

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

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JPRS L/8739

30 October 1979

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 58/79)

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

GISCARD D'ESTAING INTERVIEWED ON SOCIETY'S FUTURE

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 14 Sep 79 pp 12-22

[Interview with French president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, by Roger Therond, director of PARIS MATCH. Date and place of interview unknown. Passages enclosed in slantlines underlined in the original ]

[Text] For Valery Giscard d'Estaing, this is an important moment in his "piloting" of power. After 5 years at the helm of the French presidency, through economic and electoral hazards, the straight path of the 1981 elections can already be perceived. Critics in the opposition and the majority are after Raymond Barre and his government and, above them, the president who intends to reply on TV on 17 September. He will make his political reentry in the pages of our magazine by answering the questions of our director, Roger Therond, about the deep changes undergone by our societies. This message wants to answer the question: How shall we live tomorrow?

[Author's introduction] On 11 July, at the close of the Council of Ministers at the Elysee Palace, Valery Giscard d'Estaing made a statement which touched me. The President announced that, for the next 2 years, "France had to devote its strength to adapting itself to a new state of the world." He was letting us know, sort of officially, that the world was changing and it would affect us, harshly perhaps.

I recalled a strange and alarming statement he made on 24 October 1974 at the beginning of his 7-year term: "The world is unhappy. It is unhappy because it does not know where it is going and it guesses that, if it knew, it would discover it is heading toward disaster." It is a statement at variance with his practice of a suited-to-the-occasion optimism for which he is being currently blamed.

The President was soberly considering, and is considering, the future of our world. In December 1977, in a new edition

of "French Democracy," he wrote: "I vouch that, on the day the light of a new civilizing concept ignites somewhere, we will be the first to recognize it." This does prove that he was searching for that light. He had not yet found it. In the anguished climate of this fall reassembly, these sentences seemed to me to express a fundamental question: Where are we going? Where are our civilizations going?

To be sure, PARIS MATCH's readers have pressing worries and irritations, but it seemed to me that we were being weighted down by a prophecy of doom, as though we were all expecting an apocalypse. I asked Valery Giscard d'Estaing if he could enlighten us on those difficult themes. He agreed.

[Giscard d'Estaing] In your presentation, you quoted three of my statements which express serious concerns. You contrasted them to what you call "my optimism," an optimism which some people hold against me, especially in political circles. One word on optimism: I must inspire and, to a degree, conduct a plan of action which, in a democratic regime, assumes the adherence of the majority. This means that, to obtain the adherence of our target audience, this plan of action must concur with their self-interest or, even, their willingness to act. They need to be told that their efforts will produce results. It would be inconceivable to invite someone to make an effort and tell that person his effort will serve no purpose or, what would be worse, that it would aggravate his situation. Consequently, it is not /an optimism of illusion, but an optimism of proposition/ which is, moreover, in the nature of the office I hold.

My first concern relates to the deep change taking place in mankind and our universe at the end of this millenium. In my opinion, it can be summarized in a single concept: the incredible growth of world population.

During the combined Assyrian, Jewish and Roman antiquity, the total population of the world was less than 200 million. Until the 15th century, it never exceeded 450 million. At the beginning of the 19th century, it was less than one billion, a figure reached in 1830. Suddenly, an evolution took place and another world was born. In the year 2000, 20 years from now, the world population will amount to nearly 6 billion human beings, with the maintenance of an upward curve over the following years. Moreover, the old world was a world in which science was under control. At the beginning, it involved manual techniques for the manufacture of tools, followed by related activities: factories had human dimensions. A scientific power of a different nature was reached with the appearance of nuclear energy, the development of biochemistry and its related branches and data processing.

In other words, mankind is experiencing--and will experience--a period of change which is objectively quite extraordinary when compared to what had been experienced in the past and, unfortunately, the problems appear extremely difficult to solve. In any case, they are entirely new and traditional means of solving them do not measure up. /We are moving toward an uncontrolled world whereas, in the past, it had been controlled by its political and economic organization

and its civilization./ You asked me if I perceive the glimmer of a new civilizing concept. The answer is no. We are living in a world from which it is absent. To be sure, there are signs and presentiments, but it is not present.

Finally, you alluded to my statement of last 11 July. Everything I have already mentioned shows that we are moving toward a new state of the world and France which was rather at ease in the former state of the world--although it experienced trials and tribulations--must adapt to this new state.

We must also disregard that we have to deal with an immediate, short-lived and suited-to-the-occasion problem. Our central concept must be quite different: France must find a way to adapt to a new state of the world. This concept may seem surprising within our political thinking which is always on a short term,

[Question] But you, Mr President, have the good fortune of having at least 2 years ahead of you, maybe 9. It is a pace which allows you to face danger.

[Answer] My role is indeed to see it and describe it concretely while I make sure that governmental action is truly going in that direction.

[Question] On 11 July you also stated: "The government must clearly define this head-on policy in simple terms. It must avoid two pitfalls: illusion which exempts from effort and pessimism which deters from trying." These explanations were never given to the French.

[Answer] Let us first discuss the state of the world. I believe we would have made considerable progress had we been already convinced that we must adapt to this new state of the world. The underlying notion that we will return to a former situation persists in our whole way of acting.

Politicians and journalists proclaim: "The French must be told the truth." If you read the speeches made over the past 4 years, you would note that everything has been told over and over again. Yet, many Frenchmen sincerely believe there are not being told the truth. Why? I think they reason as follows, telling themselves: "To return to the previous situation, we will have to make sacrifices greater than we are being told. Consequently, we are not being told the truth."

/The truth is that we cannot return to the former situation. What we must do is try to adapt to another situation./

[Question] In your opinion, it is a worldwide galloping demography which, therefore, seems to delineate the great concern over tomorrow's world. Is that the only sign?

[Answer] Demography is an illustration, a kind of central event showing that we are living in a world set to have a population for which it is not ready. I ignore what the world's "normal" population could be, for it depends on technological advances. However, when the world reaches a population ranging between 6 and 10 million human beings, it will have to make a tremendous effort and drain natural resources and space.

Another worrisome phenomenon: rural population will increase very little. On the other hand, we will see a strong increase in the clustered urban population which will be accompanied by unavoidable psychological, political, administrative and cultural problems.

The fact that it is depleting its natural resources is the second characteristic of this new world. It has always consumed them, but in lesser quantities. Currently, the rate of consumption is leading to the depletion of many of our resources. It is the case for petroleum and also, in the future, for uranium. This will present very serious problems.

Food production in developing countries will not follow the growing needs.

The fact that, within some 10 years, we will reach the limit of depletion of some resources already introduces brutal fluctuations in world economy causing greater jolts than in the past. It is one of the factors of the disorganization of world economy.

There is another important factor: the development of beliefs. We reason exclusively in economic terms, but the life of human societies is largely dependent upon other factors, especially collective beliefs. We are living in a world in which very few collective beliefs exist. In the past, nations were led--or managed themselves--by collective beliefs. The crusades were a phenomenon of collective beliefs, colonialism also, in its own fashion. The yearning for political freedom was, for Europe, a strong collective belief which gave rise to revolutions. Oddly enough, there is presently very few collective beliefs in the industrialized countries. Marxism, as an economic and social organization, was an element of strong collective belief between 1900 and the 70's. With certain exceptions, it is not so today.

On the other hand, we must not forget that we are living in a world without a major conflict and this represents an extremely important and positive factor. We are living in a world which is still preoccupied with security problems, but which no longer has the idea that war is around the corner. To be sure, there are local conflicts, riots and repressions, but the idea of the "next war" edged away and that is a positive change.

[Question] Yet, for the first time, mankind has found a way to destroy itself?

[Answer] Undoubtedly.

[Question] This notion hardly existed a few years back.

[Answer] Certainly, but if you read newspapers dated before the war of 1914 and those in between the two wars, you would note that the haunting worry was this: "Will the war break out in 2 or 3 years?" Waiting for the war was part of everyday life. Today, this notion has receded.

I would say that, currently, the problems of world political balance have been relatively quelled. On the other hand, problems of economic and social balance have not yet been mastered.



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[Question] Then, you think that the threat of an atomic war is to be ruled out and we have reached a suitable balance among the great nations? All the same, we do not feel completely shielded from non-atomic conflicts. Some writers, General Hackett and Anthony Burgess in particular, are predicting the war for 1984-85. I admit that it is an intellectual game, but the fact remains that the possibility of a war persists in the public's mind.

[Answer] In 1914 and 1939, the world was moving toward a war and decisions were being made to prepare for it and, obviously, win it. Currently, outside the basic problem of relations between the Soviet Union and China and that of nuclear proliferation, the world's political system is not automatically drawn toward a conflict.

What is happening in Africa and even Southeast Asia creates clash situations, but it is obvious that people are avoiding making them into world detonators. It is important to make allowance for this.

[Question] You stated that the world was no longer keeping its economic system under control. Why? Did we come to realize that economy is not an exact science? And that security locks no longer work?

[Answer] In reality, this system was the result of a dominant situation which, of course, was that of the United States and the model it was offering. This domination no longer holds for all sorts of well-known reasons. In order for the economy and monetary system to be dominated, an agreement would be needed among leading participants, an agreement difficult to implement due to their great number and the strength of their national selfishness. The overcoming of selfish interests has not been secured. It is beginning to be in the field of security. All the nations think that an effort to eliminate war is necessary. In this context, they accept detente, even if they pass severe judgments on one another. However, they have not yet understood that, in the end, an economic system on a collective scale--even if self-serving interests interfere with it--would be a wholly more advantageous system.

We are moving in that direction, first because Europe is organizing and becoming a valid interlocutor for dealing with those problems. Moreover, during the Tokyo Summit, I noted--although the result remains naturally limited--the birth of an awareness concerning the necessary control of economic events.

[Question] In your opinion, do world solutions exist to master these events?

[Answer] They will have to be controlled, they can be, but we should not be surprised by the difficulties encountered in so far as self-serving interests are opposed to their being mastered; few statesmen control these issues; and organizations are extremely cumbersome and ineffectual.

[Question] Are then great statesmen only found during wartime?

[Answer] First, there are great men who are not politicians! However, great leaders identify with the people in times of collective trials, that is to say, until now, wars.

[Question] Can we pursue this world situation by returning gradually to France which, after all is our subject. The issue France must tackle is to face up to the situation. How? Must it adapt to what it considers a disaster or to something that will give it a chance of survival?

[Answer] I believe we must answer this question with much candor. My first answer is that Western Europe--France being part of it--will never again find the situation it once had for dominating and exploiting the world's wealth. During the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, the world was under the domination of Western Europe and secondary countries like the United States and European Russia. At the same time, under the guise of colonialism or trade relations for raw materials, it was a period of exploitation of foreign resources. This has come to an end due to a change in the world's population. Should we regret it? It is very difficult to say. Those were times which are now being painted under very favorable aspects, but which gave rise to fratricidal wars, large-scale clashes and flagrant social injustices. In any case, this situation which surely had positive elements, but also tremendous negative ones, will never be again. In other respects, the growth of the so-called consumer society was short-lived. It extended from the 60's to 1973 and yet, it deeply shaped many institutions and minds. People believed it would last indefinitely. Furthermore, it did not represent a collective belief, but it was expressive of a collective situation. Everybody was going in the same direction, borne on the same wave. There was a movement of general prosperity, very unevenly distributed, but everybody was moving in the same direction.

A certain number of practices, institutions and mechanisms were created which, strangely enough, still exist.

/Fundamentally, the French know that, under this guise, the consumer society is finished./ Moreover, they were not happy in that society. They know it, they acknowledge it, but at the same time, /it remains that everything which is expressed, everything which is organized and all the demands originated in the consumer society./ Our economic and social debates are still debates of the consumer society. The forthcoming debate will be distinctive, for it will be the debate of a society organized on the basis of different objectives and themes. It should be recalled that this consumer society led to May 1968, that is to say, to its rejection. May 1968 was an important event inasmuch as it was both youth's cultural rejection of that society and the rejection of some of its social consequences, expressed through demonstrations of dissatisfaction. People should not regret what they have rejected. My feeling has always been that the consumer society was suitable for neither France nor the French. It was destroying France. It ravaged sections of our coastal areas, mountains, towns, mode of living and culture; it wrought tremendous havoc.

I think that the sober society toward which we are moving is, after all, better suited to France which is a country of rural origin, retaining its attachment to the land and with a sense of time and measure.

I insist on the fact that all the mechanisms now in place and all the organizations voicing their opinion reason in the spirit of the consumer society. This explains the public's difficulty with making sense out of that turmoil. They know it has ended, yet, everything they are being told is being told in the language and the organizations created for and by the consumer society.

/France will be lost if, amidst this great turmoil and readjustment, it has the idea of finding again and reinstating the past./ Our country will become a withering zone such as always existed throughout the world. It is often what is being offered to the French, under more or less seductive forms. Actually, on a national scale, we have many assets, but also many weaknesses. Our cultural level, the value of our educational system and the position we have acquired in some leading sectors constitute our main assets and we must direct our thinking toward that France developing along those lines. Last winter, we suffered the serious consequences of the iron-smelting crisis, but we also logged in the success of Airbus. The forces involved are almost of the same magnitude. One sector was a messenger of hope, the other needed to be re-organized to maintain its future chances.

Our national size represents an advantage: in many sectors of advanced technology (electronics, space research, etc) we probably would have been unable to develop had we been much smaller.

Furthermore, the richness of our land, vitality and diversity of our agriculture and processing of our products represent factors of natural equilibrium and homogenization of our territory which still need to be substantially improved. It seems to me that it is enough to ensure economic balance and progress in the standard of living.

This brings me to an important subject: ecology. The fact that our resources are limited and we must conduct our collective and individual lives with concerns others than quantities springs from what I have stated, namely, population growth, decreasing resources, etc with the result that the ecological movement is deeply rooted. What is strange is that, in some of its manifestations, it seems to believe it can be satisfied with merely being a corrective factor for a consumer society. It is a complete illusion for that society's mechanisms and forces are such that the ecological movement would be squashed in it. It might lead to symbolic solutions such as the creation of a few natural parks and scattered reserves but, for me, the ecological movement must comprise many other sectors of collective life, for example, the creation of a type of economic development, certain aspects of cultural life, the respect of time and remedies against nervous tensions, pressure from mass media and advertisement and urban concentrations, etc. After all, I do not believe we can disassociate the "green pastures" aspect from the moderation and humanization effort of our economic and social system. Consequently, it is desirable that ecological thinking removes itself from its original milieu.

[Question] If I understand well, we must adapt to a new rhythm. There is no example of an harmonious society in recession.

[Answer] Sober growth is not crisis. It should be recalled that the 1979 French production will be higher than in any previous years, even 1973, that is to say, prior to the petroleum crisis and, in 1979, French standard of living is the highest in our history. There is no recession. Growth is slower, tempered. It does not give rise to the same gratifications: the quantitative gratification of "more" on all domains must be replaced by a gratification of choice, of quality. /It is the historical,/ and moreover, natural, /passage of quantity to quality./ Furthermore, it would not represent an unconquerable difficulty if we did not have to solve the unemployment problem and eliminate heavy social injustices. The unemployment problem must be considered on two levels: worldwide and French. On a world scale, it is tragic because the truth is that this tremendous increase in the available work force will not be required to produce what the world will need. The concentration of the means of production and technological advances are such that the world will not need this increase.

The problem will therefore be very difficult to solve on a world scale. All the mass products which can be manufactured by numerous and low-paid workers will, of necessity, be manufactured by them. Tension is and will be tremendous. On a national scale, we must therefore seek out sectors needing specialized and highly paid workers. Those sectors exist. In metallurgy for example, there are many highly technical sectors, accessible only with great difficulty, which means that those companies will remain the kind found in typically industrialized countries. It is highly noticeable in the textile industry: in highly technological countries, not only do some types of production not regress, but they progress.

[Question] The choice will need to be made. Who will make it?

[Answer] I believe there are two levels of choice. First, there is a community responsibility for choosing well the new large-scale sectors requiring an initial research and training investment. The effort put forth in data processing is remarkable because it will stop burdening public finances within 2 years and that sector will even be fully profitable. The same is true of the nuclear and space fields in which the State must undertake and conduct the basic research.

The second choice is the responsibility of those who produce. We are aware that centers of decisions must be increased the moment we must change to a more refined and swiftly adaptable economic system. We must therefore proceed toward a type of economy in which a larger number of companies will have to take those decisions. If we try to make inclusive decisions, one error is enough to block the whole system. /Quality is by nature decentralized./ Moreover, this is much more compatible with our national temperament.

[Question] At what level must decentralization take place?

[Answer] For example, at company or university levels.

Let us return to French demography. Alongside this explosive worldwide crisis, there are inverse occurrences affecting all the long standing countries of

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Western Europe, the USSR and North America with, for the first time in 10 years, a shift to negative rates. The first country to be affected was East Germany then, 2 years ago, West Germany.

France is in a bad situation, but not as bad as this group of countries. This is probably due to its family and rural structure and also, partly, to the presence of immigrant workers. Our population will still continue to grow for approximately 7 more years but, as far as birth rates are concerned, they are decreasing and have already dropped below the level needed to ensure population maintenance. It is obvious that everything we are undertaking is doomed to failure if such a situation continues and we witness a rapid demographic decline.

Reactions to this situation are interesting to analyze. West Germans do not react as we do. They talk about it but do nothing to change the situation. They think it is a temporary phenomenon and the extreme vitality of the population is such that it will correct itself after it reaches a certain level.

In France, it is another debate which, after all, people would like to direct essentially on benefits, as though they were the determining factor.

As modern demographic research as shown, the demographic problem is a knotty one revealing the totality of society's characteristics. It involves at one and the same time the belief in happiness, evaluation of future opportunities, relations between parents and children and the role of women in society, all very complex factors expressing a certain quality of the web of society.

[Question] Is not this demographic problem due precisely to the fact that, feeling a deep anxiety over this new state of the world, western man has no desire to procreate?

[Answer] The difficulty with society's problems is that they include successive levels of explanation. We can always find one accessible explanation, but others are more mysterious. It could be that the demographic crisis is the counterpart of the tremendous expansion of the 19th century and we are witnessing a kind of biological deacceleration of the species; a biological deacceleration which could be the origin of behaviors mistaken for causes. Pessimism could derive from a biological deacceleration of the species.

[Question] Is not the failure of religions also a sign of decline?

[Answer] We can touch on religions and collective beliefs.

France is a country where very strong collective beliefs were born and which adhered to very strong beliefs. It has been the world's Catholic country; then the country of the equality-of-political-rights doctrine; and, in the middle of the 19th century, the country of nationalism. Currently, it has no strong collective beliefs. There was a strong collective belief around General de Gaulle during the Occupation, furthermore, a belief which was not heavily felt until the second half of the conflict. Then, there were the consequences of

the decolonization. However, from 1965-1967, we saw this strong collective belief grow dimmer. Nineteen hundred and sixty-eight was the illustration of that fact.

/I believe a society cannot live long without collective beliefs./ I also believe that they cannot be created artificially, for they come from the innermost part of human nature.

There is currently in France an encouraging sign and a possible plan of action. The encouraging sign is that certainties and beliefs are few but rather intense. Let us take the Catholic religion as an example: practicing Catholics are less numerous than 100 years ago, but they probably are more earnest and motivations are stronger. I am convinced the same is true for the other religions. It expresses a need and, perhaps, an awakening. It is encouraging.

/What we can do is intensely promote cultural development./ And that is not the state's business, but society's. France must appear as a culturally very active and, if possible, vanguard country. It is already so: interest in all forms of music and all kinds of exhibits is tremendous. When we talk about literature and writing, we are faced with a worrisome predicament: size. One hundred years ago, worldwide, two-thirds of the people who read could read French. Currently, this figure is approximately ten percent and in 20 years, it will be 50 percent. Obviously, we shall fight to defend our language, but we are faced with the basic problem of the position and diffusion of our culture, an extremely difficult problem because we cannot force other people to speak our language. In my opinion, the cultural theme--which I intend to analyze more thoroughly this winter--is a factor which can contribute to the reappearance of collective beliefs and it will have to include an aesthetic component.

[Question] What about politics?

[Answer] It has no effect. The idea that, in France, collective beliefs could emerge from a political debate is erroneous because this debate discusses none of the needs which the future will have to satisfy. Marxism was the last worldwide declaration. From the moment we no longer believe that a political debate can supply this answer, a collective belief can longer be based on a political doctrine; today, it is not enough.

[Question] In this sober society, the French will undoubtedly have to relearn their duties and cease to clamor for their rights. Will they have to give up some of them?

[Answer] We were on a boat carried by a swift current. We could tell the current was going in a certain direction, namely, the growth of resources, and we were discussing among us the distribution of this surplus of resources. Henceforward, the current will be slower. Personal projections and more advanced training will require efforts. It will involve anticipating the future needs of society and learning those skills related to them. We will have to anticipate how to adapt our duties or knowledge much more than we did before. The effort to be actively involved will be greater.

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[Question] You did not speak about the employment problem in France.

[Answer] Let us talk about it. Henceforward in France, we must consider the employment problem as an objective, not a result. In the past, it was treated as a result since strong growth was the fundamental idea, the immigration rate being determined by this growth. We must have a different idea, namely, that French society must employ all its hands and, I would add, all its minds. Is it possible? Certainly. The question is to know at what level of income it must be accomplished.

It can be done at a low level of income by dividing the existing work and gross wages as they stand. It is then a society of full-time workers with a low standard of living. In my opinion, it is not the purpose, for many workers aspire, and rightly so, to a higher standard of living. Some believe that we can set up a job-sharing society at a high level of income. It is an illusion. Let us take the car industry as an example: worldwide, there may be 10 or 12 automobile companies, two of which are French: one ranks third or fourth, the other sixth. These companies compete with each other, not with other states. Let us imagine that the decision to share jobs is made in France and the working week is set at 30 hours. If, at the same time, the other companies decide not to share jobs and keep the 40-hour week, the individual who will work 30 hours will receive a real salary representing only three-fourths of the salary of an individual working 40 hours. The French standard of living will decline in that sector, as compared to the others.

That is why I do not believe that job sharing at a low level of income can solve the problem. I deeply believe that we can reach full employment at a high level of income, providing we seek and develop new activities. The key lies with the development of new activities and, consequently, I am pleased with the fact that some advanced technology industries are creating jobs, for they do it at a high level of wages and specialization.

The real choice--and we cannot escape it for long--is to choose between a German-type or a Swiss-type situation, that is to say, a high level of employment and income or, on the contrary, a sharing of jobs and income.

I favor the first formula which, I believe, can be implemented when I see all that remains to be done in many sectors, such as the agro-food industries where we should rank first worldwide; it is not the case. Tens, hundreds of thousands of jobs could then be created. The same is true in the advanced machinery industry where we lag far behind and where thousands of jobs remain to be created. The situation is identical in the clothing and furniture sectors even though our prestigious image gives us a worldwide advantage.

[Question] Are not we reacting a little too late? Have not the Germans already shifted their industry toward this adaptation?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Could you describe for us the world as it will be in the 80's?

[Answer] /What we must really understand is that we must adapt ourselves to an upcoming world, not an outgoing one./ This idea has not yet occurred to us. I am not sure it has occurred to you. And yet, it is a kind of switch which sheds light on everything needing to be done.

On an international level, France is able to do what the super powers cannot, taking into account what they are and because their efforts are inevitably perceived as being self-serving. We are one of the rare countries to have this vision of the world, this experience of world affairs, this geographical position and central policy. France has a role to play, but we must not make a mistake: this role will require an effort. If Charles de Gaulle exerted his well-known influence, it is because he gave his country the breadth of a great power and not because he was an average statesman carried by a great power. It will always be so for France.

[Question] Is this situation workable?

[Answer] It is workable, but it is not secure. It is workable because France has a historical tradition and reputation and, in some respects, the position for making it possible. It is not secure because it will not be asked to play this role if it does not force itself to do so and its leaders lack the ability to perform. Currently, France is holding its own. It originated the North-South and European-Arab dialogs; it initiated the idea of a three-party discussion with the Africans and it recommended the creation of the European Council. All these ideas are moving forward and our country appears to be concerned with what should be done in order for the international and collective organization to progress. We must continue.

[Question] You are a practicing Christian. Do you believe that religions are essential? What do spiritual values mean to you?

[Answer] I am a Christian, but president of a secular state...

[Question] The Church has sometimes interfered with state decisions. I am thinking in particular about arms sales, aid to the Third World and, mostly, about the abortion law. How do you deal with it as a Christian?

[Answer] There is no difficulty. I am a Christian and president of a secular state. Knowing what the institutions' basic concept and rule are, I make my decisions within the scope of my responsibilities and prerogative. I have my own philosophy. I sometimes express it, but in no way do I impose it in the discharge of my duties. I take the same stand as General de Gaulle.

Concerning spiritual values, I find it difficult to imagine what collective life could be without a spiritual dimension. I cannot imagine it for myself, but I know that others do so for themselves.

[Question] Do you identify spiritual values with religious values?



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[Answer] No, absolutely not. I am currently reading the biographies of world leaders and I noted that those who do not have a certain spiritual dimension are rare. It is sometimes quite clear, especially among the Arab leaders and President Sadat in particular. It is also the case in India, Latin America and even the United States.

I find it difficult to see how a person can have a conceptual system of society's development excluding any spiritual dimension. At the very least, it can be a very deep philosophical belief. Spiritual dimension is not solely religious in nature.

[Question] Does your own and your ancestors' faith influence your political behavior?

[Answer] My behavior, probably. I do not use a doctrine in the choice of political decisions, but in my behavior, my approach to decisions to be made, the answer is yes: undoubtedly yes.

[Question] Five years later, do you feel as though you have both changed and remained yourself?

[Answer] I believe that after 5 years everybody feel as though they have changed.

[Question] Granted, but not everybody have spent those 5 years where you spent them.

[Answer] By nature, I am a person who remains identical to himself, but of course, those 5 years in office taught me a lot.

[Question] Did you learn much from foreign statesmen?

[Answer] Very little, except from some of them who appear to me as being well experienced in the conduct of their affairs. We talk about it together, but I would say that it is almost from a professional standpoint. In this office, our view of the world is altered by the ease of travel and contacts which are ours while at the same time being exceptionally complete. In the past, when I was discharging my duties, for example in Chamalieres, I could see, like an instinctive image, the map of France around me. During the first years of my presidency, I could see Europe and Africa. Now I see a sphere and on that sphere France.

[Question] And the French, do you "feel" them better?

[Answer] Yes. I experience a deep feeling of identification with the French. When I say "the French," I am thinking "We, the French." When they are gloomy or dissatisfied, I understand that they have both difficulty and a slight regret adapting themselves to the world as it is becoming. I feel the same way, I therefore understand them. Of course, I also believe that those are feelings which must be subjugated because life, in the scientific sense of the term, is a continuous progress and it must be experienced as progress.

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[Question] Someone said: "We can only survive by ascending."

[Answer] I never feel irritated, even momentarily, against my fellow countrymen although this feeling is often experienced by politicians.

[Question] It may be because you have much experience with rural life.

How do you feel about criticism? Painfully or are you protected by a shell? Did you grow tougher over the years?

[Answer] I have no shell.

[Question] One could deduce that you are fragile.

[Answer] Is that so? Does strength come from the shell? In nature, it is the lion which eats the buffalo despite its hide. I am interested in the discussion and criticism of my activities. On the other hand, spitefulness is something else. I resent it as one of the forms of evil and as the manifestation of the presence of evil in the world. I do not practice it, but I resent it as much for others as for myself.

[Question] Is not this presence of evil derived from a certain permissiveness? Do you not feel this rise of evil inclusively throughout the world?

[Answer] I do not think so. Permissiveness gives it a different mode of expression, but if you were to read again the libels of authoritarian regimes, it was even worse!

I am convinced that we can neither eliminate nor reduce this worldwide evil through simple restraint. It can be eliminated and reduced through a kind of purification of the deep web of society. I am convinced that, despite its very serious problems with employment, inflation, etc, the French society of 1979 is less prone to violence and hate than the society prior to 1968.

If I left certain polemics unanswered, it is because I believe that moderation in general behavior and the collective life finally minimizes the influence of evil. Outrage and hate lessen and everybody benefit.

[Question] Let us come down from those lofty heights. Do you think that you have reached a turning point in your presidency? Is it an important date for France?

[Answer] Yes. It is an important period because, unlike what some people think, much has been done. Judging from what is being currently said, nothing is supposed to have been done. People will see that, in 1979, the French economy will react with much more vigor than the French economy of 1974. People worked, took initiatives, reorganized their production and sought new markets. Much has been done and I will compare this period to the crossing of a pass: if people panic, they no longer dare to advance and they turn back; if on the other hand they continue to advance, all of a sudden they discover another thing: a new state of the world.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PLANNING LAW REPORT CITES WORSENING MILITARY BALANCE

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 15 Sep 79 pp 30-32, 48

[Article: "Planning Law Report Excerpt: 'The Military Balance Between the Western and Eastern Alliance Systems Is Continuing To Deteriorate'"]

[Text] The statement comprising the title of this article, which could have been made by the very ones who see in this deterioration a supporting justification for their argument in favor of installing medium-range nuclear weapons in the European NATO countries, is in fact a statement excerpted from the report by the prime minister and the minister of defense, in the name of the French Government, on the enforcement and implementation of the 1977-1982 military planning law. The established date for completion of this report has been set.

This 44-page document has just been forwarded to the members of Parliament, who are scheduled to debate it in the National Assembly on 2 October. The members of the Commission on National Defense and the Armed Forces will meet on 19 September to discuss the report to be drawn up by Mr A. Paecht for the commission (cf. AIR & COSMOS No 776) after they have heard the testimonies to be presented the evening before by Mr Yvon Bourges, minister of defense, and Jean-Francois Martre, managing director general for armaments, and the morning before by Gen Guy Mery, the armed forces chief of staff.

The conclusions drawn in the commission's report will undoubtedly not coincide in their entirety with those drawn by the prime minister and the minister of defense in the report they have forwarded to the members of Parliament, which could be summarized in a single sentence: "It can be stated that the balance sheet for the first 3 years of implementation of the military planning law, projected to the end of 1979, has met expectations."

For the benefit of our readers, we reproduce below extensive excerpts from this report, which is divided into three parts: basic national security requirements; balance sheet for the first 3 years of the planning law; 1980-1982 planning law objectives.

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Basic National Security Requirements

The first part of the report was prepared by an interministerial group under the aegis of the secretary general of national defense. It leads to the conclusion that "France must maintain the basic choices of its defense policy: national independence based on nuclear deterrence, a military capability appropriate to the safeguarding of our interests, continued freedom of evaluation and decision, solidarity with the allies."

The content of this first part takes on maximum significance at a time when many Western political and military leaders are denouncing the vulnerability of the NATO forces opposed to those of the Warsaw Pact; at a time when the presence in Cuba of 3,000 Soviet troops is posing a threat to the ratification of SALT II by the majority of the members of the United States Congress; at a time when the French Government is being accused of gradually returning toward reintegration into NATO; at a time when Mr Kissinger is recalling the futility of counting on American strategic arms to defend Europe and when the publication of a German "white book" on defense reveals that, to counter the threat represented by the increased number and the precision of the Soviet SS20 medium-range nuclear missiles, Mr Schmidt's government views the defense of German territory as being totally dependent on the Atlantic Alliance and advocates modernization of the atomic weapons systems on European soil; and at a time when, according to the London IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies] report, the European nuclear defenses must be reinforced.

One reads with particular interest in this first part: "France is continuing its actuation in favor of detente (...) She approves the efforts being put forth by the United States and the Soviet Union to limit the development of their strategic potential (...) But one is compelled to note the fact that the military balance between the Western and Eastern alliance systems--an indispensable condition for the progress of detente--is continuing to deteriorate to the detriment of the Western countries, as much in the domain of nuclear weapons as in that of conventional forces.

"(...) The structuring of Europe, which France is pursuing as one of its essential objectives, continues uninvolved with questions of defense. France, however, through its own defense effort, is nevertheless contributing to European security and is not ignoring the fact that its own security rests within that framework.

"France confirms the basic choices of its defense policy: a national nuclear effort; solidarity with its allies and a desire to take part in the defense of Europe while preserving, however, its own freedom of evaluation and of decision in respect to the Atlantic Alliance with regard to the advisability, timing and conditions of a possible involvement of its forces in any case of crisis or conflict. France's special contribution to the efforts being deployed toward disarmament in no way affects its determination to assure self-reliantly its own security.

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"Certain developments that have taken place outside of Europe since 1976 have confirmed the need for forces in combat readiness to support and safeguard French interests. They have demonstrated the role that France can fulfill--acting alone or within an international framework--in maintaining certain regional balances.

"France's military strategy remains based on the deterrent and combat capabilities deriving from the existence of her nuclear and conventional forces, which mutually enhance each other.

"Our national defense effort must therefore accord first priority to the development of the effectiveness and credibility of France's strategic nuclear forces. Our tactical nuclear weapons, by virtue of their versatility of employment, must add deterrent capability.

"Our conventional forces--land, naval and air--must complement our deterrent forces and, in contributing to their safeguarding, must be capable of confronting diverse situations in Europe and overseas. The special effort that has already been deployed to improve their suitability for intervention in Europe and outside of Europe must be continued, specifically to augment their polyvalence, their mobility, and hence their flexibility of employment."

Balance Sheet for the 1977-1979 Period

From a financial standpoint, the report says, "there has been a steady increase in current franc allocations for defense (+32 percent from 1977 to 1979) and at the same time a more rapid return than anticipated toward an equitable ratio between operating expenditures and capital investments"; expressed in terms of percentages, the ration between Title III and Title V in 1977 was 59 percent to 41 percent; in 1979 it has been 56.8 percent to 43.2 percent.

As regards nuclear forces, "the balance sheet shows that the effort devoted to them has received priority.

"With respect to strategic weapons, the modernization of the Mirage IV and of the C 135 tanker aircraft is being carried out, specifically as regards increased penetration capability through improvement of their weapons system, their navigation equipment, and their electronic countermeasure devices.

"The M2 missiles with which the SNLE's [Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarines] were equipped has been replaced with the M20 missile, having explosive power in the order of megatons, increased range and improved capability of piercing enemy defenses. The production and putting into service of a fourth set of M20 missiles to equip the SNLE's currently in operation has been completed.

"The S2 missiles in Plateau d'Albion are in the process of being replaced with S3 missiles equipped with thermonuclear warheads. The first firing unit being equipped with this new missile should be operational in 1980.

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"Conforming to the planning law, which provided for completion of the fourth and fifth SNLE's during the 1977-1982 period, the fourth--the 'L'Indomptable'--entered service in 1977, and the fifth--the 'Le Tonnant'--is now in the process of being tested and will enter service during the first half of 1980.

"Funds were committed to the study and subsequent construction of a new-generation SNLE with the ordering, at year-end of 1978, of the 'L'Inflexible,' which will be the first SNLE equipped with M4 missiles and a navigation system that will improve its performance characteristics and its capabilities.

"(...) All decisions have been taken and put into effect in preparation for the realization, during the next decade, of the new strategic nuclear weapons systems (SNLE's sea-to-land, new missiles currently under study land-to-land), that will enable France to achieve nuclear powers at a technological level equivalent to that of the U.S. and USSR weapons systems.

"Four air squadrons capable of utilizing the AN52 tactical nuclear weapon are operational; a fifth one is to be formed in 1980.

"Five 'Pluton' regiments have been operational since 1978, studies relative to this missile's successor are underway.

"The adaptation of the tactical nuclear weapon to carrier-based aircraft (the Super-Etendard) aboard the two aircraft carriers is in progress; one of the two carriers was equipped in 1978 with special stowing facilities for the nuclear weapons.

"Lastly, development of the ASMP [Medium-Range Air-to-Land Missile] that is to equip the Mirage 2000 is progressing according to schedule."

In regard to the Ground Forces, the report states among other things that "the effort devoted to antitank combat has been characterized by continued equipping of units with 'Hot' and 'Milan' missiles as SA342 helicopters are placed in service."

Of the 44 SA341 and SA342 helicopters scheduled to be ordered between 1977 and 1979 (as part of the total of 128 between 1977 and 1982), 42 have actually been ordered and received. As regards the "hot" missiles, objectives to date have been achieved: 96 have been ordered of the 96 scheduled, and 58 delivered of the 61 scheduled for delivery. The situation in regard to the "Milan" is even better: 420 of the 420 1977-1979 scheduled orders have been placed, and 540 actually delivered versus 510 scheduled for delivery during this period. The 57 Rolands have been ordered as planned, of which 39 (of 44) have been delivered.

It is noted that the VAB AA (VADAR)\* program has been abandoned for the SATCP [Very Close-Range Land-to-Air] program.

\*These acronyms identify a program related to close-range defense against low-level air attack, by means of twin 20-mm guns mounted on VAB AAs [Front-Armored Anti-Aircraft Vehicles], autonomously operated or centrally controlled in groups; exact expansion of VADAR unknown]

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With reference to the Navy and more specifically the Naval Air Force, the report states that the latter presently deploys 35 Atlantics and 12 Neptunes (being retired from service) on sea patrol, and around 100 Crusaders, Alizes, and Etendard IV Ms, the latter of which are gradually being replaced by the Super-Etendard. The helicopter fleet consists of some 50 aircraft (some 20 Super Frelons in service, plus WG 13 Lynxes which will gradually replace the carrier-based Alouette III ASM [Anti-Submarine] units.

"For the Navy, the initial period of the planning law has been one of essential decisions. The most important one has been adoption, in 1978, of a set of long-range objectives. The decision to go ahead with the first new-generation SNLE equipped with the M4 weapons system was also a major one."

It is also noted that the Super Etendard program was cut back from 80 to 71 units, of which 35 have been ordered to date and are to be delivered by the end of 1979.

With reference to the Air Force, the following chart shows the situation of its principal programs. It is noted that "the Super Crotale program has been abandoned and the Crotale program extended, marking a needed new effort to improve air defenses at sensitive points. Moreover, orders for Epsilon trainers and new helicopters will be deferred until after 1980.

"The Air Forces's general profile has not changed since 1976. Its total manpower has remained stable at around 106,000 men.

"(...) With reference to air defense, three squadrons of the four are now equipped with Mirage Fls, while the putting into service of the Matra Super 530 air-to-air missile--which optimizes the high-altitude intercept capabilities of this plane--should take place at the end of 1979. The initial orders for Mirage 2000's were placed during 1979. With the Matra Super 530 D air-to-air missile which is to be associated with this interceptor, it will be able to checkmate hostile planes that penetrate at high speeds and low altitudes.

"To meet the continuing need for low altitude detection--since our radars currently cover the entire territory and its approaches at medium and high altitudes--the air force is now experimenting with a device of integrating airdrome approach radars and mobile tactical radars into the STRIDA [French Defense Data Processing and Presentation System] network, which should go into service within the next decade.

"The Tactical Air Force, consisting essentially of 21 squadrons of Mirage III's, Mirage V's and Jaguars, continues at a high level of operational readiness.

"The program of equipping air craft with electronic countermeasure devices, which is currently in progress, will increase their probabilities of success on missions and in evasive action against enemy missiles. The refueling of Jaguars and Fls in flight by C135's adds a great deal of flexibility and feasibility for remote interventions and deployments (stagings and overflights).

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Equipment	Orders			Deliveries		
	Planning law ob- jectives 1977-1982	Objec- tives for 1977-1979	Completed	Planning law ob- jectives 1977-1982	Objec- tives for 1977-1979	Completed
	Jaguar	-	-	-	84	75
Mirage F 1	109	86	86	123	35	34
Mirage 2000	127	20	4	10	-	-
Alphajet	144	88	88	142	32	31
Crotale	5	5	9	15	10	12
20 mm AA Batteries	152	24	104	48	-	20
Air-air missiles	1,770	840	620	1,150	1,060	1,256

Situation of Principal Air Force Programs



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"The reinstatement of the production cycle for C 160 Transalls, modified for refueling in flight, and the orders already placed for 12 of these aircraft, will substantially increase the transport fleet's capabilities both as regards tonnage carrying capacity and cruising radius.

"Despite an initial delay, mass production of the Alpha Jet trainer aircraft is back on schedule: 88 planes have already been ordered, 31 have been delivered and will be placed in service between now and the end of the year. The replacement of the Mystere IV and T 33 planes is thus assured.

"Lastly, with regard to the air defense of bases and sensitive installations, the deployment of Crotale close-range land-to-air missile batteries and of 20 mm anti-aircraft canon completes the effort begun in the domain of camouflage and hardening of installations in 1976."

General Objectives

This third part of the report again forcibly expresses the need to maintain a sustained effort in regard to nuclear armament.

"In the face of evolving threats and techniques, we must maintain the credibility and the capability of our strategic forces at their necessary levels as a national deterrent.

"We must also carry out the studies necessary to enable us to take timely decisions regarding the development of new generation strategic and tactical weapons. From the same viewpoint, we must continue our effort toward the utilization of space, by way also of satellite studies and possible developmental work.

"The coordinated equipping of the conventional forces necessary to our military strategy constitutes our second obligation. This objective requires that their modernization, their training and their maintenance be guaranteed; special emphasis must be placed on:

- continued modernization of the ground forces' equipment;
- modernization of the Air Forces through a sustained rate of production of the Mirage 2000 despite its earlier delays;
- an accelerated renovation of our navy's surface fleet to palliate to the extent possible the coming retirements of older ships between 1985 and 1992;
- the reinforcement of our capability for action abroad."

Among the objectives to be achieved in 1982 in the domain of forces' activities, the report cites "15 hours of flying per month for each combat pilot," depending upon the evolution of the cost of fuel.

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#### Objectives By Category of Forces

With reference to the Strategic Nuclear Forces, "the development of their two main components will be continued between 1980 and 1982, particularly by way of improving their penetration and survival capabilities.

"The priority effort will be centered on the new M4 strategic weapons system which is scheduled to be put into service on the SNLE 'L'Inflexible' in early 1985. Utilizing multiple nuclear warheads, this new missile will mark a significant advance over its predecessors from the viewpoints both of its ability to penetrate enemy defenses and of the fact that in time--when all the SNLE's are equipped with it--it will multiply the number of objectives that can be brought under threat.

"The S2 missiles of the Plateau d'Albion's two firing units will be replaced with S3 missiles: the first unit in 1980 and the second in 1982. These missiles will carry thermonuclear warheads with enhanced penetration aids. The survival capability of the launching sites will be improved.

"During the same period, studies will be carried out on the future of the Plateau d'Albion and on post-1990 projections for the strategic component, which could include use of mobile land-to-land ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

"Tactical nuclear weapons capabilities will be improved during the planning period. A third squadron of Jaguars equipped to carry the AN52 nuclear weapon will be operational in 1981, raising to five the number of Air Force squadrons (Jaguar and Mirage III E) capable of carrying this weapon.

"The navy, for its part, will by 1981 have its AN 52 weapons systems in use by way of Super-Etendard aircraft, which will endow its two aircraft carriers with a tactical nuclear capability.

"The development of the ASMP [Medium-Range Air-to-Land] missile, designed mainly for the Mirage 2000, will continue.

"Lastly, studies will be developed on future tactical nuclear weapons and especially on those for the land-to-land system to succeed the Pluton.

"As regards the utilization of space, the preliminary studies now in progress should be completed during the period 1980-1982 and the necessary development work started toward the realization of a satellite reconnaissance system and a satellite telecommunications network."

The Ground Forces are scheduled to put into service the nuclear tactical weapons systems for which they are responsible and complete the execution of their reorganization plan.

During the 1980-1982 period, they will, among other things, lay the groundwork for the period to follow by proceeding with or continuing specialized studies related to:

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--on the one hand, the basic combat missile, the antitank helicopter, the multiple rocket-launcher, defense systems against low-flying and very low-flying enemy aircraft;

--and on the other hand, a system of battlefield surveillance and attainment of targets, capable of meeting the requirements of the ANT [Tactical Nuclear Weapon], and to be installed before second-generation tactical missiles are placed in service.

As regards the navy, during the period 1980-1982, its tasks, among others, will be: to assure, as its first priority, the operational readiness and security of the Strategic Naval Force, the size of which will be increased in early 1980 by the putting into service of a fifth SNLE, to maintain the capabilities of the Naval Air Force and especially those of the sea patrol after modification of the Neptunes; and to lay the groundwork for the post-1982 period by carrying out the developmental studies necessary for future weapons systems and for the renewal of its carrier-based aircraft. In this regard, it is only after the studies now in progress in the operational, technical and industrial domains have resulted in a choice of the future carrier-based aircraft that the appropriate aircraft carrier can be defined. The go-ahead on this carrier can therefore not be issued until after 1982.

The air force, while maintaining its operational flexibility and polyvalence, must take part substantially in the continued improvement of the strategic and tactical nuclear components for whose operational readiness it is responsible.

"It must also develop and modernize the capabilities of its conventional forces and must, to this end and among other things, during the 1980-1982 period: assure, as its first priority, the manufacture of the Mirage 2000 in its two versions--air defense and ASMP--so as to maintain a level of 450 combat planes in the flight line; seek to achieve increased tactical transport, logistical transport, and in-flight refueling capabilities through the acquisition of additional C 160 Transalls; improve its low-altitude air defense capability through the acquisition of ground radars, fixed and mobile, to be integrated into the STRIDA network; develop strategic and tactical electronic surveillance means; lay the groundwork for the post-1982 period, continuing the corrective effort it has undertaken in regard to studies on new weapons systems and their operational environment, expanding, for this purpose, its studies on engines, new weapons and electronic countermeasures, and instituting the study of a tactical combat plane (Editor's note: The report does not specify whether this study is to be a joint undertaking by the three forces); continue its effort in regard to passive defense of sensitive points. As regards production, the essential programs have been put into effect. The initial delay in the start of the Mirage 2000 program can be only partially recovered, because of industrial considerations even if none other. The 1977-1982 period must produce the groundwork for the planes and weapons of the end of the next decade.

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During 1980-1982, the report states, "there must be a 0.09 percent annual growth in the ratio of the defense budget to the PIMB [Gross National Marketed Product]--which represents around 88 percent of the GNP--as during the last 3 years. This growth rate must be added to the ratio of 3.67 percent, which is the ratio of the defense budget to the PIMB in 1979."

The debate in the National Assembly will center more on the question of the actual credits to be allocated to specific operations than on percentage growth rates.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF, PS SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND DISCUSSED

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 24 Sep 79 pp 28-29

[Text] The ceremony of former halcyon days surrounded the meeting of communist and socialist negotiators Thursday morning at 1000 in the Colonel Fabian Square headquarters of the French Communist Party (PCF). Participants could well have had the impression of reliving the golden hours of the Union of the Left. The same heads of delegations: Charles Fiterman, accompanied by Philippe Herzog for the PCF, Pierre Beregovoy for the PS [Socialist Party], accompanied by representatives of the party's different wings, Messrs Chevenement, Poperen, Cot, and Le Garrec. The same ritual too: the meeting opened with each delegation reading a formal preliminary statement. But after 3 hours and 20 minutes, the negotiators parted without setting a date for a future meeting. They published a dull communique in which each party stuck to its positions.

Nobody had expected anything different. When Francois Mitterrand issued his 20 August statement from Anglet suggesting the possibility of a meeting between himself and PCF Secretary General Georges Marchais, the latter bluntly declined to comment, saying "No trumped-up deals."

Then, concerned about possibly offending leftist opinion, the communists had eventually accepted the principle of an exploratory meeting between two delegations excluding the party chiefs. But they had also immediately laid down the ground rules for such a meeting: "No make-believe meetings. No pretentious statements. No show-off committee," wrote Fiterman in the 6 September L'HUMANITE. And on 13 September, Pierre Juquin admitted: "We are pessimistic about the outcome of this meeting. Once bitten, twice shy."

The socialists harbored no greater hope. Mitterrand said "I have no faith in the Union of the Left, I admit it."

It all seemed, therefore, as if they were going through the motions of a reconciliation while knowing such was impossible. It was a show for the leftist public.

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All the special elections did, in fact, show Marchais and Mitterrand that, despite the war between party headquarters and staffs, socialist and communist voters were continuing to vote regularly for each other's best-placed candidate in the second round of balloting.

This persistence of the unitary spirit among leftist voters is useful to Mitterrand whose party benefited greatly from the Union of the Left. It was for the purpose of reviving this dynamic which has carried his party since the 1972 signing of the common program, that, in August, the socialist leader called for formation of a "public safety" left based on a rapprochement with labor unions, associations, and parties. It was to channel to his advantage this unitary aspiration of party members and voters that the first secretary of the PS adopted as his own the formula of "union at the rank-and-file level," a concept initially advanced by the communists. Lastly, it was to demonstrate the sincerity of his unitary convictions that Mitterrand allowed Jean-Pierre Chevenement, leader of the CERES [Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research, and Education], to prepare a "socialist plan" that does not fear to borrow from communist views, notably from the communist analysis of the economic situation and assessment of the countries of the East.

Within this context, Thursday's meeting was per se a triumph for the PS. The same is true about the agreement on united action concluded Tuesday by the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] and CFTD [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], thanks to Edmond Maire. In both instances, the communist movement felt compelled to simulate unitary behavior.

Such behavior is absolutely no longer a part of its strategy. The PCF is not prepared to give up the isolation approved by its 23d congress. Initially defensive, that isolation has ultimately proved to be profitable.

Communist leaders were surprised at their good showing in the European elections after a year during which they had been beset on all sides, even from within their own ranks. And at the most recent Central Committee meeting last week, Philippe Herzog was able to say that the downward trend had now been reversed. (Incidentally, prior to this meeting, PCF headquarters had denied there was any such trend).

These factors give the PCF hope of being able to repeat its European elections performance in the presidential election. Its increasing role in social and labor unrest and its taking charge of all conflicts are both designed with this end in view. The PCF is, in fact, trying to rally all the malcontents.

At L'HUMANITE's recent annual carnival, Marchais accused the PS, and especially Mitterrand, of thinking nothing but presidential elections.

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To which Jean Poperen, a socialist, replied: "No party is more obsessed by the coming presidential election than the PCF."

Actually, Marchais and Mitterrand are both thinking of the 1981 election. Marchais is worrying about the first-round of balloting, and this requires him to go it alone. Mitterrand is preparing himself for the second-round, and this compels him to seek unity at all costs.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

OPINIONS ON BERLINGUER'S 'RINASCITA' ARTICLE

Five-Point Program

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 6

Article: Berlinguer's Stoic Compromise

Text The historical compromise has been rejected by all political forces (except by a sector of the DC Christian Democrats) and clearly by the electorate. But stoically, Enrico Berlinguer does not give up and he proposes it again with an accent on "austerity" which also is not desinged to gain him popularity. In the triangular game between the PSI Italian Socialist Party, the DC, and the PCI Italian Communist Party, the RINASCITA essay, however, achieves one result: It puts the PCI back in the running.

To better understand the terms of the "general line" which Berlinguer proposes to follow in the coming encounter with the other parties, here is a resumé of the "five points" of the article.

Compromise. This word is not without its history. Togliatti used it to sum up the first post-Fascist governments. It is still valid, just so long as, as happened 30 years ago, the conservatives are aware of the real conditions of economic life and the political struggle in Italy.

Economic Crisis. There have been many errors of assessment. But now the problem is to find agreement between "those who are only interested in how much to produce and those who want to know what is produced and why."

Austerity. This does not only mean sacrifices. Above all it means worker control of the use of resources. However, it is necessary to acquire a government mentality and to stop organized resistance.

The Masses and Politics. The new model of economic development can be administered only by the large parties which, together with producers and workers, bring the masses of consumers into line.

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Democratic Centralism. Intolerantly rejecting criticism of PCI administration, Berlinguer warns against indiscriminate attacks against the parties "because they are organizations capable of overcoming social disunity."

Cicchitto Interview

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 7

[Interview with Fabrizio Cicchitto by G. Fo: "The DC Should Be Punished"]

[Text] [Question] Mr Cicchitto, how do you evaluate Berlinguer's summer "essay?"

[Answer] The Italian political system is taken for granted in the PCI secretary's analysis. Instead, the major effect, according to Berlinguer, is to be directed to healing the damage done by the economic crisis. Now, it is true that when the social forces were left to themselves, they produced distortions and coporativism that caused imbalances and contradictions in addition to dynamic progress. But in reality, the renewed proposal of the historical compromise by Berlinguer masks the failure to develop the Eurocommunist revision which pushes the PCI into an agreement with the DC.

[Question] Do you find that Berlinguer's analysis also contains new proposals in the economic fields?

[Answer] I would not say they are so new. Partially they were already advanced at the 11th Congress. Today the PCI restores a part of the Ingrao line (the so-called "development model"), which at that time was defeated. In part, they are also socialist themes, though with different emphases. We agree that it is necessary to have a rigorous selective political approach. However, we must not forget on what level public consumption still takes place (the home, schools, transportation) as well as certain private consumption, particularly in the south. In regard to what Berlinguer calls the "weight of the workers" and which we define as industrial demarcacy, it would be wise to recognize that this is a matter of the critical revision taking place between the more advanced forces of European social democracy such as the Scandinavian (the Meidner report), or the British Laborites. This brings to the forefront, positively or negatively, a theme of confrontation between socialists and communists, but also a contradiction within the PCI: A coherent Eurocommunists, but also a contradiction within the PCI: A coherent Eurocommunist revision is not achieved by starting with themes of a program that is tendentially socialist.

[Question] Then is unity of the left possible?

[Answer] I believe a considerable area of agreement exists on programatic problems which will be tested and consolidated at the September meeting.

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It will be indispensable that on questions such as energy, rate of growth, employment, reform of the state participation agencies, the united left (therefore, including the radicals and the PDUP [Proletarian Unity Party]) make its strength felt. On the other hand there is the real danger that every large DC splinter will play the leftist parties off against each other with preferential relationships and later regroup in order to maintain power. This August, unlike last year, Berlinguer is the protagonist. Furthermore he has two positions that do not represent a single voice. In the interview with STERN he speaks of a tendency to stage a coup in certain sectors of the DC, but he does not repeat this theme in the RINASCITA article. Then is this danger of a coup real and really attributable to some sector of the DC or is it not? And if this analysis were true, how could the proposal of a historic compromise be reconciled with a party that tendentially favors a coup? Would this not also be a surrender to necessity?

Question But what are the possibilities of evolution in the political framework?

Answer It is necessary to start with the need to redimension the DC hegemony. This can take place in two ways: Either with an emergency government in which all democratic political forces are represented, including the PCI; or through a government of national solidarity with a socialist president. The DC seeks to avoid both solutions, perhaps trying to play the PSI off against the PCI. This, too, must be discussed in September.

## Paggi Statement

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 7, 8

Statement by Leonardo Paggi: "These Are Our Errors"

Text Reflection on and analysis of the form the party should take is today a real problem for communists and it cannot be exorcized by fashionable formulas. But I add immediately that it is a "functional," not ideological, problem and as such it deserves to be dealt with. Asor Rosa is right when he says that the debate on democratic centralism does not call into question matters of principle, but the problem of the party "machinery," I would say rather of the "political capacity," of an organization. Therefore let us not create confusion: The K factor is not involved.

If, then, we wish to deal with the question from a lay point of view and aside from any mechanical approach, it is necessary to start seriously from those objective tendencies toward bureaucratization of politics which are an integral part of contemporary capitalist society.

In a "take-all" party of conservative inspiration, the bureaucratic supergrowth certainly implies mass passivity. But a mechanism of representation based on pure mirroring of constituted interests guarantees and even imposes the political transmission of the part of society referred to. If anything, the risk is failure to express a political line that goes beyond the exterior sum of special interests. This is now the case of the DC.

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A functional relationship between politics and society, paradoxically, is much more complex and much less automatic in a party of renewal in which political support is produced by the credibility of a program. The element of subjective construction is predominant; the timeliness with which changes in the social order are interpreted is decisive. In its more general terms I would say that the PCI today is paying for the insufficiency of a "pedagogic" structure based mainly on transmission and the diffusion of the political line from the top to the rank and file. I should like to recall only three matters.

1. The enormous growth and cultural unification of the nation and the change of social personalities which have immeasurably elevated the quality of political demand. Shorn of its original aims, the pedagogical movement risks becoming a repetitive ritual, perpetually subjected to the real demands present in the body of the party.
2. A structure based on transmitting and propagandizing the line inevitably winds up contradicting the party's tasks in the government. Taken together, the aims are not specifically analyzed, are not enriched by a study of specific situations or problems and end up remaining always identical to themselves, ignoring the quantity of input available to a capillary organization such as the communist organization.
3. In the absence of a sufficiently articulated and differentiated debate on specific content, the method of choice becomes dominant in the formation of leadership groups perhaps creating too great a distortion in the phase of assigning duties.

How has the organization reacted in the most recent and delicate phase of Italian political life? Enrico Berlinguer said, in a moment of post-electoral reflection, that the nature and scope of the ongoing clash was not made sufficiently visible. To me this seems an important point of reflection which, however, contains elements that must be further explained. If we do not want to limit ourselves to noting that the effort to explain is inadequate, the discussion shifts to the relationship between the form of the party and the form (or forms) of the present crisis. Are the cracks in Italian society more complex than those that might interpret the present political structure? Further, does the accumulation of questions coming from very different social strata require, even in the identification of forms of political initiative, a process of unification that is less Jacobin, and of a longer and more difficult effort?

Claudio Petruccioli has posed an important problem for discussion: That of the relationship between the concept of party and the affirmation of the existence of a class as a historical subject in an overall change in social relations. I do not believe it is a matter of communists once more discussing what has been more recently defined as worker centrality; but rather to better understand the extremely complex way in which it is constituted, above all at a time of noneconomic crisis in development. It cannot be forgotten that both in the communist and in the social democratic tradition forms of rigidity and sclerosis in party forms are always accompanied by worker-oriented ideologies.

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After all, the problems cannot be circumscribed by the forms of political initiative, but it also influences the way analysis and plans are developed. I agree with those who believe in the utility, during the present economic period, of a clear explanation of the PCI's reformist vocation.

However, things are perhaps much more complex than they appear to Eugenio Scalfari when he again proposes, like a kind of ace in the hole, the alliance between the working class and the healthy, productive entrepreneurial business class. In the history of the past 3 years, I should like to see a single instance cited in which the PCI disregarded a specific disposition toward an antiparasitical and antiwelfare attitude by Italian businessmen. The reality is that through the timid, and immediately unsuccessful, attempts of the foremost center-left, real proposals of bourgeois reformism deserted the Italian political scene.

What has all this to do with the party problem? In my view, a great deal. If we do not wish to see the problem (which is certainly not secondary) of moderatism result in paralysis, it is also necessary that the entire left know how to find new and extremely flexible forms of relationships and democratic leadership in the social conflict, which inevitably is destined to go through moments of bitterness.

## Boato Interview

Milan L'Europeo in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 8

Interview with Marco Boato, By G. Fo: "The Compromise Lost"

Text Marco Boato, of the PCI, is a founding member of "Lotta continua," an exponent of Catholic dissent, and a radical deputy from Trentino. He is considered one of the PCI's spokesmen, so much so that they asked him to participate in the "special" on radicals published by RINASCITA. Boato says, "Since Berlinguer goes back to Togliatti to legitimize the compromise, I also would like to go back to a quote by Rosa Luxemburg which says, 'This concept considers the imperial phase not as a historical necessity, not as the decisive struggle for socialism, but as the perversity of a small group of special interests. This concept tends to warn the bourgeoisie that imperialism and militarism are distressing to it from the same point of view as its specific class interests, tends to isolate the group of special interests and to develop a proletarian bloc with broad stratas of the bourgeoisie in order to attenuate imperialism.... The general struggle for the elimination of the historical conflict between the proletariat and capital is transformed into the utopia of a "historical compromise" between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.' As we see, there is nothing new under the sun."

Question Conditions have changed.

Answer Certainly. However the basic problem remains the same. What possibilities are offered for the workers movement in a prolonged crisis of capitalism? Should the bourgeoisie be taught to "function in their own true interests" as Togliatti maintained, or should an alternative to power

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be developed? After all, a year and a half after RINASCITA's article, both communists and socialists were ejected from government. The phase of the alliance had served once more to launch accumulation and allow the DC 30 years of almost undisturbed power. Even now for 3 years the PCI has been used--knowingly--and then cast aside. All this is absent from the Berlinguer text.

Question This time, however, it was not 18 April 1948, but 3 June 1979, and the DC, with its center allies, seems incapable of forming a stable government.

Answer That is true. This ungovernability is a potentially better condition under which to build an alternative power. Berlinguer ignores this possibility completely, even if only to criticize it. He instead dismisses the entire debate on party form which has occupied the PCI Central Committee after 3 June (perhaps all the speakers wanted to "attack the parties as such?") and directs a moralistic appeal to the DC.

Question Then Berlinguer has flunked. Without appeal?

Answer There are some new things in this article, and they are the things that the commentators have been most silent about. Asor Rosa had criticized, in L'UNITA, the fact that Berlinguer's remarks in his Genoa speech a year ago fell into a void. Now it is the PCI secretary himself who returns to and amplifies questions such as the quality of life and youth's rejection of labor. In regard to the latter, Berlinguer says that "hasty charges" were made that the entire population of young men and women did not want to work (or did not want to study) mainly because they are guilty of asking themselves and wanting to discuss the "why" of work (or the "why" of study). Very well. Without saying so, Berlinguer makes a significant self-criticism because he himself was the "hasty one". Also interesting is the renewed proposal of austerity without the Amendola-style nonsense about "workers frugality" but linked to the question of energy. All the new economic-social analyses are however canceled when the question of the ranks is considered.

Question But will Berlinguer meet Craxi?

Answer This is the least that could be done on the terrain of political initiative after months of paralysis.

Monti Interview

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 9

Interview with Mario Monti by E. Au: "Austerity in A Fog"

Text "My first consideration after reading Berlinguer's article is not really economic. In fact I note that the political debate continues to search for necessary aggregations of power to push the economy toward

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certain general goals. We are still at the point of a choice between the great alternative models (or presumed to be such), while the discussion of "means" is almost always entirely absent. And instead I have been profoundly convinced that these discussion can also be fruitful for nations more advanced than our own, but that in Italy we are still very far from the great cross-roads that demands strategic choices. I mean to say that in our phase of development, we should seek necessary consensus to make the social and economic machinery function more efficiently. Without this administrative work any goal becomes unrealizable as is demonstrated by the fate of some reforms in recent years."

Prof Mario Monti is, among the young economists, one who has fought most consistently in recent years against Keynesian illusions and the harmful effects of state intervention in the economy. Monti considers the Berlinguer article interesting because it again submits the themes of accumulation and structural rehabilitation even though, as an economist, he hesitates to comment on it because of the indeterminate nature of the economic model which is behind certain statements made by the communist leader. For example, what does better quality of life mean?

Answer Today, for most people, this means having water where there is no water, functioning transportation systems, well-organized hospitals, greater security, and furthermore laws that protect the consumer and regulate the market. All these things are done in other countries with that dose of "obtuse pragmatism" that Berlinguer criticizes, but perhaps is necessary in Italy.

Question But what means should be used according to the PCI?

Answer That is precisely the point that needs further clarification. In the first place it would be necessary to understand how, according to the PCI, individual energies can be used for socially accepted aims. A model would be needed that would create a mix between individual convenience, moral tension, and control by authority. And this mix is defined both in the liberal system and the communist system of the Eastern nations, while it is lacking in Berlinguer's program. Instead there are openings regarding accumulation and control by the workers. For the first time, it seems to me, it is recognized that most private savings belong to the workers and as a consequence, the trade unions should be concerned not only with the distribution, but also the protection, of wealth.

Question The most specific part of Berlinguer's speech is the part that is wanting. In fact there is no mention of use of power by the DC except that by its inefficiency it worsens the quality of life. Why?

Answer Because in Italy the PCI, but also other parties, prefer to dramatize the ultimate aims of the economy rather than set forth a tight confrontation concerning which party has the most accurate programs needed to make the present system work better.

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Interviewer's concluding remark:

It is clear that in economic terms, Berlinguer's speech was written on water. The speech is different from the political point of view. But does the postponement of the confrontation concerning responsibilities not favor those forces which want to change nothing?

D'Arcais Article

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 9

Article by Paolo Flores d'Arcais: "In Love With a Coup-Oriented DC"

Text Austerity, historic compromise, worker centrality, these are the main points of a strategy reaffirmed by Enrico Berlinguer as the present philosophy of Italian communism. This is a platform for resuming the dialog with an improbable Moro-style DC, but it is also--and this is most interesting-- a definition of the terrain on which the PCI intends to carry out the unifying contacts with the rest of the left. And since without the unity of the left, as things are today, no reformist project can become a government activity, Berlinguer's philosophy merits the full attention of the left. Its defect is that it is contradictory. The DC, in fact, is presented both as a democratic mass party, the irreplaceable contractor in a new and more advanced social pact, as well as a party that would potentially stage a coup the day that the left, backed by a majority vote, would imagine that it could eject it from government. An ambiguous party, then but such a special kind of ambiguity that it brings to the forefront a single logical conclusion: The impossibility of removing the DC from the government of the country since that right is inseparable from maintenance of the democratic system. Therefore, one should not be surprised that Zaccagnini's supporters immediately showed their appreciation.

The proposal submitted to the left is certainly unifying, but unifying and perpetually subordinated to DC hegemony. And that is not all. What is striking in Berlinguer's article is not so much the reaffirmation of the historic compromise as a long-term strategy by virtue of which a government of national unit would be more than an economic therapy for an exceptional emergency situation. Nor is it striking that in this way, the regulation of alternating governments, that is the physiological functioning of a democratic system, may be projected into the future with no frills. What is striking is the theoretically definite and definitive, therefore philosophical character of Berlinguer's rejection of alternation.

Having to defend the rule of democratic centralism from the objections that are multiplying even in the communist area, the PCI secretary lets himself go to an authentic call to complicity: The attack on democratic centralism is presented as an attack "against the parties as such (against the so-called party form)" and it would be only the main point of the reactionary "furious attack against the mass parties in general." Berlinguer seems

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to suggest that we are all democratic centralists. This is partially true. A democracy based on a millennial monopoly of parties that are increasingly separated and which oppose civil society has ended up by "extinguishing" internal party democracy. But the accusation does not affect all the parties to the same degree and does not eliminate the fact that the PCI's democratic centralism is the most complete form of this extinction! If Berlinguer means that there is increased hostility against "partyocracy," against the reign of the apparatus, against the oligarchy of secretariats, he is right. He is wrong when he considers this criticism a "furious attack" by the reactionaries, since today the surest form of reactionaries politics is achieved precisely by the daily humiliation the "partyocracy" inflicts upon the most energetic forces of civil society.

The nation's crisis is certainly also economic, but it is above all political and moral. And, unfortunately, it is of a piece with the crisis of the left, of its parties which so far have been incapable, to considerably varying degrees, of being parties that were "less of a party" than the others; of "remaking policy" according to the indications advanced by the most lucid and realistic political reformer of our parliament, Leonardo Sciascia. Unfortunately, this is not the suggestion that Berlinguer accepts, in order to refine it and articulate it in a concrete and viable program of "struggle against the government" to be submitted to the entire left.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

IMPORTANCE OF PCI LEADERS' EUROPEAN TOUR WEIGHED

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 11 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Article by Frane Barbieri: "But the Real Objective Is Not Eurocommunism"]

[Text] Berlinguer, the reluctant visitor, has suddenly become a great traveller. He has begun a tour which, following the first two Iberian stops, will take him to Greece and finish in Scandinavia--a journey around the perimeter of the continent, so to speak, but one which has Europe's future as its central topic.

Berlinguer has acted under the banner of the "new internationalism" rather than to provide a new thrust to Eurocommunism. In certain respects this concept substitutes Eurocommunism and in others it even embraces it. The "new internationalism" has already been outlined by the PCI leader in his report to the latest congress, in the spring. At the time it seemed like an ecumenical recipient for all the leftwing forces gathered together at the communists' initiative as a motive nucleus for progress. Within Berlinguer's ecumenical framework once again we found a hazy dividing line between a new democratic concept of communism and the traditional authoritarian concept--the only one actually being implemented.

The differences between Eurocommunism and Sovietism were historically "objectivized" to the extent that they appeared once again as two variants of the same strategy, aimed at a single goal. The characteristics of this ecumenical and pancommunist outlook are still present behind Berlinguer's international mission: To show that Cunhal and Carrillo are not so different, after all, to announce that communist parties must not be split into Eurocommunists and noneurocommunists, to maintain that such a contradictory attitude toward the EEC creates no split between the communist parties and to emphasize that the verdict on the Soviet system is not a decisive distinction [discriminante], since the USSR is a most important reference point for everyone.

In short, several of the demarcation lines drawn in red by Eurocommunism are being colored over in much more subtle shades, disappearing into gray at various points. Though confirmed as a term, Eurocommunism does not

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emerge strengthened from Berlinguer's pilgrimages either as a concept or as a current organized on a continental scale. However, the blueprint for the "new internationalism" does emerge better delineated and more detailed. Especially where it links Europe's future to that of the Third World.

The PCI secretary general often seems tortuous and reticent in launching his plans for greater flexibility. The reason probably lies in his excessive--and in fact ecumenical--concern with progressing without any wrenches, standing apart without clashes and criticizing without breaking away. This time we feel we can interpret his theses as follows: Europe is experiencing a profound structural, and not merely temporary crisis. At the same time the crisis in the Third World is escalating. The common denominator in both crises is the outdated relationship between exploiters and exploited, north and south; consequently both crises can find a solution only within the framework of a new economic order, for which Europe must act as promoter together with the Third World countries. But only a Europe with united leftwing forces can achieve this. This is the point of the "new internationalism"--an internationalism which can embrace all the continent's leftwing forces (to introduce a new lifestyle and more of consumption in the West) and all the Third World progressive forces (to build the relations of mutual trust essential for reaching the new order together).

Berlinguer is undoubtedly well aware of the interdependence between the world crises, the fact that the Western crisis stems from the Third World and that the Third World's crisis stems from the West, or rather from the developed north. He is also well aware of the circumstance that in the quest for a new economic order it is not Europe, inspired by the principles of justice and altruism, which is saving the Third World, but Europe which is saving itself, since the present machinery for exchanges--raw materials at low cost and technologies at high cost--is about to explode, or has to a large extent already exploded, with much more alarming consequences for European civilization than for the civilization of the emergent countries.

While Europe is being shaken by the class struggle--to use Berlinguer's terminology--a class struggle of much broader proportions is now shaking the world as a whole, setting the underdeveloped countries against the industrialized countries. In this struggle even the European and Western working class is in many respects on the side of the "exploiters." Although it regards itself as exploited, it must be acknowledged that, on account of its lifestyle and the consumption spiral in which it is caught up, the European working class owns a considerable proportion of the wealth taken from the Third World countries. In order to restore a fair share of that wealth to its rightwing owners all developed societies and economies as a whole, whether "exploiters" or "exploited," must decide to abandon their privileged conditions. Western privileges lie not only in capital, but also in wages. It goes without saying that such a radical change cannot be carried out without the leftwing forces. It is equally likely that the leftwing forces can carry out this task better than anyone else. And of

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all the world alignments Europe seems the best suited to proceeding toward these goals with credibility and likelihood of success.

Hence the importance of the "new internationalism," conceived in the European context and projected onto the Third World. While paying homage to the intentions of Berlinguer's new concept, one cannot avoid pointing out also its unilateral and manipulative traits. Portraying the vast framework of the new view of internationalism, the Botteghe Oscure [PCI Headquarters] daily went as far as to maintain that the scale of the new concept surmounts even the issue of relations between the PCI and Moscow, which involves outdated, antiquated schemes and prejudices. It is true that the PCI's autonomy is now determined in Rome and not in Moscow. It is also true that the concept of the "new internationalism" appears to be purely Italian. Nevertheless--and, moreover, for this very reason--one is struck by the fact that the PCI regards its relations with the USSR as absorbed or rendered non-decisive on account of a broader and more global world view and the somewhat late discovery of a Third World.

It seems to us, however, that the plan for a Europe outstretched toward the emergent world implies new points of differentiation and detachment from the USSR, rather than eliminates the existing points concerning the inter-European relations. Moscow's policy vis-a-vis the Third World is based on an entirely different kind of internationalism--the old kind aimed at hegemonizing the new countries, transforming them into a kind of impoverished appendage of the Soviet Bloc and driving them toward a radical break away from the developed West, partly with the aim of forcing Europe to find in the Soviet Union the only alternative for survival, the market and raw materials which the old continent risks losing in the Third World. The Soviet strategy emerged clearly also in the discussions surrounding the nonaligned conference.

Europe can only find a solution to its crises in the emergent countries by wrenching that scope for cooperation from Soviet hegemonization. If it is the "new internationalism" that is to resolve the crisis in relations between our continent and the underdeveloped world, then it will inevitably be set against the old-style internationalism still manipulated by Moscow. The result of an attempt to make the two forms of internationalism converge and to maintain that the new form is absorbing or superseding the old one would be to expose both Europe and the Third World to Soviet penetration at the same time.

Europe can count on an advantage in the decolonized countries, insofar as it does not present itself as a superpower. To acquire credibility it must in fact present itself in contrast to the superpowers--against both, and not just one, of them. Because both the United States and the USSR offer their own forms of hegemony to the Third World.

The second objective of Berlinguer's visit, namely leftwing unity, would not have much chance of success in the ecumenical embrace with the USSR.

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Precisely because of its aims to eliminate the present demarcation line between the two Europes, between capitalism and socialism, it is more necessary than ever to establish a clear demarcation line between the two ways of looking at and implementing socialism.

The appearance of the new problem by no means implies that the old one no longer exists. Indeed, it seems more unresolved than ever. Following Brezhnev's latest challenge--a somewhat explosive mixture of promises and threats--the European leftwing forces' responsibilities are greater than ever: A Europe defenseless in the political, social, ideological and now even military fields would be unable to aim at the goals announced by Berlinguer. The failure to mention this circumstance makes one being to suspect that Berlinguer's European visit in fact began in Moscow this summer, with his unexpected meeting with Brezhnev.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PCI'S PAJETTA ON TIES WITH PCP, PCE, CPSU, PRC

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 3 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Luca Giurato 2 October interview in Rome with PCI directorate member Gian Carlo Pajetta: "Berlinguer Seeks 'New and More Specific Content for Eurocommunism'"]

[Text] Rome--Berlinguer left yesterday on a visit in search of "Eurocommunism." In Lisbon he will meet with Cunhal. Then he will go to Madrid, where Carrillo is expecting him. He will spend 5 days in Portugal and only 2 in Madrid. We asked PCI International Affairs Department Chief Gian Carlo Pajetta the reason for this difference. Is it more difficult to convert Cunhal to "Eurocommunism" than to try to reconcile Carrillo with Moscow? "It takes longer to see Lisbon than it does to see Madrid!" was Pajetta's reply. "Last summer in Hungary, where I spent my vacation, I saw a great deal of Cunhal. On questions of principle his standpoints do not conflict with our own."

[Question] You have the same policy line. Do you think the same things?

[Answer] I wanted to emphasize that the Portuguese communists, like the Italian communists, have always believed, at moments of polemics and of the greatest differences with the socialists, that leftwing voted as a whole are a positive element for resolving the problems of all democrats. The Portuguese communists do not fight the socialists when their positions differ, when they are polemicizing. However, one could speak in terms of an anti-communism which sometimes manifests itself within the socialist parties.

[Question] At least until recently the PCI has often criticized the line of the Portuguese communists as being too pro-Soviet and has almost always shared the line of the PCE, the spearhead of "Eurocommunism." Has the situation changed now?

[Answer] When the Portuguese Communist Party called for the dissolution of a party calling itself Christian Democratic and when it supported the seizure of the paper A REPUBLICS by its printing workers, we confirmed our opinion on the freedoms of organization and expression; we expressed our disagreement and our doubts. There have been differences and polemics. Now things are going better, though one could not speak of identical positions. For that matter, we are not seeking identical position with anyone.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

ALBANIA'S POSITION AS LAST BASTION OF STALINISM VIEWED

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 17 Oct 79 p 1 LD

[Article by Frane Barbieri: "Albania's 'New Road'"]

[Text] From time to time a report reminds one of the existence of Albania, camouflaged in its self-isolation and "nonaligned" to such an extent that it does not even want to associate itself with the nonaligned countries. This time Albania is emerging from oblivion thanks to a report announcing Yugoslav Foreign Trade Minister Rotar's arrival in Tirana. He is the first top Belgrade official to cross the neighboring country's borders for 31 years, even since the split.

With his visit Tito's representative is not opening the first door but rather setting the seal on overtures which have already taken place. Though still modest, exchange has increased almost five-fold in as many years. The cultural currents between the Albanian region of Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and Albania (there are 2 million Albanians on either side) have reached such a level that lecturers from Pristina University are teaching in Tirana and vice versa.

In the economic field Albania is trying to secure supplies of industrial goods, which have been scarce since China cut off supplies. It is paying in oil, preserves and iron and steel products. The impression was that the barely opened borders might be closed again when Beijing transferred its friendship from Tirana to Belgrade.

After some limited polemics in the Albanian papers, however, everything moved toward a measured but progressive normalization. Moscow, with its sights on the Mediterranean, yearns for the use of Albania's, as well as Yugoslavia's, ports. Both countries would facilitate its plans if they clashed.

The autonomy of what are undoubtedly the most independent Balkan countries is based, paradoxically, on the first instance of explicit anti-Stalinism, in Yugoslavia's case, and, in Albania's case, is motivated by the only surviving instance of Stalinism; their relations are regulated by the

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threadbare formula of "good-neighborly relations and cooperation despite differences of system and ideology."

The formula was repeated even during Tito's visit to Kosovo, which began a few days ago. Yugoslavia places the emphasis almost exclusively on the first part, the positive part. The Albanians, however, find it more difficult to forget ideology. Especially since their split with China. They distribute their charges of subversionism and betrayal fairly equally among Beijing, Moscow, Belgrade and the Eurocommunists.

But it is the post-Maoists who are Hoxha's obsession. Resentment toward the Chinese leaders has even led Tirana to repudiate the three worlds theory, which basically provides autonomous scope for whoever is unwilling to submit to the two blocs, and to fall back on the basically pro-Soviet theory of the two opposed worlds--socialist and capitalist.

The formulas would be of no importance were it not for the fact that they caused damaging practical consequences. In Albania's case here is an example of these: At the United Nations the Albanian representative voted with the USSR on the Kampuchean case. He justified himself by saying that he was voting for Vietnam, alongside Cuba. His anti-Chinese obsession made him forget that he was thus also justifying military intervention in the name of revolution--the only disaster, in fact, which could befall the last remaining proud bastion in Europe and the world to retain pictures of Stalin and Mao in its emblems.

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