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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 28/79)



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MORAL FACTORS IN CONTEMPORARY WARS

Moscow MORAL'NYY FAKTOR V SOVREMENNYKH VOYNAKH (The Moral Factor in Contemporary Wars) in Russian 1979 signed to press 28 Feb 79 pp 1-4, 143-191, 221-223

[Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction and Chapter 6 from 3d edition, revised and supplemented, of book by Maj Gen Stepan Konstantinovich Il'in, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Voenizdat, 30,000 copies, 223 pages. Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface.]

[Text] The book reveals the role of moral forces of the people and Army as one of the most important factors affecting the course and outcome of contemporary war. In showing the moral superiority of the Soviet state and countries of the socialist community over imperialism, the author analyzes ways and means of instilling high moral-political, psychological and combat qualities in Soviet military personnel.

The book is intended for officers and the party aktiv.

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Introduction

The Communist Party is doing everything necessary to keep the USSR Armed Forces at the level of modern requirements. This was emphasized with new vigor by the 25th CPSU Congress. "The Soviet people can be sure," declared Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the Congress, "that the fruits of their creative labor are under reliable protection."¹

While taking steps to outfit the Army and Navy with the latest combat equipment and weapons and to improve personnel training, the party at the same time is displaying constant concern for developing the morale of Armed Forces personnel. The moral and political unity of Soviet society continuously grows stronger and the workers' awareness increases in the process of the grandiose transformations in our country and the accomplishment of socio-economic, political and ideological tasks. This means that the spiritual foundations of our military organization become even firmer.

It is important under present-day conditions as never before to make fuller use of the favorable opportunities for strengthening the moral factor with consideration of the fact that demands are constantly growing for training of armed defenders of the Motherland. What are these demands and how can they best be fulfilled? Success in accomplishing this task depends largely on a thorough understanding of these matters.

Relying on the experience of past wars and conforming to the character and features of wars of our time, the author examines the significance of the moral factor and provides a substantiation of the ways and methods of its development. This problem is investigated with consideration of the features of the contemporary opposition between the two social systems and of those changes which have occurred in military affairs in connection with the scientific-technological revolution.

This edition of the work provides a more detailed examination of the theoretical aspects of this problem and generalizes the experience of moral-political and psychological training gained among the troops and in the fleets.

Chapter 6: Some Problems of the Moral-Political and Psychological Training of Troops under Peacetime Conditions

A thorough clarification of the essence and significance of the moral factor and its sources is important not in itself, but in order to conduct work purposefully and on a scientific basis in creating high troop morale and for preparing them for successful operations in a contemporary war. It is for this reason that the moral-political and psychological training of personnel under peacetime conditions and its skilled, effective organization is a component of this problem.

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 83.

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The increased demands placed on soldiers' nonmaterial forces and a reinforced dependence of the attainment of victory in a contemporary war on the moral sentiment of the soldier masses--all this required an increase of attention placed on moral-political and psychological training and a detailed scientific elaboration of ways and methods for accomplishing it. It is for this reason that more books have been published, more articles have been written on this problem and more attention is being given to it in recent years in the practical activities of commanders, political workers and party organizations. In this regard it is possible to mention such works as "Mogucheye oruzhiye partii" [Powerful Weapon of the Party] by A. A. Yepishev, "Voinskaya etika" [Military Ethics] by D. A. Volkogonov, and the collective monographs "The Soldier and War" and "Problems of the Psychology of the Military Collective." A number of books were published which were devoted to the moral-political and psychological training of branches of the Armed Forces: "Letchik i sovremennaya voyna" [The Pilot and Contemporary War], "Voyna. Okean. Chelovek" [War, the Ocean, and Man], "Lyudi i rakety" [People and Missiles], and so on.

Clarification of the very concept of moral-political and psychological training and the interconnection of its component aspects is of great importance for proper and effective work in strengthening and developing troop morale and preparing them to wage a contemporary war.

The concept "moral-political and psychological training" was introduced into scientific and practical use with the beginning of the contemporary stage of our Armed Forces' development. This was caused by the fact that there was a sharp increase in attention to the problem of preparing a person for successful actions in a contemporary war in connection with the revolution in military affairs which had unfolded and the increase in demands placed on the personnel's nonmaterial forces. All this then determined a need for special scientific elaboration of ways for moral-political and psychological training of personnel and for articulation of this task in the practical activities of commanders, political entities and party organizations as well. But this hardly means that such a problem did not exist at all previously. It was merely identified less clearly and was viewed in the general course of ideological and party-political work.

Soviet military-theoretical thinking views moral-political and psychological training as a powerful means for shaping the high morale needed in personnel for victory in a contemporary war.

/Moral-political training/ has to do with forming in personnel a scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology and a sense of high social responsibility for defense of their Motherland and the achievements of socialism. This is a powerful motivating force which determines people's behavior and ability to perform any mission in a difficult combat situation. The important element in moral-political training is to arm soldiers with a profound understanding of the ideology and policy of the party and Soviet government; the character and goals of war in defense of the socialist homeland; and the requirement

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to perform their military duty selflessly and skillfully. This is directly linked with sociopolitical and ideological attitudes.

/Psychological training/ has as its purpose to develop and strengthen in military personnel the necessary psychological qualities which allow them to perform a combat mission successfully and operate in very difficult situations of contemporary warfare in full conformity with their convictions and with principles of communist morality.

The sphere of operation of psychological training is the psychology of the individual and that of military collectives. In the process of this training such aspects of servicemen's psychology take shape and develop as high intellectual qualities (flexibility of thinking, quickness of wit, efficiency of thinking and so on), appropriate volitional qualities (self-control, courage, bravery, initiative and discipline), as well as socio-psychological qualities, particularly troop comradeship, collectivism and mutual help.

Moral-political and psychological training represent a uniform process of the formation and strengthening of the personnel's nonmaterial forces.¹

The uniformity of moral-political and psychological training is determined primarily by the fact that we are dealing in both instances with a person and his consciousness. Both of these aspects of training involve the development of highly conscientious, strong-willed and courageous soldiers.

A self-sufficing significance is attached to psychological training in armies of imperialist states, and this is understandable. It is beneficial for the imperialists to view personnel training in isolation from sociopolitical factors. For this reason numerous investigations of ways for strengthening troop morale chiefly involve influence on the soldier's mind, a development of his psychological stability in combat, and influence on the basest instincts. But it is becoming more and more difficult for the imperialists to carry out such a one-sided approach to personnel training. Ideological conditioning occupies an ever-increasing place in this process. Its foundation consists of violent anticommunism and falsification of events of contemporary reality, particularly the character of opposition of the two social systems.

Psychological training under conditions of the Soviet Armed Forces cannot have a determining significance, let alone be isolated from moral-political indoctrination. The soldiers' high ideological conditioning is the basis for the development and manifestation of their psychological qualities. The psychology of the Soviet citizen is determined by his political awareness, dedication to the socialist Motherland and a deeply perceived sense of civil and military duty. At the very same time social ideas and the sociopolitical essence of particular events are reflected and interpreted in the individual consciousness, in each person's emotional experiences and in his psychological cast. This even more concerns war and the reflection of all its

1. "Soldat i voyna" [The Soldier and War], Moscow, 1971, p 16.

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complex and specific processes in the soldier's consciousness. This determines the need for a special examination and study of psychological training.

Extremely complex situations will arise under conditions of the employment of new means of armed warfare. These conditions will demand an exceptionally high psychological stability of soldiers. Ideological conviction and psychological conditioning must be merged as one, and this will help personnel overcome any hardships along the path to victory over the enemy.

The formula "moral-psychological training" exists in our literature and daily practice alongside the concept "moral-political and psychological training." This cannot give rise to objection in principle, but only with the proper interpretation. Two concepts--moral and psychological training--are combined in this formula. Inasmuch as moral training also includes an ideological-political element along with a strictly moral element, which is determined by the very content of the moral code of a builder of communism with its explanation lying at the basis of the given process, we always have to take this into account when interpreting and applying the concept of "moral-psychological training." Meanwhile, the term "moral-psychological training" is sometimes treated in the press and in verbal utterances only in the plane of psychological training. This approach cannot be deemed correct. It knowingly leads to a belittling of the ideological-political aspect in the work of shaping the moral spirit of Army and Navy personnel. Psychological training and the special measures for accomplishing it are included as a component element in the concept "moral-psychological training."

The development of nonmaterial forces of Army and Navy personnel is a complex and many-sided process. It is not exhausted by moral-political and psychological training, although it does occupy a very substantial place. A thorough understanding of this process presumes it to be viewed in mutual connection with other areas of personnel training. The issue /of the correlation of moral-political and psychological training and military indoctrination/ is of no little importance in this regard.

An identification of the essence and purpose of each of these spheres of spiritual improvement of personnel is the starting point for this. As already has been stated, moral-political and psychological training is the use of ideological work and the entire process of indoctrination and training for shaping in soldiers those qualities which they need above all for successful actions in a combat situation and for overcoming hardships and ordeals in the interests of victory over the enemy.

Military indoctrination is a system of influence called upon to shape a soldier's personality and his specific spiritual qualities, without which he cannot support the functioning of the Army either in peace or war, on the basis of political indoctrination and in unity with moral and legal indoctrination. In its content, military indoctrination reflects and takes account of the features, purpose and missions of our military organization.

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Above all, this includes its inherent very strict centralism, the characteristic mutual subordination of people and collectives, and constant readiness for armed defense of the Motherland and the cause of socialism. In the process of military indoctrination, such moral-combat qualities develop in personnel as allegiance to military duty, a highly conscientious attitude toward mastery of military affairs, discipline and faultless execution. They reach a proper understanding of the essence and significance of one-man command and so on.

Military indoctrination includes a complex of measures and efforts aimed directly at shaping the qualities military personnel need under combat conditions for victory over the enemy. In this instance, too, it largely merges and coincides with moral-political and psychological training. This is understandable, since a military person must be prepared for accomplishing missions the Army performs in peacetime to protect the creative labor of the Soviet people, but he must be fully armed with the qualities necessary for successful operations under wartime conditions should the aggressors unleash a war.

Moral-political training, which is determined by the content and primary direction of political indoctrination, develops that initial element used as the basis for shaping necessary military qualities in people. It has to do with developing in military personnel a Marxist-Leninist conviction and ideological steadfastness--the primary motivating force which determines a steadfast conformity to moral principles in a difficult combat situation. This presumes that they are armed with the all-conquering ideas of Marxism-Leninism and an understanding of the character and features of a contemporary war and the requirements which it places on personnel and on their indoctrination in the spirit of these requirements. It is understandable that all this is also the foundation of military indoctrination. It can be said that moral-political training is the heart of military indoctrination with regard to shaping the spiritual qualities in personnel needed for victory in war.

Military indoctrination and training are inseparable from soldiers' psychological conditioning. It is aimed at forming psychological combat qualities (emotional and volitional stability, allocation of attention, memory efficiency and so on) and at developing combat expertise (abilities and skills). It permeates the entire process of military indoctrination. Psychological training plays an especially large part in shaping such moral-combat and volitional qualities in personnel as courage, steadfastness, boldness, valor and the ability to overcome any difficulties on the path to victory. Psychological training is carried on chiefly in the sphere of overall training and performance of service. It presumes a profound knowledge of the soldier's psychology and a comprehensive training of his mind with consideration of the demands of a contemporary war.

The initial propositions on the role and purpose of moral-political and psychological training are included in the make-up of military science, inasmuch as the latter, along with other sciences, provides a basis for the

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model of a soldier's personality which meets the demands of contemporary warfare. At the same time, such training is carried on by diversified party-political and ideological indoctrination work and by the entire process of training and performance of service. For this reason it is a subject of investigation both by military science and by the theory of party-political work.

Moral-political training is carried on throughout the process of personnel indoctrination and training. The question arises in this regard as to the correlation of /moral-political training and party-political and ideological work./ These concepts sometimes are made identical in verbal utterances and even in certain publications. In attempting to clarify this problem, the following question also is sometimes posed: Which is broader--moral-political training or party-political work? There can be no unequivocal answer to this question. Moral-political training is accomplished not only by means of diversified party-political work, but also in the entire process of troop training and the personnel's performance of service. Nevertheless, party-political work has an enormously broader purpose than moral-political training. It is designed to reinforce party influence on all aspects of Army and Navy life and exert a vigorous influence on all components of their combat readiness.

Therefore, speaking on a concrete plane, the viewpoint where the party-political work plan is made identical with the moral-political training plan cannot be deemed substantiated, although many of its activities have that purpose.

Ideological work, which is a very important component of party-political work, occupies a special place in the moral-political training of personnel. A high ideological conviction and the soldiers' spiritual readiness for successful operations in a contemporary war are formed primarily by means of ideological work. Nevertheless, all components of ideological work are included to the same extent in the content of moral-political training. In investigating the correlation of ideological work and moral-political training, one cannot fail to consider that the latter is accomplished by ideological means as well as in the process of overall training and performance of service, and these bear a profoundly ideological character. The important element, though, is that moral-political training, which is based on the entire complex of ideas and propositions which go to make up the content of Marxist-Leninist ideology and which supply all directions of ideological work, directly absorbs those spheres of ideology and encompasses those aspects of ideological work which primarily involve the formation of spiritual qualities in personnel which they require above all for successful operations in armed warfare. It would be incorrect in this regard to include such directions of ideological work as, for example, esthetic and atheistic indoctrination, to the full extent in moral-political training, although they are involved with this process to no small degree. In this regard it is hardly substantiated, for example, to view diversified cultural enlightenment work planned in the unit or aboard ship to the full extent as

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moral-political training of personnel. All these activities are components of ideological work and although they are closely related to moral-political training in their direction, their tasks do not fit within its direction and content.

As already was stated, political and strictly moral elements of consciousness occupy a leading place in the moral factor. This also determines the place of political and moral aspects in the content of moral-political training of personnel. It is the basic nucleus of the given process and that is why it is called "moral-political training." With all this, ideological work with all its directions and moral-political training are individual concepts difficult of articulation even on special examination.

Moral-political and psychological training as an inalienable part of personnel training for defeat of any aggressor is accomplished in peacetime and under wartime conditions, but it largely is filled with a different content in war. /It has to do with a specific enemy and a very specific theater of military operations./ Its content reflects directives and appeals of the CPSU CC and Soviet government and orders of the Supreme High Command defining the combat missions of troops and naval forces in particular phases of armed struggle. It is carried on directly in the process of combat operations and thus accelerates the formation of such qualities as courage, steadfastness, valor and the ability to overcome all difficulties on the path to victory in privates, sergeants, warrant officers and officers. No matter how well trained troops are in the moral-political and psychological sense, their seasoning in real combat is of supreme importance for successful operations, and it is impossible to attain this fully under peacetime conditions.

It should be emphasized that the importance of moral-political and psychological training now is not only increasing under peacetime conditions, but these conditions are approaching those of combat at some echelons. This training is acquiring a largely different scope and content than was the case in the past, such as on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

This primarily involves the new content which filled the concept of combat readiness and the new requirements which it placed on Army and Navy personnel. It stands to reason that troops had to reckon with the need to be ready to act under wartime conditions in the past as well. Constant combat readiness is one of the determining features in the functioning of people and collectives of the military organization and the supreme attribute of military service. But its importance has risen immeasurably under contemporary conditions.

The new USSR Constitution states: "It is the duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people to defend the socialist homeland reliably and be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor." The need for constant combat readiness was legislatively fixed for the first time in the Constitution, which is fully correct since the level of combat

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readiness is the most important indicator of the Armed Forces' capability to perform their duty to the people and defend the achievements of October and the cause of socialism.

Constant combat readiness now has acquired special significance because the security of the Soviet state and consequently accomplishments of the tasks of building communism depend in a most direct manner on the level of combat readiness of troops and naval forces in our time. This is determined primarily by the fact that, in nurturing plans for unleashing war against the Soviet Union and fraternal countries of socialism, the aggressive imperialist forces are placing reliance on a surprise nuclear attack. They are counting on attaining far-reaching goals in this manner. The Pentagon and ringleaders of NATO do not conceal the fact that even now their missiles are targeted on specific objectives of our Motherland and the socialist community and that a portion of the bombers with nuclear weapons aboard are in constant readiness for action. Nuclear-powered submarines equipped with missiles occupy the most favorable positions for a possible attack from the sea. There is no basis to assume that all these weapons will not be set in motion suddenly.

It follows that all our troops and especially air defense units, the Strategic Missile Forces, as well as many Air Force units, strategic naval forces, border districts, and groups of forces must be ready even in peacetime to repulse an attack by imperialist aggressors literally every hour and every minute, deny them an opportunity to take advantage of the factor of surprise or at the very least reduce its effects to a minimum and deliver a crushing attack against the enemy in turn.

A surprise attack under contemporary conditions even without the use of nuclear weapons can sharply complicate the situation of the party subjected to the attack. World War II already confirmed this proposition very persuasively. The capabilities even of conventional weapons, and the increased speeds of aircraft above all, now permit the attacker to have even greater strategic advantages, especially if the surprise does not receive the proper counteraction. This very thing was shown by the military conflict in the Near East in the summer of 1967 and the aftermath of Israel's surprise attack on the Arab countries.

The ability to counter the suddenness of an attack, especially a nuclear attack, to disrupt it with all types of combat equipment and weapons and punish the aggressor himself is the chief criterion of the troops' preparedness for a contemporary war and for our Armed Forces' performance of their high mission of defending the achievements of October and the cause of socialism.

This is why the Communist Party's demands on the Armed Forces are permeated with the idea of maintaining constant, unremitting troop combat readiness. The party views this as a necessary condition for the successful building of a communist society in our country and for maintaining peace throughout the

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world. It is the supreme political mission which Soviet soldiers are called upon to accomplish.

But it is an extremely difficult matter to ensure constant, high troop combat readiness. This places new and difficult tasks before commanders, political entities and party organizations. It is necessary to keep large masses of people in a state of readiness for immediate combat operations for a lengthy period of time, and this is possible at the cost of a great exertion of physical and moral forces, a very strict regime of military service, and a change in the entire tenor of the personnel's life, especially that of officers.

All this determines the interconnection of moral-political and psychological training and combat readiness. It does not follow at all from the proposition that moral-political and psychological training has to do with shaping qualities in soldiers necessary for successful operations in combat that this training is neutral toward matters of increasing combat readiness. To the contrary, the deepest and most direct interconnections exist here.

In order to clarify this important issue it is necessary to bear in mind that new element which characterizes the contemporary content of combat readiness and the essence of demands which it places on the entire process of forming moral-combat qualities in personnel. The unity of training and of keeping troops in combat readiness now is one of the primary principles of military training and indoctrination of the personnel. Another essential point is that high combat readiness is the supreme means of disrupting a surprise enemy attack and a necessary condition for beginning successful operations to defeat him. Mar SU D. F. Ustinov points out that "combat readiness is the crown of military expertise of personnel in peacetime and the key to victory in war."¹

In examining this issue we also cannot fail to consider the fact that the very accomplishment of the missions indicated changes to no small extent the character of converting people's consciousness from a peacetime to a wartime status, especially in those troops who are standing combat watch, which is /the accomplishment of a most important combat mission./ The criteria used in assessing people's moral-political and psychological preparedness for waging armed warfare and performing peacetime service, meaning the maintenance of combat readiness, have converged considerably in a certain sense. This means that moral-political and psychological training deals not only with forming in personnel the qualities necessary for combat, but also with maintaining high combat readiness, and especially performance of combat watch.

All moral-political and psychological training is called upon to create in our soldiers that spiritual condition where they give full attention to the assigned job, steadfastly endure previously unknown hardships, and perform the difficult duties absolutely necessary for the country's security faultlessly and with a feeling of high responsibility.

1. "60 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [Sixty Years of the USSR Armed Forces], Moscow, 1978, p 34.

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An understanding of the entire complex of demands being placed on the combat readiness of a unit, ship and subunit under present-day conditions and the degree of exertion of spiritual and physical forces in fulfilling them represents a most important indicator of the level of troop morale and of their capability to perform any mission in defense of the socialist Motherland and its state interests. All the work of commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations in training and indoctrinating personnel capable of carrying out a combat order at any moment is focused in troop combat readiness.

The new demands placed on troop combat readiness also predetermine a different criterion of soldiers' moral and psychological readiness to perform direct combat actions. The transition from peace to a situation of war, even if an aggressor attacked without declaring war, previously still comprised a more or less lengthy period of time. Only the border guard troops entered battle in the first hours of war. The conversion to a wartime footing lasted a more or less lengthy period of time for the main mass of troops.

It is now a completely different matter. With the present means of warfare the peace can be broken suddenly for all Armed Forces and for the entire country. The troops, and above all missile troops, air defense troops, nuclear-powered submarines, missile-carrying aircraft and units of border guard districts, will be in a state of combat action in a matter of minutes. There will be no time here for long reflection, and the peacetime mood will have to be shed in a single instant.

This circumstance cannot fail to be considered both in combat training and in the moral-political and psychological training of personnel. We are speaking of ensuring that the entire process of indoctrination and of the moral-psychological conditioning of soldiers provides a situation where, by their degree of vigilance and exertion of will and energy, they are continuously ready for combat actions during daily service literally every hour and every minute and that they possess certain knowledge and skills necessary for immediate use of contemporary equipment and weapons in a combat situation.

The task of maintaining constant combat readiness is accomplished through all means of indoctrination and training and by developing an ideological conviction in the soldiers. Ideological conviction is a characteristic trait of the Soviet citizen-soldier and a source of his unbending will, steadfastness and courage in battle against the foe and of inspiration in military labor. The favorable opportunities created by the socialist system and the beneficial results of the party's ideological work are used widely in this process.

The important element is for each soldier to have a clear realization of all the consequences of a surprise attack, /especially a nuclear attack./ This must be manifested in constant, unremitting vigilance and combat readiness. Consequently there must be a continuous development of soldiers' inner

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combat readiness, which permits them at any moment to perform all functions of ensuring the country's security and the aggressor's defeat assigned to them.

It is essential to have a convincing explanation for privates, sergeants, seamen, petty officers, warrant officers and officers as to the aggressive nature of the imperialists' policy and to reveal their specific preparations for war. It is moreover important to take account of the features of this work under conditions of detente. If this is not done, there may be a one-sided understanding of detente on the part of certain people, without consideration of the active opposition shown it by aggressive forces; the more so, as now even the most inveterate militarists are doing their black deeds under the cover of peace negotiations.

A surprise attack by an aggressor against our Motherland is not precluded at the present time, regardless of a fluctuation of the political barometer which reflects the degree of acuteness and complexity of the international military-political situation. The existing relaxation of international tension does not guarantee us against a display of adventuristic acts on the part of the most aggressive circles of imperialism. This all means that soldiers have to develop a sharpened sense of danger of an aggressive attack against our Motherland.

A proper understanding by all soldiers of the character and features of a contemporary war and of the methods for waging contemporary combat has a very essential significance for the moral-political and psychological conditioning of troops. Also connected with all this is the solution to the problem in moral-political training of explaining to personnel the capabilities which aggressive forces have for unleashing a nuclear missile war. The imperialists may resort to such an extreme act under conditions of a sharp aggravation in the struggle. They themselves admit great reliance is placed on atomic weapons in a military fight against the USSR. The American newspaper NEW YORK TIMES wrote on 16 December 1977 that "the White House assigned the Defense Department to perform a thorough revision of emergency plans for waging a nuclear war against the USSR." The question is one of complying in the objectives of nuclear attacks on USSR territory more fully with the US government's overall political strategy.

A precise understanding of these matters by personnel is a necessary condition for their becoming attuned spiritually to maintaining high combat readiness and to defeating any aggressor.

The military-technical features of a contemporary war and the demands which it places on the personnel's moral-combat qualities are widely considered in the moral-political and psychological training conducted among the troops and in the fleets. The doctrinal proposition and conclusions of Soviet military science about readying troops for successful operations with the use of all types of combat technology, and nuclear weapons above all, are of fundamental importance.

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The soldiers' thorough understanding of these provisions is attained both by means of ideological work and in the training process. Propaganda and ideological-theoretical measures help service personnel thoroughly comprehend those changes which have occurred in all spheres of military affairs and the new demands on combat and political training, and to fulfill them with understanding. The process of shaping the soldiers' moral-political and combat qualities continues and their psychological conditioning takes place in particular in the process of training activities, field exercises, deployments, and the standing of combat watch.

All training and indoctrination work in units and subunits is arranged with consideration of the new demands. It ensures the soldier's comprehensive training for successful operations in contemporary warfare involving the use of contemporary weapons.

The principle of "teaching the troops what is needed in war" is well known. It wholly preserves its force now, but it has been filled largely with new content. Implementation of this principle is possible only with an enormously greater concentration of a person's spiritual and physical forces. This is caused by the increasing complexity both of the process of mastering new equipment and of the methods of troop combat training.

Inasmuch as combat equipment has grown unbelievably more complex, we must learn to perform operations with it within a sharply reduced time frame. There were 2,000 electronic assemblies and parts in the B-17 bomber which was in the U.S. Air Force inventory 30 years ago. The modern American bomber already has 100,000 of them. There have been similar changes in our aircraft as well. Over the last 30 years the amount of instruments in the aircraft cockpit has increased 30 times, while the time for performing each operation of controlling the aircraft, the engine and other equipment has been reduced 6-7 times because of an increase in flight speed and a change in equipment operating conditions.¹ Pilot training on such equipment requires them to have great moral composure, steadfastness, intensity and exceptional precision in actions, and it places a great load on their minds.

Or take the training of submariners, who now have to deal with atomic engines and missiles aboard ships--technology requiring great knowledge and diverse skills. But the essence of the matter also lies in the fact that the operating capabilities of submarines have increased sharply. The independent deployment of submarines for lengthy periods of time and long distances has become widespread.

Their cruises under the water for several months now already have become an ordinary phenomenon, and our navymen demonstrate high moral-political and psychological conditioning.

1. See "Letchik i sovremennaya voyna" [The Pilot and Contemporary War], Moscow, 1976, p 57.

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Combat activities of personnel of the Strategic Missile Forces and of air defense are complex and many-sided. There is nothing they can be compared with from the past in character, complexity or importance.

Great changes also have occurred in training personnel of the oldest branch of the Armed Forces, the Ground Forces. Their primary power now lies also in nuclear missile weaponry. The growing complexity of military labor is shown by the abrupt increase in rates of advance by combined-arms formations or the appearance of completely new divisions of troop training, such as underwater tank driving and so on.

Political indoctrination work and training work is intended to take account of all these features and of the contemporary level of development of military affairs and in turn to improve the ways and methods of forming moral-political and combat qualities, to influence the soldiers' minds correctly, and to direct their spiritual forces toward mastery of equipment and toward preparations for capable, selfless combat actions.

What is important is to prepare personnel carefully for operations with consideration of the use of nuclear missile weapons. This is the very direction in which combat training is accomplished in our Army and Navy. Personnel in all branches of the Armed Forces persistently prepare for capable, selfless actions under conditions of a nuclear missile war. At the same time, there is no let-up in attention paid to training subunits for operations in a war involving the use of conventional weapons.

It is typical that in preparing soldiers for actions in a nuclear war, commanders and political workers have to overcome a contradiction which is solvable only in the process of war itself. On the one hand, the troops must receive maximum training in actions involving the use of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, and on the other hand, it is practically impossible to employ these weapons in the process of exercises under peacetime conditions.

There are broader opportunities for accustoming soldiers to perform combat missions with conventional technology. Field fire exercises or driving tanks over personnel, for example, provide very positive results. It does not appear possible to do this with nuclear weapons. In this connection troop training is conducted at the present time with greater obligatory conditionalities than before. Such a situation often gives rise to extremes in evaluating the action of nuclear weapons. In some places there is a clear exaggeration of the destructive force of new means of warfare. In some classes pictures are painted in excess as to what might happen if the enemy delivers nuclear attacks against our forces while leaving in the dark how to act in order to overcome their aftereffects and perform the assigned mission.

In one class with seamen, Lt Ivanov was explaining the character of contemporary war at sea. He pointed out that enough stockpiles of nuclear weapons

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now have been built up in the world that there is now the equivalent of over 100 tons per person. Then he began to enumerate the atomic bombs and missiles which the enemy has for combating our submarines. In telling of the destructive features of the "Lulu" bomb, the officer announced that, having the power of 10,000 tons of TNT, it could destroy a submarine at a distance of 7 km from the burst, and if its yield increased to 10 million tons, the effective radius would increase to 70 km. Of course, he was giving figures published in the press, but he did not explain that these were optimum data when the enemy was operating under conditions favorable to him. He did not show that the bomb's effects could be reduced by approximately 7-10 times merely by changing the submarine's submergence depth. He did not give examples of how the submariners could counter the enemy and operate in the proper manner to disrupt his plans and perform their missions. Had he explained all this, the psychological effect of the class would have been different. Facts of this sort unfortunately are not isolated.

There also is another probably more widespread extreme where too light an approach is taken to evaluating the aftereffects of nuclear attacks. The following picture sometimes can be seen in exercises. A situation has been created: The "enemy" has delivered a nuclear strike against the unit's combat formations. Meanwhile, the subunits continue to operate as if nothing had happened: Why take any kind of measures, for the attack was conditional?..

During one exercise a tank company operating in the second echelon moved up to the line of commitment and awaited the commander's signal. At this time the "enemy" delivered a "nuclear strike." It seemed the only correct reaction to this was to take steps of protection against nuclear attack. But something quite different occurred. While all crew members were in the tanks before the "nuclear burst," after the burst some of them crawled from the turrets and began to admire the spectacle. And one tanker remarked, not without irony: "The combat engineers worked handsomely. They must have wasted more than just one ton of fuel."

It is understandable that both extremes are detrimental to the work of training personnel to conduct combat operations under conditions of a contemporary war.

The question arises: All the same, though, what can be done to overcome a large number of difficulties?

Yes, it is a fact that it is impossible to achieve the complete effect of a nuclear burst and its aftereffects through simulation. But something still can be done and already is being done. The question above all is about a further improvement in means of simulation, and the opportunities for this have been far from exhausted. A movie, slides, and posters can acquaint soldiers with the results of the action of nuclear weapons. They will also help to some extent create the appropriate psychological mood in the personnel. It is very important to display unremitting exactingness in exercises and various classes and see to it that personnel strictly perform all

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necessary actions in negotiating "radioactive" terrain, in its decontamination and so on. Where commanders attempt to create a near-combat situation by all available means, this has a great psychological effect on the soldiers.

A deeply perceived desire by service personnel, and especially officers, to improve their schooling in the maximum possible approximation of a real combat situation is of primary importance. It is impossible to achieve high effectiveness in combat training without this highly conscientious attitude of people toward every activity, and especially toward exercises, flights and cruises. The accomplishment of this mission is constantly in the field of view of commanders, political entities and party organizations.

Exercises "Dnepr," "Yug," "Dvina," "Okean," "Sever," "Berezina," "Kavkaz" and "Karpaty," which were held in recent years, were especially instructive and useful. A distinguishing feature of such exercises was the creation of a complex situation which approximated that of combat to the maximum. During combined-arms exercises there were lengthy marches, offensive and defensive actions, assault landings, and assault crossings of large water obstacles. They included live firing by aircraft, artillery and tanks, the negotiation of minefields and obstacle zones and so on. Units attacked directly behind the shell bursts or with firing over the heads of friendly troops. All this had a strong effect on the people's minds and developed their steadfastness, courage and ability to overcome any difficulties of the combat situation to achieve victory over the enemy.

Privates, sergeants, warrant officers and officers had an opportunity to see an enormous mass of equipment in action in such exercises, which generated in them a sense of pride in their country, the Army and the Navy and reinforced even more their faith in the force and might of Soviet weapons. After an exercise Pfc Yefanov declared:

"For the first time I saw our Army in all its power: There was so much equipment in the air and on the ground! When the attackers' fire preparation was conducted, I honestly admit that I had an unusual feeling..."

During the exercise officers and men felt themselves almost to be in real combat in many respects. They sought and found bold decisions of initiative and overcame all difficulties persistently.

"Now I know how soldiers must be tempered and accustomed to the combat situation," said Lt Minasov. "I am only sorry that this does not always work out on our own training field."

Systematic and well-arranged party-political work plays a large part in creating high intensity of an exercise.

Much was done in the preparatory period to explain to soldiers the importance of the upcoming exercise and the need for capable, selfless actions in its

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course. Attention was directed to the fact that the appearance of new means of warfare had changed fundamentally the character of contemporary war and had increased the demands placed on soldiers' moral-political and combat qualities. Party and Kosmomol meetings were held in the subunits to discuss how to ensure the soldiers' capable actions of initiative in the exercises.

Topical evenings entitled "Act in exercises as in combat," "Heroic exploits of Komsomol soldiers in the Great Patriotic War" and on other similar topics were held in many subunits. There were technical conferences, viewings of training films and documentary newsreels, and presentations by masters of military affairs.

The essential element in the content of moral-political training of personnel during a particular exercise was the determination of the leading political idea under which it took place. Exercise "Dnepr" preceded the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet state, "Dvina" and "Okean" preceded the centennial of Lenin's birth, and "Berezina" preceded the 60th Anniversary of the Armed Forces. This greatly filled the entire process of personnel training with specific political content.

The purposeful work of instilling hatred toward imperialist aggressors occupied a major place in moral-political training. For example, during preparation and conduct of Exercise "Dvina" among troops of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, all propagandists and agitators were armed with specific material on these matters. Various reference material was prepared for them on the topics "Imperialism is the Source of Wars" and "The Armies of Imperialist States are Tools of Aggression." A booklet passed out to the agitators contained necessary information about the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance and its armed forces. Talks were held in subunits about Israeli aggression in the Near East and about the interveners' crimes in Vietnam. The atrocities of fascist German invaders during the past war were shown using specific examples.

All this facilitated the development of a feeling of hatred for imperialist aggressors, served as an important means for raising the fighting spirit and instilled in soldiers a readiness to perform exploits.

Political entities reflected specific issues of moral-political and psychological training in the party-political work plans for the period of preparation and conduct of the exercises.

In the "Dnepr" maneuvers, for example, the political directorate of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District prepared special recommendations for commanders and political workers. They told of the importance of personnel having a firm knowledge of the situation, exercise missions, their place in the combat formation and capabilities of equipment and weapons; and about the ability to master the equipment and weapons expertly under all conditions. The recommendations encouraged commanders and political workers in all phases of the exercise to develop and encourage in every possible way the soldiers'

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daring, selfless actions, spirit of competitiveness and readiness to test themselves in a difficult situation, to overcome all obstacles on the path to accomplishing the assigned mission, to put down a party screen against indulgences, oversimplification, stereotypes and overcautiousness, and so on.

Party-political work during the exercise was aimed at successful accomplishment of assigned missions. The most varied forms of political work were used for these purposes. Special attention was given to the personal example set by party and Komsomol members. An increase in the party members' role as soldiers and as political fighters was an object of great concern on the march, in the attack, in assaulting water obstacles and in the defense.

A great deal of attention was given to propaganda of combat traditions and exploits of Great Patriotic War heroes in order to elevate the soldiers' fighting spirit and mobilize them for bold, selfless actions both during the preparatory period and directly during the exercise. The most varied forms of political work were used. Here is the typical content of an express leaflet put out in a subunit of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District at the height of an attack.

"Guardsmen!

"Fierce fighting raged on this soil in 1944. The father of our comrade, Pvt Vladimir Korneyev, died the death of a hero here. The son sacredly preserves the memory of his father and is proving his allegiance to combat traditions with his deeds. He drove a prime mover over a difficult route without a single forced halt. Thanks to his actions of initiative during a counterattack, the norm was bettered by almost twofold."

Such specific agitation in which the heroics of the Great Patriotic War and today's missions of the soldiers are skillfully linked, created in the soldiers the moral-political and psychological mood necessary for victory over the enemy.

Moral-political training was accomplished during the exercise primarily by means of mass political work. An indisputable conclusion follows from the experience of exercises which were held: The nearer the atmosphere to actual combat and the more complex the operational training situation, then the more that means of mass political agitation and individual work come to the foreground. This does not deny at all the use of various forms of propaganda, particularly in rear services units.

The great saturation of troops with military equipment was a characteristic of exercises "Dnepr," "Dvina," "Yug," "Sever," "Okean" and others. The work of mobilizing people for capable use of the equipment and for the interaction of its various types was of great importance under these conditions. The exercises permitted vigorous indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of confidence in our equipment and the ability to defeat any aggressor with its help. Meanwhile, the display of an enormous mass of equipment in action also

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had a certain negative psychological effect on some people. To them it appeared that the equipment overwhelmed the person himself. This made it necessary to direct attention to the need for a correct understanding of this matter.

The exercises showed convincingly that troop operations now present higher demands on the personnel's moral-psychological and physical preparedness. Consideration had to be given to the increased mobility and maneuverability of units and subunits and to the swiftness of their actions. It was important to achieve high efficiency in performing political indoctrination work and a timely explanation of the rapidly changing situation and combat missions stemming therefrom.

During the exercises personnel were trained to operate both with and without the use of nuclear weapons, but the work was arranged with personnel so that they were ready to act at any moment even under conditions of employment of nuclear means of warfare. Whether activities were being conducted in training personnel for the offense or the defense, the idea of the possibility of operating with the use of nuclear missile weapons was contained in them each time. The accomplishment of measures of protection against a nuclear attack was provided for and the people were kept ready to act under conditions of radioactive contamination, and so on, on either side.

Suddenly complicated situations are created during the exercises to develop psychological stability in soldiers. Neuro-emotional stress also may be created on special trainers.

For example, here is how one class with pilots was conducted. During an intercept "sortie" the generator failure signal light went on while climbing. The young pilot who was training switched off a portion of the power consumers, reported what had happened to the command post and turned toward the landing field. The controls suddenly twitched--the hydraulic system had malfunctioned. The situation became more complex and the psychological load on the pilot rose... While eliminating the malfunctions or reacting to them under conditions of an extreme time limitation, the pilot began to report his actions less often and made more frequent mistakes in determining the aircraft's position in space. When the "fire" signal light went on on the instrument panel, he became confused for some period of time: After the first stage of stress came the second--the body's adaptation to the stress situation. "Good practice! Almost like an ordinary flight. And the pulse is even pounding,"¹ remarked the pilot after working on the trainer.

The circumstance that the personnel are obligated to be constantly ready for immediate action for unconditional and precise fulfillment of the combat mission under any very difficult condition is taken into account in the moral-political and psychological training of missilemen both of the

1. "Letchik i sovremennaya vojna," p 129.

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Strategic Missile Forces and of the National Air Defense Forces. They therefore carry higher moral-psychological loads in peacetime as well. This particularly concerns the soldiers who are on combat watch. A sharpened sense of vigilance and of immediate and proper reaction to a situation which shapes up suddenly is developed in the missile troops.

The moral-psychological effect on the personnel of missile troops is varied and profound when all its elements are brought nearer to those of actual combat. This allows forming emotional experiences and psychological conditions in personnel similar to those which may take shape under combat conditions. This is accomplished with maximum efficiency during the preparation and conduct of live missile launches.

The entire training process of troops and naval forces must help the personnel become accustomed to acute situations involving the use of new means of warfare to the extent possible for peacetime. "When the first mine passed astern, the fear of a danger invisible to us went with it," writes submarine commander Hero SU I. V. Travkin. "We listened to the scraping along the sides many times afterward and would stop first the port then the starboard electric motor, but not one of us probably experienced such a heart-chilling feeling as the first time any longer. We 'mastered' the mines, as one of the officers joked."¹

This process of "mastering dangers" is one of the pivotal tasks of psychological training and of forming emotional and volitional stability in military personnel.

The spiritual and especially the psychological preparedness of personnel thus depends to a determining extent on the degree to which it is "entered" in the process of personnel training, and the latter depends on the extent to which it approximates actual combat conditions to the maximum.

USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov spoke about this at a practical science conference of political leaders: "We must be even more persistent in instilling in all personnel a conscientious attitude toward overcoming the real difficulties of combat training, bearing in mind the permanent truth that the more difficult it is in training, the easier it is in combat."² This statement also is of determining importance for the moral and psychological training of troops and naval forces.

Soldiers' /high state of training/ and knowledge of their entrusted equipment and techniques of using it is one of the important foundations of their moral and psychological readiness for successful operations in contemporary combat. This helps them act confidently and find the most advisable solution

1. "Voyna. Okean. Chelovek" [The War, the Ocean and Man], Moscow, 1974, p 100.
2. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 July 1976.

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in any very difficult situation. On the other hand, an inability to handle the equipment and a poor knowledge of military affairs may lead to a private, sergeant or even an officer displaying fear and confusion, which will threaten to disrupt performance of the combat mission. The following episode is typical in this regard. During an attack Pvt Korchagin pulled a grenade from the cartridge pouch at the command "Prepare grenades for action," but because of poor training was late in preparing it. When he was ready to throw the grenade he saw that he had fallen behind his comrades and would not be able to throw it to such a distance as not to injure them. It appeared to the private that he already had pulled the safety pin and had nowhere to throw the grenade. Frightened, he ran up to Jr Sgt Shustov. The squad commander estimated the situation instantaneously and checked the grenade.

"The grenade is not armed," he said. "Put it in the cartridge pouch and catch up with your comrades quickly."

A convincing example of the soldier's display of confusion due to ignorance of his weapon.

One of the important tasks of moral-psychological training is to instill in personnel a firm confidence in their equipment and weapons. This confidence is based on the soldiers' firm knowledge of the weapon's tactical and technical specifications and the ability to use it in a combat situation. At the same time, they have to know the objective data about enemy weapons, not exaggerated and not understated if at all possible.

The personnel's firm knowledge of measures and means of defense against nuclear weapons and their being instilled with confidence that it is possible to operate and win with their help is of very great importance in this sense.

...The subunit was attacking in the depth of enemy defenses. A zone of radioactive contamination was encountered along the way. If the soldiers were ignorant as to its boundaries and radiation level, this could cause uncertainty in their actions. But if they know the radiation situation with the help of appropriate instruments and if the soldiers learn that the high radiation level dangerous to life is present only in the vicinity of the burst's epicenter, they will cross the zone of radioactive contamination with greater assurance, bypassing the most dangerous places and negotiating the less contaminated sectors swiftly.

The very same can be said about the protective mask and other protective gear. An incident occurred in one of the subunits which is typical in this regard. During underwater tank driving, one of the vehicles was forced to stop under the water. The tank's hull began to fill with exhaust gases. The command came: "Put on protective masks!" Everyone except one person, a young inexperienced soldier, executed the command precisely. He was about to put on the mask, but immediately threw it aside as if to say it still

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wouldn't help. And had it not been for the comrades who put the protective mask on the soldier, this lack of confidence in the reliability of the protective gear could have cost him his life.

It is a day-to-day job for all commanders and political workers to instill confidence in privates and seamen in their equipment and weapons and in the fact that with their help it is possible not only to preserve life, but also to operate successfully in combat under conditions of employment of nuclear missile weapons. It is important here to instill a firm belief in the private or seaman not only in the equipment and weapons which each person handles directly, but in all equipment which our Army and Navy possess and in the possibility of defeating any enemy with its help.

Under peacetime conditions this work is complicated by the fact that, for understandable reasons, it is not possible to provide the specifications of our nuclear missile weapons and other new equipment to its full extent in the press and in verbal propaganda. Nevertheless, there are opportunities to perform this work effectively in every unit and aboard every ship. It is important here to provide data on the technical outfitting of armies of imperialist states correctly and to a reasonable extent. An attempt by some propagandists to "divulge" inflated information on the force of certain types of weapons of imperialist armies and on the status and prospects for development of their military equipment for the sake of sensation does great harm.

The Soviet people are doing everything to ensure a high level of technical outfitting of their Armed Forces in the spirit of contemporary requirements. Commanders and political workers are called upon on a daily basis to reinforce the soldiers' faith in our military-technological might. It stands to reason that any kind of bragging or hornblowing is inadmissible here. In case of war, our Armed Forces will have to deal with a strong, technically well outfitted enemy. The imperialist armies, and the U.S. Army above all, have thermonuclear weapons, missile technology, strategic aviation and missile-carrying submarines in their inventories. A study of the weapons of armies of imperialist states, the knowledge of the strong and weak points of their equipment and weapons, and a knowledge of the strong and weak points of personnel training are an inalienable condition for successful struggle against an aggressor.

The importance of the troops' combat activeness and the soldiers' creativeness and initiative has risen in contemporary war. The Soviet Armed Forces regulations stress that the desire to act offensively and to overtake and destroy the enemy must become firmly entrenched in the consciousness of each soldier, officer and general. There is a sociopolitical basis to the high combat activeness of Soviet soldiers. It is determined by a passionate love for one's Motherland, a burning hatred for the enemy and a desire to defeat him no matter what. Numerous examples from the Great Patriotic War persuasively confirm this proposition.

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The soldiers' combat activeness is formed to no small extent in the sphere of ideological indoctrination work. Soldiers are instilled with combat activeness including an offensive enthusiasm in exercises and problems where an appropriate situation is created and there is a decisive banishment of oversimplification and of attempts at an alleviated approach to accomplishing missions. The vigorous actions of initiative by personnel are supported and encouraged in every possible way among the troops. Officers develop a commander's independence, a creative approach to matters, and an ability to preserve presence of mind in a difficult situation, to assume responsibility for a very bold decision, but one responding to the situation, and to take advantage of all opportunities for winning victory. Such qualities form in a near-combat situation. Any alleviation of conditions or petty coddling does not facilitate the development of necessary command qualities.

It sometimes happens that a senior chief meddles in the functions of a subunit commander without need. After assigning a mission to the officer, he continuously provides instructions, including on many special matters, instead of granting an opportunity to accomplish it independently and then analyze the officer's actions. It is understandable that such an inclination toward overcautiousness does not facilitate the development of necessary command qualities.

Soldiers' combat activeness and initiative cannot be formed in isolation from the development of such qualities as steadfastness, courage and valor. Truly mass heroism, soldiers' selflessness, and a readiness not to be sparing of life itself at a critical moment if the interests of accomplishing a combat mission require it are demanded for winning victory in a contemporary war.

In sending off party members going to the front during the Civil War, V. I. Lenin would say that, for them, "there can be no choice. Their motto must be death or victory."¹ This Leninist thesis has acquired special significance in each soldier's conduct in a contemporary war, with consideration of the fact that the danger to life has increased unbelievably.

Boldness, courage and initiative take shape under specific socio-economic, political and military conditions. These qualities characterize the strength of an army's morale, which is generally known to depend to a decisive extent on the character of the social and state system and on the political objectives of the war. But this is not an automatic dependence. Sociopolitical attitudes create only favorable conditions for shaping high moral-political qualities in Soviet military personnel. Extensive indoctrinational efforts are required to ensure that these conditions are realized. The entire system of personnel training in the Army is a school of indoctrination of courageous, bold soldiers capable of heroic exploits.

1. Lenin, V. I. "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXIX, 246.

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High moral-political and combat qualities are developed in soldiers in peacetime under conditions of combat training. M. I. Kalinin said that "a particular specific instance of heroism or the confluence of circumstances under which heroism is displayed often are accidental. But the people who performed the heroic deeds were able to take advantage of these random concurrences of circumstances because they were prepared physically, psychologically, morally and politically to display heroism."¹

The heroism, valor and courage of soldiers primarily represent the fruits of strenuous work of shaping their high moral and volitional qualities. The entire training process and all forms of indoctrinational work serve to attain these goals.

Commanders and political workers act properly in conducting classes, and especially tactical exercises, when they direct attention to soldiers' conduct in especially difficult situations and commend those who have performed bold, selfless acts. During a river crossing in unit "X" a tank broke through the planking of a bridge near the shore and plunged into the water. It was necessary to put it in neutral in order to extract it from the river, and for this it was necessary to enter the tank's turret underwater at a temperature of 10 degrees below zero. Lt Val'kov undertook the task without reflection.

There was a detailed account of the officer's selfless act in the unit and a leaflet was published. This deed was mentioned in classes and in discussions. The broad publicity of the exploit unquestionably leaves an imprint in the soldiers' awareness and develops in them a desire to emulate the hero.

In developing high moral-political and combat qualities in soldiers it is difficult to overestimate well-organized socialist competition. It is generally known that competition is a powerful means for mobilizing masses to fulfill combat and political training plans. At the same time, it serves as an important factor for indoctrinating personnel. The indoctrinational effect of the entire training process is reinforced during such competition.

Socialist competition develops a spirit of healthy rivalry, serves as an effective means for solidifying military collectives, and helps vigorously polish all qualities of a soldier's personality and realization of the principle "all for one and one for all," which is of no small importance in the moral-political training of personnel for successful operations in a contemporary war. This is one of the circumstances which determines the unremitting attention to competition on the part of commanders, political entities, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations.

The soldiers' physical training is a very important component of personnel training for operations in a contemporary war and is closely connected with

1. Kalinin, M. I. "O kommunisticheskoy vospitanii i voynskoy dolge" [On Communist Indoctrination and Military Duty], Moscow, 1967, p 682.

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the formation of moral-political and combat qualities. If a soldier or officer is not physically fit and if he is not prepared to overcome the hardships of military life, he will not be able to perform the duties assigned him successfully. This concerns the actions of personnel under conditions of a contemporary war even more so. In order to endure a physical load in combat, the soldier must possess very high endurance and fitness.

But this is not the only problem. Physical training has a direct effect on the personnel's moral-psychological mood. A healthy, conditioned, physically fit body is beneficial to thought operations and efforts of will displayed in a combat situation. There cannot be a full-fledged soldier capable of overcoming all difficulties of a combat situation and venturing to perform a selfless act without sufficient physical training. "A healthy spirit in a healthy body"--this ancient saying, applied to a soldier's actions, is taken as a need to be physically strong and fit in order to act successfully in conformity with one's convictions.

This is why the moral and psychological training of personnel in peacetime provides the necessary results if it is accompanied by an improvement in each soldier's physical conditioning. Well-conceived, well-organized physical training classes are of great importance in this regard. The character of exercises and their degree of difficulty must ensure consistent conditioning of a person and his volitional qualities. Mass sports work in the unit and aboard the ship cannot be underestimated in this regard. It is a good support for physical development of soldiers and for strengthening their will. It creates conditions for successful operations in combat.

It is understandable that soldiers are physically conditioned not only in special physical training classes and in mass sports sections, but in all day-to-day service, especially tactical problems, exercises and practice sessions, if they approximate the conditions of actual combat.

The requirement to bring the entire system of training soldiers in peacetime as closely as possible to combat conditions also is related directly to the organization of party-political work in tactical exercises. Any belittling of the features of contemporary combat and the slightest ignoring of the new element introduced into political work by the use of new means of warfare impoverish its content and weaken the effect of measures conducted for preparing troops for successful conduct of a nuclear missile war.

There is a practice by many commanders and political workers which merits all possible approval. During tactical exercises they thoroughly cover problems of party-political work in different types of combat with maximum consideration given to the employment of new weapons. Prior provisions are made for activities which are carried out to mobilize personnel for successful exploitation of a "nuclear strike" against "enemy" troops for a swift advance, for crossing zones of "radioactive contamination," for taking steps of protection against nuclear attack and so on. All this is important for the soldiers' moral and psychological conditioning and for building up experience in party-political work in a contemporary war.

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Party-political work of restoring the combat effectiveness of subunits subjected to "atomic attack" acquires great significance. In this situation it is very important to support actions similar to combat actions. If a unit has come under "atomic attack" or has been subjected to "radioactive contamination," the entire complex of work to rescue and evacuate the "wounded" and to decontaminate equipment and the terrain must be carried out. The political worker's task in such cases obviously is to see to it that the party and Komsomol members set an example in this matter and assist commanders in everything.

During one exercise a subunit came under "atomic attack," as a result of which, according to estimates which were made, 40 percent of the personnel and equipment were "disabled." A rescue team was dispatched urgently to the vicinity of the "nuclear burst." A political worker arrived along with it. The entire process of evacuating personnel and equipment took place under near-combat conditions. Personnel decontamination was actually conducted. In mobilizing personnel for evacuating the "wounded," towing away vehicles and so on, the political worker together with the aktiv additionally explained to the personnel the essence and importance of measures taken to prepare for successful operations in real combat.

Under certain conditions combat operations also may be conducted without the use of nuclear weapons. With consideration of this, the very abundant experience of party-political work gained during the Great Patriotic War is of invaluable importance for raising the effectiveness of party-political work and the training of commanders and political workers during exercises and tactical problems.

/High discipline is one of the most important moral-combat qualities needed by Soviet soldiers for victory in war./ Our party tirelessly indoctrinates Soviet citizens in a spirit of socialist discipline and faultless fulfillment of their duties to society. The party teaches that unconditional observance of laws and rules adopted in socialist society not only does not contradict the democratic foundations of the Soviet system, but to the contrary, is in complete unity with them. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared that "the essence of socialist democracy is the socialist organization of all society for the sake of every person, and each person's socialist discipline for the sake of all society. It is the party's task to strengthen high discipline and organization constantly at all echelons of the party and state."¹

The November (1978) CPSU CC Plenum emphasized that an important condition for our success was supreme organization and discipline in all spheres and in all sectors of work. The measure of responsibility is especially high for leaders at all echelons to observe discipline strictly.

1. "Materialy XXIII s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 23d CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1966, p 88.

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This thesis is of exceptionally great importance for our Armed Forces as a specific organization. Under Army conditions the principles on which the relationships and conduct of Soviet citizens are based operate to the full extent and are supplemented by state demands placed on soldiers, expressed in the military oath, regulations, and the orders of commanders and chiefs.

Moral incentives in our Army play an enormous part in maintaining discipline. They give a deeply perceived character to people's actions involving the observance of military order and the performance of difficult military duties.

The discipline of soldier masses always was linked inseparably with political and class struggle. It was developed and used by particular classes in the interests of their own policy. In armies of the imperialist states, the ruling circles and the officer corps make use of various means including ideological conditioning to force the soldier masses to obey in order to conduct their antipopular, aggressive policy.

The political meaning of soldiers' discipline in socialist society is that, being in the ranks of the Army and Navy, they are subordinate to the demands of socialist military discipline and fulfill them in the interests of their people, who are building communism. Discipline is an important condition for ensuring our country's security and wrecking the aggressive plans of the imperialists.

Discipline plays a special role and has its characteristic manifestations in the Army as a specific organization. In peacetime it is a most important condition for high combat effectiveness and constant combat readiness of the troops. Throughout all his service, a soldier is subject to strict military regulation. He may be required at any moment to carry out a combat order or display an intensity of all forces, courage and selflessness.

The importance of discipline under wartime conditions rises immeasurably. Lenin emphasized that there can be no victory in war without strict discipline. In a combat situation the course and outcome of a battle and victory over the enemy depends in a most direct manner on allegiance to the oath and fulfilling the commander's order. Under wartime conditions the observance of military discipline and fulfillment of commanders' orders demands enormously more of soldiers than in peacetime with regard to the intensity of forces, courage, steadfastness, initiative and the subordination of the individual's interests to those of the common cause.

Based on the soldiers' high consciousness and on the unity of class interests of Army personnel, socialist military discipline is the firmest discipline. The Great Patriotic War confirmed this vividly. The Soviet forces' failures at the beginning of the war did not break their fighting spirit or undermine discipline in their ranks. To the contrary, discipline grew constantly stronger in our Army, while it began to drop in the fascist Army after the very first serious defeats.

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Gen Borodin, one of the heroes of Mikhail Bubennov's novel "Belaya bereza" [White Birch], told very clearly about the supreme strength of conscious Soviet military discipline.

He said: "Our retreat in October will be studied by historians with astonishment and with the same interest with which they study victorious offensive operations. That which I had occasion to observe in our Army during the days of October can be considered a miracle. Yes, I am speaking quite seriously. As you know, it is considered more common for the basest human qualities to develop in the soldier masses with such a serious retreat--qualities which in the final account transform the Army into a herd. But it happened the other way around with us. Our man was never before as pure as in these days when he was performing noble exploits for the sake of the homeland."¹

During the Civil and Great Patriotic wars our soldiers defeated the enemy and displayed marvels of selflessness and heroism primarily because they had a high awareness of their duty to the homeland and subordinated their deeds and their entire lives to the people's command and to the fulfillment of orders aimed at defeating the hated enemy.

The course and outcome of combat actions will depend to an incomparably greater extent under conditions of a contemporary war on the discipline of personnel.

In its decree dated 21 January 1967, the CPSU Central Committee demands "assurance of a thorough understanding by all military personnel that the role and importance of military discipline grows even more under present-day conditions, when nuclear missile weaponry is in the Army inventory. Each soldier is required to have an extremely precise and exact fulfillment of the military oath, military regulations and commanders' orders, and faultless execution and efficiency, since the slightest display of negligence or lack of discipline can lead to serious consequences."²

The process of industrialization of the Armed Forces has extraordinarily accelerated in our time, and the importance of discipline is increasing in direct proportion to it. This is particularly typical of the Strategic Missile Forces, National Air Defense Forces, Air Force units and contemporary warships of the Navy. This principle, which determines the interdependence of the development of technology and military discipline, also is typical of combined units and units of the Ground Forces.

With the present technical outfitting of troops, the people's interrelationships and attitudes have become abruptly more complex, and again in the direction of greater precision and cohesiveness of actions. It also follows from what has been said that contemporary means of warfare increase each soldier's responsibility for performance of the combat mission.

1. Bubennov, M. "Belaya bereza" [White Birch], Moscow, 1952, p 250.
2. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1969, p 416.

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Take the following situation for example: A battalion is crossing a zone of radioactive contamination and in a certain sector the radiological monitor was inattentive in determining the radiation level, either overstating it or understating it. This will inevitably lead either to unjustified losses or to the subunit perhaps reducing the rate of advance without any basis for this. In other words, one person's imprecise actions will affect the performance of the mission as a whole.

It is impossible not to direct attention to another factor which determines the increased importance of military discipline in a contemporary war--the factor of time. Calculation of time always was an object of great concern for commanders and military leaders. To gain time and anticipate the enemy in actions is largely to predetermine victory. But in the past, and even in the past Great Patriotic War, time was counted primarily in days and hours, and a gain in time did not have such importance as now.

Not only the days and hours, but minutes and even seconds acquire extraordinary importance in a contemporary war. It now requires a missile approximately 30 minutes to deliver a nuclear warhead to any target. Every second must be accounted for in order to accomplish the combat mission successfully under such circumstances, i.e., to manage to set the necessary means of defense in motion and simultaneously deliver a crushing blow against the enemy with strategic weapons. A gain in time now is of colossal importance to the progress of combat operations and the war as a whole. This is why such great attention now is given to reducing the time periods for placing weapons in combat readiness, to reducing the time taken to maneuver positions and combat formations, and to mastering the personnel's precise, extremely exact and rapid actions with combat equipment.

In interpreting the new element in discipline called forth by the features of contemporary warfare, we also cannot help but reckon with a rise in the role of soldiers' initiative and creativeness in fulfilling a combat mission or a commander's order. An active attitude toward the order of a commander or chief is one of the specific manifestations of the conscientious character of Soviet military discipline. An order must be fulfilled strictly, precisely and on time, but its fulfillment will be even more successful, the more initiative a serviceman displays in so doing. The entire history of the Army and Navy and the experience of past wars are full of examples of a creative accomplishment of combat missions by our soldiers.

These remarkable qualities are even more necessary in our time. Contemporary combat actions are distinguished by high maneuverability and a rapid, sudden change in the situation. Under these conditions it is necessary to have the flexible mind and initiative of the soldier, especially the commander, and his ability and readiness to make an independent decision and act in conformity with the situation at hand in the interests of successful execution of the orders of senior chiefs.

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It is also important to consider the circumstance that it is enormously more difficult to maintain direct contact between the commander and subordinates under conditions of the employment of the latest means of warfare. A situation will take shape where soldiers will have to operate in separate centers as small groups enormously more often than in the past. It is one thing where a unit operates as a single whole and when the soldier constantly feels the effects of a precisely defined combat formation, and another when there may not be such orderliness in the actions of a unit or subunit. In these instances there comes to the fore the soldier's self-discipline and the profound inner need and ability instilled in him to subordinate his actions and his will to accomplishment of the combat mission.

It is obvious that even combat operations with the employment of conventional weapons will require high discipline and cohesiveness in the personnel's actions. There has been a sharp increase in saturation of combined units and units with military equipment, and consequently their missions have become more complex. Supersonic aircraft speeds call forth a need for extreme composure and responsibility in each soldier. This is characteristic of units in all branches of the Armed Forces with conventional combat equipment in their inventory.

A contemporary war thus not only presents high demands on soldiers' discipline, but also will introduce many new elements to its very content. This all is considered in the process of troop training under peacetime conditions, since the foundation of soldiers' high discipline is laid down right during training and daily service.

At the same time, military discipline itself is a primary condition for accomplishing combat and political training missions. The successful mastery of sophisticated equipment and its skilled employment on tactical exercise fields, on cruises, and in flights is inconceivable without military discipline. The soldiers' faultless discipline is a sure guarantee for high combat readiness of a unit, warship, and subunit.

A soldier's discipline is formed and develops throughout the process of his indoctrination, training and performance of service. Our verbal and printed propaganda rightfully emphasizes that military discipline is a moral category. This means that people's profound perception of the principles of a moral code of a builder of communism as moral imperatives is of permanent importance in fulfilling its demands. But this thesis sometimes is interpreted without proper consideration of the fact that military discipline also is a category of state legality. Consequently soldiers' indoctrination in a spirit of high discipline is a uniform process of military, legal and moral indoctrination.

Moral-political training has to do with the development primarily of political and moral elements on which personnel discipline is based. In a continuous interrelationship with military indoctrination, it forms in soldiers a constant desire to observe the demands of the military oath and regulations steadfastly.

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Observance of the demands of military discipline even in peacetime assumes a great intensity of the soldiers' spiritual and physical forces. Subordination to the demands of discipline represents the greatest difficulty in military service at first for a considerable number of privates. As research in one combined unit showed, over a third of privates surveyed who responded to questions about the difficulties of military service mention above all the transition to strict discipline and a rigid routine. Here are the most typical answers:

--Prior to the Army I did not have occasion to encounter such difficulties as strict discipline and precision in everything;

--The basic, sole difficulty is to fall out of the habits of the civilian situation and become accustomed to Army life strictly by the regulations;

--It was difficult to become accustomed to strict discipline and routine.

Experience shows that these difficulties are overcome considerably easier and less painfully by those soldiers who have the necessary moral and labor conditioning and who perceive their military duty more deeply.

The young people absorb these qualities necessary for defense of the Motherland in the process of military service, and the qualities later help them perform their missions of building communism. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev directed attention to this aspect of military indoctrination in a report at the 25th CPSU Congress. He said that "young lads come into the soldier family without having passed through the school of life. But they return from the Army already as people who have gone through the school of self-control and discipline and who have received technical and professional knowledge and political training."¹

Indoctrination of soldiers in a spirit of high discipline is the continuous focus of attention of commanders, political entities and party organizations. Consideration is given here to a number of new circumstances which have an effect on accomplishment of this mission.

First of all, great changes have occurred in the postwar years in the qualitative make-up of replacements. More literate and more well-trained young people now are coming into the Army. On the one hand, this makes it easier to indoctrinate soldiers in a spirit of conscientious military discipline. It is easier to persuade a literate person as to the need for strict observance of demands of the military oath, regulations, and commanders' orders. Meanwhile, the changes which have occurred in the developmental level of replacements require an improvement in all work of instilling discipline in today's soldiers.

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, pp 75-76.

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The method of persuasion always was the determining method of indoctrination in our Army, as it was in all Soviet society, where discipline is based on high awareness. V. I. Lenin emphasized that "we must above all persuade, and then compel."¹

M. V. Frunze spoke about the proper correlation of methods of persuasion and coercion. He stated that "it is of course impossible to get by absolutely without any elements of coercion, but the narrowest limits must be placed on their application."²

Several decades have gone by since these thoughts were expressed. The changes which have occurred in Army and Navy personnel during this time in the sense of general educational training and an expansion in cultural horizons reinforce even more the importance of this thesis in indoctrinational work with soldiers.

This does not at all mean that a need for coercion with respect to undisciplined people no longer arises in our time. The party teaches that intolerance is to be displayed toward violations of social order. And in addition to that, growing attention is being given to developing the ideological-moral aspect of indoctrinating Soviet citizens in a spirit of high discipline.

These party guidelines have special significance for the Armed Forces. Their implementation in the indoctrinational process presumes an intelligent combination of methods of persuasion and coercion with consideration of the features of the contemporary "human material." In speaking of an improvement in the method of persuasion, it is important to consider that the contemporary young person who has come into the Army ranks unquestionably perceives the essence and meaning of his military obligations with greater depth and thoroughness, but at the same time he also expects a more qualified explanation of the essence of demands being placed on him. General appeals and an oversimplified interpretation of particular issues influence him least of all. Indoctrinational work in the Army has become more complex in this sense.

There is one other circumstance which cannot help but be considered in the work of indoctrinating today's youth in a spirit of high discipline. In many instances the young lad who has come into the Army is the only child in the family. As a rule, he is molded in an atmosphere of the parents' special concern and attention which does not always facilitate the tempering of his will and character. On arriving in the Army it is especially difficult for him at first to become accustomed to hard Army life and to act strictly by the regulations.

1. Lenin, XLIII, 54.

2. Frunze, M. V. "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, 1957, II, 21.

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Indoctrinational work with soldiers now requires higher pedagogic expertise and broader erudition of officers. A young lad who has come into the Army today carries within himself and in his conduct a reflection of those profound, beneficial processes which are taking place in the country--further development of democracy and a growth of the individual. With a proper perception of military discipline, exactingness, and strictness of order, at the same time he expects a sensitive attitude toward himself and satisfaction of his increased spiritual needs.

Some officers can be heard to say that it now has become more difficult to work with soldiers because they allegedly are oversensitive to interpreting high exactingness. This is of course not so. Concrete sociological research provides the basis to draw conclusions of a different sort. To the question "Which of the officers do you most respect and why?" many privates named high exactingness among the merits of the officers they respected. The officers to whom the privates gave respect are exacting, strong-willed commanders who are capable of combining strictness and exactingness toward subordinates with constant concern for them.

Meanwhile, research shows that a tactless attitude and coarseness displayed by some officers unsettles the privates most of all and generates a heightened reaction in them. Contemporary soldiers require more attention and a respectful attitude toward themselves without, of course, any kind of indulgences in observing military order.

Officers now must possess more thorough knowledge in pedagogics and psychology. They have to study the peculiarities of people's characters in more detail, make broader use of the individual method of approaching subordinates, and devote more attention to satisfying increased spiritual and material needs, especially those of young soldiers.

The second element which introduces much that is new to the work of instilling high discipline in soldiers is the growth in the Army and Navy's technical outfitting. The appearance of new means of warfare has led to a further expansion and complication of interrelationships between man and equipment. And the growing dependence of success of a battle or operation on people's knowledge of contemporary combat equipment and its capable employment serves as one of the manifestations of this objective process. The contemporary training process is above all a process in which personnel master the combat equipment, weapons and methods of their employment. Use of the latest equipment and keeping it in a combat status assume, moreover, an exceptional precision and synchronization in the personnel's actions. For this reason instilling discipline means increasing in every way the service personnel's responsibility for the equipment entrusted to them and for its capable employment. The demand to fulfill faultlessly the directions contained in instructions and manuals for the study of equipment and for maintaining it in constant readiness for action has acquired great acuteness in this regard, particularly for missile units, air defense troops, the Air Force and the Navy. Where this circumstance is not taken into account, grounds for accidents or the malfunctioning of costly equipment have not been eliminated.

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The strictest observance of the requirements of regulations, manuals and instructions on caring for and operating equipment and on keeping it ready for action is a very important component in the make-up of all work of indoctrinating people in a spirit of high discipline, since this has a determining effect on troop combat readiness.

Military-technical progress places its imprint on various aspects of the work of commanders, chiefs and all officers and requires them to have greater efficiency and composure in their work. The contemporary foremost officer is not one who achieves necessary results at any cost, but one who organizes work capably and in a scientific manner and who makes maximum use of equipment and foremost management methods. New equipment requires special precision and thought in the actions of all managers.

The third element which must not be forgotten when we speak of indoctrinating soldiers in a spirit of high discipline is bringing its demands closer to wartime discipline in a large number of echelons. This proposition is determined by the increased importance of troop combat readiness to the country's security.

Under contemporary conditions our Strategic Missile Forces and Air Defense Forces perform their very, very difficult and important missions in a near-combat situation. There is an especially important form of service: combat watch. It is the performance of a most important combat mission in its purpose and essence. All this places special responsibility on the personnel and generates additional difficulties in service.

The instilling of discipline of the highest limit, which is necessary on combat watch, demands great efforts on the part of commanders, political entities and party organizations. The important element here is for each soldier to have a clear understanding of the entire importance of his service to the subunit, unit and the country as a whole, and for him to realize how necessary is his faultless performance of duties for ensuring the Motherland's security.

Under present-day conditions the degree of people's discipline in all units of any branch of the Armed Forces or combat arm is viewed primarily through the prism of combat readiness. From this standpoint, for example, even isolated instances of alcohol abuse are absolutely intolerable under Army conditions. One sometimes can hear certain young soldiers say: "What's so special about that? We drank at home and nothing happened." These judgments reflect a lack of understanding that with today's sophisticated equipment requiring special attentiveness, a person with a clouded consciousness or with a mind traumatized by alcohol cannot perform his duties precisely and, moreover, he may do irreparable harm to the cause. This is one of the most important circumstances making it necessary to take the strictest steps to eradicate drunkenness under Army and Navy conditions.

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And fourth is something very important to consider in the work of instilling in soldiers a spirit of high discipline. It is the collective nature of contemporary weapons. The fact that new technology is activated through the collective efforts of soldiers determines each person's increase in responsibility for performance of his duties in the team or crew at his station or at the battle station.

The interdependence and interchangeability in servicing equipment, which was widely displayed in past wars only on the battlefield, has been transformed into a mandatory element of daily troop life with the present-day means of warfare. Without the firm discipline of each soldier individually, not one subunit will be able to perform the mission assigned it successfully. It is important here that each soldier's conduct be "synchronized" in the collective and that he have a developed sense of responsibility for performance of the missions being carried out by the subunit.

On the other hand, new weaponry increases the collective's responsibility for each soldier's conduct and action. Therefore a knowledge of the features of a military collective's psychology is of great importance for instilling discipline in soldiers with consideration of present-day demands.

Making military collectives cohesive on a fundamental basis must be a subject of great concern to commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations. The well-known principle of "one for all and all for one" acquires importance as a mandatory norm of behavior for all service personnel. The importance of bringing up soldiers in a spirit of collectivism, mutual responsibility, and Soviet troop comradeship increases in this regard.

The development of genuine collectivism and mutual responsibility also presumes the eradication of imaginary comradeship and unprincipled, unenlightened friendship. Even before, if mutual backscratching was displayed in some instances, it did much harm to the cohesiveness of military collectives. It now may have enormously greater consequences.

The heart of all work of indoctrinating soldiers in a spirit of high discipline is formation of their /faultless execution/ and unconditional fulfillment of military regulations and the orders of commanders and chiefs. The success of a subunit, unit or warship under combat conditions is inconceivable without this quality.

Some bourgeois military theorists attempt to place execution and initiative in contemporary battle in opposition. For example, in an article by French military specialist D. (Shavan) entitled "On the Rehabilitation of Discipline," he writes: "Contemporary methods of warmaking, use of various types of weapons, decentralization, and the unforeseen element in the unfolding of combat actions all require more initiative than subordination. In addition, at the present time soldiers primarily are not professionals. They are very much informed and wish to act independently more and more." The author correctly poses the issue of an increase in the role of initiative in

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contemporary combat, but he does not take into account that this does not at all mean a weakening of discipline or execution of personnel in performance of combat missions. Employment of contemporary means of warfare presumes that the initiative and creativeness of service personnel are combined without fail with the performance of plans, orders and instructions of superior commanders and chiefs.

The entire process and content of moral-political and psychological training are inseparable from those spiritual values which have been created in the Armed Forces throughout their entire historical path. The glorious combat traditions of our Army and Navy and their systematic, purposeful propaganda among personnel are of enormous, permanent importance in this regard.

French writer Victor Hugo once said: "Events go into the past. The people who have seen them at first hand close their eyes forever. Traditions die out with the years just as the light in a fireplace."

In his works Hugo was faithful to the truth of life, but in this instance he erred. There is an enormous mobilizing force contained in traditions, and in leading traditions above all. This can be said in particular about the combat traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy. Not one army in the world has such a very rich, truly heroic history as the USSR Armed Forces. There are many combined units and units among the troops and in the fleets which bear several Soviet Union orders on their colors. And what very vivid examples of heroics saturate the combat careers of our guards units and combined units!

The unfading light of combat glory is the life-giving source for the formation of high morale in troop personnel needed for victory in contemporary war; the source of inspiration for soldiers to perform noble deeds in peacetime.

Much experience in this regard has been gained in the Armed Forces. A broad network of military museums and rooms of combat glory is actively used in bringing up soldiers in combat traditions. Large numbers of books are published about the combat deeds and exploits of combined units, units, ships and their personnel. But it must be said that the task of creating meaningful material of high quality concerning their history and combat path has not been resolved in all combined units.

Veterans who have participated in war have made and are making an invaluable contribution to the propaganda of the Army and Navy's combat traditions. Unfortunately they are becoming fewer and fewer among the troops and in the fleets, particularly in units and aboard ships, where the process of personnel indoctrination is directly carried out. An even greater significance is acquired in this regard by the propaganda of combat deeds and the heroics of the war years and peacetime using diverse forms and means, especially involving the use of military-historical works, memoirs, relics, and works of fiction and art.

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Indoctrination in the heroics and the grand exploits which our personnel performed in battles to defend the socialist Motherland is of special importance in using combat traditions in the interests of the personnel's moral-political training. These very traditions pale and their effect on the soldiers' consciousness is reduced without this component, which largely determines the content of combat traditions. A heroic exploit is an example for emulation in a difficult combat situation. Meanwhile, this is not always taken into account. For example, during a survey in a unit, a majority of soldiers even in the first year of service could state the key element in response to the question "What do you know about your unit's combat traditions?" Seventy-four percent of the soldiers could give the battles in which it took part. But a little over 13 percent of the soldiers responded to the following question, "What exploit performed by the unit's soldiers stuck in your memory?"¹ All this attests to insufficient attention given in some units to propaganda of heroic examples and exploits of countrymen in battles for the Motherland. It is therefore so important to fill in the propaganda of combat traditions more fully with the heroics of past years.

The experience of indoctrination in combat traditions and the heroics of past years in one of the guards units is instructive. This unit has performed great services to the Motherland. There were 2,918 personnel in the unit decorated with governmental orders for exemplary performance of combat assignments in the Great Patriotic War. Seven of them were presented with the title Hero of the Soviet Union. The names of six soldiers who performed heroic exploits in battles against the fascist German invaders were entered in the unit rolls forever by order of the Minister of Defense. The soldiers maintain and develop the glory of their countrymen in peacetime. Many of the unit's personnel were awarded combat orders and medals for courage, valor and high expertise in performing assignments of the command element in peacetime. Troop traditions are alive in the military deeds of otlichniki and leaders of training.

Much is being done here to bring up the personnel in combat traditions. The first political classes at the beginning of a training year are devoted to the unit's combat path. There is much work conducted continuously in a well-arranged room of combat glory. Portraits of heroes who have been entered forever in the unit rolls and descriptions of their exploits are hung in the barracks. Displays devoted to the combat traditions of the Armed Forces and the unit have been arranged in the Lenin rooms and there are portraits of heroes of war years and peacetime here. It has become a good rule to hold regular meetings of privates, sergeants, warrant officers and officers with war veterans. Movies and belles-lettres are used widely to indoctrinate soldiers in the heroics of the past.

1. See "Voyenno-patrioticheskoye vospitaniye molodezhi v sovremennykh usloviyakh. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov" [Military-Patriotic Indoctrination of the Youth under Contemporary Conditions: Collection of Scientific Works], Novosibirsk, 1975, p 20.

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The experience of indoctrination in combat traditions has been gained in all units and aboard all warships, including those which have no rich combat history.

The missile troops, air defense forces and units activated after the war widely propagandize Armed Forces' traditions and the combat glory of units whose numbers and designations were received by some missile units. Here they create, elaborate and continuously augment the traditions of the missile troops themselves and extol the exploits of missile personnel performed in postwar times and the patriotic deeds of otlichniki and of soldiers who perform service faultlessly.

An important role is played by propaganda of the military oath and military regulations in indoctrinating soldiers in a spirit of allegiance to their military duty and in forming their high moral-combat qualities. The oath and regulations contain demands of the Communist Party and Soviet government on armed defenders of the socialist state and on the training and indoctrination of Soviet military personnel.

The military oath defines the primary qualities of the Soviet soldier needed for victory over the enemy. It contains in writing those sacred obligations where the high consciousness and fervent patriotism of Soviet citizens are displayed in their fulfillment. Therefore the military oath and military regulations, being the foundation of military indoctrination, at the same time also largely determine the content of moral-political and psychological training.

From his very first days of service, each soldier must become imbued with an awareness that the oath is a sacred vow of allegiance to the country and that it reflects the people's will and orders to their armed defenders.

Propaganda of the oath's requirements is carried on systematically, from day to day, among the troops. They are explained to more than just the young privates and seamen. All personnel also are constantly reminded of their vow to the people. Daily purposeful work of propagandizing the oath permits instilling its ideas and demands in the awareness of each soldier and seeing that he fulfills it throughout his service.

Interests of the country's defense demand that every step and every act by a soldier throughout his service be synchronized with the high, inviolable demands of the military oath--a vow of allegiance to the Motherland.

The entire meaning and direction of the work of commanders, political workers and party members in moral-political and psychological training and conditioning of personnel consists of thoroughly preparing every soldier under peacetime conditions for skilled, selfless actions in a contemporary war and for achieving victory over any aggressor.

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Conclusion

The Soviet socialist state has stood firmly and inviolably for over 60 years now. Soviet citizens look back proudly on the path they have covered and at the successes achieved in all fields of the building of communism. The Land of Soviets, born of October, has been subjected to serious tests more than once along this historic path and has been the object of imperialist aggression. Our Motherland and its Army always have come out of these tests with honor, crushing every enemy.

Our Communist Party invariably has been and is the builder, indoctrinator and inspirer of our Armed Forces and of their glorious victories over numerous enemies of the Land of Soviets. Our ideological indoctrination and the entire system of soldier training is built on the basis of party policy, directives and instructions, shaping the high, noble qualities of Soviet patriots and selfless defenders of the Motherland ready to give their all and, if necessary, life itself for the sake of her prosperity and for defense of the countries of the socialist community.

In a report at the 9th All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1921, V. I. Lenin said: "We are stronger than anyone else morally, not understanding this thought from the viewpoint of abstract morality, of course, but taking it as a correlation of actual forces of all classes in all states. This is tested in fact. It has been proven not by words, but by deeds. It already has been proven once and probably will be proven more than once if history swings around in the familiar fashion."¹

These remarkable words of Lenin about the superiority of our people's and Army's moral forces over armies of imperialist aggressors have been confirmed repeatedly by life and by the practice of the wars which our socialist state waged against invaders.

The development and strengthening of the spiritual forces of the people and Army always were and remain an object of the Communist Party's unwavering attention. Thanks to the guiding influence of the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee, ideological indoctrination work becomes a more and more powerful factor for strengthening the combat effectiveness of the Soviet Army and Navy.

If enemies should dare attack us again, the Soviet land and its Armed Forces would rise up to their gigantic height and again demonstrate their political, economic and spiritual might and ideological superiority over imperialism and its corrupt ideology, this time not alone, but together with fraternal countries of the world socialist community and their armed forces. The mighty and indestructible spiritual forces of our people and their soldiers will have a most important significance in such a development of events.

¹ Lenin, XLIV, 300.

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Accomplishment of the entire complex of tasks of shaping a high morale in soldiers both in peace and in wartime is possible only in the course of the systematic, purposeful, all-encompassing work of commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations in the ideological-political and military indoctrination of our Army's personnel. The armed defender of the nation who is building communism and is capable of performing any of the very difficult tasks of defending the peace and security of our Motherland and the grand cause of communism is shaped and tempered through all forms of ideological work in the uniform process of training and indoctrination and by the entire system of military life.

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COMBINING INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING

Moscow YEDINSTVO VOSPITANIYA I OBUCHENIYA (Unity of Indoctrination and Training) in Russian 1977 signed to press 18 Nov 77 pp 1, 2, 3-4

[Annotation, Table of Contents and Foreword from book by D.P. Poznanskiy, Ordena "Znak Pocheta" izdatel'stvo DOSAAF SSSR, 30,000 copies, 80 pages]

[Text] The author of this book, Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences D. P. Poznanskiy, discusses the comprehensive approach to the ideological-political indoctrination of students of DOSAAF training organizations.

The book is intended mainly for supervisory personnel, teachers and instructors of the defense Society's clubs and schools, and for DOSAAF activists.

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The increased tasks placed upon the Armed Forces of the USSR by the contemporary international situation, the qualitative changes occurring in the technical equipment of the troops and the nature of modern warfare are continuously increasing the requirements made of Soviet fighting men and of their ideological-political and their moral and combat qualities.

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The CPSU therefore attaches great importance to improving effectiveness in the training and indoctrination of the fighting men and that of the draft-age youth. This task has also become more important as a result of the reduced terms of military service. How rapidly the young fighting men settle into the formation and, consequently, the combat readiness level of units and subunits of the Soviet Army and Navy, depend greatly upon the quality of the training received by draftees and upon their ideological level and discipline.

The All-Union Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner Volunteer Society for Cooperation With the Army, Aviation, and Fleet (DOSAAF USSR) has a large role in the creation and development of good moral and combat qualities in the draftees and in the training of the youth for military service. "The defense Society, which is expected to thoroughly build up our state's military might and its defense against a possible enemy invasion," stated Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, "not only trains military reserves for the Soviet Armed Forces, but also, throughout its work, helps to further solidify the workers around the Communist Party and indoctrinates them in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and selfless devotion to that great cause, the building of communism in our nation."

Carrying out instructions from the Communist Party, the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress has reviewed questions pertaining to the further improvement of the training of specialists for the Armed Forces of the USSR in accordance with today's demands and with the general education, cultural level and technical sophistication of the draft-age youth, and has adopted a decision to expand and restructure the training materials base and to improve training and indoctrinational work in DOSAAF schools and clubs.

Observance of the principle of unity of indoctrination and training constitutes an extremely important condition for the development of good moral and combat qualities in the future fighting men. This principle forms the key element in the comprehensive approach to the training of students at the defense Society's training organizations. The administrators, instructors and teachers of those organizations have the main role in the implementation of that principle.

With this in mind, the 8th DOSAAF Congress demanded that the defense Society committees take steps to strengthen the staffs of DOSAAF organizations and to systematically improve their qualifications and the methodological level of instruction.

Most supervisors and instructors at DOSAAF training organizations possess the required methodological skills for training the students and for implementing the principle of unity of training and indoctrination. At the same time, many new workers lacking experience have recently joined the Society to perform training and indoctrinational work. As the DOSAAF Congress noted, this sometimes results in a situation in some organizations in which proper attention is not devoted to the military-patriotic

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indoctrination and the moral-psychological training of the pre-draft youth for military service.

In the interests of generally improving the work of DOSAAF training organizations, this situation urgently demands the further development of ways of improving the training and indoctrination and of making it a comprehensive and unified process.

The objective of this booklet, which is based on decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and subsequent documents of the Party and the Soviet Government, as well as decisions coming out of the 8th DOSAAF Congress and the experience of the defense Society's progressive schools and clubs, was to explain the nature of the comprehensive approach to the training and indoctrination of pre-draft youth at DOSAAF training organizations. Naturally, the author does not claim to have fully clarified this complex issue. He hopes, however, that the booklet will be of certain assistance to workers performing the noble job of training and indoctrinating future defenders of the homeland.—Author

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TRAINING MANUAL FOR FIELD MILITARY VEHICLES

Moscow USTROYSTVO I EKSPLUATATSIYA BTR-60P, ZIL-130, ZIL-131 (The Design and Operation of The BTR-60P, ZIL-130 and ZIL-131) in Russian 1978 signed to press 26 Sep 78 pp 1, 2, 3-4

[Annotation, Table of Contents and Introduction from book by V. I. Medvedkov, Yu. N. Komarov and A. F. Lobzin, Ordena "Znak Pocheta" izdatel'stvo DOSAAF SSSR, 55,000 copies, 312 pages]

[Text] This training manual explains the basic principles underlying the design and the operation of the BTR-60P wheeled armored personnel carrier and its modifications and the ZIL-130 and ZIL-131 motor vehicles. It embraces the program covered in DOSAAF technical schools.

The training manual can also be used as an aid to enhance the training of drivers of armored personnel carriers and motor vehicles.

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Introduction

The development and manufacture of wheeled vehicles as a military equipment item are closely linked to the development of the automotive industry's production base and with the overall achievements of our national economy.

The Soviet automotive industry has developed rapidly from semi-primitive production to a modern, highly organized industrial branch. This development was made possible by the planned expansion of all sectors of the national economy through the efforts of the Communist Party and the Soviet people. The production of steel and rubber, gasoline and lubricants, synthetic materials, machine tools and tools, rolling-contact bearings and automotive glass, and the construction of service stations and roads, taken together, have all created the possibility of developing a modern automotive industry.

A plan of continued national economic development has been established in accordance with directives of the 25th CPSU Congress, which, among other things, calls for extensive motorization of the nation. By the end of the Tenth Five-Year Plan we will have production capacities capable of turning out 2,296,000 motor vehicles in 1980. Enormous plants, outfitted with the latest of modern equipment, have already been constructed and are operating at full capacity in Tol'yatti and Izhevsk; the first section of a giant automotive plant has begun operating in Naberezhnyye Chelny; and such huge motor vehicle enterprises as the ZIL, AZLK, GAZ and others have undergone modernization.

Each year, our nation receives hundreds of thousands of the new GAZ, ZIL, KamAZ, BelAZ and other trucks; a base is being created for improving the conditions and quality of technical servicing for transport equipment. All of this is conducive to equipment of the Soviet Army with new models of automotive equipment and wheeled armored vehicles. Army motor vehicles and wheeled armored personnel carriers are now one of the most commonly used types of equipment in the Armed Forces of the USSR. This equipment has an especially important role in the Ground Forces, providing today's troops with the important quality of mobility.

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It is military motor vehicles and wheeled armored personnel carriers, to a considerable degree, which provide the troops with the ability to conduct combat operations at a rapid pace and to great depth. According to the type of vehicle, they may be designated for the performance of various combat and auxiliary functions.

The chassis of military motor vehicles provide the base upon which weapons and special equipment are installed. Army automotive equipment is used for hauling large freight to the troops and as the final element in composite transport operations with other types of transports, or, it operates as the intermediate element linking other types of transport.

Army motor transport depends to a lesser degree upon the road network than does rail transport, for example. It gives flexibility to transport operations and is less vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction, since it has greater dispersal and shelter possibilities. Damage to individual vehicles does not put an entire echelon out of action and does not entail the extensive delays which can occur in the case of rail transport.

When troops are moved great distances motor transport may be charged with the task of hauling various types of tracked vehicles. The latter are hauled on special heavy-duty, trailer-tractor units in order to conserve their running life.

Wheeled armored personnel carriers are used for transporting troops on the march and to the battlefield. When the combat situation and the terrain are conducive, motorized riflemen on wheeled armored personnel carriers can interact with tanks in a battle. Certain types of wheeled armored vehicles—reconnaissance patrol vehicles, for example—are designated for the performance of reconnaissance and patrol functions, and with the installation of special weapons, for the performance of other combat missions as well.

Soviet-produced wheeled armored vehicles and automotive equipment have good combat qualities and good technical operating features. These features have made it necessary to increase the structural complexity of these vehicles to a certain degree, however. Full application of the good technical operating features of motor vehicles and wheeled armored vehicles in peacetime and, especially, in time of war, however, is only possible with a solid knowledge of their structure, their operation and adjustment, with the ability to locate and eliminate possible malfunctions of the mechanisms and systems, and with a knowledge of the operating materials employed and of the peculiarities of their operation.

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