26 1 OF 1

JPRS L/8782

26 November 1979

Japan Report

(FOUO 33/79)



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JAPAN REPORT

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	Contents	Page
POLITICAL AND	SOCIOLOGICAL	
'JPS':	'AKAHATA' Comments on U.S. Military Plan (JPS, 2 Nov 79)	1
	RI' Urges Japan To Provide Humanitarian Aid to	
Kamp	uchea (Editorial; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 5 Nov 79)	2
'ASAHI	Poll: Ohira's Popularity Rate Down to 17 Percent (ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 2 Nov 79)	4
JCP Is	sues Statement on Ohira Election (JPS, 6 Nov 79)	6
' AKAHA	TA': Ohira Has Minority Support, May Form Coalition (JPS, 7 Nov 79)	8
'JPS':	'AKAHATA' Editorializes on LDP's 'Dying Symptoms' (JPS, 3 Nov 79)	11
Komeit	o, DSP Reject JSP Proposal on Coalition Government (MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 3 Nov 79)	13
Briefs	ICD Consol Many	1.5
	•	
	· · ·	
	•	
Kamp 'ASAHI JCP Is 'AKAHA 'JPS': Komeit	uchea (Editorial; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 5 Nov 79)	6 8

- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Pag
MILITARY	
Soviet Military Forces Counter Japan-U.SChina Military Pressure (Yoshitomo Nishijima; YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 3 Oct 79)	18
ECONOMIC	
'ASAHI': Ministries Divided Over U.S. Request on Credits to PRC (ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 3 Nov 79)	21
'ASAHI' Supports Bank of Japan's Discount Rate Hike (Editorial; ASAHI EVENING NEWS; 5 Nov 79)	23
Briefs Gulf Desalination Project	25
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY	
Nuclear Fusion Programs Outlined (LE PROGRES SCIENTIFIOUE, Jan/Feb 79)	26

- b -

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'JPS': 'AKAHATA' COMMENTS ON U.S. MILITARY PLAN

OW021025 Tokyo JPS in English 0907 CMT 2 Nov 79 OW

[Text] Tokyo Nov 2 JPS--U.S. Congressman Paul Findley in the plenary session of Congress on October 31 proposed that a "Pacific patrol fleet" should be set up, mainly to protect the sea lanes on the Pacific and the Indian oceans.

In his proposal, the following countries are required to participate in the fleet with the U.S. initiative: Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and the Southeast Asian countries affiliated with the ASEAN.

AKAHATA carried a comment on November 2 on the proposal for setting up the fleet, pointing out that the plan proves that the maritime self-defense forces' participation in the "joint military exercise of the Pacific basin countries" (RIMPAC) to be held next spring, will be a serious step to advance the "collective security system of the Asian-Pacific countries".

Citing the Carter administration's strategy on the West Pacific region, countering the socalled "Soviet-threat"--the elaboration of the joint military action plan with Japan, in addition to the reinforcement of the U.S. 7th Fleet, and the freeze on the plan for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea--the comment says the RIMPAC and the recent proposal for setting up the "Pacific patrol fleet", indicate that the U.S. Asian-Pacific strategy is steadily pushed ahead.

The comment, moreover, notes that the proposal for setting up a Pacific patrol fleet is made on the pretext of "the protection of the sea lanes, which is a common concern to all". This, the comment says, lies on the same line for expanding the sphere of action of the self-defense forces outside of Japan's territorial air and territorial waters, which is raised in the "guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation". "The plan of 'Janzus' military alliance, which connects Japan with the Anzus (Australia, New Zealand and U.S.) is revealing a dangerous development", says the comment.

CSO: 4120 1

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'YOMIURI' URGES JAPAN TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID TO KAMPUCHEA

OW0712101 Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 5 Nov 79 p 2 OW

[Editorial: "Cambodian Tragedy"]

[Excerpts] International efforts to save the Cambodian people, who are on the verge of "extinction as a race" from starvation and disease, are gaining momentum mainly in the U.S. and West Europe. The UN has also called an emergency international conference for the relief of the Cambodians.

Reports say that the Cambodian population, which was earlier estimated at 7.8 million, has been reduced to half because of the tyranny of the Pol Pot administration and the subsequent war in that country following the intervention of Vietnam. And about 90 percent of the Cambodian people are now facing death.

In addition, Cambodian children, estimated to number about 700,000, have been dying in large numbers because of malnutrition and resultant diseases. According to the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), there are very few children aged five or below left in Cambodia because of the tragic situation in that country.

UNICEF and the International Red Cross are planning joint relief activities, including 165,000 tons of food, to save the people of Cambodia. They have also sought the help of international community for more aid.

Intl Criticism of Japan

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With the increase in international efforts for the relief of Cambodian people, we feel concerned about the rekindled criticism of Japan in foreign countries for its delay in joining the anti-Japanese criticism has been smoldering since the Geneva conference last July because of Japan's unwillingness to accept Vietnamese refugees.

To make matters worse, there is virtually no Japanese among those engaged in international relief activities on the Thai-Cambodian border.

2

The Japanese Government's diplomatic stand, which was criticized for "political settlement" of the Kim Tae-chung kidnaping case, is certain to come under fire for its "lack of humanitarianism" in connection with the Cambodian situation.

The government is urged to quickly join in the international efforts to save the starving Cambodians. The private sector should also without delay join the humanitarian efforts by providing medical teams and volunteer groups.

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CSO: 4120

3

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'ASAHI' POLL: OHIRA'S POPULARITY RATE DOWN TO 17 PERCENT

OW032020 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 2 Nov 79 p 1 OW

[Text] Nearly fifty percent of the populace do not want the Ohira cabinet to stay on, according to an ASAHI SHIMBUN opinion poll carried out on Oct. 29 and 30.

The same 2,574 persons who were polled in the last survey conducted in late August were interviewed again to find out whether their attitudes toward the Ohira government and the political parties had changed after the Oct. 7 Lower House general election.

In the August survey, 30 percent supported the Ohira cabinet and 35 percent did not support it. But the people have become more critical of the cabinet: The non-support rate jumped to 49 percent in the latest poll while the support rate plunged to 17 percent.

Thirty-four percent declined to clarify their attitude.

In the past ASAHI polls, the support rating touched the record low of 12 percent in the final days of the Kishi cabinet in May, 1960, and the Tanaka cabinet in November, 1974. The latest survey indicates that the Ohira government is rapidly losing popular support.

Of those who supported the present cabinet in the August survey, only slightly over 30 percent maintained their support in the present survey, and slightly less than 40 percent withdrew their support. About 70 percent of those who did not support the cabinet in the last poll did not support it this time.

Among the LDP backers, the Ohira cabinet enjoyed a 46-percent support rate against a 21-percent non-support rate in August, but this time only 26 percent wanted it to continue in office and 39 percent were against its continuance. Among supporters of opposition parties, between 50 percent and 70 percent were against the cabinet.

4

The latest survey shows that the cabinet is losing popularity faster among men than among women and, by age and occupation, the cabinet is losing support across the board.

About 10 percent of the pollees who supported the cabinet gave as reason for their support the fact that it is an LDP cabinet; only between two and three percent cited Ohira's personal character and policies.

About 20 percent of those who were against Ohira complained of his policies, 14 percent were against it because it is an LDP government and 13 percent did not like Ohira himself. Personal dislike of Prime Minister Ohira increased from the last survey.

More than 70 percent of those who disapproved of Ohira's policies were against the introduction of the general excise tax proposed to reconstruct the deficit-ridden state finances, and seventy percent of all the pollees disapproved of the new tax. Nine percent said that the new tax should be instituted in the next fiscal year and 11 percent favored the postponement of its introduction until after fiscal 1980.

Asked what should be done before trying to increase the government's tax revenues, 46 percent cited the correction of inequalities in the existing tax system, 34 percent improper accounting practices in public corporations and 13 percent large cuts in government spending.

Despite the increasing unpopularity of the Ohira cabinet, the LDP was still favored by a high 49 percent of all the pollees, compared with 52 percent in August. The support rate for the Japan Socialist Party stood at 18 percent, the same as in August.

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CSO: 4120

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

JCP ISSUES STATEMENT ON OHIRA ELECTION

OWO60957 Tokyo JPS in English 0854 GMT 6 Nov 79 OW

[Text] Tokyo Nov 6 JPS--Tetsuzo Fuwa, chief of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, on the afternoon of November 6 issued a statement entitled "On the Result of the Election for Designation of the Prime Minister." The full text of the statement follows:

- 1. As the result of the election today to designate a prime minister, Mr. Masayoshi Ohira was designated as prime minister. The ugly struggle for power, the factional strife, which were carried on inside the LDP for about one month since the general election, have revealed more clearly before the eyes of the people, the irresponsibility of the party incapable of dealing with the national crisis, as well as its anti-people nature. It leaves no room for doubt that the second Ohira cabinet which has taken office through the power struggle, totally disregarding the interest of the people, will be a cabinet to continue the mal-government serving the interests of big business and giving priority to the Japan-U.S. security treaty, against the judgement handed down by the people. The Japanese Communist Party will make full use of the increased voice in national administration as the result of the general election to thoroughly investigate and condemn the mal-government of the Ohira cabinet and to realize the people's demands.
- 1. [Number as received] The power struggle and the confusion in the political situation has made it all the clearer that the only democratic way to make a breakthrough—the formation of a progressive united front—is a matter of urgent need. In the sequence of events, the Democratic Socialist Party and the New Liberal Club openly discussed the possibility of forming an alliance with an LDP faction which was involved in the inner party struggle. But this only confirmed that the right—leaning opposition parties are stand—by forces of LDP politics. The Socialist Party called for negotiations on the problem of establishing a government by opposition parties. Influenced by the Komei and Democratic Socialist parties which refused to accept this call from the position that the Communist Party should be excluded from a negotiation table, the JSP has shown no will to come to consultations with the JCP which accepted the call, but further inclined to

6

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seek a "Socialist-Komei axis" line. This attitude of the JSP only served the closing of the way to a progressive solution to the political situation. The politics of the Liberal Democratic Party from now on through the 1980's will be frequently visited by a crisis, but there is no other way of realizing a change in politics to meet the expectations of the people than formation of a progressive united front and its victory. The JCP is resolved to do its utmost to this end.

CSO: 4120

7

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'AKAHATA': OHIRA HAS MINORITY SUPPORT, MAY FORM COALITION

OW071255 Tokyo JPS in English 0855 GMT 7 Nov 79 OW

[Quotes as received]

[Text] Tokyo Nov 7 JPS--On November 7, one day after the House of Representatives had designated Masayoshi Ohira as prime minister with only 138 votes (27 percent) out of total 511 votes, AKAHATA carried an editorial entitled "'The Political Power Backed by Only 27 Percent' and Its Future".

The editorial said:

"The second Ohira cabinet is going to take office, covered with wounds from head to heel. Since its defeat in the general election, the Liberal Democratic Party was busily engaged in the ugly power struggle for a full month, until at last it ran two candidates for premiership in the Diet election to designate a prime minister. This was an abnormal election of the prime minister, unprecedented in the history of the Diet.

"The establishment of the second Ohira cabinet does not mean that the LDP [has] overcome its crisis, though it means a 'victory' for Mr. Ohira in the intra-party power struggle.

"The people have already turned their back on LDP politics. This is proved by such objective facts as the recent opinion poll showing only 17 percent are for the Ohira cabinet (ASAHI SHIMBUN, Nov. 2), as well as the recent general election which resulted in the serious defeat of the party.

"In this election of a prime minister, Mr. Ohira won only 138 votes, 27 percent, of confidence, out of all the House of Representatives members. He has managed to maintain the post of the prime minister by a slightest majority in the LDP, plus support from independent 'black high officials' including Kakuei Tanaka, and Dietmembers of the New Liberal Club.

"The Liberal Democratic Party narrowly dodged the crisis of a complete split of the party by a new political party being formed by the anti-main currents. The anti-main currents, however, declared that "the second round of the

8

struggle has begun" (Mr. Fukuda). It is expected that the LDP will continue its dying power struggle in another form. This means that, as the political blank for the past one month has shown, factional death struggle inside the LDP will come to the front, while many problems, the solution of which the people keenly desire, will be put aside.

It is a well-known fact that former Premier Kakuei Tanaka has been the "boss behind the scene" of the leadership faction backing up Masayoshi Ohira.... The deep-rooted corruption and crisis in the LDP administration is typically shown in the fact that a man, who controlled the Japanese administration by the strength of money and is now a criminal defendant, still affects politics and that the new Ohira government will have to rely upon him.

[OWO71335] Because Premier Ohira has adhered to the power, saying "by fulfilling my public promises, I will bear my responsibility", it will be certain that his government will make allout efforts to put into practice such mal-politics as a massive tax increase, cover-up of bribery scandals, and an increased aggressiveness of the Japan-U.S. military alliance, under the pretext of implementing the "public promises".

In the midst of the power struggle, indeed, a plan for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to participate in the pan-Pacific military maneuvers was made public to pave the way for an overseas sending of the SDF, and a massive people exploitation policy, involving a new tax increase program replacing the planned general consumer tax, as well as a series of increases in public utility charges, has been formulated hurriedly.

What we must watch carefully is that, because of the fragile power basis of the second Ohira government, there is a danger that the LDP may strengthen its outrageous attacks on the people and democracy, by winning over anticommunist right-wing opposition parties to its side and striving to introduce a small constituency system to maintain its single-party dictatorship, or to establish a fascist system involving a wartime emergency legislation. In one of their public promises in the general election, the Ohira cabinet and the LDP made clear that they would present an "election system reform" proposal after the election. It must not be overlooked that among opposition party leaders, those of the Democratic Socialist Party are saying publicly that the DSP will "positively consider" such a proposal on the introduction of a small constituency system.

Therefore, we must continue to strengthen further popular denunciation of the LDP until a final end mark is put to the LDP administration.

"The New Liberal Club has thrown into relief its true identity before the Japanese people that it is nothing more than a mere faction of the LDP, as it had cast its votes for Masayoshi Ohira in the first round of balloting to elect the prime minister. We must say that the NLC has completely lost its reason of existence, though it ostensibly calls for 'destroying money-power and corrupt politics', because it is the first to extend its helping

9

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hand to the formation of the literally money-power and corrupt cabinet backed by 'Kakuei Tanaka'.

The right leaning opposition parties, such as the Democratic Socialist Party and the Komei Party, cannot deny the fact that these parties cast blank votes in the second round of premiership election, their leaders had openly spoken about the possibility of the coalition with the LDP, if it should have decisively split, and that they tacitly suggested the possible coalition with the LDP. The Japan Socialist Party was dragged into a right leaning political line giving top priority to a 'joint struggle with the DSP and the Komei Party' by the forces aiming at prolonging the fate of the LDP, thus we can say that the JSP is sunk into the depth of confusion compatible to that of the LDP, which is in a state of sign of impending decaying of the party.

"While appealing to the Japanese people the need to establish the genuine progressive unity the JCP is determined to endeavor to bring into reality the genuine progressive unity in and out of the Diet".

CSO: 4120

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10

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'JPS': 'AKAHATA' EDITORIALIZES ON LDP'S 'DYING SYMPTOMS'

OW031201 Tokyo JPS in English 0915 GMT 3 Nov 79 OW

[Text] Tokyo, Nov 3, JPS--AKAHATA on November 3 carried an editorial entitled "Dying Symptoms of the LDP and Perspective for Progress." The editorial said:

"It is for the first time since the inauguration of the Liberal Democratic Party if two candidates from the LDP stand in the House election for premiership, though it is too early to predict what will come finally, as there have been contradictory struggles and operations, one to unite the LDP to run one single candidate, which are waged by Hirokichi Nadao, House speaker and others, and the other to win a majority, which are being vigorously waged by both camps. This ugly strife is now being played on stage with the background of the serious defeat of the LDP in the recent general election, as the result of which the LDP managed to maintain a majority by enlisting some independent winners, and which came after the party's long historical downward trend. We can safely call this dying symptoms of the LDP.

"Whatever may happen, the LDP can never escape from the responsibility for having created political vacuum for 23 days since the general election, simply due to its own internal strife, and made the special session of the Diet, which has been convened at last, pass days in vain in confusion.

"This internal strife of the LDP is a sheer struggle for power, between the claim that 'you should resign' and the other that 'I never resign'. This internal strife, lacking a slightest review on the policies and constitutional defects in the LDP, makes most supporters to the LDP disappointed.

"In this situation, what is serious is not the actual loss of the governability on the side of the LDP does not directly lead to the establishment of a progressive coalition government. [Sentence as received]

'What must be looked at straightly in this context is that among opposition parties, there are the forces represented by the Komei and Democratic

11

Socialist parties which 'stakes their life' in preventing a progressive coalition government involving the Communist Party from being formed (Yoshikatsu Takeiri, chairman of the Komei Party), and is thirsty for joining in a coalition government with the LDP.

"It is regrettable to the progressive forces that, in this critical moment, the Socialist Party does not embark on the formation of a progressive coalition. On the contrary, the Socialist Party has approached these right-leaning opposition parties, especially the Komei Party, and openly announced the policy giving priority to the 'Socialist-Komei joint struggle' which leads to an alliance with the LDP.

"When looking at this reality, what is most important at this moment for the practising of progressive politics is to raise full-fledged public opinion and movement at a national level for the formation of a progressive coalition; that the Communist Party, which has fundamentally criticized the policy and constitution of the LDP and made all-out efforts in search for the progressive unity, has made a remarkable advance in the recent general election and advanced in the Diet as a force which no one can neglect, gives a precious ground to development of this movement."

CSO: 4120

12

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

KOMEITO, DSP REJECT JSP PROPOSAL ON COALITION GOVERNMENT

OWO40638 Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 3 Nov 79 Morning Edition p 1 OW

[Text] All opposition parties—the Socialist, Komeito, Communist, Democratic Socialist parties and the New Liberal Club and the United Socialist Party—held a meeting of secretaries general on 2 November in the Diet building. At the meeting the Socialist Party put forward a five—point proposal calling for an all-opposition temporary coalition government. However, because the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party rejected the proposal on the grounds that "we cannot discuss a coalition government plan in which the Communist Party participates," the JSP proposal for "building a Cabinet for the people to replace the Liberal Democratic Party" fell to pieces less than an hour after it was introduced.

The all-opposition meeting was held at the proposal of the United Socialist Party, which was seconded by the Socialist Party. In the beginning, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party were reluctant to attend the meeting, but the Socialist Party persuaded them to attend it to "censure the LDP's intraparty power struggle."

At the meeting, which opened at 2140, JSP Secretary General Tagaya put forward a five-point temporary coalition government proposal calling for purification of politics, financial reconstruction and administrative reforms, stabilization of the people's livelihood, the securing of energy resources and the consolidation of peace.

The Communist Party indicated its readiness to accept the proposal. However, Komeito Secretary General Yano rejected it, saying, "The Socialist Party should first choose between the Communist Party and other opposition parties in planning to form a coalition government." Democratic Socialist Party Secretary General Tsukamoto also rejected the proposal, saying, "We want the Socialist Party to retract its proposal because it is against our party principle to discuss a coalition government plan together with the Communist Party."

However, Tagaya insisted on his party's proposal, and the meeting ended in about 40 minutes with no agreement being reached.

13

Emerging from the secretaries' meeting, Komeito Secretary General Yano told reporters, "When the Socialist Party wants to propose a coalition government, it had better choose either the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party or the Communist Party before appealing to us to accept their proposal." Communist Party Secretariat Chief Fuwa also criticized the Socialist Party and said, "If the socialists are not willing to discuss the matter with parties to participate in the proposed coalition government, their proposal is no more than an observation balloon."

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CSO: 4105

14

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

BRIEFS

JCP SPEECH TOUR--Tokyo, Nov 1, JPS--The Japanese Communist Party [JCP] has begun a national speech tour visiting all 646 cities in the nation. An initial speech meeting was held in Tokyo on October 31, with some 700 people attending. The following party leaders gave speeches on the political situation following the general election, the prospect for the 1980's, and the role of the JCP: Koichiro Ueda, vice presidium chairman and member of the House of Councillors; Isao Naito, member of the House of Councillors; and Zenmei Matsumoto, chairman of the JCP Diet Policy Committee. During the period of the "months for fulfilling the election pledges, disseminating JCP policies, and expanding the party force", which are set up for a successful 15th party congress to be convened on January 15 next year, all JCP district committees will each conduct a speech meeting at least once, in their districts, amounting to 300 places. Speakers include Secretariat Chief Tetsuzo Fuwa, party leaders, 41 communists newly returned to the House of Representatives, and scheduled candidates for the House of Councillors election to be held in June next year, in the national constituency and local constituencies. Speech meetings will be held on the following four themes: (1) The political situation following the general election, and the prospect of the progressive movement; (2) The public pledges of the JCP-independent joint progressives; (3) What kind of a party is the JCP?; (4) Policies for development of each district and strata of the people. [Text] [OW010947 Tokyo JPS in English 0855 GMT 1 Nov 79 OW]

DISTRIBUTION OF DIET POSTS--Tokyo Nov 2 JPS--The House of Representatives Steering Committee on November 1 decided on the distribution to each party of chairmanship of 16 standing committees. The Japanese Communist Party was assigned to chair the Disciplinary Committee. However, on the distribution of chairmanship of nine special committees, including the special committee on aircraft import scandals, the Liberal Democratic, Socialist and the Komei parties objected distribution of chairmanship to the JCP, and the decision was postponed. Zenmei Matsumoto, chairman of the JCP Diet Policy Committee, held a press conference on the same day, and announced again the JCP claim that chairmanship under consideration in the directors meeting of the Steering Committee should be distributed in proportion to each party's Diet seats. Matsumoto strongly criticized that the claim of the LDP, JSP and Komei, saying that posts that should be assigned to the JCP

15

must be reduced to one, has not logic nor reason, and this is nothing but partisan activities. [Excerpt] [OWO21021 Tokyo JPS in English 0920 GMT 2 Nov 79 OW]

JCP, OPPOSITION PARTIES' TALKS -- Tokyo, Nov 3, JPS -- Secretaries general and secretariat chief of the six opposition parties met at night, on November 2, in response to the call by the Socialist Party. Shinnen Tagaya, secretary general of the JSP, then proposed to hold a conference to conclude a policy agreement to form a government replacing the LDP government. Tetsuzo Fuwa, Secretariat chief of the Japanese Communist Party, expressed the party's view, saying: "The Communist Party is ready to take part in a conference on policy problem, if the Socialist Party sincerely proposes to run a joint candidate for premiership based on a reached policy agreement. But, the Socialist Party should first take a clear-cut attitude to carry on consultations with the party which responds to the socialist call. The Socialist Party, however, has so far taken the attitude of turning aside consultations with the Communist Party on the pretext that other parties did not join in the consultation. If the JSP repeats such an attitude, it will inevitably end in the repetition of the sterile trial." The Komei and Democratic Socialist parties claimed once more that they will never sit around a table with the Japanese Communist Party to consult a political power question. The Socialist Party then arbitrarily announced that the socialist proposal ended in failure as all opposition parties did not always agree on the JSP proposal. The Socialist Party did not show even the slightest effort to carry on consultations with the Communist Party. [Text] [OW031207 Tokyo JPS in English 0945 GMT 3 Nov 79 OW]

NUCLEAR POWER POLICY--The U.S. Government's continued moratorium on issuing construction and operating licenses for new nuclear power plants is likely to encourage popular movements against nuclear power plants in Japan. A leader of the Fukui prefectural residents conference against nuclear power plants voiced distrust in the Japanese Government for sticking to atomic power despite recent accidents at nuclear plants in the prefecture. Citing the American policy of safety first, a group seeking a moratorium on nuclear power plants also criticized the Japanese Government for resuming operation of nuclear power plants before completing thorough investigations into the accidents. However, Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission intends not to emulate the U.S. policy in Japan for the time being. The Japanese commission, now studying a U.S. report on points to check for the safety of nuclear plants, says domestic reactors underwent similar checks immediately after the Three Mile Island accident. [Text] [OW081151 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 7 Nov 79 p 5 OW]

JAPAN-ROK MINISTERIAL MEETING--A top Foreign Ministry official said yesterday evening it will be very difficult to hold the annual ROK-Japan ministerial meeting before the end of the year. The main reason is the sudden death of Korean President Pak Chong-hui. As for the Japanese side, reasons include the considerable time taken to settle the political crisis, the tight schedule for government activity till the end of the year, with the prime minister scheduled to visit China in early December, and the new budget that has

16

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to be compiled. In addition, the Diet will be in session. Japanese and ROK Cabinet members meet alternately in Seoul and Tokyo each year. The Japanese Government was preparing to host it in Tokyo this year. [Text] [OW080957 Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 7 Nov 79 Morning Edition p 4 OW]

CSO: 4105

17

MILITARY

SOVIET MILITARY FORCES COUNTER JAPAN-U.S.-CHINA MILITARY PRESSURE

Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese 3 Oct 79 p 2

[Commentary by Yoshitomo Nishijima, reporter: "Soviet Military Forces on Three Northern Islands, Political Strategy Involving Territory"]

[Text] Militarily it is a trifling matter, while its main purpose is to pursue political strategy, involving the problem of the territory." So says a majority of opinions expressed by government-related organizations, such as the Foreign Ministry and the JDA etc., concerning the deployment of Soviet military forces on three islands in the northern-territory--Kunashird, Etorofu, and Shikotan--over which the government protested to the Soviet Union on the 2nd [October]. However, the "northern threat theory" seems to arise in relation to the JDA's judgment that "the troops are of division level equipped with sophisticated weapons."

The assessment of the equipment of Soviet military forces stationed on the three islands in the northern territory includes such awesome weapons as "ground-to-air missiles," "helicopter gunships," etc. However, anti-air missiles are "defensive arms" which Soviet mechanized divisions have in order to protect themselves from attack by enemy planes. They are not equipped with nuclear warheads to attack our mainland or Hokkaido. Also the 'Hind, MI-24 helicopter gunship plays dual role of anti-tank copter and transportation. It will not fly over the sea, but is exclusively aimed at an attack on Hokkaido or the main island.

Generally speaking, arms and military forces can be defensive or offensive, depending upon the way of use. At the Cabinet meeting held on the 2d, the JDA held its view that "at the moment, the JDA does not view the matter [Soviet forces in the northern territory] a "threat." Perhaps the JDA's view reflects an analysis of the government on the intention of the Soviet Union after reviewing the multilateral aspects including the diplomatic situation. However, militarily speaking, it is necessary to be cautious about the presence of "military power capable of invading our nation" as a factor for a "real threat." In this sense, the question of whether the deployment of Soviet military forces in the northern territory can signify an increased threat—compared with a situation without such deployment—

18

will become a problem. Interpretation of this very problem should be a key to our search for "the intention of the Soviet military forces in the northern territory since last year.

Until the summer of 1960, a corps of Soviet ground troops was stationed on Kunashiri and Etorofu islands (a brigade on Kunashiri and a division on Etorofu). These ground troops returned to the Maritime Province of Siberia, but the function of military bases was kept by leaving a MIG-17 squadron (20 fighters). Eventually, armed forces of the division level was deployed, and also helicopter gunships were included in the force.

Thus, we come to the question of "whether the threat has increased or not." This will depend on our assessment of whether the Soviet Union intends to construct a base in the northern territory 1,300 kilometers away from the Maritime Province of Siberia in an attempt to invade Japan, or not.

According to the JDA survey, two divisions are always stationed in Karafuto, which is 40 kilometers away from Dohoku in Hokkaido. In the Maritime Province of Siberia, a marine, air mobile brigade and an airborne division are stationed. In other words, quite a few troops, capable of invading Japan, are located in places where access to supply is much easier than the northern territory.

The GSDF Staff Office says that "an attack by five divisions is possible during the period of a month." Also, because the Soviet Far East Air Force deploys the most advanced fighter bombers such as the MIG-23 and SUKHOI-19 in the Maritime Province of Siberia, its range of action ranges as far as central Japan, not to mention Hokkaido. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that Soviet forces cannot wield their power directly toward Japan without helicopters deployed in the northern territory.

If Soviet military forces are deployed in the northern territory in order to attack Japan, it is simply like "covering the roof with a roof" [the Soviets are wasting their efforts.], and also an offensive base located on small islands as far as 1,300 kilometers away from the Maritime Province of Siberia, on the contrary, turns into an "extremely vulnerable presence" when it is attacked.

If we venture to seek a military significance, we may take the view that "the Soviet Union is either transforming the sea of Okhotsk into an inland sea in view of its nuclear strategy to counter U.S., or it is strengthening the seaborne transportation route to Petropavlovsk. This policy can be important to the Soviet Union, but is that a task urgent enough for the Soviet Union to carry on construction all through one whole winter?

Ultimately we may accept the view of the Foreign Minister who says due to the diplomatic circumstances including the signing of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty and the normalization of U.S.-China diplomatic relations, the Soviet Union felt "Japan-U.S.-China military pressure," and

19

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intended to place Japan's inherent northern territory under heavier and effective control. In other words, it's an offensive strategy toward Japan, in that the Soviet Union is trying to cause the Japanese people to give up reversion of the northern territory, by military means which takes the form of deploying of Soviet military forces."

Of course, we need to take measures in order to keep strict watch on Soviet military forces stationed on the three islands in the northern territory. However, if we are to be upset about a "threat," it is hard to say, but we may be trapped in a psychological war directed by the Soviet Union.

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20

ECONOMIC

'ASAHI': MINISTRIES DIVIDED OVER U.S. REQUEST ON CREDITS TO PRC

OW050840 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 3 Nov 79 p 1 OW

[Text] The government is divided on how Japan should respond to a U.S. request to unite credits to China in principle.

Washington has made the request on the grounds that the continuation of the present practice may give Japan a monopoly of the Chinese market. The request is expected to be made again in the third Japan-U.S. sub-cabinet level meeting to be held in Tokyo on Nov 8 and 9.

A ranking official of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry described the request as unjustified and said compliance with it is difficult, considering the present condition of the Japanese economy and the state finances.

He expressed the belief that since no discussion in general terms at the coming meeting will be conclusive, the question should be taken up when the Chinese projects for which credits are to be supplied have been decided upon.

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China has asked Japan to extend about \$3.5 billion in credits to finance eight projects.

The Japanese response to the U.S. request in the Tokyo meeting is to be worked out in interdepartmental consultations. The Foreign Ministry is in favor of complying with the request.

Even within the MITI, there is the opinion that compliance is desirable when the purposes for which economic aid is given and the future of the world economy are taken into account.

The Chinese request is still under study. Japan proposes to move in step with the Western countries as the requested credits are too large for it alone to supply.

The government feels that consideration should be given to Southeast Asia in studying the request. It also wants to make clear that Japan will not help any Chinese military project.

21

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Japan has asked Washington to approve these principles. It also wants credits to China to be counted as part of the country's economic aid to developing nations.

Japan has been accused of being miserly in helping the poor countries despite its wealth.

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22

ECONOMIC

'ASAHI' SUPPORTS BANK OF JAPAN'S DISCOUNT RATE HIKE

OWO70438 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 5 Nov 79 p 5 OW

[Editorial: "Hiking of Discount Rate"]

[Text] The Bank of Japan decided to increase the official discount rate by one percent and make it 6.25 percent per annum.

The decision to bring about the third hike this year, following the increases in April and July, was reached during a time of political confusion. Although the Bank of Japan gave up on waiting until a new cabinet was formed, some people believe that the decision came too late.

In the foreign exchange market and the stock market, a higher official discount rate had been expected for quite some time. So, when the decision finally came, a normally dramatic effect of such a step did not occur.

This latest hike was a sensible response to the economic climate. The current accounts in the first half of fiscal 1979 (April-September 1979) recorded an unprecedentedly large deficit, mainly because of the big increase in payments for oil imports. The foreign exchange market for the yen is even weaker than that for the ailing dollar. The situation is completely different from last year when there was so much demand for the "strong yen."

When the supply-demand situation was tight as a result of the economic recovery, the steep rise in crude oil prices coincided with the depreciation of the yen. As a result of this, wholesale prices recorded a two-digit increase rate compared to last year. So, the red danger signal was lit for consumer prices.

In West Germany, despite the fact that wholesale prices and the foreign exchange market for the German mark are more stable than in Japan, the official discount rate has been hiked again. Rightfully, Japan should have taken the step before West Germany. Recently Anthony M. Solomon, U.S. Undersecretary of Treasury in charge of monetary affairs, said, "The drop in the value of the yen is excessive. If the yen continues to deteriorate,

23

Japanese exports will increase and perhaps disrupt international trade." There is no reason to delay measures to prevent the depreciation of the yen.

What must be noted here is that, as a result of the gap between interest rates in the United States and Japan having become so big, the trend for short-term capital to flow out of the country has become stronger. The Bank of Japan, while calling on the United States and other countries to do their part, should intervene to a greater extent in the foreign exchange market. A higher discount rate is needed to prevent the yen from declining even more.

Some businessmen were opposed to a bigger discount rate because they did not want to carry a heavier interest burden. But as pointed out in the annual report of the International Monetary Fund, the common problem now facing the advanced countries is to prevent the start of the vicious circle of inflation and wage hikes. In Japan also, if prices continue rising, it would be difficult to get wage hikes set at low levels next spring. It is is logical to first exert all-out efforts to prevent prices from rising.

The economy is presently expanding smoothly due to increased individual consumption and brisk investment in industrial facilities. But the outlook for fiscal 1980 is very unclear. If the enthusiasm for investment in such facilities, which has finally become strong, is cooled too much through a clampdown on credit, this will weaken production capacity, threatening the country with higher prices.

From the standpoint of not damaging civilian production activities, it is odd that control measures have emphasized only the credit side and that no substantial steps have been taken in the compilation of the budget for fiscal 1979. Public utility project funds are a large part of the budget, but because there is a strong sense of a financial crisis, even if the economy turns upward in fiscal 1980, there appears to be little surplus for propping up finances.

If so, at this time when the economy is expanding independent of government help, it would be wise to restrict expenditures with the intention of carrying over into fiscal 1980 some of the public utility projects planned for fiscal 1979. The government decision to make the contract rate for public utility projects as of Dec. 31, 1979 about the same as that for the year before is insufficient.

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.24

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ECONOMIC

BRIEFS

GULF DESALINATION PROJECT--The government will dispatch an expert team to three Gulf states around this year-end to study the feasibility of a joint sea water desalination plant using the solar energy. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) said that the planned plants in Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates will be part of various technical cooperation schemes with the oil rich nations. Proven technologies to utilize solar heat, now a pet program among MITI's long-term innovative energy sources projects, will be available for the plants' construction, it said. Present blueprints show that the first desalination plant will be tested for operational capabilities next year in one of the three nations. Full commercialization will start five years later to produce 200 tons of fresh water per day. MITI expects that such technical aid by Japan to the Middle East is a plus factor in deepening mutual relations, and consequently may favorably affect future bargaining for oil. [Text] [OW221149 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 20 Oct 79 p 5 OW]

CSO: 4120

25

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

NUCLEAR FUSION PROGRAMS OUTLINED

Paris LE PROGRES SCIENTIFIQUE in French Jan/Feb 79 pp 44-50

[Study conducted by the Scientific Services of the French Embassy in Japan]


[Text]--Japan now depends on foreign sources for more than 85 percent of its energy supplies. Since it was late in starting to develop the use of energy from nuclear fission, and resorted very widely to foreign technologies in this sector, the Japanese officials see in nuclear fusion one of the possible means for reduction on a long-term basis of their energy dependence, by implementing national technologies. That is why the government supports in this sector a considerable research effort, which is analyzed in this article.

General Organization

The research and development activities in the area of nuclear fusion are implemented by the Agency for Sciences and Technologies (AST), by the Ministry for National Education (MEN), and to a much lesser extent, by the Ministry for Industry and Foreign Trade (MITI) (Table 1).

The general policy is placed under the direct responsibility of the prime minister. It is prepared substantially by the Nuclear Fusion Council (CFN) of the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission, a unit answerable to the prime minister. Created in 1975, this council now includes 13 members, of which 3 are representatives of the ministries concerned (AST, MEN and MITI), 1 a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1 a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission, and 8 university professors acting as experts. Practically, the CFN controls and defines directly only the orientations of the AST; but the other ministerial departments establish their own policy, particularly at the budget level, taking into consideration these orientations. A management committee and five specialized subcommittees assist the CFN: superconductive coils, J.T.60, tritium, equipment, biological effects of tritium. Its secretariat is assured by the Technology Division for Atomic Energy of the AST.

26



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The MEN policy is defined by the Nuclear Fusion Committee of the Science Council, a consultative organ attached to the minister. This committee has 11 members, all professors, of which 4 also belong to the CFN of the Atomic Energy Commission. The secretariat of this committee is assured by the Bureau for Sciences and International Affairs of the MEN.

The prime minister is assisted furthermore in his decisions, by the National Science Council which also created a committee specialized in this area of nuclear fusion. This committee has no direct influence on the policy of the ministries.

Practically the coordination of the programs is rendered possible by the simultaneous participation of four professors in the CFN of the Atomic Energy Commission and the specialized committee of the MEN Science Council.

Research Budget

Nuclear fusion has a very large and progressively increasing budget. The equipment budget, which was 17,376 million yen in 1978 (347 million francs), should reach about 31.5 billion yen in 1979 (630 million francs) $^{\rm I}$ (Table 2).

These funds, deriving totally from the public sector, are devoted mainly to fusion by magnetic confinement (FCM) (about 85 percent of the funds allocated to fusion in 1978).

In terms of budget, the AST, which directs all its efforts to the TOKAMAK method, assumes a predominant position. Actually, it is responsible for the implementation of the TOKAMAK J.T.60, whose total cost may reach 200 billion yen (4 billion francs). In 1979, the construction costs will represent about 90 percent of the fusion budget of the AST.

In reality, the overall budget devoted to nuclear fusion is much higher than the one presented in Table 2, since the indicated figures should be increased by personnel costs (which may be estimated at about 1600 million yen, 32 million francs, in 1978), the related research funds of the MEN (about 150 million yen, 3 million francs in 1978 in the sectors of equipments, tritium and superconductive magnets), the current operation costs (about 1000 million yen, 20 million francs, in 1978) and the cost of the specific MEN buildings, that is, about 1000 million yen, 20 million francs per year between 1976 and 1980.

On this basis, the overall expenses in the nuclear fusion sector may therefore be estimated as about 21000 million yen (420 million francs) in 1978, that is 2.2 percent of the public funds allocated to research and development that same year. The figures given in Table 2 reveal the extremely rapid growth of the share allocated to nuclear fusion in the public funds for research and development.

28

¹ Average conversion rate of 2 francs per 100 yen.

3 (2)

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31524 630.5 1979 24757 6288 24641 47 I I I I1.8 17376 347. 366 1978 11632 1903 1281 1944 249 11508 44 Budget Allocated to Nuclear Fusion (excluding salaries and operational costs) 1.4 198. 250 817 1896 332 12334 7715 1977 7819 8247 133.0 1.0 155 4070 808 675 1805 632 1976 4172 46 4374 63.2 9.0 190 100 1210 53 2710 2590 1553 1975 111 1906 31.4 0.3 808 95 1974 897 0.2 929 15.2 1973 460 541 (Million yen) (Million francs) Year Ministry for Industry and Foreign Agency for Science and Technology Plasma Physics Laboratory (Kyoto) Plasma Physics Institute (Nagoya) Ministry for National Education Percentage of public funds for Nuclear Energy Research Institute for Physical and Metallurgical Research Laser Institute (Osaka) National Institute for National Institute for Chemical Research Miscellaneous Organization Table 2: rotal: Trade

Including 21955 million Yen for the construction of the JT-60 $\,$ Forecasts 33

research and development

29

Research Centers

About 450 persons are engaged in researches concerning directly nuclear fusion. All these persons are employed in the public sector.

But industry contributes directly to the studies by supplying the main equipment needed. The large companies of electrical equipment (Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, Sumitomo Electric, Fuji Electric) have specialized high-level teams capable of working in direct collaboration with the researchers of government and university researchers. This collaboration is facilitated by deputing engineers of the private companies to long training stages with research groups. The government and university institutions most often call upon industry to build their experimental devices. The Hitachi company, which received in 1978 an order covering more than 38 billion yen, will be the principal supplier of the equipment for the J.T.60.

Government Institutions

The government institutions are engaged almost totally in the programs of fusion by magnetic confinement.

National Institute for Nuclear Energy Research

The National Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (JAERI) devotes all its efforts to the TOKAMAK method. Attached to the AST, it has about 150 persons employed full time, working in the Tokai-mura Center, and divided into two divisions. The TOKAMAK Development Division (50 persons) is assigned to the building of the TOKAMAK J.T. 60. The Research Division (100 persons) includes seven laboratories:

Theory of plasmas; Experimental Plasma Physics (J.F.T.2 and J.F.T.2a reactors); Plasma Engineering (Physics of Surfaces); Superconductive Magnets; Heating of Plasmas (Neutral Injection and Microwave Heating); Systems; and Tritium.

Other Government Institutions (About 50 Persons)

Two institutions, attached to the AST, are engaged in research aimed at direct support of the JAERI effort:

--The National Metallurgical Research Institute (NRIM), which studies the materials used for the confinement vessel and for the construction of superconductor magnets;

--The Institute for Physical and Chemical Research (IPCR), which studies the microwave heating of the plasma, the measurement methods applied to the plasma, vacuum and ion source technologies.

The Laboratory for Electrotechnology (ETL), attached to the MITI, is engaged in the study of the high beta confinement devices (Theta Pinch) and the development of high power solid lasers.

30

University Institutions

The university, which is very active in the area of fusion by inertial confinement (FCI) accomplishes an effort supplementing that of the governmental institutes in the area of the FCM. The research teams, comprising nearly 250 persons, are distributed mainly in 3 institutions:

--The Institute for Plasma Physics (IPP) of the Nagoya University, created in 1961, and representing the largest group (20 research units, UR, and 140 persons). Its activities relate to the FCM (TOKAMAK, Stellarator, Bumpy Torus, open configuration system of the cusp type) and FCI (beams of relativistic electrons);

--The Laboratory for Plasma Physics (LPP) of the Kyoto University (4 UR and 21 persons), created in 1966, and engaged in the study of the Heliotron device, an FCM apparatus derived from the stellarators;

--The Laser Institute of the Osaka University (4 UR and 22 persons), established in 1972, which develops high power lasers and studies the FCI with laser beams and relativistic electron beams.

Besides these institutions, we should mention in particular the Institute for the Theory of Fusion of the Hiroshima University, created recently (2 UR), the Universities of Osaka (FCM with a linear compression device), of Tsukuba (FCM by means of an apparatus with multiple mirrors), of Tokyo (FCM: Pinch/TOKAMAK, neutral injectors; FCI: production of plasma totally ionized by laser, plasma theory), of Tohoku (FCM: nonplane confinement), and of Kyushu (FCM: Ultra Fast Theta Pinch). Nearly 35 universities altogether in research relating directly to nuclear fusion.

Research Programs

As indicated by the budgets and the nature of the teams described so far, the principal effort is now aimed at the FCM, particularly by the TOKAMAK method. However, the other main FCM techniques and the FCI techniques are the object of extensive studies permitting Japan to assure an overall technological continuity in the nuclear fusion field.

Fusion by Magnetic Confinement (FCM)

After more than 10 years of fundamental research in the universities, the Atomic Energy Commission launched in 1969 a vast national program of research conducted in a coordinated manner by the government institutions (JAERI, IPCR, and ETL). After a first exploratory phase (1969-1974), a special effort was directed to the TOKAMAK method, then considered the most promising. Supplemented by a considerable effort on the university level, the present program retains nevertheless a widely diversified nature, (Table 3) and particularly interesting results were obtained recently with the multiple mirror equipment of the Tsukuba University (increase by one


31

Principal Devices for Fusion by Magnetic Confinement, used, under construction, or planned Table 31

				S	Caractéristiques	es 1	ပိ	Caractéristiques du plasma	es du plas	ima 2	Date
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					shaped						
			J.T60	ဗ	-	2	5- 10	5- 10	1019 - 1020 0,2	0,2 -1	1983
: .		Tokamak	J.P.P1	0,5	0,07	0,4	0,3 - 70	1	1015 - 1016	I	construit
10.00	1.P.P.	rator	J.P.PII	0,91	0,17	က	-	0,4	1018	0,02	construit
11		Bumpy Torus	N.B.T.	1	1	١	1	1	1	1	construit
	.P.P.	Heliotron	Heliotron	1,05	6,0	0,5	150	30 - 70	1018 - 1020	0,001	construit
	Kyoto		Hello- tron E	1,875	0,4 × 0,2	8	-	8,0	1019 - 1020	0,1	1979
	E.T.L.	Pinches	T.P.E1	cnergie de 20 et	energie des condensateurs 180 kJ. Champs toroïdal et poloïdal max. de 20 et 6 kG en 3 μ 5.	nsateurs 1 µ 5.	180 kJ. Ch	namps toro	īdal et pol	oīdal max.	construit
				Tempére nes de	Température électron 100 eV, temps de confinement : quelques dizalnes de microsecondes.	on 100 e\ des.	V, temps d	е сопііпел	nent : quelo	ques dizai-	
	I.P.P. Nagoya	Cusp	C.C.T.	1	ı	}	1	1	l	1	construit
Ouverte 1.2	Tsukuba	Miroir 13	G.A.M M.A6	i	I	1	1	1	. 1	1	construit

Key: 1. Characteristics 2. plasma characteristics 3. laboratory 4. designation 5. large radius 6. small radius 7. Troidal field 8. density 9. confinement period 10. date of beginning of operation 11. toroidal 12 open 13. mirror 14. built 15. Energy of the condensers, 180 kJ. Maximum toroidal and poloidal fields of 20 and 6 kG in 3 5 16. temperature electron 100 eV, confinement period, a few tens of microseconds.

32



order of magnitude of the confinement period as compared with simple mirror units) and with the stellarator/TOKAMAK JIPP II of the Institute for Plasma Physics of the Nagoya University (simultaneous reheating of the plasma by neutral and radiofrequency beam).

The TOKAMAK development program, begun in 1973, was assigned to the JAERI. It should permit by 1983 the use of the JT.60 reactor (Table 4). The characteristics of this reactor are similar to those of the European (JET), American (TFTR) and Soviet (T-10M) reactors, but unlike the latter, the JT.60 is not intended for deuterium-tritium fusion. The objectives pursued are the production of plasmas close to critical ones and the study of their physical qualities and associated technological problems. The studies in progress are described in the Appendix.

After the construction of the JT.60 reactor, the principal stages of the TOKAMAK program are the construction of a reactor for D-T fusion, the building of an experimental reactor permitting controlled fusion and the production of energy over long periods, meant for the study of materials, and tritium technology, the construction of a prototype reactor integrated with a mini power station, and finally, a demonstration reactor (Table 4). It will be possible to modify the nature and chronology of this program according to the course of the work and international cooperation. It is already likely that the construction of a reactor of noncircular section (JT-4) foreseen initially, may be abandoned in view of Japan's participation in the Doublet III project within the framework of the agreements recently discussed with the U.S.

Fusion by Inertial Confinement (FCI)

Receiving a very rapidly increasing annual budget allocation, close to 2000 million Yen, 40 million francs, in 1978, the fusion by inertial confinement is chiefly studied in the Universities of Nagoya and Osaka.

The Laser Institute of the Osaka University has been studying since 1972 the laser devices meant for nuclear fusion. After building in 1977 the GEKKO IV device furnishing a power of 2 kJ from 4 beams (neodymium glass laser) the Institute is developing for 1980 the LEKKO III apparatus (10 kJ carbon dioxide laser) and the neodymium glass laser module of the GEKKO XII device. The KONGO program (1980-1990) provides for 1984 the construction of the GEKKO XII device (20 kJ, 12 beams, neodymium glass laser) and for 1990, that of a 100 kJ device. During the period 1976-1980, nearly 4800 million yen (96 million francs), excluding salaries, were devoted to these developments. The equipment costs provided for the KONGO project (1980-1989) are 63000 million yen (1260 million francs). Various university teams, including that of the Tokyo University, collaborate in this area with the Laser Institute. Moreover, the Electrotechnical Laboratory of the MITI is studying laser-plasma interaction and is developing high-power solid lasers. Meanwhile, the Laser Institute of the Osaka University, the Institute for Plasma Physics of the Nagoya University, and the Kanazawa

34

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University are pursuing researches in the area of fusion by relativistic electron beams.

Conclusion

The Japanese program for Research and Development in the area of nuclear fusion is characterized both by the extent of the effort invested, as compared with that in Europe, and the diversity of the means involved; indeed, the principal methods are objects of studies of significant extent, although the TOKAMAK method receives the largest funds.

Japan is engaged actively, both in multilateral international cooperation within the framework of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and in bilateral cooperation, chiefly with the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless it is still very desirous of developing its exchanges with other countries, as shown by the contacts recently made with Chinese specialists.

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35