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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 656



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

MALIAN ARMS TRANSSHIPMENT CONCERN--President Moussa Traore's visit to Guinea was less "informal" than was officially reported. The Malian chief of state was concerned over the reticence shown by Sekou Toure about the transit of armaments for Mali over Guinean territory. For almost 20 years, all equipment for the Malian army--which comes essentially from the Soviet Union--has been reaching the port of Conakry, from where it is carried overland to Bamako. However, President Sekou Toure has been increasingly intolerant of this arms traffic in recent months. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 983 7 Nov 79 p 20]

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ETHIOPIA

ERITREAN OFFICIAL CRITICIZES USSR, PRC, PCI STANCES ON HORN SITUATION

LDO90959 Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 8 Nov 79 pp 64-71 LD

[Interview with Isaias Afe Werki, deputy secretary general of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), by Pietro Petrucci: "Neither Moscow Nor Beijing, Nor Even Berlinguer"--date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] The wind seems to have changed in your favor, but one problem remains. There are 3 million Eritreans and 30 million Ethiopians. Will they not eventually overwhelm you?

[Answer] They are the ones with manpower problems. Despite everything that they have mobilized they have been immobile for the past 6 months. Moreover, they are experiencing peasant revolts from one end of the country to the other. The peasants have had enough. To nurture this war they have dragged people from the villages with the promise of only 1 year's war, pay and family subsidies. The economic crisis and the outcome of the war have nullified all those promises and it has become increasingly difficult to recruit peasants into the "militia," which has to wage the physical conflict.

[Question] What about the regular army?

[Answer] The army cannot be improvised. The militia serves as cannon fodder but also as a reservoir for the army. And the malaise is universal. A member of the militia receives \$20 a month and a soldier at least \$100, \$120. The peasants who are unable to escape obligatory enrollment rebel against their superiors and against the army itself, which often forces them into enemy fire at gunpoint.

[Question] Are these warning signs or just a current phenomenon?

[Answer] We never stop calculating the number of our enemies, trying to discover who they are and where they come from. Well, for the past year the Ethiopian "establishment" has simply diminished. Now they are sending "security squads" to the front from the urban centers. In other words, the "red terror" squads.

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[Question] Then there is the superiority of weapons. The USSR has already taken the entire Ethiopian coffee harvest at "token" prices in payment for weapons. It does not seem that Ethiopia has any means for paying for new weapons...

[Answer] If Moscow supported the Addis Ababa junta just to sell it weapons, there is no doubt that there would soon be a situation of insolvency and therefore a military and political change. Unfortunately, Moscow appears to want to keep this regime alive at all costs to avoid jeopardizing its own policy in the region. Mengistu's junta is equally determined to continue this war, because it knows that it will prove to be its tomb, just as it was for the emperor. It is a vicious circle. Moscow will continue to provide weapons and Mengistu will continue to overexploit the peasants to pay for them as far as he can.

[Question] Just 2 years ago you described Soviet policy in this region as an "error." Are you still of the same opinion?

[Answer] The error in Soviet foreign policy has been made and it remains. Nor does it now concern only this region or this continent. We have analyzed this error, striving to consider Moscow's foreign policy from a broader viewpoint than the Eritrean viewpoint. There is now a fundamental flaw in the way in which the USSR regards its conflict with U.S. imperialism: It believes that it can, and must, be the obligatory guide for all peoples struggling for their freedom. This guiding role is, in fact, imposed as a cage within which parties, movements and countries are imprisoned, no longer free to determine their own destiny. The next step from solidarity is conditioning, and we do not want to have anything to do with that.

[Question] There are continuing forecasts of a spectacular rapprochement on your part with the Chinese.

[Answer] All the reports concerning our contacts with China are lies. We have never had--and do not have now--any formal or unofficial relations with the CCP. Of course, we are always looking for new allies and we try to convince everyone--including the Chinese--of the worthiness of our cause. But we have not succeeded.

The fact is that we regard China's foreign policy as aberrant and we fail to understand many aspects of its domestic policy. The world view spread by Beijing is the most aberrant ever proposed by any Communist Party. Even with respect to us, instead of trying to understand who is in the right and who is in the wrong, they concern themselves with discovering whether we share their little formulas, whether we are prepared to repeat their slogans in exchange for some aid. We do not need friends like that. We are satisfied with what the Chinese taught us by carrying out their own revolution.



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[Question] There are still the Eurocommunists. The PCI is your friend, but on the Horn of Africa it is friends with everybody. Even Mengistu and Siad Barre. Are you satisfied with the PCI?

[Answer] Many of our friends believe that there is a revolution "also" in Ethiopia and that it must be supported. That is their free choice. If they are in good faith, we try to correct what we believe to be an error. If, however, the "dual support" is the result of diplomatic calculations, nothing can be done about it. For some time the PCI has held a stance on the Horn of Africa, which we consider confused, as you yourself said. I am not sure how it justifies its support for diametrically opposed forces. If its aim is to open the way to a dialog, it is a good tactic. But is it correct for a revolutionary force to maintain a tactical stance for an indeterminate period? Time will tell. We do not intend to bring anyone to trial--least of all those who help us in one way or another.

[Question] Who are your best friends?

[Answer] At last our cause has made an impression in Africa. Mozambique has openly announced that it supports us. Others would like to do so but their ties with Moscow prevent them from doing so. Algeria is changing from political to material backing. Then there are the old friends who do not abandon us: The PLO, Syria, Iraq. It is strange, but we are, in fact, turning to them to help our experts become acquainted with the most sophisticated Soviet weapons which we have wrested intact from the Ethiopians' hands but which we do not yet know how to use to the fullest.

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GHANA

SPECULATION ON UNCERTAIN FUTURE CIVILIAN-MILITARY BALANCE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 983 7 Nov 79 pp 26, 27

[Article by Marc Yared: "Who is Pulling the Strings?"]

[Excerpts] The Ghanaian national assembly refused, on 9 October, to approve two appointments proposed by Dr Hilla Limann, chief of state: Mr Riley-Poku as minister of defense and Prof George Benneth [sic], who had been asked to retain his position as commissioner for oil. The deputies demanded that the two candidates proposed by the president be first questioned by a committee of inquiry on illicit gains.

This apparently innocuous incident is truly revealing. It actually highlights the principal problems which are assailing the Third Ghanaian Republic even from the moment of its birth.

However, the mini-contest opposing Dr Limann and certain parliamentary circles on the issue of Riley-Poku and Benneth illustrates also the existence of a certain sense of malaise among the civilian leadership. Dr Limann may have actually been propelled to the presidency of the republic on 24 September of this year....

In Accra, the rumor is that the man who is "pulling the strings" is Imoru Egala, one of the leaders belonging to the PNP (Popular National Party) "old guard," the big winner of last June's elections and heir to the CPP (Popular Convention Party) founded by Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the hero of Ghanaian independence. Dr Limann, CPP militant during the fifties and present leader of the PNP, recently acknowledged in an interview that his election to the presidency was the result of "negotiations."

The chief of state will find it difficult to put some distance between himself and his "protectors," who are retaining their influence in the legislative assembly and often obey the directives issued by those professional politicians in voluntary exile in London, such as Dr Ayehkumi, Krobo Edusei, Kojo Botsio, Tawia Adamafio, etc. They reportedly would like to have an international peace-keeping force intervene in Ghana to watch over internal security while waiting for discipline to be re-established within the army.

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Dr Limann will encounter difficulties in maintaining an even balance between this conservative old guard and the PNP progressive wing, embodied in the government by Isaac Chinebuah and Ekow Daniels, respectively ministers of foreign affairs and interior.

Last but not least, the controversy created by the designation of Riley-Poku and Benneth for the ministry of defense and the oil sector could well poison relations between civilians and military. Indeed, the two candidates are very close to the leaders of the AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) who were presiding over Ghana's destiny from June to September of this year.

Violently anti-militaristic, animated by a spirit of revenge, the PNP "old guard" wish to exclude Riley-Poku and Benneth.

On the contrary, Dr Limann does not wish to burn his bridges with the officers, who willingly relinquished the reins of power in September after seven and a half years of military rule. The chief of state is subtly trying to satisfy the AFRC leaders while reducing their political role. This is why he has appointed several former AFRC leaders--and especially Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, the soul of the "purifying" June revolution--to the leadership of a council of state which he promised he would consult. This is also why he has adopted the anti-corruption slogans and the price controls dear to the heart of the AFRC. All of this, of course, does not prevent him from attempting to bring about a rapprochement with Nigeria, to advocate a moderate economic policy and to reject any extension of the public sector in order to ensure oil supplies for the country and not to discourage possible foreign investments.

The happenings in Ghana since last June can be analyzed in two ways: it is possible that Rawlings, a 32-year-old mulatto, sincere, honest, devoid of ambition, thought it his duty to effect a four-month "house-cleaning," but will not seek power any longer. Unless, as he puts it, "the new regime starts a policy of corruption...." The AFRC leaders would be content, then, to ensure their role as advisors to the chief of state, as "conscience of the nation" and as censors of the excesses committed by the civilian leaders, now that Ghana is again on track.

However, Ghana's military are not all genuine reformists. According to some observers, there exists, in the army, a tough core which unleashed a long revolutionary process, of which the 4 June coup d'etat--and this is the second interpretation--was merely a first phase. The situation in Ghana, then, would present strange similarities with that in Ethiopia in 1974-1975. In both countries, the threat of famine, strikes and student unrest were catalysts of the crisis. Flight Lieutenant Rawlings would then be but the equivalent of Gen Aman Andom, a very popular man, who ended up being liquidated because of his moderate opinions. Specifically, because he was advocating civilian participation in the government....

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Within the Ghanaian AFRC, just like within the Ethiopian Derg (Provisional Military Committee), junior officers and corporals are the spear-head of the revolution. The real strong man--Captain Boakye Djan in Accra, Lt Col Mengistu Haile Mariam in Addis Ababa--is actually a second-rank player, leaving to others--civilian or military--the task of making unpopular decisions, before taking center stage and revealing his goals: monopoly of power by the tough and pure military, class struggle, Marxist socialism and alliance with the Soviet bloc....

Reform or revolution? Only the future will be able to tell which will be Ghana's direction.

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MOZAMBIQUE

RECENT EVENTS MAY DENOTE ANGOLANIZATION OF SITUATION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 983 7 Nov 79 p 39

[Text] "The revolution is not accomplished with candy." This is a favorite saying of Mozambican president Samora Machel. Neither is the counter-revolution. In Maputo, on 22 October, Minister of Foreign Affairs Joaquim Chissano revealed for the first time the extent of the confrontation between the national army and the MRM (Mozambique Resistance Movement) anti-marxist guerrillas. Chissano even acknowledged that a few weeks before, the rebels had occupied the city of Macossa in the central province of Manica after six days of fighting.

Is Mozambique on the road to Angolanization? One might well fear it is. Since the beginning of 1979, the MRM sabotage activities and surprise attacks have become increasingly frequent. Last April, the anti-marxist guerrillas blew up the country's main fuel tank in the port of Beira. Like Jonas Savimbi's UNITA operating in Angola, the MRM, led by Domingos Arrauca and Matade Matsangaisse, enjoys the support of the white minority regimes in Southern Africa. UNITA's bases are in Namibia, while those of the MRM--which numbers about a thousand men under arms--are in Rhodesia, and specifically in Gwelo, where the powerful radio station VOZ DA AFRICA LIVRE (Voice of Free Africa) is located, flooding Mozambique with its anti-marxist propaganda.

The objectives of the two movements are identical: to establish a government of "national unity" and rid the country of the Cuban, Russian and East German military advisors. Besides sabotage activities and spectacular raids, the men of the MRM--trained by Rhodesian instructors--have become specialized in selective killings of Cuban or Soviet officers. They even operate in the suburbs of the capital, Maputo. Just like UNITA in the southern part of Angola, the MRM enjoys a measure of popular support in the northeastern part of the country, along the frontier with Malawi. However, none of the various movements constituting it really participated in the struggle against the Portuguese colonial army.

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Having reacted violently in the past against the guerrillas and their sympathizers (executions, imprisonment in work camps, etc.), Mozambican authorities are seemingly displaying today a measure of liberalism. Samora Machel has gone as far as to announce the release of several hundred prisoners at the end of October. It is true that the only solution, as far as he is concerned, is a peace settlement with Zimbabwe, which would cut off the MRM from its bases in the rear. The same is true for the Angolan leaders, for whom only Namibian independence would put a stop to UNITA incursions.

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RHODESIA

DESTRUCTION OF ZANLA'S CHIMOIO BASE DESCRIBED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Oct 79 pp 21-22

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Bitter Victory"]

[Text] The Rhodesian Army counted on destroying Chimoio in 2 hours. ZANLA's guerrillas resisted 5 days.

Chimoio no longer exists. Sixty-four square kilometers of burned earth, fissured by bomb craters, have replaced the bunkers and casemates of the headquarters of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the armed branch of Robert Mugabe's ZANU. Here, 20 km inside Mozambique territory, in the entangled bush of Manica Province, there took place, from 27 September to 1 October, the most important confrontation between Zimbabwe nationalists and Rhodesian armed forces since the beginning of the struggle for liberation 15 years ago.

Before dawn on Thursday, 27 September, the Chimoio camp, built at the beginning of 1977 by Soviet military engineers, was the principal training center for the ZANLA guerrillas and the starting point for the armed columns infiltrating the east-central part of Rhodesia, toward Umtali and Mashonaland. A camp made of half-buried concrete bunkers, linked by a network of trenches, among hills whose crests were protected by light anti-aircraft batteries. Inside: 1,000 men, the spearhead of some 10,000 ZANLA guerrillas, led by Gen Josiah Tongogara. Among them about 10 Soviet advisers.

On 27 September at 0600, when the first Rhodesian fighter-bombers rumbled on the horizon, there was a general alert. Chimoio was accustomed to this: in 2 years, the camp had already undergone 15 bombardments. But this time, something else was involved: "operation Tiger" had only begun.

At Salisbury, the commander in chief of the Rhodesian Armed Forces, Gen Peter Walls, had decided to wipe Chimoio off the map. Such a "blow," the Rhodesian authorities considered, would considerably weaken ZANU's striking

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force and would reduce the margin for maneuver of its leader, Robert Mugabe, during the tripartite negotiations in London. For that, it was necessary to act quickly. Peter Walls set himself a time limit: in a few hours, everything would be over.

An attack scenario was set up on the classic model of Rhodesian raids: aerial bombardment, landing of troops transported by helicopter, then return to base. But the means used were exceptional: some 10 Mirages and Canberras, some 20 Bell helicopters and nearly 800 men. Walls had gone all out. He did not yet know that this surprise attack would become a frontal combat of 5 days' duration.

The waves of bombardment had, in fact, spared the majority of the guerrillas, protected from the napalm by the thickness of the bunkers. The Selous scouts, an elite unit of the Rhodesian army, sent as an advance guard, came up against very sharp resistance and had to fall back. Moreover, the approach of the helicopters, which were to bring up the waves of ground support, was considerably impeded by the 20mm Soviet anti-aircraft guns. Two days would be needed before the Rhodesian forces could take possession of the crests and silence these batteries. Dug in in the trenches, the men of ZANLA would hold out for another 3 days.

On Sunday, 30 September, a small unit of Mozambique armor coming from Mavita tried without success to dislodge the guerrillas. It is true that the old Soviet T-34's dating from World War II, with which Maputo's army was equipped, could not do much in the face of the French antitank missiles, delivered to the Rhodesians by South Africa. In the morning of 1 October, ZANLA withdrew, leaving nearly 500 dead on the ground. The Rhodesian Army itself finished the destruction of Chimoio before regaining its base.

Officially, the Rhodesian general staff acknowledged...two killed and six wounded, a figure that seems far below the reality. The few press correspondents allowed to follow the operation--and whose dispatches had been censored at the request of the military authorities--as well as several South African newspapers, themselves spoke of 80 dead and 150 wounded: the most serious losses suffered by the Rhodesian Army during a battle. A victory for Muzorewa, therefore, but a Pyrric victory that strongly resembled a defeat. For the guerrillas, for the first time, held out five days and five nights in the face of an adversary whose equipment and armament were unquestionably superior to theirs. For them, for their leader, Robert Mugabe, this resistance was a victory, somewhat like the way the battle of Karameh, in 1967 in Jordan, had been a success for the Palestinians of Al Fatah. At Chimoio, the acrid odor of napalm is still afloat, but ZANLA's soldiers have already begun to rebuild the camp.

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RHODESIA

'GUARDIAN': ZANLA COMMANDER ASSESSES RHODESIAN SITUATION, LONDON TALKS

LD031114 London THE GUARDIAN in English 3 Nov 79 p 17 LD

[Interview with Josiah Tongogara, commander of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and member of the Patriotic Front Delegation at the Lancaster House talks on Zimbabwe Rhodesian independence, by Alves Gomes, Mozambique magazine TEMPO--date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Where were you born?

[Answer] I was born in Selukwe, in the southern part of Zimbabwe.

[Question] It's also the place where Ian Smith was born, and we have heard a story at this conference of your meeting with Smith. What was the meeting?

[Answer] I merely met Smith as one of the participants of the Lancaster House talks. It so happened that I got nearer to him and he also got nearer to me. So we looked face-to-face and then we couldn't avoid talking to each other. When he met me he greeted me. I greeted him too. But immediately I switched to asking him about his old mother whom I had known during the time when I was a kid. So he then replied to me that she was very energetic, and she was now 86 years old, but still able to walk on her own two feet, and I was very much impressed. The old lady, during those days when I was a youth, a small boy in 1952 and 1953, used to throw sweets at us kids. You know kids, when you give them sweets they always say "Let's go back in and get some more." So those days I and the other kids treated the old lady as a very kind lady, because she was supplying us with sweets.

And we then dragged into the discussion of politics, talking about the conference, and one point Ian raised was that he was very much impressed because he thought we wouldn't meet. I said no, he was wrong. We have never been able to meet because he has been in Salisbury and I have been somewhere, commanding the army, so there was no possibility of us meeting, I posed a question to him--What would have happened if I had gone to

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Salisbury two days before we came to London? Was he going to welcome me, or was he going to shoot me as a terrorist? Also, if he had come to our operational areas two days before we came to London, would we have been able to go back to Salisbury?

I think both of us couldn't answer. We looked at each other and said, okay, let's forget about what would have happened if... Let's concentrate on what is happening here at the conference. He started telling me about Selukwe, which has now become a prosperous zone...

[Question] What is the present military situation in Zimbabwe?

[Answer] Well, on our side we look at the situation as excellent. We have made a lot of progress. We have been able to accomplish our 1979 programme, we have reached all the areas we have always wanted to reach; most of the targets within our programme have been accomplished.

[Question] However, the British are saying that you did not come here as the winners of the war. What is your comment?

[Answer] When the Rhodesians declared war in 1965, Wilson said he was not going to send troops, but if the situation inside Zimbabwe deteriorates and there is a need to intervene, the British are going to intervene. What is happening here at Lancaster House is that the British now want to intervene. They think they want to send their administration. They want to take over, because there is something going on. It is the war that makes them think so. We could have refused to come to talk to the British. We have lost nothing. We are making progress every minute inside Zimbabwe. And, I can assure you, if we had remained in the bush and said continue, we forget about London, we would still be going to win.

[Question] Did many people from the Rhodesian army desert to join your forces?

[Answer] I can't even give the figures. Nearly every day I think if Peter Walls was to be honest, you'd know that half the forces he created are no more with him. They come to us.

[LD031124] [Question] In London your leaders have been saying that you will run for the elections as one party. You have ZAPU and ZANU--how will you do it?

[Answer] We don't talk of ZAPU and ZANU at the moment. We are a patriotic front which has got ZAPU and ZANU in it. We have formed this not because we were going to go to Geneva, or Malta, Dar es Salaam, and London. We formed it in order to bring unity for the people of Zimbabwe.

[Question] And do you hope to win the elections?

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[Answer] It's something that is natural. I don't have to hope.

[Question] Your proposal is the integration of the regime forces with your forces?

[Answer] What we are saying in our proposals is that during the transitional period, we would like what we call "three men in a jeep." That is, we have the PF forces, the regime's forces and the United Nations' forces to police the situation during the interim period.

[Question] How do you think it will happen in reality?

[Answer] The reality is that you cannot ignore the PF forces--the forces that have brought about this conference, the forces which have done a lot of decolonisation in Zimbabwe--and reject their participation. They have to participate, they have to be there.

[Question] So it means that you cannot accept the British plan as it is now?

[Answer] No, we don't accept it. They say they want to be everything, run it--how do we know that the British will safeguard us? That is the question of security.

[Question] Are you prepared for a cease-fire?

[Answer] Well, we came here to achieve peace. Peace means we should cease to shoot each other. So we are ready for that as long as conditions are created for a ceasefire.

[Question] So it means that your remark some weeks ago saying that if this conference decides that you have to work with the regime forces or even Peter Wall's, you will do so?

[Answer] What I said was that we are here at Lancaster House and we hope that any agreement that is achieved here between the parties participating must be respected. If we agree, as we have stated in our document, that we feel that in the Rhodesian forces there are the mercenaries and some undesirable elements, if those could be pulled out then there would remain a force which is considered to be a force for Zimbabwe, which is going to be loyal to any administration which comes to power.

[Question] Are your guerrillas prepared for a cease-fire?

[Answer] They are prepared for a cease-fire under the terms laid down by their leadership, the PF.

[Question] Do you have conditions for your liberated areas? Areas you control?

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[Answer] Well, that would depend on the formula if our ceasefire was such that we say "we have these areas where our peasants are, no one should interfere," or "we have areas where the Smith forces are--forget about Muzorewa--and then no shooting," we will have to be there to explain. This is the reason why we have been saying to the British that the process of a ceasefire should not be less than two months, because we think in that period we will be able to get to every area. You cannot go to the radio and shout--they will not accept. You must go and explain to them.

[LD031253] [Question] Your guerrillas: Do you have contact with the farmers?

[Answer] Oh yes, we have contacts. In much of the area we have covered there are farmers, and in those areas we have committees and some of the farmers have joined the committees. But mainly the blacks. You could not expect the whites to do so. Some of the white farmers have sympathised with us and given us some help.

[Question] What kind of help?

[Answer] Without mentioning names of the farmers, if you go to their farm and ask for food they give you food. You ask for directions and they give you directions, and tell you "the security forces are there--go this way." We have taken these white farmers as our allies because they want to see that the people of Zimbabwe are free.

[Question] They will receive special treatment after independence?

[Answer] Not special treatment. They will have that special treatment which is given to every Zimbabwean.

[Question] What about the farmers who do not give you support?

[Answer] Some of these farmers who don't give us support, and some of the soldiers who fight us, they think that they must fight to maintain white supremacy. But once a government of the people's choice is there, I see the possibility of those people changing their mind. Once they accept the reality, there is no reason to go round and say "you didn't support us."

[Question] You will allow the white farmers to produce and work on their land?

[Answer] We will allow every Zimbabwean to run what he's supposed to, irrespective of his colour. We are trying to destroy this idea of race which we think is very dangerous. Every Zimbabwean is a Zimbabwean, regardless of colour.

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[Question] If an agreement is not reached here, what will be the situation?

[Answer] Disagreement at Lancaster House means continuation of war? We will not be to blame.

[Question] If the Commonwealth countries and the British arrange a solution for this present situation you will have a transitional period and elections. If you win the elections, what will happen to Muzorewa?

[Answer] Muzorewa is not our enemy and even his bunch of lieutenants are not our enemy. Our enemy is the system. Once we uproot the system, there is no enemy. Muzorewa will be treated like any Zimbabwean, who lost and we will ask him to contribute in any capacity he can. But if he refuses and tries to cause trouble, we will definitely treat him as a troublemaker.

[Question] The South Africans have threatened to intervene in the country. If they will not do so, what will your relations be with the South Africans?

[Answer] If South Africa invades Zimbabwe or causes trouble, we will treat it as an enemy and we will fight the enemy. After all, South Africa has always been fighting us in Zimbabwe ever since we opened the north-east through Mozambique. If they don't interfere, we will treat South Africa like any other country that has not intervened in our internal affairs.

[Question] You will have a policy of noninterference with South Africa?

[Answer] If it doesn't intervene, it would be wrong to treat South Africa as our main enemy. We will put it in the place as it is put by other OAU countries. We will still talk to them because they will have done nothing to us.

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SENEGAL

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS SURVEYED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 pp 2685-2687, 2688

[Article by Jacques Latremolieres: "A New Dimension for Senegal"]

[Text] Stopping in Paris on his way to Normandy, President Senghor recently gave voice to his bitter disappointment over French industrialists' lack of interest in investing in Senegal. Coming from a man whose life and career have been devoted to Eurafrikan cooperation, who has so often given proof of his attachment to our country and thanks to whom France has, before and after 1960, always found in Senegal an essential partner in its African policy, his statements were disturbing and surprising. Perhaps it was he who in part provoked the friendly visit Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing made in summer to his home in Calvados, to the "wise man of Dakar," whose 74 years have in no way altered his youthful figure and keenness of mind.

First of all, is it appropriate to judge this apparent or real stagnation of French investments in Senegal in terms of overall foreign investments and their evolution in the neighboring African countries? While Senegal's rate of industrialization is comparable to that of Ivory Coast, the resulting industrial power obviously ranks it fairly far behind the latter and in the course of the past few years there has been four times as much foreign investment in Abidjan as in Dakar. True, this situation is not a new one and is in part the result of physical circumstances that could not be modified overnight.

On the other hand, in response at the start of the year to Mr Mamadou Dia, who had accused the Senegalese Socialist Party of having favored French economic influence on the country, Mr Senghor pointed out that France, which in 1962 provided 85 percent of the foreign capital invested in Senegal (in itself 90 percent of the total), in 1978 accounted for only 54 percent of this capital, since reduced to 68 percent of the financial volume invested. Far from deploring the fact, the Senegalese chief of state quite rightly viewed this state of affairs, which enabled him to refute Mr Dia's criticism, as a sign of the progress made by local industry and the internationalization of support for it. Therefore, the disappointment he has recently voiced does not refer to the percentage of French capital in foreign investments, but to their absolute value, which he feels is declining.

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This view of the situation is worth going into in greater detail. In calculating investments, too often African statistics bureaus only take new transfers into account. In a country where the French have been entrenched for as long as they have been in Senegal, the reinvestment of profits which our enterprises annually engage in must be kept in mind in order to appreciate the true value of French contributions toward the creation of jobs and the growth of national income. Furthermore, these contributions affect not only industry but also the other sectors of the economy.

While the conversation of the two presidents in fact dealt with the problem, Mr Giscard d'Estaing probably did not fail to mention to his interlocutor the devices elaborated in France to encourage foreign investments, easy loans and government guarantees against political risks, nor to remind him, unfortunately, of the reasons for the slowdown, linked with the economic situation, which apply not only to Senegal but to all capital movements, the French market being no exception. He regretted them, furthermore, questioning their validity, during his last television interview.

But it is also interesting to analyze those factors which, from Senegal's standpoint, could explain the phenomenon: fears of political instability, a lack of real or presumed boldness in the Senegalese economy, or certain more specific aspects of how it is oriented, its prices regulated or simply its administrative organization.

#### Political Stability

If we have brought the issue up here, it is certainly not because the risks of destabilization are greater than elsewhere in Senegal which, on the contrary, presents the image of a democracy better balanced and more moderate than that of any other country in Africa. But this very balance, whose bases have been gradually reinforced since independence, curiously arouses a certain mistrust in potential investors, which can be expressed in two ways: "It is precisely because it has lasted too long that it cannot help but be upset soon," or: "Senghor, O.K., but after him?" without going so far as to paraphrase General de Gaulle who, during one of his press conferences, added, applying the same kind of reasoning to himself: "For fear that things may go badly later, some people would prefer to have them go badly right away."

"I ask for time to think," General de Gaulle concluded. No statesman seems to have thought more about this problem than Leopold-Sedar Senghor. The solution he designed and realized guarantees the present and pretty much the future as well, given the fact that the political future belongs to no one.

The limited multiparty system, official doctrine in Senegal, in fact assures the regime a liberal opposition, fairly solidly anchored in public opinion, thanks to the personality of its leader, Mr Abdoulaye Kane, a professor brilliant enough to constitute a symmetrical match of value to the chief of state, yet one who really does not overshadow his authority. Assuming positions more advanced than the government in the domain of foreign affairs, be it on

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the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], the POLISARIO Front or South Africa, Mr Kane's Senegalese Democratic Party as a result benefits from a major leftist intellectual current on its fringes without for all that jeopardizing the essential principles of the state's political and economic administration.

On the opposing side, a Moslem-influenced conservative faction brings together a large number of older, prominent individuals, which keeps the Socialist Party now in power from being disagreeably branded as a rightist party and fends off the lampoons of the young people. And finally, in the extreme left the break with the Marxist front resulting from the "legalization" of Mr Mahjmout Diop's PAI (African Independence Party) has not affected the movement's theoretical options, but by staying out of Mr Mamadou Dia's COSU [Coordination of the United Senegalese Opposition] and the Senegalese Association of Democrats it has had the obvious effect of weakening its impact on public opinion and the possibilities of intervention.

No doubt this four-man political team does not give the impression of being in perfect harmony. Mr Abdoulaye Kane is often sharply critical and does not hesitate to launch incisive attacks, albeit from the sidelines, against Mr Senghor himself. The staunchly conservative nature of Mr Babakar Gaye's movement, whose goal is a "nonfeudal" kind of unionism with a reexamination of nationalizations and state majority holding takeovers as well as a strengthening of cooperation with Senegal's traditional friends, France, the United States, the EEC and Saudi Arabia, apparently includes nothing that might give investors cause for concern.

But, at a time when Islam is mobilizing from one end of its historic territory to the other — the echos of this movement recently resounded at the symposium on Islamic thought at Tamanrasset — in a country profoundly marked by religious societies, the religious nature of the movement could turn it into the receptacle and the instrument of forces its founders had not necessarily envisioned. It is true that what is asked of opposition movements is in no way a community of thought and of action, rather the recognition of a political system in which differences are settled by parliamentary means alone while the restrictions of the law are at all times suspended with reference to parties without official recognition or which are subversive and which are left outside the system.

Under the circumstances, can we say that the question of a successor to President Senghor, who, as he willingly admits, is attracted to a state of semi-retirement by so many topics he would like to meditate on, has now been settled? It would be more accurate to say that what will happen can in any event be foreseen. The head of the government, Mr Abdou Diouf, an energetic and capable politician, often appears to be the official successor. There can be no doubt that he is the one most naturally singled out for later leading and vitalizing the Socialist Party. But, while the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] has only 17 deputies in the present National Assembly as opposed to the Socialist Party's 82, it is in luck. Partial elections in the rural councils

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which govern the communities established in 1972 have indicated a considerable strengthening of support for the PDS. The merger of the two major labor unions, the UTLS [expansion unknown], allied with the PDS, which received the lion's share in the recent elections of union delegates to the enterprise committees, at the expense of the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers], which is linked with the austerity policy conducted by the government, one that disfavors workers (the 10-percent hike in wages that went into effect at the start of the year followed a freeze that had lasted since 1975), will work to the advantage of the PDS.

And finally, in the exercise of its power, it is the Socialist Party toward which the extreme left's usual criticisms of corruption and mismanagement are directed, criticisms endowed with fresh current interest and virulence by the recent National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development (ONCAD) scandal, while the PDS is left untouched and even to a certain extent stands to gain from them.

With satisfaction Mr Abdoulaye Kane notes these developments and seems to regard as inescapable the gradual merging of the substance of the Socialist Party into the PDS, going so far as to show concern for the end result of such a process, the disappearance of an opposition worthy of the name. Senegal has not yet reached that point. But, like that of Mr Senghor himself, the figure of the PDS leader extends beyond the borders of Senegal, representing at the same time a tradition and a national need. Without prejudicing the final outcome of the succession, when it comes, we may well imagine that, whatever his personal preferences may be, Mr Senghor feels that, in terms of the higher interests of the state, he has two irons in the fire to assure its success.

#### Moderate Economic Advance: Farming

Senegal has never experienced the spectacular growth in farming and industry recorded in Ivory Coast. Furthermore, the relative age of their foundations condemn them to carrying the burden of outmoded economic formulas. In the farm sector the range of possible speculations is narrow. However, on the whole, despite setbacks attributable to droughts and market price fluctuations, the expansion curve has been rising since independence. The fact that this development is not more pronounced does not in itself constitute a reason for mistrust on the part of investors and we may legitimately ask ourselves whether it would not rather justify an increased effort on their part.

The farm situation remains, however, perplexing. From 1960 to 1975 production rose by only 2.6 percent a year, altogether nearly 40 percent, not enough to compensate for the effects of a 2.9-percent rate of population growth. It supports 70 percent of the population but contributes only 18 percent to the gross national product. It is still based on peanuts, accounting for an average 60 percent of overall production, 80 percent of commercialized farm income and with average volumes of about 900,000 tons and mediocre yields running from 500 to 700 kg per hectare. Considering the fact that, taken as a whole, farm production has changed little and that peanut production still

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commandeers 50 percent of the cultivated areas in the regions of Diourbel, Thies, Luga and Sine-Saloum, 35 percent in Casamance and 28 percent in Eastern Senegal, we come to the conclusion that the oft-proclaimed intentions of liberating the country from the tyranny of market prices by diversifying production have hardly gone beyond the stage of speeches or memorandums.

Diversification, the icing on the cake for single-crop countries, in Senegal as in the Antilles, is easier said than done. In a country where rainfall varies from 800 mm in Niore on the Gambian border to 300 mm in Podor on the river, with Casamance alone benefiting from levels in excess of 1 meter, there are few alternatives to the crop the population is used to and which the religious societies have imposed and rigidly control. It also assures the ONCAD, the SONACOS [National Marketing Company of Senegal], which sells it to the oilworks, the oilworks themselves, even though the latter job the material for the SONACOS, and the Equalization and Price Stabilization Office, which benefits from the difference between the price of peanuts as of arrival at the factory and the transfer price established daily on the basis of world market prices, sizable profits. Although the purchase price from the producer has not changed since 1975, while the family consumer price index has since then gone from 188 to 219 (against a base figure of 100 for 1970), the combined weight of these factors does not work in favor of effective diversification.

Especially in the food sector, however, it would be particularly opportune, since Senegal has to annually import 35 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs worth of food products, including 360,000 tons of grain, rice and wheat, worth 16 billion CFA francs. Paddy production has not kept up with the demand, declining from 133,800 to 83,671 tons between 1975-1976 and 1977-1978. A major effort has nevertheless been made to increase millet and sorghum production in terms of both regulation and purchase prices with an eye to the use of millet flour in making bread. Since this project has encountered technical difficulties that have not yet been resolved, the operation has unfortunately resulted in a stockpile of millet that is hard to dispose of. The same error in timing has led the government to push rice imports because they produce a profit for the Equalization Office and, through artificial inflation of the retail sales prices of sugar, the local production of which has not yet reached the level set in the Fourth Plan, and in fact supply an underground import traffic in this product from Gambia.

In 1974-1975 cotton production seemed to have gotten off to a good start, with the launching of an integrated operation with the spinning and weaving industry which could have relieved Senegal of the burden of annually importing cloth worth over 3 billion CFA francs. But it has not met the expectations of the SODEFITEX [expansion unknown], a joint economy company responsible for the promotion of this crop, since the marketed volume has declined from 45,000 to 37,000 tons of cottonseed. For the same reason, spinning and weaving mill production has dropped 38 percent while some of the cotton produced is exported in the form of fiber.

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Fishing is one of the sectors whose economic health is less questionable. It particularly benefits from a large skilled labor force, almost 5 percent of the working population, or more than the civil service. Its contribution to the gross national product has been constantly rising since 1960, going beyond 5.5 percent in 1976, while the number of incoming boatloads increased 15 percent a year between 1970 and 1974. The slight decline in industrial fishing that had been noted since 1975 was reversed in 1978 and, due to the equipping of new units, 1979 should prove to be a very favorable year, which is reflected in the growing importance of cannery operations. Yields could be even better if part of the Dakar fishing fleet did not, paradoxically enough, work for the Venezuelan canneries. Moreover, along with the thinning out of the shrimp beds on the continental shelf, the shortage of freezing facilities and of surveillance over territorial fishing waters constitute the critical factors in this industry.

## Industrial Prospects

The results obtained in industry are comparatively more satisfactory than those in farming, given the fact that its contribution to the gross national product went from 12 percent in 1962 to 23 percent in 1974. The peanut industry crises that occurred between 1967 and 1972 were obviously reflected in oilworks operations and, due to the drop in rural purchasing power, in consumer industries like beverages and tobacco and, all the more so, in the import trade. To a certain extent, however, this drop in purchasing power was compensated for by the opening of border nations to the Senegalese processing industries. On the whole, growth came to 10 percent between 1972 and 1976 with the recovery affecting just about all sectors except sugar, leather and textiles where stagnation has become a habit. Following the exceptional results obtained in 1977, phosphate mining has been maintained at a volume of 1.5 million tons, 90 percent of which is for Taiba. Despite a rate of increase of about 12 percent, cement production, amounting to about 360,000 tons, is under the country's needs, estimated at 2 million tons, without any convincing explanation having been found for postponement of the execution of projects pending nor for the pointless draining of hard currency which the Senegalese economy has thus been condemned to.

The very nature of the nation's industries, almost wholly centered about the Cape Verde region, reflects the effects of the economic capital mission of the former federation, which was for a long time assigned to Dakar. This resulted in weak integration, forcing the enterprises to buy 40 percent of the material needed for their operations from abroad, with the added export volume remaining under that of the intermediate consumptions thus imposed. On the whole, industry has experienced a deficit trade balance while the number of jobs created has been low: about 28,000 or 1.5 percent of the working population.

On the other hand, bad luck has compromised or condemned the three major projects: Port Sedar, the Dakar marina and the industrial free zone, whose competition would have permitted industry to get out of the poor situation

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it is having a hard time ridding itself of. The first of these projects, providing for the construction of a gigantic petrochemical complex, will have to be abandoned due to a defaulting of the Iranian capital which has hitherto supported it. The scope of the second project will be reduced to meeting the needs of medium-sized and small naval repair facilities, nonetheless including the construction of a floating dry dock representing a relatively large investment: 17 billion CFA francs.\*

Justification for the third project is derived precisely from the apparently low level of integration of Dakar industries. It is, however, rare that these enterprises depend on foreign sources for both their supplies and their outlets. Those which can be called enterprises do not hesitate to abandon already amortized installations and the high cost of production factors (wages, electricity, rents) is not calculated to attract new ones to Dakar. At the present time only two enterprises of relative importance are in operation inside the zone. The establishment of a few others is planned, to say nothing of several miniprojects. If confirmed, the lowering of admission requirements to 100 million CFA francs in investments and the creation of 100 jobs will reveal the poor success of a formula which to succeed requires extremely low wage levels which Senegal, despite its economic shortcomings, ought to really congratulate itself on not having experienced.

#### For Economic Recovery

There is no way of hiding the fact that, while Senegal's books, as they stand today, do not reflect a catastrophic situation, they do not exactly give rise to enthusiasm either. A per capita gross national product stagnant at 120,000 CFA francs, an organically deficit trade balance, a balance of payments with a balance constantly in the red which the rise in peanut and phosphate market prices had alleviated in 1976 almost to the point of achieving balance but with no prospects for the future and the existence of some sectors with no previous history of development, like fishing or tourism — the number of entries is steadily rising, having exceeded 200,000 in 1978 and justifying a hotel program allowing for the addition of 10,000 units to the 5,000 now in existence — cannot let us forget the anomalies that afflict Senegalese economic mechanisms, leaving us with the impression that we have not made the best of the available development instruments under financial conditions that are still healthy: the public debt accounts for about 20 percent of the gross national product (costly eurodollar loans unfortunately constitute a growing portion of this) and to this day income from exports covers no more than 12 percent of the cost of servicing the foreign debt.

No comparison is more revealing of the anemic nature of the economy and its slow evolution than that of the import structures in 1960 and 1975: dependence on food imports scarcely reduced (25 percent instead of 33), volume of oil

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\* The execution of the new Dakar marina project now in progress was described in our issue No 1742 of 30 March 1979.

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and semi-manufactured products on the rise, from 5 to 12 percent and from 12 to 20 percent respectively. The most encouraging factors are a drop of 50 percent in consumer goods and a rise of from 15 to 23 percent in capital goods.

All this is still weak development. If the criticisms leveled against the luke-warm attitude of French investors by President Senghor are really well-founded — which has not been determined — we might also look for an at least partial explanation in organizational defects, the shortcomings and errors of management which an examination of the Senegalese economy reveals. Moreover, private investment is not the only kind and we should not forget that French public aid is still by far the most important kind of foreign aid: 5.5 billion CFA francs for FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] investments, 3 billion for training, 15 billion for technical assistance, 4 billion for scientific research, 350 million in food aid, subsidies to which we ought to add 15 billion CFA francs in Central Bank medium or long-term loans, all totaling almost 43 billion CFA francs in commitments for 1978. With its subsidiary organizations, the IDA and the IFC, the IBRD contributes 9 billion CFA francs, the FED 6.2 billion, the BAD [African Development Bank] and the FAD [African Development Fund] 1.6 billion, the U.S. AID 3 billion, the FRG 2.2 billion and Canada 1.6 billion. Taking into account Arab financing, the total of bilateral and multilateral commitments thus represents a sum in the neighborhood of 70 billion CFA francs, just for the fiscal year under consideration.

We are surprised at the size of these sources of support in comparison with those granted other African countries of comparable population and economic importance, as well as at their still weak impact on development.

The explanation of this phenomenon could reside in the gap that separates a certain geopolitical image of Senegal from the reality of its resources. The fact that for three centuries the country had belonged to the European world, the quality of its elites and the role of leadership it has played for several decades at the head of a federation of territories which it knows it has guided toward emancipation have led it to attach more importance to the superstructures than to the foundations. The structure showed no signs of weakness so long as the services provided by Dakar still constituted a monopoly. With the development of competition and the appearance of the crisis, the inadequacy of the means of production set in motion is apparent not only in the stagnation of tonnage volumes, but also in the drop in commercial revenue and the abandonment of the ports.

There are only two solutions to this state of affairs. The first lies in an adaptation of the mode of government and the standard of living of officials to the country's current economic dimensions as they are determined by its political borders and the resources of its farmers and wage-earners. Whatever precautions may be taken against destabilization, this solution would involve obvious risks in a country in which the population is more attached to the values of a consumer society than are those of the neighboring countries.

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The second solution consists of restoring Senegal, through organizations like the OMVS (Organization for the Development of the Senegal River) and the OMVG (Organization for the Development of the Gambia River) to its traditional role of international promoter. To the extent this solution is the one chosen by the Senegalese Government, the days to come will be endowed with exceptional importance for it. In fact, the studies and negotiations dealing with the Diama Dam were approved between 25 and 28 September with the opening of bids on the project. The financial stake is relatively modest (17 billion CFA francs for the dam alone). But in making their decision, the granters of European, French, German and Arab funds will be stealing a march on the future by considering that they have definitively acquired control over the financing of the Manantali Dam, thus broaching in a positive way the problem of the mining of Faleme iron along with the consequences that will have on the hydroelectric facilities and river navigation structures.

If, as we hope, no new delay affects this decision, a new dimension opened to Senegalese activities will thus bring to the nation's economy an element of dynamism and coherence which it has until now lacked.

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TANZANIA

UK PAPER INTERVIEWS NYERERE ON RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT PLAN

LD040930 London THE OBSERVER in English 4 Nov 79 p 1 LD

[Article by Jonathan Dimbleby in Dar es Salaam]

[Text] The Rhodesian peace talks will break down unless Lord Carrington agrees to lengthen the proposed transition period before an election and to remove General Walls from control of the armed forces, President Nyerere of Tanzania said yesterday.

The president who is chairman of the presidents of the front line states said in an interview with THE OBSERVER: that he differed from the Patriotic Front on some details of the interim administration.

"The Patriotic Front has agreed to a new constitution. The British are taking over. That's fine, but there is now an atmosphere of Gilbert and Sullivan farce about these things. The Patriotic Front helped the British end a rebellion. The idea that the British should now 'get tough' with the Patriotic Front is ridiculous. The front can't succumb to this pressure. They--all of us--need to be satisfied that the interim period will lead to free and fair elections.

"The British say that two months is long enough, that the ceasefire can't hold up any longer. They say it's a matter of commonsense. But no leader of the Commonwealth that I've spoken with believes that two months is reasonable."

President Nyerere went on: "If you have a ceasefire it will be as a result of agreement. If there is no agreement then there is no ceasefire. So why the fuss about two months? A short period like this is clearly intended to favour the parties already inside Rhodesia.

"The Patriotic Front will have to go home, organise the ceasefire, and get their parties--which are illegal at the moment--prepared for an election. How can it possibly be fair to expect them to come out of the bush and have elections in two months?"

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On another issue which deadlocks the conference--the future of the two opposing armies--President Nyerere was more conciliatory. He acknowledged that "The British appear to be stating that there is going to be equality of status and role as far as the maintenance of the ceasefire is concerned. This is reasonable. But after the elections the new government will have to build a new army. For this reason there must be no suggestion that during the interim one of the armies is 'constitutional' and the other 'terrorist.'"

Significantly departing from the Patriotic Front's position, President Nyerere accepted that the new governor appointed by Britain for the interim period would have to use "the existing machinery" of state. But he insisted that Lord Carrington must make it clear to the Patriotic Front that "the symbols of oppression" will be removed.

As soon as the governor takes over, he expects General Walls to be relieved of his command. He also expects the police to be cleaned up by the appointment of British officers. Only by this means would the "equal status" of the opposing armies be established: "This is the least the British can do."

Again differing from the Patriotic Front. President Nyerere accepted that there was no need for the United Nations to play any role in the interim period. But he does not accept Lord Carrington's interpretation of the role of "Commonwealth observer."

He suggests that a way out of the deadlock would be for the Commonwealth to play a "peacekeeping role" under British Government authority--an idea Lord Carrington has so far rejected.

President Nyerere argues that the British should recognise that "their power cannot be completely metaphysical. It has to be real. If the Commonwealth is prepared to contribute armed forces to help strengthen the authority of the governor and to monitor the ceasefire, why doesn't Lord Carrington accept"?

President Nyerere made it clear that if Britain were to accept such a role for the Commonwealth then in turn the front line states would not expect the Patriotic Front to allow the issue of "international supervision" to lead to a collapse of the talks.

David Martin writes: In what is seen as a co-ordinated move Mozambique yesterday also attacked Britain's handling of the talks. Britain was "organising the conditions for a civil war in Zimbabwe" and its proposals were deliberately "ambiguous and vague" a statement from Maputo said.

The statement, obviously approved by President Samora Machel, said that only an "international military force not previously involved in the conflict" would be able to ensure peace.

Britain's handling of the conference threatened its chances of success the statement said.

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The front's co-leaders, Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo, were also on the offensive yesterday. At a press conference in London they insisted that integration of guerrilla and security forces must begin before independence if "disaster" was to be averted.

Zambian sources said last night that a "contingency plan" exists for President Kuanda to fly to London this week to talk to Mrs Thatcher if the Rhodesia talks are deadlocked.

President Kaunda called in Britain's high commissioner in Zambia on Friday night to outline his objections to Britain's proposals. Simultaneously an aide delivered a message to London.

Sources said that Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia were co-ordinating their strategy.

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