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No. 2042

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ARAB FUNDS' LENDING UP 22 PERCENT IN FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 15 Oct 79 pp 12-16

[Text]

SPECIAL SURVEY

**ARAB FUNDS' LENDING UP 22 PER CENT
IN FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR**

The eight principal Arab development funds increased the value of their lending to Third World countries by 22 per cent in the first half of this year, to a total of about \$818 million. This was chiefly due to substantial increases in loans by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and the OPEC Special Fund.

According to figures released by the Coordination Secretariat of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the funds concluded 74 agreements with 43 developing countries, compared to 83 agreements with 73 countries in 1978 as a whole.

As in previous years, the biggest lender was the Saudi Fund for Development, which paid \$261.35 million in nine loans to eight countries; this was however 39 per cent lower than in the first half of last year (throughout this survey, dollar equivalents are expressed in terms of the exchange rates prevailing at the time).

The biggest increases in absolute terms were in loans disbursed by the Kuwait Fund, \$253.4 million, and the OPEC Special Fund, \$137.2 million. In the case of the Kuwait Fund, this represents an increase of 170 per cent over the first half of last year; the OPEC Special Fund made no loans in the first half of 1978 and paid a total of \$93.9 million in the second half.

Other funds which raised their lending totals were the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, up 152 per cent to \$65.52 million, the Arab Fund, up from \$745,000 to \$21.96 million, and the Iraqi Fund, which lent \$6.5 million compared with nothing in the first half of last year.

Lending by the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) was down 67 per cent on the first half of last year, to \$7.2 million, and by the Islamic Development Bank down 32 per cent to \$64.05 million.

Only the Kuwait Fund, the OPEC Special Fund and the Arab Fund increased lending over the half-yearly average for 1978, however. The totals for the last three six-month periods are tabulated below:

Loans extended by Saudi Fund for Development, first half 1979
(in millions Saudi Rials)

Borrower	Amount	Terms*	Project	Total cost of project
Mauritania	166.50		Kiffa-Nema road (see Kuwait Fund)	445.00
Sudan	120.16		Kenana Sugar	1,739.00
Comoro Islands	48.00		Road building	48.00
Pakistan	306.70		Pipri thermal generation	1,056.00
Bangladesh	106.00		Limestone mining	344.00
Malaysia	73.70		Oil palm and cocoa plantations and settlements	299.70
Malaysia	21.20		Five junior science colleges	86.59
Togo	16.60		Irrigation, education and health	-
Cameroon	12.30		Road building	47.26
Total	871.16			

* Terms not published

Lending by Arab development funds
(in \$ US millions)

	1st half (1978)	2nd half	1st half 1979
Saudi Fund	429.6	200.7	261.3
Kuwait Fund	93.7	104.3	253.4
OPEC Special	-	93.9	137.2
Abu Dhabi	26.0	189.3	65.5
IDB	94.8	66.9	64.0
Arab Fund	-	0.75	21.9
BADEA	21.7	31.7	7.2
Iraqi Fund	-	39.5	6.5
Total	665.8	727.0	818.0

The Kuwait Fund, Islamic Development Bank and OPEC Special Fund also disbursed a total of \$5.38 million in eight technical assistance loans, tabulated on page 15.

More than one-third of all loans were granted by the OPEC Special Fund, 28 loans to 27 countries. The Kuwait Fund came next with 17 loans to 13 countries, followed by the IDB, 10 loans to eight countries, the Saudi Fund, 9 loans to 8 countries; the Abu Dhabi Fund made three loans to three countries, the Arab Fund and BADEA two each and the Iraqi Fund one loan.

Of the total 43 borrowers, 12 were in the Arab world, 18 in Africa (they included one regional bank), 9 in Asia (this includes Turkey) and five in Latin America and the Caribbean (all from the OPEC fund).

The figures contrast sharply however with the total value of loans extended to countries in these areas. The 12 Arab nations (which, for the purpose of this survey, include the Comoro Islands) received 58 per cent of the total; this compares with only 16 per cent in the first half of 1978 but with 64 per cent for 1978 as a whole. The nine Asian countries received 28 per cent, compared with 17 per cent for 1978, while the 19 African countries and one bank received only 12 per cent, compared with 18 per cent last year. The Latin American and Caribbean borrowers received 2 per cent.

Lending by sector followed the pattern established in 1978, except that loans for agriculture jumped from \$83.56 million for 1978 as a whole to \$116.9 for the last six-month period and accounted for 14.5 per cent of the total instead of 6 per cent. The biggest sector by far was still infrastructural development such as road, railway and airport building, education and power, which totalled \$456.3 million, or 55.5 per cent of the total. Comparative figures for 1978 as a whole were \$877.17 million and 68 per cent; industrial projects received \$184.5 million, 22.5 per cent of the total; comparative figures for 1978: \$238.9 million and 19 per cent. Trade financing, which includes balance of payments support loans, totalled \$60.6 million and represented 7.5 per cent of all loans; in 1978 the figures were \$90.5 million and 7 per cent.

Taking a six-month average from the figures for 1978 as a whole, this means that in absolute terms (and assuming constant values for the US dollar), loans for agriculture jumped by 180 per cent, for industry by 54 per cent and for trade financing by 35 per cent; in the same period, loans for infrastructure development increased by only 3 per cent.

Loans extended by Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, first half 1979
(in millions Kuwaiti Dinars)

Borrower	Amount	Terms	Project	Total cost of project
Jordan	10.00	i: 4% R: 20 yrs G: 6 yrs	Dead Sea potash project with annual capacity of 1.2 million tons. Project should create 700 jobs and bring in KD 314 million in foreign exchange	122.44
Jordan	2.90	i: 4% R: 16 yrs G: 4 yrs	Project to produce 740,000 tons of ammonium phosphate and 105,000 tons of phosphoric acid per year	85.58
Syria	7.60	i: 4% R: 20 yrs G: -	Construction of highway between Aleppo and Qaza Kozak in north-east Syria	15.20
Syria	2.70	i: 4% R: 20 yrs G: 4 yrs	Construction of road between Homs and Tartous near the northern border of Lebanon	9.67
Morocco	7.00	i: 3% R: 25 yrs G: 5 yrs	Construction of Tamazaourt dam to develop 1,200 hectares of agricultural land in Wadi Sous	49.20
Mauritania	6.00	i: free R: 25 yrs G: 5 yrs	Construction of 485 kms of bitumenous road between Kiffa and Nema, part of project to link capital with five districts	37.86
Tunisia	6.00	i: 4% R: 15 yrs G: 3 yrs	Construction of open cast phosphate mine at Kaf Echfaier	21.31
Sudan	6.00	i: 4% R: 20 yrs G: 4 yrs	Preparation of 81,000 feddans of land and associated works for Kenana Sugar project	173.50
North Yemen	3.60	i: 2.5% R: 36 yrs G: 6 yrs	Development of water resources in Wadi Mawr and associated works	25.00
North Yemen	3.50	i: 2% R: 36 yrs G: 6 yrs	Technical assistance for Wadi Rima development	11.12
North Yemen	0.50	i: 1.5% R: 25 yrs G: 3 yrs	Financing 9 professional advisers and associated equipment for General Planning Organisation	0.80
Comoro Islands	1.50	i: 1% R: 40 yrs G: 10 yrs	Construction of 5.7 km road between Pomoni and Moya plus two bridges, causeways, drainage and tunnel	1.50
Pakistan	5.00	i: 3.5% R: 25 yrs G: na	Extension of Tarbela power station to raise generating capacity to 1,050 MW	105.50
Turkey	4.00	i: 4.5% R: 20 yrs G: 4 yrs	Construction of 3 km overhead transmission line across the Bosphorus linking 224 km network	15.40

Nepal	2.00	i: 3% R: na G: na	Supplementary loan for Kulekhani hydro-electric project	31.31
Senegal	1.60	i: 3% R: 25 yrs G: 5 yrs	Development of irrigation and agriculture in Debi-Lampsat	9.84
Central Africa	1.00	i: 3% R: 25 yrs G: 5 yrs	Improving road system from Bangui	7.40
Total	70.4			

Loans extended by OPEC Special Fund, first half 1979
(in \$US millions)

Borrower	Amount	Terms*	Project
North Yemen	8.70		Third highway
Egypt	6.00		Rural electrification
Morocco	5.00	i: 4%	Dam project
India	20.00		Thermal power
Bangladesh	8.50		Greater Kulna electrification
Pakistan	5.50		Pipri thermal generation
Nepal	5.00	G: 4 yrs	New international airport
Philippines	3.50	i: 4.75%	Irrigation
Burma	2.00		Hydropower
Mali	7.00		Sevare-Gao road
Zaire	7.00	G: 4 yrs	Railway
Burundi	6.60		Balance of payments support
Mozambique	5.00	na	Financing food imports
Cameroon	4.50		Development Bank credit
Rwanda	4.50	na	Balance of payments support
Zambia	4.50	i: 4.75%	Railway
Ghana	3.70	G: 4 yrs	Hydroelectric
Lesotho	3.00		International airport
Guinea	2.00		Balance of payments support
Sierra Leone	1.60		Power
Seychelles	0.20	i: 4.5% R: 15 yrs	Balance of payments support
Madagascar	6.50		Hydroelectric
Bolivia	5.00	G: 4 yrs	Urban water and sewage
Haiti	4.00		Storm drainage
Honduras	3.50		Hydroelectric
Barbados	1.50		Balance of payments support
Paraguay	1.45	i: 4.75% G: 4 yrs	Drinking water
Paraguay	1.45	i: 4%	Storm water sewage
Total	137.20		

* Unless otherwise specified, loans are interest-free, repayable over 20 years with 5 years grace.

Loans extended by Islamic Development Bank, first half 1979
(in SUS millions)

Borrower	Amount	Terms*	Project	Total cost of project
Sudan	14.00	-	Financing refined petroleum products imports	--
Algeria	10.00	-	Leasing operation to establish broiler parent stock centre	--
Mauritania	10.00	-	Equity participation in iron ore production	450.00
Jordan	6.45	-	Equity participation in industrial bank	--
Oman	6.20	-	Vocational training centres	--
Tunisia	5.08	-	Equity participation in National Bank	--
Niger	4.35	-	Financing cement imports	--
Mali	2.73	-	Financing urea fertiliser imports	--
Mali	2.62	-	Financing cement imports	--
Mali	2.62	-	Financing corrugated iron imports	--
Total	64.05			

* Terms not published

Loans extended by other Arab funds, first half 1979
(in \$ US millions or SUS millions equivalent)

Borrower	Amount	Terms	Project	Total cost of project
BADEA				
Development Bank	5.00	i: 4.5% R: 12 yrs G: 3 yrs	Help finance bank's participation in development of small and medium industries in Cameroon, Chad, Central Africa, Congo and Gabon	--
Botswana	2.20	i: 2% R: 10 yrs G: 3 yrs	Two-phase treatment of foot and mouth disease	6.25
ABU DHABI FUND				
Tunisia	56.68	i: 6% R: 12 yrs G: 4 yrs	Building two factories to produce 3,000 tons of sulphuric acid a day and two to produce 1,000 tons phosphoric acid a day	208.00
Morocco	10.40	i: 4.5% R: 20 yrs G: 5 yrs	Comprehensive irrigation system for agriculture in Gharb region	301.86
Comoros	1.04	-	Comoro Islands airport development	--
ARAB FUND				
South Yemen	14.40	i: 4% R: 20 yrs G: 5 yrs	Building 4 X 4 MW power station to electrify pumping operations in Wadi Hadramaut, plus associated transmission and other services	30.67
Jordan	7.56	i: 6% R: 20 yrs G: 4 yrs	Excavation and preparation of seven wells plus two experimental wells and main pipe to serve Aqaba and surrounding area	40.03

IRAQI FUND

Guinea	6.50	i: 3%	Extension of Conakry plastics factory	14.00
		R: 12 yrs		
		G: 3 yrs		
Total	103.78			

**Technical Assistance Grants, first half 1979
(in SUS millions or SUS millions equivalent)**

Borrower	Amount	Project
KUWAIT FUND		
Maldiv Islands	0.36	Financing economic, planning and law experts
Guinea	0.36	Consultancy services for Kunkuri dam
Rwanda	0.36	Consultancy services for road building
ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK		
PLO	0.103	Design of Al-Najah university, Nablus
PLO	0.103	Design of Islamic university, Gaza
Upper Volta	0.097	Feasibility study for petroleum tank farm
OPEC SPECIAL FUND		
River blindness Control Programme	2.00	
Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research	2.00	
Total	5.38	

A final remark about terms. Some of the funds decline to publish details of terms, while the OPEC Special Fund almost always lends at the same terms. Given the slight degree of lending by all but one of the other funds, no fruitful comparison can be made with 1978 except in the case of the Kuwait Fund. This single example suggests a relaxation of terms.

In 1978, the fund extended 13 loans worth \$194.8 million. Of these, more than half, seven to be precise, carried 4 per cent interest or more and the minimum rate was 2 per cent; less than half, six loans, were repayable over 25 years, while others matured over periods as short as 15 years.

Of the 17 loans totalling \$253.4 million extended in the first half of this year, only seven carried interest as high as 4 per cent, one was interest-free and two carried less than 2 per cent interest. Nine loans were repayable over periods ranging from 25 to 40 years and only two over less than 20 years.

CSO: 4820

NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CANARY ISLANDS REINTRODUCED AS FACTOR IN MAGHREB HOSTILITIES

London WEST AFRICA in English 15 Oct 79 pp 1882, 1883

Text The merits of the case of the decolonisation of the Canary Islands have seldom been clearly reviewed. Part of the problem has been the involvement of the Islands in the much more immediate issue of the Western Sahara and the conflict between Morocco and Algeria. A correspondent examines the problem after some new developments in the region.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT, the week before last, by Antonio Cubillo that his Movement for the Liberation of the Canary Islands, MPAIAC, would renew its campaign of violence in the islands would have come as something of a surprise to most. Furthermore, it was made in Algiers, the city where he was almost killed last year under circumstances that have never been made clear, and where he was effectively silenced following an agreement reached between the Algerian authorities and the Spanish government.

The announcement has therefore not only renewed interest in the claims of MPAIAC to represent the Canary Islanders — jolting to life once again the dispute about whether Canary Islanders are Spanish or African, and which they would prefer to be — but it has also reintroduced the Canary Islands as another factor in the hostilities that pervade north-west Africa with their attendant international implications and alignments.

Mr Cubillo's re-emergence coincides with the latest Moroccan diplomatic initiative aimed at drawing away fire from its precariously held position in Western Sahara. It involves a proposed conference of all the states that border on the Sahara, particularly those that are landlocked, Mali, Chad and Niger. The object, as King Hassan II explained in a letter to President Tolbert of Liberia, the current OAU

chairman, which was read out in part to the UN General Assembly in New York, is to discuss the possibility of access to the sea along a much more economical route than most countries enjoy at present.

In other words, King Hassan is putting up El Aiun, the Western Saharan Capital, with its already developed port facilities, as an outlet to the Atlantic. The offer is also extended to Algeria, as King Hassan suggested in a news conference after the OAU conference in Monrovia. In exchange there would be a tacit recognition of Moroccan sovereignty — renegotiated, and one presumes after a referendum of sorts — in the Western Sahara.

As things stand in the Western Sahara at present, Morocco is finding that the Polisario Front has stepped up its incursions all along the Moroccan frontier, destroying with alarming regularity most of the resistance it meets from the Royal troops, signifying something even more dangerous for King Hassan: a certain demoralisation among his troops.

The Polisario Front has just announced that its guerrillas have killed 120 Moroccan troops in an attack on the Moroccan frontier garrison of Zuk. They also claim to have taken the town of Smara, the second

largest in the northern part of the Western Sahara. Smara has been the target of Polisario Front raids for a long time, but this is the first time they claim to have captured the town.

King Hassan has had to acknowledge that Morocco can no longer fight its own battle. Since the King announced that Morocco would occupy the southern half of the Western Sahara from which the Mauritians withdrew six weeks ago, the Polisario Front has intensified its attacks on Moroccan positions and Morocco has responded by stepping up its own military activity. President Sadat has now confirmed that Egypt is sending military supplies to Morocco (he had previously suggested that he would be prepared to give assistance) while the US has now agreed to raise its military credits to Morocco because the kingdom is the object of attacks into its own territory. Previously, the US administration had been reluctant to extend aid to Morocco on the grounds that the weapons sought were for offensive purposes beyond Moroccan frontiers.

Pressure on Hassan

Not only is the King likely to become dependent on the US for military supplies, but the present conjuncture of interests between the US and Egypt over President Sadat's peace agreement with Israel suggests — and President Sadat has said as much — that pressure is being put on Morocco to reverse its condemnation of the Egypt-Israel agreement.

Essentially, the war over the Western Sahara is no longer localised, as the King would have wished. And as the variables in the conflict grow Morocco's position becomes less independent and weaker.

It is in this context, as well as that of the OAU's unclear position on decolonisation of the Canary Islands, that Mr. Cubillo's recent announcement has to be seen.

MPAIAC, which seek independence for the Canary Islands, represents the extreme end of the Islands' autonomists. When international circumstances have been favourable, they have been able to cause disruption, especially since 1976 when MPAIAC took to violent methods. Antonio Cubillo's welcome in Algiers is, however, dependent upon other more important considerations in the Maghreb and Mediterranean politics of the Algerian government. He was effectively silenced after assurances from Spain that the latter would alter its position on the

Madrid agreement. Now the Spanish relationship is undoubtedly being strained by allowing MPAIAC to renew activities from Algerian territory.

From the strategic perspective, Cubillo is another irritant for Morocco: his re-emergence adds pressure on Spain to come out more forthrightly against Morocco. The eventual target is the Spanish-Moroccan fishing agreement. This has already been brought into the limelight by the Polisario attacks on Spanish fishing vessels in Saharan waters and the abduction of a crew based in the Canary Islands. The problem will continue as a thorn until territorial waters of the Canary islands, Morocco and the Sahara are clearly demarcated.

The 1977 Fishing agreement provides finance for Morocco to set up a processing industry, to buy vessels and to establish a training school. The Spanish, in particular the major boat building and fishing companies, will provide the vessels, the expertise and the industrial plants. It has been estimated that up to 15,000 islanders have been put out of work, and the Spanish company owners have warned islanders that if they cause any disruption by striking the firms will move to Morocco.

It has been noted that Morocco has increased investment considerably over the last few years and that it has now reached an important proportion in the islands' economy. There has been a corresponding rise in Moroccan immigration into the Canary Islands.

Under such circumstances MPAIAC serves a very useful disruptive purpose. It can partially mobilise a thoroughly discontented working population, threaten the islands' massive tourist industry and finally focus on the fact that the Canaries are considered an important base for US activities. NASA has a telecommunications centre there and a nuclear submarine base is now under construction.

Whatever the eventual fate of MPAIAC, its existence has already been the driving force behind OAU consideration of the islands as part of Africa and therefore to be decolonised. In the 1978 OAU summit in Khartoum it was decided that material assistance should be given to MPAIAC.

Since then the subject has lain dormant, a fact which reflects ignorance as much as political manoeuvring. At the heart of the issue is the debate over whether the islands and the islanders are Spanish or not. Antonio Cubillo has maintained that there is an indigenous culture, and in his broadcasts from Algiers he spoke very often in Guanche, the original language of the islands but which has now been diluted to a

certain extent by both Spanish and Arabic words. One recent article* by an authority on the Canaries suggests that there is a link that is cultural, between the inhabitants before the conquest 500 years ago and the present population. Many of the artifacts are local in inspiration and origin. The economic conditions are such that there has been a considerable identification by the *canarios* with their past as distinguished from the Spaniards. There has been a degree of activity over the decades for home rule — a measure of autonomy is being granted by Spain under its present policy of decentralisation. There has, however, never been a sustained and popular support for MPAIAC, which is the only party to support independence.

The Canaries have therefore been introduced of late into African politics as an instrument of the Maghrebian power struggle. Economically — one has the fishing facilities in mind — they operate, and are used as a base of operations, as part of the African continent. Strategically they are in danger of becoming a foreign base. The local population has been exploited economically in a manner that is colonialist in the extreme. The relationship between

Spain and the islands is a colonial one; autonomy or representation in the Spanish Cortes or representation by a political group that is based abroad and which does not seem to have wide popular support is no substitute for self determination. It is with these factors in mind that the OAU and its members states should consider the lot of the Canary Islanders.

CSO: 4420

AFGHANISTAN

'KABUL TIMES' GREETES AMIN ASSUMPTION TO PARTY, STATE CHIEF

BK170629 KABUL TIMES in English 17 Sep 79 p 2 BK

[Editorial: "New Leadership Will Bring New Victories"]

[Text] Change is the principle of life. It draws life toward completion. It is on the basis of this principle that the economic, political and social affairs are in a process of change.

The statements of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA and RC of the DRA are based on this principle. On the basis of these statements Hafizollah Amin, first minister, has been appointed as the general secretary of the PDPA CC and president of the RC of the DRA.

Hafizollah Amin as the heroic personality of our party gave the command of our chain-breaking revolution, that is the Great Sawr Revolution. It has been as a result of his courageous and valorous determination that the victorious Sawr Revolution was successful and the tyranny of the treacherous Nader-Daud family ended forever.

The courage and bravery of Hafizollah Amin is best manifested in his command for the start of the Great Sawr Revolution, and also in his work within the army, to equip the young armymen with the epoch-making ideology of the working class. It has been as a result of this endeavor that our people accomplished their goal, that is establishment of a progressive and Khalqi regime.

The role of Amin as secretary and member of the PDPA CC politburo, vice premier, first minister and in charge of the Ministry of Defense of the DRA has been decisive and significant in the party and government affairs after the victory of the Great Sawr Revolution. It was Amin who organized party affairs taking care of the administrative organizations. It was Amin who has been working untiringly toward popularisation of the working class ideology in the country. His scholarly speeches and statements have been the best guide to the followers of the PDPA and the epoch-making ideology of the working class. His personality had a deep impact in the international conferences and meetings and he has played important roles in the domestic and foreign affairs.

His firmness against the enemies of the people of Afghanistan is of great importance. While talking to tribal elders recently, he said: "The main objective of our revolution is building of our country and this has frightened your enemies. They have been worried and surprised how workers, peasants, labourers, and toilers have seized power in Afghanistan and how they live in these palaces where Sardars used to live."

Raised in a lower-middle class, Hafizollah Amin has been closely associated with the people. He says: "We learn from our people and use this knowledge in their service." It has been as a result of this belief and link with the people that he, once in the years before the Great Saur Revolution, was elected as deputy to Wolesi Jirga and represented his prideful party there.

His appointment as the general secretary of the PDPA CC and president of the RC of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is good news to our people. It is certain that, at this moment while we are taking paramount steps in the process of development of our revolution, his appointment to this task will further enhance the progress and development of our society to the objectives of our party and people. His energy, valour and wisdom give us this hope and assurance that the classless society is the prime goal of our party and people, which will be met soon.

As Hafizollah Amin enjoys the full support of the party leadership and the revolutionary people of this country he will surely succeed in his objectives to fulfill the desires of our people.

Long live our prideful party and long live our comrade the commander of the victory of the Great Saur Revolution.

CSO: 4920

AFGHANISTAN

DEVELOPMENT PLAN AIMED AT BRIDGING ECONOMIC GAP

LD152300 Kabul Radio in English to Europe 1900 GMT 15 Oct 79 LD

[Unattributed Commentary: "The Regional Development Program of the First 5-Year Development Plan of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan"]

[Text] With the victory of the Great Saur Revolution, which toppled the class oppression of the Yahya Dynasty, the political power was transferred to the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and a great deal of social and economic inequality inherited from the past regimes was wiped out with the decisive support and the struggle of the toiling and patriotic classes and strata of the country, and our oppressed peasants were especially released from the exploitation of the feudal exploiters.

Undertaking the implementation of the First 5-Year Economic and Social Development Plan will surely do away with economic and social backwardness after implementation of two 5-year development plans and lay the foundation of a new and blossoming economic order and will bridge the economic gap existing between different parts and areas of the country.

As it is observed, the geographical structure and physical conditions of different provinces of the country are approximately similar. The main characteristics of different provinces of the country are unfavorable topographical features, mountainous areas, economic backwardness and scatteredness of population structure. These problems are felt in all provinces in the same forms. As a result of these geographical and population characteristics there has been imbalance between the social-economic standard of living of the people of different regions and areas throughout the country. The result of this imbalance, along with class and social oppression, is the fact that the economic development in different regions of the country has been in a primary stage and the standard of living of the people is low.

With the removal of all these problems and shortcomings, there should come a change in the ways of living of the people within the framework of the specific and long-term strategy. Within the framework of this strategy, the existence of a short cut and medium method is also possible and it is necessary that on the basis of a study of basic conditions in social development, new

formulas and new initiatives should be worked out for strengthening the infrastructure, development and the work of social-economic [?spheres], betterment of administrative affairs, coordination of development activities of various organizations and development and democratization of planning for effectuating this strategy in the long, medium and short terms at provincial and district levels.

In our country, social-economic development did not receive necessary attention in the far-flung areas of the country until the victory of the Great Saur Revolution due to the domination of antinational and antidemocratic regimes. However, after the consolidation of political view of the toilers in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [words indistinct] and regional development throughout the country in general and in the far-flung areas in particular is envisaged in the First 5-Year Social and Economic Development Plan of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In this plan, for the purpose of removing the problems of the people and raising their standard of living, the main target is to raise the level of [?gross] productivity in agricultural and cattle-raising activities with due consideration for the natural resources, workpower and existing possibilities, and growth of all production processes meeting the primary needs of the man.

All this planning and activity is aimed at doing away with imbalance and the great gap existing between the economic and social levels of urban and rural areas in a short period of time and providing ground for greater development of the backward regions of the country. It is for this reason that the 5-year social and economic development plan has included a number of development programs for the central provinces of the county. Of course, with the realization of these development programs, all-out importance will be given to the standard of living of the people of all provinces of the country.

CSO: 4920

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH CSSR--The agreement for the exchange of information between the BAKHTAR NEWS AGENCY and ORBIS of Czechoslovakia was signed in Kabul yesterday. According to this agreement, the BAKHTAR agency and ORBIS will exchange commentaries, articles and information material concerning the internal life of their countries, as well as material pertaining to international political trends. [Text] [LD142240 Kabul Radio in English to Europe 1900 GMT 14 Oct 79 LD]

EAST EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS RECEIVED--Prof Dr Abdorrashid Jalili, the minister of agriculture and land reform, met in his office today His Excellency Stoyan Radoslavov, the Bulgarian ambassador in Kabul, and discussed with him matters related to agriculture and multilateral cooperation between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Bulgarian Republic. Similarly, the minister of agriculture and land reform received for an introductory meeting today (Abu Hakim), the world Food and Agriculture Organizations's adviser in Kabul. During the meeting discussions were held about the world food and agricultural organization (?in) Afghanistan. The representative of the organization expressed his readiness to render the assistance of the organization. Similarly, Prof Dr Abdorrashid Jalili, the minister of agriculture and land reform, received for an introductory meeting today His Excellency Dezsoe Kiss, ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic in Kabul. During the meeting, matters related to the amount of wheat (?seeds) assisted by that country for the agricultural (?research) were discussed. [Text] [LD142238 Kabul Radio in English to Europe 1900 GMT 14 Oct 79 LD]

BULGARIAN ENVOY RECEIVED--Abdolkarim Misaq, the minister of finance, today met for a courtesy call in his office His Excellency Stoyan Radoslavov, the Bulgarian ambassador in Kabul. During the meeting matters related to the improvement of the accounting system and the training of personnel in the financial affairs with the cooperation of the Bulgarian Government and other matters of mutual interest were discussed in a friendly atmosphere. [Text] [LD142239 Kabul Radio in English to Europe 1900 GMT 14 Oct 79 LD]

TELEGRAM TO SPANISH KING--The Information Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that Hafizollah Amin has sent a congratulatory telegram to Madrid addressed to King Juan Carlos on Spain's national day anniversary. [Text] [GF130905 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 11 Oct 79 GF]

CHILD CENTER OPENS--In compliance with instructions on revolutionary functions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan regarding the fostering, development, and guidance of children of our country, the revolution child center at Gozargah section was officially opened this afternoon. Cutting the ribbon was Prof Gholam Mohammad Sahebi, first deputy minister of education. There are presently 12 teachers and 65 children at the center, which has the capacity for 250 children. [Text] [GF150530 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 14 Oct 79 GF]

CSO: 4906

ALGERIA

BEN BELLA'S HOUSE ARREST COULD BE LIFTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Oct 79 p 6

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "Ben Bella's House Arrest Could Be Lifted"]

[Text] Algiers--The measures abridging the liberty of the former president, Ben Bella, might soon be mitigated, if not completely lifted.

The chief of state, Mr Chadli Bendjedid, passed the word to the publishers and editors-in chief of the organs of the national press with whom he talked on Thursday, 27 September for more than 3 hours, in the presence of the prime minister, Mr Abdelghani, and the minister of information, Mr Mehri. Colonel Belhouched, inspector general of the army and member of the Politburo, made a similar communication to the man himself in the course of a visit he paid him at M'Sila, where he has been in assigned residence since 4 July.

Do these conciliatory statements reflect a genuine political intention, or are they simply meant to be just one more ploy to inspire patience in the prisoner and in those who are interested in his fate? The situation of the former chief of state grows all the more embarrassing as the anniversary date approaches with celebrations on 1 November, marking 25 years since the start of the national liberation struggle. Having Mr Ben Bella under detention of sorts, one of the nine men who played a pivotal role at the beginning of the fighting, is the sort of thing that would cast a troublesome shadow over the festivities.

"Mr Ben Bella is a free man from now on. He can move about at will within the limits of the M'Sila governorate. He may meet anyone he chooses," as the authorities specified when they made their laconic announcement of the "lifting of measures taken with regard to Mr Ben Bella." Very swiftly the truth of the matter revealed itself to be quite different.

His former lady lawyer describes as follows the condition of his life in a letter addressed to President Chadli requesting permission to call on her "client." "Military security personnel guard the entrance to the villa," she writes. "Additional ones are posted in the cellars. Still more walk their posts around the house and through the town...It still takes a lot of courage to pay a call on the president. Inhabitants of M'Sila who took the chance were rounded up by the police, his familiars were questioned and threatened."

This information is confirmed by members of Mr Ben Bella's entourage. The identity of visitors is noted, according to those close to him, his mail is opened, telegrams intercepted, telephone messages filtered, the villa is equipped with microphones, as is the car placed at his disposal. Government officials who called on him were penalized. This is why the president of the M'Sila Court of Appeals was removed after having taken this step.

Mr Ben Bella continues to do a lot of work, reading, writing, and he goes out very little. His first excursion to the outside was a visit to the mosque, where he went to pray. He has mentioned to friends two wishes he cares about particularly: to visit his mother's grave at Maghnia and to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Sometimes he comments on current political affairs to his visitors. On one such occasion he passed qualified judgment on the "clean-up" operation currently in progress throughout the country (LE MONDE, 12 September), approving the principle but criticizing certain aspects of intervention on the part of the police and the judiciary. For this he was attacked in the daily newspaper EL MOUDJAHID. The paper deplored that "the Holy Man of M'Sila" should be joining up with "the mob of exploiters and revanchists the world over" who are gunning for the Algerian revolution and use every false move it makes to make the point that Algeria "has made a poor choice of the path it follows."

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CSO: 4400

ALGERIA

BOUTEFLIKA RETURNS TO ALGERIA

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Oct p 42

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "Mr Bouteflika Has Made His Political Reappearance After Over 6 Months' Absence"]

[Text] Algiers--After more than 6 months' absence, Mr Bouteflika, former foreign minister and minister counselor to the president of the republic, has made his political reappearance in Algeria. On Wednesday, 3 October, he attended a meeting of the Politburo concerned with preparation of the Central Committee for next December. His friends, Messrs Draïa and Tayebi Larbi, were also present. Mr Bouteflika's picture is incidentally included in a photograph published on the front page of the daily newspaper EL MOUDJAHID. He appears on the right of President Chadli Bendjedid.

Mr Bouteflika, who figured among the possible candidates to succeed President Boumediene, had looked like the great loser in the turn of events at the beginning of the year. In the government formed in March he had even been compelled to relinquish the office of foreign minister which he had occupied for 14 years. Since that time he had been living abroad, dividing his time between France and Switzerland, where he received medical treatment.

He had attended no meeting of the Politburo nor of the government since the formation of those two bodies. During these past weeks there were even rumors that he had been definitively due to be eliminated from the Politburo, which could have happened at the next meeting of the Central Committee. It appears that here too, the chief of state has chosen the route of "cooling it" and that his efforts to settle the differences that have manifested themselves recently have borne fruit.

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ALGERIA

CLEAN-UP CAMPAIGN REPORTEDLY TAINTED BY BRUTALITY

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Oct 79 p 5

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "Cleanup Campaign in the Capital--The good results achieved have been tarnished by acts of brutality and misconduct."]

[Text] Algiers--The campaign of "cleanup" and struggle against "the evils and plagues of society" begun on 4 September is now under way throughout the entire country. Far-reaching activities have been undertaken in all the big cities, particularly at Oran and Constantine. Even in the small villages, retired police and members of the gendarmerie have been mobilized to teach a sense of civic duty to their fellow-citizens.

In Algiers the results of efforts mounted without interruption for 3 weeks are beginning to show. In the last few days paint-brushes taken over from the brooms. The streets having by now resumed for the most part an aspect long forgotten, the authorities have decided to address the problem of the facades of buildings and shop-windows. All through the day professionals and amateurs vie with one another in coating, plastering and sanding, whitewashing and lacquering. The shops are thus getting a brand-new look. This all seems to be going on in an atmosphere of good humor. The famous waterfront arcades, blackened and filthy, have not escaped this renovation operation, neither have some particularly run-down buildings.

This action is due to continue, even to increase. The governorate of Algiers has that decided to commit several hundred million dinars* in renovating certain quarters in the capital. Maintenance crews can be seen just about everywhere fixing street lamps that have long been dark, repainting gates and railings, curbstones and pedestrian walks. Boxes of flowers have been placed at the main intersections.

The improvement is plain to see in the transportation sector too. The arrival of 200 small buses supplied by the Belgian company, Van Hool, and the reconditioning of 100 others that have lain idle for weeks for want of spare parts and tires, have all had their good effect. Traffic moves with

*One dinar equals 1.20 franc at the official rate of exchange.

greater fluidity, with the police conducting a pitiless hunt for road-hogs and parking violations, daily lifting dozens of driver's licenses and gray cards.

All the government agencies are invited to join in the fight to improve the quality of life. The Post Telegraph & Telephone Service have announced that some 20 public phone booths will soon be in service. Previous experiences with these were disastrous, as the booths were vandalized as soon as they went into service.

A "Program of General Organization"

It would seem, then, that all the conditions were on hand for the capital to present a worthy appearance for the festivities of 1 November to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the outbreak of the insurrection so that none of the thousands of personages invited for the occasion shall be disappointed. Over and above this deadline date, the authorities plan on undertaking vast reorganizations. The Council of Ministers, meeting on 30 September, gave much time to studying a "General Organization Program for the Capital."

The good results accomplished in the last few days in hygiene, restoration of the quality of life, security and municipal services have won favorable comment as a whole from the population. There are those, however, who wonder about the limits of the notion of "cleanup" and fear that the cleaning up of the streets and building-fronts might move on to a cleanup of minds. They wonder particularly about the meaning of an appeal published on Tuesday, 2 October by the National Party Council of the governorate of Algiers, which reads: "The cleanup operation is for a limited time and will touch all areas of social life." What matters is knowing where "social life" begins and ends.

The extraordinary powers that have obviously devolved upon the police and custodians of public order are not of a character to calm these anxieties. The brutality with which certain interventions have been carried out has caused shock. This was especially the case at Aïn Beninan, near Algiers, where panels used to transform terraces into additional rooms were torn off without notice and burned, exposing the family privacy of the dwellers to the public eye, and where families were ordered to slaughter their chickens immediately. The forces of public order had obviously received word to enforce respect, by fear if need be. This undoubtedly gave rise to excesses, intrusions on privacy, needless confiscations of ID cards, which have been ill-received by the population.

Justice Caught in the Machinery

Justice, too, has been caught up in the machinery. Estimated in the thousands are the individuals brought before the magistrates on charges of

"in flagrante delicto."* The accused, mostly youths, have their heads systematically shaved and are put in irons. They are allowed to be represented by a lawyer, but as one of them told us, in almost every case the magistrate follows the ruling of the Attorney General. The habitual offenders [once arrested] are automatically sentenced, even if they have committed no new crimes. Most of the sentences include to enter the governorate of Algiers. Several work areas for picking alfalfa grass or reforestation have been opened on the high plateaus to receive the prisoners for terms of more than 6 months. Believing that rights of defense cannot be normally assured under these conditions, a certain number of lawyers refuse to accept the cases they are offered.

The authorities may claim that in an exceptional situation, exceptional solutions are required. The lack of security in the big cities had indeed reached a disturbing level. The National Party Council for the governorate of Algiers says as much in its declaration: "However much it may annoy certain detractors vainly trying to pinpoint the few inadequacies or excesses noted here and there, the positive aspects of this operation far exceed the rare negative aspects which have been carefully recorded and studied and which shall be corrected without fail in the future."

Will these correctives put an end to the affronts being inflicted--systematic searches, being taken before the police commissariat--on "unmarried couples" caught in police round-ups, especially at night? The management of a movie theater in the center of town has even taken the step of separating the couples who come to a show, girls on one side and boys on the other. Some detect here the stale smell of fundamentalism, and fear lest the cleanup operation might begin to move in that direction.

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*In a press conference the Attorney General and the President of the Algiers Court stated that 941 individuals had been prosecuted between 6 and 30 September in Algiers alone. Four hundred and fifty-two were sentenced to penalties equal to or greater than 6 months, 53 of them to 2 years imprisonment; only 9 were acquitted.

IRAN

THEOLOGIANS SEEN CONSOLIDATING POSITION

Tehran THE IRANIAN in English 19 Sep 79 pp 3, 15

[Text]

On September 12, 1979, clerical rule was institutionalized for the first time in Iranian history. Should Article 5 of the Constitution which calls for the *velayate faghih* (government by theologians) remain unaltered and the document be approved by referendum, we will have one or a group of clergymen as the highest authority of the land, probably as head of state, and this, in spite of Ayatollah Montazeri's soothing assurances.

The existing situation, on the other hand, attests to the fact that the clergy lack the expertise to efficiently administer a 20th century society and tackle its intricate system. The government's merger with the Revolutionary Council, the gradual withdrawal of the Committee powers and functions, the rising public discontent, etc., reflect the wide recognition of this.

Nevertheless, the clergy today have the strings of power tightly in their hands and are moving fast towards institutionalizing their position. But while they hold the strings, it is the secular technocrats who actually operate the system. This is precisely the pattern that is most likely to persist even after the elections.

Whether the *velayate faghih* will be the same as the presidency will be clear only when the deputies start debating the presidency. But since historically, under the 1906 Constitution, an overseeing clergymen's committee failed to survive and protect the clergy's interests, it may safely be concluded the *velayate faghih* will be in full control of all executive authority, including the military.

Yet a clerical presidency would require several conditions to maintain supremacy over the system. First, it would require very wide powers ranging from appointment and dismissal of a prime minister and his cabinet, to calls for a referendum and perhaps even the cancellation of elections and/or dissolution of the Parliament.

Second, the president would need to institutionalize his power-base among the masses, who will remain for the

foreseeable future strictly pro-clergy. Direct elections would guarantee this, since any clerical presidential candidate can comfortably outvote a secular opponent.

Third, the strengthening of clerical rule also necessitates another change in the draft Constitution. Article 142 provides for a Council to Protect the Constitution, which under the draft, has a non-clerical majority. A change to establish a clerical majority in the body would strengthen the political position of the clergy and this change will probably be made when article 142 comes up for review in the Assembly.

In general, the drive towards institutionalizing and strengthening the political position of the clergy will be quicker and from now on more marked. The reason is clear. Ayatollah Taleghani's death was a blow to all the clergymen. Ayatollah Khomeini himself who is now more concerned about their future, has begun to call once again for a speedy passage of the Constitution. And even though Khomeini may appear to be above clerical partisanship, he would like to see his own followers in office as soon as possible. With Taleghani's death, and the consequent turn of attention towards the non-dogmatic Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, this is something

THEOLOGAINS

Continued from page 3

Khomeini has to consider even more than before.

In any case changes in the Constitution are initiated more easily now that a majority in the Assembly has been established. The ease with which *velayate faghih* was incorporated in the Constitution is remarkable. While the draft Constitution never mentioned the idea in order to avoid making it the focus of public attention it was introduced behind the closed doors of the first Review Committee. The committee is empowered to deal with "the General Principles and Objectives of the Constitution." The Review Committee's chairman Dr. Beheshti's close links to Ayatollah Khomeini, his leadership of the Islamic Republican Party which is the majority party in the Assembly, and his presidency of the Assembly, all provided him with the means for speedy ratification of the articles he supports. And while the committee worked on the wording of the article, the required

Assembly majority to approve it was also being created. And by the time the proposed article reached the floor, the deputies under Ayatollah Khomeini's influence had made up their minds.

The creation of this majority in the Assembly, which is reportedly to be kept alive through the normal parliamentary practice of 'cultivating' friends and letting them know what the boss prefers (perhaps even with a mention of the fate of the outcasts such as Ghasemloo), guarantees the passage of other desired proposals.

This process has not escaped unnoticed, and is even being challenged. Dr. Sahabi, for example, is said to have boycotted some sessions in protest. These developments have also led to the formation of another public forum for debating the Constitution. The Muslim People's Republican Party now holds regular Friday meetings at its headquarters in Tehran, perhaps to exert public pressure on the proceedings. Rahmatollah Moghaddam-Marghei, deputy from Azarbaijan with close ties to Shariat-Madari and the party (see story page 6) was the first

speaker at the meetings. The question of *velayate faghih* was criticized at the last meeting, in particular by Maraghei himself, who said Taleghani's views on this subject were totally ignored and that the article was too hastily approved.

And while institutionalization of the clerical hold over the system is taking place in the Assembly with "Allah Akbar" after every successful vote call, government influence in administering the country is gradually rising.

Only last week, responsibility for the prisons was taken away from the Committees and handed over to the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, arrests of government officials by the Committees have also been prohibited.

And less exposed to public view, the Gendarmerie is hiring more personnel in order to eventually take over law enforcement functions from the Pasdaran. The military is gradually being reorganized, with encouraging signs of border control. And Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi has privately said he has solved the problem of contradictory pronouncements on foreign policy issues, especially those involving Ayatollah Montazeri.

The continuation of these trends should take us to a situation with clergymen heading the overall political system (either through a presidency or a powerful overseeing body), and a secular head of government running the system.

Ayatollah Khomeini's recent calls for unity between the university intellectuals and the clergy can be explained in this context. It is time he feels to blend science, technology and modern management with Islam. In fact, as clergymen become more familiar with the problems and intricacies of administering society, they themselves will tend to reach this conclusion. The government's merger with the Revolutionary Council, which led to the appointment of clerical deputies in the

ministries, has proved to the clergymen that realistic solutions to the nation's problems are necessary if genuine welfare is to be achieved.

So as the Constitution debate moves ahead and the clergy increasingly fill the seats of power both in Parliament and the executive branch they should become more aware of the real needs of our society and more tolerant of the secular technocrats, many of whom have been called "corrupt."

The more ambitious clerical figures will join the political club, and once there, face the real issues. And with a demanding public, it is difficult to imagine them surviving on pure dogmatism. We can expect to see greater secular content to the solutions offered by Islam. []

CSO: 4920

IRAN

VETERAN DISSIDENT BARAHENI SLAMS PGOI'S POLICIES

Tehran THE IRANIAN in English 19 Sep 79 pp 8, 10, 11

[Text]

Reza Baraheni was one of the best known critics of the Shah's regime, especially outside Iran. One of the many Iranian intellectuals to have been tortured, he is among the lucky few who was released because of international pressure brought against the regime. An Azarbaijani he is an internationally known Iranian poet, critic, writer and thinker whose works have been translated into many languages. He returned to Iran during the Revolution after teaching English Literature in the U.S. for several years and has just authored a new book, The Iranian Revolution: What Was and What Will Be. Following are the excerpts of an interview he had with Hamid Nazari of The Iranian.

Q. Can our national uprising be called a true revolution?

A. Yes, and it is a very deep revolution. It has touched not only Tehran and Tabriz as the Constitutional Revolution did or the second Revolution after World War II, i.e. the uprising for self-determination that lasted all the way up to 1953. There has been a recognizable pattern in all the revolutions in Iran. The people who participated in the revolt in Qom were not numerous. But in Tabriz, hundreds of thousands of people came out. And who were they? They were the young people, that is students, including those

from the mosques, and the newly-migrated population of the city. There were as many as 200,000 of them. Then there were women and workers, and finally the bazaaris. Because this happened in Azarbaijan it cannot be seen as a purely religious movement. If it was a religious movement, then from Qom it would have gone to Mashhad, the largest religious city in the country. But it went to Tabriz. Those people who look dialectically at history, have got to find a reason for this. Later, particularly after Black Friday, the pattern in Tabriz was repeated all over the country on a wider and deeper basis. What is most interesting about this whole movement is that the same pattern existed during the Tobacco Rebellion. And at that time, Azarbaijani soldiers didn't want to shoot the people, so they got Persian soldiers to do the killing. In other words, the army breaks up first, because of people who belong to regions other than Tehran. So you see, the Revolution in Iran is a combined revolution. It's not the revolution of one nationality, but of several nationalities.

If there had been a bourgeois revolution in this country, the autonomy and the self-determination of all the oppressed nationalities would have been guaranteed. This is what happened in Europe. These people would have created their own nation-state. So, the bourgeois revolution in this country has not been completed.

Q. What is preventing this development?

A. There can be no bourgeois revolution without an independent bourgeoisie which we do not have. What exists is a totally uneven situation. You have both the richest and the poorest person in the world living here. There are no facilities for the masses, but you have a minority living in palaces that even the Europeans

cannot dream of. On top of this inequality there are several nationalities striving together for a revolution. If the bourgeoisie wants to give the people democracy, this will take society straight into socialism. Democracy in this semi-colonial society means having factory committees, army committees, self-determination for the various nationalities, nationwide elections, etc. This is what the bourgeoisie should be providing. Had we been in Europe, all this would have been given to us. But in a semi-colonial state, democracy and socialism are completely intertwined. Look at Cuba before Castro. He in fact had a bourgeois programme for the country before the revolution, but as soon as the revolution succeeded society demanded and moved towards socialism. There is simply no other way. If you want democracy you will end up with socialism. If you want socialism, you must have democracy. This is very important in understanding the position of the intellectuals in this country. I know of no intellectual in this country who is not a socialist. No matter what government we have – bourgeois, petty bourgeois or clerical – and no matter what democratic steps it takes, it will be pushed towards socialism. Of course it can adopt socialist programmes under the name of Islam, which will be accepted and understood.

Q. But specifically what reforms must be carried out?

A. By solving the land problem in this country you will automatically solve the problems of the Kurds, Turkomans, most of the Azarbaijanis, and Baluchis. The nationalities in this country have several problems. In

A. ... you have the oppressed nationality problem, as well as the working class problem. Go to Kurdistan and you have the rural and the religious problems. In Khuzestan there are one and a half million Arabs, generally at the bottom of the social scale, and besides this there are religious and cultural problems. How is the government going to solve all these problems? The solution is to let these nationalities solve their own problems, by giving them their democratic rights. We keep talking about the Palestinians. What have the Palestinians been deprived of? Their lands? So have the Turkomans. Their language? So have the Turkomans. Their cultural identity? So have the Turkomans. So the Shah's regime was Zionist. The central government does not have any responsibility to the Turkomans. Let them solve their own problems.

Q. Why is the government not doing this?

A. It is wrong to say that all members of the government are in favour of this. I do not see a single person inside or around the government who understands what self-determination for oppressed nationalities means. The least they could do is go and read what we have written about the nationalities. I have volunteered to sit down and discuss these problems with anyone in the government. Today the government can end the Kurdish revolt, but it cannot solve the classical problem of Iran's history. So why not solve the problem once and for all in the Constitution? I cannot think of a constitution which would not acknowledge the existence of several nationalities in this country, and deny them their democratic rights.

Q. Does not the draft Constitution acknowledge this?

A. The draft says there are *aghvam*. *Ghom* is an anthropological term. A

ghom is part of a nation. But we are a country of nationalities each of which has a separate and identifiable culture, folklore, language, manners, customs, music etc. If you want to solve the nationalities problem, you will have to move towards democracy, which means going towards socialism. Can the present government afford this? This is why it is always looking for alternative solutions. With several nationalities living together, you must have an independent bourgeoisie. But you need finance capital for an independent bourgeoisie and the mechanism to turn money into finance capital does not exist in this country. So you always stay dependent and are driven to exploiting your own working and peasant classes. In fact you end up exploiting everybody. Consequently, whatever system you have, with whatever name, it will still be a form of monarchy. In fact it will be oriental despotism. In other words you must move towards democracy and socialism, in which case imperialism cannot touch you. But unfortunately the government is moving towards dependence on global imperialism. The greatest sin against the nation is that these people have banned the free newspapers, got rid of democracy and dialogue, and deprived themselves of the learning of intellectuals.

Q. What is the impact of the Islamization of society on our masculine history and women's rights and liberties?

A. Masculine history is another name for oriental despotism. This is intensifying in Iran and other Islamic countries. But you have to realize that the exploitation of women began long be-

fore Islam. It was founded on the patriarchal system of monarchy in this country. And for 25 years we were under the pressure of Westomania, with the mass media promoting foreign values. In the case of women this was even more pronounced. The family itself is an exploitative institution here and is dominated by the man. Women have been deprived of thinking independently. The monarchy itself provided the best example of this exploitation. While the Shah said he was for equality, every time he walked out of an airplane, his wife was a few steps behind him. He believed a two day old boy should be crowned as king, but his own wife could never become queen. There is also an economic dimension to this. Women suffer most because they carry the burden of the family and society on their shoulders. Islam must find an economic system, which can create economic equality. One either solves these problems or sells the country to imperialism, which is what the Shah did. Obviously the answer is socialism. But let people keep religion which is so important to them.

Q. Are we moving towards socialism?

A. I don't think so. I think most of the religious leaders have an abstract notion of an economic system in which everybody is equal. But you have to be objective, and to do that you must maintain a dialogue with the intellectuals.

Q. But if socialism is the solution and the regime is not moving towards it, what will happen?

A. If the regime does not move towards socialism, it is doomed to failure. They will have to go back to a very repressive dictatorial regime and if that happens, it is the end of Islamic culture. If they don't give economic equality and freedom Islam will bear

the taint of injustice forever. Can they take that risk? By simply holding on to power, they may move in the direction of tyranny. For the first time in 1,400 years they have created an Islamic state with the approval of 90 per cent of the people and not just a minority. If they have the support of the whole nation but don't provide for equality, then it will be difficult to mobilize people with the same principles in the future. That will be the end of Islam. And where does one go from there? One alternative is a dictatorial regime of generals such as in Chile, but that would not last for long. Or if we imitate the socialism of the Soviet Union we will end up with another form of the Asiatic mode of production which is called Stalinism. We don't want that either. It is here that the intellectuals become very important. These 20th century intellectuals are deeply rooted in Iranian and Islamic culture, and at the same time have good knowledge of the West, the Soviet Union and China. They are the ones who should run the country. The clergy could always invite them, but they feel threatened by these intellectuals. Fortunately Iran has created an intellectual class. Our intellectuals are much more intelligent than those in Turkey and this is because of the multinational structure of the country. We have the biggest number of students in the West. If there is democracy they will come back. We can make a heaven of this country.

Q. Will we ever have an independent bourgeoisie which you say is essential for democracy?

A. No I don't think so. But we don't really need the independent bourgeoisie. What is the independent American bourgeoisie doing for the 25 million blacks, the Indians or the intellectuals? What we have to do is change the structure of government and give

the nationalities the right to have their own elected assemblies where they decide what they need. They can use the central government for help -- a true federal system.

Q. How do the intellectuals, many of whom have returned to Iran, feel now?

A. Some of the intellectuals who came here have now left because they feared repression. Doctors and professors have been disappointed. Most of the intellectuals who came here have good opportunities abroad. And while foreign governments have spent no money on training many of our intellectuals, they inherit them because of what is going on here. All the money spent on specialists in this country is going down the drain as they leave.

Q. What is your attitude towards the West?

A. Our society is making a great mistake by denouncing all that is Western. There are many Western things we can identify with. The struggles against imperialism, despotism, a police state, torture, government excesses, etc. also exist in the West. We should remain in touch with the Western struggles that are today similar to our own. There is a lot we can learn from each other in this exchange. I oppose my dear friend Al Ahmad's thesis that anything Western is alien and must be rejected. There are many parallels that we could use here. {}

CSO: 4920

KUWAIT

PLANNING MINISTER EXPLAINS CONSTRUCTION SITUATION

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Aug 79 p 5

[Article: "Minister of Planning Muhammad Yusuf Al-'Adasani at a News Conference: No Reduction in Government Spending and No Decline in Services Projects; 1.9 Billion Dinars for Construction Projects Over the Next 5 Years; The Defects in Quality of Services Due to Population Growth at a Record Rate of Up to 10 Percent; Population of Kuwait Will Reach 1.4 Million People Next Year"]

[Text] Minister of Planning Muhammad Yusuf al-'Adasani has categorically denied any decrease in government spending on the services sectors and other sectors in the country. Speaking at a news conference yesterday, the minister said that the funds allocated for Section Three, which pertains to projects and construction over the next 5 years, amount to 1.9 billion dinars, of which 397 million dinars have been allocated in this year's budget. He said that in addition to that there was an increase in uncategorized expenses and costs in the housing sector to the tune of 117 million dinars, bringing them to a total of 1.115 billion dinars.

At the instruction of his highness the amir, the minister added, projects have been drawn up to complete the services needs of the 4th and 10th regions and the Al-Jahra' region. The Ministry of Planning, on commission from the Higher Commission for Projects and Structural Planning and in coordination with the municipality and the other ministries concerned with services, is now carrying out urgent services in the area. A sum of 204 million dinars has been set aside for this particular phase which includes the completion of major roads and sewage, electricity and telephone networks. Of this total, the sum of 23 million dinars has been allocated in this year's general budget.

Non-vacating of Occupied Houses

Minister al-'Adasani said that the reason for the delay in implementing services in those areas has been the non-vacating of occupied houses or the non-occupation of others. He added that all occupied houses in al-Jahra' have been vacated. Thus, all impediments to the first phase have

been removed. In the 4th region, the construction of major roads is now in the final phase while the construction of the other roads is proceeding according to schedule.

He said that the unoccupied houses which form a hindrance cover an area of 49,716 square meters, including an area of 11,759 square meters of unoccupied houses and real estate in Abra q Khitan. In Julayb al-Shuyukh, 70 out of a total of 150 houses have been vacated. The area of unoccupied real estate in that location comes to 44,571 square meters. There are as well 61,632 meters of unoccupied spaces, in addition to 55 occupied houses, in al-Manqaf. In al-Fintas, the area of unoccupied real estate has reached 40,725 square meters, and in al-Mahbulah, it has reached 48,888 square meters.

10 Percent Rate of Population Growth

In reply to statements that there is a deficiency in the quality and kind of services provided by the state, the minister explained that the population of Kuwait is growing at an annual rate of up to 10 percent, although this rate has not exceeded 2.5 percent in Egypt and India, which are considered to be suffering a population explosion. He said that the increase in the birth rate is up to 4.5 percent among Kuwaitis and 2.2 among residents. To this should be added 3.5 percent of newcomers per year. Such a rate of growth in the population, he said, creates definite deficiencies in the quality of services.

The minister of planning went on to say that every 3,349 working newcomer supports 6,651 dependents; that is to say, the total comes to 10,000 persons serviced by 687 individuals, broken down as follows: 141 for educational services; 125 for medical services; 142 for security and judicial services; 167 for personal, household and janitorial services; and 112 for maintenance and repair services.

This number of people requires 1,450 residences, 39 hospital beds, 34 elementary school classes, 31 preparatory school classes, 8 secondary school classes and 3 mosques.

The minister went on to say that this number of people also requires 41 million kilowatt hours of electricity and 603,000 gallons of water daily, in addition to 4,723 tons of food materials annually, not to mention durable and semi-durable commodities such as cars, refrigerators and so on.

Vicious Circle

The minister said that his ministry is now in the process of setting forth the framework and structure of a housing policy. Unless this policy is carried out, he said, we will continue to be in a vicious circle. He said that the education policy receives great attention from his highness the emir and his highness the crown prince, and the prime minister, especially

with regard to the development of human resources. There is also a plan to increase investment of such human resources on the medium and long term in order to meet the future needs of the country. He added that the return of good capabilities and efficiencies will be the best means of investment. He also affirmed that the government is concerned with enabling its sons to receive a good education in order to be able to utilize them in the event of the depletion of other resources.

1.4 Million People

The minister of planning pointed out that the ministry is presently preparing a general census which is scheduled to be conducted in April 1980, when the population--both citizens and residents--is expected to reach 1.4 million people. He said that the ministry over the past 3 years has laid down medium- and long-range plans. He said that the ministry is coordinating its efforts with other ministries with regard to several matters, including the housing policy.

11,000 Vacant Housing Units

Turning to the real estate sector, the minister said that in January the ministry conducted a field survey of that sector because it felt that a setback might befall it as a result of the rush of construction following the 1975 housing crisis. He said that the survey showed that there are 5,566 housing units for rent, that 4,441 units are being scrapped, and that there are in addition 1,123 vacant units of private housing. Of these units, there are in the capital 468 units for rent and 743 units that are being scrapped. In Hawla, there are 4,064 for rent and 3,079 units are being scrapped. In al-Ahmadi, there are 1,034 units for rent and 619 units are being scrapped. The total number of vacant housing units is 11,130.

Discontinuation of Government Construction

The minister went on to say that the number of housing units planned by the General Housing Authority which are being scrapped is 2,884 units of middle income and lower income housing and 3,948 units of Arab-style housing. The houses built by the State Properties Administration of the Ministry of Finance or those built as part of the housing projects of other ministries and government agencies total 123 family apartments, 336 efficiencies for singles, 206 residence blocks for singles and 830 family apartments. He said that the government, because of its concern for the private sector in the real estate field, has decided to discontinue all government building undertaken by the Ministry of Finance.

A Lower Increase in Rents

The minister turned to the question of rent increases for medium size houses, saying that in 1975 rents increased by 49 percent over the 1974 rates and increased by 15 percent in 1977 and 1976. But the rate of increase went down in 1978, he said. He added that since 1975, the state spending on housing increased 70 times against a 30-fold increase in income by the state.

9254

CSO: 4802

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KUWAIT

LLOYDS ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT HORMUZ CONTROVERSY

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Aug 79 p 1

[Editorial by Jasim Ahmad Al-Nisf: "We Can Fight Robbery With Awareness"]

[Text] Random and chance events sometimes leave in their wake consequences which affect the future of a person, a state or an area. Sometimes they pass unnoticed. Over the past two days, Western news agencies and media reported two ordinary incidents which carry, however, a special significance.

One incident concerned an explosion in an empty tanker, the other was about a fire in a second tanker in the Gulf. Since the eruption of the oil boom in our region, fires and explosions in oil wells or tankers have been common and have been routinely classified as incidents caused by technical errors or weather and environmental conditions. The media, both Arab and Western, did not bother to pursue such incidents and relegated them to the section of miscellaneous news.

For a fairly long time now, ever since we freed ourselves from economic and political domination and began to utilize our resources freely and independently, the West has been mounting a severe blackmail campaign against us, a campaign aimed at our political and economic independence, in which it has tried to convince the world that the oil states are trying by their oil and economic policies to strangle the world through increasing oil prices.

Apparently the West was not satisfied with a long series of threats of military intervention in the area, but adopted other methods as well. The latest such method was its attempts to raise the cost of living for the peoples of our region by various means, including raising the prices of the manufactured goods which we import in an attempt to regain our return from oil exports and the successive series of major world currency devaluations. The latest story is the attempts by the British Lloyds Group to raise the shipping insurance fees in the Gulf region on the basis of the dangers which threaten the region's security.

We can thus see that the West, which has not been satisfied with the exploitation of our national resources for a long time, is trying by all means and step by step to rob us again. This we reject. Accordingly, we need to take a well-considered step or steps and to maintain great awareness in order to confront the attempts of Lloyds and others which might try anew to exploit the two chance incidents in order to launch a new rabid campaign.

9254
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KUWAIT

PLANNING MINISTER REPORTS FINDINGS ON FEMALE POPULATION

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 30 Aug 79 p 4

[Article: "An Important Report About Kuwaiti Women in the 15-29 Year Age Bracket; 42 Percent Are Unmarried and 50 Percent Illiterates; Only 9 Percent Are Working, 19 Percent Are Studying and 72 Percent Are Housewives"]

[Text] At his news conference the day before yesterday, Minister of Planning Muhammad Yusuf al-'Adasani reported on a number of research studies conducted by various competent authorities in his ministry on a number of economic, social, agricultural and other affairs. The studies have been distributed among various government agencies and they include an extremely important study, the results and recommendations of which should not be underestimated, especially since it concerns the training and preparation of Kuwaiti women between 15 and 29 years of age.

According to the report, there are 65,108 women in this age bracket, that is 27.6 percent of all females in Kuwait, according to the 1975 census. Of these, 38,000, or 58 percent, are either married, divorced or widowed, and 27,307, or 42 percent, have never been married. The non-marriage phenomenon, it must be noted, has become a world-wide one and not a situation that is confined to Kuwait or the Third World alone. It is due to the difficulties and complications as well as the increasing costs of marriage in the present age. The study shows that 50 percent of the women in the above-mentioned age bracket are illiterate and that about 72 percent of them are not working--this at a time when the Kuwaiti women in this particular age bracket should be an important part of the human resources but do not in fact enjoy a decent level of efficiency, in spite of the state's need to utilize every single human resource which can be put to work and participate in the process of development.

Planning the Future of Kuwait

The study says that the planning of Kuwait's future should address itself to the question of how to prepare a generation capable of undertaking the requirements and burdens of development and growth and capable of coping with all its responsibilities in all the scientific, economic, agricultural

and social spheres. The study places the burden on the Kuwaiti family on the grounds that the family has a basic role in bringing up the generations of young Kuwaitis who will constitute the pillars of the future. The study also defines the role of the state machinery in this up-bringing process by means of the health, educational, social and other services that the state can offer; but, it believes that the state's role is secondary to the family's. The study affirms that to allow a family to shirk its responsibilities in bringing up the children either because of ignorance or lack of education, or to place the burden of the responsibility of up-bringing on governesses or servants will inevitably lead in most cases to juvenile delinquency and an increase in psychological and social problems among the young.

The study emphasizes that if the state showed interest in the family and provided the capabilities which would enable the family to carry out its duties, the state would be saving itself a great deal of future expenses and treatment of psychological and social problems which would beset children and young people in the future.

The Mother's Responsibility

The study notes that if the family, that is the parents, bears the responsibility of bringing up the child in the various stages of his age, then the mother's responsibility in this aspect is greater and clearer in the early stages of the child's growth, since the mother is closer to the child in his early years. Therefore, any education and instruction given to mothers will have a clear impact on the up-bringing of the child and therefore on defining and forming his future personality.

Educating and Preparing Young Women

The study goes on to say that both the developing and advanced nations are concerned with educating and preparing young women to face the requirements of family life in its full dimensions. The means of preparing young women differ from one state and one society to another in accordance with the life styles, values and traditions which govern families in any one society. In Spain, for example, the training of young women for family life is compulsory. A young woman is required to spend a period of time at a training institute before marriage, during which time she would be instructed in the various aspects of housekeeping, in addition to training in bringing up children. The young Spanish woman is not allowed to get married until she has completed that training period successfully.

The training of young women is not confined to government efforts, for in most countries of the world civil groups, especially feminist groups, carried out considerable activities in this field. Some of these activities might be jointly mounted by the government and such civil groups.

The Training of the Young Kuwaiti Woman

The study notes that there are, no doubt, experts which are active in the field of training and preparing Kuwaiti women, although this is being done in an incomplete manner. Some social organizations, especially feminist groups, hold training courses with the aim of training young women in certain activities, such as sewing and dressmaking. There are however, no overall programs which would prepare young women to be successful housewives, wives, and educated mothers who will be able to run the affairs of the family and bring the children up on the basis of education and scientific knowledge, since such a task is part and parcel of the process of utilizing our human resources and therefore is part of the plans and programs of many advanced and developing nations.

Dimensions of the Problem in Kuwait

Some people wonder if Kuwait was indeed in need of this kind of utilization of human resources, so we shall review certain facts about the Kuwaiti woman, especially those women who are in their early years of marriage or are about to get married or are mostly in the 15-29 age group. These facts throw light on the dimensions of this problem in Kuwait.

42 Percent Unmarried

The number of Kuwaiti females in this age bracket is 65,108 according to the 1975 census, that is 27.6 percent of the total number of women in Kuwait. The number of married women or women who are divorced or widowed, supposedly with children, is 37,801, that is about 58 percent of that age group. The number of women who have not been married is 27,307 or 42 percent of that age group.

50 Percent Illiteracy

An analysis of the educational standards among Kuwaiti women in this age bracket shows, according to the study, that more than 50 percent are illiterate, in addition to 19.6 percent who can barely read and write or who have elementary education. This means that about 70 percent of all Kuwaiti females in the 15-29 age group are in need of training, education and instruction.

A Lower Percentage of Working Women

In terms of employment, we find that no more than 8.8 percent of women in the above-mentioned age group are working. That is to say, 91.2 percent are not working. If we take into consideration that among this group of women there are 12,282 girls who are pursuing various levels of education--secondary, technical and university--that is about 19 percent of the total, we find that more than 70 percent of the women in this age group, that is about 47,000 women, either married or about to be married are staying at home, and the majority, that is about 32,000 women, are illiterate.

Social Status of Kuwaiti Women

Age Group	Unmarried	Married	Divorced	Widowed	Status Unknown	Total
15-19	18,112	7,104	125	16	-	25,257
20-24	6,902	14,179	365	92	1	31,529
25-29	2,293	15,343	414	162	-	18,212
Total	27,307	36,626	904	270	1	65,108
Percentage	42	56.2	1.4	0.4		100

91 Percent Outside Work Force (Including 19 Percent Students)

Age Group	Working	Not Working	Other	Total
15-19	403	24,952	2	25,357
20-24	2,811	18,717		21,528
25-29	2,504	15,708		18,212
Total	5,729[sic]	59,377	2	65,108
Percentage	8.8	91.2		100

Analytical Survey of Educational Status

Age Group	Illiterate	Literate	Elementary	Intermediate	Secondary	College	Unknown	Total
15-19	962	1,072	5,497	8,113	1,072	-	1	25,357
20-24	11,216	1,232	2,064	3,111	3,590	323	3	21,539
25-29	11,816	1,327	1,586	1,264	1,578	638	3	18,209
Total	32,634	3,631	9,147	12,488	6,240	961	7	65,108[sic]
Percentage	50.1	5.6	14	19.2	9.6	1.5		100

The Pressing Need for Guidance

The study points out that Kuwaiti women in this age group represent a significant part of Kuwait's human resources and that they do not enjoy a decent level of efficiency, in spite of the state's need to utilize every single human resource that can be put to work and to participate in the process of development. Since the family is the basis of society, as the constitution provides, then taking care of the family and providing it with all guarantees that would enable it to perfect its children should be a basic goal of this society--a goal that should not be confined to raising the material level of the family or providing it with more services, but should also include the means of preparing all members of the family by training and developing their capacities to undertake the functions of a family in the best possible manner. Since the Kuwaiti woman is one of the pillars of the family, then there is a pressing need to train, instruct and guide her so that she may be able to undertake her duties and functions as a mother and housewife and as the person most directly responsible for the up-bringing of future generations.

The Responsibility for the Solution

The study notes that the solution of this problem is not only the responsibility of the state, but it is also the responsibility of social organizations, especially civil feminist organizations, which are required to promote and provide this kind of service since they are best equipped to train and prepare Kuwaiti women within the framework of well studied and overall programs.

We hope that Kuwaiti women in the above-mentioned age group will be able to reach this honorable standard in the near future thanks to the efforts of all those who are concerned with probing the problems of women.

9254
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KUWAIT

NUMBER OF WORK PERMIT CANCELLATIONS RISES

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Aug 79 p 4

[Article by Husayn Salamah: "The Final Cancellation of Work Permits Is 249 Percent More Than Last Year; 2.8 New Workers Enter the Country for Each Worker That Leaves Permanently"]

[Text] Muhammad al-Shadnan, assistant undersecretary for labor affairs at the Ministry of Social Affairs, has stated that the rate of final cancellation of work permits this year is 249 percent more than last year. He said that for each worker leaving the country finally there are 2.8 workers. He pointed out that Arab workers in Kuwait are more permanently settled than Asian workers. He expressed the belief that the decision number 37 for 1979 of the minister of social affairs, 'Abd al-Aziz Mahmud, with regard to organizing the issuance of work permits for the civilian sector is the result of the experience acquired by the ministry and is in line with its understanding of the conditions of the employment market at this particular time. He said that the administration for the organization of the working force actually monitors the rapid, continuing, and overlapping changes which accompany the ebb and flow of new numbers of workers arriving in Kuwait, as well as in renewing the work permits of others and the transfer of workers from one establishment or one sector to another.

Decrease in Number of Applications

Al-Shadnan noted that April, May and June saw a decrease of 2.6 percent in the level of applications over the previous 3-month period. He said that the decrease was most pronounced in the number of work permits, which dropped by 27.5 percent from its level of last year. There is also a decrease of 65.2 percent over the same period last year of applications for transfer to the government sector or for employment as a house servant or for applications to join the head of the family.

Increase in the Percentage of Departures

Al-Shadnan added that there was a noted increase of 19 percent during that period in the number of applications for newcomers as well as a very high

increase of 249.5 percent in the number of final cancellations and departures of foreign workers.

An Increase in Market Demand

The official also pointed out that for every worker leaving the country finally, there are 2.8 new incoming workers. He explained that there is a continuing increase in demand in the Kuwaiti employment market for production workers, for ordinary workers, and for workers in the field of transportation. The increase in the number of workers who entered the country in the 3-month period mentioned before is 76 percent.

Women Workers

As to demand for women workers, al-Shadnan said that such demand does not exceed 1.9 percent of workers who entered the country in the period mentioned. Further, he said that most of these female workers are engaged in clerical or secretarial jobs.

He emphasized that Kuwait, as a full employment market, should pay attention to the ages of the workers who enter the employment market, since the market requires workers of a full-production age, that is young workers. He said our studies, therefore, show that the highest percentage of newcomers to Kuwait is in the 24 to less than 28 years age group. In this age group, the percentage of newcomers is 25.8 percent, whereas 86.1 percent of the total newcomers who come to Kuwait to work are under 40 years old.

Renewal of Permits for Arab Citizens

Al-Shadnan said that workers from Asia constitute the highest percentage of workers arriving in Kuwait, but the highest number of work permit renewals in April, May and June was for workers from the Arab countries. Of new workers arriving in the country, he said, Asians make up 61.3 percent. In terms of work permit renewals, the percentage among Arab workers was 57.1 percent, whereas it was 41.2 percent among Asian workers.

Al-Shadnan ascribed this to the fact that workers from Asia leave the country upon termination of their work contract or the completion of the project on which they had been working, whereas the Arab worker settles in the country for a longer period and some of them, in fact, reside in Kuwait for many years.

The Higher Wage Level

The official said that the wage level of workers whose permits have been renewed is higher than the wage level of workers who have just entered the country. But the highest wage level, he said, is among that group of workers who earn between 150 to 200 dinars a month.

9254
CSO: 4802

MAURITANIA

MINISTER DISCUSSES SAHARA POLICY, ISRAEL, ECONOMIC PLANS

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 26 Sep 79 p 11

[Interview with Foreign Minister Ahmed Ould Abdallah of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania by Bara Diouf and Hamadoun Toure; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Mauritania has decided to follow a policy of strict neutrality from now on toward the conflict in the Western Sahara, a conflict in which it was formerly involved.

We would like to hear your views on the political, diplomatic, and naturally, the military consequences of this neutrality.

[Answer] In removing itself from the conflict in the Western Sahara under the terms of the 5 August agreements signed with the POLISARIO, Mauritania renounced all territorial claims on the Sahara. By the statement of 13 August 1979, Mauritania withdrew physically from that territory and consequently entered into a status of strict neutrality. The Military Committee, and foremost of all Prime Minister Haidalla, in taking this position of neutrality, did so for the primary purpose of strengthening peace and then attending to the country's domestic problems. On the diplomatic level, their main concern is to remain aloof from the conflict and see to the country's territorial integrity and independence.

On the military level, this neutrality means an army so reorganized and reinforced as to remain vigilant in defending our national territory. In short, being neutral means doing everything possible not to become involved in this conflict. This is what Prime Minister Haidalla understands by neutrality, and I must add that there is broad national support for the position taken by the CMSN [Military Committee for National Safety].

[Question] Despite what you have just said, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania's borders do place it on the front lines of this conflict. This means it will be difficult to maintain your neutral stand. For this reason, we should like to know what you think of King Hassan II's statement calling for a summit conference of all countries bordering on the Sahara for the purpose of settling what he calls the "Western Sahara problem."

[Answer] As you say, this position of strict neutrality is indeed a political position that may appear difficult. In actual fact, an effort is required in this matter just as in all other matters.

Since we initially proclaimed our position of strict neutrality, we have received the support of many countries, and foremost among them was France which officially announced its support on 29 August 1979. Thus this position of neutrality has already received the backing of many friendly countries, in addition to the national consensus which, in our view, is the fundamental factor.

As for the conference you mentioned, Mauritania is so preoccupied with its domestic problems that it has yet made no decision. This is a matter within the province of the Military Committee which is Mauritania's supreme political and legislative authority.

I simply know that while being neutral, we still hope to see all parties affected by this conflict meet in a way suitable to them in order to reach a peaceful solution.

[Question] After these questions on Mauritania's political situation, I should like to touch upon the subject of the recent Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Havana at which you represented your government. As you know, this conference has been the subject of much controversy. Some persons claim Castro wants to change the nonaligned movement into one aligned with Moscow. Others, namely the moderates, believe it is more a question of being oneself than of choosing between Washington and Moscow. I should like, if I may, to ask you your general opinion of that conference from the standpoint of its results as well as the way it was conducted.

[Answer] I must say that from an organizational standpoint the conference was conducted under the best possible conditions. I believe we must objectively acknowledge this. Obviously, in a conference of this type there were several currents of thought and several currents of opinion. Being the conference organizer, Cuba did have a key role, and unquestionably the Cubans did play an essential role. In the view of some, the chairman sought from the very outset to impart a style to the conference by the way he arranged the order of debate. In the view of others, this was a rule that exists everywhere.

What I can say is that the conference was dominated mainly by the Kampuchea and Middle East issues. Unfortunately, commentators have paid no attention to these two aspects and depicted the conference as a duel between progressives and moderates.

But the main part of the conference was concerned with these two issues.

Basically, the majority of the delegates favored strict neutrality outside of any alignment with Western Europe, or America, or the Soviet Union. The majority of the countries wanted true nonalignment. And I really believe this view prevailed.

[Question] Excuse me for bringing up a sensitive subject, namely the expulsion of Moroccan diplomats from Nouakchott. What were the reasons for this action and what is its significance?

[Answer] I thank you for giving me the opportunity to explain myself for the first time in public on this point. Mauritania first asked for the replacement of Moroccan citizens deemed, with irrefutable proof, to be persona non grata because of their activity and inadmissible conduct. Mauritania did not wish to aggravate this action. For that reason, in our note to the Moroccan embassy, we stressed our desire to maintain friendly cooperation and our desire to pursue towards one and all a policy of peace and strict neutrality. I must add that the Military Committee, its chairman and our prime minister, Lieutenant Colonel Haidalla, are very desirous of maintaining a policy of neutrality in the region. Since the advent of peace, they have committed themselves to rebuilding the country. They have remained cool and collected at all times. I trust that our Moroccan friends will continue to help us maintain this policy of strict neutrality.

[Question] A bombshell exploded last week on the African political scene. It was detonated by Andrew Young who, while agreeing that Africa, within the OAU, should support the PLO in its basic demands which he personally considers justified and legitimate, suggested at the same time that Africa initiate a dialog with Israel. What do you think of his suggestion?

[Answer] As far as Mauritania is concerned, the conditions that justified the break in the Israeli-African dialog have not changed. The Palestinians and their sole and legitimate representative, the PLO, are deprived of their right of expression. All of the forcibly occupied Arab territories continue to be forcibly occupied and the holy city of Jerusalem is still not under Arab sovereignty. These three conditions combined warranted the break in diplomatic relations between Israel and Africa, and all three remain unchanged. Hence, in my opinion, and based on what we know at the present time, Andrew Young's suggestion is not justified. I believe Africa has already given him its answer.

[Question] What are Mauritania's current concerns?

[Answer] The prime minister has repeatedly set forth Mauritania's main concerns. The first is to strengthen peace and then attend to the country's internal problems, first and foremost of all, the rebuilding of our economy.

We are firmly determined not to deviate from this program.

Any attempt by anyone at all to disturb us will receive the response it deserves. The Mauritanian temperament is a peaceful temperament. But the Military Committee will defend the national interest by all possible means. That committee's impetus and major courses of action have resolutely broken with past practices, namely the practices of beating about the bush or supporting one neighbor against the other.

As long as our neighbors fail to understand this fundamental change in our diplomacy they will always be beside the point, if not one generation in arrears.

Let me reiterate that I am convinced the Military Committee is committed to strengthening peace and settling our internal problems in a good neighbor spirit and in strict neutrality. The committee has called for understanding by all countries of the region and is sure its call will be heeded. I am convinced it will do its utmost to be heeded.

Our economic concerns within the framework of national reconstruction include: first, increased impetus to investment in the interior of the country, mineral prospecting, reorganization and rehabilitation of our industry sapped by a demagogic policy of nationalization, fisheries, and the revival of rural projects, particularly agricultural projects. Beyond these national concerns, Mauritania is engaged with Mali and Senegal in a vast program sponsored by the OMVS [Senegal River Development Organization].

The subregion's future depends on this program. My country is determined to move ahead in coping with both national and subregional problems.

8041
CSO: 4400

MAURITANIA

LEADERS FACING URGENT FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 8 Oct 79 pp 44, 45

[Article by Mireille Duteil: "A Peace Full of Ambushes"]

[Text] "Is it true that the start of the next school year might be particularly lively at Nouakchott?" On hearing this abrupt question, the Mauritanian minister frowned and took his time before answering calmly but with a certain twist: "You know, people have been talking about this for two months now. This subject is old hat now." One thing is certain: For the time being, the political atmosphere is all hearts and flowers in Mauritania. But there are few who believe that this will continue.

Foreign threats are fading now and disquiet is no longer being sustained by the noise of weapons at the borders. However, domestic policy issues quickly took the limelight and keep people thinking.

There are two major concerns on the eve of the resumption of the school year which had been postponed to mid-October: The economic mess and the issue of national unity.

Last May, the government proposed to step up Arabization in the secondary schools. This project was like an explosion: The black African high school students went out in to the streets to demonstrate against the spirit and adoption of this measure. By the end of September, the commission, established according to the directives issued by the head of government, Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, charged by him with drafting specific proposals for an education reform, had not yet filed its report. And there was doubt at that time that it would be able to do so before the school year was scheduled to start again.

However, emergency measures were necessary if one wanted to avoid new frictions between the Mauritanian and the black African communities which are divided on the issue of the language to be used in teaching. They determine the atmosphere as the school year starts again and the return to the schools in turn will act like a barometer for the

resumption of political activities in Mauritania. The people are not fooling themselves: The language issue is only the tip of the iceberg. It does not outline the full scope of the battle for power which the various Mauritanian political clans are fighting by means of intrigues and maneuvers.

If school starts again without any major disorders, the prime minister will be able to rack up a point for himself. He will have proved that he restored confidence and he will have won the game. He tried very hard to demonstrate that the neutrality, proclaimed by Nouakchott in the conflict in the Western Sahara, was received favorably both in Mauritania and beyond the country's borders. During a press conference on 11 August, King Hassan II declared in rather enigmatic terms that "within a month or a month and a half" we will know whether peace has been definitely restored in the region. In the light of that, certain people in Mauritania deduced the idea that, by setting these deadlines, the Sherifian sovereign was hinting at the threat of new tensions in Nouakchott on the occasion of the resumption of the school year. There was further cause for worry now: The Mauritanian authorities on 23 September demanded that Rabat recall three Moroccan diplomats stationed in Nouakchott who supposedly established contact with "pro-Moroccan" opponents.

To put the instruments of their neutrality in place, the Mauritians had to run a real race. Starting on 13 September, Moroccan detachments, with the exception of several hundred of men, left Mauritanian territory. At the end of September, the exchange of ambassadors between Algiers and Nouakchott was considered imminent. However, Mauritians and Moroccans reaffirmed their determination to continue their economic cooperation. Thus Rabat was getting ready to receive close to 700 Mauritanian students for the 1979-1980 college year.

"Morocco and the POLISARIO Front have an interest in helping us maintain our neutrality in order not to push us into the arms of the adversary," it was explained to us by Mr Moulay Ould Boukreiss, minister of planning and fishing, when we asked him whether his country really had the means for assuring its neutrality. For Mauritania, the presence of Moroccan armed forces in Tiris El-Gharbia, close to its northern border, did represent a certain danger. In case of a clash between Moroccan soldiers and Saharan guerrillas, might not Rabat be tempted to pursue, into Mauritanian territory, the guerrilla fighters who, in turn, might consider Mauritanian soil as their rear base or at least as "transit" territory? "I do not think that the fighting men of the POLISARIO Front would be interested in crossing Mauritania in order to get to the Western Sahara," the minister assured us.

Fully aware of this vulnerability, Mauritania is firmly huddling under the French "military umbrella." "We do not desire the physical presence of French military personnel on our soil," the Mauritians declared. "That would be embarrassing for everybody. But we do need air protection

for our territory." Paris has given assurances that "the Mauritanian borders of 1960" would be defended against any aggressor. As a matter of fact, considering the position of "neutrality" assumed by Paris-- which now seems anxious to maintain good relations with all of the parties to the conflict--it is quite improbable that France would intervene militarily. It is precisely France's diplomatic weight which is assurance of peace for Nouakchott.

Is it not this rediscovered confidence in a peace guaranteed by Paris which just persuaded the Saudis to release their share of \$60 million in financing for the Guelbs iron mineral exploitation project? Likewise, Ugine-Kuhlmann and a Japanese company are supposed to start prospecting for uranium in the northern part of the territory by the end of the year. Besides, the recent visit of the Mauritanian prime minister to Paris made it possible to release the funds promised several years ago by the French for development projects in agriculture (F30 million), telecommunications, and fishing. In particular, F15 million in financial aid will be made available to the Mauritanian treasury. In recent months, financial aid from the Arab countries has become quite rare.

In particular, Colonel Qadhdhafi had his ears pulled last September. It is true that he has several points on which he can reproach Nouakchott. Oblivious of the secret agreement entered into at Tripoli last May, between Libyan and Mauritanian representatives, Nouakchott and the Polisario Front find their accord at Algiers on 5 August. But above all President Qadhdhafi proposed to send his soldiers into Tiris El-Gharbia which was to be returned to the Polisario Front in order to help the fighting men defend it.

But, in spite of the small volume of expected aid and the urgency of solving certain economic problems, the Mauritanian leaders do not want to worry. They have decided to tighten their belts.

5058
CSO: 4400

MOROCCO

NATIONAL STUDENT UNION MEETS, DENOUNCES POLITICAL OPPRESSION

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 14-20, 21-27 Sep 79

[New Executive Committee Chosen]

[14-20 Sep 79, p 11]

[Text] The 16th Congress of the Moroccan National Student Union (UNEM) elected the following members of its executive committee:

President, Mohamed Boubekri; Vice President, Abdellah Bouchtaoui; Vice President, Omar Ben Ayach; Vice President, Yahya Bouabdallaoui; Assistants to the Vice President: Mohamed Ismaili, Messaoud Bouich, and Aissa Ben Attabou; Vice President, Larbi Ben Abdellah; Vice President, Ayouch Mouhcine; Vice President, Mustapha El Alaoui; Assistants to the Vice President: Hassan Soussi and Mohamed Benceur.

[Excerpts from Final Resolution]

Representatives of the Moroccan Student Movement, meeting at Rabat for the 16th Congress of the UNEM from 31 August to 6 September,

1. Reaffirm their determination to carry on with the struggle on the basis of the principles which have always guided UNEM during the 23 years of its existence as an integral part of the people's liberation movement in our country.
2. Affirm their mobilization and declare themselves ready to defend the integrity of the homeland (...) and ask the rulers to give over their procrastination, hair-splitting, and the narrow self-interest that has thus far marked their every action in this field, and from which our country has reaped only diplomatic defeats and a lengthening roll of human victims, all of which clearly exposes the real inadequacy of the ruling classes to their task of achieving national unity on the scale

required by present-day historical circumstances. Similarly, they affirm the need for opening military camps to train the masses, including the students, so that they may prepare to go to the front of the armed struggle against the mercenaries and their paymasters. (...)

They further demand the implementation of a global strategy in which all components of the organized masses of the people may participate, both so as to consolidate positions and move to the offensive at the military level, and to link action in the field with diplomatic action. [They ask] that all this be done along with all-out military preparation (including consolidation of our defense potential) and reinforcement of the domestic front. This can be done only as part of a global mobilization of every potential our nation can offer, material and human, within the structure of social justice and participation by the masses in the decision-making process, in execution, and in control.

3. They remain convinced that the dialectic of events stemming from the national liberation process and the process of mass struggles to impose its will for true democracy, for social progress, and for political sovereignty -- that that dialectic is such as to push the whole of Moroccan society into forward movement. On this basis, they totally support the struggles of the working class to improve its living conditions and gain respects for its rights and hard-won prerogatives, and demand that the rulers rescind all measures taken against the working class, including layoffs, suspensions, and trumped-up charges.

4. Issue a warm appeal to all the national and progressive parties to join in a broad front to struggle against all manifestations of political authoritarianism, and the anti-democratic and absolutist practices which typify the exercise of power by the state, thereby forcing:

liberation of all political and labor prisoners, and promulgation of a general amnesty covering all prisoners and exiles;

abrogation of all arbitrary laws and measures which interfere with individual and collective public liberties;

establishment of true democracy based on respect for the will of the people and the right of the masses to orient and supervise their rulers.

They hail the heroic struggles of liberation movements against imperialism, Zionism, racism, and reaction throughout the world, be it in the Arab Middle East where the Arab masses of Palestine struggle under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in collaboration with the Arab masses under the banner of the Lebanese National Movement against American imperialism and its Zionist offspring, or

in Africa where the people of Zimbabwe are fighting the Rhodesian racists, or again in Namibia and South Africa.

They declare that they stand shoulder to shoulder with these peoples and their liberation movements until they achieve their goals of national sovereignty and liberation.

6. They consider themselves an integral part of the liberation movement for democracy that reaches around the world and which is beginning to overthrow reactionary and puppet regimes on many continents, achieving initial victories in Iran, Nicaragua, and Equatorial Guinea and in other countries struggling for democracy, liberation, and human dignity.

[21-27 Sep 79]

[Report on UNEM Executive Press Conference by Ahmed El Bergmi]

[Text] The executive committee of the Moroccan National Student Union held its traditional press conference on Tuesday 18 Sep at the organization's headquarters. Several representatives from the national and international press and from chancelleries and liberation movements, as well as a large number of students, attended the conference, which was called to release a summary of the work of UNEM's 16th Congress, which restored its structures to the Moroccan student movement after 6 years under a ban.

The new UNEM president opened by underscoring the point that merely holding this 16th Congress, after the arbitrary ban that had lain upon the UNEM for 6 years, amounted to a crown of victory for the struggles of the student masses, who stood firm beneath all the blows rained upon them by local reaction in an attempt to turn them away from their natural role in the struggle for the establishment of a people's democratic university and in solidarity with the masses of people who aspire to build a free and democratic society, banishing forever the exploitation of man by man.

"The legal ban in no way dampened the determination of Moroccan students to force compliance with their legitimate demands. The student masses, through their union and through their associations, mounted a coordinating action at the national level, and through it fuelled unified struggles throughout Morocco's university as a whole. The ban was lifted on 9 November 1978 as a consequence of the Moroccan student movement's struggle at home and abroad, and of the support given the students by national and progressive parties, as well as by the active solidarity of the international student movement." (...)

"The Congress, which brought together 380 delegates and some 160 observers, broke up into several committees including those on instruction, on organization, on the final resolution, on union affairs, etc..."

Our serious, democratic discussions, said the UNEM president, once more gave proof of Moroccan students' deep awareness of their responsibilities. (...)

On the matter of instruction, the Congress agreed that the system of instruction in our country is a natural secretion of the economic, social, political, and cultural situation, which channels the choices of the dominant class toward the exploitation and alienation of the individual.

The Congress in other action unmasked the education policy in our country, which is designed to distort reality and to keep the student in subjection... It laid bare the bankruptcy of the school system which has clung to the backward colonial content it inherited from the protectorate.

Transforming the University

Scorning the repressive and unscientific nature of the curricula and teaching methods used in the school system, the Congress emphasized the need for transforming our university into a national university responsive to the nation's needs, an instrument of liberation from economic, political, and cultural dependence, a democratic, people's university that can welcome all the children of the common people whom the present class policy robs of their right to continue their educations. The only way in which this can come to pass is through scrapping the selection and elimination system at all levels of education.

Democracy in education will not come about solely with the scrapping of the classist school system quantitatively, said the president; it will also take the establishment of qualitative democracy closely linked with the content of the education dispensed and the degree of student participation in the management of their schools and the setting of curricula.

Further, our struggles and that of the national and progressive parties must be oriented along two main channels, said the UNEM president:

1. liquidation of the classist school system;
2. building the national democratic university.

Bringing Democracy into the School System

Liquidation of the classist school system can come about only by bringing democracy into education, and that, in turn, can be done only within the framework of political democracy for the nation. And while the latter is necessary, it is not sufficient, because it must be coupled with economic and social democracy.

As for building the national democratic university, said the UNEM president, its aim must be to make Morocco's university a central beacon for liberating culture. And if the university is to accomplish this vital mission, it is imperative that it be brought out of its present isolation which the rulers would deepen in any way they could. The university must become a great forum for the propagation and expansion of education for the people, the very opposite of the present design of the Moroccan university today, which is the private preserve of privilege. When this is done, our educational system will have taken on its true national democratic features. (...) This goal can be achieved only through massive struggle by the people at every level, in which the UNEM will participate side by side with all who yearn for change.

Nevertheless, said the UNEM president, until such time as this goal becomes reality, we must struggle to win the greatest possible number of material and moral victories for the student masses, and work to open the road to the democratic national university.

Concerning organizational problems, the UNEM president announced that the 16th Congress had done a great deal of work on organization as a tool for mobilization and struggle, taking into consideration the number of students (80,000) and the multiplication of campuses as well as the aftermath of 6 years under the ban. (...) After reaffirming the organization's principles -- progressive, mass-oriented, democratic, and independent -- the Congress adopted new patterns of organization tailored to the quantitative reality of the student sector and aimed at consolidating participation among the rank and file, effectively and efficaciously, in the management of the organization, in the definition of its militant position, and in the mobilization of every ounce of its energies to put its resolutions into practice.

The UNEM president recalled, in conclusion, that the 16th Congress adopted a general resolution containing the positions of the Moroccan student movement on a number of issues at the national, Arab, and international levels. The Congress, he said, expressed the conviction of Moroccan students that the dialectic

of the events stemming from the process of national liberation, as well as from the struggle of the masses to make the will of the people prevail in the achievement of social progress and democracy, is great enough to propel the overall evolution of Moroccan society forward in the right direction.

"The Congress, with this as its foundation, affirmed the commitment of Moroccan students to territorial unity, expressed their constant determination to defend the nation's territorial integrity, and called for the opening of training camps for the masses, students among them, so that all may contribute to the struggle against the mercenaries and their paymasters. It also dwelt on the need for abandoning the irresponsible line and the line of narrow self-interest pursued by those who rule us, and from which our country has reaped only isolation and diplomatic defeat." The Congress also reaffirmed its active solidarity with the Moroccan working class in its struggle to improve its living conditions, respect for its rights, and preservation of the prerogatives it has won. It reiterated to those in power its demands for the nullification of all arbitrary measures (layoffs, dismissals, and trumped-up charges as a basis for illegal trials) taken against the workers.

A Broad Fighting Front

"And considering that the delegates are aware of the fact that our country is going through a critical phase in its history," said the UNEM president, "the 16th Congress addressed a militant appeal to all national and progressive forces to join in a broad front to struggle against political oppression, against the anti-democratic and absolutist practices typical of the behavior of the state in our country, and for the liberation of all political and union prisoners, a general amnesty for all under sentence, including exiles, and repeal of all the arbitrary laws and measures which limit public and individual liberties, as well as the establishment of a genuine democracy based on respect for the sovereignty of the people and for the right of citizens to direct and control governments..."

"And in view of the fact that to Moroccan students the Palestinian question is a national issue, the 16th Congress affirmed its effective and absolute support for the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian revolution in its bitter struggle against world imperialism, its by-product, Zionism, and its ally, Arab reaction."

And inasmuch as the Moroccan student movement is an integral part of the tidal wave of the democratic liberation movement

that is sweeping across the world and which has begun to carry away before it some of the reactionary and puppet regimes on all the continents, the UNEM president concluded, the Congress reaffirmed its militant support for all national liberation movements fighting for independence, liberation, democracy, and social progress.

After this summary of the proceedings of the 16th UNEM Congress in Rabat from 31 August to 6 September, the UNEM president answered several questions from representatives of the national and international press.

He stated that the 6 years under the ban had in no way altered the mass nature of the UNEM, nor will it affect it in any way in the future, because the Moroccan student movement has assured its continuity in various forms and through the implacable struggle of the student masses.

To a question from the PLO representative concerning the UNEM's "Palestine Committees," the UNEM president replied that these committees are still active and that, in any case, the Palestinian cause is a national cause of the whole Moroccan people, just as much as is the cause of territorial unity.

The representative from the Eritrean Liberation Front voiced his surprise at the fact that there had been no mention of Eritrea in the course of Congress deliberations. But the UNEM president pointed out that the report on foreign relations deals with the question, and considers the Eritrean revolution a national liberation movement and therefore voices its total support for the Eritrean people fighting for their freedom and independence. The closing resolution of the Congress makes mention of UNEM's unwavering support for all liberation movements struggling for independence, democracy, and progress, of which the Eritrean revolution is indubitably one.

6182

CSO: 4400

SUDAN

COMMUNIST LEADER FORESEES DECISIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN NEAR FUTURE

Beirut AL-NIDA' AL-USBU' in Arabic 16 Sep 79 p 12

Interview with Ibrahim Zakariya, member of the Central Committee of Sudanese Communist Party, by Sulayman al-Dirani, date and place not given⁷

[Text] Events in Sudan over the past year have elevated the struggle of the masses there to the level of open, full-scale confrontation against the regime in power. Until then, that struggle had been occurring in various forms either among the ranks of the army or in trade unions and in various areas where the regime sought to stir up ethnic and communal strife.

Under the cover of "combatting communism," the regime mounted campaigns of mass arrest against compatriots in every area and street; in fact, it went beyond that to strengthening religious and sectarian groups that pay homage to it to create the illusion that the struggle that is taking place is one between these religious and sectarian forces and the patriots and democrats.

Last month's demonstrations and processions, which were one of the high points of that confrontation, reaffirmed once again that any hope by the regime to remain in power will be doomed by the political and economic scene which engulfs it. Those demonstrations did not stop at demanding a change in the economic policy of the regime, but they went further to demand a political change, too, especially a change in the policy of being subservient to the United States, the World Bank and the West, as Al-Sadat has done in Egypt.

AL-NIDA' was able to interview Comrade Ibrahim Zakariya, member of the Central Committee of the Sudanese Communist Party and assistant secretary general of the World Trade Union Federation, to discuss the present situation in Sudan as follows:

[Question] Khartoum and other Sudanese areas have recently witnessed several mass protests which added up to a threat to the regime. How do you see the development of such a protest movement in the future?

[Answer] Before looking downstream to where the situation in Sudan might lead, it is necessary to talk about the objective conditions which have caused this situation. As you know, the present economic situation in Sudan is very poor and has become intolerable. This condition, however, has a political background which is fully understood by the recent protests which were mounted by the workers, farmers, and all the professional organizations, such as intellectuals, doctors, lawyers, teachers and so forth. The economic situation in Sudan is, of course, not isolated from other conditions there, especially from the regime's political orientation. It is well known that after the apostasy of 1971, the regime adopted as its basic orientation a capitalist path with all that means in an underdeveloped country such as Sudan. The regime opened the doors of Sudan to Arab and world capital, and provided infinite guarantees for profit and the exploitation of the working force at a time when there is no trade union movement in Sudan, since that movement was stricken in 1971. This process has led to the rise of a parasitic class in Sudan--a class that profited at the expense of the popular masses. In addition, it created various social problems, such as the disruption of educational services and the retardation of those services to the point where they were unable to cope with the increase in population and the development of educational concepts and methods in general. It also created disturbances and disruptions in the transport services.

Briefly speaking, all those problems are related to the question of profit, only a small part of which, however, goes to the parasitic Sudanese bourgeoisie. There are also certain internal problems which have not been controlled yet, such as the problem of the various nationalities and minorities in Sudan, including the Negro nationalities in the south. All those actions by the regime were naturally bound to create a resistance, but the resistance began in a weak and fragmented fashion as a result of the blow dealt to the national and progressive forces. However, the resistance movement continued to grow and expand; and events, demonstrations and clashes with the police and armed troops are a natural demonstration of the resistance which has been building up over the past 6 years. The slogans raised in most of these protest movements affirm the need for a radical change in conditions in Sudan and this, of course, cannot be realized except through the elimination of the present regime.

The Change That the Masses Want

[Question] Therefore, the matter has reached a point where one of the two parties has to do away with the other. How would the regime face such a situation?

[Answer] In trying to face the movement which we have talked about, the regime sought the method of suppression. Prisons now teem with hundreds of patriots, democrats and communists, as well as members of the National Unionist Party and leaders of mass organizations of students, workers, women and farmers. In addition to those suppressive measures, the regime

also sought to bring about cosmetic changes in the government and the Socialist Union, as well as in some official machinery, in the belief that it can then claim that the government has responded to the demands and wishes of the masses. But while those changes reflect the crisis besetting the regime, they cannot dupe or deceive the organized masses because the change these masses want is to get rid of this regime altogether, that is to say, the change demanded by the masses is a radical change of the economic and social policies in Sudan. In this respect, the masses link those legitimate demands with the foreign policy espoused by the regime, which is a policy of subordination and subservience to the al-Sadat regime and imperialist forces.

The pressing problem now is the control Egyptian bourgeoisie and Western domination exercise over a substantial part of Sudan's destinies. Our regime is no longer able to lead the country, nor is it able to maintain complete control through intimidation and suppression. This is why we attach great importance to slogans demanding radical changes in all aspects of life in Sudan.

[Question] How do you assess the participation of the Moslem Brotherhood in the government in the person of their leader Hasan al-Turabi, who is also a member of the Political Bureau of the Socialist Union?

[Answer] The Moslem Brotherhood has consistently sided with the regime. It is well known that they are seeking certain interests and will put their hands in the hand of any power that would enable them to attain those interests. The collusion between Hasan al-Turabi and al-Numayri is nothing strange, as far as we are concerned. It is useful to mention here that some members of the Moslem Brotherhood do not support such cooperation because they believe that al-Numayri will isolate them from their grassroots and will cut down their scope of operations in the future.

[Question] Hasan al-Turabi said a short while ago that he is against the Camp David accords. How do you explain that?

[Answer] The fact is that such statements are an attempt to circumvent any effort to isolate the Moslem Brotherhood, and therefore they are nothing more than a tactical move. We can regard what al-Turabi has said as part of the balancing role he is playing in the sense that he is a man walking on two ropes.

[Question] And would the government changes that have taken place recently apply also to Abu al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim?

[Answer] I believe that all these matters are part of the crisis of the regime. Abu al-Qasim and a group of his associates have tried to pose as people seeking reforms and an improvement in the people's living standard. But they are doing that within the general framework of the regime, which of course would not allow this to happen. Abu al-Qasim and other members of the Political Bureau of the Socialist Union were, therefore, scapegoats.

The Army Is Not Isolated From the Protest Movement

[Question] Where does the army stand today, especially after al-Numayri has appointed his minister of defense, 'Abd al-Majid Khalil, as his first deputy in place of Abu al-Qasim?

[Answer] The appointment of 'Abd al-Majid Khalil is an attempt to seek the army's support. But I don't believe that the army, and all its forces and divisions, is isolated from the masses' protest movement in Sudan, despite the fact that the regime has tried to tempt its senior officers with extra allowances. It has also been noted that the army as a whole will be affected by poor economic conditions in the country.

[Question] Recently, it was announced that the regime has uncovered revolutionary cells inside the army, and it has been alleged that they are communist cells. Previously it was announced that weapons taken from army arsenals were discovered in certain areas. Do such incidents signal a crisis within the army?

[Answer] The Sudanese Communist Party's position on the army is quite clear, and that is that the army should be a support for the progressive forces in their endeavor to reform and halt the present deterioration in the country. The Sudanese Communist Party primarily depends on the generation of a wide-scale and mass movement supported by the armed forces. Any talk about the existence of cells within the army is an attempt to distract attention from the main problem, as well as an attempt to intimidate some officers in the armed forces and to put them in line with the destructive policy adopted by the regime. The party operates in the midst of the masses and seeks to create a radical change in the country.

[Question] You have said that the regime has not solved the question of nationalities in Sudan in accordance with the popular will but is using that question as an instrument to control the country. What is the nationalities problem and how does the regime handle it?

[Answer] The question of the south is quite complicated. To enter into its details is equally difficult, but it can be said that the so-called solution devised by al-Numayri in 1970 with Haile Selassie, the deposed emperor of Ethiopia, which was called "the Addis Ababa agreement," was nothing but an attempt to produce a superficial solution which does not get to the roots of the problem. That is because this agreement had been reached between the regime of al-Numayri, where all traces of democracy have disappeared, and separatist elements who do not believe in the interests of the southerners themselves as much as they believe in their own personal interests and in serving certain imperialist and Zionist circles. The southern leader who planned the agreement with al-Numayri is Joseph Lago, who received his military training in Israel and has not severed his relations with it up till now. These elements have controlled events in the south and disavowed the real demands and claims of the southerners--claims

for self-expression which would enable the area to develop and that would maintain the traditions of the tribes as well as maintain the unity of the Arab and African nationalities. After the signing of that agreement, the elements which are now in control of the south began to face resistance, and that resistance is now in full swing. There is another aspect to the problem, namely that those who participate in the regime in the north and "represent" the southerners refuse any real reform in the south. They have exhausted the budget and turned the southern problem into a chronic one, although in a different form.

[Question] What is the position of the authorities in the south with regard to the political orientation of the regime?

[Answer] Those separatist elements have opposed the Arab orientation of the Sudanese regime. In the early days of al-Sadat's treasonist course and before al-Sadat was opposed publicly, those elements posed the question of joint cooperation with Egypt with regard to the development of water resources from the Nile. But after the conclusion of the Camp David accords, those elements began to support al-Numayri's policies with regard to the relationship with Egypt, and this has provided a new reason for indignation in the progressive and democratic circles in the south.

[Question] Some news agencies have reported resignations among some members of the regional Council of Deputies in the south. What is the relationship between these resignations and the recent changes announced by al-Numayri and the crisis in the south in general?

[Answer] It can be said that the crisis of the regime stretches from the north to the south. The resignations in the southern Council of Deputies and other suppressive measures taken by the regime are one other facet of the crisis or the basic contradiction which is intrinsic in the regime and which has not been solved by the Addis Ababa agreement. We anticipate that those contradictions will continue to grow and to intensify, and in fact they have reached the point of armed clashes among the southerners themselves and among southerners and armed troops from the north.

A Subordinate Relationship With al-Sadat

[Question] How do you see the relationship between the Sudanese regime and the al-Sadat regime in recent times and the Sudanese regime's relationship with the other Arab states, especially after al-Numayri's visit to Saudi Arabia?

[Answer] Although al-Numayri adopts a policy of complete subservience to the al-Sadat regime, a subservience which is demonstrated in the interdependence agreements, his relationship with the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, continues to be intact and has not been affected by his relationship with Egypt. Up till now the Sudanese regime has depended on oil supplies from Saudi Arabia, which is interested in maintaining the regime in Sudan since that regime is looking after its vast investments in Sudan.

In addition, the Sudanese regime has been adopting positions in international politics which are in keeping with the Saudi-American design. Saudi Arabia does not want to see Sudan turn into another Ethiopia, and is therefore providing al-Numayri with full support. The same is being done by Kuwait and other Gulf states.

[Question] Are there any signs of a popular or official restlessness in Sudan because of the presence of Egyptian forces?

[Answer] The presence of Egyptian forces in Sudan is seen by the Sudanese Army as a presence of foreign forces. The presence of the Egyptian forces is another phenomenon of the subservience of al-Numayri's Sudan to al-Sadat, and falls within the provisions of the joint defense agreement signed 3 years ago, which allows Egypt to send troops to Sudan at any time and without a prior request by the Sudanese Government. This occupation, which is taking place under a pretext of legitimacy through the joint defense agreement, is rejected by all Sudanese, even by those who support the regime. Recent reports about clashes between Egyptian and Sudanese forces in southern Sudan reflect this rejection.

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SUDAN

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SAUDI AID TO KHARTOUM--The Sudanese Socialist Union, meeting under President Ja'far al-Numayri, has recently adopted resolutions designed to correct Sudan's economic course, relieving it of restrictions imposed over 10 years of experimentation with socialist solutions. The decisions were taken shortly after a reappraisal of certain political positions and after a visit by President al-Numayri to Saudi Arabia at the invitation of King Khalid. The visit was one of those few visits which acquire special significance and during which certain issues were discussed with great thoroughness. It has been noted that the first meeting was a plenary one, whereas two later meetings were confined to President al-Numayri and Amir Sultan Ibn Abd al-Aziz, minister of defense and aviation, and between the president and Amir Fahd Ibn Abd al-Aziz. Following the president's return to Khartoum, reports circulated that the Saudi royal palace had decided to help the Numayri regime in dealing with Sudan's economic situation and the continuous shortages in supplies as well as military assistance. According to reports, the Saudi aid consists of a check for \$300 million, which President al-Numayri immediately deposited in the Bank of Sudan; 2 million tons of oil, which will begin to arrive shortly; and \$150 million in military aid. [Excerpts] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Sep 79 p 14] 9254

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