken under official auspices, but the important thing is that it not be taken as being a repeat performance. Rather, businessmen are asking the government to take some kind of action to make certain, shall we say, "environmental" conditions are at least tolerable in Calabria.

[Question] Local Mafia interference?

[Answer] I certainly hope not to get directly involved in that sector, but I do think, anyway, that we will have to make a big contribution to eliminating the concrete conditions that cause industrial unrest.

[Question] What have you been doing to create new jobs in the Gioia Tauro area, in particular?

[Answer] Concrete solutions for Gioia Tauro will be put off as long as five steel mills are demanded. By this I do not mean that five steel mills will never be built in Calabria. I want to emphasize that the five mills cannot be built in the present situation of the international and Italian steel industry. As for the future, we'll see. Meanwhile, however, Gioia Tauro should not remain in the twilight zone. We are having investments made that will make it possible to set up a whole system of small and medium-sized industries.

[Question] What's that?

[Answer] In the first place, I have been in contact with government investment organizations concerning the construction of a mill to produce cold-rolled steel. Up to the time I took over the matter, there were no operative plans for the mill. Also in the works are a mint for coining money and three automobile assembly plants to be sited, if not actually in Gioia Tauro, at least in the Reggio Calabria zone. But 7,500 jobs were promised, and 14,000 in the whole province of Reggio Calabria.

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[Question] Now what? What other initiatives are being prepared?

[Answer] EFIM has said it is ready for two projects: one concerns the expansion of the Reggio OMECA office [Calabrian Machinery Works] for the construction of railroad materials; the other involves a plant in Gioia Tauro for the production of antitank missiles for the army. For the missile plant, I have been in contact with Defense Minister Ruffini and, naturally, President Cossiga. In the next few days a high-level meeting will be held with military authorities. If Italian missiles are ordered in advance by the army, as opposed to missiles produced by foreign competition, the new plant can be built soon. The OMECA expansion will produce 200-300 more jobs and 700-800 with the new missile plant.

Let's not forget, either, the coal-burning electric power plant that will supply the port of Gioia Tauro.

[Question] So to sum up, how many jobs will there be for Gioia Tauro and the province of Reggio Calabria?

[Answer] In the short term, within 2-3 years, 2,000 more jobs should be created in Gioia Tauro and 3,500 in the whole province of Reggio Calabria (including the 2,000 in Gioia Tauro). In the middle term, the objective of 14,000 jobs can be met gradually in Calabria. And let's not forget, too, that private industry initiative is going forward. Among these is an interesting program for Soja by Montedison and the Rende and Feruzzi groups, not to mention a study for a containerization center.

[Question] And the Fund for the Mezzogiorno?

[Answer] I have issued a directive to speed up the Fund's procedures as much as possible.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

DETAILS ON NAVY'S NEW HYDROFOIL RHS 200

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Aug-Sep 79 p 40

[Article: "New NAVALTECNICA Hydrofoil"]

[Text] The keel has been laid for what will be the largest hydrofoil ever built in Italy. NAVALTECNICA has announced the RHS 200.

This hydrofoil of the surface penetration type will prolong the success of the preceding series of the RHS class, commercially established throughout the world at this time.

Details: length, 35.50 meters; beam, 7 meters; displacement, 120 metric tons. It is expected to attain a maximum speed of 40 knots and a cruising speed of 37 knots. It will also have a system to increase stability which will guarantee perfect navigability at cruising speeds of even 5 knots. The RHS (the prototype) will be built in a commercial version, and it will have space for 310 passengers in three air-conditioned cabins.

A military version of the vessel has been completely designed and studied, and it has also been demonstrated in special exhibitions. That version is designated the M 600, and it is the same as the civilian model except for the superstructure and the internal equipment, and has a cargo capacity of 40 metric tons.

Both versions are equipped with MTU diesel engines, ZF transmission equipment and Ka Me Wa variable-pitch screws.

It is believed that the test runs of the RHS 200 will take place late in the spring of 1980.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

NAVARRA DIVIDED OVER INTEGRATION WITH BASQUE REGION

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 21 Oct 79 pp 17, 18

[Text] Navarre is divided in two at the hour of decision on its integration with the Basque Country. While the majority in the northern part of the province, which includes Pamplona, is favorable to the idea, the southern half--where Tudela's strong rejection is most prominent--appears hesitant toward the Basque Country.

If the referendum on whether Navarre should be incorporated into the Basque Provinces--which is expected to be convened in the coming months--were held tomorrow, one of the most evident results would be that geographical disparity, according to a survey made for CAMBIO 16 by Metra Seis.

But if the referendum were held tomorrow, would Navarre become part of the Basque Country or would it not? One can conclude from the survey's results that, just hours before the votes were cast, the outcome would hang in the balance.

When the canvassers asked people whether they were for or against integration--regardless of whether or not they planned to vote--the responses showed that 42.4 percent favored integration, 25 percent were against it, 15.6 percent didn't care and 12.2 percent either didn't know or didn't answer.

The survey was taken from a sample of 500 people over 18 years of age, residing in towns of 1,000 inhabitants or more. For this reason, the overall results are subject to a statistical error of plus or minus four percent.

Nonetheless, the survey, which was made in the streets, evidenced a clear distrust of the polltakers. In southern Navarre, for every woman who agreed to be interviewed, three refused. Among men, there was one refusal for every one interviewed.

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In northern Navarre, the area most inclined towards integration with the Basque Country, the rejection of the survey takers was more pronounced. Although almost all of the women from 18 to 35 who were approached answered, those between 36 and 55 refused at a rate of 6 for every 1 interviewed. Above the age of 56, the refusals climbed to 10 for every woman polled.

Among men up to 35 years of age, everyone responded. From 36 to 55, 3 refused for every 1 who answered. Among men over 55 years of age, there were 6 refusals for every interview granted.

This distrust among those surveyed introduces a significant bias into the representativity of the sample. Thus, according to Metra Seis, the results are representative only of the people who agreed to take part in the interview, which was held during the last week of September.

How many Navarrans would be willing to vote in the referendum? The survey indicates the following data: 61 percent of those interviewed were planning to vote, 14 percent were not, another 17.6 percent said they were undecided, 1.2 percent replied that they were not registered and the remaining 6.2 percent did not answer or did not know.

Blocs of Supporters

The three blocs that most clearly support Navarre's incorporation into the Basque Country were people with some university education, those belonging to the upper middle class and those between 18 and 35 years of age.

Among the 61 percent who plan to participate in the referendum and the 17.6 percent who are undecided, 41.5 percent would vote in favor of integration and 21.9 percent against; 1 percent would cast a blank ballot, 31.6 percent did not know how they would vote and the remaining 4.1 percent did not want to respond.


Not counting the 17.6 percent who are undecided--that is, limiting the question of whether Navarre should become part of the Basque Country to only 61 percent who stated their definite intention to vote--the pro-Basque percentage rises considerably.

In fact, of all those surveyed who were going to vote, 51.1 percent would vote for integration; 27.5 percent against it; 3 percent would cast a blank ballot; 17.4 percent had not made their decision and the remaining 3.6 percent did not want to answer.

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Geographic Distribution of the Vote




Key:

- a) Data from Pamplona, capital
 - 1) How will you vote?
 - 2) For integration 50.7 percent
 - 3) Against integration 14.5 percent
 - 4) Will cast a blank ballot 3.0 percent
 - 5) Don't know yet 31.7 percent
 - 6) No answer 2.7 percent

- b) The rest
 - 1) How will you vote?
 - 2) For integration 29.7 percent
 - 3) Against integration 31.4 percent
 - 4) Will cast a blank ballot 1.7 percent
 - 5) Don't know yet 31.4 percent
 - 6) No answer 5.8 percent

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
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Key:

a) Will you vote in the referendum?


- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Undecided
- 4) Not registered
- 5) Don't know



Key:

b) Those who would vote

- 1) For integration
- 2) Against integration
- 3) Will cast a blank ballot
- 4) Don't know yet
- 5) No answer



Key:

c) For/Against Navarre's integration with the Basque Country

- 1) For
- 2) Against
- 3) Don't care
- 4) No answer

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Among this bloc, the spectrum of those who lean toward integration may be outlined as follows: It includes more men (56.1 percent) than women (45.4 percent). Taken by ages, the younger the person the more pro-Basque (62.8 percent between the ages of 18 and 35). With regard to educational level, those with some university education (68.6 percent) were more favorable and, finally, the upper middle class would be most likely to vote for integration.

Regarding the anti-integration group represented among the 27.5 percent of those who were planning to vote, women were more pro-Navarre than men. By ages, persons between 36 and 55 were the least inclined toward integration with the Basque Provinces. By educational level, those who had completed the equivalent of a grade school or junior high school education were the least favorable toward the Basques and by social class, the middle-middle and lower classes were the least pro-Basque.

However, it is in a geographical division of Navarre that the vote and its intent can be most clearly seen. We can deduce from the survey results that the northern part of the province, together with the capital, would show a margin of 50.7 percent in favor of integration, but only 29.7 percent in the southern half. In northern Navarre, only 14.5 percent would vote against integration, while that percentage would climb to 31.4 percent in the south.

Lacunza and Tudela

As data that are symptomatic in the survey, we would have to stress that the greatest percentage of votes in favor of integration was noted in Lacunza, a town located in the northwestern part of the province, almost on the border of Guipuzcoa, where 61.1 percent of those surveyed proved to be pro-Basque.

By contrast, the town that was the most pro-Navarre turned out to be Tudela in the southern part of the province, on the River Ebro, where 52.8 percent of those surveyed gave a categorical no to integration with the Basque Country.

Thus Lacunza and Tudela have become the symbols of that province, which the survey shows to be split at the hour of decision regarding its future autonomy.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BRIEFS

MISSILES ORDERED--The Italian firm of Selenia has received a sizable order for Aspide sea-to-air missiles to equip the new F 30 class reconnaissance frigates. Parts of the Aspide missiles and of the Albatross weapons system intended for use in their operation will be manufactured in Spain by INI [National Institute of Industry]. This order brings to seven the number of navies that have purchased the Aspide-Albatross weapons system from Selenia. [Text] [Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Aug-Sep 79 p 40] 8631

INVESTMENT IN CASA--The Spanish Aerospace Company (CASA) has just realized an increase in its capital stock, with the Northrop Corporation participating in this commercial venture. The cooperation between CASA and Northrop dates back to 1962, beginning with an exchange of technology that was of great assistance to the Spanish company and which subsequently made it possible for it to manufacture the Northrop F-5 fighter under license and to make various modifications on Spanish and U.S. Air Force planes. The latest example of this close collaboration is Northrop's participation in the CASA 101 trainer plane program. This trainer was ordered from CASA by the Spanish Air Force, with Northrop cooperating in the final design studies, program management and plans for utilization, as well as in the test flights. [Text] [Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Aug-Sep 79 p 40] 8631

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END

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