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29 October 1979

South and East Asia Report

(FOUO 6/79)



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SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT

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INDIA

SOLAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT PROCEEDS RAPIDLY

Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 24 Sep 79 p 7

[Text]

INDIA, too, is keen on developing solar energy. Of this we were made aware at the National Physical Laboratory, New Delhi, which has devised a polycrystalline silicon solar cell.

"It replaces a single-crystal silicon solar cell which still is too expensive to be serviceable," explained the laboratory's Dr. Jain.

In an outdoor experimenting station we were shown eight solar-cell panels, each about 20 centimeters by 50 centimeters, supported by an iron frame stood slantingly. Small, disk-shaped solar cells were laid all over each panel like so many checkers on a checkerboard. A declining afternoon sun shone full on them.

A cord stretched from the panels into an experimenting house close by. Dr. Jain switched on the cord. A small electric fan on an experimenting table began generating a soothing breeze.

The solar cells in service in Japan are mostly single-crystal silicon cells which Dr. Jain finds expensive. A single crystal is made up of silicon atom lattices neatly arranged. It takes a great deal of time and money to produce single crystals on a commercial basis.

"Our polycrystalline silicon has been developed out of a byproduct of iron-steel mills

by an Indian technology," Dr. Jain explained. "I estimate that its cost can be reduced to one-tenth of the cost of single-crystal silicon."

Polycrystalline silicon, being an assembly of tiny single crystals, is considered slightly inferior in electricity-generation efficiency. This efficiency is determined by the output, in milliwatts, obtainable by means of a cell one square centimeter in area from 100 milliwatts of solar ray projected per square centimeter.

The polycrystalline silicon cells made at the New Delhi laboratory are each 1.6 centimeters in diameter and 17 milliwatts in output. That means an efficiency rate of about 8.5 percent, compared with the 10-14 percent for the single-crystal silicon cells in service in Japan. But the difference in cost makes an eminently redeeming feature for the New Delhi product.

Woman does the work

In the laboratory's inspection room, a sari-clad woman was hard at work, placing one cell after another, on a measuring instrument and recording their characteristics with a pen recorder.

The National Chemical Laboratory in Poona, near Bombay, has gone a step further and started experimenting with amorphous silicon. Even

more uneven in makeup than polycrystalline silicon, amorphous silicon, like grass, contains atoms and molecules unevenly distributed.

Japanese universities and industrial companies started research into amorphous silicon cells a year or two ago.

Cells made of amorphous silicon are poor in efficiency, so the Poona laboratory uses an alloy of silicon and ordinary hydrogen. It has devised an apparatus to produce silane (SiH₄), the gas for making the alloy. "Our goal is an efficiency rate of 10 percent for our cells," says the laboratory's Dr. S. T. Kshirsagar. If all goes well, there is hope of making the cells at lower cost than polycrystalline silicon cells.

Amorphous silicon cells are expected to go into commercial production in Japan in the near future, but their efficiency rate is as low as 2 percent or so.

In Japan, solar cells are used mainly in lighthouses and at radio relay stations. In India, there should be a big future demand for them as power sources for homes in remote areas. For one thing, they require no transmission wires which cost much money to set up. But above all, India is rich in sunshine.

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KAMPUCHEA

SIHANOUK WRITES ON KAMPUCHEAN SITUATION

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 1 Sep 79 pp 146-151, 154-155, 158

[Article by Norodom Sihanouk: "Cambodia: War and Suicide"]

[Text] A prisoner in his palace, Prince Norodom Sihanouk was present during that abomination known as the Cambodian genocide. He followed the ups-and-downs of the war between communists when Giap's tanks swarmed over his country. He saw child soldiers trained to commit acts of cruelty. He heard the comments of their leaders. He now gives us his eye-witness report of those events. His book, "Chroniques de guerre et d'espoir" [Chronicle of War and Hope], published by Stock-Hachette, will appear in bookstores next week. Suddenly, the incomprehensible becomes clear. Norodom Sihanouk reveals his conversations with Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong, and the ulterior motives of the Khmer Rouge. But above all, he offers a comprehensive explanation revealing that this conflict between Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge had, in fact, been raging for 8 years. Even at the height of the war with the Americans, between 1970 and 1975, the alleged brothers of the former Indochina were settling old scores and killing one another. Norodom Sihanouk names--occasionally with anger--those persons responsible. In an exclusive interview given L'EXPRESS by telex from Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, where he has taken refuge, the former Cambodian chief of state explains why he no longer agrees with the present Peking leadership. [Translation of this interview follows Sihanouk's article].

In late December 1977, the armed forces of socialist Vietnam launched their "Blitzkrieg No 1" against "democratic" Kampuchea.* The Vietnamese soldiers and their armored vehicles attacked Pol Pot's troops on several fronts along practically the entire length of the common Vietnamese-Kampuchean

* Kampuchea: Cambodia. Kampuchean: Cambodian.

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border from the high plateaus to the Gulf of Thailand. The invaders advanced to within some 50 kilometers of Phnom Penh.

This blitzkrieg was merely "fireworks." General Giap's armored and infantry units began withdrawing from Kampuchea on 6 January 1978, taking with them 150,000 Khmer "members" of Pol Pot's "cooperatives."* According to Radio Hanoi, these Kampuchean had "freed themselves" by their own means and succeeded in fleeing to Vietnam. Radio Phnom Penh retorted that the retreating invasion forces have forcibly taken the (150,000) refugees with them. The truth is that the Vietnamese used these 150,000 refugees to provide more or less voluntary supporters for the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea (FUNSK, an organization created by Hanoi in December 1978) and also to give a certain credibility to the "Kampuchean people's movement" directed against Pol Pot and the People's Republic of China!

Pol Pot's supporters made some serious mistakes after 6 January 1978. The withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops made them insanely arrogant. The 6th of January became a "historic date" on the "national calendar." Khmer Rouge leaders declared that the "victory of 6 January 1978" surpassed in importance even the victory of 17 April 1975," their entry into Phnom Penh.

Khmer Rouge propaganda never stopped harping on the same slogan to the effect that "democratic" Kampuchea was 10 times, 100 times, 1,000 times more powerful than Socialist Vietnam, and that it had "the world's most responsible, most respectable, most far-sighted, and most extraordinary" leaders. As a result, the armed forces, cadres and members of the Khmer Rouge party, all ultimately no longer believed in the possibility of any victorious revenge by the Vietnamese.

Pol Pot became intoxicated a little too quickly with "his" victory and to such a point that he was comparing himself to the greatest conquerors of the past, such as Alexander of Macedonia, Caesar the Roman, Napoleon the Corsican, Hitler the Nazi, etc. Pol Pot is a "visionary." According to Khieu Samphan (the chief of state), who acted somewhat as Pol Pot's spokesman to "the retired Sihanouk," it appeared that the "Vietnamese Danger," with a capital D, was like a cancer endangering the Kampuchean body's existence in the same way that cancer could eat away at a man's body. Son Sen, Pol Pot's defense minister, had previously told me, in September 1975, that to save Kampuchea and the Kampuchean race from total and irreversible extinction, this Vietnamese disease, this cancer, had to be removed from "Kampuchea's body" once and for all by a "threefold surgical operation."

On several occasions in the course of our (rare) conversations during the period 1976-1978, Khieu Samphan insisted on explaining the details of this "threefold surgical operation":

* Pol Pot's "cooperatives" are concentration camps, as Norodom Sihanouk explains later in his article.

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First, categorically deny to all Vietnamese, no matter who they may be, the right to live in Kampuchea. The measures taken for this purpose by the Khmer Rouge included the physical liquidation of a large number of Vietnamese residents "suspected of being Viet Minh or Viet Cong agents or spies," and also the expulsion "manu militari" of all other Vietnamese residents. This latter action had already been taken by the second half of 1973.

Second, give all Kampuchean men and women the order to work 2 times, 10 times harder than the Vietnamese people, and this, Khieu Samphan explained to me, was for the purpose of making Kampuchea much stronger than Vietnam in all respects, militarily, economically and ideologically. According to the Khmer Rouge leaders, this forced labor imposed on their own people would transform Kampuchea into an "Impregnable fortress."

Third, "accept" a large-scale armed confrontation with Vietnam so as to block Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism which, without the "barrier" erected by Democratic Kampuchea, would inevitably quickly spread over the rest of Southeast Asia.

In a late 1978 press conference, Pol Pot mentioned, in utter seriousness, the "probability" that Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Bulgarian and East German troops would be sent to the rescue of the Vietnamese, Soviets and Cubans "in full route in Kampuchea." In all seriousness, Pol Pot asserted that the Vietnamese were too weak to dare pit themselves "alone" against Kampuchea's revolutionary army. He added that this was why the Soviets had had to commit to the anti-Kampuchean war a good number of Russian and Cuban pilots, tankers, artillerymen, and staff officers.

Pol Pot, still "very serious," explained that despite this formidable Russian-Cuban reinforcement, the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam would be totally defeated by his Khmer Rouge troops. He then imperturbably predicted that the USSR would soon be obliged to help the collapsing Vietnamese by dispatching troops from East European countries, "members of the Warsaw Pact." Speaking in the grandiloquent tone of a "great expert" in guerrilla warfare, Pol Pot gave his journalistic "friends" a magisterial lecture to which, I imagine they must have listened open-mouthed: "We Khmer Rouge have provided for everything. We have taken all adequate measures to "welcome" these Bulgarians, Czechoslovaks, East Germans, etc. Like the Yankees in 1970. These Warsaw Pact Europeans will be quickly decimated by our guerrilla forces, and also by our country's extremely hot climate, by the terrible drawbacks (for them) of our rainy season, etc."

In a decidedly imaginative mood, Pol Pot laughingly added: "Accustomed to a daily fare of bread and European dishes, to drinking wine or beer, these Europeans from the Warsaw Pact will very rapidly become hors de combat as soon as they find themselves unable to become inured to the waters from our stagnant pools and our ponds, and once they have exhausted their canned food!"

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Admittedly, in a war, one must not overestimate the enemy. But it is also extremely dangerous to underestimate that enemy and scorn it. What is more, Pol Pot, Ieng Sary,* Khieu Samphan and Son Sen took inordinate delight in imagining all sorts of utterly freakish occurrences for the subsequent phases of the Kampuchean-Vietnamese war, for example, direct intervention by combat troops dispatched from Moscow, Havana, and even Prague, Sofia, Budapest and East Berlin, all of whom would fall like so many flies sprayed with insecticide.

This folly eventually spread among the young Khmer Rouge. My jailers took pleasure in telling my entourage about their "recent exploits at the front." These men were most probably excellent and even heroic soldiers. But once they were far removed from the front, they ended up thinking they had become legendary heroes, whereas they were really more like Tartarins de Tarascon [Tartarin is the novelist Alphonse Daudet's comic, boastful hero who is so carried away by his own tall stories that he believes them]. They claimed, with unfeigned conviction, that they had each killed, in each "clash," dozens of Vietnamese and even destroyed, with their "unsophisticated" weapons, tanks, aircraft, etc.

This then is how the Khmer Rouge became caught in the trap of their own monstrous propaganda machine.

This ostrichlike policy prevented the Khmer Rouge from facing up to certain disagreeable facts. Here, as an example, is only one of the hundred such facts: the insidious and persistent infiltration of Vietnamese units into a certain number of border areas, particularly into the so-called "203" area.

As a matter of fact, after their alleged "total withdrawal" on 6 January 1978, the Vietnamese succeeded in establishing and consolidating impregnable military bases in certain sectors of strategic importance, such as the "Parrot's Beak" and the rubber plantations of Kompong.

Radio Peking endeavored to draw the attention of Kampuchians "indirectly" to this slow, discreet but nevertheless real, successful infiltration by the Vietnamese. By listening to Radio Peking, it was possible to obtain a very clear, daily picture of the territorial "gains" made by the Vietnamese. Yet Pol Pot's supporters imperturbably continued to proclaim over their radio that they were not losing even 1 inch of ground. Radio Phnom Penh daily announced new impeccable victories over the Vietnamese who were labeled "funky and cowardly to the nth degree."

Towards the end of their reign, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary mistrusted everyone. They ended up displeasing a good part of their own armed forces by making a distinction between the "die-hards" of the southwestern region and the "less reliable" military personnel in other regions. There were six

* Deputy prime minister for foreign affairs, and the No 2 man in the Khmer Rouge regime.

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"superdivisions" protecting the Pol Pots and the Ieng Sarys in Phnom Penh and around the capital. The "ordinary" divisions were called upon to march "normally" to their death at the front. They were not as well-fed or as well-equipped with modern weapons as the "superdivisions" of the "praetorian guard" and had less firepower than the latter.

Pol Pot's favorites were the Yothea, peasants from the Mount Aural region in Kompong Speu Province. Unlike most of the peasants in the rest of Cambodia, they had spontaneously and totally devoted themselves to the Khmer Rouge revolution. They accepted all possible sacrifices to ensure the triumph of Pol Pot's cause. As a result, they received the supreme honor of manning a "safety belt" around Phnom Penh, of providing security for the capital itself, and of conducting various punitive operations against "undisciplined elements" of the revolutionary army, particularly those in Area 203 bordering on South Vietnam, (and to which the following had "belonged": Heng Samrin, Chea Sim and Ros Samay, currently "in the government" in Phnom Penh).

The result of such a "class policy" proved disastrous to Pol Pot's attempt to retain power in Phnom Penh. The "ordinary" divisions were sacrificed in advance. In December 1978, General Giap's "Wermacht" cut them down in the eastern and northeastern provinces and in the famous Parrot's Beak.

When Giap's armored columns appeared before the gates of Phnom Penh in early January 1979, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary decided to leave them the capital in order to save the six superdivision of their praetorian guard. They held them in reserve for future counteroffensives to be launched from guerrilla strongholds in the Elephant and Cardamom mountain ranges.

By 1978, according to Radio Hanoi, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary had already "liquidated" 3 million Kampuchians. Hanoi was doubtlessly exaggerating. Yet even if Pol Pot and Ieng Sary killed only 1.5 million Cambodians between 1975 and 1978, the constantly shrinking population of Kampuchea was enough to portend a bitter defeat for Pol Pot when Hanoi launched another blitzkrieg, especially since the surviving 5 million Khmer were already exhausted after 3 years of forced labor, privations of every kind, and adversities unparalleled in the entire history of mankind!

Another aspect of this very dark picture was the agonizing flight of those desperate persons wishing to escape the hell created by Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. These "slaves" of the regime--former university and secondary school students, compulsorily unfrocked Buddhist monks, doctors, officials of the previous regime, former Lon Nol soldiers, bourgeois, ex-capitalists having "miraculously" survived the genocide of "class enemies," peasants unwilling to accept communism, etc.--took considerable risks in braving minefields and other deadly booby traps in an effort to find freedom beyond their national borders.

Those Khmers crowded into refugee camps in Thailand report that scarcely one-tenth of the fugitives succeeded in safely crossing the border.

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Why were the Khmer Rouge so cruel?

There are two basic reasons:

1. Their recruiting methods: the only persons "recruited" were "poor peasants," Montagnards, persons living in forested areas and the most remote villages, in short, those who had been most neglected by the previous regime. For what purpose? A clever propaganda campaign imbued their hearts and minds with an increasingly burning hatred, an inextinguishable hatred, of the "upper classes," namely those persons wealthy enough to be well-housed, well-clothed and well-fed, those who could send their children to school without needing to keep them at home to work in the fields or care for the oxen or buffaloes, those who had servants and owned a great deal of personal and real property, those who had no trouble paying their taxes or who collected taxes, those who administered, who governed. In a word, all those who "oppressed."

2. The use of children: as soon as these children were enlisted in the revolutionary armed forces, they were separated from their family, removed far from their native village, and regrouped within the indoctrination mold of Pol Pot supporters. Recruits began their military career at 12 years of age. Taken in hand at a very early age by their leaders, they became quickly convinced that the party had bestowed the greatest possible honor on them by designating them "the party's dictatorial instrument."

Being "the party's dictatorial instrument" meant having the possibility to command the "herds of workers," those men and women who were not members of the party, those men and women--including intellectuals and former university students--who had been driven from the cities and rich villages at the end of the war (April 1975), those men and women who had been members of FUNK*--including former ambassador of the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea--and whom the party had not yet decided to "liquidate."

Being "the party's dictatorial instrument" meant having the right to life and death over all herds of slaves "of every category." It meant having the right to freely consume whatever could be found in cooperatives or in the fields (fruits, meat, etc.), whereas the ordinary "civilians" received only a daily ration strictly measured out by the local "chairman."

The Khmer Rouge child soldiers had no reason to detest Pol Pot's inhuman regime. They had never known or could not clearly recall the "gentle life" of the Sihanouk era. And they sincerely believed what they were being told about the "former society," a "detestable, contemptible, corrupt, unjust and utterly oppressive" society.

* FUNK: National United Front of Kampuchea, established by Norodom Sihanouk on 23 March 1970.

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Back in the 1960's, Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan had decided to eliminate, with no qualms, all obstacles they might face in their determined march toward total domination of Kampuchea. One of the first training methods designed to harden their soldiers was the "game of cruelty" in which young recruits began to "harden their heart and mind" by using a stick or bayonet to kill dogs, cats and other "edible" animals.

Even after their victory of 17 April 1975, when the Khmer Rouge no longer had any human beings to torture or kill, these young soldiers kept themselves in "shape" by throwing animals into a roaring fire.

In the Royal Palace where I was kept under house arrest, I saw, in 1976, the political "commissar" in charge of the "princely prisoners," and his staff derived great pleasure from catching mice, locking them in a cage, and then setting fire to the cage. The commissar and his men enjoyed themselves immensely at the sight of the mice scurrying about, desperately and vainly trying to find a way out. They then gleefully watched the death-throes of these animals burned alive. This was a daily show. And it was simply out of the question for my family to lecture its jailers, because they would have been at a loss to understand "energetic Buddhism."

Another "game" consisted in torturing monkeys whose "suffering resembled that of humans." The torturers would cut off the monkey's tail with an axe. They also enchained them. The chain, wound around the monkey's neck, would choke him little by little as he was forced to run behind his torturer who kept pulling harder and harder on the chain. The poor monkeys would shriek with pain. The spectacle and screams were unbearable. But the young Khmer Rouge were overjoyed at these sights and sounds.

One day, a skinny female dog ran into the palace grounds. She was pregnant. A soldier took a stick and bludgeoned her to death. A few hours later, we were "treated" to roast dog and roast fetus of puppies.

Not far from the Royal Palace, a company of soldiers had a rather "special" method of raising crocodiles. They fed them live monkeys. Every day, monkeys were thrown into the crocodile pit and the soldiers reveled in the actions of the unfortunate simians who yelped with terror and tried in vain to get out of the pit. And then, subdued and hypnotized by the stony stare of the monstrous reptiles, the monkeys were inevitably snapped up and devoured.

Pol Pot had believed, and rightly so, that by hardening his soldiers early in the "game of cruelty," they would ultimately become infatuated with butchery, and consequently with war. During the 3 years of my detention among the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh, I often heard the soldiers guarding my "camp" bemoan the fact that they had not been sent back "to the front" and could not "kill themselves some Vietnamese." It is certain that the best gift Pol Pot and Ieng Sary could give their soldiers was to just simply send them into the front lines to clash with the enemy. Khmer Rouge soldiers, men and women, felt no fear of being killed or wounded, and they continue to ignore such fear completely. In this connection, we must give

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credit to the Khmer Rouge soldiers: while they do "adore" killing and making their victims suffer as much as possible, these Pol Pot supporters, or "Polpotians" as they are called, rise above their own physical suffering and maintain a perfectly stoical attitude in the worse personal situations. What are the factors that contributed to the Vietnamese victory in Kampuchea on 7 January 1979?

The Vietnamese are an extremely intelligent, tenacious, and heroic people. Their government and party are closely knit and united. In the opinion of the best experts, Vietnam has one of the world's finest armies. In addition, the Vietnamese never forget the humiliation inflicted upon them. These are the facts that a person should know if he wants to understand the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

In his youth, Ieng Sary lived for a long time in Vietnam. He should have known, therefore, that provoking the Vietnamese was playing with fire! When you choose a "mortal enemy," it is essential first to know that enemy well from every aspect, "from every angle." Admittedly the Khmer Rouge were right in telling me that it was absolutely necessary to beware of over-estimating the enemy, that it was essential to free Kampuchians of any inferiority complex with respect to the Vietnamese. But what ruined these "revolutionary" Kampuchians was their truly extraordinary superiority complex with respect to the Vietnamese, to Vietnam in its entirety, to the United (of course!), even to their dearest allies, in short, to the whole world!

In such matters as arrogance, bluster and contempt for one's allies, Hitler is largely surpassed by his Khmer Rouge "disciples."

I shall analyze this lexicon of arrogance.

In 1976-1978, Khieu Samphan complacently told me that the Koreans of Kim Il-song's regime (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) were "on the wrong course" in communization and defense matters, because in wanting to inordinately raise their people's standard of living and develop their economy, the North Koreans ended up having luxurious houses and automobiles and much too beautiful country homes. "Those people," he added, "are letting themselves become captivated by the comforts of their new, allegedly communist, way of life." And they no longer dare provoke or even face up to a new war to liberate South Korea and achieve national reunification."

In September 1975, Premier Chou En-lai, already very ill at the time, received us in his Peking hospital room. During that meeting he advised, in my presence, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Thirith (Mrs Ieng Sary) not to attempt to attain integral communism in one single giant "leap." The wise and far-sighted veteran of the Chinese Revolution underscored the necessity of "proceeding by stages," of advancing cautiously towards socialism. Once the stage of socialism has been reached after several years of patient effort, it will then be time, at that particular movement, to advance towards

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communism. Premier Chou En-lai recalled how China itself had suffered bitter and disastrous setbacks not so long ago by wanting to make "great leaps forward." He recommended: "Proceed instead by small stages. That is the surest way to lead Kampuchea and its people to development, prosperity and happiness." In reply, the "juniors," Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary, merely smiled with an air of skepticism and "superiority."

During that same period, having returned to Phnom Penh, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen told me--no doubt as an indirect reply to Chou En-lai--that their Kampuchea was going to give the whole world proof that integral communism can be achieved in one fell swoop.

"Thus," they added, "our country will have its name inscribed in letters of gold in world history, having been the first country to communize successfully without going through useless stages."

It is understandable, therefore, that such folly was able to render the Khmer Rouge totally blind to the tremendous Vietnamese "potentialities."

The Vietnamese, for their part, realized full well that they would be able to bring the arrogant Pol Pot-Ieng Sary government to recognize its errors only by waging war against it, a major war organized according to all the rules of the "martial" art.

If the truth must be told, the alleged Vietnamese "defeat" in late December 1977 at the hands of the Khmer Rouge army was never any such thing.

As part of their Blitzkrieg No 1, the Vietnamese literally swept away all Khmer Rouge divisions opposing their advance to Neak Luong, a strategic position from which the capture of Phnom Penh would have been mere child's play. In 1977, crossing the Mekong opposite Neak Luong would have been no problem whatsoever for the Vietnamese who had amphibious vehicles and ferries.

Pol Pot's artillery was still "in its infancy" and had no capability of opposing such a river crossing. As for the Khmer Rouge air force, it was insignificant, indeed even nonexistent. But the Vietnamese had no intention of attacking Phnom Penh at that time. They wished to avoid any inopportune and dangerous international condemnation.

The mistake made by Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, when confronted with the Vietnamese Blitzkrieg No 2 (1978-1979), was to organize the permanent departure from Phnom Penh of foreign embassies at the approach of Vo Nguyen Giap's "Wehrmacht." By 6 January 1979, all diplomats friendly to the Khmer Rouge had left the capital. On 7 January, the Viets entered it en masse. Nobody could testify to their presence in Phnom Penh or in the rest of the country, except, of course, the Russians and their satellites who--as we can readily guess--deliberately "saw nothing."

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The Vietnamese strategy was obvious: they organized the total conquest of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary's Kampuchea into two distinct stages. Blitzkrieg No 1 was the first stage of the process. It destroyed a large part of the enemy's vital elements and ruined a large part of its national economy: looted the recently harvested rice and other grains, and the rubber from rubber plantations. It also destroyed these plantations and all factories and industrial enterprises. Another very important action taken was the elimination of "excessively Polpotian" cadres, while the "recoverable" Khmer Rouge and the "slaves" were taken into Vietnamese territory, overjoyed at extricating themselves so easily and being able to escape the living hell of Kampuchea. In this way, the Vietnamese were able, in January 1978, to bring into Vietnam tens of thousands of Kampuchean civilians, men and women. Once "settled" in Vietnam, the Buddhist monks unfrocked by Pol Pot were able to don, once again, the saffron-colored robes of Buddha's disciples, and also become ardent advocates of the rebellion against Pol Pot and Ieng Sary.

Hence, thanks to the Vietnamese Blitzkrieg No 1, the future "government" of Heng Samrin was able to have, as of January 1978, a large number of persons under its jurisdiction--at least 150,000--including cadres (Khmer Rouge voluntarily changed into Khmer Viet Minh), professors, teachers, doctors, technicians, even journalists (Pol Pot's slaves now emancipated), all of them rallied to the cause of the "Indochinese Federation" under the aegis of the "heirs of Uncle Ho."

The last factor having contributed to the Vietnamese victory in January 1979 is called the USSR. The Soviets had an old score to settle with the Khmer Rouge. Son Sen, the deputy prime minister for national defense, described for me, in September 1975, "the Russian-Kampuchean incident" of 17 April 1975: Upon entering "liberated" Phnom Penh on that day, a Khmer Rouge detachment expelled "manu militari" the Soviet diplomats from their embassy building and authoritatively lowered the USSR colors flying above the embassy.

The initial reaction of the Soviets was to refuse to come out of the building. The Polpotian soldiers first took an intimidatory measure: they riddled the embassy walls with bullets. They then stormed the building. The Russian diplomats were forced to follow their "captors," but not without having been subjected to yet another humiliation: their wrists were tied with a very abrasive, farmer's-type rope. This rope was not removed until the Soviets were brought into the French embassy compound which had been transformed, despite French protestations, into a (temporary) concentration camp "reserved for foreigners" pending their expulsion from the "new Kampuchea." Leonid Brezhnev's representatives never forgave the Khmer Rouge for this insult.

But this insult was not the only thing that persuaded the Russians to give the Vietnamese decisive assistance. From 1975 to 1977, the entire Soviet bloc exerted an unprecedented effort to get in the good graces of the Khmer Rouge. It was hoped, contrary to all common sense, that Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, all "150 percent" pro-Chinese, would eventually

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relent under the influence of the East's "good will" and "outburst of ardent overtures," all of which were totally suspect, however. Cuba, the spearhead of "social-imperialist" penetration into the Third World, had made a point of officially supporting the Khmer Rouge anti-American resistance from 1970 to 1975. It did not succeed, however, in convincing the new Kampuchean republic to declare itself "a neutral and nonaligned country" equally distant from the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

War-weary and humiliated, the USSR, in an effort to avoid losing face and correct its bad image resulting from its support of the Lon Nol regime from 1970 to 1975, decided to regain Kampuchea's "friendship" by force and with Vietnam as intermediary. This decision by the Russians was also consistent with their hegemonic aims in the Third World.

For China, it was fundamental and even vital that Kampuchea not align itself with Vietnam and the USSR who were already controlling Laos. Because the Polpotians had stubbornly, and with highly humiliating disdain, repulsed the Soviet bloc's advances and toadyism, and aligned themselves 150 percent with China, they had to be punished. Such was the purpose of the Blitzkrieg.

In February-March 1979, the Chinese Army's steamroller crushed the too arrogant Vietnamese in Vietnam's northern provinces. This Chinese operation literally enabled the Khmer Rouge regime to survive.

Today, that regime does indeed subsist in certain parts of Kampuchea. Its guerrillas are much more at home in the jungle than in the cities. They are beginning to perk up and are making the future of the "government" of Hanoi's "Quisling," Heng Samrin, more uncertain than ever.

Sometime in 1978, Khieu Samphan, my successor as Kampuchean chief of state, told me that even at the height of the anti-American war (1970-1975), Kampuchea's Communist Party and revolutionary army never ceased considering North Vietnam and its army as enemy No 1, with American imperialism ranking only second. Khieu Samphan explained that "the Americans could conquer our country only superficially, whereas the men from Hanoi would swallow it, would send in tens of millions of Vietnamese to colonize it in depth, thereby reducing our 8 million Kampucheans to the status of an ethnic minority. That would mean the end of our race and our national sovereignty!"

This was no doubt one of the reasons Lon Nol's very weak "Khmer Republic" was so slow in "falling like ripe fruit." The American press itself--the same one which, in 1971-1972, had predicted, without excessive pessimism, that the Lon Nol regime would fall in 1973 at the latest--expressed astonishment in 1974 at that regime's "inexplicable" longevity! The reason for this "astonishing longevity" was simple: the Khmer Rouge did not worry much about American imperialism, instead their primary concern was to settle their score with their Viet Minh-Viet Cong "comrades" and "companions in arms," not to mention the difficult liquidation of the Khmer Viet Minh and the Sihanoukists! There is no doubt about it, the war that stretched from March 1970 to April 1975 was certainly not commonplace. Indeed it was "extraordinary."

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One day in March 1973 when I was in the liberated area, I asked Son Sen-- then the chief of staff of the Khmer Rouge forces--how combat operations were coordinated between his troops and Vietnamese troops. Son Sen very calmly answered that "the Vietnamese had to fend for themselves." Fighting separately, without any coordination, without any cooperation, without any mutual assistance, and completely ignoring one another, even though the American enemy was all-powerful: such conduct was beyond anyone's imagination, even the imagination of a Kafka!

I am convinced that, in spite of everything, there were certain "relations" between the "hostile brothers," and I shall mention the following, among others:

1. Use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail for the transportation of supplies and other aid from the People's Republic of China to the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge told me that the Vietnamese were shamelessly helping themselves to these supplies. But I believe that at least part of the shipments from China must have reached the Kampucheans.

2. The artillery support--especially from heavy artillery--obviously furnished by the Vietnamese in important Khmer Rouge operations.

3. The repeated round trips to China made via the Ho Chi Minh Trail by such key figures of the regime as Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and company. These gentlemen made more and more frequent trips, at Vietnamese expense.

The Khmer Rouge denounced the "criminal egoism" of the Vietnamese because, in 1973, the latter had finally signed an agreement which provisionally ended the war between the Viets and the Americans. This cessation of the fighting ensured the "availability" of all U.S. air and naval air forces in the Far East, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. These forces were then massively employed against the Khmer Rouge.

During my entire stay in the liberated area of Kampuchea, in March 1973, I witnessed varied and ruthless round-the-clock bombings and strafings of our cities, small market towns, villages, lines of communication, archeological treasures, croplands, rice fields, rubber plantations, and even virgin forests, in fact anything likely to serve the Khmer Rouge as cover. These extremely murderous American operations were conducted without respite, even on Sundays. With my wife Monique, I had the special honor of experiencing bombings and strafings alongside Khmer Rouge leaders (including Pol Pot).

Upon my return to Kampuchea after the April 1975 victory, I was allowed to see and talk to Khieu Samphan, Son Sen and associates. They made me very conscious of the resentment and even the hatred they harbored toward the leaders in Hanoi as a result of the "Vietnamese betrayal" of 1973. After a while, they admitted to me that by leaving them in the lurch, the Viets had allowed them to take draconian measures designed to put an end to the presence of the North Vietnamese Viet Cong.

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The Viets had previously been able to live like "fish in the Kampuchean water." They were allowed to take certain Kampuchean back to Hanoi to serve them in military, political, ideological, economic, social and other capacities. After my departure from the liberated area (April 1973) and return to Peking, the Khmer Rouge decided to deprive the Viet "fish" of Kampuchean "water." They took it upon themselves to "regroup" the population of each commune and each district into "cooperatives." These were rapidly transformed into veritable concentration camps whose compulsory members were, of course, denied the possibility of having any kind of dealings with the Viets.

For instance, the Khmer Rouge began, in 1973, to empty our Tonle Sap (Great Lake), our rivers and streams of their Vietnamese occupants. These Vietnamese were fishermen. In 1969, there were more than 400,000 Vietnamese in Kampuchea. Immediately after their coup d'etat of 1970, Lon Nol supporters eliminated and expelled into Vietnam at least half of these Vietnamese. As personally acknowledged by Khieu Samphan, the Khmer Rouge "did the rest" between 1973 and 1975. In 1978, Radio Hanoi confirmed the Pol Pot regime's murder or massive repatriation of Vietnamese residents of Kampuchea.

In his speeches and press conferences, Pol Pot showed himself to be deeply fascinated by Hitler. He would obsessively harp on this disturbing theme: "We are accused of having committed monstrous crimes! But we are not Hitlers! Hitler was the only one capable of genocide!" Pol Pot would pronounce and mention this name--"Hitler"... "Hitler"... "Hitler"--with obvious relish and obsession. The genocide of Vietnamese by Lon Nol, and afterward by Pol Pot, strangely resembled Hitler's genocide of Jews.

Who Are the Khmer Rouge?

The Khmer Rouge leaders belong to two categories of intellectuals.

The first category, which I call the "superintellectuals," is composed of persons with advanced degrees. For example, Khieu Samphan has a doctorate of economics from a celebrated French university, and Thiounn Mumm is the only Khmer to have graduated from the French Ecole Polytechnique. The other two "specimens," whose reputation is now international, were Hou Youn and Hu Nim. Each held a Doctor of Laws degree. Interior Minister Hou Youn and Propaganda Minister Hu Nim were very likely assassinated--one after the victory of 17 April 1975 and the other in late March or early April 1977--on orders from Pol Pot and Ieng Sary because they were felt to be "too dynamic" and "too popular."

The second category is composed of secondary school teachers (example: Son Sen) or elementary school teachers who became secondary school teachers after completing teacher training in France (example: Pol Pot and Ieng Sary).

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These two categories of Khmer Rouge have the following in common: hatred of the monarchy which they say is "bimillennial: this really is the limit!"; a supernationalism much more chauvinistic than Sihanouk's; an ardent love of the People's Republic of China and unbounded admiration for Chinese communism when the latter was carried to its most terrible extremism (Cultural Revolution). And yet these Khmer Rouge leaders had started out being republican nationalists back in the days when some of them were students and others teachers.

Their association with French and international communists in France had made our young "antifeudalists" turn "Red." When they returned to Phnom Penh and entered, after 1956, into relations with diplomats of the People's Republic of China, our "Parisian communists" changed into "Maoist Reds." Between 1956 and 1970 (the year of the Lon Nol coup), "our" Khmer Rouge steadily "grew taller and bigger" ideologically "by sucking" on the People's Republic of China. According to Pol Pot himself, more and more frequent contacts and more and fruitful cooperation were established clandestinely and harmoniously between Peking's embassy in Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge leaders. A good number of them were even able to secretly visit Mao Tse-tung in China. The 5 years of the anti-American and anti-Lon Nol war (1970-1975) only served to strengthen the "matrimonial" bonds between Khmer Rouge leaders and Chinese leaders.

And by an irony of fate, the Vietnamese communists are the ones who played the "cuckold's" role in this rather peculiar type of "theater."

Interview with Norodom Sihanouk

[Question] You left Peking for Pyongyang, North Korea. Have you quarreled with the Chinese?

[Answer] I continue to like China but can no longer live there permanently. First, because we have altogether opposite and irreconcilable views on the Cambodian problem and the fate of the unfortunate Cambodian people.

Second, China is currently the large base area for the Khmer Rouge criminals responsible for my people's terrible and unending misfortunes. I do not want to breathe the same air as Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, and company who are pampered by China. I did go to Peking last week. It was to spare Mrs Chou En-lai, the former premier's widow, a tiring trip to Pyongyang. The late premier and I were great friends.

Third, China continues, despite my appeals, to do everything it can to get me to change my mind and form a united front with the Khmer Rouge for a second time.

[Question] Yet you did have the intention of assuming the leadership of that united front.

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[Answer] Since the day I first introduced that idea, various Khmer intellectuals in Paris have been conducting a campaign against me and doing everything to deter me. I have dropped the idea of heading a united front.

[Question] If, in spite of everything, this front is created, will it not be necessary to forget the past and place yourself once again alongside Pol Pot and his friends?

[Answer] The united front should have as its goals not only the liberation of Cambodia from the Vietnamese yoke, but equally the liberation of the Khmer people from such bloodthirsty archcriminals as Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Son Sen, etc. Aside from those principals responsible for the national genocide, the united front should accept those Khmer Rouge without any such responsibility, provided they agree to lay down their arms, because I advocate a peaceful solution of the Khmer problems.

[Question] Why have you not come to Paris? Are you coming here this winter?

[Answer] According to information given me by certain fellow countrymen in Paris, information confirmed by news agency dispatches, particularly those by REUTERS, and newspaper reports, LE MONDE's for example, the French Government, though issuing me a visa, still fears that my presence in France may create difficulties between France on the one hand, and Vietnam, the USSR and even China on the other. Consequently, I shall not go to France this winter.

[Question] Do you still believe the Cambodian problem can be settled by negotiation with Vietnam or by an international conference of the Geneva type?

[Answer] The hour is not ripe, but the increasing and insurmountable difficulties Vietnam will encounter both at home and in Cambodia and on the international level may force that country to accept a negotiated solution or an international conference. That international conference will be realizable only if China and the USSR support it. China and the USSR will not decide in favor of any international conference until that day their respective clients, that is the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese, start gasping on the battlefield of Cambodia.

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LAO REFUGEE REPORTS VIETNAM INFLUENCE IN COUNTRY

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU (JAPAN MILITARY REVIEW) in Japanese Oct 79 pp 109-110

[Article: "Vietnamese Secret Police in Laos"]

[Text] To suppress discontented elements in Laos, Vietnam has permanently stationed 800 secret police in Laos and has begun to settle Vietnamese in the border area of Vietnam and Laos.

A former leading Lao People's Revolutionary Party cadre who fled to Thailand told the following to the UPI correspondent at the Nong Khai Refugee Camp in Thailand:

While several thousand Vietnamese are allowed to cross the border and settle in the region from Sam Neua to Savannakhet, Lao are encouraged to settle in Vietnam.

Vietnamese control of Laos is accomplished by four Vietnamese divisions (40,000 or more) and 6,000 or more Vietnamese specialists and advisers. In contrast, there are only about 24,000 Lao troops.

The Vietnamese who controls activity in Laos is Colonel Nguyen Van Ho, who is around 55 years old. He meets with Prime Minister Kaysone almost every day. The prime minister goes to Hanoi almost every month to confer.

In the past 3 years more than 200 party members have been arrested because they opposed the party policy. Among them, he [the Lao refugee] heard that about 100 have already been executed. No more than 10 percent of the party members give full support to Secretary General Kaysone. Another 10 percent are positively opposed and the remaining 80 percent vacillate.

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INFORMATION ON LAO MILITARY UNITS

[The following information was extracted from Vientiane Domestic Service broadcasts in Lao at 0400 GMT unless otherwise noted on the dates indicated, or from Lao press material as indicated. Unit designators and locations are as given. The remarks include a brief summary of the information available in the source.]

UNIT	REMARKS
Unit "A" under Air Force Command in Vientiane	Visited by delegation of Nationalities Committee (30 Aug 79)
Unit "E" attached to Signal Corps in Vientiane	Installed machines, repaired others, en- gaged in agricultural production Jul- Aug (30 Aug 79)
Nam Souang Irrigation Project Construction Unit	Carried out specialized work. Attended political courses, engaged in agricul- tural production (30 Aug 79)
Veterinary Unit of Army Settle- metn in Southern Region	Started vaccinating animals early Aug (30 Aug 79)
Film Projection Unit Xieng Khouang Military Region	Showed films in Jul (30 Aug 79)
Logistics Office Saravane Province	Held meeting 17 Aug to review achieve- ments (31 Aug 79)
Medical Cadres Nam Souang Hospital	Cured patients, built clinics, produced traditional medicine (31 Aug 79)
Vientiane Military Training School	Closed political, military training course 20 Aug (1 Sep 79)
Military Command, [Meuang] Samtai District Houa Phan Province	Held military training course for local cadres, combatants early Jul (1 Sep 79)

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Unit "A" Vientiane	Organized political classes for local people, set up agricultural cooperatives (1 Sep 79)
Military Command, [Meuang] Loang Ngam District Saravane Province	Organized local guerrilla-militia forces, attended political course, planted crops (1 Sep 79)
Vientiane Auto Repair Shop	Repaired vehicles, typed documents, cured patients, attended two political courses (2 Sep 79)
Local guerrillas [Tasseng] Phonsai Canton, [Meuang] Samtai District, Houa Phan Province	Engaged in agricultural production, carried out specialized tasks (2 Sep 79)
Regional Force, [Meuang] Samtai District, Houa Phan Province	Engaged in agricultural production, raised animals, saved rice and salt, kip (2 Sep 79)
Construction Unit under Sam Neua Provincial Military Command	Built warehouses, repaired four guest houses, planted crops, organized sports and literature activities (2 Sep 79)
Military Training School in Vientiane	Opened political training course 23 Aug (3 Sep 79)
Military Command, [Meuang] Khamtai District, Houa Phan Province	Carried out training for cadres, combatants in mid-Aug (3 Sep 79)
Regional Forces [Meuang] Samtai District	Engaged in military, political training in mid-Aug (3 Sep 79)
Political Office of Military Command, Viangsay Region	Organized political training course for cadres 13 Aug (3 Sep 79)
Infantry Unit "T" Northern Military Region	Scored achievements in specialized work (4 Sep 79)
Army Shoemaking Factory Vientiane	Engaged in political study in Jul-Aug (4 Sep 79)
Army Unit "E" Vientiane Capital	Scored achievements in specialized duties and public service work (4 Sep 79)
Army Unit "S" Vientiane Capital	Built more living quarters, offices Jul-Aug (4 Sep 79)

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Army Unit "A" attached to Central Region Command	Stepped up efforts to boost food produc- tion (4 Sep 79)
Air Force Command Vientiane	Opened cultural training program for children 3 Sep (5 Sep 79)
Army Fish Sauce Factory	Produced fish sauce (5 Sep 79)
Army Unit "y" Vientiane Capital	Studied Army regulations, discipline in early Aug (5 Sep 79)
Unit "T" attached to Infantry Corps in Northern Region	Attended military training 19 Aug (6 Sep 79)
Public Security Force of [Meuang] Pak Ou District, Luang Prabang Province	Engaged in self-sufficient agricultural production (6 Sep 79)
Military Training School Northern Military Region	Attended political, military courses; cleared land, raised many animals (6 Sep 79)
Army Signal Branch Vientiane	Repaired communication equipment (6 Sep 79)
Unit "C" attached to Armored Corps	Planted crops, raised cattle (6 Sep 79)
Unit "S" attached to Vientiane Armored Corps	Attended political course (6 Sep 79)
Vientiane Public Security Force	Taking care of rice fields (6 Sep 79)
Army Garment Factory Vientiane	Pledge to produce garments (7 Sep 79)
Unit "T" Northern Region	Conducted patrol missions, attended poli- tical courses, cured patients, built houses and warehouses, transported goods, planted crops (7 Sep 79)
Army Sports Corps Vientiane	Engaging in sports activities, attending political course (7 Sep 79)
Xieng Khouang Provincial Military Command	Opened cultural training course 26 Aug (7 Sep 79)

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Army Technical Repair Unit 5th Engineer Corps in Vientiane area	Scored achievements in specialized work (9 Sep 79)
Guerrilla Unit, [Tasseng] Houai Khoua Luang Canton Sayabourgy Province	Scored outstanding achievement in public security work, assisted people in farm work (9 Sep 79)
Bn "S" in Northern Region	Took care of rice plants, people (9 Sep 79)
Army Staff Officers, Houa Phan Military Provincial Command	Visited people in [Tasseng] Phonsai Can- ton [Meuang] Samtai District in Aug (9 Sep 79)
Infantry Unit "S" in Vientiane Region	Built several buildings, raised livestock Apr-Aug (9 Sep 79)
Guerrillas in [Meuang] Khai, Nan Districts, Luang Prabang Province	Conducted patrol missions, planted rice, helped local people built irrigation canals (10 Sep 79)
Regional Forces in [Meuang] Pak Ou District, Luang Prabang Province	Attended political, military courses; planted crops; built irrigation canal; raised animals (10 Sep 79)
Staff Office under Sayaboury Provincial Military Command	Loaded and unloaded goods, conducted patrol missions, engaged in agricultural production (10 Sep 79)
Guerrillas of [Tasseng] Phou Louang Canton [Meuang] Chomphet, Luang Prabang Province	Built two clinics (10 Sep 79)
Vientiane Provincial Military Command	Held meeting 1 Sep to review work (11 Sep 79)
Vientiane Army Settlement	Produced animal feed (11 Sep 79)
Vientiane Army Medical Training School	Built houses, repaired roads, planted crops (11 Sep 79)
Logistics Department in Vientiane	Cleared land, built three schools, clubs and barracks (11 Sep 79)
Cultural Training School of Army Logistics Department in Vientiane	Held ceremony 7 Sep to review results of school year (12 Sep 79)

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Army Logistics School under Army Logistics Department in Vientiane	Attended political courses, built houses, repaired others, planted crops (12 Sep 79)
Youth Section attached to Luang Prabang Provincial Military Command	Held political course for local youths in Aug (12 Sep 79)
Sayaboury Provincial Military Command	Held ceremony 4 Sep to close political course (12 Sep 79)
Northern Region Military Command	Closed meeting 6 Sep which concerned building all-round strong companies (13 Sep 79)
Driving School under Army Logistics Department in Vientiane	Attended specialized, political and military courses (13 Sep 79)
Regional Force in Savannakhet Province	Cleared land for rice cultivation (13 Sep 79)
Finance School under Army Logistics Department in Vientiane	Built houses and warehouses, cured patients, attended cultural courses (13 Sep 79)
Air Force Hospital in Vientiane	Cured patients, vaccinated and gave medicine, contributed to agricultural production (14 Sep 79)
Army Rice Mill in Vientiane	Repaired machines, built barracks, planted crops (14 Sep 79)
Army Noodle Factory in Vientiane	Produced noodles, while carrying out rice farming in Jul-Aug (15 Sep 79)
Cultural Training School attached to Army Logistics Department in Vientiane	Studied culture Mar-Jul (15 Sep 79)
Army Auto Repair School in Vientiane	Concluded political study 4 Sep (16 Sep 79)
Army Art Troupe in Vientiane	Staged performances Aug-Sep (17 Sep 79)
Defense Unit "A" in Vientiane	Attended political, military courses (17 Sep 79)
Army Driving School, Vientiane	Started attending political course 11 Sep to study documents on socialism (18 Sep 79)
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INFORMATION ON LAO MILITARY UNITS

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UNIT	REMARKS
Southern Region's Logistics Office	Attended political and cultural classes since Jun (19 Sep 79)
Army Band Vientiane	Raised animals in first half of 1979 (19 Sep 79)
Basic Medical Training School under Vientiane Public Security Force	Planted crops, raised many animals in July (20 Sep 79)
Specialized Corps in Central Region	Attended political, military, cultural courses, engaged in agricultural production (20 Sep 79)
Political Training School under Vientiane Public Security Force	Studied documents of party and state (20 Sep 79)
Anti-Aircraft Bn "A" in Vientiane	Planted rice, raised animals, cooperated with other local units to carry out public security tasks (21 Sep 79)
Military Command of [Meuang] Hatsaifong, Vientiane Province	Closed military training course held for guerrillas in [Tasseng] Tha Mouang Canton on 7 Sep (21 Sep 79)
Driving School attached to Vientiane Public Security Forces	Held ceremony 18 Sep to mark closing of first driving course (21 Sep 79)
Political Training School under Vientiane Public Security Force	Planted crops in first half of 1979 (21 Sep 79)

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Air Force Command in Vientiane	Opened political training course 5 Sep, training course concluded 18 Sep (22 Sep 79)
Infantry Bn "S" Vientiane	Studied politics since June, planted crops (22 Sep 79)
Units "S" and "TH" Southern Region Command	Held ceremony 11 Sep to mark conclusion of military training courses (22 Sep 79)
Infantry Bn "S" Vientiane	Published more than 10 reactionaries from Jan-Jun. Persuaded tribal people to come under patronage of state and party (23 Sep 79)
Political Office Xieng Khouang Military Command	Successfully concluded political training 8 Sep (23 Sep 79)
Engineering School Xieng Khouang Military Command	Held ceremony 6 Sep to conclude 6-month training. (23 Sep 79)
[Meuang] Lamam District Military Command	Opened military and political classes 20 Aug (24 Sep 79)
Brick Producing Unit under Xieng Khouang Military Region	Attended cultural training course 20 Aug (24 Sep 79)
Engineering School Xieng Khouang Military Region	Cleared land, engaged in self-sufficient agricultural production since Mar (24 Sep 79)
Driving School under Public Security Forces	Conducted 402 patrol missions, built barracks, offices and other buildings, repaired vehicles, planted crops (25 Sep 79)
Regional Forces Oudomsai Province	Engaged in agricultural production (25 Sep 79)
Various Units under Sayaboury Provincial Military Command	Carried out specialized tasks while engaging in agricultural production (25 Sep 79)
Regional Force Oudomsai Province	Attended political, military classes since early this year (26 Sep 79)
Signal Unit "S" under Xieng Khouang Military Region	Closed political course 22 Sep (26 Sep 79)

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Vientiane Transport Unit "S"	Attended meeting 24 Sep to review achievements of first half of 1979 (26 Sep 79)
Vientiane Public Security School	Planted rice, raised animals, attended political course (27 Sep 79)
Transport Bn "A" in Vientiane	Transported goods, soldiers and people since early this year (27 Sep 79)
Artillery Corps in Vientiane	Attended political courses, military course. Planted crops, raised animals (28 Sep 79)
Construction Corps "A" in Central Region	Planted rice, raised many animals (28 Sep 79)
School of Accountancy under Xieng Khouang Region's Logistics Office	Studied specialized subjects, engaged in agricultural production (28 Sep 79)
Regional Force Houa Phan Province	Cured patients, built buildings, raised animals (28 Sep 79)
Regional Armed Forces Savannakhet Province	Studied specialized subjects, culture, carried out patrol activities, publicizing line and policies of party and state and boosted production (29 Sep 79)
Infantry Bn "GN" Vientiane Region	Opened training on general staff work 2 Sep. training concluded 26 Sep (29 Sep 79)
Cultural Training School	Held ceremony 16 Aug to mark end of academic year (29 Sep 79)
Regional Armed Forces of Luang Prabang Province	Maintained tranquillity of their responsible areas, planted crops (29 Sep 79)
Vientiane Provincial Military Command	Opened military training course (30 Sep 79)
Saravane Provincial Military Command	Scored achievements in specialized work, food production (30 Sep 79)
Logistics Office Central Region	Held study session to study various documents of Party Central Committee 16 Sep (30 Sep 79)

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Artillery Bn "Y"
Vientiane

Pledged to contribute to socialist transformation and construction (1 Oct 79)

Patriotic Women's Association
Air Force Command

Held meeting 26 Sep to review results of political study (1 Oct 79)

Mobilization and Training Office
of Army Political Department

Held banquet 30 Sep for delegation of Ethnic minority people in Louang Namtha Province (2 Oct 79)

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END