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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SCHMIDT REMARKS ON ITALIAN ISSUES, EUROMISSILES CITED

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 19 Oct 79 p 2

[Davide Lajolo report on FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 18 October Interview on Italian Television: "Germany Neutral Over PCI in Government"]

[Excerpt] Rome--People at the Italian radio and television studios recount that Helmut Schmidt repeatedly implored that, while he was willing to have a conversation on television with such illustrious interlocutors, Andreotti, Agnelli, Lama and journalists Ronchey and Scalfari, crowded together in the studio, must not be allowed--for goodness' sake--to take advantage of the opportunity to argue among themselves. Whether humorous or serious, this apprehension was dispelled by the German Chancellor who, with a couple of apposite remarks, placed not only his direct interlocutors but also the broader audience of Italian viewers in the best possible frame of mind.

For it must have pleased almost everyone, and not just the president of Fiat or the secretary of the Italian General Confederation of Labor, to learn that, in the opinion of the leader of West Europe's "locomotive nation," "the Italian economy is much stronger than people think, the lira is much stronger than the Italians themselves think and in the near future some people could be surprised by the Italian recovery." Likewise the assertion that, if Germany is flourishing, "this is mainly thanks to the trade unions" must have startled not only Luciano Lama, but all those who, despite the existence of strong social tensions, believe in the fundamental role of the trade union federations.

And finally the skill with which the Chancellor managed to handle the most treacherous question ("is it true that our German ally would view the PCI's presence in the Italian Government very unfavorably?") and his answer ("we will judge from the facts, from how that government behaves, though perhaps at the beginning a new situation might alter the Germans' viewpoint on Italy") must have met with the approval not only of Andreotti, but also of all who believe that relations between allied countries must be based on correctness and noninterference in each other's affairs.

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Schmidt was asked whether this implied "indulgent neutrality." "Just neutrality," the government leader corrected, adding that he was waiting to see the Italian and French communists put to the test of the European parliament.

Even when Ronchey steered the discussion toward the topic of the day--NATO missiles in Europe and Brezhnev's warnings--Chancellor Schmidt managed to express a tough stance in soft words: "I think it would be a big mistake to believe that the Soviet leaders are planning a war, though it is undeniable that the Soviet SS-20s have unilaterally altered the previous balances, and therefore the U.S. desire to achieve counterbalance is legitimate." But Germany's concern is not only with defending itself: Its policy is aimed at not spoiling relations with the eastern bloc. This is why Schmidt added the following two considerations. First, that "the missiles issue is too important to be decided by a majority within NATO." Second, that in any case "there must be negotiations with the Soviet Union."

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALY

COMMENTARY ON SALT II NEGOTIATIONS

Rome RIVISTA MILITARE in Italian Jul-Aug 79 pp 17-26

[Article by Gen Filippo Stefani: The SALT II Negotiations--Instrument of Nuclear Strategy"]

[Text] Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, and Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Soviet Union and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, met for the first time in Vienna, between 15 and 18 June, in the imposing and solemn 18th-century Imperial Hofburg Palace to sign the SALT II agreement and to examine the international situation at the moment as well as the prospects for its further development.

The signing was an academic and formal act but the summit and the treaty--above and beyond what may still turn out to be uncertain developments--are two events which in terms of their implicit significance go far beyond the very frontiers that they tried to delimit and indicate the recognition and almost the discovery of a scientific verification, of the political and strategic misconception of further progress in nuclear strategic arsenals the subsequent increase in the dangers of a nuclear catastrophe.

In terms of rationality, the summit and the treaty should at least mark the slowdown in the tendency toward the nuclear area and the start, in Russian-American relations, of a new road or, rather, the return of these relations to the road of detente from which they had strayed in recent years. In terms of history--where there is no lack of examples of men stubbornly sticking to absurd positions--things could go differently. But this time, the dilemma is between catastrophe and survival and the United States and the Soviet Union are aware that the choice really depends on both sides. This is why, even if Congress should not ratify the SALT II agreements--or if the United States Senate should propose substantial amendments unacceptable to the Soviets--one cannot reasonably assume either a final rejection or the accord or a return to its endless renegotiation since both parties are fully aware of the urgent needs for stopping any possible ultimate disaster.

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The Nuclear Facts of Life

The SALT negotiations are based on a strictly scientific implication: The nuclear energy in strategic arms has the power of reciprocally wiping out the contending parties, literally to destroy them as functioning societies, abysally turning the globe upside down, and killing hundreds of millions of people. And a "truth in physics" and the laws of science cannot be argued with.

The problem, as it is stated now, is disconcertingly clear and simple; shifted to the field of the search for a solution it instead assumes inextricable complexity from all aspects. There is no effective practical means for protection against strategic nuclear arms. The global renunciation of their employment could seem to be the only coherent and consistent solution but for the time being it is utopian and illusory. The fact that World War III has not yet broken out is not so much due to the good will of the rulers--who found themselves facing situations of challenge much more serious than those that led to the wars of the past, such as, for example, in connection with the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and in Indochina--but rather above all, not to say exclusively, to the existence of nuclear arsenals. This apparently contradictory fact vice-versa expresses a "real phenomenon" from which one can only draw positive conclusions.

Until we see the day--if it ever comes--when politics and strategy are completely subjected to logic and science, not to say ethics--which by itself would seem to be enough to prevent any war of aggression--the nuclear tangle will not have been resolved. This does not mean that we should become even more confused and, viceversa, we must not try gradually to loosen the knots in the hope of finally and gradually, in spite of many mistakes, getting to the end of this effort through the effect of the constant change of political and strategic situations and the continuous advance of science and technology.

Will not the entry upon the international scene of new and major "partners" --China, Japan, India, the Arab World and, soon we hope, a united Europe--bring about the end of the bipolar system? Are we not about to produce the energy of "annihilation" which is the absolute equivalence between mass and energy? In our world today which is in a continuous conflicting evolution, the sudden discarding of nuclear energy could, contrary to the opinion of many--including qualified personalities--bring about a "destabilization," as we put it today, a frightening upset of the current unstable equilibrium or, if you will, of the balance of terror, created precisely by nuclear strategic arms.

By virtue of their "destructive capacity" and the "scientific certainty of the destruction" which they caused, strategic nuclear arms make the "risk" of their employment unacceptable, no matter how high the stakes may be. Their "deterrent capacity" is absolute; it rules out any

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possibility of victory; it seeks to prevent the other side from making the decision to employ those weapons through the "threat" of just as catastrophic retaliation. "War is designed to force others to accept the consequences which one wishes to impose whereas deterrence is designed to prevent the decision to go to war," wrote French General Beaufre in his book "Defense Against the Atomic Bomb." But nuclear deterrence is credible only if it is exercised in the defense of existential interests. This is why it does not prevent local conventional wars and unpleasant political uprisings beyond the geographic boundaries of the vital areas considered or declared to be such; and here is the reason behind the mechanism of "escalation" which graduates the responses in keeping with the degree of danger at gravity of intimidation and aggression.

The SALT negotiations are a part of this context, otherwise one cannot grasp the essential significance and one runs the risk of falling into a kind of moral and intellectual error, on account of the boundless and almost unintelligible novelties introduced into politics and strategy by the advent of nuclear arms which mark the transition from the era that Stalin with good reason called the era of "industrial war" to the era which Beaufre defines, with no less justification, as the era of "scientific-technological war."

The Content of SALT

The key idea behind SALT is to make a nuclear Pearl Harbor as improbable as possible, the kind of event that would be expressed by an absurd reciprocal global holocaust. By way of assumption, it does not rule it out--otherwise the probability of successful deterrence would be zero--but it does tend to make it unfeasible and to have the nuclear power retain the function of "deterrence" through "escalation" or the fear of this eventuality.

SALT I was signed in Moscow by Nixon and Brezhnev after three years of negotiations and this was the first major and serious attempt at containing nuclear strategic armament. These treaties consisted of the following:

A treaty limiting ABMs to 200 on either side;

A provisional 5-year accord on offensive weapons committing the parties not to build new fixed land launch ramps for ICBMs and limiting the number of SLBMs as well as the number of missile-firing nuclear submarines to those already in operation or under construction as of the date the accord was signed;

An additional protocol establishing a double ceiling for the SLBMs and submarines carrying strategic nuclear weapons.

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These treaties almost crystallized the actual situation existing at that time in line with the concept of "strategic parity" which it is believed would be satisfactory by granting the Soviet Union a quantitative advantage in offensive missiles--2,358 against 1,710 for the United States--compensated by American technological superiority and the possession of MIRVs.

As happened years before concerning nuclear energy, the Soviets were in a good position to know and utilize the "MIRVing" procedure, thus confirming how chimeric it would be for anybody to think that he could be the sole possessor, for an indefinite period of time, of the truth and the discoveries that are produced by science which, speaking a cosmopolitan language, is neither American, nor Russian, but universal. Soviet "MIRVing" capacities changed the balance of SALT I and it became necessary to attempt a new "overall approach" to this subject matter, rejecting the idea of compensating for quantity with quality and substituting it with the "principle of equal security" approved at the third military summit meeting in Vladivostok in November 1974. Now, five years have passed between then and last June and it has been seven years since SALT I; during those years, the objectively complex negotiations, which are laborious from any angle, went forward with difficulty, with long interruptions, sudden suspensions, bitter debates, frequent reviews and reciprocal accusations of bad faith.

In contrast to SALT I, which almost produced a photograph of the situation at the moment and which committed the contracting parties not unilaterally to modify it beyond certain agreed-upon restrictions (which was verified), SALT II built a new reality, different from the existing one, committing the parties to implement that reality by specific deadlines.

The SALT II treaties consist of the following:

A "preamble" and a "treaty" of 19 articles which will be in force, after their ratification, until 31 December 1985;

A three-year "protocol," valid until 31 December 1991 [sic; 1981!], involving a series of questions not yet ready for settlement (on which, as a matter of fact, there is no understanding as yet) such as for example the dispute on the cruise missiles;

A "schema" for future SALT III negotiations which will deal with non-intercontinental strategic armaments in the European theater of operations;

"Agreed-upon declarations" on the interpretations contained in the treaty and in the three-year protocol;

A "memorandum of understanding" on the current substance of the respective strategic arsenals.

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The sustaining walls of the new edifice are made up of the agreements on the following:

The maximum ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles--ICBMs, SLBMs, ALBMs, or bombers carrying cruise missiles, missiles with a single warhead that can be launched from land bases or submarines, bombers carrying vertical-drop bombs--allows each side to have 2,250 units (2,400 for the first six months after the entry into force of the accords);

The lowering of the ceiling on the most destabilizing weapons, that is, strategic delivery vehicles with multiple warheads, the MIRV, to no more than 820 ICBMs and 1,200 SLBMs for a grand total of no more than 1,320 units;

The maximum ceiling of 12 warheads for each MIRV;

A slowdown in the race toward qualitatively new weapons through the requirement, for each of the two parties, not to develop any new strategic missiles;

The pledge to launch--immediately after ratification--new negotiations for a further quantitative and qualitative restriction of strategic nuclear arms and for a reduction of nonintercontinental strategic arms;

The obligation of reciprocal noninterference in national technical verification means.

These are the main points included in SALT II; while they do not guarantee anything specific, such as the certain start of an era of peace, they do contemplate the total stoppage, including the qualitative stoppage of the strategic nuclear arms race, the total termination of new and perhaps even more mobilizing technological developments, the immediate limitation of nuclear theater and tactical weapons, and so on. But in the global architecture of the policies and strategy of our times, SALT II does very much and accomplishes a noteworthy qualitative advance.

Political and Psychological Aspects

The political validity of the SALT II negotiations is above discussion. Evaluations are unanimously positive not only on the part of the responsible American and Soviet officials, the governments of the other NATO countries, and the most important countries, but even from China which is not against the agreement although it is very skeptical as to the Soviet desire to observe its provisions, so much so as to warn everybody not to have any "blind confidence" because "the entire military effort of the Soviet Union over the past two decades is an unmistakable sign of its intentions to fight and win a nuclear war." Nobody, in summary, feels capable of challenging the policy of disarmament and peace. That could not be otherwise.

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The principle of "mutual security" wipes out the traditional principle of the search for "strategic superiority"-- although, as we recall, we are dealing here not only with strategic nuclear weapons that determine the substance of both of these principles but also many other parameters, some of which may be imponderable--and reveals, in terms of concepts and doctrine, the definite repudiation of Clausewitz' theory on war understood "as a continuation of policy with other means," at least as far as a general war is concerned. This is the recognition of the new historical-scientific reality which does not allow a reasonable alternative to "non-war."

The start of the process aimed at reducing the level of weapons systems, the start of quantitative and qualitative restrictions on strategic nuclear arms, the dismantling of several hundreds of the latter already in operation or in readiness, the multiannual breather for the purpose of settling the extremely difficult problem of missiles, and the immediate resumption of new negotiations on decisive reductions and more significant restrictions on nuclear armament, also to the lowest levels--these are tremendous political facts that outline the concept of a policy following a new tendency of inversion which is as revolutionary with respect to the past as it is positive for the entire world.

The Vienna Summit promotes the development of negotiations concerning the general abolition of nuclear tests for military purposes (already well along the way and, after the Soviet Union subscribed to the idea of on-site inspections, only some technical questions remained), the continuation of negotiations on the settlement of the problem of antisatellite weapons (perhaps even all the way to the renunciation of competition in that sector), the active resumption of the activities of the Vienna MBFR Conference, commensurately and with properly defined methods, tied in with SALT III, the placement on the agenda of the question of the military use of lasers, ignored by SALT II, and the positive impetus toward the downhill race toward the demilitarization of political relations. This is not only of symbolic value but also has an emblematic and effective value.

Still, there is something that keeps us from giving our unconditional and enthusiastic support to this happy twin event, in contrast to what happened on the occasion of SALT I which were ratified right away by the United States Senate almost unanimously. At that time President Nixon assumed that this was the start of an era of peace; he recited an act of faith; he expressed absolute if not blind confidence in Moscow's understanding. Today, President Carter hopes for a resumption of the policy of detente, he issues a message of hope, he expresses only a vote of no-confidence, he speaks a less emphatic and more restrained language.

The fact is that the great hope for peace which accompanied SALT I and the 1972 Moscow Summit were disappointing.

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Since then, Soviet expansionism continued to play its cards just about everywhere, from the Latin American subcontinent to the Indian subcontinent, from the Middle East to Africa, from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Sometimes gradually, sometimes suddenly, sometimes directly and sometimes through another nation (Cuba and Vietnam), always with a broad political-strategic approach, with much imagination, with many different ideas and means, the Soviet Union has registered a considerable number of successes--Angola, Ethiopia (Ogaden, Eritrea), Pakistan, South Yemen, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iran, etc.--and it only suffered some rare and partial setbacks (Egypt). All of these visible cuts in the exquisitely political international fabric not only did not bring us the era of peace which Nixon had promised but they dried up and almost stopped on the threshold of a return to the Cold War, the dialogue between the two superpowers, confirming that it is not enough to comply with an accord formally--the SALT I treaties were never violated--in order seriously to move on the road of peaceful coexistence. In view of this continuous increase in the political-strategic and military power as well as international prestige of the Soviet Union, the United States, under the "shocks" of the defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, for a long time continued to be a confused and deluded spectator and in the end attempted the dialogue again by seeking a basic clarification at Vienna (dealing not only with strategic nuclear arms) which it is now too soon to say whether it will bring a real improvement.

The psychological atmosphere thus is not only different from what it was in 1972 but, because of what happened since then, it is almost skeptical. But it would not be truthful to deny the improvement which we saw. It is impossible to predict whether these hopes will soon be confirmed but something good seems to be taking shape. Psychological motivations certainly cannot be easily and quickly removed and the return to detente can only be slow. Otherwise, we would be dealing with illusions and with chimeras for which the realism of SALT II and Vienna do not allow any room. The psychological background of diffidence and reciprocal suspicions does not yet seem to us to have been sufficiently dispelled. That requires convincing proof as to political moderation on the part of the Soviets in international relations and in relations with the United States particularly as part of an overall view which cannot conceal the reality of the Washington--Moscow--Peking triangle.

Strategic and Military-Technical Aspects

On the other hand, we are not convinced by the effort on the part of the all-out supporters of SALT II to stress the political, purely essential and priority aspect, overshadowing and almost completely pushing aside the strategic and military-technical aspects which are of no less importance.

It is true that the "old concepts and old definitions of strategy are not only outdated but make no sense in a time of strategic nuclear arms," that

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"absurdity increases if we think in terms of long-range missiles built to take the place of piloted bombers," and "to think in terms of winning the war, of making final victory the only objective is pure folly," as Liddell Hart wrote ever since the start of the sixties. But it is also true that the "perennial" aspect of strategy retains its full value and that it consists of the search for correspondence, sufficiency, and suitability of means and the coordination of those means with respect to the political purpose one wishes to pursue. In our case that would be disarmament and peace. The search and the choice of the means explain the complexity of strategic thinking which today is greater than it was yesterday and which cannot be boiled down to intellectualistic abstraction.

The opponents of SALT II are not irresponsible warmongers but are persons who are doubtful as to the correspondence, sufficiency, and suitability of the choice of means in order to attain the purposes which they likewise approve with conviction and intensity. If that were not so, their opposition would have no validity. To the fears and the doubts of a psychological character--commonly found to a certain degree also among the supporters of the agreement, as we can tell from a certain silence, which by the way is justified in this phase, and by the measured tones with which the supporters express themselves--the opponents have been adding negative evaluations of a strategic and military-technical character. Here the debate becomes difficult and esoteric but it can be reduced to terms of clear simplicity. The all-out opponents start from the observation of that, according to them, the accord would not provide the basis for the implementation of substantial equivalence in every sector of strategic nuclear armament and that, behind the formal facade of nuclear parity among the two arsenals, there would in the end be a practical increase in the advantages deriving from the development of the Soviet military nuclear program; the Soviet Union supposedly already has strategic superiority which the clauses of the agreement not only would fail to eliminate but which they might potentially even expand and codify to the very limit of unattainability; it therefore seems to us that there is an operational discrepancy here which would infect the substance of SALT II all the way. Moderate opponents maintain that SALT II could be accepted if modifications or additions would be inserted into the text of the various documents already signed--amendments or additions which, taken together, would render the grave strategic nuclear asymmetry less grave and which would close the gaps and remove the imperfections which, according to them, would appear quite obviously in the current draft. Finally, there are those who are unsure and doubtful and who have not yet managed to find their place in the heat of the debates that divide the different groupings.

Here are two crucial fundamental points which have a common factor in the attitudes of the critics, both the radical ones (rejection of agreement and renegotiation in a new overall strategic and military-technical context), as well as the revisionist ones (introduction of substantial and formal amendment into the text which would reduce certain

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discrepancies and which would promote greater possibilities of verification): The failure to implement strategic nuclear symmetry and the insufficient reliability of means of verification or control over application.

"Equal security" thus would not seem to be capable of being pursued, according to the opponent, wherever one does not take into account not only the number of delivery vehicles and warheads but also the number of warheads held in readiness and those stockpiled in the supply dumps, the precise location of launch ramps, the capacity to bring a throw weight to the target, the specific designation of weapons and their real destructive capacity against protected targets, the applicability of the various systems, the vulnerability of targets, and the fact that the technology of nuclear arms, once contained in one sector, is being developed powerfully in other sectors. "Essentially equivalent" nuclear arms would not be sufficient to guarantee "equal security," not even if the steps promoted by President Carter himself were to be adopted, such as modernization of strategic nuclear forces within the limitations provided for by SALT II and the strengthening of NATO; the placement of new "Trident I" missiles on submarines; the launching, in 1980, of new and more reliable "Trident" submarines and the construction of new, more powerful, and more accurate "Trident II" missiles; the development of the cruise missile program which would be capable of penetrating almost any defensive area which the Soviet Union might build up in the near future; the substantial improvement in the power and accuracy of the Minuteman missiles from fixed bases and the creation of mobility for at least some of them, which will be vulnerable in the future (starting in 1980?) to a Soviet surprise attack.

The accord--and this is the other basic line of argument used by the opponent--would not be verifiable because the data collection and situation control system would be neither sufficient nor secure, especially after the loss of the bases in Iran. The ban on interference to prevent or hinder controls, approved in the treaty, and the implementation of the various technical measures (satellites, radars, etc.) or measures of a different nature would scarcely protect, from any possible deception and violation, the targets which, by virtue of their nature and their size, are easily spotted--submarines under construction or being assembled, hangars and missile support facilities, factories building intercontinental bombers--but they would not be sufficient to reveal the technological developments of the Soviet strategic forces with the necessary broad range, precision, and timeliness.

One of the basic objections--by no means unfounded--explicitly pertains to the European theater of operations. The failure to include the Soviet "Backfire" in the group of strategic delivery vehicles (the "Backfire" is the Tupolev Tu-26 with a speed of 1,900 kilometers per hour at an altitude of 12,000 meters with an action radius of 4,000 kilometers) not only would constitute an unacceptable alteration of "equal security" but--

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independently of the restrictions signed by the Soviets to the effect that they would build no more than 30 bombers per year and that they would not station them in regions (for example, Eastern Siberia) from which they could reach the United States--would imply the acceptance of the Soviet intention of separating the European theater of operations from the worldwide strategic theater, with the most serious consequence of "de facto" and "de jure" compromising the West's political-strategic unity. This would be all the most serious if it were to be related to the commitments undertaken by the United States not to station cruise missiles in Europe and not to transfer the pertinent construction technology to the European Allies until 1982. The SALT III negotiations, which might last a long time, and the possible stationing of the "Pershing II" missiles in Europe after 1981 would not prevent the Soviet Union from increasing the potential detachment or separation of its "theater nuclear forces" (the SS-20 and the "Backfire") from those of NATO and thus placing Europe in a situation of greater exposure if not political blackmail.

We are dealing here with a most delicate and difficult debate where it is not so much the ratification of a treaty, complete or incomplete, that is at stake, but rather the fundamental direction of security and defense policy and the consequences deriving from that in terms of the survival of the entire world and Europe in particular.

Prospects and Predictions

The ratification of SALT II requires a two-thirds majority in the United States Senate. According to a survey among the press carried out prior to the Vienna Summit, senators definitely in favor would number no more than 45; the all-out opponents would be no less than 25; the undecided senators would number about 30 and 15 among them are opposed unless amendments and additions are introduced while 15 are completely reticent as to the position they will assume. Between May and today, many events, beyond the Carter-Brezhnev summit itself, could have modified the initial lineup, such as, for example, the indications of greater moderation on the part of the Soviet Union, especially in the conflict over the Persian Gulf which commands the petroleum energy sources and supply lines, from whose shortages and high cost the industrialized world is now suffering, risking a general chaos, in turn capable of triggering military conflicts, as well as disasters in production and in the economy. We also recall the reception given by Moscow--although with reservations--to the "advances" from Peking regarding a dialogue between the two of them in an attempt to settle the numerous unresolved issues and the outcome of the last meeting of the council of NATO foreign ministers which ended with a resolution expressing full satisfaction with SALT II.

In spite of all this, everything still remains uncertain and much will depend on the debate that will develop in the United States Senate. This debate is difficult to gauge because of the vast range of interpretations

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of the subject matter and the no lesser difficulty of providing the specifically technological knowledge required for the discussion.

The first point to establish is whether SALT II will or will not safeguard the security of the United States and its allies and whether it will be in line with the basic criterion of modern high-level strategy: Know the possible, seek the necessary, do the indispensable. The second point is to figure out whether SALT II "will review detente without lowering our guard" and whether it would strengthen the extremely difficult process of establishing Soviet-American relations and whether it will constitute a push toward other immediate understandings. The third point is to estimate whether it is better to have "an imperfect world with SALT II or an imperfect world without it" (Carter) and carefully to consider the consequences of a rejection or a postponement for a more or less long interval of time which, in the strategic nuclear arms sector, could in itself be most serious.

The failure to ratify the treaty or to postpone ratification could furthermore lead to a hardening of international relations, the strengthening--on both sides, which would be both ambitious and useless--of the nuclear strategic forces, the increase in Soviet activism through the creation of new and more dangerous pensions in vital strategic areas, the drift away from a medium-term policy of gradual disarmament or perhaps even a return to the Cold War.

We need not lend excessive credence to the scenarios of catastrophe pictured by the supporters and the opponents, with the former announcing the inevitably of nuclear "confrontation" if the treaty does not go through, while the latter announce the codification, in case of ratification of the current treaty, of Soviet strategic superiority, all the way to absolute nuclear blackmail intended to force the United States to withdraw in any future international crisis, especially in Europe; these are strong propaganda moves which moreover do not help in our technical examination and which do not help create an atmosphere of calm and reflection suitable for making a decision of such tremendous significance. The choice is not between peace and war but between an attempt, albeit very risky, to launch a new process of international relations, or inaction which would lead to obvious motionlessness but which would be no less charged with risks and dangers.

There is finally one more complication which hampers the possibility of ratification to a by no means minor extent. Contrary to what is happening in the Soviet Union, the United States is making the ratification of such an agreement--because of the very existential implications connected with it--dependent upon the Congress which, in democratic countries, rejects the "either-or" approach, the "take-it-or-leave-it" approach, and which reserves itself the right to approve or disapprove and to propose additions or variations. The Soviet Union has hinted that it is not inclined toward any amendments, neither substantial, nor formal, in other words,

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it is all or nothing. This makes it rather difficult to go on to a subsequent negotiation phase if any of the clauses were to be revised. The Soviet Union has thus forearmed itself against the burial of SALT II and its indefinite postponement--events which would have tremendous repercussions not only in political and strategic terms but also in psychological terms.

In summary, there is uncertainty as to the prospects after the entry into force of the agreement, there is even greater uncertainty as to what might happen if the treaty is not ratified, and there is uncertainty as to the predictions on the outcome of the debate in the United States Senate.

Conclusions

All of these uncertainties and obstacles however are confronted by truth and reality which are beyond dispute and beyond challenge.

The first of these is that, in the era of scientific-technological warfare, concepts of policy and high-level strategy have changed their significance and their sign: The ultimate purpose of policy is peace and the ultimate purpose of strategy is deterrence. The nuclear reality commands a choice because the equipment of strategic nuclear arms--and not those arms alone--is an absurdity if one does not wish to follow the logic of mass suicide.

The second one is that the SALT negotiations--in spite of incompleteness, insufficiency, imperfections, and, if you will, errors and risks--constitute serious attempts at rejecting the outdated principles of strategic and military superiority and must be evaluated and handled as such, assuming of course that the application of the content of those treaties by the two contracting parties is constantly verifiable. Let there be no illusion about SALT II: It does not mean peaceful coexistence nor does it perhaps, at least initially, mean a return to detente, but it does mark the specific start (for better or worse, existing weapons will be destroyed and those to be built will be limited) of a gradual reversal of the constant tendency toward the progressive increase in armaments to the point where one is forced to use them in order not to be paralyzed by their uselessness. They are the result of "a unique effort in the history of mankind" (Carter) lasting about seven years; "they constitute a triumph of patience, persistence, and reasonableness" (Brezhnev), an effort by two great nations to contribute to a less insecure world, although within a persistent framework of competition, while respecting the experience of reciprocal and equal security.

The third point is that a rational dialogue will continue toward the restoration of less uncertain, ambiguous, and risky relations. There is no doubt that, when the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union is interrupted, the whole world holds its breath, it loses its sense of history, and falls into a state of passive resignation, just

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waiting for inevitably events, including even nuclear disaster. It is also certain that, when the United States and the Soviet Union recover the courage to indicate and fix specific points, imperfect though they may be, the entire world will breathe a sigh of relief, will pull itself together again, and will once again believe in and hope for reason among men and cooperate toward the resumption of forms of understanding. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, at least so far, contain the germ for any rational and realistic solution leading to general survival.

There are no undertakings without risk and that is also true of SALT II. But no problem can be settled or solved--and one cannot even move toward normalization--if one is always inclined toward suspicion of bad faith on the part of the other fellow and if one reasons in terms of pseudo-Machiavellism. The SALT II negotiations may or may not be full of dangers--although it does not seem likely to us that one could accuse the entire American strategic command center (Carter, Vance, Brown, Church, and the five chiefs of staff, the entire host of diplomats, military men, scientists, and engineers who continue to work on this) of incompetence, inability, and disloyalty--and SALT II may or may not be a good treaty but it certainly was a factor in terms of attraction toward moral and political, strategic and psychological ideals, toward putting the lid on the unrestrained arms race and toward the resurrection of indispensable values, toward the redimensioning of a human society half-destroyed and brutalized by nuclear terror and oppressed by the lack of solution to its most serious population, ecological, and energy problems which are getting ever more pressing. SALT II at least brought out the underlying need for trying to restore an order which is above all moral and, secondly, political and strategic.

With this observation and with the hope that everything will turn out for the best we might conclude these notes if we did not feel the duty to add one more remark, referring to what we wrote on another occasion ("The European requirement," RIVISTA MILITARE, No 2, 1979, p 24, last paragraph, and p 25, first paragraph).

The European members of NATO had no voice in the SALT II negotiations. This is neither the fault of the United States nor of the Soviet Union; it is only their own fault. With each of them jealously guarding an absolute sovereignty which, as demonstrated by SALT, they do not have, they can no longer continue to reject the cession of portions of their sovereignty to a European supernational or at least transnational body and, failing to realize that their destiny is in the hands of the two superpowers, they cannot confine themselves to expressing their satisfaction with the way American "leadership" has been operating, certainly with a conscious and intimate regret over their powerlessness. If the SALT II negotiations are successful, they will be immediately followed by SALT III directly involving also the European theater of operations. But the participation of the European countries, not even the nuclear

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ones, has so far been scheduled--at least for the moment--concerning SALT III either, as was announced by secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

European destiny and security will once again be entrusted to the United States. To change that situation, to break the bipolarism of today and the "imagined" tripolarism, the only thing to do is to build a united Europe which alone will gain "partnership" status in NATO, which would become a protagonist of history, which could directly and with high authority become involved in all negotiations concerning security and disarmament and peace as well as the civilian and economic development of the world.

But the construction of a united Europe is still far off. The road leading to that goal is still long; it is strewn with obstacles and impediments which may be entirely artificial. We cannot fool ourselves into believing that we are going to win the race against time involved in SALT III. But we cannot imagine that decisions on "theater weapons" and on the neutralization of the rising threat of Soviet arms in Europe would be made without consultations inside the entire alliance and not just within the framework of a bilateral understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. If that were so, the European members of NATO should above all build unity of views among themselves, unity of intentions and orientations, they should emerge as being in agreement and as being unanimous within NATO; in all of the various participation bodies--MBFR, CSCE, COD, etc.--they must not repeat the fiasco of the "N" bomb (the "inhuman" bomb which spares buildings and kills people, as if the other nuclear bombs were humanitarian) and they should in particular express only one united thought; they should express themselves with a single language and they should always and everywhere act according to one and the same understanding, especially when it comes to taking up the issue of the "Pershings" and the issue of counterbalancing the Soviet "SS-20" and the "Backfire" bombers.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALY

CONSCRIPT SERVICE VERSUS VOLUNTEERS WEIGHED

Rome RIVISTA MILITARE in Italian Jul-Aug 79 pp 13-16

[Article by Carlo Bess: "Draftees and Long-Term Volunteers"]

[Text] The debate on the type of recruiting system to be adopted for the armed forces has been rather lively for quite some time in Italy as in other Western countries.

Some people might deny that the draft is good enough to meet modern military requirements and would like us to drop it in order to set up a career military force with long-service volunteers.

The supporters of the volunteer army assert that the draft was justified in the past when we had mass armies, when there was heavy reliance on mobilization, when weapons were relatively simple, and when enlistments were sufficiently long. Now these factors have been changed profoundly which is why the draft supposedly lost any of its functional effectiveness. Among those who think so is Stefano Silvestri, who maintained that "we cannot continue to defend the senseless system of conscription; this is a screen behind which there is hidden an electoral, welfare-oriented, and corporative establishment. The volunteer army is part of the inevitable development of an industrialized society which moves toward specialization and professionalization."

With a necessarily small volunteer army, it would be possible to invest a larger capital share in the individual soldier in order to improve his armament and training and, hence, to raise his productivity. That would not be possible with an army of conscripts because its very dimensions--which cannot be reduced beyond a certain limit, given the requirement of maintaining the general nature of the military obligation--would doom it to technological underdevelopment.

Other people on the other hand feel that any increase in the number of long-service volunteers would pose a threat to the armed forces model based on the draft, as provided for in the Constitution, which in this respect

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ties in with the concept of the people's army inherent in the kind of democracy that sprang from the Risorgimento and that was vigorously re-asserted during the Resistance.

Still others hold a position halfway in between. For them, the best solution would be to integrate draftees with a strong quota of long-service military personnel. In this way it would be possible, on the one hand, to safeguard the model of the national and people's army, with its positive, not only general but also technical-military reflections; on the other hand it would be possible to meet the technological requirements of the armed forces which keep growing in relation to the continuous increase in the specifications of weapons of war.

This is the solution which appears to us to be not only preferable but also the only possible solution in the current Italian situation. By the way, this is the solution deriving from the current recruiting law which provides for the enlistment of a long-term volunteer quota equivalent to 16 percent of the draftee force carried on the budget (for the Army, that would amount to about 28,000 individuals).

Recruiting Problem is Not Only Technical-Military Problem

The recruiting problem is a focal issue not only because of the type of instruments we want to have available but because of the very position of the armed forces in national society and because of the relations existing between military and civilian institutions.

This problem cannot be solved only in a technical fashion. That would distort the substantially political nature of the issue.

The problem must instead be examined from the overall viewpoint of its political, ideological, social, and economic aspects, plus of course the military-technical aspects. And it must be examined by avoiding the discussions on basic principle which disparage the reality of things.

Political Aspect

In a society, such as the Italian society, characterized by profound domestic lacerations and conflicts, by a level of popular consensus in support of the institutions of the state which is traditionally low and by quite noticeable economic and territorial imbalances, it would be quite difficult to consider a regular army to be an expression of the entire national community, such as it would have to be for the sake of its own efficiency. It would inevitably be a "separate body." Its operational capacity would decline. The latter, as a matter of fact, must not be evaluated only in terms of specialization and professional skills. It depends to a great extent on the links with the national community and on the consensus and moral support from civilian society. With the draft, this link is at least assured by the continuing rotation of draftees.

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The draftee army furthermore constitutes the proportional expression of the various political and ideological tendencies in the country. It is therefore representative of the country and can be considered an asset belonging to the entire national community, much more so than a volunteer army could ever be. Because of the way things are, the latter would, in name only or in fact, be "a majority" and "single-member" outfit. The draftee army can, for better or worse, absorb civilian society's dissent and contrast within itself. A volunteer army would irremediably be separated from the mass of society, as it indeed has already been taken over by other government institutions, likewise due to a factor peculiar to Italy. Under the specific conditions prevailing in Italy, the mass recruitment of volunteers would be subjected to the negative influence of social and territorial factors which would modify their representativeness of the society of which such an army is an expression and which it is called upon to defend.

In substance, even if we think that we can recruit the necessary volunteers, there is no reason to believe that a regular army would be better than the current draftee army. It would inevitably have a vacuum behind it. With the proper adaptation of its structures and the specific methods of implementing obligatory military service, the latter could absorb the conflicts and dissent. But between a draftee army, even though it may be paralyzed by conscripts who are dissenters or absenteeists, and a regular career army uprooted from the population, the former is still preferable. The former, if nothing else, offers the best conditions for getting the consensus of the people in the future, a consensus which already exists but which will undoubtedly be strengthened and improved.

The essential problem of the military establishment is identical to the one that comes up in connection with the other government institutions: Obtaining a broader popular consensus and, hence, greater substantial legitimation. These are the only conditions that can permit the strengthening of the government machinery and hence the creation of an institutional framework not undermined by passive resistance if not outright popular dissidence which would strengthen the bulwarks of security that shield liberty and the democratic and republican structures.

To attain this objective, an army based on the draft is undoubtedly in a better position than an army made up only of volunteers.

Ideological Aspects

From the ideological viewpoint, the citizen's right and duty to serve under arms--strictly tied to Italy's national tradition, from Machiavelli to Cattaneo, to Pisacane, and to the Resistance--is substantially shared by the popular masses. As a matter of fact, the number of deserters, draft dodgers, and conscientious objectors is insignificant and, at any rate, it is lower in Italy than in many other nations. It is necessary to make sure that the general acceptance of the basic principle will correspond to a more concrete commitment.

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The state of uneasiness and malaise, which sometimes developed in some units, does not spring from an insurmountable and atavistic qualunquism, absenteeism, or lack of civic education on the part of the average Italian.

There are undoubtedly objective shortcomings. But they can be overcome through the improvement of service conditions for draftees. In particular, this can be done through broader information, through more intensive and interesting training, through a disciplinary system in keeping with the times, by giving civilian personnel the kind of nonmilitary housing connected with garrison life, the solution of problems of a material and psychological character, including the recognition, in economic and normative terms, of the services rendered by those who are draftees so as to give them an advantage as compared to those others who for various reasons are not drafted. This can be done above all through the active and constructive participation of all military personnel in the life and development of institutions, as prescribed by the basic law. In this way, military service could really constitute a democratic assumption of national responsibility, making sure that the youngster will not only perform a precise duty but will also have a formative experience which in the future will be useful to him and the nation.

The armed forces can and must decisively help in this rather personal recovery of faith in the republican and democratic fatherland. Without that recovery, it will become increasingly problematical to obtain from the cadres and the troops the kind of sacrifice in terms of discipline which is an essential requirement to promote the operational capacity of the units and which so far was kept alive by virtue of the exaltation of the traditional values of the old army. The attainment of this objective constitutes an essential guarantee for the constitutional system, the country's democratic development, and the efficiency of national defense. The latter must be a commitment for everybody and cannot be delegated to a few regulars who are paid when they are needed.

In the current Italian situation, the status and the social legitimacy of the volunteer armed forces would inevitably be challenged.

Social Factor

From the social viewpoint, it is inconceivable for us to be able to recruit in Italy the young men necessary to have a volunteer force only. Proof of that is furnished by the difficulty we are having in recruiting police officers who have a strong tradition of volunteer recruitment and who can place all recruited personnel in permanent slots.

The army, on the other hand--which must above all have young men--would have to release the mass of volunteers after a certain number of years of service. That right away introduces the difficulty of massively activating volunteer recruitment of this type, also with higher pay, with substantial enlistment

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and discharge bonuses, with intensive professional training designed to facilitate smooth return to civilian life, and with job security at the end of volunteer military service.

Economic Factor

From the economic angle, massive volunteer recruitment, which is not completely compensated for--and that is an extremely uncertain thing--by an increase in defense allocations would have an unacceptable effect on the already insufficient amounts of money allocated for modernization and day-to-day operation. The attainment of the objective of raising the Italian army's technological level through an increase in professional personnel skills would be frustrated by the lack of funds needed to procure advanced weapons systems.

Obligatory military service on the other hand consists of a personal service which is not remunerated. It is a sort of in-kind tax through which the draftee in the final analysis is a taxpayer who provides practically free labor for the community. In this way, it is possible--also within the framework of current financial resources--to shift a hefty amount of money to the procurement of new equipment and to training.

Military-Technical Factors

From the strictly military-technical viewpoint, the draftee army presents numerous advantages over volunteer armed forces.

The draft permits stability in terms of numbers and promotes a qualitatively constant personnel level, independently of the labor market situation. The institution of military service as a matter of fact does not depend on the will of the individual and the most qualified young men can always be called to the colors. With a volunteer army however we cannot reach those population strata that are professionally and culturally best trained, regardless of the economic and social incentives employed in order to attract volunteers. Instead we recruit the least trained youngsters who would have to be trained through lengthy training courses at heavy costs. The qualitative advantages of a volunteer force would thus be considerably reduced.

Next, the draft makes it possible, without training expenditures, to utilize special skills and job experience deriving from civilian life. This is a tremendous advantage. Besides, through the draft, psychological-physical-attitude selection can be extended to an enormously larger number of young people with conspicuous advantages for the many tasks that require special individual gifts.

Finally, the growing sophistication of weapons of war does not necessarily lead to an increase in the difficulty of their employment. In many cases the exact opposite is true. For example, it is much more difficult to

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employ a first-generation, manually guided AT missile than a second-generation missile which is guided semiautomatically. Training times can be reduced and the employment of new electronic fire control simulators reduces training time and costs. It thus becomes more acceptable from the cost-effectiveness angle, that is to say, the ratio between the time and the cost of initial training and the duration of effective utilization in operational units, to employ draftees for certain duties, even with the currently reduced term of obligatory military service.

The requirements that cannot absolutely be met with draftee personnel are those connected with the maintenance and repair of modern weapons systems. The kind of training required here is so lengthy and complex as necessarily to demand the employment of long-service volunteer personnel.

While the bulk of operational functions in operational units can be reserved for the draftees, volunteer personnel would work in "overalls," to provide logistic support for increasingly sophisticated and expensive standard issue equipment, rather than serve in "battle dress." This is a vital requirement which we cannot do without, a requirement which can be handled only by increasing the number of long-service specialist personnel. It is therefore indispensable to promote the conditions for recruiting the volunteers provided for by law, volunteers who, considering the current state of affairs, cannot be gotten because the current incentives are insignificant and unreliable.

Final Consideration

For all of the reasons given here it does not now seem possible in Italy to abolish the draft and to switch to a volunteer force.

A draftee army can be an army of excellent quality, in spite of the increase in the employment of technology and the increase in the sophistication of equipment and operating procedures. But it will be sufficiently motivated and trained so as to obtain the consensus and perfection of all personnel in the routine operations of the various units. In particular it is necessary for the draftees to be assigned to combat tasks and not to be employed in support or clerical functions which are inherent in garrison life and for which civilian personnel can be used.

Draftees employed to meet the requirements in question here will have the feeling of being utilized as low-cost labor, as unskilled day laborers without pay. That in turn creates moral uneasiness, inconveniences in terms of training, and also a certain laxity which must be eliminated.

Draftee personnel furthermore will be integrated with long-service personnel necessary for the purpose of setting up units and for logistic support for equipment issued.

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Regarding the volunteers, it is necessary to implement the current provisions of the law, stepping up recruiting through adequate pay and furnishing certainty as to ultimate placement in the civil service and in government-owned industries as well as in private industry at the end of the term of service. The modern training organization of the armed forces can turn out young volunteers in a vast range of technical specialties in keeping with the demand from the job world.

The draftee army would lose all of its credibility and operational capacity without an effort to straighten out the volunteer force designed to eliminate any narrow social and regional characteristics and without an effort aimed at recruiting the qualitatively and quantitatively necessary long-term personnel. In the long run, the very principle of the draft and the military instrument model provided for in the Constitution of the Republic could be harmed as a result of that.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

ELITE SECURITY FORCE--The First Regiment of the Republican Guard, the new elite unit that will henceforth take care of honor-guard duties and security functions for the chief of state, will consist of 840 men. Reorganized by the Ministry of Defense at the personal request of President Giscard d'Estaing, the First Regiment will be commissioned on 11 November during ceremonies at the Arc de Triomphe. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 22 Oct 79 p 21]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

ROUND TABLE ON NATIONAL, CIVIL DEFENSE ISSUES

Rome RIVISTA MILITARE in Italian Jul-Aug 79 pp 2-11

[Round table discussion at Higher Military Study Center]

[Text] Gen Franco Barbolini, President, Higher Military Study Center

This round table discussion revolves around the topic that was presented to the 30th Session of the Higher Military Study Center by the Defense General Staff.

This is a study of national defense in the broadest meaning of the term, in other words, it is a synthesis of military and civil defense.

The 30th Session tried to touch upon all the possible elements as to what the others have been doing, from the countries in the NATO area to those of the Warsaw Pact and finally to the neutral countries and, apart from the inevitable and logical differences, the concrete element that emerged clearly was that all countries, in facing the problem of national defense arrived at specific conclusions that obviously vary.

In Italy the problem could not be examined--for contingent reasons--in terms of its overall nature and we have come up only with sector solutions dealing with specific requirements.

The decisive element--which will always have to be kept in mind in the course of our analysis--is the configuration of the threat which national defense must meet, a threat which fluctuates from a moment of major significance and which takes shape through the attack upon the country's borders from the outside all the way to the possible destabilization of the constitutional order, to attacks upon the economic system and finally to natural disasters which Italy experienced in all of their tragic reality several times.

We thus have here a range of extremely varied and extremely complex threats of differing scope which however always involves national defense as a whole and consequently its two fundamental components, the military component and the civilian component, both of which in turn, depending upon

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the type of threat, will be involved in various ways, in different proportions, but always in a closely interdependent fashion.

The only restrictions imposed upon us were those that were derived from the constitutional provision which could not and must not be altered and those deriving from international agreements, with particular emphasis on those connected with NATO, where the Alliance was concerned with studying, examining, and above all coordinating civilian action in case of natural disasters or other types of disasters through the special organization of civilian emergency plans.

This is the context of the problem facing the 30th Session.

It tackled it above all in an effort to ascertain how it might be possible to organize the basic scheme of the system, to define the decision-making summit, and specifically to spell out functions, responsibilities, and tasks.

For this purpose it accumulated voluminous data in the legislative field, in the organizational field, and in the area of the experiences of other countries and a certain solution model has already taken shape. But before arriving at final conclusions, we must still look at different specific experiences and authoritative opinions coming from those who examined the problem from a different angle.

Prof Franco Alberto Casadio, Director, Italian Society for International Organization

National defense and civil defense--and above all relations existing between these two elements--constitute an old problem. But the ways of defining them and above all the reasons that we must provide for the relationship we intend to establish between them, specifically, at a given moment and in a given country--those instead can be new. These problems should however emerge more clearly after we have come up with adequate answers to three groups of questions.

First. By common consideration, the concept of national defense is defined in relation to an emergency situation in which a country may find itself. We speak of an emergency situation in which society feels the need for having to react with an instrument that would reveal the typical nature and effectiveness of the military instruments. To understand what we mean here we must realize that we are dealing here with an instrument characterized by an adequate strength level and by a proportional degree of efficiency.

It seems to me that there are two problems to which we must find answers: Are the causes involved in the provocation of emergency situations the same as they were in the past or are there some new ones? What is the emergency threshold and how do we measure it?

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As regards the causes of the emergency situation, the tendency, which has taken shape in all countries of the world, is oriented toward broadening its range while including in it not only conflict and various types of conflict but also natural disasters. Conflict situations, which involve the defensive instrument, no longer are those which go beyond the threshold of hostilities but also the tensions, crises, and controversies; they are no longer "outside" conflicts, looking toward the outside world, but they also include "internal" conflicts, that is to say, domestic conflicts; they involve not only wars but they first of all include the situations and moments leading up to wars.

How much time before a conflict or before an assumed natural disaster is it necessary to arrange the required means and instruments? What is the cost which the community as a whole is prepared to sustain, today, in order, tomorrow, hypothetically, to reduce the damage deriving from a conflict or a disaster which might on top of it all never happen anyway?

Along with conflict and, hence, among the assumptions of a certain action to be taken, we must include natural calamities, from disasters all the way to catastrophes. We all agree that the element constituting civil protection is represented by the population and that the primary mission is to restore it after the impact of conflict and disaster.

But we must ask ourselves this: In what way does the civilian population, so to speak, get into the emergency, in case of conflict and in case of natural calamities? We realize that the civilian population is involved in a disaster, such as a flood or an earthquake. But the way in which the population can be involved in a war is vastly different and much more manifold, for example, as a target of aggression, as a theater of operations, as the social fabric within which violence spreads, as an instrument of military action, as a target of moral assault.

As of what threshold of external aggressiveness is or can the civilian population no longer be protected? But let us look back for a moment: Is it permissible to liken the case of war to the case of catastrophe in order to call for the defense of the civilian population by anybody, military or civilian, in other words, by somebody who is supposed to do the job on the basis of institutional provisions?

We think that one of the most appreciable results of the recent trend of thinking, which goes by the name of "operations analysis," concerning conflicts consists precisely in measuring the emergency through the calculation of vulnerability. The external factor, indirect permeability, direct permeability, and the essential nature of the internal factor are measurable. It suffices to use the proper method.

Second. What characteristics must the instrument, to be used in response to an emergency situation, in which the country may find itself involved, have? Obviously, you have to calculate the efficiency here. There are

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two conditions for this efficiency: Central decision-making and the capacity for making the available means, instruments, and methods creative and comparable among each other.

First of all, what are the factors that make centralization useful and profitable? I think that centralization will serve its purpose as a function of time and space. Centralization does its job as a function of time, prior to the emergency, by preparing the necessary means and by checking their reliability. At the moment of emergency, it serves to reduce the effective reaction time. I believe that the latter requirement would suffice to explain centralization.

But when it comes to space, centralization creates some delicate problems. The structure of the central vertex, of the peripheral vertexes, a real and proper peripheral structure, does raise questions which in many cases have not yet been matched with satisfactory answers. The problem remains in theory and above all in practice.

The other efficiency factor--the capacity to make the means used coherent and compatible--may be measured in two different ways. The first way is simply the way of economical employment. Can one measure the economy inherent in the military instrument or in the civil defense machinery in a suitable fashion? Would it be better to use absolute indicators (how much we spend on the establishment as such and throughout the fiscal year, how much we spend on fixed assets and operational expenditures) or relative indicators (how much we spend to get civilian defense ready as compared to how much we spend for schooling, public health, hunger throughout the world)?

Another way of measuring the efficiency of the civil defense machinery is even simpler: Here we try to find out whether it is capable of coping with the situation if the moment should come to prove itself. But how broad is the range of emergencies which we are considering here? Do we determine that by drawing up a really complete list of presumed types of action? Is there anybody who has the power to place upon the community as a whole the consequences and burdens deriving from being too pessimistic when the list of likely emergencies is drawn up?

On the other hand, it would be a good idea to realize that simply dropping the problem would inevitably lead us to two possibilities. We could in this way avoid preventively assigning a specific authority to the decision-making and operational centers, both civilian and military, both central and peripheral, putting our trust in the combination capability which these centers might reveal under the impetus of the urgency of circumstances. The other alternative consists in putting our trust in the grant of "full powers"--at the moment of the emergency--to an authority to be designated.

Third. What legislative and administrative instrument would it be good to have in anticipation of the development of the emergency? In countries,

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such as Italy, which do not yet have a legislative and administrative instrument capable of covering all of the possible situations with all of the available means--in such countries what could be the causes of such a delay?

We have no reason for hiding the fact that some of those causes have a psychological root. Other countries, where the system of government is much more centralized than in Italy, are much further along than Italy in "defense planning and civil protection." This is very natural and we are therefore not going to emphasize it.

The fact or the impression that it is a good idea to postpone the listing of specific emergency cases, in which we might find ourselves involved, is of a psychological nature. It is just as natural for us to be inclined to postpone the assumptions of misfortune. But the psychological roots of the attitude of those who do not look kindly upon the concentration of power, not even in the face of an emergency--those roots are much more subtle.

Might it not happen then that the delay, materializing at such points in the legislative and administrative horizon, concerning national and civil defense, would spring from some defect in the domestic and foreign policy decision-making process? Finally, could it not be that even scholars studying strategic and military topics might have at least a little bit of responsibility, if not also blame? Are we sure that we always raised the right problems at the right time and in a clear manner? Are we sure that we ourselves understood them?

The Hon Giuseppe Zamberletti, former Government Commissioner for the Earthquake Areas of Friuli

This situation offers me an opportunity once again to think about a series of topics which I have addressed myself to several times before and which we worked on, in the legislative area, when we drafted the civil protection law, and in the action area, when we found that the civil protection law stood up to the test of the emergency. Professor Casadio introduced a series of questions and I would like to make my contribution toward answering them.

What is national defense? It is the overall effort made by the nation to cope with a threat. When, in parliament, we drafted a bill on civil protection, which then became the law on civil protection, we found ourselves facing the difficulties which Professor Casadio recalled. In line with the request of some political parties, we did not want to include a threat from other countries under the heading of national defense, in other words, aggression against the nation; we therefore had to create an instrument which at least--regarding another type of threat (natural calamities and disasters)--could render the law operative in Italy.

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What then was the objective of the legislative branch? The objective was above all to create an integrated structure for the anticipation, to the extent possible, of the threats that might materialize in terms of civil defense and thus to have an instrument that would add anticipation to the structure of emergency action, gathering data through the most suitable instruments. That would include instruments of a military type, in certain aspects, but also civilian instruments, deriving for example from the existence of the regional setup in Italy. This is why we provided regional civil protection committees which are under the region but which, in addition to the latter's authority, would also have the authority deriving from the bureaucratic decentralization of the state as found in the region.

They should handle everything concerning the identification of the threats that may arise in a certain region.

The data pertaining to this study should go to the interministerial civil protection committee, chaired by the minister of the interior, and they should then be worked up into an overall national plan which, for management purposes--and this is the interesting point in the law--should be assigned to the national civil protection secretariat which is run by the director-general of civil protection, under the ministry of internal affairs.

Having extrapolated from the list of threats only those of a natural character, the competence of the minister of internal affairs in this field is quite evident; we already touched upon it in the law on the ministry of public works because here we realized that the ministry of public works is not in a position to have a network for checking on the "alert" systems since this is a ministry that has nothing to do with emergency situations whereas the ministry of internal affairs, due to factors connected with national security, does have an apparatus--also concerning communications networks--capable of handling all of the information that might come in and operating an "alert" system with a peripheral structure in the prefectures and in the government commissioner's offices attached to the region.

The plans drafted by the national secretariat should be handled, on the peripheral level, no longer by the region, but by the government commissioner attached to the regions, that is to say, by a civilian authority under the central power. This is so for two obvious reasons: First of all, because responsibility for a response to the threat is held by the state and the central government (as a matter of fact, even though this threat may involve citizens of one region, the result of the response may involve all of the other citizens); second, because responsibility for the defense and security of citizens is not held by the regions but by the central government since, to respond to the threat, it is also necessary to call upon forces outside the region and, hence, forces which are mobilized within the national context.

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It is therefore necessary that the operational command, when the emergency breaks out, can derive its authority from the central government and would be an extension of it. The anticipation aspect on the regional level therefore was and is being assigned by the civil protection law (I always say "theoretically" because the civil protection law has not yet been implemented and the implementing regulations have not even been issued as yet) to the civil protection committees which will draw up a list of possible threats and also resources that are available on the regional level. But the executive phase, implemented by any action designed to respond to the threat, springs from the central government which, on the regional level, uses the government commissioners and, on the provincial level, the organization of the prefects.

What is the problem we face today regarding the standards? It springs from the discovery that the type of legislative instrument we have available is partial because it selects the threats and concerns itself only with those deriving from natural disasters.

I believe that we must make an effort to provide a multivalent possibility for using one organization: Rather than having two different organizations, one for civil defense and one for civil protection, I think we should have only one national defense organization which would coordinate the entire national effort in response to any type of threat. I believe that, at least as regards civil protection, the problem anticipating the threat and the analysis of the means we have available has been resolved rather well, theoretically.

Professor Casadio has made a reference to the nation's effort to line up resources to confront a threat, that is to say, he talked about the cost; I think that the kind of planning effort designed to respond to a threat in the international context in which we move today (also considering our alliances) must be made a part of our national planning effort.

Let us now talk about the second phase, that is, the response to the threat. Here I had a rather unique experience: After having drafted a law on civil protection, I found myself in a position where I had to carry it out, almost by a strange quirk of fate. And here I must say that we certainly noticed the absence of a national secretariat for civil protection and even more so the lack of a combined general staff which would make provision for everything that might happen at the moment when the threat turns into aggression; we found ourselves facing aggression, not by an enemy, but by nature, with all of the tremendous shortcomings which we still have today; I found myself without any programs to back me up, without any plans beyond the sector plans, drafted as a command function in dealing with almost serious threat, assisted only by good luck and some extremely helpful coincidences; the first of these circumstances was represented by the intuition of Prime Minister Aldo Moro to give me a combined staff with the appointment of a deputy commissioner taking into account the forces that would have to tackle that threat. Luck would have it that this combination was particularly fortunate.

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But we cannot trust in good luck for the future when it comes to specific appointments; the structure must already be in existence and it must have been tested. I recall that I met and was introduced to the staff, with which I was supposed to operate, only at the moment we were drawing up the plan and at the moment we had to go into action; this is incredible from the viewpoint of operational possibilities. We do know in fact that the first 48 hours, during which the threat turns into actual aggression, are the decisive hours; during those 24 hours you either save a certain number of lives or everything is lost; during those 48 hours, either the organizational machinery and the integrated system work full-speed, or the initial delay during the period of uncertainty may turn out to be ruinous. One of the most important things to do is to have unity of command because, at that moment, united command is a necessary and indispensable requirement for being able to respond to the threat; all forces which are involved in the action must be under that command, from the first steps all the way to the end.

Besides, this command should be set up in advance and it should be organized in advance with respect to the threat; we should not have to spend ten hours to decide whether or not to appoint a supreme commander; perhaps the most delicate moment in the entire affair was the political consultation to find out whether we were really facing a disaster that did call for the appointment of the commissioner.

That moment, which can be really decisive, should be clarified in the law so as not to confront the prime minister--who must provide the special powers--with a situation where he has to consult with other people in order to determine in the first place whether or not an operational commander should be appointed. I believe that, in a new edition of a civil defense law, we should provide a whole series of threat levels in response of which we automatically set in motion certain procedures leading to the appointment of the operations commander, that is to say, the unified command. This is a problem of an organizational character which we face up the line; we have to find what kind of unified command we may have with reference to the threat; the civil protection law is quite flexible on this point and does not tell us what type of command we should try to set up; it leaves it up to subsequent regulations and common sense to select the men who are to be a part of that team, in the light of the threat.

But the most important thing is automatically to provide for the entry into action of the operational segment in order to respond to the threat, also taking into account the levels of standard power. And here Professor D'Onofrio can be more precise than I in terms of doctrine. This as a matter of fact involves not only coordination but also command; we get coordination through command. Either we command, and then we get coordination, or we do not command, and then we coordinate nothing, we only exchange reports and we often wind up multiplying our problems, rather than reducing them. Therefore the command must have legislative authority, that is to say, the power of delegation, in our case. In the second

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emergency this came out so evidently that, with the help of the law and the decree-law, the government, following the 15 September earthquake, took steps to provide the commissioner not only with power of command over the forces operating to meet the emergency and the threat but also to amend all laws that hindered the use of those forces or that made certain operations, necessary in order to meet the threat, difficult.

These are real legislative powers; as a matter of fact, it occurred to me that we might not only innovate and amend laws ranging from the highway code to procedures for the confiscation of buildings but also regarding the evacuation of the population; it also occurred to me that we should change the income tax deadline for a traumatized population which was encountering difficulties in meeting certain normal everyday requirements. We amended the laws providing certain procedures for getting a driver's license or for having civilian vehicles driven by military personnel, in other words, a whole series of things that cannot be resolved through the pure command of forces involved but that are most important in terms of their execution in connection with the effort to contain the threat that comes up. These powers must be established in such a way that, in coping with a "yellow" threat, we would have powers extending up to a certain level; in dealing with a "green" threat, there would be other powers on a different level; and in responding to the "red" threat, there would be still other powers on a certain level.

We are going to get special powers which, according to some experts, even modify the very principles of the constitution because the limitations were only the basic principles of the juridical system. But I realize that those powers were important. In those cases it is possible to get the entire organization to respond if we protect it from the risk of having to violate some federal government laws which in reality do not permit certain types of action or certain summary procedures connected with requisitions and evaluation, the establishment of schools and hospitals in various places, etc. It is true that, during the first phase of the emergency, I did exercise these powers without actually having them because the law on civil protection did not recognize them; but there are special moments when power derives from things, as they develop; since the emergency always covers a long span of time, the problem therefore must be tackled and resolved.

In conclusion I would say that we have a good civil protection law but we lack a civil defense law. The civil defense law in my opinion must complete the civil protection law. This does not mean that we should turn it into something else; in substance, the organization for responding to the threat involves the same type of model; it would be a mistake to have a defense organization and a civil protection organization because in reality all civil protection also serves for civil defense and all civil defense also serves for civil protection.

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I want to add one last consideration: When we have laws, we must implement them; I see with some discomfort that the law on civil protection does not yet have its regulation and a combined staff has not yet been constituted. What would happen if we were to find ourselves faced with another calamity?

Well, I am very much worried because I think that, under such assumptions, we would have to start from scratch every time, we would have to set the organization up, we would have to put the staff together whereas, on the basis of past experience and laws in force, we could already have the entire structure capable of responding without losing those 48 hours which other countries also lost during earthquakes.

Under these circumstances, time is so tight as to call for immediate action, with organizations and persons already trained to work together, people who know each other, people who know the various levels of authority not only in legal and formal terms but also in terms of tasks assigned to them in advance.

I have perhaps been a little bit expansive in my presentation but, being invited to a discussion of this kind sometime ago, when things were seen in terms of all of their aspects, also from the weak points, constituted a magnificent opportunity for reviewing a topic which is always timely in Italy, where problems continually come up once the acute phase has passed, with the risk of finding ourselves in a worse fix when these tragedies come up again. I asked myself what would have happened if, instead of in Friuli we had to face the same emergency along the ridge in Calabria, where problems involving communications, the armed forces, and the transport of individuals and equipment are much more complex than in Friuli, without advance planning.

Prof Francesco d'Onofrio, Professor of Constitutional and Comparative Law

I would like to alert you to the fact--in all of its gravity--that the topic complex concerning the military establishment so far has attracted the attention of only a few constitutional law experts so that the overall contribution from university thinking on this topic is by far inferior--at least quantitatively--to what we could and should have here.

This most probably--and as the Hon Zamberletti noted a short time ago--is one of the manifestations of that phenomenon of dismissing the military topic complex which the Italians experienced with intensity that perhaps only today is beginning to decline and whose roots go far back into Italy's national history, both before and after the republic.

If I therefore seek to answer the questions which were put to us here by Professor Casadio at the beginning of our endeavor here, I will have to do so with an approach that will constantly seek to hold together the constitutionalist and the cultural-political aspects of our debate here,

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in full awareness of the difficulty of this undertaking, which grows even further as we move on from the general military topic complex to the more specific and more complicated topic complex concerning the concept and the institution of overall defense, where the contributions from Italian constitutional law experts, it seems to me, are practically nil.

The need for constantly keeping in mind these two focal aspects of our debate appears clearly also in the light of the two premises outlined by General Barbolini in his introduction: The constitutional framework, on the one hand, and the system of current military alliances, on the other hand.

It is as a matter of fact evident that an exclusively domestic approach (which is the one that can be related to the constitutional framework) or an exclusively foreign-affairs oriented approach (the one that can be related to the framework of military alliances) is bound to run the risk of losing sight of the interconnection between the two approaches in a situation, such as the Italian situation, which, since after World War II, has been so profoundly marked by the almost simultaneous existence of constitutional choices and international choices.

Discussing the issue of national defense, which in so many other countries has been taken up years ago with results that look quite respectable, in substance signifies discussing the meaning of the emergency and the powers that can be exercised in an emergency situation.

That we are dealing here with an essential topic complex for the purpose of describing the status of institutions in a certain country is something that emerges very clearly only if we realize that one of this century's most incisive authors on political theory and constitutional law--I am talking here about Carl Schmitt--asserted rather sharply that "sovereign is he who decides on the state of emergency."

Although this is not supposed to mean that we subscribe to the political and constitutional view of Carl Schmitt (which, by the way, the passage of time has proven to be correct more often than we can say following the wartime disaster of the forties), we do want to say that the issue of national defense is indissolubly tied to the issue of sovereignty, regardless of whether it is viewed in its strictly domestic dimension or whether it is viewed in its international dimension.

Well, it seems to me that I can say that, over these past 30 years, the consensus on the premises and on the ultimate purposes of our constitutional system has been gradually broadening, increasingly turning the constitution into a point of reference above and beyond political contests; in short, we can say quite calmly that the constitution today has much more of a uniting effect than we can say 30 years or so ago.

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As I see it, the topic complex of national defense can concretely make substantial progress in the cultural debate and in the confrontation among the political forces everytime we must take up topics dealing with the security of our constitutional setup.

The debate concerning the international focal point of this issue however still looks different to me today; the system of military alliances, as a matter of fact, has not produced greater political and popular consensus to the same extent as the consensus on the constitution grew, although we can now detect by no means minor indications of a change of opinion, also among the political forces that are traditionally most hostile to NATO, forces that at least reveal a certain reconsideration of the view of world affairs expressed at the time NATO itself was set up and during its consolidation as an instrument for peace in Europe.

The fact therefore is that the issue of national defense will tend to be considered in a different light and probably in a more uncertain light every time it must come up with decisions directly connected to Italy's membership in NATO.

Going back for this purpose to a passage in the remarks by the Hon Zamberletti, I think that the special powers, with which he was provided on the occasion of the Friuli earthquake, were not challenged politically by anybody (in spite of the doubts as to constitutionality which he himself expressed at least with regard to some of the forms of intervention, using his powers as commissioner on that occasion) precisely because the "natural" quality of the phenomenon, which made those powers practically applicable, did not confront any political force with the problem of relating those powers to the military alliance or to any other aspect of the question of civil defense which is politically so controversial.

It is evident, as a matter of fact, that a natural event by definition, at least according to common acceptance, cannot be related to any ideology, to any political persuasion, to any religious face, to any overall view of relations between the state and civilian society, although it does instinctively unify the national conscience in defense of the assets threatened by the natural event itself.

Whenever we want to establish, in a normative fashion--and hence, at least in a law--those cases which constitute emergency situations different from those caused by natural events, we will have to visualize a gradation of consensus which would range from a maximum, relating to situations which everybody today connects with a natural event, to a minimum, covering emergency situations that might spring exclusively from Italy's membership in NATO.

It is true that substantial progress has been made recently on the road toward the verification of the consensus on the defense of institutions, as demonstrated by Law No 382, of 1978, spelling out the principles of military discipline.

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As we know, this law expressly asserts that the armed forces will assist in the defense of republican institutions, thus also concerning the spirit of the constitutional provisions pertaining to the armed forces, but at the same time demonstrating the maturation which has taken place among the political forces in connection with the topic complex concerning the armed forces in the Italian system of government.

The possible development of the political debate and the legislative decisions on this matter therefore enables us to consider as having been overcome, at least in part, the prejudices that confined the topic complex of national defense to questions which one could not talk about without causing profound dissent in Italy.

That obviously does not mean that we are moving toward new forms of militarism, nor does it mean asserting that the topic complex of national defense has now been backed up by a consensus equal to the one we were able to record, for example, with regard to a particular aspect, such as civil protection in the strict sense of the word.

This more precisely means that the debate on national defense (or, as we say, on overall defense) has found the Italian parliament more inclined to understand the value of national interest in terms of not necessary, radical juxtaposition of overall views.

It follows from this that we can anticipate the possibility of launching a revision of the law on civil protection in terms which would enable us to propose that which, at the time, although not too long ago, was difficult to include in the legislative text.

But I must inject a warning note here: While the area of consensus on the constitution is broader than the area of consensus on military alliances, it is a good idea for the parliamentary debate not to try to impose legislative solutions designed, all at once, to cut all of the preliminary political knots concerning the organizational solutions for national defense, but to demonstrate the flexibility necessary in a situation, such as the one that involves the subject matter which we have gathered here today to discuss.

The constitutional principles relating to the defense of the republic are a help here.

It is certainly not by chance that the Italian constitution provides only for war as a prerequisite for having parliament give the government "necessary powers."

This is a very broad formula which precisely leaves parliament with the specific evaluation of the quality and quantity of powers--also evidently the normative powers--to be conferred on the government in order to cope with the state of war.

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But the Italian constitution does not contain any provisions for a domestic state of emergency, nor for a state of siege, arising from facts not connected with war so that the ordinary legislator must be quite aware of the limitations which the constitutional system now in force places upon the instruments necessary in order to tackle emergency situations not related to a state of war.

The debate in the Constituent Assembly on these points was very intensive and high-level and was testimony of the effect which the experience of the preceding dictatorship and the war of 1940-1945 has on the drafting of the constitution.

The various phrases to be found in other constitutional texts, among them particularly the constitution of the Fifth French Republic, enable us to say that the possibilities given to the various national legislators, in terms of normative and operational instruments connected to the state of emergency, are not entirely identical; this has to do with the different extent of the political and popular consensus on the very concept of national unity and national interest.

It follows from this that a set of legislative instruments, designed to cope with problems arising from the need for guaranteeing the instruments for national defense, will have to move within the environment of formal and substantial indications deriving from the Italian constitutional system; very probably, the quality and quantity of the powers, which the Hon Zamberletti told us earlier he got on the occasion of the Friuli earthquake, cannot be extended to many assumptions of emergency.

An exception here, for example, would involve the constitutional limits on the reservations of law and jurisdiction instituted to safeguard basic individual liberties, although normative government powers may take shape on the assumption of an emergency that would lead to amendments in legislative sources likewise, in public organizational structures, and in the system of authorities.

The regionalistic topic complex assumes its full weight precisely at this point.

It does not seem to me that one can seriously challenge the government's authority in legislative and administrative matters connected with civil defense; not only are we not dealing here with "subjects" included among those that are under regional authority but we also note that the territorial limit of regional and local powers is difficult to reconcile with the necessary organic setup--often rather prevalently ultraregional--of the actions to be taken by the public authorities in responding to emergency situations.

It is a fact moreover that the Italian regional system and the system of local powers still performs a function of guaranteeing the political forces, in addition to a function of self-government for the local communities.

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It follows from this that legislation on civil defense should--for the sake of safeguarding federal government authorities--provide for the possibility of using regional administrative structures and local agency structures, as well as regional and local political personnel itself in order to implement the decisions made by the national constitutional bodies.

The involvement of the regional and local authorities as a matter of fact, seen not only as constitutionally required--which, I repeat, does not seem sustainable to me--but as politically determinable in the specific actual situation, could represent that flexibility to which I referred earlier in connection with the legislative formulation concerning the peripheral apparatuses of civil defense, both in the preventive survey phase and in the operational phase following the development of the actual emergency situation.

I definitely think that the way is now open toward a broader discussion on the topics of national defense, designed to take place not only in a climate of civilian confrontation but also to give Italy cultural, organizational, and juridical instruments for overall defense.

Dr Vito Sansone, Journalist

I have no difficulty in confessing that this is the first time I find myself involved in a discussion of this kind and I think the whole thing is rather stimulating. Besides, when I was invited to attend this meeting, I was tempted not to accept because I realized the difficulty of making an effective contribution. But then I thought about it and I said to myself:

No, this is one of those opportunities which one must not miss. Thus, because of my own scruples, I went to the files of a big Roman daily and I asked the custodian to get me the file on "civil defense."

Well, in it I only found some things I already knew, that is, some essays on civil defense in the United States and in the Soviet Union with relation to limited war, the problems of nuclear war, etc.; much material was written by special correspondents on the atomic shelters in China but apart from that there was nothing else. Going further back in time, there were many sensational articles on the problems of the billionaires who were having atomic shelters built for themselves, first in America and then in Europe, etc.

I was stunned to make this discovery and I asked myself: Looking at these articles, how could a journalist react who, overnight, finds himself facing a problem of this tremendous significance, what means does he have available, what means of information? This fact is particularly worrisome because in my judgement--and I think that the remarks made so far fully confirm this judgement--the problems of information, organization, and consensus are absolutely preeminent and fundamental.

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I think--and Professor D'Onofrio emphasized this rather well--that we are dealing here with problems that must be resolved first of all.

And in this connection I would like to share with you a personal, professional experience: I was and still am one of the few journalists--I am talking about the daily press which reaches everybody or just about everybody--who concerned himself with military problems in the sense that I tried to cover problems of military strategy, of East-West relations, nuclear problems, etc. Well, I must tell you that I always found obstacles at the newspaper and the main obstacle was represented by the attitude of the managing editors and the desk editors but above all the former. I think that this is an obstacle that must definitely be removed by making an effort to convince those people that problems of defense, military problems, both national and international, are important problems on which public opinion must be informed and sensitized. And since the managing editors are precisely worried about selling newspapers, we must tell them that those problems, those problems likewise, offer interesting subject matter for discussion and reading.

This purpose can be attained by asking them for their opinion, by getting them interested somehow, by inviting them to television debates or round table discussions.

I am convinced that the problems of defense often represent something entirely new that can be of interest to the people.

Having made these points, I hope you will allow me to make some simple and, I would say, elementary statements on the obstacles in the way of a full understanding of the problems of defense. I believe that there are political obstacles but also obstacles of a psychological nature. It is not that people are talking only very little about civil defense; people in general talk very little about military problems, about defense in a general sense. Why? Perhaps we can draw an analogy. Some time ago we had a touch of a debate on the problems of austerity. We all know that this debate, which looked so promising, finally wound down because it was discovered--the politicians discovered or at least they think so--that the problem of austerity is not a popular one and does not make anybody else popular. People do not want to hear talk about savings, about tightening their belts, etc. People want to continue to live the way they have been living for all of these years. But we all know, including the politicians, that this is precisely the moment we must talk about austerity. It is therefore necessary to seek the means, the instruments, without bothering the people, in order to force them to think about what shape we all are in now.

I think that, in view of the gravity of the civil defense problem by now, viewed in its overall aspects and in terms of national defense, in other words, as an integral part of national defense and, hence, of the context of a defense policy that the public would find clearer and more acceptable,

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we will have to find a way of getting this problem to the forefront likewise. And we will succeed in doing that to the extent that we manage to convince the people of its importance, using proper means and methods of disclosure.

There has been talk of the perception of the threat but the people do not want to hear anything about threats and they do not like to hear talk about dangers and imminent disasters. If you talk about it, they immediately knock on wood. This, by the way, is an understandable mentality. I myself, when I start out on a trip by car on the highway, try not to think about what might happen. The first problem to be solved therefore is this: The people reject anything that is unpleasant, even though it may be the real thing.

Another motive of a psychological character, which in my judgement makes civil defense quite incredible, is that, whenever anybody talked about it, it was done in relation to nuclear disasters, that is to say, events of such dimensions as to seem impossible and unrealistic to us. The idea of civil defense has for some time been discredited also by all of the news about private atomic shelters when we learned about the billionaires who were spending millions upon millions in order to create a little safe corner for themselves while everybody else who did not have the billions in cash would remain exposed to the disaster. In other words, civil defense, understood in these terms--although it was in these terms that it was being talked about--was something unattainable. Now, we obviously know that civil defense has a different meaning and this is the meaning which was brought out during this round table conference.

I must add that, as far as Italy is concerned, the obstacles are not so much of a psychological but rather of a political character. They are those problems which were touched upon by Professor D'Onofrio, that is to say, problems which we might define as being historical, problems which come from our history and which took shape throughout the period of time from the unification of Italy until today. The armed forces have been a separate body only for a very short time. That of course is nothing new. Only now is a new situation beginning to take shape in the sense of a more incisive involvement of the armed forces in the nation's civilian life. It is with great pleasure that I can see the following printed, for example, in "Libro Bianco della Difesa" [Defense White Paper]: ". . . The armed forces however strongly note the urgent need for an instrument that would be closely connected abroad with the civilian organizations that express the life of the nation in its aspects. . . etc."

I was also happy to read an article in RIVISTA MILITARE [Military Review] talking about the need for the armed forces to be involved in a civilian circuit.

Here, it seems to me, we have the way to make the image of the armed forces more attractive and more acceptable, that is, the armed forces

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which are interested in civil defense problems, in economic problems--and it is quite correct that they should be interested in that, since they are part of our society at large.

Prof Franco Alberto Casadio

It is a good thing to be aware of the fact that, in Italy and in every country of the world, the debate on defense daily involves diverse and changing aspects. The solution which is provided from time to time to this type of problem is only one aspect of the broader problem of civilian society and the manner in which it must be experienced. After having resigned ourselves to this situation of "permanent study," it remains for us however to find out whether we are not falling behind the events as such.

The valuable contributions by the speakers and those who commented during the debate covered the entire broad range of questions we asked ourselves at the beginning. The threat represented by the emergency is now being perceived by everybody in such a manner as to explain, justify, and guide the military functions and, in a broader sense, the function of defense. The list of causes of possible emergencies is getting longer. The emergency "threshold" is being lowered under the weight of the quantity and variety of possible emergencies. The example of other countries, which are just as sensitive to those problems, confirms this tendency. The "place" where this emergency can arise no longer concerns only domestic interests but involves facts which may happen far away from Italy. The "time frame" and early action in response to circumstances therefore are of the utmost importance, as we saw during the debates.

Defense has been considered not only as a guarantee of individual liberties but as the environment within which the citizen has the right to be admitted to experiencing his right and his duty to participate. The juridical apparatus, whose object is defense, has not yet been completely worked out in all of its possible points. The time has come for us to realize what the two aspects of the juridical problem are and they are fortunately complementary: For the national defense agencies, the area of available autonomy would probably, in the opinion of some people, be explored with more of a calm attitude; on the other hand, the constitutional limitations and the control mechanisms with which the country's juridical apparatus is equipped do represent valuable "shields."

Gen Franco Barbolini

This series of comments pointed up the fundamental aspects of our problem:

The juridical aspect, within whose context we conducted our investigation;

The operational aspect, through concrete, in some cases totally realistic authoritative experience;

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The information aspect which tends to make public opinion participate in the handling of the problem by sensitizing it and arousing its sense of responsibility.

Finally, but perhaps decisively, the political will to put up for discussion a problem of such tremendous concern as the choice of the most opportune moment for taking action.

National Defense

By Air Force Lt Gen Francesco Cavalera, Chief, Defense General Staff

The topic of overall defense, assigned to the session which is about to conclude, in my opinion is of the utmost interest not only because of its timeliness but also because of the noteworthy broad range of factors characterizing it.

The study here undoubtedly will not fail to hold the attention of those who hold responsible positions on the national level in the vast field of defense; at the very least, we hope that the work produced by the 30th Session of the Higher Military Study Center will effectively contribute to a better awareness of the fundamental problem and will activate those initiatives and those measures which are considered indispensable in giving Italy a concrete defense guarantee.

It is not my intention here to come back to the results of the study since it will be the various staffs and departments concerned who will utilize the results in the common attempt to perfect and, where necessary, to create suitable structures in order to assure overall defense. However it seems that I should conclude with some remarks on the images which were presented to us here.

I would like to talk, for example, about a statement made by General Barbolini, when he talked about the determination necessary to implement the proposed organization.

I would like to expand a little bit on this concept of determination.

I talked about this when the subject came up and when I had to emphasize that a defense instrument is of no value whatsoever--especially the military instrument--if the nation, the people, do not have the will to defend themselves.

I must point out that, by the will to defend oneself, we must not mean the will to take up the necessary weapons at the moment the need arises.

This will is certainly not lacking even in the most indifferent and the most dissident individuals and it would perhaps not even be lacking in those who preach total and unilateral disarmament at the moment they are really struck by the enemy's offensive, at the moment they are getting hit by enemy fire.

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But by then it would be too late.

By the will to defend oneself we must mean the will, at the right time and certainly far from the moment of truth, to constitute a system that will be capable of functioning first of all to deter a potential adversary--and this is the most valid defense because it prevents the offense in every sense--and, after that, if deterrence should fail, to prevent or reduce the damage deriving from the offenses and to stop it as soon as possible.

For that we would need correct information, an awareness and a sense of responsibility on the part of everybody, in any action that can contribute to defense, even from far away.

In the constitutional charter of the Italian Republic, our legislators, in drafting the articles pertaining to political relationships and when approving the well-known phrase at the beginning of Article 52--that is to say: The defense of the fatherland is the sacred duty of the citizen--certainly did not want to talk only about a possible final event, the moment when arms must be taken up, but all of the actions necessary in order to prepare and guarantee the defense.

It is therefore the sacred duty of all, in their own field of activity, and I want to underscore that phrase "in their own field of activity," to promote and implement those measures that are necessary in order to make the defense system work properly, a system in which weapons represent the final act under the responsibility of the military.

While an important or predominant part in the defense role is assigned to the military instrument, as has been decided by the Italian people so far through its democratically elected representatives, it is necessary to make sure that this instrument will have maximum effectiveness.

This effectiveness is the result of a product, a product in the mathematical sense, a product of four factors. If one of those factors is zero, then the entire product will be zero.

These factors are: Personnel, materiel, training, and organization.

Personnel is undoubtedly the most sensitive and the most delicate factor. Its efficiency is proportional to its motivation. Motivation is developed in the environment and is conditioned by treatment, not only economical but also and above all moral.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

ETA (P-M) AIDE INTERVIEWED ON AUTONOMY STATUTE

LD291235 Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 21 Oct 79 pp 14-17 LD

[Interview with Basque Homeland and Liberty Politico-Military Wing (ETA (P-M)) unidentified spokesman in San Sebastian by Juan Gomez Puiggros: "ETA (P-M) Speaks"; date not specified]

[Text] CAMBIO 16: ETA (P-M)'s support for the Guernica statute [Basque autonomy statute] has caused surprise in many quarters. Why do you support it?

ETA: It is true that this may have caused surprise, but not among people who know ETA (P-M)'s line. Our struggle has been aimed at clarifying the class struggle in the Basque country. The Guernica statute will serve to clarify who serves the bourgeoisie's interests and who serves the interests of the working classes in the Basque country.

There has been an ambiguity so far in the struggle in the Basque country, and it is the struggle against the central government which has promoted interclass collaboration between the bourgeoisie and the working classes.

CAMBIO 16: Could you enlarge on this point?

ETA: Yes. The period of transition to democracy has left many Basque leftwing political forces--for instance, Herri Batasuna, the LKI (Communist League) and the EMK (Communist Movement)--perplexed, and they have been unable to adjust to the present situation, continuing with the same methods and policies as under fascism.

We foresaw that things would change and hastened to take part fully in the new situation, since it is also revolutionary to combine with our struggle the struggle within the bourgeois institutions. Thus we have supported forces which are using all the machinery and possibilities of this "democracy."

And it can be said that bourgeois democracy is now coming to the Basque country with the Guernica statute, but under very specific conditions....

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As we have said, interclass collaboration has so far predominated in the Basque people's struggle. Very well, henceforth there will be a Basque government with some powers and a party heading it--the Basque Nationalist Party [PNV]--and the latter will have to govern, approve crisis proceedings [with respect to enterprises in difficulties], direct the Basque country's industrial reorganization and so forth, and it will be clearly seen what interests everybody defends.

Moreover, the statute will clarify another historical problem in the Basque country: What is the framework of the revolution? Statewide or nationwide? The Guernica statute establishes the nationwide framework. Thus the right wing which will govern, in accordance with the oligarchy's plans, will unmask itself and the leftwing forces will have to define themselves clearly in the Basque country.

Well then, if we wish to achieve socialism and independence, we will have to pressure and drive forward the statute, which is a broader framework of freedoms within which the left will have to be leftwing and within which it will be possible to create unity in a single party for revolution and also a powerful armed organization dependent on that party.

CAMBIO 16: The patriotic [abertzale] left's criticisms of the Guernica statute concern three issues which, in their opinion, have not been included--that is, Navarra, the refugees and an amnesty.

ETA: It is untrue that the statute does not include the issue of Navarra. It includes it and raises the possibility of integration for the first time in the Basque country's history. However, the issue has not been resolved, although it could be resolved by implementing transitional provision 4 (a). Herri Batasuna, the PNV and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party must now demonstrate their resolve that this be done.

Either all the parties which are initially in favor of this integration reach agreement in the Navarra regional parliament, or, as a result of another kind of pressure, forces which are now even opposed will change their views in a new political situation.

In this connection we wish to point out that Herri Batasuna's stance is to agree with the Navarra oligarchy's proposals, since, being the non-negotiators par excellence, they have gone to Madrid to negotiate the enlargement of the fueros [local rights], which coincides with the intention to make Navarra a "tax haven," so as to create different processes conflicting with the rest of the Basque country.

CAMBIO 16: And what about the refugees and the amnesty?

ETA: An autonomy statute in the Basque country cannot function with political prisoners in the prisons. Under these circumstances the Basque government would be unable to function.

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This situation creates such a state of instability that all the institutions would be affected. And so if this problem is not resolved, the degree of instability will remain and it will not be possible to clarify the class struggle.

[LD291237] CAMBIO 16: How will you act on these issues?

ETA: We will convince the central government, the bourgeoisie and the PNV that they must take up these issues and that the action-repression-action dynamic which produced results under fascism must be eliminated under bourgeois democracy; and the PNV and the PSOE must involve themselves in this solution since it closely concerns them. Otherwise, they will be unable to govern.

We are now at the historic moment of discarding this dynamic.

CAMBIO 16: You have spoken of the situation of the PNV and the PSOE. What is your opinion of the other political forces?

ETA: The best way in which the Union of the Democratic Center [UCD] can achieve what it proposes--"breaking" Herri Batasuna and ETA's military wing--is to cooperate in resolving these issues, since it is these which are fostering them.

Otherwise, if the national police remain, if roadblocks persist and if torture continues, the ambiguity of the antirepressive struggle will continue, and it will be impossible to govern the Basque country. And it is in this atmosphere of repression that Herri Batasuna's demagogic and populist stance finds an outlet, since the bad mood created by wage freezes, unemployment and so forth takes the false outlet of the national and antirepressive problem, since when a workers strike is repressed, the cry of "ETA, kill them" is raised, as a result of which the strike loses its nature as a wage-claim dispute.

In this connection we believe that the UCD wants a "yes" to the statute, but not a massive "yes," because it is encouraging abstention with the probable trials of Monzon and Letamendia as martyrs, since with such a weak "yes," the institutions which emerge will also be weak.

One of our fundamental policies is aimed at inducing really leftwing sectors in Herri Batasuna to reconsider its activity and act consistently as a leftwing force.

CAMBIO 16: Will your support for the statute entail abandoning the armed struggle after its approval?

ETA: No; the armed struggle will continue. The Seventh Assembly forecast that the forms of domination would change under bourgeois democracy and that it would be necessary to change the forms of political and armed struggle as well, but this does not mean abandoning the latter.

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Within the context of the mass struggle against the central government, the oligarchy's plans and so forth, these may be instances in which just demands cannot be achieved, whether as a result of superior strength on the part of the central government or as a result of a limit to the masses' capability for organization and struggle. It is then that the armed organization's role comes into play to guarantee their success and also to serve as an educational element for the masses and demonstrate to them in practice the usefulness and need for the armed struggle, as a further element in the mass struggle.

We believe that there will be no revolution without an armed insurrection, and since we do not believe in Santa Claus, we believe that it is necessary to begin immediately to prepare the organization of military cadres and the material and logistic means, so that when the masses are determined to make this leap forward, they will have the means for doing so.

CAMBIO 16: So what will have priority in your struggle: preparation for that moment of insurrection which you mention or military intervention?

ETA: There are two convergent forms of struggle--that of the party which raises the masses' level of organization and consciousness and also its own level of organization (political and ideological struggle), and that of the armed organization which will create principally the material means for guaranteeing the masses' triumph at the time of revolution, but this cannot be understood unless armed intervention's educational role at the present time is understood, since this educates the masses with respect to its usefulness. We have thus prepared what we term "intervention areas," which is where we will concentrate our intervention in trade unions, culture and so forth, always in accordance with the armed struggle.

This is how the armed struggle's strategic and tactical aims are combined, and it is also how we will succeed in the long term in driving the statute forward, and in this connection we wish to alert the left in the Basque country to its historic responsibility to create that party capable of leading the revolution.

[LD291239] CAMBIO 16: The atmosphere which is being created in the Basque country has caused talk of army intervention in some military circles.... Do you believe this possible? What would your stance be in that event?

ETA: We believe that the government has for the most part opted now for the democratic and bourgeois path--that is, that of persuasion and political and ideological control--and that military intervention in the Basque country therefore forms no part of its plans.

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However, if it became convinced at any time that this form of domination is not working for it in the Basque country, we believe that it will not hesitate to use other means, even the army, to perpetuate its domination. However, we repeat that we do not believe that this is its present approach.

But if they opted for the latter solution--that is, military intervention--we would not hesitate to attack the government where it could be hurt most, and not necessarily in the Basque country. We would take our intervention wherever necessary, and we are prepared for doing this.

Today the stance of ETA's military wing could provoke this intervention, but this would occur in a situation totally unfavorable for the Basque revolutionary forces, since there is no armed organization prepared for victory or an organized working class.

Today, blowing up Parliament or killing the king would mean returning to the situation of 40 years ago and having to start from scratch. And if there are sectors of the military wing which are seeking this, we tell them that it is totally counterrevolutionary.

CAMBIO 16: There has repeatedly been talk of negotiations with the Spanish Government. Have there been negotiations on the topic of the statute?

ETA: Yes, there have been negotiations: the transfer of some prisoners, the withdrawal of the repressive forces from Soria prison and the very contents of the statute are the result of them, and also of the armed struggle.

CAMBIO 16: Who conducted the negotiations on behalf of the government?

ETA: We prefer not to say, but it is a fact that Prime Minister Suarez himself has been directly involved in them, as a result of the Mediterranean campaign (they are referring to the bombs on the beaches during the summer) and the attack against Gabriel Cisneros, whom we initially wished to detain and question. But his attitude at that time caused him to be shot.

CAMBIO 16: Have there also been negotiations with the French Government on the situation of the refugees?

ETA: We have not held any, but we know that ETA's military wing has held negotiations, negotiating residence permits. And this when people say that they are the "hardliners," who do not negotiate. And note that we are not opposed to negotiation and regard it as a valid weapon, but we do not claim to be what we are not.

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CAMBIO 16: What is your opinion of Basque General Council Chairman Carlos Garaicoechea's role?

ETA: He is the perfect bourgeois politician; his role cannot be separated from that of the PNV. The latter will be the instrument which will guarantee the oligarchy's interests in the Basque country. When it holds power in the Basque country government, the sectors of the working class which follow it will clearly see the interests which it defends, who will carry out the Basque country's industrial reorganization and subject to what interests and how the issues of unemployment, bilingualism, health and so forth will be tackled.

It will be very difficult, not to say impossible, for them to reconcile the interests which they really defend with those of the working class and low-income groups, and their role is becoming increasingly clear, now that even people like Olarra (a prominent Basque businessman) are backing the PNV.

CAMBIO 16: What is your opinion of Telesforo Monzon?

ETA: He is the person with most power in Herri Batasuna; his personality and stance sum up Herri Batasuna's entire policy and ideology. Neither Ortzi (Letamendia), nor Solabarria nor Castells holds power there--only Monzon.

CAMBIO 16: How are your relations with ETA's military wing progressing?

ETA: They are not progressing and are very unlikely to progress; however, if we learn of some sector among them which wishes to seriously consider the real situation in Euskadi, we are prepared to hold contacts with them.

We believe that the military wing can be asked to hold their Seventh Assembly, since they are continuing to operate with the same presuppositions as in 1973, and many things have changed in the country since then. And it is after that Seventh Assembly that we will be able to talk.

But we wish to draw attention to a matter concerning relations between the military wing and ourselves, and this is that there are currently people who want to cause conflict between us. The attack against the Herri Batasuna San Sebastian councilor, Tomas Alba, was carried out with buckshot--a weapon which we use a great deal--and a Euskadiko Ezquerria member was recently shot with "Geko" ammunition, which the military wing also uses, and we did not attack Tomas Alba, nor did they attack Emilio Guitia. For our part, we will not fall into provocation, and we hope that they will not, either.

[LD291241] CAMBIO 16: The conclusion of the "Mediterranean campaign" was truly tragic, with the bombs in Madrid. What can you say about this?

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ETA: The warning that the bombs had been planted was given long enough in advance and was sent by our usual means. So it must have been reliable, and their explosion, or at least victims, could have been averted. We had previously announced the second stage of this campaign, if the government did not carry out the agreements on the return of the Soria prisoners, and so they had warning.

So if the reliability of the 11 previous warnings had been demonstrated, why did the government not intervene on this occasion? All the more so, since we have evidence (a tape recording) that the San Sebastian police chief informed the civil governor and police chief of Madrid of the bomb warning.

CAMBIO 16: If it was a deterrence measure, why did you not plant the bombs deactivated? The effect could have been the same....

ETA: In the first place, we gave warning about 2 hours in advance, and, second, if you plant a deactivated bomb, it loses its deterrence effect, and the same applies to subsequent bombs. We deeply regret the victims we caused, but the principal responsibility rests not with ourselves but with those who, although able to avert these victims, did not do so.

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