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JPRS L/8781

26 November 1979

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 46/79)

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EFFECTS OF SMARA ATTACK

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Oct 79 p 35

[Article: "King Hasan: Smara Is a Moroccan Lesson"]

[Text] King Hasan II left no room for doubt about his intentions when he selected an honorable statement by the Prophet as the basis for the significant speech with which he inaugurated the current session of the Moroccan Parliament last Friday. The Prophet's statement says, "The strong believer is better and dearer to God than the weak believer."... "Yes, a strong Morocco is better and dearer to God than a weak Morocco."

Observers here noticed the significant sense that the Moroccan monarch wanted to convey by emphasizing the strength of Morocco and the unity of its popular groups at this stage. This affirmation came only 6 days after the battle of the city of Smara in the Sahara.

Addressing the elected candidates and the Moroccan people, the king said at the outset of his speech, "We want a Morocco whose political and unionist ranks are united just as they are united today, so that this Morocco can stand as one wall and as an impregnable stronghold against all ambitious desires and against all those who allow themselves to be enticed into thinking that they can with the stroke of a pen or with a gunshot remove from the surface of the earth the plans we have been making for centuries and centuries."

With his customary diplomatic skill the Moroccan monarch addressed the Polisario and those who stand behind it without naming them. He also referred to the results of the battle of the city of Smara and said, "Morocco has always been giving lessons [to others], but, unfortunately, we see that people have forgotten these lessons. Ever since the old days and until today, the Moroccan ranks have never been split in facing a threat to Morocco, to its existence, to its borders and to its integrity. Morocco has given many such lessons, but people, God forbid, did not want and do not want to benefit from these lessons."

The battle of Smara became the subject of commentary in different political and popular Moroccan circles.

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The newspaper AL-'ALAM which speaks for the Istiqlal Party that is led by the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs M'Hamed Boucetta described the city of Smara as "the city which bonds knowledge and the holy war." The newspaper considered the attack on this city "an Algerian attack on sacrosanct Islamic objects."

In an appeal that was made to Arab parties, organizations and officials after the Smara operation by the Central Committee of the Istiqlal Party, which is considered one of the most influential Moroccan parties, the Central Committee stated, "The strong close ties between the Algerian and the Moroccan people--and especially in the area of the common struggle against colonialism--and the commitments with which we have encompassed ourselves in the ups and downs of this struggle force upon the Algerian people themselves a special responsibility."

The appeal that was made by the Central Committee added, "The non-aligned position of the remaining Arab brothers and their silence harbors weakness in facing the conspiracy to fragment the Arab land. This matter is inconsistent with the Arab peoples' unification aspirations, all of which oppose separatist trends whether they be territorial or religious."

Meanwhile the newspaper AL-MUHARRIR which speaks for the Socialist Union of People's Forces [USPF] and is led by Abderrahim Bouabid stated, "The two treacherous attacks on Smara and Oued Draa indicate that the opponents of Morocco's territorial unity have gone to extremes in a plan to escalate not only the style of the aggress, but also its nature, its means and its goals. The battalions that were used in the attack on Smara and Oued Draa, the kinds of weapons with which the attack was carried out and the intensity and viciousness of the confrontation affirm that the guerilla war has given way to a classical war that usually takes place only between regular armies."

The Executive Office of the National Rally of Independents which is chaired by former Prime Minister Mr Ahmed Osman condemned "the aggression on Smara severely and commended the officers and the soldiers of the royal armed forces for the victory they achieved."

After denouncing "the attack," the statement of the Party of Progress and Socialism (the Communist Party) which is led by Mr Ali Yata asked that the unity of Morocco's territory be completed by liberating the areas of Ceuta and Melilla. The statement said, "The circumstances which the area of North-west Africa is experiencing are quite serious. They may lead to the outbreak of a comprehensive war that would devastate Algeria and Morocco and bring about a major catastrophe that would overpower the two fraternal nations. Although Algerian leaders have refused all efforts at mediation, it has become evident that [their position] springs from an erroneous premise."

Observers here think that the Smara operation has removed the probability of any hope for mediation in the area in the foreseeable future. Informed

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diplomatic sources here stated that all mediation efforts had been suspended even before the two recent operations--that of Smara and that of South Oued Draa--because Algeria had maintained its position of considering the struggle to be one between the people of the Sahara and Morocco. Morocco, [on the other hand], regarded the struggle to be one between Morocco and Algeria.

Reports repeated recently by the Spanish and the American media about the presence of Cuban advisers in Mauritania and in the bases of the Polisario have increased the tension in the atmosphere between the two countries.

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ALGERIA

FAVORABLE OUTLOOK FOR ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH BELGIUM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Sep 79 pp 2269, 2270

[Text] For the fourth consecutive time Belgium was represented at the International Fair at Algiers, and this year the representation of more than 40 companies, federations and agencies, was enhanced by the 16 to 19 September visit of an important official mission, government spokesmen and businessmen headed by Prince Albert accompanied by Lucien Outers, minister of foreign trade.

Economic and commercial relations between Belgium and Algeria are already at a high level. Assuring them of a favorable outlook, Outers echoed Prince Albert's remarks, declaring that Belgium wanted to establish more personal ties "with a country which is our primary partner in Africa and which in years to come will be our primary partner among the countries of the Third World." Outers affirmed that between now and 1980 Algeria would become one of Belgium's 10 most important trade partners.

Rapidly increasing rates of foreign exchange between Belgium and Algeria is now on the order of 2 million dinars per year. The Belgian Office of Foreign Trade, of which Prince Albert is president, recorded that the value of Belgian exports to Algeria went from 10,340 million Belgian francs in 1977 to 12,718 million in 1978 and statistics for the first 4 months of 1979 confirm that the increase continues: 5.1 billion as compared to 4.1 billion in 1978.

While currently favorable to Belgium in spite of increased exports from Algeria of which 90 percent are petroleum products, the balance of trade will soon become favorable to Algeria when the contract for natural gas that Belgium signed with Sonatrach goes into effect in 1982.

At the 16th FIA, Belgium (and for the first time the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was at its side with three exhibitors) presented: model projects from the Belgian Office of Engineering Research as well as from assembly plants (steel, textiles, petroleum refining, extraction of natural gas, chemicals and petrochemicals, production of electricity, etc.); electrical and electronic products (for surveillance and investigation); machine tools for working metal (especially presses, lathes, and drills), etc.; metal

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products, especially of aluminum (extrusions and sheet metal); chemical products (insulation panels, paints, etc.); transport goods (semis, tank trucks); elevators; wrapping paper; textile industry goods (accessories for textile machines); water treatment products; insulating materials; heating and air conditioning; supermarket and store fixtures; plastic coverings; materials for finishing surfaces; model projects from Belgium in vocational training.

We have already many times, and especially during the official visit last 15-17 May of Henri Simonet, Belgian minister of foreign affairs, insisted on the importance of the projects now being studied between Belgium and Algeria (see MTM of 29 Sep 73 p 2575, 19 Jan 79 p 128, 25 May 79 p 1295). According to AGENCE ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIERE of Brussels, the contracts now being negotiated are worth an overall total of more than 50 billion Belgian francs. They concern construction (public housing), transportation (railways), hydraulics, housing, gas, and numerous other industrial sectors.

"Algiers," AGEFI notes, "stated it was quite satisfied with the visit of the Belgian mission and means to extend economic ties with our country, especially in the exchange of knowledge, technology, technical assistance, and training. The two parties have already decided on: (1) a major Belgian exhibition in Algiers next spring; (2) setting up an exchange system for information in hydraulics, building construction, and energy; (3) opening an office of the Federation of Chemical Industries in Algiers; (4) a visit to Belgium by the Algerian ministers of foreign trade and scientific research in the next few months.

It should be noted that Belgium Day at FIA, 17 September, presided over by Prince Albert, was a great success. The prince was received the next day by President Chadi Bendjedid and Mr Abdelghani, prime minister. Also during his visit he talked with Abdelghani Akbi, minister of commerce, Salah Goudjil, minister of transport, Abdelhamid Brahimi, minister of planning and territorial management. These discussions dealt with strengthening cooperation between Algeria and Belgium, particularly in the area of railways.

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ALGERIA

DIRECTIVES ON 1979-1980 PLANTING SEASON

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 pp 2753, 2754

[Text] The Algerian 1979-80 planting season officially began on 1 October, to close 31 December. A meeting to coordinate the various officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agrarian Revolution was held in Algiers on 1 October.

This meeting, APS noted, was held as a reminder that for the third consecutive year the country has registered a bad harvest of cereals and that this situation cannot be blamed entirely on climate conditions, but that organizational and technical weaknesses, such as not doing the work according to the times imposed by the seed varieties and the vagaries of the country's climate, insufficient utilization of the land in maintenance and organization, nonusage of elementary techniques which could affect yield, and chronic insufficiency of weeding.

The role of each organization concerned as spelled out in a ministerial directive last 23 September. The success of the season largely depends on local level scheduling and on-going follow-up on operations.

For scheduling, APS continued, a planting calendar was set out for each ecological zone: a sowing calendar by species and variety, a schedule of claims for pooled materials, as well as distribution of means of production (seed and fertilizer particularly).

The maximum manpower available from the administrative and technical agencies will be assigned to those locations during the season, their prerogatives and tasks clearly defined and for which they will be held accountable.

The directive emphasized that a well conducted planting season necessitates effective participation by all the agencies involved, MARA (Ministry of Agriculture and the Agrarian Revolution) as well as the decentralized political and administrative agencies of the governorate.

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ALGERIA

SNAGS IN FRUIT, VEGETABLE, FISH PRICE CONTROLS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 pp 2694, 2695

[Text] The embryo strike begun the penultimate week of September by fruit and vegetable vendors in Algiers had extended by the 24th to almost all the principle city markets. The strikers were protesting the application of price controls they judged "arbitrary" and were supporting 20 of their colleagues being prosecuted for breaching price regulations. The AFP reported: "We've had enough of being scapegoats," declared an old stall keeper seated tailor fashion on the empty planks of his booth. According to him, the prices set by the price control agency--as part of straightening out the large cities "wouldn't enable the vendors to even recover their expenses."

The vendors' strike ended 28 September. On that day the stands in Algiers' principle markets displayed their wares, prices were posted as required, and those prices were clearly below those of the preceding week in those same markets. However, lesser quality merchandise was offered and those vegetables which had been the subject of dispute were less evident.

As for fish, the stands were still empty the middle of last week, the fish sellers still rejecting the official prices. On 26 September there was a meeting to study problems relating to fish in the governorate of Algiers in the government headquarters, presided over by Ould Kablia, governor of Algiers. At the meeting, in which Mustapha Hachmaoui, party commissioner, also participated, were also the governorate's director of prices and commerce, a representative of the state secretariat for fisheries, ship outfitters, fish wholesalers and retailers.

In a preliminary statement reported by the ALGERIAN PRESS SERVICE (APS), the governor of Algiers noted that the purpose of the meeting was to study the problems and difficulties characteristic of the fishing industry and "to put an end to the anarchy of prices at both the wholesale and retail levels."

Following the discussion, APS continued, a table showing three categories of fish was set up, with a ceiling price at both wholesale and retail levels. The prices set, it was noted, will be authorized by a governorate decree.

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For category B (dog-fish, bonita, mackerel, sole and rates) the wholesale ceiling is 16 dinars and consumer price is 18 dinars.

Finally, for the third category, including eels, congers, octopus, angelfish, squid and mullet, wholesale prices are fixed at 8 dinars, retail at 10 dinars. For sardines the production price is 5 dinars.

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ALGERIA

ROAD CONSTRUCTION INAUGURATED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2754

[Text] In the presence of three government officials, Ahmed Ali Ghozali, minister of public works, Abdelmadjed Aochfiche, minister of urbanism, construction and housing, and Said Ait Messaoudene, minister of light industry, as well as the governor of Algiers, the national party commissioner, the commander of the military sector, and the president of the APW [Governorate Popular Assembly], the Algerian prime minister, Abdelghani, symbolically positioned on a bulldozer, proceeded on 4 October at Birkhadem to inaugurate the construction of the south by-pass which in 24 months will link Birmandreis with Quatre Chemins in the district of Boufarik.

APS noted more precisely that the 20 km-long road will start at the junction of RN-1 and the Birmandreis bypass and is composed of two sections: (1) circling Birkhadem from the west; and (2) Birkhadem, Quatre Chemins.

Traffic of this section once it is opened for use in 1981 is predicted to be 15,000 vehicles per day. The highway will consist of four lanes, with the possibility of expansion to six lanes divided by a central parkway.

Sonatro, a national public company under the Ministry of Public Works will be in charge of the construction. The expected cost is 160 million dinars.

Other projects are the eastern exit route from Algiers, the southern by-pass, and the western exit.

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ALGERIA

BRIEFS

ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK LOAN--The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has granted a \$35 million loan to the SNS (Algerian National Steel Company) to buy steel products. The contract was signed at Algiers on 19 September in the presence of the Algerian minister for heavy industry, Mohamed Liassine, by Hocine Arezki, general director of SNS, Mr Benhalima, representing the BEA (Algerian Foreign Exchange Bank), and Ahmed Mohamed Ali, president of the Islamic Development Bank. The IDB president was received by President Chadli Bendjedid and spoke with several members of the Algerian Government on developing commercial relations between Islamic countries with the participation of the Islamic Development Bank. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2626] 8860

NEW AIR ROUTE--A new air route Oran-London will be opened 28 October by the English airline, British Caledonian Airways. Liaison between the English capital and Oran will be assured by a weekly flight every Sunday. The national airline Air Algerie will cover the same route beginning next 7 November. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2754] 8860

DISTRIGAZ-GDF CONTRACT--The Belgian ministerial committee on economic and social coordination has approved a proposed agreement between the Belgian company Distrigaz and Gaz de France to receive Algerian natural gas for Belgium at Montoir from 1982 to 1985. Approval of this contract by the Belgian authorities will enable Distrigaz to honor its contract with Algeria while waiting for construction of the methane terminal at Zeebrugge to be completed. In 1982 Montoir will get 1.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas; then 3 billion a year until 1985. The methane received at Montoir will be used in France. In exchange the Belgians will use an equivalent tonnage produced in the French part of the North Sea and which then is transported to France through a gasline on Belgian territory. However, the Distrigaz-Sonatrach contract specifies 5 billion cubic meters per year, and Distrigaz must resolve the problem of the remaining 2 billion. It is generally thought that the same type of arrangement might be made with the future Netherlands terminal at Emshaven. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2754] 8860

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ANEP ADVERTISING MONOPOLY CONFIRMED--In its report to the interministerial council meeting in Algiers on 1 October, the ALGERIAN PRESS SERVICE made the point that this council, having examined "the question of advertising in Algeria as well as outside" had emphasized that "all proposed advertising must go through the National Agency for Publishing and Advertising must go through the National Agency for Publishing and Advertising (ANEP) according to the criteria conformable to Algerian policy. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2754] 8860

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MOROCCO

NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALGERIA PROPOSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Oct 79 pp 34-36

[Interview with Ali Yata, Secretary General of the Party of Progress and Socialism, by 'Adil al-Samlali: "Where Do Moroccan Communists Agree and Disagree with Regime on the Question of the Sahara? Let Us Impose Negotiations on Algeria; No One in Morocco Is Deprived of Freedom of Speech, but..."]

[Text] AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has studied the opinions of a large number of Moroccan politicians and officials regarding the question of the Sahara, and it finds that it is its journalistic duty to present the opinion of the Party of Progress and Socialism (the Moroccan Communist Party) on the question of the Sahara, on other domestic Moroccan questions, and on Morocco's foreign policy so as to complete the political and social picture that AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has been trying to convey to the reader about the conditions of this Arab country in the context of the struggle over the Sahara.

The correspondent of the magazine in Morocco met with Mr Ali Yata the secretary general of the party and addressed several questions on this matter to him.

The Party of Progress and Socialism [PPS] is the official name of the Marxist Communist Party in Morocco. It is officially licensed, and it is chaired by Ali Yata who is a veteran Moroccan politician and a member of the Moroccan parliament.

It is not strange that there be a licensed communist party in Morocco. The democratic experiment in this Arab country was able to make great progress in establishing its foundations, thanks to the sophistication and the wisdom of the Moroccan monarch, King Hasan II.

Moroccan public opinion is thus expressed in different accents and movements in a number of parties that are stretched out from the right to the left. They have considerable freedom in expressing their opinions and causes in the context of their political and ideological content.

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The fact is that the Moroccan regime, through the experiences it has had, has been able to overcome many complexes and sensitivities that would have prevented, for example, [the existence] of multiple points of view, platforms or parties in other Arab countries.

Morocco was thus able to overcome with considerable success the upheavals, the tragedies and the catastrophes that other countries in the Third World have been subjected to as a result of the closed nature of their political experience.

The question of the Sahara brought the different parties, inclinations and affiliations together on one common ground with regard to protecting national unity and defending national soil. Differences in points of view that were originally due to differences in political and ideological premises were taken into consideration.

[Our] colleague 'Adil al-Samlali the correspondent of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Morocco met with Mr Ali Yata the secretary general of the PPS and conducted this interview with him. The interview dealt with the opinion of this Marxist party on the question of the Sahara and on other domestic questions. This interview took place in the context of the interviews that AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is conducting with different Moroccan politicians on the basis of their different political and procedural positions.

The exchange that took place in that interview between Mr Ali Yata and AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI follows.

[Question] What is your view of the current situation and of the prospects of the development of the struggle between Morocco and Algeria regarding the question of the Sahara?

[Answer] It is known that friendly and fraternal countries have been engaged recently in mediation efforts between Morocco and Algeria for the purpose of overcoming the tense situation in the area. Among these efforts one must mention those of the Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba and those of Mr Yasir 'Arafat the chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO.

It is also known to us that all these efforts have failed because the Algerian leaders do not recognize the existence of a struggle between Morocco and their country, and they claim that the struggle is between Morocco and what is called the Polisario.

The fact is that the Algerian leaders refuse to communicate with the Moroccan leaders because they believe that they are in a strong position and that they are capable of forcing Morocco to surrender.

This is an erroneous appraisal because Morocco is not in a weak position as the Algerians imagine. Furthermore, Morocco is determined to defend its territory. When I say Morocco I mean the Moroccan nation in its

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entirety. I know of no nation in history that surrendered when it was quite determined to defend its legitimate and sacred rights.

The Algerians are refusing negotiations that would remove this tension. They are in effect wasting a valuable opportunity. With their conduct they may be working towards igniting a war that we hope will not take place because it will be a loss to both countries.

Let Us Impose Negotiations on Algeria

[Question] What are the prospects for the development of the problem with Algeria in particular?

[Answer] The prospects will be those that we ourselves make. It is my belief that we can force Algeria to negotiate, and we can force Algeria to recognize our rights, that is, to respect our territorial possessions.

[Question] How do we do that?

[Answer] First, we are to protect our territory by not permitting the mercenaries of Algeria to set foot on the soil of our country. This is possible because we have enough willpower and military power to protect our soil from all sides and to protect every one of its posts.

Naturally, the classical regular army would not suffice for carrying out this mission. It must be strengthened by forming groups of volunteers. Moroccan youth--and there are hundreds of thousands of them--are quite prepared to undertake this mission.

Second, we are to improve our economy in a manner that would ensure the needs of a country that is in a state of war. On the other hand, we are to fulfill the wishes and the demands of the people. Our adversaries depend on the Moroccan economic crisis. They are forcing a war of attrition on us because they are convinced that it will lead to a stifling economic crisis that would force Morocco to surrender. It is for this reason that we are advocating improving and strengthening our economy so that we may intercept [the effort to] exploit our economic crisis to eliminate us.

Third, we are to meet the legitimate demands of the masses and primarily the workers (labor) because defending the homeland and [our] territorial possessions cannot be done without the participation of the popular masses.

Fourth, we are to make a complete and a radical change in our foreign policy. Our foreign policy is one of non-alignment, but actions during recent years have proven that our foreign policy is aligned and that it is often sympathetic with the West. I cite as evidence what happened in Zaire during the two Moroccan interventions and the support that the traitor al-Sadat obtained in the days of his first initiative.

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We must, therefore, change our foreign policy, and we must make it a policy that is in practice established on the bases of independence and noninterference in the affairs of others. Our policy must support all the just questions, and it must work with a spirit of initiative for the Arab cause at whose forefront is the question of the Palestinian people.

These are the four conditions that must be honored so that our position may be strengthened. We will force Algeria to negotiate with us as our position strengthens, and then new prospects will appear.

A Poisoned Gift

[Question] Speaking of President al-Sadat, how do you view the Egyptian initiative to supply Morocco with weapons?

[Answer] We consider al-Sadat's initiative of support for Morocco and, according to his statement, the weapons that [he offered as] aid, to be tantamount to a poisonous gift that hurts Morocco more than it benefits it.

The statements that al-Sadat made on this subject while the Havana Conference was in session had a poor effect. Many of the Arab brothers believed that Morocco had gone back to dealing with al-Sadat and to denying the commitments of the Baghdad Conference. This is what forced many of the brothers to hesitate in supporting Morocco.

I believe that Morocco does not need al-Sadat's assistance. He, of course, needs the assistance of all the brothers, including the people of Egypt. We gain nothing by dealing with al-Sadat or by accepting what he claims to be offering to Morocco.

[Question] Why did you refuse to take part in the Moroccan delegation to the recent Conference of non-aligned countries in Havana?

[Answer] I refused to participate in the Havana Conference not for personal reasons as was alleged by the official report that was announced by the leadership of parliament. I refused to go for political reasons. I was not notified about the participation until 2 days prior to the departure of the Moroccan delegation to Havana.

I did not take part in drawing up the political plan that the Moroccan delegation was supposed to defend at the conference. I was also not able to obtain any information regarding this plan.

In my judgment preparations for a conference such as the Havana Conference should have been made seriously. This did not happen, and it is this that made me refuse to take part in the delegation that represented our country in Havana.

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[Question] What is the role that your party is playing in defending the question of the Sahara on the foreign scene?

[Answer] In spite of the fact that, like any opposing and completely independent party, our material capabilities are limited, our delegations are touring the world. They do not always go only to the socialist countries, but they also go to Western countries and to fraternal countries in the Arab world and in Africa to defend our national cause, to explain the point of view of our party on the matter and to fight against the assertions of our enemies and adversaries.

A Position That Is Not Harmful

[Question] What is your evaluation of the position of the Soviet Union and of the socialist countries on the question of the Sahara and on Morocco's position?

[Answer] Except for Cuba, the camp of the socialist countries in general has a positive position towards Morocco. Cuba has its own view on the subject and has its official position which it defends. It is our opinion that the conduct of the other socialist countries does not hurt the National Moroccan question. All these countries have good relations with Morocco and deal with it in various areas.

[Question] Do you believe that the good relations which tie the Soviet Union to both Morocco and Algeria can help the Soviet Union carry out an initiative that would reduce the tension in the area?

[Answer] The Soviet Union's position on the tension that is prevailing in the area is well-known. It does not view this tension favorably, and it is saying that it must be removed. The Soviet Union is simultaneously asking Morocco and Algeria to communicate with each other, to renounce force and violence and to try to solve the problem by negotiating and using peaceful means. This is the Soviet Union's official and practical position.

[Question] I mean did the Soviet Union in fact carry out an initiative in this direction?

[Answer] I believe that if the Soviet Union were asked, it will not refuse to make efforts to help Morocco and Algeria restore matters to their former course.

The Democratic Experiment Has Positive Features...But

[Question] Two years have now gone by since the democratic experiment [was begun] in Morocco. What does the PPS think about the democratic practices?

[Answer] The democratic sequence did bring about positive factors that no one can deny. Our party which had been banned for years was among the

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beneficiaries of this sequence; the socialist Union and the National Association of the Students of Morocco regained their legal status.

In the course of the sequence democratic freedoms for all citizens were recognized, relatively, of course. And it may be said that no one in our country under the current circumstances is deprived of the freedom of speech, the freedom to assemble and the freedom to establish societies within the framework of the laws that are in effect. We consider this very important, and we hope that other countries in our Arab homeland, on the African continent and in the Third World in its entirety will experience it.

This does not mean that we have reached our goal and that matters are as well as they can be in the democratic field. There are numerous weak points: elections are not above reproach; the authorities interfere in favor of the agencies that support them; and the standard of the representative institutions is below par because their powers are limited. This pertains basically to parliament.

I am not saying that parliament is a superficial institution, but I am saying that parliament is not allowed to participate fully in legislating and in overseeing the executive organization [of government].

[Question] How effective is your representation in parliament even though you are the only representative of your party in parliament?

[Answer] I am trying in parliament to carry out my mission as a representative of a group of poor people and as a fighter for a progressive party. Had the elections been carried out satisfactorily, our party's representation would have been more significant than it is at present, and I would have been able to do more than what I am doing under the present circumstances.

[Question] Are you establishing alliances in parliament?

[Answer] My contacts with the unionist brothers (the Socialist Union of People's Forces [USPF]) are continuous. I have cooperated extensively but not exclusively with the unionists, and I do try to make agreements with other political authorities.

We Are Ready To Take Part in Government

[Question] You have advocated more than once the formation of a national coalition government to confront the circumstances that Morocco is experiencing. On what basis do you see the formation of this government?

[Answer] You believe that the formation of this government has become necessary and urgent. But we cannot imagine that a coalition government

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be formed without prior agreement over a program for this government and over the means that will be given to the government to implement its program.

[Question] Have you been contacted to take part in such a government?

[Answer] We have heard that there have been official contacts with the USPF. It has been said in some circles that the monarch, King Hasan II, did contact Brother Abderrahim Bouabid, the secretary general of the Socialist Union and that he also contacted the Political Bureau of this party and also its current members. But as far as we are concerned, there was no contact.

[Question] What if you were offered [an opportunity] to participate in the government?

[Answer] We have a desire to take part in the government so we can serve our homeland in a more useful fashion. It is known that being in the government is not our only concern; we will serve the country whether we are in the government or not.

[Question] There are occasional communications between you and the Socialist Union. What is the nature of these meetings and what are their results?

[Answer] We have had numerous communications with the Socialist Union especially in the last year. We have been meeting and consulting with each other. We frequently are in agreement about serving our homeland. The results [of our communications and agreements] are evident in the common efforts of the two parties. These results became evident, for example, while the Conference of the National Association for the Students of Morocco was in session.

[Question] Where in your opinion does the popular mobilization [effort] for defending the Sahara stand now?

[Answer] We still believe in the need for popular mobilization, but, unfortunately, we notice that the authorities are not making sufficient efforts to help the masses mobilize.

[Question] What in your opinion are the political organizations from which the government must be formed?

[Answer] In my opinion this government must include all the active, genuine, national parties, that is, the representatives of all the vital forces in this country.

[Question] Does this mean that you would bear the consequences of the policy of the present government that you are criticizing?

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[Answer] Not at all. The present government is made up of three parties only: the National Rally of Independents, the Istiqlal Party and the Popular Movement. There are other parties in Morocco, such as the Socialist Union, that may play an important role. Our strong party [is another]; it has influence in several circles and especially among young people. There are other forces that are respected [by the people].

[Question] What are the solutions that your party is suggesting to get the organization of the Greater Arab Maghreb out of the crisis it is experiencing?

[Answer] The solution in our opinion lies in having the Algerian leaders refrain from interfering in our affairs. The question of the Sahara is purely a Moroccan question. If Algeria decides to respect our territorial unity just as we respect in word and in deed the territorial unity and the regime of Algeria, it may be said that the problem would be finally solved.

I believe that if Algeria accepts the notion of our territorial unity, all agreements will then become possible. Morocco will be willing to make many concessions [as long as] its territorial unity is respected. Morocco will be willing to look into all the suggestions [that are offered] including that of the common utilization of resources in this area.

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ECONOMY TO DETERMINE SURVIVAL OF NUMAYRI REGIME

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 27 Sep-3 Oct 79 pp 32-33

[Article: "Sudan: Game of Balances Has Again Saved Numayri Until Further Notice; Regime's Future Is Strongly Tied to Improvement of Economic Situation"]

[Text] Khartoum--The future of Numayri's regime is tied by a large degree to improvement in the economic and living conditions. But the political crisis is pending a fundamental solution. What is this solution and how [will it be brought about]?

Once again President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri has escaped his regime's crisis by playing the same tune: Arab and local balances. But the economic crisis that has led the regime to its predicament is still pending and cannot be postponed.

Thus, President Numayri will be able to continue for a time by spreading promises left and right, by blaming others for the regime's mistakes, by moving on the Arab arena to get aid and by misleading the Arabs into believing that his relations and ties with President al-Sadat's regime do not force him to be tied to the Camp David bandwagon.

President Numayri has promised to find a solution to the economic crisis by introducing economic and financial changes. Badr-al-Din Sulayman, the new minister of finance, has resorted to devaluing the Sudanese pound for the second time in a year. This is the second devaluation for the Sudanese pound. It has been devalued by almost one third its price this time.

But the minister's cancellation of the restriction requiring the acquisition of a permit from the Central Bank of Sudan for importation has been

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received with strong criticism here because it is believed that the decision will intensify the economic confusion and will eliminate control over the sale prices of imported commodities.

The prevalent belief is that the Sudanese president acquired some Saudi aid during his latest visit to Saudi Arabia to solve the deteriorating oil problem. Sudan's oil spending amounts to 120 million pounds annually.

The new economic and financial measures have set two official prices for the dollar. The first price is 50 piasters per dollar and is used for exports, imports and short-term (short-term) loans. The exports here include cotton, peanuts, sesame, corn and [vegetable] oil whereas the imports include flour, grains, fertilizers, tea, sugar, cigarettes and spareparts.

The second price is an incentive price of 80 piasters used for the accounts of repatriates and foreigners. It is now the right of these people to deal with banks other than the Central Bank of Sudan. This price is the same price that the dollar gets in the black market and is intended to eliminate the black market, to offer facilities to repatriates returning with money from abroad and to provide hard currencies to the state treasury.

The measures have also included the formation of a technical committee to reconsider restoring nationalized properties and companies to their owners. This means turning away from the last vestiges of the socialism that President Numayri adopted one day.

But what are the causes of the economic and living crisis being experienced by Sudan?

The truth is that there are numerous causes, foremost being the excessively and wastefully increased government spending, the administrative and financial corruption, the commissions collected by the regime's leaders and influential figures, inflation and the oil crisis.

However, there are other causes that have helped the conditions to deteriorate and caused the state treasury to incur grave losses due to mismanagement on the part of the government.

#### Story of Job Emendation

The Socialist Union, which is the ruling and the only political organization recognized officially, had previously adopted the so-called "job emendation" which is tantamount to a [new] cadre to improve the living conditions of the government and public sector employees and workers.

The first part of this cadre was applied without sufficient study and its costs exceeded all calculations and expectations, considering that they amounted to nearly 100 million Sudanese pounds (200 million dollars). This caused the minister of finance at the time to declare that the treasury could not pay the costs of the second part of the emendation.

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However, the civil servants and the workers resented this and demanded implementation of the second and final part. When the government procrastinated, they threatened to go on strike. The railroad workers did actually proceed to stage the strike and all the government and Socialist Union efforts to dissuade them, by both promises and threats, failed.

Worker demonstrations marked in the city of 'Atbarah, the main communication link (600 kilometers north of Khartoum), and political chants and slogans were raised--(parties rather than suffering) and (Major General Bashir rather than the field marshal president). Maj Gen Hasan Bashir was the number two man in the regime of Lt Gen Ibrahim 'Abbud which ruled from 1958 to 1964.

The state treasury incurred losses estimated at 4 million pounds daily and the strike caused complaint and constraint all over Sudan because the railroads are the major means of transportation (2,600 kilometers) in this vast Arab country, which has an area of 1.5 million square kilometers, and is the biggest African country. The strike, which was staged last August, caused bottlenecks in the distribution of consumer commodities which, to start with, have become scarce under normal conditions.

#### Problem of al-Jazirah Farmers

In addition to the worker crisis, an agricultural crisis also erupted. This crisis was embodied in the strike of al-Jazirah project (south of Khartoum) farmers who refused to cultivate cotton this season--this has been cooperative farmer-government cultivation since the days of British colonialism.

The government is a 50-percent partner in the project in return for its supplying services, expertise, pesticides and marketing means to the farmers.

The farmers felt that there was tampering in the marketing process and that some officials had made enormous profits [out of it]. They also felt that cotton cultivation was no longer rewarding and that the government was selling cotton abroad at a certain price and then told them that it had sold it for a lesser price to deny them the collection of their full share of 50 percent.

When the Ministry of Finance wanted to levy a certain sum on the project annually, regardless of any consideration, the farmers refused to cultivate cotton. After difficult settlements, mostly promises, the farmers returned to work.

But observers do not expect the cotton crop this year to yield more than 70 million Sudanese pounds in revenues whereas this crop has been producing yearly revenues of 220 million Sudanese pounds or 40 percent of the gross annual national income.

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As a result, the budget will suffer a big deficit whereas the farmer will not be affected that much because he has the other half of the land which he cultivates with crops which the government does not share with him. Meanwhile, the government has to pay the wages of the employees and the workers and the costs of the services that it supplies to the project.

The fact is that governmental mismanagement, laxity, negligence, the lack of planning and the lack of relations of good and sound cooperation between the government and the farmers are the factors responsible for the catastrophe that has hit the Sudanese cotton season this year. Cotton is considered Sudan's white oil.

#### Political Crisis

These, generally, are the main economic factors and the living conditions prevailing in Sudan at present. But what about the political side?

The political forces rushed to exploit the crushing economic crisis embodied in inflation and in the unavailability of the essential consumer and food commodities to point out the regime's role in and responsibility for the crisis. The popular reaction was reflected in the student demonstrations and the worker strikes.

The armed forces were perhaps the main force that the regime tried to win over to its side. In their meetings with President Numayri, the commanders and officers expressed their resentment over the widespread corruption, laxity and political vacuum resulting from the ruler's deteriorating popularity.

Numayri's reply was to assign Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Majid Khalil (42), the chief of staff, to the post of first vice president which had been vacated with the dismissal of Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim. The purpose of this appointment was to appease the armed forces and to create a balance between the regime and the army.

Numayri also resorted to bolstering the Muslim Brotherhood's ties to the regime by appointing Dr Hasan al-Turabi to a ministerial post, namely that of minister of justice, in addition to its membership in the [Socialist Union's] Political Bureau. The truth is that the Muslim Brothers (the National Charter Front) support the regime because they fear the alternative. They claim that the regime has taken an Islamic direction to justify their cooperation with it.

As for al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, he has a mutual feeling with the regime, namely the feeling that each needs the other. What is required of al-Sadiq at present is to rally al-Ansar [partisans] behind the regime. But the problem of al-Sadiq is that al-Ansar are revenge-oriented and they still seek revenge for "martyr" al-Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi who was killed by the regime in the early 1970's.

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Al-Sadiq is incapable of overcoming this thinking among al-Ansar and al-Ansar don't want their thinking to be overcome. Yes, Numayri has pleased al-Sadiq and al-Ansar by ousting Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim (the hero of [the attack on] Aba Island where al-Hadi al-Mahdi was killed) but al-Ansar are still asking: Where is al-Imam and if he has died, who is his successor? The truth is that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi does not want the imamate because if he accepts it, he will be compelled to cling to his previous demands when he used to insist that the imamate must stay clear off politics. In any case, the closest description of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi is that "he is in the opposition, but through legitimacy."

#### Attempt to Fragment Unionist Democratic [Party]

The regime is attempting at present to direct its blows to the Unionist Democratic Party by trying to win over to its side some of the personalities connected with this party in one way or another and trying to attract the party's bases that are comprised of merchants and businessmen.

In addition to Vice President al-Rashid al-Tahir who is closely connected with this popular party, Numayri has resorted to the appointment of Dr Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad to a ministerial post. Hamad is a personality with its political weight and is close to Al al-Mirghani, the leaders of al-Khatmiyah sect which forms the party's spiritual support and which is customarily sympathetic to Egypt, regardless of the nature of the regime existing in Cairo.

Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad, the current minister of communication and the candidate to replace Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim to the position of the Socialist Union Secretary General, had been previously accused of corruption, jailed and then released by Numayri's regime.

It is well-known that the Unionist Democratic Party is the outcome of the merger of two parties in the late 1960's, namely: The National Unionist Party which was led by the late president Isma'il al-Azhari and the People's Democratic Party which was led by Shaykh 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahman who became al-Azhari's vice chairman in the new party and who has been considered the party's chairman since al-Azhari's death.

But Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rahman's old age and poor eyesight have helped to highlight the brilliant role played by al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi who is now considered the party's actual chairman and the leader of the Sudanese opposition. Al-Hindi has proven his ability by rejecting the reconciliation offer made by President Numayri in 1977. Consequently, he has refused to return to Sudan from exile except on the basis of the full restoration of democracy and of a pledge by Numayri to resign.

The Unionist Democratic Party is considered the political arm of al-Khatmiyah sect. However, its leaders, especially al-Hindi, have been able to

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go far beyond the narrow sectarian affiliations and to open up to national, democratic and pan-Arab positions that have helped to broaden their popularity and not to cause it to be confined to the middle class and to the businessmen. Meanwhile, the party's spiritual leaders, represented by the sons of Shaykh 'Ali al-Mirghani, the sect's late leader, have continued to sympathize strongly with Egypt and have been compelled to appease Numayri because he is an ally of President al-Sadat.

The communist party, which is led by Muhammad Ibrahim Naqd, is now more loyal to Moscow than ever before. The party lost heavily at the popular level in the wake of his support for Hashim al-'Ata's coup in 1972 and as a result of the blow it was dealt by the regime.

In any case, Numayri's future is dependent largely on the improvement or the further deterioration of the economic situation. If this situation improves, Numayri has another chance to survive while waiting for a solution for the problem of his political isolation. If there is no improvement, surprises will occur, especially since the army commanders have their ambitions, since the parties are lying in wait and since the south is getting restless because its economic situation is much worse than that of the north.

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BA'THIST LEADER SAYS NUMAYRI'S REMOVAL ONLY SOLUTION TO ECONOMIC WOES

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 27 Sep-3 Oct 79 pp 34-35

[Interview With Badr-al-Din Mudaththir, Member of Ba'th Party National Command, by Kamal Hasan Bakhit; "Badr-al-Din Mudaththir: There Is no Way to Deal With Economic Crisis as Long as Numayri's Regime Exists"]

[Text] The Ba'th Party has its extension on the Sudanese arena by virtue of its being a pan-Arab party. The sympathy that this party receives on this arena emanates from the masses' deep faith that they are Arab and that they are an indivisible part of their nation and of its national and pan-Arab aspirations. It is natural for AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, which has already presented the views of a number of Sudanese political and partisan personalities on the Sudanese and Arab issues of the hour, to address the same questions to the Ba'th Party by virtue of the bond that ties this party with its Sudanese masses. So we conducted this interview with Badr-al-Din Mudaththir, member of the party's National Command and one of the first Sudanese Ba'thists.

[Question] President Numayri has acknowledged the presence of the economic crisis. Is this admission enough to change popular complaint in Sudan?

[Answer] To start, it must be said that this admission has come very late and after the economic crisis has taken root and has engulfed with its whirlwind all the sectors of our people and all utilities and aspects of life in the country. So, this admission is a foregone conclusion and means nothing in favor of the regime, whether politically or economically.

However, the important things that Numayri has not acknowledged are very many:

First, that this economic crisis is tied to the nature of his regime and that it will continue to deteriorate and to oppress our people, regardless of what sedatives he resorts to as long as such sedatives are based on a partial diagnosis and on justifying the crisis.

Second, that the true causes behind the emergence of this crisis lie in the fact that the regime has tied the Sudanese economy to the international

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capitalist market and to the international organizations controlled by the U. S. imperialism and the fact that the regime follows the instructions of these organizations, such as the World Bank and others.

The causes also lie in the fact that the regime has wasted the public treasury's resources on extravagant spending for the so-called May anniversary celebrations, the anniversaries of Numayri's assumption of the presidency and the anniversaries of his return to power in July 1971.

The causes further lie in the enormous salaries given to the regime's followers [al-mahasib] and beneficiaries, the members of the so-called People's Assembly and of the so-called Socialist Union and to the special security and oppression agencies.

The causes also include the fact that the loans and aid advanced to Sudan go to the pockets of the regime's leaders in the form of commissions and misappropriations and the fact that whatever remains of this aid and these loans is wasted as a result of laxity in the administrative apparatus and lack of enthusiasm among the workers who are convinced that "it is rotten at the top."

The causes further include the fact that the regime's leaders in the various phases through which this regime has gone in the past 15 years have been aware of Numayri's temperamental disposition and his fondness for the game of balances that ousts one group from power to bring another so as to maintain a balance. Consequently, this awareness has made all these leaders realize that their turn is inevitably coming and has caused each of them to think of benefiting personally as much as possible from the period of his stay in government.

The causes and aspects of the crisis are numerous but Numayri cannot acknowledge them the way he has acknowledged the presence of the crisis. Here we find Numayri at present, in his attempt to mislead the people into believing that he is working to solve the economic crisis, doing nothing other than to move along the same axes which have entrenched the crisis. He brings Badr-al-Din Muhammad Ahmad Sulayman--the communist of the 1950's who was also the attorney for a number of foreign firms and who then became chairman of the board of directors of the Sarkis Izmirilian Company and a shareholder in this company and others--and appoints him minister of finance and national economy to reform the Sudanese economy by devaluing the Sudanese pound by 11 percent of the value of the dollar and to try to extinguish the fire by pouring more oil on it [sentence as published].

The minister promises to open up to foreign capital and to give it all legal facilities and guarantees to bring it into Sudan, re-examines and liquidates the public sector establishments and opens up the avenues of the Sudanese economy to foreign and national capital.

This is why the Sudanese people are entitled to reiterate what is being now said in Sudan about Numayri planning to solve the economic crisis by expanding the base of millionaires so that his regime's base may become broader

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than what it has been so far, considering that there were only 70 millionaires in the country.

The third, and important, thing that Numayri has not acknowledged is that the crisis is very strongly tied to his entire treasonous policy at the level of the issues of the national and pan-Arab struggle, led by the issue of democracy and the central Arab issue of Palestine and the Arab struggle against Zionism and imperialism.

The link between the local domestic issues and the pan-Arab struggle has always forced itself on the two sides of the struggle in our country--the regime and the opposition--in a manner that grows clearer year after year and to the degree whereby not even the fiercest regionalists, who previously denied the presence of such a link, can now ignore the aspects and consequences of this link.

The economic crisis became deeper and more comprehensive when Numayri openly placed the regime within the U. S.-Zionist-al-Sadat anti-Arab alliance. After the Camp David accord, after the defeatist stance taken at the Baghdad summit, and after the boycott by Numayri's lackey regime of the conference of Arab ministers of economy and of foreign affairs, we have found that the popular opposition has become more comprehensive among the various people's groups, such as the workers, farmers, students and professionals. We have also found that this opposition has also turned from seasonal opposition into continuous opposition: One strike ends and another starts, student demonstrations subside only to have the worker strikes begin and develop into sit-in strikes, etc. This is happening at the same time in which the national and pan-Arab political meaning and scope of the group strikes and strikes for certain demands, of the entire popular movement and of the union organizations are becoming clearer.

Arab Aid Will Be to no Avail

[Question] How does the Ba'th Party view Numayri's endeavors to move closer to some Arab countries and will this serve him economically or politically?

[Answer] Economically, nothing can, as I have already said, bring the country out of its economic crisis under the canopy of Numayri's regime. Matters have reached the point where the following equation is dictated: There is no way to deal with the economic crisis in Sudan as long as Numayri's regime exists.

I do not think this equation needs any explanation. Everybody knows how the oil deal that Numayri concluded recently with one of the Arab countries to solve the fuel crisis, which he claimed to be the cause of the economic crisis because it led to the stoppage of work in factories and farms, did not find its way to Sudan at all and how it was sold in the international black market, and in Rotterdam Port in particular, at twice the price for which Numayri bought it--a price that has not been paid yet.

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Numayri bought the Rotterdam deal [sic] at a price of 18 dollars per barrel and sold it at 30 dollars per barrel and most of the sum [the profits], estimated at 4.6 million dollars, went to the accounts of the regime's leaders in Swiss banks. The rest was spent on the requirements of the regime's security and on propaganda and information abroad on the pretext of confronting the campaign to which the country is exposed.

Our party, the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, stresses that any aid advanced to Numayri by any Arab country will only end with the fate of the well-known oil deal that has come to be known as the Rotterdam deal.

Moreover, such aid is ultimately no more than a sedative to prolong the life of this regime, to enable it to engage in all forms of oppression and to help it perform more roles in the service of the U. S.-Zionist-al-Sadat alliance. In its final analysis, such aid constitutes an aid for al-Sadat himself and a deviation from the Arab consensus against al-Sadat's regime and against the Camp David line.

Politically, any move at the Arab level by Numayri will be no more than an attempt to mislead the Arab countries to believe that he wants to back down on his connection with al-Sadat and with the Camp David line whereas he is in fact bolstering his regime's ties with al-Sadat's regime at all the military, security and economic levels.

Numayri's Arab movement comes on the basis of full coordination and collusion with al-Sadat to serve the common goals that the two have. The foremost of these goals is embodied in the endeavor to enable Numayri to play the role designated for him in the second page of the Camp David line [sic]. The second of these goals is that al-Sadat, like Numayri, is interested in enabling the regime of his ally in Sudan to obtain Arab aid, be it in cash or in supplies, such as oil, to slow down the tempo of the deteriorating economic crisis.

The third of these goals is the attempt to benefit from the influence that some of the Arab countries have over the traditional Sudanese leaders to push these leaders in the direction of completing the so-called national reconciliation at a faster pace.

[Question] Do you mean by this al-Sadiq al-Mahdi?

[Answer] Yes, because one of the most important goals of the regime's recent domestic political measures is to prepare the climate for a strong entry into the regime by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim and his group are not against Numayri's general course and they are no less enthusiastic for the Camp David line than Numayri himself. But they have been ousted because they obstructed the reconciliation with al-Sadiq, being aware that this reconciliation will enable Numayri to further reduce their weight in the game of balances which he has mastered. This group thus embarrassed al-Sadiq al-Mahdi through the attack it launched

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against him by way of the Socialist Union's information media and agencies that were controlled by Abu-al-Qasim's group. This attack turned the reconciliation into a source burning al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and causing him to lose his popularity among al-Ansar instead of being a source for bolstering the regime.

This explains Numayri's ouster of al-Sadiq from the Political Bureau in the theaterical of the recent changes which were coupled with placing all the state resources, including the railroads, at the service and disposal of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's efforts to regain the loyalty of some of al-Ansar and to reinstate himself as their imam before returning to the regime. It is believed that this return will be strong and capable of saving the regime from its inevitable fate, especially in the wake of the recent uprising which, both Numayri and al-Sadiq are aware, constitutes the prelude [irhasah] to the coming general popular revolution.

Ba'th and Unionist Democratic Party

[Question] Is there an explanation for the joint statement issued recently by the Ba'th Party and the Unionist Democratic Party? What are the foundations on which the relationship between the two parties is based?

[Answer] This statement was no surprise for our people in Sudan. It was evident from the outset that the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party was against the National Front in its previous structure, considering that this front included the traditional reactionary right in Sudan, represented by the Nation's Party (al-Sadiq) and al-Turabi group (Muslim Brotherhood), which the Ba'th Party considered a part of the regime.

The reconciliation which started in 1977 has proven the soundness of the position taken by our party, considering the fact that the Aba Island massacres in 1970 and the execution of hundreds without trials in the July 1976 uprising which took place under the name of the National Front have not prevented agreement between the opposed right and the ruling right when their interest has required such agreement.

When the Unionist Democratic Party, led by al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, refused to get involved in the reconciliation game, this refusal constituted a clear indication of the possibility of pushing the polarization [opposition] movement in Sudan toward its progressive national and pan-Arab horizons.

The joint statement issued by our party and the Unionist Democratic Party has come as a reflection of the broad common background on which both parties stand. It is natural that coordination between the progressive pan-Arab and national forces is most strongly tied to the vastness and depth of this background. This coordination is not a superficial act but a tactical reflection of a common program, namely the masses' program in their struggle against Numayri's dictatorial regime.

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The joint statement of July 1979 defines clearly the bases on which this relationship is founded and which can be summed up in the following:

First, deep faith in the bond between the national struggle issues in our country and the central pan-Arab issues in the Arab homeland. The statement underlines Numayri's connection with al-Sadat-Zionist-U. S. alliance which is hostile to our nation, rejects all the steps taken by al-Sadat and all the liquidatory and transactional solutions for the Arab issue and abides by the Baghdad summit resolutions and the resolutions of the Arab ministers of economy and of foreign affairs in their capacity as the minimum-limit resolutions that represent the separating line between loyalty to the pan-Arab cause and pan-Arab treason.

Second, rejection of the capitalist path and underlining the socialist option.

Third, democracy for the masses. The statement declares that the progressive national alternative sought by the masses is the alternative [regime] that struggles for restoration of the masses' democratic rights and for preservation of the citizen's and homeland's dignity under the supremacy of the law and of legitimacy.

Fourth, struggle for a united Sudan in which the opportunities of social and economic progress are available, heeding the regional self-rule in the south and taking it beyond the superficial form in which Numayri's regime has imprisoned it to turn it into a real accomplishment in the spheres of development, services and of enhanced interaction and solidarity between the two parts of the country on a democratic bases founded on mutual respect and trust.

Fifth, solving the issue of the traditional sector in the country and in Sudan's semi-desert areas by utilizing this sector's resources and by providing essential services to the citizens.

Sixth, an independent course at both the national and pan-Arab levels, considering that the statement rejects leaning on any of the international walls and all forms of political and economic subservience.

Seventh, the national and pan-Arab alternative for which the masses are struggling is the alternative that emanates from the depths of our people's history, that ties their religious and pan-Arab heritage with their present, that respects the citizen's religious beliefs and the freedom of religion and of faith, that devotes its profound respect, care and attention to the religious institutions so that they may carry out their sacred and divine message, that seeks to spread the spirit of love and amity among the citizens and that treats the citizens equally in both rights and duties and does not subject them to any form of discrimination because of religious beliefs.

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These are some of the central bases on which the relationship is founded between the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party with its profound struggle and organizational experience and its pan-Arab organization and the Unionist Democratic Party with its broad masses and its historical national leadership that has been experienced in struggle and that has played a major role in confronting Numayri's regime.

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