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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS

PAGE

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Japanese Trade With Africa Detailed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Sep 79)..... 1

Japan 1979: Economic Situation
Foreign Trade With Africa, by Jacques Clere

Transportation Outlook for 1978-1988 Discussed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 24 Aug 79)..... 17

Briefs
GDR Expeditionary Forces 26

BENIN

Stability, Good Management Contribute to Progress
(Philippe Simonet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Sep 79)..... 27

Briefs
Student Unrest 31

CHAD

Points Included in Lagos Agreement
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 31 Aug 79)..... 32

Lagos Agreement Viewed as Moderately Hopeful
(Editorial; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
31 Aug 79)..... 34

- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]

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CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	
Some Mysteries Still Remaining Concerning Coup (Pierre Gardel; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Aug 79).....	38
Teodoro Nguema's Political Ideas Said To Be Unknown (Pierre Gardel; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Aug 79).....	40
Africa Loses One More Dictator (Hamza Kaidi; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 15 Aug 79).....	42
MADAGASCAR	
Briefs	
Military Agricultural Operation	45
Soviet Equipment Specialists	45
RHODESIA	
Lifestyle of Whites Changed (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Sep 79).....	46
SOMALIA	
WSLF Leader Discusses Ogaden Liberation Struggle (Abudulahi Hassan Mohamud Interview; ASAHI SHIMBUN, 24 Sep 79).....	49

- b -

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

JAPANESE TRADE WITH AFRICA DETAILED

Japan 1979: Economic Situation

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2429

[Article: "Japan 1979: Economic Growth Continues, Slight Inflation, Very Moderate Unemployment"]

[Text] In 1979, with a very moderate rate of unemployment (less than 600,000 unemployed), a price increase held down to approximately 6 percent and a growth rate also on the order of 6 percent, Japan offers an enviable example of stability and economic competitiveness, even though the latest (23 July) increase of the discount rate to 5.25 percent by the Bank of Japan indicates a recent inflationary thrust which may be difficult to contain in view of the new gasoline price hikes.

However, in 1974, at the beginning of the crisis, when its unsettled economy seemed destined on a long term basis to deflation and regression, Japan was considered the big loser by the "bookmakers" of the economy.

As the JOURNAL DE GENEVE (issues of 13, 14, 15 and 16 July) noted recently in a series of articles on the "new Japanese challenge," today the Japanese are once again being visited, spied upon and questioned by a great many experts and officials of all kinds who are trying to understand the workings of an astonishing system, where the rigidity of the social structures accommodate themselves to a very great economic adaptability. In 1974, the year when the rate of inflation in Japan reached the alarming figure of 30 percent, many observers thought that the decline of Japan had just begun. The economic situation which was still depressive in 1975 and during the first half of 1976, confirmed the pessimistic diagnosis of the future of Japan. But the most learned forecasts could not withstand the test of the facts. Today, more than ever victorious, the Japanese economy is ready for a commitment. Better yet, the vast Japanese industrial empire has profited from the crisis to further improve its ability to adapt.

By what methods did the Japanese manage to overcome the 1974-1975 crisis? Essentially, "by integrating into their actions the corrective measures imposed by the constraints produced by the energy crisis."

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Thus, in a very short time they restored a high growth rate, an assurance of a high level of investment. Faced with the crucial problem of the security of their supplies of mineral and energy raw materials, they succeeded in record time in diversifying their purchases so as to better protect them against the threat of shortages. In this gigantic effort of recovery and adaptation, the role of the MITI [Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry] has been essential; "the MITI is an amazing economic war machine whose intervention and advice have been decisive during these transition years."

It is well known that the large industrial countries have denounced Japanese commercial expansionism with increasing irritation. And today the United States, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and many other nations complain about the strong competition of Japanese products and denounce with equal firmness the protectionist practices of the Tokyo government.

In response to these criticisms, the Japanese have developed a series of initiatives to correct their international public image. The fact that the trilateral conference was held in Tokyo last April is an example of this strategy. At the same time, the authorities in Tokyo decided to grant more facilities to the heavily indebted poor countries, in order to increase their influence and prestige with the Third World nations (specifically those from South East Asia) on the occasion of the fifth session of UNCTAD which was held in Manila in May.

While Japan is thus trying to develop its economic relations with South East Asia, and also and primarily with China, /Africa/ [printed in italics] remains an interesting trade partner, representing 5 percent of its foreign trade in 1978. Sino-Japanese trade constitutes about 3 percent. But it appears probable that this percentage will rapidly increase during the next few years, "because the Japanese methodically invest in the major sectors which the Chinese are opening up to international economic cooperation."

We believe that it is useful to publish these few pieces of information and observations in order to be better able to place Japan's foreign trade with Africa within the present context of the Japanese economy.

Foreign Trade With Africa

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 pp 2429 - 2433

[Article by Jacques Clere: "Trade Between Japan and Africa in 1978"]

[Text] Africa's share in Japan's foreign trade is about 5 percent. But it should be noted that this share has constantly gone down since 1976, decreasing from 6.03 percent in 1976 to 4.86 percent in 1978, due to the fact that exports decreased more rapidly than imports and lost 2.20 points over these 3 years. This evolution has been summarized in Table I.

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Table I. Africa's Share in Japan's Foreign Trade in 1976 - 1977 - 1978
(in millions of yen)

	Exports (1)	Imports (2)	Echanges globaux (3)
1976			
Monde (4)	19 934 618	19 229 168	39 163 786
Afrique (5)	1 744 836	615 982	2 360 818
Part de l'Afrique % (6)	8.75	3.20	6.03
1977			
Monde (4)	21 648 070	19 131 780	40 779 850
Afrique (5)	1 787 885	575 607	2 363 492
Part de l'Afrique (6)	8.26	3.01	5.80
1978			
Monde (4)	20 555 840	16 727 624	37 283 464
Afrique (5)	1 346 573	464 266	1 810 839
Part de l'Afrique (6)	6.55	2.77	4.86
Variation 1976-1978 (7)	- 2,20	- 0,43	- 1,17

Key:

1. Exports
2. Imports
3. Global Trade
4. World
5. Africa
6. Africa's share in percentage
7. Change 1976 - 1978

An important remark needs to be made when considering these figures: as a matter of fact, a special place must be assigned to two African countries which present characteristics which clearly set them apart from the rest of the continent, specifically South Africa and Liberia.

Let us study Table II. One notes that out of a global Japanese African volume of 1,810,839 million yen in 1978, Liberia by itself represented 393,396 million yen (21.72 percent), while South Africa represented 425,976 million yen (23.52 percent). But the profile of these two countries is fundamentally different from that of the other African countries.

As far as /Liberia/ [printed in boldface] is concerned, if one breaks down the figure of its imports (354,720 million yen) from Japan, 98 percent of it falls under the heading "Ships and Navigational Materials" (Chapter 89 of the Brussels Nomenclature).

On the other hand, out of a total sales to Japan of 38,675 million yen, one notes that: 2,348 million yen also fall under heading 89 of the Brussels Nomenclature; the major share -- 35,123 million yen (91 percent) -- of the global figure is modestly classified as "non-specified" products.

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Table II. Trade Between Japan and Africa in 1976, 1977 and 1978
(in millions of yen)

Exportations du Japon sur l'Afrique (1)					Importations du Japon en provenance d'Afrique (2)				
	1976	1977	1978	1978/1976 (%)		1976	1977	1978	1978/1976 (%)
Maroc (4)	15 312	19 525	14 031	92	Maroc (4)	10 975	10 777	8 837	90
Ceuta et Melilla (5)	9 100	10 359	8 552	94	Ceuta et Melilla (5)	1	12	1	-
Algérie (6)	60 818	125 079	153 443	253	Algérie (6)	3 088	6 398	8 012	260
Tunisie (7)	4 839	9 389	3 191	69	Tunisie (7)	579	209	228	41
L'Égypte (8)	96 798	74 760	73 592	76	Libye (8)	60 927	29 762	3 707	6
Égypte (9)	97 678	103 632	86 240	88	Égypte (9)	20 108	21 518	17 187	85
Soudan (10)	18 737	31 818	17 656	94	Soudan (10)	14 502	15 857	12 549	87
Mauritanie (11)	1 705	2 100	1 428	84	Sahara occidental (11)	3 008	-	658	22
Sénégal (12)	682	1 171	1 684	254	Mauritanie (12)	9 448	8 788	4 384	48
Gambie (13)	1 348	748	408	30	Sénégal (13)	3 804	3 424	2 650	70
Guinée (14)	464	2 357	389	84	Gambie (14)	-	4	7	-
Sierra Leone (15)	3 601	3 113	4 663	129	Guinée (15)	38	-	305	803
Côte d'Ivoire (16)	19 548	28 478	30 151	154	Sierra Leone (16)	32	18	50	156
Ghana (17)	12 795	15 435	8 615	67	Côte d'Ivoire (17)	12 987	23 046	11 780	91
Togo (18)	3 582	2 350	2 712	76	Ghana (18)	23 709	40 537	22 149	93
Bénin (19)	7 011	5 257	1 978	28	Togo (19)	1 135	371	298	25
Mali (20)	308	878	1 503	491	Bénin (20)	1 438	1 558	1 265	88
Haute-Volta (21)	505	1 065	1 097	121	Mali (21)	1 455	2 504	841	58
Capverdes (22)	22 528	33 778	24 008	74	Haute-Volta (22)	1 241	1 083	792	64
Niger (23)	169 872	270 287	203 900	120	Capverdes (23)	948	33	101	11
Niger (24)	8 434	8 297	4 902	58	Nigeria (24)	32 878	5 627	1 559	9
Réunion (25)	3 403	3 527	3 809	108	Niger (25)	101	104	7	7
Cameroun (26)	9 581	11 816	10 060	105	Réunion (26)	102	1 027	1 535	1 800
Tchad (27)	852	425	345	52	Cameroun (27)	7 313	8 218	6 834	80
Centrafrique (28)	371	617	578	156	Tchad (28)	4 412	4 881	2 622	59
Gabon (29)	4 918	5 108	3 317	67	Centrafrique (29)	1 869	1 958	501	30
Congo (30)	1 725	1 483	1 180	68	Gabon (30)	5 289	1 884	1 234	23
Zaïre (31)	9 962	8 999	4 968	50	Congo (31)	1 728	2 119	1 778	103
Burundi (32)	851	977	1 758	206	Burundi (32)	25 632	24 244	17 488	68
Angola (33)	1 233	8 954	7 548	612	Angola (33)	89	84	8	-
Éthiopie (34)	18 880	17 088	10 767	64	Éthiopie (34)	12 008	2 778	1 317	11
Djibouti (35)	3 900	3 135	3 848	94	Kenya (35)	8 528	8 994	4 466	68
Somalie (36)	1 379	501	458	33	Somalie (36)	848	1 848	518	80
Kenya (37)	29 975	38 319	31 994	107	Kenya (37)	7 028	4 805	3 424	49
Ouganda (38)	1 863	5 622	3 391	182	Ouganda (38)	7 252	10 026	8 995	98
Tanzanie (39)	22 395	18 282	23 301	104	Tanzanie (39)	3 782	9 282	2 455	65
Soudan (40)	888	815	854	95	Seychelles (40)	2	32	28	-
Mozambique (41)	3 980	4 275	8 585	188	Mozambique (41)	10 833	10 014	9 004	85
Madagascar (42)	1 104	3 750	5 821	187	Madagascar (42)	10 098	9 977	5 011	50
Maurice (43)	7 320	7 555	6 414	74	Maurice (43)	28	11	311	818
Reunion/Comores (44)	2 187	2 018	2 327	106	Reunion/Comores (44)	10	11	-	-
Nam. de (45)	170	501	877	398	Nam. de (45)	2 920	2 354	3 006	103
Nam. de (46)	3 520	4 828	6 095	173	Lesotho (46)	-	8	-	-
Zambie (47)	6 878	9 912	5 580	95	Malawi (47)	713	227	515	72
Botswana (48)	702	287	15	2	Zambie (48)	49 887	50 532	34 408	69
Swaziland (49)	697	398	575	82	Botswana (49)	31	74	48	155
Divers (50)	730	731	450	50	Swaziland (50)	11 380	8 059	5 184	45
	703 107	911 481	785 198	112	Océan Indien (51)	1 612	77	25	-
Libéria (50)	831 430	673 321	354 721	43	Divers (55)	4	4	34	-
Afrique du Sud (51)	210 239	203 103	208 654	98	Libéria (50)	19 734	334	38 675	199
	1 744 838	1 787 885	1 348 573	77	Afrique du Sud (51)	222 273	241 577	219 322	98
						818 982	878 607	484 786	79

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Key to Table II:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Exports from Japan to Africa | |
| 2. Imports by Japan from Africa | |
| 3. Base figure | |
| 4. Morocco | 30. Congo |
| 5. Ceuta and Melilla | 31. Zaire |
| 6. Algeria | 32. Burundi |
| 7. Tunisia | 33. Angola |
| 8. Libya | 34. Ethiopia |
| 9. Egypt | 35. Djibouti |
| 10. Sudan | 36. Somalia |
| 11. Mauritania | 37. Kenya |
| 12. Senegal | 38. Uganda |
| 13. Gambia | 39. Tanzania |
| 14. Guinea | 40. Seychelles |
| 15. Sierra Leone | 41. Mozambique |
| 16. Ivory Coast | 42. Madagascar |
| 17. Ghana | 43. Mauritius |
| 18. Togo | 44. Reunion/Comoro Islands |
| 19. Benin | 45. Namibia |
| 20. Mali | 46. Malawi |
| 21. Upper Volta | 47. Zambia |
| 22. Canary Islands | 48. Botswana |
| 23. Nigeria | 49. Swaziland |
| 24. Niger | 50. Liberia |
| 25. Rwanda | 51. South Africa |
| 26. Cameroon | 52. Western Sahara |
| 27. Chad | 53. Lesotho |
| 28. Central African Republic | 54. Indian Ocean |
| 29. Gabon | 55. Other |

Consequently, as a country known for its free passage and its flags of accomodation, where Japan holds substantial maritime intersts, it is appropriate to classify Liberia separately.

The case of South Africa is different: as one of the largest industrial countries, a veritable "ore country," its foreign trade has few points in common with that of the other countries of Africa. And when one examines the figures in detail with regard to Japan, one notices that:

- 97 percent of the exports from Japan to South Africa consists of products from the iron and steel industry and the heavy industry, equipment materials, ships, electronic materials, etcetera;

- the exports from South Africa to Japan are those of a highly industrialized mining country, endowed with a high level agricultural power; as evidence of this:

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	<u>Millions of yen</u>
Corn and grains	36 550
Sugar	20 864
Mineral products	12 227
Pyrites	41 559
Coal	25 587
Precious stones and metals	29 717
Ore and products from heavy industry ...	13 928

These seven items by themselves represent 180,472 million yen, or more than 82 percent out of a total of 219,322 million yen.

This is why, in order to provide a picture which is closer to the reality experienced by the rest of the African continent, we decided that it would be more useful to present the figures and comments, while isolating Liberia and South Africa most of the time.

Overall Evolution of Trade

Table II provides a country by country evolution of trade between Japan and Africa during the calendar years 1976, 1977 and 1978. The figures are expressed in millions of yen. Let us recall that 1 French franc equals approximately 50 yen, which could also be expressed in the following form: 1 million yen are worth approximately 20,000 French francs.

The evolution of Japanese-African trade is presented in a more condensed form in Table III and in graph IV.

It is evident that the evolution, as well as the Japanese-African balance of trade and the export-import ratio, has become increasingly less favorable for Africa. This is made even worse by the reduction of trade.

There is an even less favorable fact: while the export-import ratio of Japan with regard to Liberia and South Africa put together has dropped from 429 to 218, for the rest of Africa this same ratio has more than doubled, going from 189 to 381. From an African point of view, this means that (aside from Liberia and South Africa) the export-import ratio has deteriorated to a disturbing degree, having dropped in 3 years from 53.03 percent (1976) to 26.27 percent (1978).

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Table III. Evolution of Trade Between Japan and Africa from 1976 until 1978
(Exports - Imports - Balance - Export-Import Ratio)
(in millions of yen)

	(1) Exportations vers l'Afrique	Importations en provenance d'Afrique (2)	Echange (3) totaux	Balance (4)	(5) Taux de ouverture (4) %
1976					
Liberia et Afrique du Sud... (6)	1 041 729	243 107	1 284 836 +	798 622	429
Reste de l'Afrique (7)	703 107	372 875	1 075 982 +	330 232	189
Total (8)	1 744 836	615 982	2 360 818 +	1 128 854	283
1977					
Liberia et Afrique du Sud... (6)	876 424	244 871	1 121 295 +	831 553	358
Reste de l'Afrique (7)	911 461	330 736	1 242 197 +	580 725	276
Total (8)	1 787 885	575 607	2 363 492 +	1 212 278	311
1978					
Liberia et Afrique du Sud... (6)	561 375	257 997	819 372 +	303 378	218
Reste de l'Afrique (7)	785 198	206 269	991 467 +	578 929	381
Total (8)	1 346 573	464 266	1 810 839 +	882 307	290
Évolution 1976-1978 (9)					
Liberia et Afrique du Sud... (6)	- 141 732	+ 14 890	- 465 464	- 495 244	- 211
Reste de l'Afrique (7)	+ 82 091	- 166 606	- 84 515	+ 248 897	+ 192


Key:

1. Exports to Africa
2. Imports from Africa
3. Global trade
4. Balance
5. Export-import ratio
6. Liberia and South Africa
7. Rest of Africa
8. Total
9. Evolution 1976 - 1978

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Table IV. Trade Balance Japan-Africa



Key:

1. Trade balance
2. Japan-Africa
3. Billions of yen
4. Exports
5. Imports
6. Exports to Africa
7. Liberia and South Africa
8. Rest of Africa
9. Imports from Africa

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Japanese Imports from Africa

For all of Africa, the main products imported by Japan are given in Table V.

Table V. Principal Sales by Africa to Japan in 1978
(entire continent)
(in millions of yen)

<u>Products</u>	<u>Values</u>
1. Pyrites	58 287
2. Copper	45 991
3. Corn and grains	40 920
4. Precious stones and metals	33 017
5. Coffee	26 803
6. Cotton	22 614
7. Sugar	20 864
8. Fresh fish and shellfish	16 755
9. Cocoa	16 302
10. Aluminum	15 051
11. Iron, cast iron, steel	14 068
12. Mineral products	12 912
13. Petroleum	11 387
14. Oilseeds	9 979
15. Natural phosphates	7 078
16. Ivory	5 451
17. Wool and other hair	4 680
18. Lumber	4 058
19. Hides and leather	1 026
Total	367 243

or 79.1 percent of the overall total

In Table VI, the major suppliers have been ranked from 1 to 27 (out of 48 countries, excluding Liberia and South Africa, having substantial trade with Japan) in decreasing order of importance. With regard to each of these countries, we have noted the main products it exports to Japan.

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Table VI. The Main African Suppliers of Japan in 1978
(excluding Liberia and South Africa)
(in millions of yen)

<u>Countries</u>	<u>Main Products</u>	<u>Values</u>
1. Zambia	Copper	34 408
2. Ghana	Cocoa-Aluminum-Stones and gems	22 149
3. Zaire	Pyrites-Copper and ores-Ivory	17 485
4. Egypt	Cotton-Aluminum	17 187
5. Sudan	Cotton-Oilseeds	12 549
6. Ivory Coast	Coffee	11 780
7. Morocco	Fresh shellfish-Phosphates	9 837
8. Mozambique	Corn-Fresh shellfish-Pyrites-Coffee	9 004
9. Algeria	Petroleum	8 012
10. Uganda	Coffee	6 995
11. Cameroon	Lumber-Coffee	5 834
12. Swaziland	Pyrites-Paper pulp	5 164
13. Madagascar	Fresh shellfish-Coffee-Pyrites	5 011
14. Mauritania	Pyrites-Fresh shellfish	4 584
15. Ethiopia	Coffee-Hides-Oilseeds	4 446
16. Libya	Petroleum	3 707
17. Kenya	Ivory-Coffee-Plant fibres	3 424
18. Namibia	Copper-Lead	3 006
19. Senegal	Fresh shellfish-Phosphates	2 650
20. Chad	Cotton	2 622
21. Tanzania	Coffee-Plant fibres-Ivory	2 455
22. Congo	Ivory-Pyrites-Lumber	1 778
23. Nigeria	Fresh shellfish-Oilseeds	1 559
24. Rwanda	Coffee	1 535
25. Angola	Coffee	1 317
26. Benin	Cotton	1 265
27. Gabon	Pyrites	1 234
Total		200 997

or 97.44 percent of the overall total of sales by Africa
(excluding Liberia and South Africa) to Japan

. Petroleum. - It comes from two suppliers: Algeria (7,775 million yen) and Libya (3,612 million yen).

. Fresh fish and shellfish. - The global tonnage amounts to 32,438 tons (16,755 million yen), of which 23,043 tons consist of shellfish alone. The fish and shellfish are caught by factory-ships operating off the African coasts, and which process them immediately into canned or frozen products.

The major supplier is Morocco (fish: 2,290 tons; shellfish: 8,649 tons) for a value of 3,640 million yen. It is followed by Mauritania: 1,949 million yen (6,827 tons), Senegal: 1,528 million yen (5,150 tons), Madagascar and South Africa.

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. Coffee. - It represents 26,803 million yen (36,353 tons) and comes primarily from the Ivory Coast: 9,498 million yen (13,114 tons), Uganda: 6,695 million yen (10,061 tons), Cameroon: 1,871 million yen (2,372 tons), Rwanda: 1,535 million yen (1,633 tons), Ethiopia: 2,944 million yen (3,583 tons), Angola: 1,221 million yen (1,628 tons) and Tanzania: 1,097 million yen (1,385 tons).

. Cocoa. - The number of cocoa suppliers is far less and, out of a global value of 16,302 million yen (18,097 tons), Ghana: 15,453 million yen (17,418 tons) is the quasi exclusive supplier, the rest being provided by the Ivory Coast and Cameroon.

. Oilseeds. - The global figure is 9,979 million yen for a tonnage of 91,349 tons. It is divided as follows: sesame: 4,362 million yen (26,802 tons); peanuts: 3,209 million yen (16,196 tons); karité: 1,568 million yen (20,720 tons); cotton: 750 million yen (22,018 tons); other: 90 million yen.

With regard to these figures it is interesting to note that the Japanese have recently published articles about and taken out patents for the use of karité in the preparation of /shortenings/ [*printed in italics*] (bases and additives) for pharmacology and cosmetology.

The major suppliers of oilseeds are (in millions of yen): Sudan: 5,328 (sesame-peanuts), South Africa: 981 (peanuts), Mali: 683 (karité), Upper Volta: 546 (karité - sesame), Nigeria: 545 (sesame - karité), Ethiopia: 532 (cotton - sesame), Ivory Coast: 445 (karité - sesame) and Togo (karité), Benin (cotton), Mozambique (peanuts).

. Corn and grains. - There are two suppliers: South Africa: 36,550 million yen and Mozambique: 4,370 million yen.

. Cotton. - It represents 22,614 million yen (56,153 tons). The main suppliers are: Egypt: 9,266 million yen (17,364 tons), Sudan: 6,410 million yen (14,501 tons), Chad: 2,502 million yen (8,447 tons), South Africa: 976 million yen (3,365 tons), Benin: 974 million yen (3,961 tons), Cameroon: 893 million yen (3,176 tons), Ivory Coast: 646 million yen (2,241 tons) and the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Uganda, Tanzania.

. Lumber (unworked and squared). - This represents 4,058 million yen and comes primarily from Cameroon: 2,033 million yen, from the Congo: 599 million yen, from the Ivory Coast: 441 million yen, from Gabon: 271 million yen, from Mozambique: 205 million yen, and from Zaire: 195 million yen.

. Natural phosphates. - The main supplier is Morocco: 5,259 million yen, followed by Senegal: 1,085 million yen and the Western Sahara: 658 million yen.

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. Pyrites. - These represent 58,287 million yen, of which 36,013 are iron pyrites, 6,970 are copper pyrites and 5,525 are manganese pyrites. It will be noted that, excluding South Africa, iron pyrites are also produced in (expressed in millions of yen): Swaziland: 3,205, Mauritania: 2,448 and Mozambique: 1,078; copper pyrites in Zaire: 6,919; and manganese pyrites in: Gabon: 904, the Congo: 450, Ghana: 222.

. Precious stones, gems and metals. - The first place is held by Ghana: 2,223 million yen, followed by Zaire: 148 million yen and Zambia: 200 (South Africa: 29,717 million yen, of which precious stones: 4,844 and platinum: 24,658).

. Copper. - The main suppliers are Zambia: 33,938 million yen, followed by Zaire: 3,206 and Namibia: 2,210 (South Africa: 6,541 million yen).

. Aluminum. - Out of a total of 15,051 million yen, we find: Egypt: 7,616, Ghana: 4,118, Cameroon: 673 (South Africa: 2,599).

. Ivory. - This item is very important, even though it concerns only 5,451 million yen (364 tons). The main supplier by far is Zaire: 224 tons, followed by Kenya: 48 tons, the Congo: 41 tons and the Central African Republic: 18 tons.

The world price of ivory varies around \$65 per kilogram (approximately 290 French francs) and the figures show that the Japanese are purchasing it at that price. Now, if one knows the price of the smallest "netsuké," one can only admire the talent of the Japanese in the area of ... added value! However, it is sad to note that, at the rate of 40 kilograms of ivory per average animal, this corresponds mathematically to 9,100 animals killed; being familiar with the hunting methods used in Africa, one may estimate that in reality this would represent a global slaughter of nearly 20,000 animals a year ...

. Antiques. - Let us mention, in closing, this very special market, which represents 375 million yen (approximately 7.5 million French francs) -- the value of officially declared sales. The Japanese are enlightened amateurs and the pieces coming out of Africa are very likely quality products. The main suppliers in this area are: Nigeria (126 million yen), followed by Zaire (72), Egypt (50), Guinea (29), Ivory Coast (19) and Cameroon (16).

Japanese Exports to Africa

The total of Japanese exports to Africa has increased in 1978 up to 1,346,573 million yen -- 785,198 of which goes to countries other than Liberia and South Africa. As could easily have been foreseen, this only involves manufactured products and the major items have been grouped together in Table VII.

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Table VII. Principal Exports from Japan to Africa in 1978
(Brussels Nomenclature)
(in millions of yen)

1 - Navires et matériel de navigation (89)	(1)	414 264
2 - Voitures, tracteurs et cycles (87)	(2)	283 958
3 - Fer, fonte, aciers (73)	(3)	146 708
4 - Machines et engins mécaniques (84)	(4)	144 564
5 - Machines électriques, Radio-TV (85)	(5)	125 753
6 - Textiles synthétiques continus (fils et tissus) (51)	(6)	28 035
7 - Textiles synthétiques discontinus (fibres) (56)	(7)	25 029
8 - Caoutchouc (feuilles, crêpes et articles manufacturés) (40)	(8)	23 179
9 - Conserves de viande et poisson (16)	(9)	22 089
10 - Instruments d'optique-photo (90)	(10)	14 437
11 - Matériel ferroviaire (86)	(11)	12 149
12 - Instruments de musique et d'enregistrement (92)	(12)	10 421
13 - Produits chimiques (28, 29, 38)	(13)	10 079
14 - Outillage, coutellerie, articles de métal (82,83)	(14)	9 432
15 - Horlogerie (91)	(15)	8 783
16 - Matières plastiques et leurs articles (39)	(16)	6 480
17 - Habillement (61)	(17)	5 220
18 - Produits céramiques et porcelaine (69)	(18)	3 996
Total	(19)	1 292 575
soit : 96 % du total général des exportations (20)		

Key:

1. Ships and navigational materials
2. Cars, tractors and bicycles
3. Iron, cast iron, steel
4. Mechanical machinery and engines
5. Electrical machinery, radio - television
6. Continuous synthetic textiles (threads and fabrics)
7. Discontinuous synthetic textiles (fibres)
8. Rubber (sheets, crepes and manufactured products)
9. Canned meat and fish
10. Optical and photographic instruments
11. Railway materials
12. Musical and recording instruments
13. Chemical products
14. Tools, cutlery, metal products
15. Time pieces
16. Plastic materials and articles thereof
17. Clothing
18. Ceramic and porcelain products
19. Total
20. Or 96 percent of the overall total exports

Excluding Liberia and South Africa, Japan's major African clients are represented -- for 97.43 percent of the total, or 765,000 million yen -- by 28 countries out of 46 having substantial trade with Japan (excluding Liberia and South Africa). These countries have been listed, in decreasing order of importance, in Table VIII.

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Table VIII. The Principal African Clients of Japan in 1978
(in million of yen)

1 - Nigeria	(1)	203 900	16 - Mozambique	(16)	6 565
2 - Algérie	(2)	153 443	17 - Malawi	(17)	8 095
3 - Égypte	(3)	86 240	18 - Madagascar	(18)	5 841
4 - Libye	(4)	73 992	19 - Zambie	(19)	5 580
5 - Kenya	(5)	31 994	20 - Maurice	(20)	5 414
6 - Côte d'Ivoire	(6)	30 151	21 - Zaïre	(21)	4 966
7 - Canaries	(7)	24 008	22 - Niger	(22)	4 902
8 - Tanzanie	(8)	23 301	23 - Sierra-Leone	(23)	4 663
9 - Soudan	(9)	17 658	24 - Djibouti	(24)	3 648
10 - Maroc	(10)	14 031	25 - Rwanda	(25)	3 609
11 - Éthiopie	(11)	10 757	26 - Ouganda	(26)	3 391
12 - Cameroun	(12)	10 060	27 - Gabon	(27)	3 317
13 - Ghana	(13)	8 615	28 - Tunisie	(28)	3 191
14 - Ceuta et Melilla	(14)	8 552	Total	(29)	765 008
15 - Angola	(15)	7 548			

Key:

- | | |
|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1. Nigeria | 16. Mozambique |
| 2. Algeria | 17. Malawi |
| 3. Egypt | 18. Madagascar |
| 4. Libya | 19. Zambia |
| 5. Kenya | 20. Mauritius |
| 6. Ivory Coast | 21. Zaire |
| 7. Canary Islands | 22. Niger |
| 8. Tanzania | 23. Sierra Leone |
| 9. Sudan | 24. Djibouti |
| 10. Morocco | 25. Rwanda |
| 11. Ethiopia | 26. Uganda |
| 12. Cameroon | 27. Gabon |
| 13. Ghana | 28. Tunisia |
| 14. Ceuta and Melilla | 29. Total |
| 15. Angola | |

Japan's major African clients are, by products and values (in millions of yen):

. Canned meat and fish. - Nigeria (14,784) - Egypt (2,440) - Ghana (1,479) and South Africa - Ethiopia - Zaire.

. Rubber (sheet, crepes and manufactured articles). - Egypt (4,970) - Algeria (4,790) - South Africa (2,905) - Nigeria (2,393) - Sudan (1,813) - Libya (1,253) - Kenya (672) and Liberia - Ethiopia - Tanzania.

. Continuous synthetic textiles (threads and fabrics). - South Africa (7,021) - Egypt (3,540) - Sudan (3,288) - Ethiopia (2,381) - Nigeria (2,306) - Tanzania (723) - Ghana (655) - Liberia (636) - Malawi (575) and Kenya - Rwanda.

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. Discontinuous synthetic textiles (fibres). - South Africa (8,383) - Nigeria (4,072) - Egypt (1,829) - Sudan (1,566) - Ethiopia (1,299) - Algeria (1,218) - Kenya (1,060) - Niger (952), and Tanzania - Libya - Mauritius.

. Iron, cast iron, steel. - Algeria (41,566) - Nigeria (35,543) - South Africa (13,369) - Libya (11,834) - Egypt (10,249) - Kenya (8,439), and Tanzania - Sudan - Madagascar - Angola - Tunisia - Ethiopia - Mozambique - Ghana - Morocco - Mauritania.

. Mechanical machinery and engines. - Algeria (48,712) - South Africa (35,152) - Nigeria (17,380) - Egypt (9,894) - Tanzania (5,617); and Sudan - Kenya - Canary Islands - Libya - Angola - Zaire - Mozambique - Malawi - Ivory Coast - Ethiopia.

. Electrical machinery - radio - television. - Nigeria (32,796) - Libya (17,228) - Egypt (16,357) - South Africa (13,934) - Canary Islands (6,949) - Ceuta and Melilla (4,149), and Tanzania - Kenya - Ivory Coast - Morocco - Ethiopia - Sudan - Uganda.

. Cars, tractors and bicycles. - South Africa (78,851) - Nigeria (66,076) - Libya (31,878) - Algeria (14,226) - Egypt (14,085) - Ivory Coast (12,553) - Kenya (12,280), and Cameroon - Tanzania - Canary Islands - Liberia - Morocco - Sierra Leone - Ghana - Sudan.

. Maritime and river navigation. - Liberia (347,226) - Algeria (24,880) - Egypt (12,137) - Ivory Coast (11,778) - South Africa (10,788) - Morocco (4,652) - Mozambique (1,397) - Madagascar (1,187).

. Inorganic chemical products. - South Africa (1,405) - Tanzania (346) - Egypt (277) - Kenya (114) and Zambia.

. Organic chemical products. - South Africa (2,283) - Tanzania (465) - Nigeria (279) and Ivory Coast - Kenya - Egypt - Algeria.

. Plastic materials and plastic articles. - South Africa (2,238) - Nigeria (1,661) - Algeria (385) - Tanzania (310) - Egypt (307) - Kenya (233) - Libya (191), and Morocco - Canary Islands - Angola.

. Clothing. - Nigeria (1,042) - Benin (591) - Egypt (413) - Libya (396) - Niger (365) - South Africa (338) - Kenya (311) - Djibouti (287) - Togo (240) - Morocco (222), and the Canary Islands - Ceuta and Melilla - Malawi - Liberia.

. Tools, cutlery and household articles. - South Africa (2,359) - Nigeria (948) - Egypt (913) - Libya (542) - Morocco (211), and Kenya - Angola - Algeria.

. Metal articles. - Nigeria (1,092) - Algeria (674) - South Africa (378) - Egypt (333) - Sudan (230), and Tanzania - Libya - Kenya.

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. Optical and photographic instruments. - South Africa (5,293) - Nigeria (1,889) - Canary Islands (1,270) - Algeria (1,058) - Libya (907) - Egypt (820) - Ceuta and Melilla (526), and Morocco - Kenya - Sudan - Tanzania - Tunisia - Ivory Coast.

. Time pieces. - Canary Islands (3,707) - Libya (1,685) - Egypt (1,255) - Ceuta and Melilla (809) - South Africa (742), and Ethiopia - Nigeria.

. Musical and recording instruments. - South Africa (2,404) - Nigeria (2,203) - Libya (1,354) - Canary Islands (836) - Egypt (774) - Ivory Coast (374) - Algeria (294) - Kenya (246), and Swaziland - Ceuta and Melilla - Mauritius.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TRANSPORTATION OUTLOOK FOR 1978-1988 DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Aug 79 pp 2308-10

[Article: "The Decade of Transportation in Africa: 1978-1988 "]

[Text] After the heads of state of the member countries of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) at their June 1973 meeting adopted the "Declaration of Cooperation for the Development of Transportation and Communications" it required more than 5 years for the UN to ratify the declaration and--in December 1978--to proclaim officially the inauguration of the "Decade of Transportation and Communications in Africa: 1978-1988."

Despite its protracted, slow progress through the maze of the various international jurisdictions, this declaration--reinforced by the countersignature of the United Nations General Assembly--seems to hold promise for the future. Indeed, an important document concerning this "decade" has just been published by the United Nations. It should be emphasized that this is the first time a comprehensive study concerning Africa has been carried out, and the first time a strategy embodying specific objectives has been elaborated with precision and sufficient objectivity to serve as a basis for action during the years to come.

The authors of this study are members of the Economic Commission for Africa--the organization that was designed, moreover, to be the prime contractor for the projects which are to be undertaken. The Commission's role will accordingly be to monitor, activate, supervise and coordinate the inauguration of the successive phases of the overall plan, which is scheduled to be spaced over the 8-year period from 1980 to 1988.

When one considers that transportation and communications facilities are the keystones of all economic progress, it is understandable that the first comprehensive choice to be made by Africa would reflect that orientation. To open up the landlocked countries of the interior; to improve, or create, major transportation axes that will make possible the continuous exchange of persons and goods; to harmonize the many existing regulations; and to develop telecommunications with a view to creating genuine local economies and obtaining the participation of the rural population in the economic awakening of a continent that possesses a great human potential and energy potential--these are the major themes of this report.

17

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The first phase of this "decade" covers the 4-year period from 1980 through 1983 and concerns a total of 49 countries--circumstances which in themselves bespeak the difficulties in compiling, selecting and refining hundreds of projects involving a continent which has many facets.

The cost estimates made for all these projects total \$8 billion. This sum has no great significance per se: it may prove to be too small or too large but is in any case imprecise, for it is subject to revision. All this is reason enough to accord only limited credence to this estimate. On the other hand, it is useful to know the budgetary percentages allocated to each individual sector, to each type of activity and to each infrastructure.

For example, national projects that impact one or more other countries represent approximately 70 percent (\$5.4 billion) of the total budget. This fact reflects a determination to develop--on a priority basis--the interstate infrastructure that is an indisputable prerequisite for any economic awakening. Projects that concern only individual states account for one-fourth of the total budget.

The types of action envisaged--investment, training and research (in the broadest sense of the term)--are distributed in the following proportions. First of all, capital investment (equipment purchases, construction, and so forth) alone account for 95 percent of the overall budget. This serves to emphasize (if such were necessary) the tremendous effort that will be required to adapt the transportation and communications network in such a way as to enable substantial progress in the current economic situation. The 3 percent allocated for training appears quite modest by comparison in view of the fact that \$95 million (1.2 percent of the budget) is allocated for research (feasibility studies, engineering surveys, planning). The commission has requested that the department of training be assigned special priority.

Lastly, an examination of the distribution in terms of structure shows that primacy has been given to highways (50 percent of the budget) followed by railways (20 percent), ports (15 percent) and airlines (7 percent), with fluvial waterways and maritime transport at the bottom of the scale. Telecommunications--including the postal services--account for 6 percent.

After establishing the general objectives and grouping the various activities into major categories, the study makes a sector-by-sector analysis of the projects.

Highways and Highway Transport

Estimated to total approximately 100,000 kilometers, the existing highway network remains relatively undeveloped in that its infrastructure has not been adapted to the various present-day modes of transport and because maintenance has manifestly been inadequate. "Africa is a victim of its geography, its lack of financial resources and its lack of technicians," is the comment most usually heard.

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These characteristics are more or less intensified depending on the region. In Burundi, Rwanda and the northeastern regions of Zaire, for example, highway transport is very poor and communications are difficult. In West Africa, on the other hand, the network of "all weather" highways will be near completion in 1982. In North Africa, where an international highway network has long been in place, the situation is substantially better: the Southern Morocco-Cairo trunk highway is completely negotiable by vehicular traffic, while the Trans-Saharan highway linking Algeria to Mali and Niger is well on the way to completion.

Two basic concepts guided the Commission in the elaboration of its projects. The first concept is that development of the various highways should be articulated around major international axes, which will in some measure serve as the skeleton of the highway infrastructure onto which the adjacent roads will be grafted. Five transnational highways will be completed soon: the Mombasa-Lagos, Cairo-Gabon, Dakar-N'Djamena, Lagos-Nouakchott and Trans-Saharan highways. Four others are in the planning stage: the Tripoli-Windhoek, Nouakchott-Cairo, N'Djamena-Massawa and Beira-Lobito highways.

The second concept is the necessity of ending the isolation of the landlocked countries (countries without an outlet to the sea), which are quite often linked to their neighbors by roads (or even trails) on which traffic is interrupted during the rainy season. For example, the N'Gaoundere-Chad route--which provides direct access from Cameroon to Chad--is rendered impassible from year to year. For many years traffic has therefore been diverted toward the Nigerian highway which runs from Maiduguri to N'Djamena, but when Lake Chad overflows (as in 1963) congestion results, with all the attendant consequences. Plans also call for putting the 313-kilometer stretch from N'Gaoundere to Guidjiba (on the Chadian border) into good condition.

The 80 projects which have accordingly been studied for inclusion in this initial phase (1980-1983) constitute a unified whole, and their completion would unquestionably assist in ending the isolation of the interior regions and to a substantial extent facilitate the movement of people and goods.

Rail Transport

Fragmented rail lines which come to an abrupt end in the middle of a country or at a national border: this is the way the African rail network appears on a map. Except in North Africa and South Africa, the density of this network is low. For a total area of approximately 30 million square kilometers there are in Africa only 80,700 kilometers of railroad, or an average of 2.5 kilometers of railroad per 1,000 square kilometers. A comparison with the European rail network, which has 60 kilometers of railroad per 1,000 square kilometers (300,000 kilometers of railroad for a total of 4.75 million square kilometers of area), demonstrates Africa's poverty in this regard. Ten countries have no rail system at all: The Gambia, Niger, Somalia, Chad, Rwanda, the Central African Empire, Libya, Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea.

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In addition to their low density the railroads are disparate in that they are currently of three different types, with those of 1.435 meter gauge and 1.065 meter gauge accounting for 75 percent of the network, not to mention various railroads of a purely local character (1.005 meter and 0.60 meter gauge) which nonetheless represent 4 percent of the overall network. There is also disparity in terms of motive power (diesel, electricity and steam). Only 6,500 kilometers of line are electrified (in North Africa and in South Africa). Diesel is the motive power most commonly used at present.

Because of all these constraints--to which must be added an inadequate infrastructure--traffic on this network moves slowly, at an average speed of 40 kilometers per hour for passenger traffic and 30 kilometers per hour for freight traffic. The famous Casablanca-Tunis "streamliner" can of course bear comparison with our European express trains, but it is virtually the only one of its kind.

The initial objective, as stated, is to achieve optimum utilization of existing capacity through improvement of the infrastructure and equipment. The second objective is subsequently to initiate a program designed to unify, harmonize and link together the various national systems, with the primary aim of opening up the isolated regions. Even more than on expansion of the railroad network, emphasis is placed on improvement and standardization of the existing lines. Expansion of the network (save for several exceptions, as for example the Trans-Gabon Railroad) has accordingly been postponed to the second phase of the program (1984-1988). Preparatory studies will be undertaken during the first part of the "decade," however.

A total of 20 studies and projects have been evaluated and proposed. We may cite in this connection the studies for the Parakou-Niamey and Togo-Niger-Upper Volta lines; the restoration in Cameroon of the Eseka-Maloume line (80 kilometers) and Edea-Eseka line (27 kilometers); and the restoration in Guinea of the Conakry-Karikan line.

Maritime Transport

The countries of Africa became involved in maritime transport only recently. The emergence of SITRAM (Ivorian Maritime Transport Company) as one of the lines serving the West African coast is a relatively recent development, despite the fact that the preponderance of Africa's international trade--more than 95 percent--moves by sea as a consequence of the insufficiency of interstate communications on the continent. It must be acknowledged that Africa's merchant fleet (consisting of 291 units, including 69 coastwise vessels) is very small and represents only 0.7 percent of total world tonnage--a circumstance which leaves to foreign companies the task of handling 97.5 percent of the African trade.

Except for the aforementioned SITRAM, the Black Star Line, the Nigerian national shipping line and a few others, the African navigation companies are small enterprises (operating from one to five ships each) which are often not very profitable because of an insufficiency of management cadres trained in the field of maritime transport.

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Although only 13 of the 49 African countries have no direct access to the sea, the African people have nonetheless not been oriented toward a maritime vocation, the lone exception being the population of the Barbary Coast, who "in modern times" plied the Mediterranean. A substantial investment has, to be sure, been made in this sector, but the reasons for this insufficiency must be sought elsewhere and are of an historical character.

Despite this situation, the authors of the plan have allocated only a relatively small part of the budget to the development of maritime transport, undoubtedly because of the large amount of capital required and the lack of specialists but also because a solution of this problem does not appear to be urgently essential to the progress of the African economy.

Nevertheless, because economic independence is one of the leitmotifs of the African leadership, strong emphasis was placed on the need for all the states of the OAU to adopt, very quickly, "the code of conduct for the Conference lines." This code stipulates the division, on a basis of equality, of traffic between a given country and the Conference lines that serve it. This is the so-called 40/40/20 rule,* which has already been implemented by a number of countries including the Ivory Coast.

The projects approved relate principally to the training of technicians to assume the functions of management and operation of the future African shipping industry, and projects to provide the indispensable technical assistance.

Provision has also been made for the purchase of a very limited number of ships, for a sum which nonetheless represents more than 60 percent of the total value of the funds allocated to maritime transport. Specifically, 114 ships will be purchased for Ethiopia for a total of \$124 million out of the overall total of \$198 million.

Ports

At the conclusion of World War II Africa possessed only a very few modern ports. On the west coast, for example--other than Dakar and to a lesser degree Takoradi--there were only so-called "wharf" ports. In those days, passengers for Lome or Cotonou went ashore by borrowing "boats" which shuttled between the ship and the wharf. The situation has since changed considerably. There are now a total of 49 major ports in Africa (12 in North Africa, 12 in East Africa, 18 in West Africa and seven in central Africa).

*Reciprocal traffic, in the amount of 40 percent for each party, the remaining 20 percent being awarded to third parties--the so-called "cross-traders."

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This represents progress that is at least encouraging, but progress that is only superficial. While it is true that the equipment in these ports is generally worn out and antiquated and that storage facilities are inadequate, the lack of efficiency and productivity that prevails on the wharves derives in great part from bad management. The pace of cargo handling is abnormally slow: 7 or 8 tons per gang-hour for miscellaneous cargo, a figure which sometimes drops to 5 tons per gang-hour. This state of affairs causes significant delays for shipping and consequently produces congestion in the ports.

The Economic Commission for Africa has been very sensitive to this problem, in consideration of the fact that of the total of 49 ports 16 serve as outlets for the landlocked countries. For this reason emphasis has been placed on the accelerated training of personnel with a view to relieving--as quickly as possible--the congestion that prevails in the ports. On page 74 of the report one accordingly reads, under the heading "Port Staff and Labor": "In every case the development of human resources must come well before the growth of the ports. The training of personnel is therefore a priority consideration and involves all categories of port employees. One of the solutions proposed is the organization of theoretical and practical training courses. This type of training can be instituted immediately, without any need for the creation of special centers."

It is therefore not surprising that a significant proportion of the projected investment for the ports has been allocated to training.

Other measures--in this case, of a material character--have also been planned, notably the expansion of the transit facilities at Lome, which is destined to become one of the outlets of Upper Volta and Niger. In addition, the projected development of the port of Kobo in Nigeria can help to provide a solution for the constant congestion of the Nigerian ports.

Waterways

Little by little, waterways have become the "poor relation" of the transportation field. Other than a few major axes (as for example the Rhine and the Seine), waterways have been neglected by investors. The same phenomenon exists in Africa as well. "Underprivileged" is the word applied to them by the authors of the report.

Without pursuing this analysis further, it should be pointed out that the notorious irregularity of the flow of the African rivers does not predispose to the development of this means of transport, a means which is, however, very economical. On some rivers the water depth normally drops below the minimum of 1.10 required for profitable navigation. Moreover, many of the rivers are divided into impassible reaches by rapids and waterfalls. At the present time the majority of the waterways remain in their natural state: that is to say, poorly suited to commercial utilization.

The river ports are either under-equipped or ill equipped and are poorly linked to the hinterland. There are many farms along the rivers and lakes

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but they have remained in the artisanal stage, in particular on the Niger, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Victoria and the affluents of Lake Chad. Several major companies operate plantations on the Benoue (which is navigable one and a half months out of the year) and on the Congo upstream from Brazzaville.

In-depth studies will be undertaken concerning the potential for navigation on certain rivers--the Volta Noire, the Gambia and the rivers of Rwanda--and also concerning the possibilities for improving the navigability of the Benoue and Casamance rivers.

A number of construction projects are also projected, including expansion of the port of Bujumbura in Burundi and the construction of a port at Gaya in Niger. A total of \$102 million has been allocated for the riverways, representing 1.2 percent of the total sums allocated for the first phase of the "decade."

Multimodal Transportation

The Commission experts who have studied the use of containers throughout Africa remain predominantly skeptical concerning the progress of this means of transportation. The share of funds allocated to the container sector substantiates this view: only \$6.40 million, whereas (as we have stated) overall expenditure for the first phase of the "decade" has been projected as \$8 billion.

This should not cause surprise. What purpose, indeed, would be served by expanding containerization on a large scale at a time when facilities for dispatching freight are still scanty, when the ports remain congested, and when the ports, railroads and highways remain poorly integrated? The progress of multimodal transportation must necessarily be slow in Africa, for it is linked to improvement of the entire infrastructure.

For the present, therefore, only country-by-country studies will be made, in order that a better approach to this problem will be possible. This is the decision that has been taken with respect to multimodal transportation.

Air Transport

In 1977 the African airlines accounted for 5 percent of the international passenger traffic and 3.3 percent of the international freight traffic. Their participation in intra-African air transport remains relatively undeveloped by comparison: 30 percent of passenger traffic and 4 percent of freight traffic. The domestic network, moreover, lacks cohesion, with service being centered predominantly on the North-South axis. One explanation is that once an African state possesses "its own line" it displays a tendency to keep the line jealously for itself, to the detriment of its development. The "jet," the present-day symbol of a certain kind of power, is not yet a factor for unity in Africa. This protectionism at the national level did not go unnoticed by the Commission's investigators, who

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reported the fact quite objectively. Hence the primary emphasis placed on the necessity for cooperation among the states in an effort to enhance the commercial potential of the existing lines.

Another factor (in this case an economic factor) has also helped to retard the growth of this means of transportation, namely operating costs. Direct costs were estimated in 1977 to be 17.3 cents per ton-kilometer (compared with the world average of 14.2 cents) and the indirect--or structural--costs to be 16.6 cents per ton-kilometer (compared with the world average of 12.9 cents).

Be that as it may, there are regions in Africa where the airplane is still the sole means of communication, and its development is therefore imperative.

The projects approved for this sector fall into two categories: the training of personnel, and the expansion and improvement of the infrastructure. The Commission has left to another organization--the African Civil Aviation Commission--the task of studying the problem of expanding the air fleet. In 1976 the African countries operated a total of 377 aircraft. At the beginning of 1978 it was estimated that in the course of the ensuing 4 years it would be necessary to acquire a total of 171 aircraft--including 60 long-range airliners--representing a total of \$2.2 billion. The financing of these purchases will be dealt with under a separate procedure.

Telecommunications, Radio, Television, Postal Service

It is a truism in Africa to say that telephonic and telex communications are mediocre, that the radio and television networks are relatively undeveloped and of slight significance, and that the postal services are highly unreliable. There are 0.44 telephones per 100 inhabitants, compared to 4.5 per 100 in South America and 5.2 per 100 in Asia.

It is obvious--the authors of the report emphasize--that a large-scale effort must be made quickly to alleviate the isolation of the residents of the rural areas and--more generally--to make the actions undertaken in the other sectors more effective. The principal objectives proposed in this regard are as follows:

1. Telecommunications
 - a. Improvement and expansion of the national networks, with the goal of one telephone per 100 inhabitants, and one public telephone per 10,000 inhabitants, by the end of the "decade."
 - b. Connections for capitals that lack transit to the outside world.
 - c. Harmonization of rates.
 - d. The development in Africa of a telecommunications industry.

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2. Radio and Television

- a. Improvement and expansion of the infrastructure of the radio and television networks with a view to assisting the economic and social development of the rural areas.
- b. An exchange of programs among the individual states.
- c. Consideration of measures to bring about an increase in the number of radio receiving sets among the population (at the present time the least expensive radio receiver costs \$20).
- d. The development in Africa of a radio and television equipment industry.

3. Postal Services

- a. Development of the infrastructure through the creation of multinational transit centers.
- b. Organization of mobile mail delivery services in rural communities.

At the conclusion of this brief analysis several comments come naturally to mind. How will all the projects mentioned in this report be financed? Assuming that the appropriate organizations will grant the credit requested, how will it then be integrated into the multiple, bilateral and multilateral aid granted to the individual states through the intermediary of the numerous national and international organizations--the OCDE [Cooperation and Economic Development Organization]; the EEC; the EEC/ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific countries]; the EDF [European Development Fund]; and others--not to mention the regional African organizations that function as the payees in this transaction? One can anticipate that--at the very least--a situation difficult to clarify will result.

Let us also once again consider Africa's political problems, which do not predispose to optimism. Will these problems not act as a brake on cooperation among the individual states, which is, however, indispensable to the successful implementation of this plan? The African leaders hope over the long term to achieve economic integration--an African common market at the continental level. Will the economy take precedence over politics?

In any event, the report drawn up by the Economic Commission for Africa and approved by the conference of the ministers of transportation is scheduled for presentation to the UN next November, for the approval of that body. There is not yet any reason for skepticism concerning implementation of this vast program.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

GDR EXPEDITIONARY FORCES--Six thousand men: these are the East German forces of the "Afrikakorps" presently stationed in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. According to South African intelligence sources, these Germans adapt themselves very rapidly to combat and living conditions on the black continent, even faster than the members of the Cuban expeditionary corps. Pretoria has passed on a dossier on this particular question to the Bonn government. [Text] [Paris VELEURS ACTUELLES in French 1 Oct 79 p 34]

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BENIN

STABILITY, GOOD MANAGEMENT CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Sep 79 pp 36-39

[Article by Philippe Simonet: "The Experts Are Optimistic"]

[Text] The World Bank is optimistic regarding the medium-range economic future of Benin. This is the conclusion that can be drawn from the international financial organization's latest report on the country. This report is more extensive than the bank's previous report on Benin covering the period 1972-1973. The new report covers the entire period since Lieutenant Colonel Kerekou's rise to power. The report describes those years as "a period of political stability" following a dozen years of troubles and incessant changes in government.

The World Bank expects that Benin's gross national product will grow by 6 percent per year, in real terms, between 1978 and 1985 (disregarding inflation). This growth will result from an increased rate of investment over the next 4 years (22 percent of the GNP according to bank experts). This rapid economic expansion should allow an increase, in real terms, of 2 percent per year in per capita consumption and thus produce a noticeable increase in the standard of living.

The World Bank also believes that this growth can be accomplished without producing a deficit in Benin's balance of payments. What will happen, it believes, is that foreign aid will offset any trade deficit. It may even happen that Benin will be able to increase its reserves of foreign exchange during the next few years. This would result from the fact that 85 percent of all investments in Benin will be financed by foreign capital. The other side of the coin is obviously an increase in Benin's foreign indebtedness: the debt service (the repayment of loans), which is currently equivalent to 4.5 percent of the value of exports, will by the early 1980's amount to 10 to 15 percent of the value of exports. This level of indebtedness--which is common for developing countries--is viewed by the World Bank as "tolerable, especially," the bank adds, "with the support of the Nigerian Government behind the two major investment projects that are planned." The two projects referred to involve the sugar and cement industries.

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This vision of the future is all the more comforting in view of the fact that Benin is one of the poorest countries in the world; 170 dollars per capita income (1976 estimate). The picture of Benin's past and present that the World Bank's experts paint is not all bright however. Economic growth is a new phenomenon for Benin. Per capita income has been stagnant for many years due principally to population growth which remains at about 2.8 percent per year. The economic growth that has occurred over the last few years is essentially due to trade and industry. Agriculture, which still employs 60 percent of the work force, did not increase its average production between 1972 and 1976.

The importance of the agricultural sector is obvious, both to the distribution of income and the standard of living for the most disadvantaged classes.

Industry employs only 2 percent of the active population (but its growth rate was about 11 percent per year between 1972 and 1976). The rest of the population is engaged in trade which thus provides employment for almost 40 percent of the active population. If one were not aware of these two facts one might think that Benin had already entered the post-industrial era.

In reality, the size of the tertiary sector is explained and justified in part by the nature of the transportation system that connects Benin with its neighbors, particularly Niger and Nigeria.

Is the strategy that has been adopted by the government in matters of economic and social development responsive to Benin's needs? Since 1974 the objective of public officials has been the nationalization of the economy and greater state control over all sectors of activity. The large modern businesses are now under government control: water and electricity, banks, fuel distribution, breweries, textiles, etc. Now the government is trying to reorganize the rural sector through the introduction of new institutions: provincial agencies for rural development and new forms of cooperative production units, particularly in Borgou Province.

As a result of this extension of the public sector one might expect to disorganization in governmental finances. According to the World Bank's report this has not happened. On the contrary, and this is apparently one of the most positive points concerning the new regime's management, the government's financial situation has improved considerably over the last decade.

The budgetary deficits which had characterized the 1960's and which had been financed by transfers from the French treasury have been eliminated. Growth of government expenditures has been controlled by the authorities particularly by a campaign against waste and inefficiency. As for government receipts, they have been considerably increased as a result of the growth in import taxes and income taxes. The bank believes that this

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prudence in the management of the public sector has given more strength to the economic growth.

After compliments such as these the document's authors are even freer in their criticism of some aspects of the current 3-year plan for economic development (1977-79). The principal reproach concerns the rate of investment set by the government for the first 2 years: it would approach 60 percent of the gross national product. The experts feel that such a level is neither possible nor desirable; it exceeds the level of valid projects, the capability for financing from foreign capital, and the capacity of the country to absorb the investment. The report goes so far as to say that "The inclusion of this exaggerated development program in the plan diminishes the credibility of the document." The bank estimates that the level of investment that is possible is on the order of 125 billion CFA francs or about half of the figure proposed by the government in its plan (244 billion CFA francs).

The bank's report also criticizes the "export-substitution" orientation that the Benin authorities have given to their economic development policy.

According to the bank, such a policy, which consists of broadening domestic markets rather than orienting production toward the export markets, will be seriously handicapped by the small scale of Benin's economy. According to the experts at the bank, Benin's industrial experience shows that projects have succeeded when they combined the three following conditions: a large domestic and neighboring market, well-developed technology, and a modest initial level of operations.

In spite of these disagreements the World Bank approves of the majority of investments proposed by the plan, all the while feeling that it would be wiser to stretch them out over a longer period of time. There is however one major project on which the bank stamps its clear mark of disapproval, that of an oil refinery.

The report shows that Benin's economic development is still hindered by certain deficiencies in manpower. "This observation may appear surprising," the report reads, "for a country which has had, since World War II, a reputation for supplying all of French speaking Africa with qualified administrative personnel." The report makes no attempt to explain this paradox which has already been noted in this publication (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 970). The report confines itself to observing that it will be necessary to strengthen the system of education and training.

One of the biggest problems facing Benin, that of its relations with its neighbors, and particularly with the largest of them in terms of power, size, and resources, Nigeria, is dealt with in a cautious manner by the World Bank. The paragraph concerning this question is herewith quoted in almost its entirety: "Benin has traditionally played a role of trade and transportation in the region and events of the past several years have

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demonstrated well that the country has the capacity to turn the opportunities provided by its neighbors to its own advantage. Nevertheless a note of caution should be sounded. For example, the reduction in imports effected by Nigeria during the spring of 1978 had direct repercussions on the Benin transportation economy and the same will be true as Nigeria develops its own ports. Over the long term the current plan to establish a joint customs union with a common foreign duty, combined with the existence of a large industrial base in Nigeria, could easily lead to significant imports to Benin from its neighbor. Nevertheless a small-scale and undiversified economy such as that found in Benin must necessarily keep the lid on foreign imports and the policies of free trade that have benefited this orientation in the past should be retained." Is this trade liberalism, in the long run, compatible with the economic nationalism that is sought by Lieutenant Colonel Kerekou's regime? The World Bank stops short of asking the question. But would it have been a valid question within the framework of the report?

Generally speaking how credible is this report? According to its preface the contents of the report were discussed with the Benin government and some changes were made to the text. In other words the report was not able to go too far in its criticism. But on the other hand it is a confidential document for "restricted" distribution, all of which serves to increase the confidence that it is due. In any case it has merit in that it raises some of the principal problems that are faced by Benin's economy and it is thought provoking for anyone who is concerned about Benin's future.

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BENIN

BRIEFS

STUDENT UNREST--Beninese authorities are trying to find a way to calm student unrest which has disturbed the university the last 3 months, mainly over the problem of the poor transportation system. After reacting vigorously by calling the complainers "anarchists" and "agents of imperialism," the government is now playing down the situation. A special commission of the Beninese People's Party central committee has reportedly been formed to "find concrete solutions" before the election scheduled for 20 November. [Excerpt] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Sep 79 p 35]

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CHAD

POINTS INCLUDED IN LAGOS AGREEMENT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2363

[Text] Here are the nine points of the "Lagos Agreement" signed during the night of 20-21 August by the 11 Chadian groups in the capital of Nigeria:

First point: The signatories call for an immediate cease-fire in Chad and request that the neighboring countries refrain from interfering in Chadian domestic affairs. A 100-km zone around Ndjamena will be demilitarized. The cease-fire will be controlled by neutral troops composed of contingents from several countries, excluding those bordering on Chad.

The neutral force will also operate in the cities of Abeche, Faya, Moundou and Sahr and will be responsible for protecting "important Chadian personages."

Second point: Creation of an independent control commission responsible for guaranteeing enforcement of the cease-fire and seeing that the neutrality of the national radio is respected until a transition government is formed. This commission will be presided over by the secretary general of the OAU or by his representative and will be placed under the moral authority of the president of the transition government. It will be made up of two representatives from each participating or observing country represented at the Lagos Conference and by a delegate from each Chadian group that is a signatory of the agreement.

Third point: Use of any clandestine radio station is forbidden.

Fourth point: Release of all political prisoners within 15 days following the forming of the transition government, and amnesty for all political exiles.

Fifth point: The temporary national union government will be made up of members of all signatory groups, with an 18-month term. The temporary government will apply a political program leading to free elections that will give birth to a new government.

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Sixth point: Dissolution of the Armed Forces and creation of an integrated National Army.

Eighth point [as published]: The agreement to become effective immediately.

Ninth point: A copy of the agreement to be sent to the OAU.

The signatories of the agreement are:

Abdoulaye Adam Dana (First "Volcan" Army)
Fatcho Balam (National Democratic Union)
Mohammed Abba Said (First Army)
Acyi Ahmat (First Army of the People, Revolutionary Democratic Council)
Abba Siddik (original FROLINAT; [Chadian National Liberation Front])
Moussa Medela ("Western Forces" of FROLINAT)
Hadjero Senoussi (FROLINAT)
Aboubakar Abdel Rahmane (People's Liberation Movement of Chad)
Goukouni Ouaddeimi ("People's Armed Forces"--FAP)
Hissein Habre ("Armed Forces of the North"--FAN)
Wadal Abdel Kader Kamougue ("Armed Forces of Chad"--FAT)

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CHAD

LAGOS AGREEMENT VIEWED AS MODERATELY HOPEFUL

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 pp 2363, 2365

[Editorial: "The Lagos Agreement (21 August 1979): Moderate Hope for Chad"]

[Text] Most Chadian circles are in agreement in considering the results of the latest Lagos conference "unexpected." And indeed, for the first time they have seen, in addition to the strongly affirmed reconciliation between the representatives of the north and the south, the beginning of a genuine plan for rebuilding the state that is likely to straighten out the country's economy, which today is plunged into "total chaos," to use the expression of Goukouni Ouaddeimi himself. However, the euphoria that followed upon the announcement of the agreement in Ndjamena was succeeded by certain reservations and the feeling that it will be necessary to await the forming of a new government--the date for which is still uncertain--and its first measures, in order to appraise the chances for success of the new charter and the solidity of the reconciliation between the two most outstanding representatives of the north and south, Goukouni Ouaddeimi and Col Abdelkader Kamougue.

Among the rapprochement factors may be noted first the desire to look for a solution among Chadians by limiting as much as possible the influence of two too-powerful neighbors who might be suspected of wanting to "vassalize" Chad: Nigeria and Libya. The former did not hesitate late last April to order an embargo on oil deliveries, in order to weaken the resolution of Goukouni and Habre, who had been opposed at the second Lagos conference to recognizing certain groups they had judged to be too receptive to the interests of the Nigerians. As for Libya, she still occupies the Aouzou strip, and during the first 2 weeks of June she armed the columns of "Libyan mercenaries" who in the north approached to within 15 km of Faya-Largeau before being cut to pieces by FROLINAT troops commanded personally by Goukouni Ouaddeimi. To counterbalance their influence, three French-speaking states were invited and participated in the second Lagos conference beside Chad's six neighboring states: Senegal, Benin and the Congo. Likewise, the neutral force that is to be responsible for controlling the cease-fire in Ndjamena, Abeche, Faya-Largeau and Sahr and protecting "important Chadian responsibilities" is to include no contingent from the countries bordering on Chad. It will be furnished by Benin, the Congo and Guinea, Senegal having refused.

34

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On the other hand, Goukouni Ouaddeimi has publicly acknowledged the errors committed after the second Kano conference by the government to which he belonged. "Those of us who held the power in Ndjamen, he has said, "made decisions that were against the principle of African solidarity." Those unfortunate decisions explain the French-speaking countries' reluctance to recognize the Chad Government's representatives at the Kigali Franco-African conference and the refusal to the OAU to allow it to sit at the Monrovia summit. The most serious error was the attempt by the Ndjamen government to subjugate the south militarily at the time of its military expedition from Bongor toward Pala and Kelo. Hissein Habre's troops were routed there on the road from Lai by the units of the Chad regular army, fighting in their native country under the energetic command of Colonel Kamougue.

Goukouni and Habre must have concluded that it would be very difficult militarily--if not impossible--for the northerners to conquer the south militarily, just as peaceful conquest of the north by southern cadres had been shown to be unfruitful.

As conqueror of Hissein Habre's troops, the south speedily strengthened its unity under the vigorous impetus of Colonel Kamougue, and restored its economic potential. Cut off from Ndjamen, it easily formed a new administration with cadres who had withdrawn from the north and the capital and come to seek refuge in their native country. From then on the south was in a situation where it was negotiating as an equal with the Ndjamen government, which for its part was weakened by internal dissension, but at the heart of which Goukouni Ouaddeimi's prestige was strengthened by his victory in the north, whereas Hissein Habre's was much damaged by his defeat in the south.

The Chadian delegates of all persuasions present in Lagos drew the logical conclusion from this power struggle, while entrusting the highest responsibility to the country's two "strong men," Goukouni Ouaddeimi was made president of Chad, Colonel Kamougue vice president. In their persons are represented the Moslem populations of the north and the Christian or animist populations of the south.

Together they have proclaimed their reconciliation on high. "With your agreement I am certain that we will succeed in uniting Chad," Goukouni Ouaddeimi stated to Colonel Kamougue, while the latter answered him, "Today you are the president of Chad. You are from the north, you are a Goran, but Goukouni is the president of Chad."

He had previously affirmed "The commitment is made to serve the country selflessly from now on. There will be no more south or north. Speaking on behalf of the Chadian Armed Forces and the people of the southern zone, I assure you that we are in favor of unity for Chad." For their part, the other groups represented in Lagos unanimously declared their acceptance without restrictions of the nine points of the agreement.

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The understanding between Goukouni Ouaddeimi and Colonel Komougue and the continuation of the unanimity manifested in the Nigerian capital appear to be indispensable to enforcing the agreement, and that condition alone demonstrates its fragility. As the Ivorian daily FRATERNITE-MATIN said, "The 11 Chadian groups, including those whose leaders represent only their own ambitions, have thus agreed to make peace. We would have liked to write that that country is on the threshold of peace," but this is Chad "and it is always possible that there is someone there who, because he did not fall heir to the position he expected in the government, will take to the bush in the desert."

The difficulties involved in enforcing the agreement are underlined by a number of diplomatic observers in Ndjamena. They are particularly foreseeable in the matter of forming a government charged with preparing for elections to be held in 18 months' time. What place will be reserved in it for Hisssein Habre, who until then is defense minister, and of whom it is repeatedly said that he has voiced serious reservations on several points of the compromise drawn up at Lagos?

The departure of the French troops, of whom the Paris government reminded us that it had already decided to withdraw them and that it had kept them there only on the express request of the Ndjamena government, was demanded, says the Lagos communique, by "all parties" present at the conference. According to the same rumors circulating in Ndjamena, Hisssein Habre was fiercely in favor of their being maintained until the neutral forces are put in place. Thus he joins with the position of the Cameroonian President Ahidjo who, on his return from Lagos, where he attended the conference, published a communique on 23 August in which he characterizes as "unrealistic and unrealizable in the near future" certain of the agreement's clauses, especially those concerning the putting in place of neutral forces "without this being called into question by the countries that are supposed to supply the troops." Consequently, President Ahidjo is hoping that Chad's new authorities will ask that the French troops be maintained "until the principal decisions of Lagos are implemented."

Among those decisions is the creating of an integrated national army. Thus it will be necessary to combine troops as different as those of the FROLINAT, which are trained and accustomed to conducting desert operations akin to guerrilla warfare, and those of the former regular army, more traditionalist and closer to conventional armies of the Western type. Moreover, they have confronted each other in the past. The task will be a difficult one.

Drawing up a foreign and a domestic policy will also be difficult. Goukouni Ouaddeimi belongs to the FROLINAT, which proclaims itself a revolutionary movement that demands socialism. Colonel Kamougue has the reputation of being closer to a liberal system of the Western kind.

36

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Abroad there are two unknowns: the attitudes of Nigeria and Libya. Together they have at their disposal, among the 11 groups, "proteges" with whose help they could exert pressure on Ndjamená.

Nigeria, whose military contingent in Chad left unfortunate memories among the population there, is supporting Aboukabar Abdel Rahmane's People's Liberation Movement of Chad. In the recent past the government of Lagos has shown that it intended to make its conception of what the Chadian reconciliation requires prevail.

As for Libya, whose occupation of the north of Chad was surprisingly not contested by anyone at Lagos, only a common front of the majority--if not the whole--of the groups represented at Lagos, appears capable of dissuading her from renewing her attempt to control the north with the help of bands armed by means of Libya's attention.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SOME MYSTERIES STILL REMAINING CONCERNING COUP

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 29 Aug 79 pp 16, 17

[Article by Pierre Gardel: "'We Are Free.'"]

[Text] A red star gleams on the light khaki uniform. The officer, a second lieutenant, carries a simple scarlet plastic plaque which replaces the traditional array of decorations. These Equatorial Guinean military personnel are...in Gabon, at Cocobeach, a border town without a border town's characteristic features. No customs office, no visible police. A short beach where coco trees are few and far between. Invited to the celebration of Gabon's national holiday (17 August), the 'Equatos' as they are called here, didn't arrive until 18 August, to the discomfiture of the local authorities--deputy, prefect, and customs director--who hadn't planned on paying for beer two evenings in a row.

The 'guests' came by boat from the Guinea district of Kogo, the other side of this arm of the sea. In the building of the Democratic Party of Gabon (PDG), they exchanged toasts and clinked glasses freely to liberty regained, to the arrest of the ex-dictator Macias Nguema.

Still at Cocobeach, but a few hundred meters (and three bottles) away, a rough shed sheltered the misery of Luis, Antonio and Bartolome. During the times of the 'Senors' (the Spanish), the first of the trio had guided planes along the runways of Malabo airport, the capital of Equatorial Guinea. Dismissed with the rest of the staff, he then worked in a textile shop which liquidated, slowly but surely, the colonial stock. Once the funds of the Equatorial branch of Mata were exhausted, Luis had to go back to Kogo and return to a subsistence economy before finally choosing exile. He has lived too long at Cocobeach to not traffic a bit in soap, oil, or other product become rare in Macias' Guinea. Antonio and Bartolome had arrived the evening before. Fang before being Equatorial Guineans, they had come to Cocobeach to see Gabonese relatives.

All were afraid to talk. They glanced furtively at a local male nurse, a fellow national who belonged to the family of dictator Macias, but above all they feared administrative hassles with Gabonese authorities.

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According to them, everything was calm in Guinea. At Kogo there wasn't even any revengeful settling of accounts. "People were in Macias' militia because they had to be. Anyhow, since the coup d'etat their life doesn't seem to have changed any." At the words 'work', 'food', they responded with sad smiles and an awkward silence.

But for all that there is no question of throwing doubt on the importance of the coup d'etate, 'El Golpe, '. On this subject they became enthusiastic. "We are free." The rest will come once the government is constituted. Macias? "He shouldn't be killed, but kept a prisoner the rest of his life. He should suffer as much as he has made us suffer."

At Libreville, at the entrance of a popular noisy dance hall, the Equatorial Guineans are a little hastier. By Radio-Malabo they learned of the arrest of the former dictator. To questions about the fate he deserves they responded by an expressive gesture, a rapid movement of the hand across the throat. Here too, the past of the new master of Guinea close to the dictator didn't seem to bother anyone. "We don't have the right to doubt the authors of the liberation." Teodoro Obian Nguema is a 'good' man, according to a refugee who remembers having studied with him at the college La Salle de Bata. He declared his intention of returning soon to his liberated country, but at the same time he intended to go back to his work in Port-Gentil after his vacation in Libreville.

No one doubts that Equatorial Guinea has been liberated, but a return to the country has not begun. But the notables who surrounded President Macias and who first fled to Gabon, were able to leave. This is notably the case of the minister of the economy, Oyono, of the commander of the military sector of Bata, of Macias' personal physician, and even of the ex-dictator's first wife (pregnant) who passed the frontier with six suitcases and chests full of money, immediately confiscated by the Gabonese government and remitted to a delegation of the new Equatorial Guineas regime come to Libreville on 7 August.

Among the Equatorial Guineans other news circulates, not always verifiable. According to the rumors, Macias Nguema was arrested on 11 August, alone in the forest, carrying a suitcase stuffed with money. Wounded on the hand on this occasion, he was taken to Bata. As for the famous Cubans, they seem to have disappeared into the landscape. As much as it is believed that the putsch had been rapid and without rough edges, it is believed that its success is due to treason by the Cubans in Macias' immediate entourage. But no one has seen a Cuban or the body of one--even after the hard fighting at Ncue and during Macias' counteroffensive towards Bata. Some think they left the country long ago, not being suited by Macias' Marxist-Leninism. Others think they are still there in their roles as instructors and technicians, refusing to take part in the fighting. Mysterious Cubans in a coup d'etat which has not yet unveiled all its mysteries.

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39

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

TEODORO NGUEMA'S POLITICAL IDEAS SAID TO BE UNKNOWN

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 29 Aug 79 p 17

[Article by Pierre Gardel: "A Last Minute Democrat"]

[Text] "The dog has changed his collar, but he is still tied up." The expression comes from Antonio Ondo, one of the principal Equatorial Guinean opposition party refugees in Madred. He and many others are not yet confident in the new strong man of Equatorial Guinea. To be sure, Teodoro Nguema has overthrown the tyrant Macias Ngyema, but has that earned him the label of democrat? He who today presides over the Revolutionary Military Council was not too long ago the vice minister of defense of the fallen regime. And this position and the confidence it supposes explains the success of the coup d'etat.

Teodoro, by whom democracy has arrived, in effect directed the forces of repression of the country that he has just liberated. In December 1969 he was present in the area where a Fang, two Nigerians, and a Bubi were executed. He was there as a military chief, while the rest of the public had been forced there by the guard. His presence had also been noted at the executions which took place in the Place of the Clock, at Bata, etc. Can he take refuge in "orders from higher up"? Some doubt it. "Juan Manuel Tray", one of those rare Guinean military professionals, directed the president's military establishment, Fortunato Okenve occupied the position of secretary general of defense, but they had no power. The simple Lieutenant Teodoro was in fact the real head." It was he who masterminded the elimination of those Guineans trained by the Spanish Army. In 1965 there were 11 cadets to the military academy of Saragossa: Teodoro of course, but also Maximiliano, shot in 1970 in the prison of Santa Isabel, Jesus Eguoro, clubbed to death in 1972. But Teodoro's star never checked in its rise. Because of his kinship with Macias? Without a doubt. But also because of his role in stopping the conspiracy fomented in 1973 by the Britisher F. Forsyth.

*Afterwards he was placed under house arrest at his residence in the village of Musola.

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Only recently did the future strong man exhibit a certain independence. He played mediator between the all-powerful master and those foreigners who had the misfortune of falling into his hands, such as the captain of the Spanish ship Ukola. From that it could be deduced that Teodoro Ngyema was pro-West, but, finally, no one could pride himself on knowing his political ideas. The new regime has carefully refrained from any precise declaration. Even the announcement of the liberation of political prisoners has not sufficed to convince those familiar with Macias' pretensions to liberalism. For if Teodoro Nguema has proved himself as a putschist, he must still prove himself as a democrat.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

AFRICA LOSES ONE MORE DICTATOR

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Aug 79 pp 20, 21

[Article by Hamza Kaidi: "One Dictator Less"]

[Excerpts] Will 1979 enter into history as a black year for tyrants? In 6 months, five despots have fallen one after the other. After the bloody regimes of Pol Pot in Cambodia, Mohamed Reza Pahlavi in Iran, Idi Amin in Uganda and Somoza in Nicaragua, that of one of the planet's most sinister scourges fell in its turn. On 5 July Equatorial Guinea radio announced in a brief communique that a military junta led by Col Teodoro Nguema Mbazago, vice minister of defense, had overthrown the dictator on the evening of 3 July.

Cousin and close collaborator of the fallen dictator, Colonel Nguema, who frankly acknowledges Marxist-Leninist leanings, was a student at Spain's Military Academy at Saragossa. He distinguished himself by his zeal in suppressing an attempted coup d'etat in 1972. Nor did he hesitate to eliminate his 11 classmates one by one, among whom figures another dignitary of the regime, Jesus Esgoro, minister of justice from 1968 to 1973. In 1976 he denounced a budding conspiracy against 'Guinea's unique miracle,' which won him promotion to the rank of vice minister of defense and the governorship of the island of Fernando Po, renamed Macias Nguema Island.

This man who had served the dictator Macias Nguema so well, today presents himself as a liberator. Calling himself Teodoro Nguema Mbazago, he leads a junta whose members are also mostly Nguema, and is thus the second chief of state of Equatorial Guinea.

Independent since 12 October 1968, after close to two centuries of Spanish colonialism, Equatorial Guinea is composed of two distinct territorial regions: the Rio Muni, a 26,017 sq km rectangle squeezed between Gabon and Cameroon, facing the Atlantic, and the island territories of which Macias Nguema holds the capital city Malabo (formerly Santa Isabel).

In 1973 the population of this state of 28,051 sq km was estimated at 300,000. Since then there has been a steady decline as thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled the country's terrorist regime. Nearly 70,000 found refuge in

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Gabon, 40,000 in Cameroon, 8,000 in Spain and 5,000 in Nigeria. Leading his rival Bonifacio Ondo Edu by a short nose, Macias Nguema, elected chief of state in 1968, did not delay in getting rid of his rivals physically. His collaborators and partisans, anyone who might cross him, paid the price of a thirst for power.

Macias then turned against the leaders of other political groups whom he accused of conspiring against him. This was the beginning of a series of assassinations. In 1970 he created a political party at first baptised PUN (Party of National Unity) and then PUNT (National Workers Party). He proscribed all other parties and concentrated all powers into his own hands, proclaiming himself president for life, 'Guinea's unique miracle,' leader of the nation and the party, grand master of education, science and culture, commander in chief of the army, minister of defense, etc.

His relationships with other countries were more curious yet. He readily practiced an official racket: after a Soviet airplane fell on Equatorial Guinea territory, Moscow had to pay a fine of \$75,000 for damage to the mountain. Spain was only able to obtain the release of six priests through a ransom of \$100,000. Five passengers of a French helicopter which had to make a forced landing were released only after payment of \$25,000.

In spite of all this, the Western nations observed total silence about the misdeeds of the despot. All the news from Equatorial Guinea was censored by the Madrid government up until the death of Franco.

The United States was the first to break with the government of Malabo, in 1976, followed by Spain in 1977. Only France continued good relations with the Macias regime, imitated, it's true, by the OAU, who hardly dared bring up the least misdeed of the despot. Although Moscow had severed diplomatic relations with the dictator--who had adopted an additional title, 'grand inquisitor of colonialism'--it continued to supply oil and military goods to Equatorial Guinea. In exchange, Macias granted a base for its 'fishing fleet' at San Carlos, 20 km from Malabo. As its part Cuba maintained a sizeable technical mission which assured the continued functioning of the airports at Bata and Malabo, the electrical power centers, and the two radio stations of the country. Moreover, the army and Macias' guard were officered by Cuban instructors. During the war with Angola in 1975, the base at San Carlos served as a staging area for military goods destined for the MPLA. The Soviet cargo carriers left armaments there which were then picked up by small Angolan boats.

But the relationship between the Kremlin and the master of Equatorial Guinea was never cordial. In spite of their insistence, the Soviets were never able to get concessions for research and development of cobalt and wolfram (tungsten). The contract for the base at San Carlos itself had to be renewed every year.

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In the end, the Soviets got tired of their burdensome protege, especially after finding the ear of his faithful lieutenant more receptive. But what could the vice minister of defense do, governor of the territory where the capital was situated though he was? The soldiers of Teodoro Nguema were armed only with some old Mausers dating from World War II and had little ammunition.

In February 1977 a Bulgarian ship, the M.S.Bulgam, unloaded a mysterious cargo. A box accidentally opened revealed about 20 grenade throwers. In August 1977, an airplane from the Czechoslovakian air lines deposited at Malabo airport a cargo including, among other things, about 20 Czech 7.62 mm machine guns. In March 1978, 500 AK47 Kalashnikov combat guns were sent by the Czechoslovakian firm Omnipol to a Polish port, from which they were loaded onto the M.S.Ustinov, destination Equatorial Guinea.

In January 1979 relations between the dictator, who was then taking long vacations on the continent, and his vice minister, suddenly deteriorated. Only the lack of communications (there was only a small boat to serve as liaison between the island and the continent) prevented them from being unraveled. Then, in August, the crisis came to a head. Col Nguema Mbazogo put his wife on the first plane for Madrid, where she arrived on 2 August. The next day he took action. For the moment we do not know what means of transportation had been used, and above all, who had put them at the disposition of Colonel Nguema. The garrison at Bata, around 300 men, led by Cuban instructors, didn't move. But the putschists were disagreeably surprised to find the dictator absent. He was at Mongo, his birthplace, about 5 km from the Gabon frontier.

A helicopter (the Cubans must have had a strong hand in all the aeronautical material) was put at the disposal of the insurgents. The detachment for Mango had no trouble in encircling Macias' bunker, protected by his personal guard of 70 men led by 18 Cubans. He attempted to resist, refusing to surrender. But on 6 August it was confirmed that all the armed forces had joined the putschists. The Nguema 'miracle' faded away.

With Macias Nguema's disappearance from the scene, Africa sees itself rid of two vampires in the space of 3 months. An old saying says there is never two without a third. When will the third be?

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

MILITARY AGRICULTURAL OPERATION--The OFFICIAL JOURNAL has published a decree establishing the Military Agricultural Production Operation, Omipra. Omipra is a public body responsible for various crop developments and 100,000 new hectares of rice-growing. The army is in charge of the operation. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2655]

SOVIET EQUIPMENT SPECIALISTS--About 10 Soviet technicians who will work on maintenance of tractors and other agricultural equipment from the USSR are expected to arrive soon. Their arrival is covered by a contract signed 6 September by the Malagasy rural development and agrarian reform minister and Zapchasteexport/Tractorexport representative, Baziliev. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2655]

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RHODESIA

LIFESTYLE OF WHITES CHANGED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Sep 79 pp 38-39

Text A disillusioned white said the other day at the Golf Club bar in Salisbury, "I really don't know what country I could take refuge in." The fact is there really are no more countries where you can find blacks who earn a pittance by shining your shoes. Here in Rhodesia itself after these miserable elections, you no longer can find even one who wants to push your Rolls, which has run out of gas, to the nearest gas station and wait in line for you for a dollar, because of the fuel shortage created by those dirty Arabs!

No doubt, all the luxurious joys of living have not yet disappeared in the 3 months since Mr Smith handed over the fundamental leadership of the country to the blacks. However, one had been warned for a long time that any concession to these apes would cause a ridiculous drop in the standard of living. One has certainly tried to find a middle ground, so that the white minority could actually continue to control some puppet black ministers, so that one could, all the same, have his breakfast or his whisky served when he wanted it and one could have his car washed for nothing.

But it is dreadful that Abel Muzorewa who was considered submissive and reasonable, dared to establish a minimum hourly wage for his black brothers. And nevertheless, the experts (some whites, the only experts in the country, obviously) had assured that the country's tottering economy, could not support this measure.

Fortunately, in fact, one continues to enjoy agricultural workers, maids and gardeners for next to nothing!

The fact is that, despite wretched wages, there are always people looking for work. There are always even two or three blacks who scramble for every job offered. But precisely this

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failure of his employment policy has cost Mr Muzorewa the support of a large part of those who were responsible for his success in the elections. So that a large number of those who voted in April for the Methodists who graduated from American universities are now ready to side with their enemies the guerrillas or at least agree with them in believing that the bishop's government has sold out to the whites. Which does not improve things for the latter.

"It is not a question of driving the whites out of here, says Stephen Nguru, a young black, 27 years old, who has a wife and a child and who, having just lost his job in a factory, contents himself for the moment with the meager wages of a caddie on a golf course. We do not want to carry out a revolution. We merely want more jobs, more money to live better, what then? If not, we will get rid of the bishop."

Under a sweltering sun, Mr Nguru earned 650 CFA francs for an 18 hole game, from which he must deduct 125 francs for his round trip in a bus from his house to the golf course, located in a Salisbury suburb. That is enough for him to support his family 2 or 3 days. But he recognizes he is lucky, for there are sometimes 30 caddies at the golf club waiting vainly to be hired.

Reverend Muzorewa toured the country, asking his black brothers to be patient. But his problem is that he must spend 1.5 million dollars a day to conduct the campaign against the Patriotic Front guerrillas and that the West stubbornly persists in refusing to lift the sanctions imposed on Smith's regime--and the latter are very poorly supported by a black population which has been waiting for more than 20 years to take over power.

It is enough to walk in a supermarket to realize the distance which has to be covered for the living standards of the blacks and whites to be approximately equal. On Saturday morning, one sees white families pile up meat and fresh vegetables in the wheeled baskets at prices which would be enough to tempt European and American housewives. At the checkout exits, young blacks almost fight each other to carry the groceries of these ladies and gentlemen to the parking lot and stow them away in the trunk of a cadillac for paltry tips.

Domestic help, which the whites value the most, earn 5,000 to 15,000 CFA francs a month, a low enough wage to allow the most poorly paid whites to have their boy or maid at home. Official statistics indicate that the whites employ about 150,000 blacks as domestics. Now since less than 250,000 whites remain in Rhodesia today, that means more than one domestic per home.

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Most of the latter work 6 days a week, getting up at dawn to serve tea and only going to bed late in the evening after having finished the dishes. In addition, the maids' rooms have no light or heat most of the time.

The whites are sure of it: the blacks adore their white employers. Why certainly! The proof of it is the condolences they publish when one of them is executed by the guerrillas or in a criminal attack. Nevertheless, the courts hear every day the complaints of the blacks about discriminatory treatment or racist remarks.

No doubt, such behavior still exists elsewhere. However, the appeals of Reverend Muzorewa, asking the whites in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to change their attitudes, will be useless, so long as political and economic power is not transferred into the hands of the blacks. In spite of all the conferences and international pressures and in spite of the guerrillas, Smith and his clique have definitely decided to resist that, as long as possible... no doubt, until death. One could repeat a famous slogan of the Algerian war: "the suitcase or the coffin." But where can they go? My dear, even South Africa becomes unlivable for a lady and a gentleman from Salisbury!

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SOMALIA

WSLF LEADER DISCUSSES OGADEN LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 24 Sep 79 Morning Edition p 6 OW

[Report by Masataka Ito on interview with Abudulahi Hassan Mohamud, secretary general of the West Somalia Liberation Front, in Ogaden; date not given]

[Text] --Ogaden's area is 150,000 square km, and it has a population of 2.5 million. Harar, Ethiopia, was the capital of the Somali people, but it was occupied by the Ethiopians in the late 19th century. There had been no clear boundary between Ethiopia and Somalia until after World War II. Even now most Ethiopians in Ogaden are either government officials, soldiers or merchants. Ogaden is a typical colony.

--When the Ethiopian Government began collecting taxes in Ogaden in 1958, the Somali there for the first time realized that they were under Ethiopian rule. So they immediately organized the West Somalia Liberation Front [WSLF] and began to fight against the division dispatched by Emperor Haile Selassie. The armed struggle was launched in 1963, much earlier than the armed struggles in Rhodesia and Namibia.

--I cannot tell the size of the guerrilla force. All I can say is that there is not a single indigenous Ethiopian in Ogaden, and the whole population can become a fighting force. At least 20 percent of the displaced people have taken up arms as regulars or militiamen. Their weapons are rifles, handgrenades and landmines.

--Approximately 20,000 Soviet and Cuban troops are stationed in Ethiopia. The main force of Cuban troops is in Ogaden. The enemies are holed up in cities with their communication lines cut. Eighty percent of Ogaden is in the hands of the WSLF.

--We are receiving aid from Islamic countries, but I cannot identify them.

Reporter's note: The WSLF has missions in Somalia, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, and apparently these countries are providing aid to the WSLF.

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49

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