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30 October 1979

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 653



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MALIAN DISSIDENT ON 'ISLAMIC UNITED STATES OF SAHEL'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 975, 12 Sep 79 pp 31-33

[Interview with Dr Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou by Mohamed Selhami in Tripoli at the Palace Hotel, 1 September 1979: "'J-Day' Has Already Been Chosen"]

[Text] When JEUNE AFRIQUE (No 963) [See JPRS L/8564 10 July 1979, Sub-Saharan Africa] announced in its "Confidential" column the creation of a movement for the liberation of Mali supported by Libya, Qadhafi's ambassador in Bamako felt obliged to deny it (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 966) [See JPRS 73988 9 August 1979, Sub-Saharan Africa]. Now we are in a position not only of confirming the existence of that movement but also of publishing an interview with its chairman, Dr Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou. The meeting took place on Saturday, 1 September, at the Palace Hotel in Tripoli where Dr Medina has been living for almost a year.

His movement is the UDRM [Democratic Republican Union of Mali] (organ of the late Modibo Keita's Sudanese Union-RDA [African Democratic Rally]). According to him, he has strong army of 7,000 men trained and ready to go into action and the UDRM allegedly has operational equipment available right now: 17,000 Kalachnikov automatic rifles, 17,000 M-16 automatic weapons, 6 tons of grenades, 47 long-range canon-carrying Toyota vehicles, three Fiat trucks, 6 tons each, two King Air-200 planes, 52 motorcycles equipped with radios, one vehicle-mounted transmitting center and 12 ambulances.

This materiel was for the most part furnished by Libya. But other countries are providing financial and military support to Dr Medina, e.g., Iraq, which has ensured the training of about 2,000 fighting men. Dr Medina asserted that he was in touch with Benin and Togo. He even added that the Benin Government has apparently authorized him to utilize its section of the Niger River to send arms to Mali. Dr Median--who is assisted by Toure Tapa, a professor at the University of Tripoli, and Amadou Traore who has a doctorate in law, both Malians and members of the UDRM's executive bureau--even announced that he has already selected the day on which he is to unleash his "war against the regime of Malian president, Moussa Traore."

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Dr Medina's statement are simply astounding. But the one who is believed to be the leader of the guerrilla war in Mali resides in Tripoli. He received us on the recommendation of one of the leaders of the Libyan Popular Committee (the country's supreme authority). In the suite he occupies at the Palace Hotel, we noted a few submachine guns and even a colonel's uniform, a uniform Dr Medina is hoping to wear the day he returns as conqueror to his native town, Bamako. He was born there 38 years ago to a poor family of seven children. Today, aside from his Tripolitan "pied a terre," Dr Median admits to wning a 12,000 square meter residence wiht 13 rooms and a swimming pool at Chateau d'Ex in the Lausanne (Switzerland) area. He also owns two apartments, one in Rome, the other in Geneva. I had a rambling conversation with Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou.

[Question] Why did you decide to settle in Libya?

[Answer] First, Libya is a socialist, democratic and popular country. And then our two countries are part of Islam's great family and of the Sahara, that vast ocean of sand.

[Question] Of what does Libyan aid consist?

[Answer] It is a rather delicate matter to give precise information on that. We are in Libya, hence at home. Libyan aid has made it possible for us to have a military and political striking force which is proving to be effective right now. But we particularly do not wish to be identified in Chad. We do not wish to wage a war that will drag on for 10 or 20 years.

[Question] You think Mali may experience the same fate as Chad?

[Answer] Yes. Traore has been in power for 10 years and nothing worthwhile has been achieved.

[Question] Are you thinking of acting in the same way as the FROLINAT, that is, by taking up arms?

[Answer] We are no longer at the stage of thinking. Right now we are in the midst of armed struggle. Moussa Traore came to power by force; he will leave by force. We will act at a time of our choosing and unflinchingly.

[Question] Who gave you the weapons?

[Answer] Libya, of course! And other friendly countries...

[Question] Which ones?

[Answer] Well... Iraq and Benin. But our organization, the UDRM, has very solid financial means available to procure arms for itself.

[Question] And aid from the Soviet Union?

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[Answer] We have nothing to do with that country. We are anti-Soviet and anti-American. We do not wish to have anything to do with those two imperialisms. Once Mali has been liberated, we will chase them out of the country.

[Question] And France?

[Answer] That is a matter requiring some thought. We have nothing against that country a priori. It is up to it to accept us or reject us. I will simply say that we are prepared to cooperate with France. In the meantime, however, let it keep still and not get involved in our problems.

[Question] Are you sure of winning out?

[Answer] We know the strength of Mali's armed forces, all of whose elements do not support the regime. We also know our strength. So we are certain to get our hands on Moussa.

[Question] How many are there of you?

[Answer] We have 7,000 well-trained, well-armed men.

[Question] Where were they trained?

[Answer] In Libya and in Iraq, among others...

[Question] How do you manage to keep informed as to what is going on in Mali?

[Answer] We have a solid network, informers inside the presidential palace itself, among the ministers and among the army officers and the gendarmerie. Our party has 30,000 active members in Mali.

[Question] But President Traore was nonetheless elected just the same by the Malians last June...

[Answer] That is ridiculous. A president elected by 99.99 percent is a usurper. A fortiori, a single candidate who has the army and police under his banner... Be serious with your questions, sir...

[Question] It is said that you are for dividing Mali into two states, one made up of the north and one of the south.

[Answer] That is not true. It was your paper that told those lies. We are not a secessionary movement. We stand for one Mali with its present borders in the north as in the south. JEUNE AFRIQUE has no right to ascribe such an orientation to our party. We demand the total liberation of Mali's entire territory.

[Question] If you seize power in Mali, what will you do with Moussa Traore and his friends?

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[Answer] Moussa threw out Modibo. I will kill him with my own hands.

[Question] How long has it been since you left Mali?

[Answer] Back in 1971.

[Question] You have never gone back there?

[Answer] Yes, several times. Along with my men, I have often held secret meetings in Bamako and in other towns of the country.

[Question] Do you enter weapons in hand?

[Answer] We are rather well protected. We have listening posts throughout Mali.

[Question] What weapons do you use?

[Answer] No, sir, I am not going to tell you! We will attack as soon as we have the green light from a friendly country. And Moussa will not be able to resist us more than 2 hours.

[Question] Which country is that?

[Answer] I will not tell you. You may know only that it is an African one and Moslem.

[Question] Are you to Mali what Goukouni was to Chad?

[Answer] Not at all. But Goukouni is a friend. We often correspond with each other. Goukouni is Medina and Medina is Goukouni. We have the same goals. We are going to create the United States of Sahel. That is our objective.

[Question] You will be lacking Niger...

[Answer] I see that JEUNE AFRIQUE does not know everything... There is a Nigerian movement whose executive committee is located in Tripoli. A Nigerian Goukouni does exist.

[Question] Who is it?

[Answer] I won't tell you. It would be premature. When we have finished with Mali, Kountche who is currently governing Niger will need to know where to lay his head.

[Question] Goukouni agrees with you on creating the United States of Sahel?

[Answer] Absolutely. It will be the Islamic United States of Sahel. Goukouni is not helping us. He is participating.

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[Question] Libya agrees to it?

[Answer] Absolutely.

[Question] Will Libya be part of those United States?

[Answer] Libya is already totally committed to this process. It will be part of the Sahel.

[Question] And Mauritania?

[Answer] Now at last you are getting down to it! Give us some time for that...

[Question] It will be thanks to the Polisario?

[Answer] Perhaps. But we will proceed by stages.

[Question] Is Algeria involved?

[Answer] It will rally to it necessarily. It will not want to be isolated. It needs the countries of the Sahel, it is a natural ally.

[Question] You will still have Morocco and Tunisia.

[Answer] They will not be in it. They have no connection with our problems. The Islamic United States of Sahel will include Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Algeria and Libya: The states making up Greater Sahel.

[Question] And the West Saharan Republic?

[Answer] It must exist. Perhaps, I don't know...


[Question] Do the West Saharans have a right to independence?

[Answer] I think so. We support the Polisario. We have supplied it with fighting men, about 1,700, who were trained in Libya and Algeria.

[Question] While you are at it, why not also liberate Morocco and Tunisia?

[Answer] That is too much. What we are interested in first of all is the liberation of Mali, then that of Niger. Since in Chad it has already been accomplished...

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REPUBLIQUE DU MALI U. D. R. M.	
	
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

KENYAN AID TO ZAIRE--The Kenyan Government has acceded to the request of the Kinshasa authorities to evacuate by air, from Zaire to Mombasa, some 7,275 tons of coffee that have remained blocked in the eastern part of the country since the closing of the Ugandan border, according to information obtained from an official source in the Zairian capital on 25 August. The same source has indicated that the Kenyan Government has insisted that the evacuation be effected exclusively aboard Air Zaire cargo planes "for reasons of security." [Text] [Marches TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2397] 9238

BENGUELA RAILROAD REOPENING--Mr Baudour, director of operations of the Zairian National Railroad Company, announced that railway traffic between Zaire and Angola was to resume on 1 September with the opening of the Benguela railroad. Recalling the meeting which recently brought together at Luao on the Angolan frontier delegates from the railroads of Angola, Zaire and Zambia, Mr Baudour also announced that Zaire and Angola had reached an agreement "to return to each other on a reciprocal basis the rolling stock held in each of the two countries" since the closing of the Benguela railroad in 1975. This railroad is a low-cost export route for the mining products of Shaba, in particular copper. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 7 Sep 79 p 2466] 9434

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

CABINDA PIPELINE DAMAGED--A break the causes of which are still unknown brought about the closing of the pipeline which transports petroleum from Yabe to the Xalongo installations in Cabinda Province. The ANGOP PRESS AGENCY, which cites sources close to Sonangol, the oil company, states that the accident occurred 29 August and adds that repairs are underway. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 7 Sep 79 p 2466] 9434

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CAMEROON

UCCAO EXPERIENCES SATISFACTORY COFFEE YEAR

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2453

[Text] The board of directors of the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives of the West (UCCAO) met in Bafoussam on 10 August 1979 under the chairmanship of Jean Teinkela, chairman of the union.

The agenda included the following points: approval of the minutes of the preceding meeting, a first meeting with the new governor of the West, examination of the balance sheet, the union's participation in construction of the building that will house the third regular congress of the UNC [Cameroonian National Union] in February 1980 in Bafoussam, personnel problems, and other questions.

During fiscal 1978 the UCCAO's factory processed 3,040 tons of coffee. Sorting operations began late due to the lack of spare parts. This year the factory's production will improve thanks to the installation of a second line of sorting machines.

Production up 34 Percent

As of 31 December 1978 the union had produced 13,624 tons. Compared to 1977's production, that represents a leap of 3,451 tons or 34 percent. The increase in production results from renewed upkeep of the plantations and a greater use of fertilizer owing to higher producer prices. All of those positive factors had already made it possible to foresee increased production in the years to come.

During the past fiscal year the union extended its activities to include Robusta coffee. Several tons were collected by the cooperatives in Dschang, Bafang, Bangangte, and Fouban.

The 1978 coffee season was calmer than the preceding one. There was no need to deal with aggressive price forcing, market prices being such that speculators were unable to make incursions into the UCCAO zone.

At the level of the cooperatives, the collecting was organized in accordance with the decentralized structures which have been set up and which will be strengthened and improved in the future as part of the "High Plateaus of the West" project.

Production figures by cooperative were as follows: Caplame (Dschang): 4,076.7 tons; Caplabam (Mbouda): 3,244.4 tons; Caplaba (Foumban): 2,893 tons; Caplami (Bafoussam): 3,176.3 tons; Caplahn (Bafang): 119.4 tons; and Caplande (Bangangte): 113.9 tons.

Domestic sales rose by 37.11 percent in 1978. The new roasting unit that began operating during the year made it possible to supply the national market for ground coffee.

The coffee revival, which has already entered its operational phase, is experiencing outstanding success. In April 1978 more than 2.7 million saplings produced in cooperative nurseries were distributed to planters.

As was true the year before, the union subsidized complex fertilizers at 6,000 CFA francs per ton, not including transportation and distribution costs.

Coffee pests cause more than 20 percent of the UCCAO's production to be lost every year. In order to combat those pests, the union joined with the technical departments in the struggle for plant health by buying spraying equipment and bearing the cost of wages for machine operators. The objective is to cover all of the UCCAO's coffee plantations with regular and effective treatments.

The union's budget for the fiscal year called for revenues of 199,938,089 CFA francs and expenditures of 188,962,768 CFA francs, leaving an expected surplus of 10,975,000 CFA francs.

The year 1978 was also one of reorganization. The names of the union and of the cooperatives were changed, with the result that while it has retained its acronym, the UCCAO is now the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives of the West and no longer the Union of Arabica Coffee Cooperatives of the West. In addition, the Arabica and Robusta coffee cooperatives in the departments of Bamoun, Haut-Nkam, and Nde were merged to form one cooperative in each department.

The above changes resulted in modifications to registered capital and management structures. For example, the union's registered capital was increased from 100 million to 140 million CFA francs.

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CAMEROON

BRIEFS

AID FROM BRITISH BANK--On 1 August 1979 in London, the Cameroon Sugar Company (Mbandjock) and a banking consortium headed by the Chase Merchant Banking Group (London) signed a \$50-million loan agreement. In addition to the Chase Merchant Banking Group, the banking consortium includes the DG Bank (Germany), the Standard Chartered Bank, Limited, the American Express Bank, the Bank of Montreal, the European Bank of Tokyo, the General Bank of the Netherlands, and Barclays International. This Eurodollar loan will run for 10 years with a 4-year grace period and a floating interest rate equal to the libor plus 1.5 percent annually. Guaranteed by the state, it is intended for the financing of various supplementary investment programs of CAMSUCO [Cameroon Sugar Company], whose production capacity when in full operation will total 50,000 tons of sugar annually. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2393] 11798

CACAO PRICE INCREASE--Cacao producer prices for the upcoming season have been set by a presidential decree signed on 1 September. The new prices, which are higher than those for the preceding season, are as follows: grades 1 and 2: 290 CFA francs per kilogram, compared to 260; and nonstandard: 100 CFA francs per kilogram, compared to 90. Another decree, this one issued by Cameroon's minister of economy and plan, sets the start of the cacao season at 17 September. The Basic Products Marketing Office remains Cameroon's only registered exporter of cacao. It purchases the product from the planters through registered middlemen. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2453] 11798

OFFSHORE OIL DISCOVERY--A communique dated 28 August 1979 from the French Petroleum Company announces that Total Exploration and Production of Cameroon, operating on behalf of a partnership with Mobil Exploration Equatorial Africa, has just discovered signs of petroleum in the course of its "Victoria East" drilling, on Permit H-17, in Cameroonian waters. The drilling was carried out from the Pentagone 81 platform 80 kilometers offshore from Victoria and in 45 meters of water. A final depth of 1,835 meters was reached. The drilling showed evidence of a high-quality sandy reservoir at a depth of 1,500 meters. Tests have given positive results. The oil produced is light (42°API) and of good quality. Further drilling will be necessary in

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order to evaluate the size of the discovery. Total Exploration and Production of Cameroon (a subsidiary of the French Petroleum Company) and Mobil Exploration Equatorial Africa each have a 50-percent interest in the permit. We recall that the French firm of Elf-Aquitaine recently discovered two small petroleum deposits in the same country (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 17 Aug 79, p 2280). They are in the Ekoundou concession and north of the Rio del Rey concession. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2453] 11798

NEW MERCHANT SHIPS--With further reference to the report published in our issue for last 3 August (p 2167), we can state that the freighter Cam-Ilomba, built in Bremerhaven for the Cameroon Shipping Lines [CAMSHIPLINES], has not yet been delivered. It was launched and christened on 10 July and will be delivered to the Cameroonian company this 26 October. The second partial container ship on order--the Cam-Iroko--will be launched and christened on 14 September and delivered to CAMSHIPLINES on 21 December. The christener of the Cam-Iroko will be Mrs Beleoken, wife of the Cameroonian ambassador to the FRG. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2453] 11798

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

POPULATION DATA--2,305,000 inhabitants in 1979. In the course of the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 25 July, 1979, the Central African Government recognized as the most probably correct the estimate of the general census of 1975 which recorded 2,305,000 inhabitants as of 31 December 1975. Hitherto the Central African authorities held to the figure of 3,055,000 inhabitants, an estimate disputed by the United Nations. Taking into account a population increase figured at 2.5 percent per year, the Central African population would be approximately 2,305,000 as of 31 December 1979. Moreover the government decided to ask the United Nations Fund for Population [FNUAP] for a grant to conduct an investigation in 1980-1981 for the purpose of estimating the total population and determining various rates of population growth. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 2519] 2750

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COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT POSITION ON MAYOTTE--Since the problem of the island of Mayotte in the Comoros "has not evolved" since the unilateral declaration of independence by the Comoro Islands on 6 July 1979, it should be "revitalized so as to find a strategy for defusing the situation" declared M. Ali Mroudjae, Comoran minister for foreign affairs and cooperation, to the AFP on 25 August. Mr Mroudjae, who is to participate in the Council of Ministers of nonaligned countries, in Havana from 28 August to 1 September, added that as the problem of Mayotte remains unchanged in spite of the "resolutions taken" a solution ought to be found "with the normalization of our relations with France." Nevertheless, "It is not our intention to take the OAU and the UN out of the Mahoran affair...we simply want to generate the sort of dynamics that will move the problem forward," said M. Mroudjae before concluding: "The problem of Mayotte should be resolved in concert and mutual trust." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291

PROPOSAL FOR SPECIAL COURT--The Federal Islamic Assembly of the Comoros opened its first extraordinary session, which was called by the president of the republic, M. Ahmed Abdallah. Under the presidency of M. Mohamed Taki the deputies will examine a law to create a special Court of Justice to judge crimes and offenses committed on 3 August 1975, date of the seizure of power that led to President Abdallah taking over the government on 12 May 1979, at Moroni. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

SPAIN BACKING NEW CURRENCY--A committee from the Spanish Bank of Foreign Commerce will arrive on 20 September at Malabo to negotiate with the authorities of Equatorial Guinea for the issuance of new paper currency that will keep the designation ekuele and will be backed by the Spanish peseta. This committee's mission was announced by the new Spanish Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea, Mr Juan Antonio de Andrada, soon after his arrival in Malabo on 2 September. In another connection, a source close to Spanish economic circles reports that Spain is presently prepared to make investments in Equatorial Guinea to a total of 10 billion pesetas (\$150 million U.S.). These investments will specifically permit joint ownership enterprises, particularly in the fishing industry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 2518] 2750

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GUINEA

ELECTION OF NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 7 Sep 79 p 2447

[Excerpt] Radio-Conakry announced on 31 August the election of a new Central Committee by the National Council of the revolution, the supreme authority between two congresses of the Democratic Party of Guinea (DPG).

This Central Committee, which numbers 75 members (as against 25 in the previous one, elected in April 1972), includes 22 ministers, 20 regional governors, 7 "commissioners general of the revolution" (assuming the highest functions of the DPG at the regional level), 4 superior officers and several regional political personalities. The 15 members of the Political Committee all belong to the Central Committee. Five members of the former Central Committee were not reelected. Among them is Mr Leon Maka, former president of the National Assembly.

Nine ministers are making their entrance into the new Central Committee: Messrs Senainon Behanzin (Information), Abraham Kabassan Keita (Public Works), Alafe Kourouma (Agriculture), Mamady Kaba (Industry), Gualema Guilavogui (Preuniversity Education), Mamadou Sy (Labor), Sikhe Camara (Justice), Fode Mamadou Toure (Finance) and Nfaly Sangara (delegate to the EEC).

Other outstanding entrances into the new Central Committee--those of four officers: Gen Toya Conde, chief of combined general staff; Col Soumah Kourouma, deputy chief of staff; Commander Toure, "commissioner general of the revolution" in Conakry, and Commander Diarra Traore, governor of the Pita region.

Incidentally, the secretary general of the Women's Union, Mrs Sophie Maka, and the secretary general of the Workers' Union of Guinea, Mr Kandas Konde, also belong, as well as Mr Mamouna Toure, director general of the Kindia Bauxite Office.

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KENYA

PETROLEUM PRICE INCREASES CAUSE CRITICAL ECONOMIC SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2652

[Text] The latest oil price rises constitute a new handicap for Kenya's economy as well as for that of the other developing countries that do not produce petroleum. The country must henceforth devote one-third of its foreign exchange earnings to the purchase of petroleum products as against one-quarter a year ago; this entails the risk of having serious repercussions on development projects and especially on agricultural projects or those pertaining to transportation or energy infrastructures.

According to certain economists, summarized by the New York TIMES, Kenya's budget deficit should come to \$2.5 billion during the next five years and the per-capita income should go down. The 1979-1983 development plan would already be outdated. This plan, the fourth launched since independence in 1963, is particularly aimed at resettling African farmers on recently cleared or poorly utilized land and to develop water power-supported agricultural improvement projects. Kenya remains an essentially agricultural country but only ten percent of its land have a high production potential and five percent on the other hand are suitable only for animal husbandry.

These same economists feel that this fourth plan should have 30 percent of its programs cut off but nobody knows which sectors could be sacrificed. The third five-year plan, published in 1973, at the time the OPEC announced the quadrupling of its petroleum prices, fell far short of attaining its target and only 40 percent of the programs were properly concluded.

We must recall that, like most of the other African countries, Kenya is forced to import all of the petroleum it needs and that represents 80 percent of the energy produced in the country. This year, Kenya will need 12 million barrels of petroleum or 6 percent more than last year.

Like many other African countries, Kenya also spends more than it earns; this year, weather conditions and world prices caused a noticeable drop in earnings deriving from coffee and tea, reducing foreign exchange

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receipts by 40 percent, whereas expenditures for defense and energy went up. Kenya's balance of payments within one year tilted from a surplus of \$286 million to a deficit of \$210 million and there is reason to fear that the situation will get even worse.

A Canadian advisor to the Kenyan government on energy questions thinks that, for every dollar of increase in the price of each barrel of oil, Kenya would have to increase its exports by 1.5 percent merely to compensate for this rise. As a matter of fact, it would be necessary to increase the tea and coffee output (60 percent of the foreign currency earnings) by something like 30 percent; but, because of this year's weather conditions, the producers would be happy if they could merely hold on to last year's low output level.

We can hardly count on that other source of foreign exchange represented by tourism which in turn has been very heavily hit by the oil price rise since that resulted in an increase in air travel costs and safari price tags.

Having neither coal, nor petroleum, Kenya must import 90 percent of its energy, including electricity from Uganda. Economizing steps have been taken but their influence remains marginal, especially since petroleum price rises had only very partial repercussions on retail prices for petroleum products.

More than ever before Kenya therefore needs the support of foreign countries, especially Western countries. Whether we have a good year or a bad year, the World Bank, the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and the Scandinavian countries supply Kenya with approximately \$200 million in aid; but last July Kenya was forced to borrow \$200 million at 14 percent from a consortium of European and Japanese banks and President Daniel Arap Moi has just gone to Saudi Arabia to ask for that country's cooperation.

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

INNOVATIONS INSTITUTE--The Madagascan Government will establish a Madagascan Innovation Institute by decree, a public institution placed under the direct authority of President Didier Ratsiraka. Within the framework of its plan for "development on all fronts," Madagascar thus expects to provide itself with "a structure adequate to tackle all problems tied to the economy in an innovative and unconventional manner." The explanation of the motives for the ordinance specifies that "the RDM does not want to apply the technological progress of the developed countries to the letter. It expects to adapt them to the needs of the national development." The objective of the Madagascan Innovation Institute is to increase the technological autonomy of Madagascar and to reduce the outside orientation of its economy in conformity with the socialist options of the country, by research and establishment of original technology based on the national and human resources of the country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291

TAMATAVE: HARBOR SILO CONSTRUCTION--Towards October 1981 the autonomous port Tamatave will be equipped with a round harbor silo, which will have a capacity of 15,000 t and consist of 10 compartments, each with a diameter of 9 m and a height of 35 m. This silo, which will store imported grains (rice, wheat) as well as those for export, will be built of reinforced concrete. It will be independent of the flour silo which the Soviets are going to install in Tamatave. Those specifications were spelled out again by the secretary general of the faritany of Tamatave on the occasion of a visit by French technicians of the agroindustry, charged with the construction of the silo which will be connected directly to all three means of transport: Rail, highway and sea. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291

ENERGY: GAS CONSUMPTION--According to Solima (Solitany Malagasy, the government agency for products and byproducts of petroleum) national consumption of gas represented some 7,000 t annually of which 3,600 t are used in the faritany (province) of Antananarivo, 1,040 t in Toamasina (Tamatave), 580 t by Toliary (Fort Dauphin), 500 t by Mahajanga (Majunga), 400 t in Antsiranana (Diego Suarez) and 250 t by Fianarantsoa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291

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RICE CULTIVATION--Within the framework of the plan for cultivation of rice on 100,000 ha, Korean technicians have started an exploratory mission at the beginning of July in the faritany of Finarantsoa. They conducted an evaluation of the possibilities for planting in the plain of Betanimena, in the firaisana of Mahasoa, and have estimated the yield of a dam to be built at Menakopy, in the firaisana of Bekily, which is supposed to irrigate 2,500 ha. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291

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NIGER

BRIEFS

SOLAR PUMP USED FOR IRRIGATION--President Senyi Kountche made a visit at the end of August to the hydro-agricultural facility at Karma, some 40 km from Niamey. This trip served chiefly to enable President Kountche to acquaint himself with the experimental solar pump, the first of its kind in west Africa. This solar pump, built at a cost of approximately 90 million CFA francs, has been in operation since the end of July 1979. This experimental solar pump was put in place thanks to cooperation between ONERSOL [Niger National Office of Solar Energy] and SOFRETES [French Society for Thermal and Solar Energy Studies]. It has an output of 400 m³/h making possible the irrigation of 40 to 60 hectares, or one-half the Karma facility. Execution of the solar pump project was financed by the FNI and the FED [expansions unknown]. The 408 solar batteries of the receiving panels were designed by ONERSOL. Still in the experimental category, another pump will be installed at Toukounouss. A 150 meter well has already been dug for this purpose. The rest of the material is in process of being transported to the site, or being finished.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 2514] 2750

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SENEGAL

PRESIDENT ON ALLAHOU AKHBAR SEIZURE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2633

[Text] Questioned by AFP [French Press Agency] on the seizure of the newspaper ALLAHOU AKHBAR (God is Great) at Dakar on 21 September, after its announcement on the creation of the Islamic "Hizboulahi" Party (Party of God) and the dispersion, several days earlier, of a meeting held by an unrecognized association of Arabic language students, the Senegalese chief of state confirmed these events and added: "The problem is not as to whether or not this is an Islamic party or not. The fact is that the constitution authorizes only four already existing parties (Conservative, Liberal, Socialist, Marxist) and not a fifth party. The government will proceed with inflexible rigor against any attempts to violate the law, regardless of what text may be quoted, because this is nothing but a pretext; first they talk about religion and then about economic problems and tomorrow they will start talking about race, etc., but we must know that the law is the law."

Mr Senghor also revealed that prosecution will be started against Mr Cheikh Anta Diop, secretary general of the "National Democratic Rally" who in various ways pursued political activities which however were not legally recognized.

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SENEGAL

CINEMATOGRAPHER DISCUSSES POLICY ON WOLOF LANGUAGE, ISLAM

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Sep 79 pp 72-75

[Interview with Sembene Ousmane, Senegalese cinematographer: "Culture Is The Leaven of Politics, but Integrism Is Fascism"--date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Question] "Ceddo" is your eighth film. Do you feel that you have now achieved translating African reality into a cinematographic language proper?

[Answer] No, not quite. I think that I shall have completed this quest in my next film which shall be about African women. Since I always make in turns a historical film and a contemporary film, the next one will take place in 1980.

To come back to the language of my films, I am trying to translate a certain African rhythm into images. I must admit that "Ceddo" may seem dull. Some find it too slow. I think it is mainly because African audiences, especially in cities, have become too used to action films. And certainly I give credit to African filmmakers who do not choose the facile way of commercial movie-making. They could earn a lot of money...

[Question] Why is it that this film, which was made in 1976, has still not been shown in Senegal?

[Answer] That is a long story! At first, I was asked to use the introductory formula: "This film has no connection with contemporary events, etc." I did not refuse. But then a presidential decree has prevented the film from being released. This should be made clear: "Ceddo" has not been censored. The decree bears only on the spelling of the film's title. According to the government, "Ceddo" should be spelled with only one d. If I agreed to cross out one d, the film would be released.

[Question] Is it really a problem, whether "Ceddo" takes one d or two?

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[Answer] It is a far reaching problem! At stake are African culture and the Wolof language. At present, the Senegalese Government is trying to integrate us into the French-speaking community. Why did we gain independence, if we are to be uprooted within our very own culture? Wolof is spoken by 80 percent of the Senegalese people; therefore, it could become our national language. We must fight for our cultural nationalism. We have founded Wolof newspapers, we have worked for years to codify this language in writing! Faced with the extent of this movement, President Senghor has signed this decree codifying in a different way a language which is not his language and which he cannot speak!

[Question] President Senghor does not speak Wolof?

[Answer] He can speak it, but very poorly. Our language has been codified by expatriates which know it only phonetically. We feel they are the wrong people for the job; Wolof linguists, on the other hand, have a thorough knowledge of their language. This situation has created internal conflicts and "Ceddo" came at the right or at the wrong time...

[Question] Would you feel compromised if you gave up?

[Answer] Why should I compromise when I know I am right? I think governments should have the courage to acknowledge their mistakes. I think we should outgrow the stage where one says: "the government is always right." I assure you that on this particular point, the government is mistaken. I refuse to cross out that d as a matter of principle. And believe me, I am losing money. And so does the state because, since I get no returns, I have been unable to reimburse the funds it had advanced to me...

[Question] Does the public know about this dispute?

[Answer] The public knows and is divided in opinion. I think they would like me to give up, but I feel that the public is not always right. In addition, Dakar University has just published a dictionary in which the doubling of vowels and consonants is recognized. So I feel that I should not back out now.

[Question] What is the present status of the transcription of languages in Senegal?

[Answer] We are marking time. Senegal has become the capital of the French-speaking community and most of our officials and executives are illiterate when it comes to their own language. Can you imagine all university professors going back to school to learn their mother tongue? The African people are also the victims of an ill-placed pride. We spend more efforts learning French, English, Russian or Chinese than learning one of our neighbors' language: hausa, pular or toucouleur...

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Right now, the teaching of our national language should go beyond the experimental stage since the language has been codified. Recently, Professor Thiam gave a lecture on modern mathematics, in Wolof, at the University of Dakar. Geography, sciences, medicine (one of the hardest disciplines), even theology can be taught in Wolof. The government should have the courage to go on to the next step.

In a first stage, French is a valid tool, especially to give access to the technique of industrialized countries. However, as the years go by, national languages shall outweigh it.

[Question] Do you mean to say that, at the government level, there is some unwillingness to promote the national language in Senegal?

[Answer] Exactly. Apparently, but only apparently, they are willing to do so. You know, in a liberal country like Senegal, we are not safe from demagoguery. We are told that there are literacy programs on television, but we are not told how many people are watching them. We are told that there are experimental classes where teaching is done in Wolof, but we are not told that these classes have been abandoned a long time ago. We are told that many radio programs are broadcast in Wolof, but this is the least we can expect! Even merchants have understood that advertising in Wolof has more impact than advertising in French.

[Question] Do you really think that the problem of national languages should really receive priority in Africa?

[Answer] We must lead simultaneously our economical, political and cultural struggle. I believe that culture is the leaven of politics. Culture makes it possible for people to know themselves and, therefore, to have a better understanding of what we want. Apart from that, those who do not speak French find themselves isolated from the centers of decision and from certain aspects of our national life.

[Question] What is your opinion of the theme developed by L. S. Senghor: "a dialog of civilizations?"

[Answer] There is always a dialog between civilizations...But, as far as I am concerned, Africa is the center of the world; Europe is a borderland. I have conducted a dialog with Greek, French, German people. They have their culture, I have mine. Africa is the center of the world because it is my continent. For the European, it is Europe. I stopped being deceived by Europe years ago. Take the case of Great Britain. In 1914, it was the "queen of the seas," but we forget that it was thanks to oil. Today it has lost its empire and its maritime supremacy. There are now on the market more products "made in India" than "made in England." Great Britain has ruled over India for centuries. Apart from pudding, it did not teach India anything, while all Europeans are now practicing yoga!

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In 1885, European countries divided Africa among themselves and, now, it is getting organized to better snap it up. Take the example of oil or cocoa and you will realize that, in spite of its greatness, in spite of its technical advance, Europe has been freeloading on other peoples. Off the coast of Senegal, there is a fish which lives only on other fishes' blood... It is a very succulent fish!

[Question] What about negritude?

[Answer] Negritude? What is that? I don't even want to talk about it. My merits have nothing to do with the color of my skin. And the value of African culture has nothing to do with fantasies or inhibitions caused by the canons of Greek beauty. Our ancestors have created monuments and masks of which we are very proud. But I do not think that they were trying to define themselves as negroes or anything else.

[Question] In Senegal, culture is given a large place, and a large budget.

[Answer] Yes, 30 percent of the state's budget are devoted to culture. But we should be given more details. For years, I have been asking exactly how are these 30 percent spent. I would say that Senegal does not have a cultural policy. More exactly, its cultural policy revolves around one individual.

[Question] What do you think of the rise of Moslem integrism?

[Answer] In itself, Islam is a good thing. It is its use which is dangerous. The main thing is to know if Black Islam can be democratic. Will it be able to listen to others and accept certain controversies?

[Question] The Senegalese Islam is tolerant...

[Answer] We must watch out. When an individual detains both spiritual and temporal power, he is capable of everything. As for tolerance, I would just remind you that one day Sheikh Ousmane Badji presumed to destroy the sacred sites of the Diola. Why ransack what is an object of cult to other people? This is an attack on individual liberties. I am afraid that the development of this movement might bring us a fascist state. The four Moslem brotherhoods--mouride, tidjane, khadria, layenne--are getting organized again. Through our neglect, or our weakness, we may find ourselves faced with an accomplished fact. Each citizen should examine the actions of the spiritual power.

[Question] In the past, Islam has been a nationalist force. Could this still be the same today, in the face of neocolonialism?

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[Answer] I do not agree. God is always on the right. At present, Moslems are one of the mainstays of Senghor's power. So much so that our representatives have to be endorsed by the Sheykh Marabout before they are invested.

Even the opposition parties come to terms with religion. In order to gain some amount of legitimacy, they have to take cover under some religious leader's umbrella.

[Question] Do you believe the Arab expansionism south of the Sahara constitutes a real threat?

[Answer] I believe, and I have often said, that as long as Maghrebians and Africans cannot sit around the same table and openly discuss their differences, problems will exist. It is true that some people use religion as a means of conquering, or reconquering black Africa...

[Question] For instance, Qadhdhafi?

[Answer] He is the most obvious example, but he is not alone. He is rich enough to undertake an economic conquest. But he knows that he will have more followers if he starts a new Islamic crusade at the head of his army. Arab countries are investing a lot more in building mosques in Africa than in building schools or medical clinics. They are trying to recolonize the minds. So that, in Senegal, people call themselves Moslems out of self-defense. They loudly proclaim the fact that they are Moslems and go to the mosque every Friday.

[Question] In your country, intellectuals define themselves with reference to President Senghor or to Sheykh Anta Diop. You seem to be closer to the second.

[Answer] I do not feel close to either one.

[Question] Do you mean that you do not agree with Sheykh Anta Diop?

[Answer] He is not in power, I have nothing to reproach him. I believe he is an honest man, capable of leading the country. But I have chosen culture once for all.

[Question] You do not recognize yourself in any of the Senegalese parties?

[Answer] I don't.

[Question] How do you explain that the Senegalese opposition is still trying to find itself?

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[Answer] I don't know. I think I am not in a position to discuss the opposition since I do not belong to it. I do not think that I should tell them what to do. If I were to speak about the Senegalese opposition, I would first go and register as a member of this or that party.

[Question] Nevertheless, you are in the opposition to Senghor, even if not within the framework of a party...

[Answer] If Senghor were only a professor, we might be friend, as I am friends with Sheykh Anta Diop or Abdoulaye Wade. But Senghor represents a government which, in my opinion, has done nothing for us. I am not against him as an individual. I question his authority as a leader because, in my opinion, his politics are bad for the country and profitable for those who use him.

[Question] Who is using him?

[Answer] I shall not answer this question because I do not want to cast aspersions on anyone.

[Question] Is Senegalese multipartisanism a positive achievement?

[Answer] Yes, I do think that it is a good thing. But I would like to make reservations, because I think that the right of association should be enlarged and Sheykh Anta Diop's party recognized.

[Question] What do you think of African Marxism?

[Answer] In practice, it will never be the same as in China, in the Soviet Union or in Vietnam. Often, Marxism is thought of only in terms of the economy. But man needs more than just his bowl of rice, his fish tails or his drop of oil.

In Mozambique and in Angola, attempts are made to found a new kind of Marxism. It is extremely interesting!

[Question] Do you recognize yourself in certain theoreticians of the Third World revolution?

[Answer] Right now, we have thinkers: Sheykh Anta Diop, Pathe Diagne, Amady Ali Dieng. I think that, more and more frequently, young people stop looking at African thinkers in terms of European or Parisian standards. Cabral has written things which make sense. I find Nyerere fascinating. He is the only one to move within so many contradictions and still maintain himself by his charismatic power which everybody respects. With his socialist option, he is doing something new.

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[Question] How about Sekou Toure?

[Answer] I found him interesting at first; not anymore. You have to go to Guinea to understand. You know, there is such a thing as a false pregnancy...

[Question] As a long-time expatriate, what do you think of the new French immigration policy?

[Answer] Mainly, I think that African heads of state do not protect their nationals. Expatriates have done a lot for their countries. They have invested, built hospitals, medical clinics which they are supplying with medicines, instead of the state doing so. Their contribution is often more beneficial to the African countries than to themselves or their families.

[Question] How are you doing in the field of literature?

[Answer] I have just finished a book on the history of the Senegalese bourgeoisie between 1944 and 1980, this bureaucratic, comprador bourgeoisie who has made money mainly in real estate, but has not done anything in the industrial field. It plays the role of a gendarme for the West which lets them have the buildings, the fronts, the taxis, control over the workers... Thus, the Senegalese bourgeoisie guarantees the stability of the country.

[Question] Would you agree to other filmmakers adapting your novels?

[Answer] I have had several proposals. But often, these are from young filmmakers and I tell them to first finish their studies. On the other hand, Paulin Soumayou Viera made me an offer and I have accepted it.

[Question] The creation of inter-African film production and distribution consortiums, which had been proposed at the Ouagadougou Festival, was supposed to have been approved by the heads of states at the OCAM summit in June. However, the subject has hardly been mentioned.

[Answer] On paper, Africa is wonderful! The idea is good, but how can it be implemented in an interstate framework when the states have no cultural policy? My opinion is that heads of states are still afraid of the cinema and of filmmakers...

[Question] To the point of blocking the implementation of such consortiums?

[Answer] That is possible. They do realize that the African people love the movies. At the Ouagadougou Festival, you could see people rushing in to the theaters. The image has more impact than speech. Government officials are aware, and afraid of this. They feel that movies like "Django" and "Bruce Lee" are less dangerous than American movies.

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[Question] You consider them as accomplices of the alienation of the African audiences?

[Answer] Not accomplices, they are responsible for it.

[Question] Can you speak of an African cinema, as you would speak of an American or an Italian cinema?

[Answer] Not yet, but the day will come. We have not yet found our own style of filmmaking. In the early 1960's, European critics began to speak of the "African cinema," because the action took place in African landscapes. At that time, in most films, the camera was fixed. The characters moved into and out of the field. Nowadays, we have achieved a greater mastery of technique and the result has been original research in form, lighting. There exists a purely Senegalese approach which may some day influence filmmakers in other black African countries. I could not say whether this is desirable or not. But I think that a different style for each country or each region is likely to emerge. This is a vast continent.

[Question] Are you embarrassed when you hear, or read that you are the greatest filmmakers in black Africa?

[Answer] It does not bother me. However, I have made it a rule never to read anything that has been written about me. Because, if it is flattering it makes me feel important, and if someone is panning me, I consider him as an enemy. And often, in both situation, these people are sincere.

[Question] Do you mean that film critic is of interest only for the spectator, not for the author?

[Answer] I did not say that! A man who creates must accept criticism. If someone flatters me, I am delighted. I choose to leave to my wife the task of reading, cutting and filing. This is how I am!

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SENEGAL

DAKAR FISHING WHARF TO BE COMPLETED IN DECEMBER 1980

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 2508

[Text] Mr Chaufournier, vice president for Africa of the World Bank, at the end of his stay in Senegal from 31 August to 3 September, 1979, (see MTM, 7 Sep p 2446) visited the construction site of Wharf 10 of the autonomous port of Dakar, accompanied by the port director. This wharf, 90 percent completed, was financed with the assistance of the World Bank.

The autonomous port of Dakar will in fact have by December 1980 a tenth wharf which will make possible clearing up the bottleneck in the commercial port by accommodating all the fishing boats. Its financing amounts to 4.7 billion CFA francs, the World Bank participation being one-quarter. It will be completed in December 1980 and will include an embankment of 10.5 hectares and 1500 meters of wharves with financing by BADEA [Arab Bank for Economic Development], the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique [Central Treasury of Economic Cooperation] the autonomous port of Dakar and the Senegalese Government.

Wharf 10 is made up of 5 sections: three main sections and two annexes, the latter two being involved with the construction of sand barriers and sea-walls, the opening of a canal on the one hand and on the other, the highway communication between the north and south wharves, and the servicing of the terrace [terre-plein] completed in October 1978.

For the three main sections, construction of the wharf is 81 percent finished, the 800,000 cubic meter embankment (12 percent) and main highway and various road-systems (4 percent).

The purposes of the wharf 10 project are aimed at giving the port of Dakar modern infrastructures that will permit the full development of the fishing industry, taking advantage of the geographic location of the country as well as the abundance in fishery resources of the adjacent waters.

It will enable the assembling of all fishing vessels in a single sector and the maximum realization of catches unloaded and exported, as well as the effective control of the movements of fishing vessels.

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SENEGAL

HARVESTING CAMPAIGNS' SUCCESS VARIES WITH REGIONS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 pp 2508-2509

[Text] The Senegalese minister of rural development left on 7 September for a 30-day tour spread out until the beginning of December to visit regions where he must take note on the spot of the progress of the harvest campaign throughout the territory.

The harvesting campaign presents different situations according to the different regions. Added to the drought that occurred in many areas in the Diourbel and Sine-Saloum regions there is the effect of parasites and defective fungicides sold on the parallel market. Only in the peanut basin, the Thies region, are there satisfactory crops.

As for millet, except for the drought pockets and the areas that felt the effect of coleoptera, the crop does fairly well in the three regions.

In the Department of Louga rainfall was especially deficient in comparison with the previous season, and even more so in relation to a normal year. Only one precipitation was recorded on 18 July within the entire department. It will be followed by a period of drought of approximately 1 month. This has dangerously compromised the germination and growth of seedlings. The Department of Louga is very likely to harvest not a single grain of millet.

In another connection, the chief of the livestock department has emphasized that pastures are nonexistent or sparse. This situation is grave and constitutes a serious threat to the livestock. However, the rain fallen in the past few days can change the situation.

There is all the same one note of satisfaction for this department. The niebe and beref crops are doing well together. Moreover it appears that these two varieties adapt themselves perfectly to the climatic conditions of this department. For this reason it would be opportune to accentuate the effort of extending the farming area reserved for them each year.

For the Department of Kaolack, Gandiaye remains the principal source of concern: the situation there is unfavorable for peanuts as well as for millet. It is the edible peanut crop, however, that preponderantly shows poor results.

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There were numerous pockets of drought, and catastrophic conditions prevail in many areas. Forecasts already announce a drop in production, especially for edible peanuts, whose situation has been characterized as "catastrophic" on the level of Djilor, and the same for millet.

Whereas the normal average is 100,000 vines per hectare, in the case of the peanut crop in many areas of Sine-Saloum for example, the average is between 40,000 and 50,000 vines per hectare.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

SENGHOR GETS ULTIMATUM--Sheikh Ahmed Khalifa Niassé, religious leader of the 80 percent of Senegal's population that is Moslem, has given President Senghor, a Roman Catholic, 3 months to renounce his French citizenship and fire Minister of the Interior Jean Collin, a Frenchman. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 15 Oct 79 p 43]

BOAD LOAN--The West African Development Bank [BOAD] on 4 September granted a loan of 160 million CFA francs as partial financing for investments in the industrial domain of Kaolack. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 2509] 2750

REFORESTATION GOALS REVISED--By reason of the inadequacy of human and financial means available the areas due for reforestation in Senegal are currently fixed at 3000 hectares, whereas the initial plans were for 7500 hectares per year. In fact, of the 12 billion CFA francs set aside for local projects and national forest projects, it is necessary to deduct the expenses of administration overhead, equipment and training of personnel. Moreover, 300 individuals are charged with the supervision of 10.5 million hectares. One engineer controls the reforestation of 187,000 hectares, while the normal permitted assignment load is only 50,000 hectares. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 2509] 2750

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

FRANCE AIDING AIRPORT EXPANSION--Under the terms of a financial agreement signed on 22 September in Dar es Salaam, involving a total of F125 million, including a portion of gifts taken from public funds and another one in commercial credits guaranteed by COFACE (French Foreign Trade Insurance Company), France pledged to facilitate the improvement and extension of the airport in the Tanzanian capital. This is the first time that an agreement of this kind was signed between France and Tanzania. It expresses the desire of both countries to promote economic cooperation between each other. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2653] 5058

BULGARIAN AID AGREEMENT--At the end of his visit to Sofia by President Nyerere (see this publication, 15 September 1979, p 2585), Bulgaria and Tanzania signed a joint agreement laying the foundations for long-term cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical, and cultural fields. Under the terms of this document, Bulgaria will grant loans to Tanzania for the construction of factories. The two chairmen of the mixed Bulgarian-Tanzanian commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation--the Tanzanian industry minister Cleopa Msuya and Mr P. Kubadinsky for Bulgaria--signed this joint statement. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2653] 5058

CANADIAN AGRICULTURAL AID--The ACIDI (Canadian International Development Agency) decided to grant Tanzania \$150,000 for the execution of a pilot rice cultivation project on Zanzibar Island, at Cheju. We recall that Zanzibar has for several years been trying to increase its rice output, both in terms of cultivated area and better yield. To attain this objective, the island's government received aid from the FAO which thinks that initial results are encouraging although \$3 million would be needed to attain the project's target which is two annual harvests of selected rice. A Tanzanian source indicated that Canadian aid could be released in 1980 in the light of the results obtained presently at Cheju. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2653] 5058

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TOGO

SPECULATION ON RAMIFICATIONS OF PLOT AGAINST EYADEMA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Sep 79 pp 34-35 No 975

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "A New Appeal from Palime"]

[Excerpts] President Gnassingbe Eyadema arrived at Palime on 30 August by special train as he did in 1969. To celebrate there the 10th anniversary of the appeal he had made and which was to create the RPT [Rally of the Togolese People], the only party, a few months later.

Nestling on the plateau in an extraordinary setting of greenery dominated by Mount Agou, Palime, that cacao fiefdom very near Ghana, recently gave a resounding welcome to Eyadema. But the fete, full of color, banners, dances, parades, music, nonetheless gave an impression of congealment. A kind of indefinable malaise hovered over that liveliness: Economic recovery is slow in coming and the political trial which took place in Lome on 23 and 24 August (See No 974 of JEUNE AFRIQUE) was still troubling people's minds. The result of a huge plot with broad ramifications, this trial led the state's security court to impose the death penalty on 10 individuals--eight of the accused, it is true, being convicted in absentia...

Everyone held his breath when the time came for the chief of state's address.

In grave, measured tones, President Eyadema spoke of the RPT's 10 years, of its achievements, of the long way the country has come. Those who are "nostalgic" and those who are "jealous" have nevertheless not given up as evidenced by the most recent plot ending on 15 October 1977 in an attempt to assassinate the chief of state.

"However," Eyadema remarked, "in this affair of the mercenaries and their local agents, we had to remain calm leaving to justice the task of doing its work in complete independence. We have no feeling of hatred nor of revenge. We do not wish to assume a responsibility that is not ours. Indeed, if man proposes, it is God who disposes. We have decided to pardon them." In their wisdom these moderate words filled the Palime stadium with spontaneous enthusiasm. They were not received in the same way on the official tribune where members of the political bureau, of the government, of the central

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committee, officers and other dignitaries were crowded together. For them it was a surprise. Apparently, they had no part in that decision deliberately thought out by the chief of state while on a retreat of several days in his native village of Pyra 430 kilometers to the north of Lome...

But this time the plot seemed far more serious than the preceding ones and the trial did not reveal everything. One has a very definite feeling that outside of Sylvanus Olympio's (the president assassinated in 1963) sons, some of the plot's instigators are still running. And have perhaps even infiltrated themselves into the system, still holding top level positions. The malaise which all of that causes was accentuated even more by the discovery of a new arms cache, revealed on 26 August by Emmanuel De Souza one of the two prisoners condemned to death (along with Major Sanvee Kouao). Feeling death near at hand, De Souza added a new bit of scandal. The cache contained automatic rifles, gas bombs, and even small pistols containing poison capable of putting their target to sleep.

This new discovery set speculation going once again. Why did some people in responsible positions, military men in particular, want to have those condemned to death to be finished off so speedily when someone like De Souza turned out to be a real mine of information? In any event, it is certain that the vast majority of the military reacted out of loyalty, unwilling to accept the "treason" of a few of their own people, such as Lt Col Lawson Merlaud, now in hiding, and Major Sanvee Kouao. The latter pleaded not guilty although when contacted to join in it through "human weakness" he did not denounce the plot.

In Palime 30 August, General Eyadema did not only announce that those condemned to death were to be pardoned, but also his intention of "definitively institutionalizing the party" so as to "get the regime out of the unusual situation" in which it has found itself for over 10 years. For that reason, he said, "I have decided to convoke an extraordinary congress this very year in order to make an objective analysis of the situation, to define responsibilities, weaknesses and hiatuses, to decide upon orientation of the next state..."

So Eyadema has thus decided to move up the RPT congress by 2 years. That surely heralds major changes in positions and responsibilities as well as in the manner of running the country. Above all, the regime has to struggle against the government's erosion in an area of upheaval, specifically with the turning over of power to civilians in neighboring Nigeria and Ghana in the near future.

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UGANDA

BINAISA HAVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, MILITARY DIFFICULTIES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Sep 79 p 20

[Text] Four months after his downfall, Idi Amin has declared that he "wishes to return" to Uganda. Moreover, rumors of war with Kenya are heard in Kampala. The government of Godfrey Binaisa is facing increasing difficulties. Severe political tensions, started by the expulsion on 20 June of Yusufu Lule, interim president, have undermined the trust of the international community. At the end of July a meeting among assessors concerned with industrial projects--meant to reestablish the economy at its 1971 level (before Amin's arrival)--ended with contracts barely reaching \$135 million, less than 10 percent of the estimated requirements.

But Uganda has even more pressing needs. In the next 6 months, it will have to borrow \$600 million in order to import oil, parts, and raw materials to revive current production. Bank loans will yield \$300 million, but \$300 million remain to be found and the IMF has expressed reservations. Without urgent and massive assistance in the form of credit unconnected to imports, it seems unlikely that Binaisa's government will be able to keep political conflicts within limits compatible with democracy.

The tenacious fighting between factions created by Lule's eviction, accusations calling him an "enemy of the people," and the arrest of some of his supporters have put a stop to the euphoria and spirit of national reconciliation of last April. Anger against the 20,000 Tanzanian soldiers still in Uganda is increasing, but it seems that Binaisa could not stay in power without their support. It appears that it was for the sake of justifying their presence and an increase in their numbers that Binaisa denounced on 9 August the threat of an invasion by 30,000 troops from Sudan supporting Idi Amin Dada. The government has also announced the arrest of a group training for guerrilla warfare. This group formed of Bagandese (the ethnic majority to which Lule belongs), is said to belong to the Democratic Union of Uganda, an underground formation whose foreign headquarters are in Nairobi. Consequently, relations with Sudan and Kenya have deteriorated.

This climate of insecurity has been encouraged by a crime wave, attributed not only to prisoners liberated after the war, but also to Ugandan and

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Tanzanian soldiers who receive no pay. The integrity of civil servants is also questioned while medicines and food products supplied by international organizations are traded on the black market.

In Uganda's army, factions are becoming more and more clearly related to ethnic allegiance. Two main currents appear. One is led by Oyote Ojok and is a regrouping of Langi, a Northern ethnic group that supported Milton Obote against the Baganda regime. The other is led by Yoweri Museveni, current chief of the army, and is followed by southern ethnic elements.

It does not seem that distinctions between socialist and conservatives are significant enough to explain the divergence between Binaisa's and Lule's supporters. Neither group has proposed a program of social transformations and a recent delegation from the World Bank reported that Binaisa intended to follow Lule's policy of economic liberalism. The divergence rests on regional representation and policies in the government, as was desired by Lule. The opposition--both inside the country and in Kenya--accuses Binaisa of imposing UPC members (Uganda's People Congress, the sole party of Milton Obote), many of whom were in exile during Idi Amin's "reign."

Beyond people and clans, there seems to be a general political orientation. Lule and his followers accuse Binaisa of wanting to lead Uganda toward a close political and commercial union with Tanzania. This fear seems to be shared by Nairobi's authorities.

It is not certain that applying this policy through Tanzania's military forces would help the cause of unity in East Africa. It could lead instead to an aggravation of hostility among countries in that region. It could also lead Uganda and Tanzania to disastrous economic situations, which could be favorable to audacious initiatives from political adventurers.

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UGANDA

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS PROTEST 'DICTATORSHIP'

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2399

[Text] Two political groups outlawed by former President Idi Amin Dada, the Uganda People Congress (UPC), led by former president Obote, and the Uganda Liberation Group (ULG) sent a telegram of protest on 21 August to Binaisa, accusing the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), which is now in power, of imposing a dictatorship on the country. This telegram was sent one week after Binaisa forbade activity within Uganda by opposition parties.

Both groups are also protesting the manner in which members of the Consultative Council, whose number was increased from 30 to 110, were nominated. The groups stated that members of the council should have been elected (and not selected) by the other 30 councilmen, who (according to them) were not chosen by anybody.

Four representatives from these two groups, exiled in Lusaka, went to Uganda on 24 August to meet with Binaisa and to express their concerns in person.

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UGANDA

APPEAL ISSUED TO FOREIGN INVESTORS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 pp 2398-2399

[Text] "Uganda cannot solve its development problems without important participation from foreign investors," declared Uganda's President Godfrey Binaisa on 22 August to a group of students at Makerere University.

The president added that he would soon make a speech on general social and economic policies to be followed by his government, explaining that these policies would be based on a combination of private and governmental capital.

In response to those who have asked for general elections or for a referendum, Binaisa stated that "it would be useless, since we do not know who would vote," referring to the lack of electoral lists and districts.

Finally, Binaisa indicted that Uganda was going to look again into its relationship with the Central African Empire. He said, "I can tell you that I don't get along too well with Bokassa." Binaisa has also recalled Uganda's ambassador to Bangui.

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UGANDA

BRIEFS

AID GOODS IN BLACK MARKET--On 21 August Ugandan authorities arrested about one hundred people while they were selling goods on the black market supplied by the EEC, the Catholic organization Caritas, and the International Red Cross. These people are believed to have been supplied by dishonest government employees who took advantage of their positions and embezzled such goods as sugar, powdered milk and blankets. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2399] 8924

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ZAIRE

CONSEQUENCES OF DEVALUATION OUTLINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 pp 2457, 2458

[Text] The new devaluation of the zaire, decided 17 August (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 31 August, p 2396), was officially announced by the Executive Council on 29 August.

This dévaluation, amounting to 25 percent (1 zaire for 0.375 SDR [Special Drawing Rights] as compared to 1 zaire for 0.50 SDR previously), is variously appraised according to basis of calculation, thus giving rise to some confusion. Actually, it results in a 33 percent revaluation of certain foreign currencies with respect to the zaire.

It is expected in Kinshasa that this devaluation--the fifth since 1 November 1978 when the parity of the zaire was reduced from 1 SDR to 0.90 SDR--will result in a shot in the arm for exports, which are the keystone of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] stabilization plan.

On the other hand, this devaluation is expected to result in further detriment to the more disadvantaged social strata, whose purchasing power will probably experience a substantial drop momentarily.

This operation, instigated by the IMF within the framework of its economic recovery program, has for its immediate objectives a putting in order of the country's economy and finances, and improving the revenues of the government and the finances of enterprises involved in export. Its aim is to protect the country's balance of payments by reducing the gap between the national currency's official exchange rate and its actual market rate.

The IMF recovery program also provides for special allocations, to be granted periodically by the Bank of Zaire from its own funds or by drawing on the IMF, for enterprises to replenish their supply stocks. The country's authorities must also establish controls on prices and on distribution channels.

In addition, in view of the size of Zaire's foreign debt (\$3.7 billion), negotiations have been undertaken with its principal creditors (France, United States, Saudi Arabia, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Japan)

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within the "Paris Club" framework to arrange a settlement of this debt and to obtain \$300 million of "emergency aid," on which conceptual agreement had been reached in November in Brussels.

The AFP [French News Agency] points out that, while awaiting the positive effects of all these measures to be felt by the Zairian economy, the majority of the population, and especially the more disadvantaged social strata, must face a sharp drop in their purchasing power--the more so since many merchants have already begun anticipatively to raise prices, thus contributing to an inflation that is already sizeable. The large majority of the population, with their meager wages barely enabling them to survive, particularly in Kinshasa and the eastern part of the country, will undoubtedly find it difficult to accept their new living conditions, as they view the displays of luxury goods and Mercedes Benz's for the wealthy.

New Zairian Exchange Rates

The Bank of Zaire has communicated to the officially recognized Zairian banks the new exchange rates to be used from 27 August 1979 for calculating the equivalent values, in zaires, of amounts involved in export licenses. They are:

FOREIGN CURRENCY	ZAIREES
100 DM	112.2523
100 Italian lire	0.2512
100 Swiss francs	124.0210
100 Danish kroner	38.9453
100 Norwegian kroner	40.7752
100 Swedish kroner	48.5953
100 schillings	15.3533
100 French francs	48.1675
1,000 CFA francs	9.6335
100 pounds sterling	456.6030
100 guilders	102.2887
100 Portuguese escudos	4.1731
100 U.S. dollars	205.2423
100 Canadian dollars	175.8718
100 Belgian francs	7.0019
100 Burundi francs	2.2805
100 Rwanda francs	2.2107

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ZAIRE

PROGRESS OF ZAIRIAN NATIONAL RAILROAD COMPANY OUTLINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Sep 79 p 60

[Text] Formed on 2 December 1974 by merger of the four railroads then exist-ent in Zaire, the SNCZ [Zairian National Railroad Company] is today a unique case in free Africa.

The company serves 90 percent of the national territory--a territory four times the area of France, for example, half of it equatorial forest.

This successful challenge of nature has enabled it to post an impressive balance sheet, with revenues totaling 2,724.5 million units of account in 1975, 291.8 million of which from passenger traffic and 2,432.7 million from freight operations.

Its vast network also enables it to respond to the objectives assigned to it under the country's development effort, which are:

--to promote interchange and economic growth within the interior of the coun-try;

--facilitate the circulation of agricultural and mining production within the interior and toward the exterior of the country;

--facilitate the access of imported goods (capital equipment and consumer products) to the interior of the country.

An impelling force in the Zairian economy, the SNCZ also fulfills a prime social function.

Of Major Significance

The SNCZ has 21,486 regular employees: 20,158 in operating and administra-tive positions, and 1,157 nationals in upper management positions together with 171 foreign nationals.

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It puts a substantial effort into the training of this personnel through:

- the technical training center in Likasi (mechanics and electricity); and
- the administrative training center in Lubumbashi (routes, passenger and freight handling, railway police, personnel administration).

The management cadres regularly attend the meetings and conferences organized by the UAC [United Africa Company] and by the international organizations.

In addition to this professional training activity, the SNCZ has created and developed a substantial social promotion service the ramifications of which extend throughout its network--in the form of social, cultural and sport centers, employee commissaries, and schools for the children of employees--and the impact of which is felt on life throughout the country.

Concrete Results

Thus, operating within the SNCZ there are 15 social centers staffed by 112 instructresses.

Their activities are centered on four principal objectives:

- education of young girls,
- domestic courses for adults,
- kindergartens and nursery schools, and
- counseling on nourishment and welfare of mothers and children.

In the cultural and sports domains, private recreations clubs have been created in most of the urban centers. They are subsidized by the company and run entirely by committees elected by the workers. These clubs cover a wide range of cultural and sports activities (brass bands, orchestras, theatrical troupes, football teams, etc.)

Through commissaries, the SNCZ endeavors to make essential consumer items available to all its employees at the lowest possible prices; it does this in urban centers, where possible, by establishing commissary department stores, and at isolated posts by means of post exchange trains.

Regarding these isolated posts, it should also be pointed out that to avoid handicapping the children of the employees stationed there, the SNCZ maintains an actual network of rural schools installed in 20 localities, staffed by 56 teachers and attended by more than 3,000 pupils.

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SNCZ Social Infrastructure

- 1 clinic (a second one is under construction in Lubumbashi)
- 10 hospitals
- 44 dispensaries, of which 3 are equipped for hospitalization
- 15 social centers
- 18 employee urban centers, containing:
 - 29 workers' camps
 - 23 cultural and recreation clubs

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ZAIRE

MARKET PRICES OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, JUNE 1979

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2397

[Text]

ITEM	DELIVERY POINT	UNIT	REFERENCE PRICE JUNE 1979
Sand	Job site	1 m ³	30.025
Quarry stone	Job site	1 m ³	32.106
Portland cement - normal	Kinshasa East rail station	1 ton	105.080
Reinforcing rod, 22 mm	Job site	1 ton	1,498.875
Bricks	Ex-factory on flatbeds	1,000 bricks	268.750
Corrugated galvanized iron 0.47 mm 26 BG	Ex-factory	1 m ²	8.426
Flat sheet iron 1m x 1m x 5mm	Ex-factory	1 m ²	10.750
Hardwood beams 7/15	Job site	1 m ³	368.775
Diesel fuel (1,212 Li)	Ex-storage	1 tank	290.880
Cutback R.C. 2	Ex-storage	1 tank	1,019.600
Gasoline in drums (super)		200 liters	345.000
Crushed rock 8/15 "Special"	Job site	1 ton	37.018

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ZAIRE

ZAIRIAN-ITALIAN REFINING COMPANY TO ACQUIRE DESALINATOR

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2458

[Text] The Zairian Executive Council has just unblocked \$1 million to enable the SOZIR [Zairian-Italian Refining Company] to equip itself with a petroleum desalinator. This equipment will enable Zaire to refine its own oil production, which it has until now had to export "as is."

Zaire, which has been exploiting offshore deposits in its territorial waters on the Atlantic coast since 1975, produces some 9 million barrels of crude a year, placing it ninth among the African oil producing countries.

The Zairian economy has nevertheless been dependent until now on the OPEC countries for its oil supplies. The SOZIR, the sole refinery in the country built with the participation of Italian capital, can actually only handle light crudes imported from the Middle East. Zairian crude, which is extracted by the American Gulf Oil Company, has a very high sulfur content and for this reason represents a hazard for existing installations. Being unsuitable for use on the local market, it has until now been exported abroad.

The acquisition of a desalinator by the SOZIR has twofold interest for the Zairian economy. First, it makes possible a resurgence of the company's activities after having been temporarily crippled by the drop in national imports of crude (891,531 tons in 1978 versus 1,062,207 tons in 1976). The refinery currently operates at less than 50 percent of its capacity, which is normally 750,000 tons. And lastly, the putting into operation of this desalinator will result in foreign exchange savings through a reduction in purchases of foreign oil.

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

FINANCIAL AUDITS--Approximately 16.5 million zaires (46.2 million francs) have been recovered by the state in the course of financial audits conducted between 28 July and 3 August, according to official sources in Kinshasa. These financial audits are being conducted within the framework of the vast moralization campaign being carried out over the past few months by the Zairian authorities against fraud and corruption. They have enabled a close examination of the accounts of over 200 companies and commercial enterprises, many of which are not in order with fiscal requirements and with current commercial and customs legislation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2397] 9238

ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS--The manager of an Italian enterprise of the Hasson et Freres group, Mr Hasson Giacomo, was sentenced on 14 August by the Kinshasa county court to 1 year of criminal imprisonment for corruption of government officials and irregularities in his commercial activities, according to a report by the ZAIRIAN PRESS AGENCY [AZAP]. Two of his employees, Mr Robert Ariel (Belgian) and Mr Franco Isaac (Italian), both commercial engineers, were sentenced to 6 months of the same imprisonment. They will moreover be expelled from zaire at the completion of their sentences. The Hasson et Freres company itself was fined 164,000 zaires (443,000 francs). These sentences were handed down within the framework of the vast moralization campaign being conducted throughout the country under the initiative of President Mobutu in a fight against fraud and corruption. Systematic audits of numerous companies, Zairian as well as foreign, have been carried out daily over the past 3 weeks by 18 teams of 7 members each. More than 200 establishments and enterprises have now been audited since 27 July, more than 200 cases of irregularities have been uncovered and penalized (lack of invoices, lack of import licenses, tax fraud, lack of registration with the Commercial and Trade Register, lack of registration of employees, etc.), and several commercial firms have been put under seal. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2397] 9238

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GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATES IN 131 COMPANIES--The Zairian Government participates directly in 131 companies distributed over 10 principal sectors of the national economy, as well as in 14 public enterprises, according to the Zairian minister of the economy in Kinshasa. Most of its investments are in the mining sector. The state has invested 259 million zaires (1 zaire= 2.80 French francs) in the General Quarries and Mines Company [GECAMINES], which exploits the copper deposits in Shaba, and holds 24 million zaires of shares (out of a capitalization of 30 million zaires) in the Bakwanga Mining Company [MIBA], which operates the diamond mines in Kasai. State participation in the financial sector is, on the other hand, minor. The Zairian Government recently also purchased additional shares in foreign oil companies (Shell, Fina and Mobil) and in foreign agroindustrial companies (Lever Plantations). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2397] 9238

FRENCH TROOPS IN SHABA--President Mobutu Sese Seko, who was in Paris from 24 to 27 August, will personally direct the French-Zairian military maneuvers in Shaba from 15 to 18 September. These maneuvers, which are intended to provide a "direct assessment of the degree of technical training and combat readiness of the Zairian soldiers," will be carried out, for the Zairian Armed Forces [FAZ], by two battalions of parachute troops trained by French instructors (311th and 312th), and for the French, by two companies of the 11th Airborne Division. Two drops are planned during this maneuver--one French airborne company and one Zairian company--using three FAZ C-130 transports and three French Transalls. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2457] 9238

FOREIGN COMPANY CESSIONS--Mr Umba Di Lutete, minister of information and spokesman for the Zairian Executive Council, announced on 17 August that the Zairian Government is granting foreign companies a period of 4 months in which to cede 40 percent of their shares of ownership to Zairian enterprises of their own choice, in accordance with the law of 17 November 1977 on the general measures applicable to the retrocession of "Zairianized" assets. After 31 December 1979, the government will automatically impose Zairian partners on companies that have failed to comply. As regards government employment, the Council of Ministers, according to the spokesman, has decided to create immediately a "civil service code" designed to "guarantee job stability and security" for government employees. On the other hand, the council has given government employees 4 months in which to "choose between their careers and business." Many government employees, it is pointed out, are also owners of shops or business enterprises, which is strictly forbidden by law. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2458] 9238

FRENCH COOPERATION FOR TIN--The Zaire Government and the French Mining Company [COFRAMINES] are planning to exploit jointly a tin deposit in Shaba beginning in 1981, according to information released on 31 August by Mr Bouvet, president and general manager of COFRAMINES. Exploitation of this deposit, which is expected to produce 100 tons of metallic tin a year, will require an initial investment of 40-50 million French francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2458] 9238

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ZAMBIA

ECONOMIC RECOVERY CONDITIONS EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 pp 2619-2621

[Article: "The Conditions for the Recovery of the Zambian Economy"]

[Text] Still surrounded by the aura of international prestige produced by the quality of his presidency and the success of the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka last August, President Kenneth Kaunda must now again tackle the formidable problem of healing the Zambian economy.

And, as if these economic problems were not enough of a headache, he was informed that a fire which occurred in August temporarily interrupted the flow from the pipeline between Dar es Salaam and Ndola -- the center of the copper industry vital to the country -- which supplies petroleum to his landlocked country.

Yet, at the time of its independence in 1964, Zambia could look to the future with more confidence than any other African country.

A humanistic and reasonable head of state, who had succeeded in bringing an end to the sharp tribal rivalries, was presiding over the destinies of a country whose economy could rely on substantial foreign income from its copper industry, which benefited from soaring world prices. It is true that skilled labor was scarce, even in terms of the standard of the other newly independent African countries, and the development of the substantial potential of agriculture had been neglected. However, the substantial domestic and foreign financial resources at the disposal of the government made it possible to hope that this situation would be rapidly remedied, to the extent that during the first years of independence the government's main concern was to find a way to spend money.

Today, 15 years later, these beautiful dreams have vanished and Zambia finds itself mired in the political imbroglio of southern Africa, while at the same time it faces a sharp crisis in its foreign trade. The financial crisis is so serious that payments for imports are more than 18 months late and the debt rate per capita is the highest in Africa, above even that of either Egypt or Zaire.

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The spectacular reversal in the economic situation of the country is illustrated by the remark made by an official of a Zambian state company, who was recently staying in Nairobi. He was wondering whether the meagre foreign currency allowance at his disposal might not compel him to cut his business trip short. "When I was a student at the University of Nairobi, 15 years ago, of all the students from other African countries we had the most pocket money, and we practically ran the university. Today we have been reduced to begging."

The inability of the Zambian economy to keep its promises is due to both internal and external causes over which it has no control at all, to the combination of an unfavorable economic situation and bad management.

The main factor remains the price of copper on the world market. For the last several years -- in fact, since the end of the Vietnam war -- the price of copper has remained depressed, in spite of a slight hike last year. Because the sale of copper represents more than 90 percent of the exports of Zambia, it is sufficient at any moment to take a look at the price of the red metal on the London Metal Exchange to get a good idea of the economic situation of Zambia. The attempts made by Zambia and the other copper producing countries of the Third World through their common organization, the ICCEC, to strengthen world prices by setting up a producers cartel similar to OPEC, have generally failed.

The other constraint which weighs primarily on the development of Zambia is its geographic situation: not only is Zambia a landlocked country -- and consequently dependent on the mood or conditions of its neighbors for access to the sea -- but in addition it has found itself more and more involved in the political problems of Southern Africa, specifically those of Rhodesia.

President Kaunda's decision, true to his commitment to fight for freedom, to close the border between Zambia and South Africa may have been popular in the beginning. But as the price the Zambian citizens had to pay became higher and higher with the passing years, this measure proved to be not only disastrous economically but also politically dangerous.

Thus, last year's decision to restore the railroad links with South Africa was dictated not only by economic imperatives, but also by the fact that President Kaunda and his political partners would have to face the electorate.

Question of Railroad Transportation

The fact remains nonetheless that this decision was humiliating. It had become inevitable for two reasons. The first was the closing, due to the civil war in Angola, of the Benguela railroad which traditionally carried a large share of Zambian imports and exports. The second reason was that the TAZARA (the Tanzania-Zambia railroad), built by the Chinese to link Zambia with Dar es Salaam, never reached its expected transportation capacity.

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As far as the Benguela railroad is concerned, efforts to get it going again have never stopped. A group of Western donor countries met in Brussels at the beginning of this year and is to meet again very soon to examine the financing problems of putting the railroad and essential equipment in working order. Western governments are also willing to participate in the financing of this operation, which they believe is such that it might reinvigorate the Zambian economy, the success of which is of direct interest to them.

However, the reopening of the Benguela railroad not only requires financial cooperation from the West and from the government of Angola. It also requires the approval of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] which still controls a large part of the Angolan territory, and specifically that through which the railroad runs. There is little likelihood that UNITA will allow it to run without demanding political compensation. This would almost certainly mean the granting of substantial concessions to UNITA by the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and the Angolan government or, at the very least, the departure of the Cubans. Prior to his sudden death, Dr Agostinho Neto was not in a sufficiently strong position to be able to accept such concessions, so that the Benguela railroad will remain closed a while longer.

As for the TAZARA, problems have arisen simultaneously at the political level, the technical level and the management level.

First of all, the transportation capacity of the railroad never reached the level hoped for. The Chinese locomotives proved to have insufficient power. At present, the Tanzanian-Zambian Authority, which manages the railroad, is considering the purchase of new locomotives or the replacement of the original engines with more powerful engines.

Moreover, the line has recently been damaged by enormous landslides, caused by torrential rains in Southern Tanzania. The repair work on the line has been done, but the trains must still travel at a reduced speed over some sections of the line, which reduces its capacity even further.

Finally, the costs of TAZARA are affected by the slowness of the handling operations at the port of Dar es Salaam for the exported copper and for the goods imported by Zambia. Numerous Zambian officials privately express the opinion that this slowness is deliberate on the part of the Tanzanian government, which sees it as a means of putting pressure on Lusaka.

Mediocre Economic Performance

Another major cause for the mediocre performance of the Zambian economy has been the quasi complete failure of the authorities in developing the rich agricultural potential of the country. The abundance of financial resources which were at the disposal of the government at the time of independence, led it to a nearly incoherent approach to the problem of agriculture. Massive amounts of capital were injected into it, but the policies which were followed were either badly designed in the beginning, or else badly applied.

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The mediocrity of the management and administration of the principal organization in charge of marketing agricultural products, the NAMBOARD [National Agricultural Marketing Board], has always been a problem for the government, while at the same time being a source of discontent for the farmers.

These difficulties largely explain the dismaying results in the vast state-controlled sector.

Nationalization and the policy of "Zambianization," aimed at replacing the expatriated managers by Zambians, were applied with such speed and such a lack of planning that the whole government machinery was more or less completely blocked, not only within the government itself but also in the sector of state-controlled companies. Consequently, today we are witnessing an extraordinary phenomenon: notably through the channel of British development aid, the government is recruiting British technicians and managers to fill positions which were "Zambianized" a few years earlier.

Situation in Mining Sector

The current situation in the mining sector also shows how slow the government was in becoming aware of the weaknesses of its earlier policy. Today, the major state holding company, INDECO [Industrial Development Corporation], is trying to reestablish a semblance of order in its affairs by separating itself from all the non-profitable companies. Its efforts have been supported by the government which all through last year insistently sought to reduce political interference in the affairs of INDECO and which, at the beginning of this year, authorized the state companies to sell their products or services at more realistic prices.

One of the main reasons for the mediocrity of management in the government services as well as in the sector of state companies is the low morale of the Zambian managers, even though many of them are competent and passionately wish to realize the potential which the country undoubtedly possesses. Their discouragement is due primarily to political interference both in the administration and in the state-controlled productive sector. One of the most striking examples of this is the surprising speed with which the upper cadres are transferred from one position to another and from one sector of activity to another. As one official in a state company stated: "The government seems to think that if you are capable of running a bus company this week, you could just as well head a brewery or a brickyard the next week. The result of all these movements of the upper cadres is that all professionalism has practically disappeared."

Because of their economic weight and their size, the two largest mining groups, Roan Consolidated Mines [RCM] and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines [NCCM], have held up better in this area. Aside from the difficulties in foreign trade and the problems of transportation mentioned above, their main handicap lies in the disturbing reduction of the number of experts through expatriation over these last 2 years.

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The miners and white officials whose experience is vital for the country are leaving Zambia for many reasons: their wives are discouraged because of the shortage of essential products in the stores, the salaries and living conditions have become less attractive than those in other mining countries, the high rate of armed attacks in the Copperbelt has increased their fear that their personal safety is not guaranteed, etcetera.

However, the situation in the mining sector improved last year. The flow of departures slowed down and the price of copper recovered. Consequently, the financial results of the mining companies have suddenly improved. RCM, for example, which registered a loss of 22.16 million kwacha during the 9 months ending with March 1978, made a profit of 41.1 million kwacha during the 9 months ending on 31 March 1979.

Moreover, the largest share of this recovery is due less to the rise in copper prices than to the substantial increase in cobalt production, which is mined at the same time as copper. Today, thanks to a new processing plant, RCM produces approximately 200 tons of cobalt a month and the price of cobalt is so high that it brings in about 8 million kwacha a month for the company. In other words, without the cobalt -- the sale price of which is so profitable that the mining companies can afford to export it by air to Europe and to North America -- the mining companies would not do much better than cover their operating costs.

Perspectives for Economic Development

The perspectives for the development of the Zambian economy depend on a certain number of imponderables.

The country's potential in the sectors of agriculture and mining is huge. Zambia is relatively rich in skilled labor because, since independence, the government has invested widely and wisely in professional training. Moreover, and unlike most of the other African countries, Zambia possesses an industrial and technological tradition. Thanks to the mining industry, there is a veritable reservoir of workers in the country who possess a basic technological qualification.

Zambia is also in a rather exceptional situation in that its rate of urbanization is very high. As early as 1964, at the time of independence, 20 percent of the population -- which then amounted to 3.6 million inhabitants -- lived in urbanized areas. Today, 40 percent of the 5.5 million Zambians live in cities.

Like all developing countries without petroleum, Zambia will be severely affected by the hike in fuel prices. For example, 18 months ago the annual petroleum bill of the RCM amounted to approximately 9 million kwacha. Today, the budget estimates foresee an annual bill of approximately 20 million kwacha.

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In spite of this, one of the most favorable factors for Zambia is its current wealth and future possibilities in terms of hydroelectric energy. Nearly all the electric energy consumed by the cities along the railroad and in the Copperbelt comes from the two giant hydroelectric power stations at Kariba and Kafue and their future expansion is entirely feasible.

Of the other two imponderables, the first is the turn of events in Rhodesia. More than any other country, Zambia has a great deal to win or to lose depending on the development of the situation in Rhodesia. From that point of view, it was a good thing that the recent Commonwealth declaration -- which represents the best chance for a settlement since 1965 -- was achieved in Lusaka.

The second imponderable is the choice of economic policy which the government will finally decide to apply. To tell the truth, President Kaunda never really seems to have decided among the various possible economic options. For years, he and his main collaborators have given out contradictory signs. Sometimes they would denounce the possessiveness of capitalism and insist on the need for state control and socialism. At other times they would stress the role of the private sector in flattering terms and would emphasize the need for foreign investments.

Zambia has the capacity to become the energy supplier for Central Africa and at the same time one of the main exporters of agricultural products and an important industrial base. However, it will achieve this only under two conditions: that a settlement is reached in Rhodesia and that private companies receive clear assurances and reasonable guarantees with regard to those sectors they will be allowed to operate in.

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