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26 September 1979

West Europe Report

(FOUO 54/79)

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 54/79)

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

BELGIUM

SOVIET COMMENTS ON BELGIAN FIGHTER PILOT TRAINING

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to press 6 Apr 79 pp 43-44

[Article by Lt Col (Res) B. Sokolin, candidate of military sciences: "Personnel of the Belgian Air Force Master the F-16"]

[Text] Following in the wake of aggressive NATO policy, the ruling circles of Belgium are building up the strength of their armed forces in conformity with the interests of the bloc. Equipping the air force with the latest fighting planes is one step in this direction that the military leadership of the country is taking.

It has been reported in the foreign press that four West European countries who are NATO members, specifically Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark, have signed an agreement in the United States to buy 348 new American F-16 fighter planes. Of them 115 are for the Belgian Air Force. According to the agreement Belgian aviation construction firms will participate in production of the aircraft. Specifically, in October 1978 the first series-produced F-16 fighter with a wing produced in Belgium was built (see picture [not reproduced]).

Retraining programs for flight and technical personnel were developed in connection with the decisions of the Belgian Air Force to adopt the F-16 fighter plane. These programs envision training 120 pilots and about 900 technicians between 1978 and 1983.

Retraining flight personnel. The first step is for Belgian flight instructors to master the F-16 at Edwards Air Base in California. The pilots chosen for this have instructor's ratings and at least 1,000 hours of flying time, including 750 hours in F-104G or Mirage 5 jet planes. Each pilot will go through a theoretical course figured for 88 hours and then perform 16 flights (six training flights to develop flying techniques, five to master the procedures of waging aerial battle, and five involving strikes against ground targets). Each instructor will have a total of 25 hours of flying time.

The retraining of other pilots will begin in September 1979. The first crews to go through it will be the crews of the 350th Fighter Squadron

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stationed at Beauvechaine air base. The retraining course is figured for three months. Pilots will be divided into two groups based on flying experience. The first group will be pilots who have 800 hours or more of flying time; their retraining program resembles the program for training the flight instructors. The second group will comprise the remaining pilots, each of whom is allocated at least 30 hours of flying time to master the aircraft.

During retraining flights will be made in two-seat F-16B training planes. The command of the Belgian Air Force has ordered 13 such planes, which will be delivered as follows: six in 1979; four in 1980; two in 1981; one in 1982.

The F-16 trainer specially devised in the United States is also to be used intensively for pilot training. The Belgian Air Force expects to receive it in the fall of 1980. In addition, two other types of simulation equipment will be used for pilot training: a cockpit simulator with a full set of equipment to help the pilot develop stable skills in using the aircraft instruments and systems and a trainer to practice procedures for abandoning the aircraft in various situations.

The pilots will go through the program of combat training in line units. Each of them will make at least 50 flights to master this program, foreign specialists believe.

The foreign press notes that the F-16 fighter will be mastered by pilots who have sufficient flying experience in jet fighter planes, while pilots who have just graduated from school will be sent to squadrons which have not received the new planes yet. Technical personnel to service the F-16 aircraft will be retrained at a specially established training center in Beauvechaine from 1979 to 1982 inclusively. This subunit has an instructor group (two officers and 23 NCO's) who have been trained at training centers in the United States. The specialists of the group are now developing a methodology and program for retraining technical personnel.

Technical aids such as video recorders and special simulators are to be used extensively in the training process. In the initial period the amount of actual aircraft equipment allocated for the training center will be inadequate. Belgian specialists think that this shortcoming can be overcome by the use of video recorders and this will enable trainees to become familiar with the new combat equipment in sufficient detail.

The trainer for training technical personnel will make it possible to reproduce the functioning of aircraft equipment and systems, show the location of particular parts and assemblies, stimulate the occurrence of malfunctions, and practice searching for and fixing them. At the end of the drill the trainer's computer will read out information on mistakes made by the trainees (in order of their significance).

A special engineering-technical group of 45 persons trained in the United States has been formed to receive and service the first F-16 aircraft, which began to arrive in Belgium in early 1979.

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According to the thinking of the command of the Belgian Air Force, taking all these steps to retrain flight and technical personnel should make it possible to put the first squadron (the 350th Fighter Air Squadron) in the ranks of the combat ready by the end of 1980. Plans call for the four stated squadrons to be supplied with new F-16 planes by 1983.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SOVIET COMMENTS ON THE WEST GERMAN AIR FORCE

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to press 6 Apr 79 pp 37-42

[Article by Col V. Sibiryakov: "The West German Air Force"]

[Text] Militaristic circles in West Germany are constantly building up the might of their armed forces, including the air force. In the opinion of foreign military specialists, the air force now occupies the leading place among the air forces of the European members of the aggressive NATO bloc and is the air force most prepared to wage combat actions.

The missions of the West German Air Force are defined in the points of the "doctrine" adopted by the NATO command in 1976 on the use of the tactical aviation of the unified air force. This doctrine was worked out on the basis of the NATO strategy of "flexible response" and the conception of "forward lines" with active participation by representatives of the West German Air Force and was approved by the West German minister of defense as the fundamental document with respect to employment of the country's military aviation.

According to this "doctrine," aviation should be capable of waging offensive air operations, providing air support to ground forces, performing air defense of important sites and aerial reconnaissance, and transporting men and equipment to theaters of military operations.*

In the following article we use information published in the foreign press to elucidate the organization, composition, combat training, and prospects for development of the West German Air Force.

Organization and combat composition (see Figure 1 [not reproduced]).
The air force is headed by an inspector (commander) who is subordinate

* For more detail on this subject, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE 1978, No 8, pp 47-49 and 1979, No 1, pp 49-52 — editor.

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to the minister of defense and inspector general. He exercises leadership of the air force through the main staff, which has several divisions: personnel and combat training, military intelligence, command and control of the air force, organizations, rear services, planning, weapons systems, and others.

The tactical air command, logistic command, and general directorate.

The tactical air command is the highest operational force of the air force. The tactical air command headquarters directs the combat training of the formations and units under it, is responsible for maintaining them in constant combat readiness, cooperates with the corresponding NATO headquarters, and participates in organizing exercises conducted within the bloc framework and independently.

According to information published in the foreign press the tactical air command includes two air support divisions (1st and 3rd), two air defense air divisions (2nd and 4th), and the training command of the West German Air Force in the United States.

The 1st Air Support Division (headquarters at Lautlingen) includes the 32nd, 33rd, and 34th fighter bomber squadron (36F-104G planes apiece with bases at Lechfeld, Buechel, and Memmingen respectively), the 35th fighter bomber squadron (30F-4F planes, see Figure 2 [not reproduced], based at Pferdefeld), and the 51st Reconnaissance Squadron (30 RF-4E planes, Bremgarten).

The 3rd Air Support Division (Kalkar) includes the 31st and 36th fighter bomber squadrons (36F-104G's, at Nerwenich; 30 F-4F's, at Hoptsten), the 41st and 43rd light combat air squadrons (42G-91's apiece, Husum and Oldenburg), and the 52nd Reconnaissance Squadron (30RF-4E planes, at Leck).

In addition, these divisions have the 1st and 2nd squadron (36 launchers apiece) of operational-tactical Pershing 1A missiles (see Figure 3 [not reproduced]).

The air defense aviation divisions include the 71st and 74th fighter air squadrons (30 F-4F planes apiece, Witmundhafen and Neiburg respectively), the 2nd, 13th, and 14th Nike -Hercules antiaircraft guided missile regiment (each with two battalions of four batteries, nine launchers per battery), the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Hawk antiaircraft guided missile regiments (each with three battalions of four batteries, six launchers per battery), the 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 34th radar support regiments (equipped with radar and communications equipment, as a result of which the press sometimes calls them radar support and communications regiments or even simply communications regiments). The aviation squadrons of the West German Air Force usually consist of two subsquadrons and several auxiliary subunits. The subsquadrons have three-digit numbers in which the first two digits are the squadron number and the last is the ordinal number of the subsquadron.

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The training command of the West German Air Force in the United States, which is included in the tactical air command, trains pilots and engineering-technical personnel for aviation and missile units. It has a missile school at Fort Bliss in Texas and an aviation training center at Luke Air Base in Arizona.

The logistic command purchases and repairs aviation equipment and weapons, supplies them to fighting units and subunits, and provides air force personnel with all types of rations.

The headquarters of the command plans supply operations and replenishing reserves, monitors timely supply of essential materiel to air force units, and organizes development work on promising aviation equipment and weapons. In addition, it is responsible for the deployment of the ground equipment for radar and certain other types of flight support.

To accomplish these missions the command has set up two logistics groups, the North group and the South group, each with a definite area of responsibility. The appropriate institutions, units, and subunits are included in the two groups.

The command has a significant number of central and field storehouses and transport vehicles for moving goods among storehouses and delivering them to aviation units. An information service has been established to improve the organization of logistics in the command. It has a computer which can store up to 2.5 million types of supply articles in its memory.

The general directorate is engaged in training cadres and supplying personnel to air force units and subunits. It is also responsible for air shipment of personnel and materiel in the interests of all the branches of the armed forces. It has a training command and a transport command.

The training command trains flight and engineering-technical personnel for the country's air force. It has various schools, in particular Flight School No 10 at Jever Air Base (60 F-104's - 45 of them two-seat TF-104G trainers, see Figure 4 [not reproduced], and 15 F-104G fighter planes) and School No 50 (Fuerstenfeldbruck, 55G91T training fighter bombers).

The air transport command has three squadrons (61st, 63rd, and 64th) and a special-purpose detached group (subsquadron). The first two squadrons have C-160 Transall planes (36 apiece, see colored insert [not reproduced] and are stationed at the air bases in Landsberg and Hon, and the third (Olhorn air base) consists of four subsquadrons of 23 UH-1D helicopters apiece.

The training subunit at the Wuensdorf air base, with 14 C-160 Transall planes, trains military transport crews.

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The special-purpose group at the Wan air base is designed to carry the top leaders of the ministry of defense and other highly placed figures in the country. It has various planes (four Boeing 707's, eight HFB-320 Hanses, three C-140's, and three VFW614's). Aircraft discarded by this group and other subunits, for example nine Pembrokes, five Noratlases, and two C-47's, continue in use in the air force as communications planes and for the performance of other special missions. In addition, the West German Air Force has more than 120 light Do-28D planes. They are assigned to the aviation squadrons and headquarters where they are used as communications planes, for weather reconnaissance in airfield regions, and to perform other auxiliary missions. Finally, there are 16 OV-10Z planes, several B0105 helicopters, and so on.

Thus, according to information published in the foreign press, the West German Air Force has more than 500 fighting planes (the types of aircraft and their basic performance characteristics are given in the table [not reproduced]), 90 military transports, and more than 300 auxiliary and special-purpose airplanes and helicopters. The air force also has operational-tactical Pershing 1A missiles (72 launchers) and Nike-Hercules and Hawk anti-aircraft guided missiles (432 launchers).

All the forces of military aviation plus the operational-tactical missiles and anti-aircraft guided missiles of the West German Armed Forces are included in the 2nd and 4th joint tactical air commands of the NATO Unified Air Force in the Central European Theater and, in the opinion of foreign specialists, are the most powerful aviation group in this theater after the U. S. Air Force. In addition, part of the forces of the West German Air Force are included in the command of the NATO Unified Air Force in the Baltic Strait zone.

The combat training of West German Air Force units and subunits is organized in conformity with requirements of the NATO command and aims at a further increase in their combat readiness. The crews of West German aviation perform regular flights more for the purpose of improving combat skills than to develop flying techniques. Significant attention here is devoted to mastering flight at low and extremely low altitudes, waging combat actions from standby and field airfields (including specially rigged sectors of highway), delivering strikes against ground targets at any time of the day or night under complex weather conditions in close cooperation with other branches of the armed forces and independently.

As the foreign press observes, the West German Air Force is trained under conditions maximally approximating those of combat, with an eye to both conventional and nuclear weapons. West Germany has specially prepared proving grounds and training bases for this purpose. At the same time the air force command makes extensive use of the training bases, airfields, and proving grounds of its NATO allies for personnel training. For example, each year 2,000-2,500 West German pilots, navigators, missile experts, and other specialists go through training at American military training centers. The crews of fighting planes practice bombing ground targets and firing at aerial targets year-round in the proving grounds at Sardinia and Crete.

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Prospects for development. Because they consider the air force one of the principal means of achieving their revanchiste designs, which are directed against the USSR and the other socialist countries, the militaristic circles of West Germany are constantly increasing their combat might and combat readiness. One of the important steps being taken by the country's military leadership in this direction is the program to re-equip air force units and subunits with new aviation equipment and weapons.

In the first stage of this program 273 Phantom tactical aircraft were bought in the United States; of them 88 were the RF-4E reconnaissance variation and the rest were F-4F fighter planes.

As noted in the foreign press, the second phase was to begin in February 1979 with the delivery of the first of 175 light Alpha Jet ground-attack planes that have been ordered. They are to replace the B91 plane, first in the training unit of Flight School No 50 (after which it will be renamed the 49th Fighter Bomber Squadron) and later in the 45th and 43rd light combat aviation squadron.

The third phase will begin in the 1980's when the air force receives the first multipurpose tactical Tornado fighters; 324 planes have been ordered, 212 for the air force and the rest for naval aviation. The Tornado fighters are to replace obsolete F-104's in four squadrons and the TF-104G's in the training subunit.

Concurrently with the delivery of new aircraft programs have been developed and are being carried out to modernize the aviation equipment now in use, including the comparatively new F-4F fighter plane. Work is also underway to equip fighting planes with the latest weaponry and reconnaissance and flight navigation equipment.

Along with this the command of the West German Air Force continues to improve ground air defense means. In particular, a large share of the Hawk antiaircraft guided missile subunits have been supplied with the improved Hawk antiaircraft missile complexes and work has also been done to modernize the Nike-Hercules complexes. The foreign press reports that these complexes will be kept in use until at least the mid-1980's. However, the country's military leadership is already considering the question of replacing them with more sophisticated missile systems, for example the Patriot antiaircraft missile complex under development in the United States.

All the air defense personnel and means of the West German Air Force are part of the NATO unified air defense system in Europe. In the opinion of West German specialists, one of the weak points of the air defense system is ineffectiveness against low-flying enemy aircraft. In the first place, they say, the network of radar stations in West Germany has primarily long-range stations, for example, the AN/TPS-43E (see colored insert [not reproduced]), which do not completely overlap the air space when detecting and tracking targets flying at low altitude. In the second place, the Hawk and Nike-Hercules missile complexes do not provide reliable cover for air bases, command and control elements,

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storehouses, and other important objects when enemy aviation operates at low altitude and the 20-millimeter twin-mounted antiaircraft guns now in use are ineffective.

To solve the first problem the West German Air Force bought 55 mobile MRDR30/1 radar sets, and to resolve the second problem they plan to adopt the mobile Roland 2 antiaircraft missile complex.

The West German military leadership is taking steps to improve the system of command and control over combat actions by its aviation, devoting considerable attention to increasing the reliability and speed of control. For this purpose the West German Ministry of Defense in 1975 approved a plan to establish a unified automated control system for the air force based on broad use of computers. This system is to be set up before the mid-1980's. It will be a composite system consisting of several distinct automated control systems and an automatic communications network.

All the measures mentioned above illustrate once again that the militarization of West Germany is continuing. These measures testify to the aggressive aspirations of the West German military leadership.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN

SOVIET COMMENTS ON THE SPANISH GROUND FORCES

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to press 6 Apr 79 pp 26-30

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Yur'yev: "The Spanish Ground Forces"]

[Text] The military-political leadership of the United States and of NATO, nurturing aggressive plans against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, have been concentrating attention recently on Spain. Spain occupies an important military-strategic position on the European continent. The militaristic circles of the North Atlantic Alliance aspire to turn the country into a military springboard and to draw it into the growing arms race. As a result of bilateral military cooperation with the United States and the leading Western European countries, the Spanish command is building its armed forces, directing great efforts to increasing the fighting power of the ground forces by equipping them with up-to-date weapons and combat equipment and refining the organizational structure of formations and units.

The ground forces are the chief branch of the Spanish Armed Forces. As observed in the foreign press, they are structured with regard to specific purpose and at the present time are subdivided into combat forces and territorial defense forces, as is done in most of the Western European countries (see Figure 1 [not reproduced]). General command over them is exercised by the chief of the main staff of the ground forces who is directly subordinate to the chief of the general staff of the armed forces.

At the present time the Spanish ground forces have two forms of organization: administrative (for peacetime) and combat (for exercises and wartime).

In peacetime formations of the ground forces are maintained with reduced complements. A division has three brigades (one of them regulars) each consisting of two regiments (two motorized infantry battalions in a motorized infantry regiment, one tank battalion and one motorized infantry battalion in a mixed motorized infantry regiment, one tank battalion and

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one motorized infantry battalion in armored personnel carriers in a mechanized regiment, and two tank battalions in a tank regiment). When necessary each regiment establishes one additional battalion for the regular brigade. The tables of organization for wartime envision switching to a different structure: battalion — brigade — division (see Figure 2 [not reproduced]). In the opinion of the Spanish command this system saves money on the maintenance of armed forces in peacetime.

Organizationally the ground forces are included in nine military districts and detached military commands on the Baleric and Canary Islands and in the zones of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, which are administratively subordinate to the corresponding headquarters of the 2nd and 9th military districts.

As the foreign press observes, the formations and units of the ground forces are stationed virtually everywhere in Spain. Detached infantry and airborne brigades are located in the north, while there are two mountain infantry divisions on the border with France, a motorized infantry division and detached units in the south, and a mechanized division in the west. An armored division and detached units are stationed in the central part of the country, around the city of Madrid.

The combat forces are the main element of the Spanish ground forces. They include the basic formations and detached units as well as support and service subunits. The peacetime complements have 75-80 percent of full personnel and 85-100 percent of a full supply of weapons and combat equipment. When an extraordinary situation or war occurs, mobilization plans envision that the combat forces will be joined in one army corps.

According to the foreign press the combat forces include the following formations and units.

The 1st Armored Brunete Division (headquarters in Madrid) comprises the 12th (El Goloso) and 13th (regular) tank and 11th Mechanized Brigades (Campamento), an artillery regiment, a light armored cavalry regiment, an engineer regiment, and other units and subunits. In all the division has 162 medium AMX-30 tanks (see Figure 3 [not reproduced]), more than 50 M-41 light tanks, 12 M107A1 175-millimeter self-propelled canons, four 203.2-millimeter tractor-drawn howitzers, 18 M409A1 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzers, two launchers for 381-millimeter rocket shells (see Figure 4 [not reproduced]), 32 40-millimeter antiaircraft cannons, more than 250 armored personnel carriers, and other equipment.

The 2nd Mechanized Guzman el Bueno Division (headquarters in the city of Seville) comprises the 21st Mechanized (Badajoz), 22nd Motorized Infantry (Jerez de la Frontera), and the 23rd mechanized (regular) brigades. The division has 162 M47 medium tanks and 58 M-41 light tanks, 24 155-millimeter self-propelled and tractor-drawn howitzers, and more. The other units and their weapons are the same as in the armored division.

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The 3rd Motorized Infantry Maestrasdo Division (headquarters in Valencia) includes the 31st (Castellon de la Plana), 32nd (Cartagena), and 33rd (regular) motorized rifle brigades. It has 162 M47 medium tanks and 68 M41 light tanks. The organization and weaponry of the other units and subunits are similar to those of the units and subunits of the armored and mechanized division.

According to the views of the Spanish command, the brigade is the tactical formation capable of waging combat action both as part of the division and on its own. The wartime tables of organization envision 3-4 fighting battalions, an artillery battalion, a rear support battalion, and other subunits in each brigade. Plans call for the tank brigade (two tank battalions and one motorized infantry battalion) to have 108 medium AMX-30 tanks (produced on a French license) and 18 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzers, while the mechanized brigade (one motorized infantry battalion in armored personnel carriers, two in motor vehicles, and a tank battalion) should have 51 M113 armored personnel carriers, 54 M47 medium tanks, and 18 M108 105-millimeter howitzers, and the motorized infantry brigade (three motorized infantry battalions and a tank battalion) will have 54 M47 medium tanks, 15 M41 light tanks, 39 M113 armored personnel carriers, more than 500 motor vehicles, 18 105-millimeter howitzers, and other weapons.

The Spanish military press remarks that the ground forces today have detached units designated to support the combat actions of the army corps to be created in an exceptional situation. Among these detached units are the detached armored cavalry Jarama brigade which has its headquarters in Salamanca (one light armored cavalry regiment and three conventional armored cavalry regiments with 52 M41 light tanks and 102 M48 medium tanks), the detached corps artillery brigade (stationed in Northern Castile with field and rocket artillery regiments), the corps light antiaircraft artillery regiment (headquarters in Valladolid, 40-millimeter antiaircraft canons), the detached airborne brigade (headquarters in La Coruña), and other units.

The territorial defense forces are designed to wage combat actions in cooperation with combat forces primarily within the country's boundaries and to defend important sites and structures, combat enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and so on.

As the Spanish press reports, the territorial defense forces have formations, units, and subunits staffed at 50-60 percent of personnel and supplied with 70-80 percent of regulation weapons and combat equipment.

The mountain infantry division is the chief formation of territorial forces. There are two, the 4th Mountain Infantry Urjel Division with headquarters in Barcelona and the 6th Mountain Infantry Navarra Division with headquarters in Pamplona. A division includes two mountain infantry brigades (one regular), an armored cavalry regiment, an artillery regiment (equipped with 105-millimeter mountain howitzers), a light antiaircraft artillery battalion, a mountain ski company, a mixed engineer regiment, and other subunits. The mountain infantry brigade has two mountain infantry regiments (a total of three

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battalions) and a battalion of pack animal artillery (12 105-millimeter mountain howitzers transportable on mules).

The detached alpine brigade has two alpine regiments (three battalions), a field artillery regiment (105-millimeter mountain howitzers) and support and service subunits.

The territorial defense forces also include 10 detached infantry brigades (one reserve brigade). In these times they are maintained with reduced complements and have two infantry regiments of one battalion (a battalion has 768 men, 33 88.9-millimeter antitank grenade launchers, eight 106-millimeter recoilless M40 guns, 18 mortars, 20 7.62-millimeter machine guns, and 78 wheeled vehicles) and the headquarters of the third, regular regiment; a light armored cavalry group (five medium M47 tanks and 65 wheeled vehicles); an artillery regiment including a howitzer battalion (12 105-millimeter tractor-drawn howitzers) and a regular cannon battalion; a mixed engineer battalion (sapper company and signal company). With its wartime complement the territorial defense infantry brigade will have more than 6,500 personnel and 700 transport vehicles.

In addition to these formations and units the territorial defense forces have 20 special-purpose companies, three antiaircraft regiments (one of which includes a Hawk antiaircraft missile complex battalion and a Nike-Hercules antiaircraft guided missile battery), 13 mixed artillery regiments, and support and service units.

Foreign specialists believe that the lack of nuclear missiles and the presence of many outdated models of basic weapons significantly reduce the fighting effectiveness of the Spanish ground forces. However, in the opinion of the Spanish command, the continuing process of supplying them with modern combat equipment and weapons will make it possible to increase the firepower and mobility of formations and units and to bring their combat readiness close to the level of the NATO countries.

Specifically, the ground forces are continuing to receive medium AMX-30 tanks, and production of them is to be expanded. The M47 and M48 tanks are planned for modernization. Amphibious wheeled armored personnel carriers produced in Spain, the BMR-600 and Pegasso 3550, are being adopted by units and subunits.

In the next few years purchases of modern equipment and weapons in other countries are contemplated: M60 tanks, Tow and Dragon anti-tank guided missiles, improved Hawk missile complexes, 35-millimeter Erlikon antiaircraft guns on modernized M48 tank frames, BO105 fire support helicopters, and others.

All these steps to increase the fighting effectiveness of the Spanish ground forces are assessed by the Western press as a significant Spanish contribution to the militaristic preparations of the NATO bloc

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into which the United States is trying to draw Spain, considering it as a potential reserve in Europe if a new war breaks out.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

TURKEY

SOVIET COMMENTS ON TASKS AND STRENGTH OF THE TURKISH NAVY

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 79
signed to press 6 Jun 79 pp 59-64

[Article by Captain 2d Rank V. Kanin: "The Turkish Navy"]

[Text] In their militaristic preparations for war, the North Atlantic alliance's military and political leadership is devoting considerable attention to the development of Turkey's armed forces, particularly her navy.

The importance of the Turkish navy's role in executing the military operations planned by the NATO command is determined by the country's advantageous strategic position (the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits connecting the Black with the Mediterranean Sea belong to it) and the naval-oriented nature of the Southern European TVD [theater of military operations].

According to foreign press reports, Turkish naval forces are charged with the following primary missions in time of war: blockading the Black Sea straits, action against submarine and surface naval forces in the Black Sea and the northeastern portion of the Mediterranean Sea, providing support for land forces operating in coastal sectors, shore anti-amphibious defense, defense of their own sea-lanes and the disruption of enemy communications and conducting reconnaissance on behalf of both their own national armed forces and OVS NATO [combined NATO armed forces].

In order to insure the accomplishment of these missions, Turkey, relying on NATO assistance, is continuously strengthening her naval forces. The U.S. and the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] are the primary suppliers of ships and arms for Turkey's navy, these countries also providing her technical assistance in expanding her national shipbuilding capability and in training cadres. The general principles governing the development of her naval forces, their combat employment and their operational and combat training are being developed under the supervision and with the participation of American military advisors. During

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peacetime, the navy is subordinate to national authorities; but upon the outbreak of war or the aggravation of the world situation and during the conduct of exercises within the framework of the bloc as a whole, they are placed under the authority of the combined NATO naval command in the Southern European theater of operations.

Turkey's naval forces constitute an independent service of her armed forces. They are headed by the chief commander, who exercises administrative and operational command of the navy through headquarters located in Ankara. The navy is comprised of the following elements: the fleet, the northern and southern naval zones, naval aviation, the Gölçük main naval base, the naval training command and the general directorate of shipyards and ship-repair enterprises.

The fleet constitutes the Turkish navy's primary operational command and comprises virtually all vessels divided organizationally into three flotillas: the submarine, the battle (surface) and the minesweeping flotillas. These in turn are divided into divisions.

According to Jane's naval reference, the navy numbers approximately 200 combat ships and boats (including 12 submarines, 12 destroyers, 2 frigates, 6 small ASW vessels, 21 landing ships and 48 minesweepers, 7 guided-missile boats, 13 torpedo boats, 41 patrol boats and 36 amphibious assault craft) and 50 auxiliary vessels and boats.

The basic types of vessels (submarines, destroyers, frigates and the small ASW ships) comprising the combat nucleus of the navy are primarily former American ships built during the Second World War or the early postwar years. They have been handed over to Turkey as part of a military assistance program and, in the estimation of foreign military specialists, possess only limited capabilities for waging naval warfare under present-day conditions. The navy's newest ships are thought to be 3 Project 209 submarines built by West Germany and 2 "Berk" class frigates (Figure 1) built in national shipyards. The "Gearing" and "Allen M. Sumner" class destroyers, which have undergone modernization under the FRAM program, maintain a sufficiently high level of combat capability. The tactical-technical specifications for these ships are presented in the table.

The minesweepers include 21 coastal and 13 inshore minesweepers, 7 minelayers and 7 boom-and-net tenders built by America, West Germany and Canada from the 1940's through the 1960's. The largest of these ships is the N110 "Nusret" minelayer (Figure 2). It was built in Denmark for the U.S. and transferred to the Turkish navy in 1964 as part of a military assistance program. Its displacement is 1880 tons, maximum speed 18 knots, armament-- 2 76-mm twin-barrelled gun mounts and up to 400 mines. It carries a crew of 146 men.

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Amphibious landing force vessels include 4 tank-landing ships, 17 small landing ships and 36 landing boats. The tank-landing ships were formerly of the American navy and were transferred to Turkey during 1974-1975. Their total displacement is 4000-5800 tons. As a rule, the small landing ships and landing boats have been built in the national shipyards during the 1960's and early 1970's (600 and 100-400 tons displacement respectively).

The small combatants (guided-missile, torpedo and patrol boats) are the most numerous type of vessel in the Turkish navy. The guided-missile carrying boats (3 "Dogan" type and 4 "Kartal" class) are the most up-to-date. The type boat "Dogan" was built in the FRG in 1976 (its displacement is 410 tons; its armament consists of the "Harpoon" guided-missile system and 2 76-mm gun mounts), while two others were built in Turkey and put into service in 1978. The "Kartal" class guided-missile boats have been converted from torpedo boats (formerly of the West German "Jaguar" type) by mounting "Penguin" guided-missile systems on them in place of two torpedo tubes.

Tactical-Technical Specifications for Basic Types of Ships in the Turkish Navy

Type of ship: number, country of construction and year of commissioning	Displace- ment, t: <u>standard</u> full load	Basic dimen- sions, m: L= length, B=beam, D=draft	Power plant capac- ity, hp	Maxi- mum speed, knots	Crew, men	Armament
Submarines*						
Project 209- 3, FRG, 1975- 1978	$\frac{990}{1290}$	L=54 B=6.2 D=5		$\frac{10}{22}$	31	533-mm torpedo tubes - 8
"Balao" (mod- ernized under GUPPY-3 pro- gram) - 2, U.S., 1945	$\frac{1975}{2540}$	L=99.4 B=8.2 D=5.2	$\frac{6400}{5400}$	$\frac{20}{15}$	85	533-mm torpedo tubes-10

* Displacement: numerator - standard, denominator - submerged.
Power plant capacity: numerator - diesel-engine, denominator -
electric-motor. Maximum speed: numerator - surfaced, denomina-
tor - submerged.

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"Balao" (modernized under GUPPY-2A program) - 7, U.S., 1944-1945	<u>1829</u> 2424	L=95 B=8.2 D=5.2	<u>4800</u> 5400	<u>17</u> 15	85	533-mm torpedo tubes, 10
Destroyers						
"Gearing" (modernized under FRAM-1 and -2 programs) - 5, U.S., 1945-1947	<u>2425</u> 3520	L=119 B=12.4 D=5.8	60,000	34	275	127-mm two-gun mounts - 2, ASROC antisubmarine guided missile system or "Hedgehog" depth charge launcher, Mk32 triple torpedo tubes - 2, ASW helicopter
"Fletcher" - 5, U.S., 1943-1944	<u>2100</u> 3050	L=114.7 B=12.1 D=5.5	60,000	34	250	127-mm two-gun mounts - 4, 76-mm single-gun mounts - 6, "Hedgehog" depth charge launcher - 2, 533-mm quintuple torpedo tube

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"Allen M. Sumner" (modernized under FRAM-2 program) - 1, U.S., 1945	2200 3320	L=114.8 B=12.4 D=5.8	60,000	34	275	127-mm two-gun mounts - 3, Mk32 triple torpedo tubes - 2, "Hedge- hog" depth- charge launchers, 2
"Robert H. Smith" - 1, U.S., 1944	2250 3375	L=114.8 B=12.4 D=5.8	60,000	34	274	127-mm two-gun mounts - 3, 40-mm 4-barrel automatic AA guns-2, 20-mm automatic AA guns - 11

Frigates

"Berk" - 2, Turkey, 1972- 1975	1450 1950	L=95 B=11.8 D=5.5	24,000	25	76-mm two-gun mounts - 2, Mk32 triple torpedo tubes - 2, depth charge rails, ASW heli- copter
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Small ASW Ships

Guided-mis- sile - 6, U.S. (5), 1943; Turkey (1), 1965	280 412	I=54 B=7 D=3.1	2800	19	65	76-mm gun mount, 40-mm automatic AA gun, "Hedge- hog" depth charge launcher, depth charge launch- ers - 4
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Comprising the torpedo boats are 12 "Jaguar" type boats (displacement 190 tons, maximum speed 43 knots, armament: 4 torpedo tubes, 2 40-mm gun mounts, may carry mines on board) and a boat of domestic construction (delivered to the navy in 1976, its displacement is 75 tons, its armament 4 torpedo tubes and 2 40-mm gun mounts).

The patrol boats (former American as well as those of West German and domestic construction) have a displacement of up to 170 tons and are armed with 20- or 40-mm gun mounts. Some of them have been converted for ASW operations and are fitted with depth charges.

The Northern and Southern Naval Zone commands are considered territorial operational formations and comprise six naval regions: Black Sea, Bosphorus, Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora (Northern Zone) and Aegean and Mediterranean (Southern). These commands are responsible for the missions of organizing all types of defence of the coast, VMB /naval bases/ and ports, as well as of providing material-technical support for naval combat forces. Under normal conditions they comprise only command and control organs, shore units, small units and installations of the rear and a small number of auxiliary naval vessels. For the conduct of combat operations within the individual zones in wartime, the required number of combat ships is transferred to their command from the fleet.

Turkish naval aviation numbers 20 "Tracker" patrol aircraft (eight S2A and 12 S2E) and nine "Agusta Bell" ASW helicopters (three AB-204B and six AB-212B) which are divided organizationally into two squadrons.

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The American-made coastal patrol aircraft are considered obsolete. Six aircraft have been removed from the combat-operational inventory because of the poor condition of the equipment. Several aircraft have undergone modernization in the U.S. involving their fitting with up-to-date submarine detection and tracking systems.

In recent years Italy has delivered ASW helicopters to Turkey, including six during the years 1977-1978. The process of fully mastering the employment of these helicopters is still under way.

Turkish naval development is proceeding primarily along the lines of the qualitative improvement and modernization and the quantitative increase in the inventory of vessels by means of both foreign deliveries and the construction of combat vessels in domestic shipyards, and especially of boats. The Turkish command's view is that, as compared with large ships, they are less vulnerable to enemy weapons and the most advantageously adapted to operations in the coastal regions of the Black, Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, as well as in the zone of the Straits. Attention in this regard is being devoted primarily to guided-missile boats. They are being built in the Taskizak (Stambul) shipyards with technical assistance from the FRG. As indicated in the foreign press, construction is now being completed here on the third "Dogan" type boat, and four more are expected to be laid down. Plans call for continuation of the process of converting "Jaguar" type torpedo boats into guided-missile boats. Plans also provide for fitting Project SAR33 (13 units) patrol boats, which are being built with the assistance of the FRG, with guided missiles.

The processes involved in the construction of Project 209 diesel-powered submarines are being assimilated and mastered in the Gök shipyards; their basic equipment is being supplied by the FRG. The first submarine of this type has been under construction here since 1975.

According to foreign press reports, the country has set up for the series production of small landing ships (four-six units per year).

During the period 1979-1980 Turkey anticipates obtaining from the United States five submarines and three destroyers of postwar construction but which have undergone modernization.

Efforts are being made to enhance the combat capabilities of the Turkish naval aviation. From Italy deliveries continue of the AB-212B ASW helicopter. Plans call for their number to be increased by six during 1979. Negotiations are under way with the U.S. for the replacement of obsolete "Tracker" aircraft with more up-to-date models.

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The Turkish naval command has in recent years turned its attention to the development of diversionary forces whose mission is to conduct diversionary and reconnaissance operations in enemy coastal territory and waters and to insure the security of the underwater barriers at the approaches to naval bases and the Straits zone. The navy has formed several small units of frogmen.

According to foreign press reports, Turkish naval personnel number 45,000, of which 15,000 are career officers and petty officers. The system of recruitment operates on the basis of a universal military service law. The period of active service is 20 months. Approximately 10,000 recruits are called up for naval service each year.

Rank-and-file enlisted personnel under go training at the training center in Gölçük, petty officers in Beylerbeyi (Istanbul region) and Gölçük. Officer cadres receive their training at the naval academy on the island of Heybeli. Each year it graduates approximately 120 naval command and engineering officers. General officer personnel undergo training at the naval academy in Istanbul, as well as at the NATO War College in Rome.

According to the estimate of foreign military experts, the navy could, in case of a declaration of war, call up more than 25,000 trained reservists.

As indicated by items in the foreign press, the Turkish navy's operational and combat training is oriented primarily toward practicing the missions it would have to execute in wartime.

The separate elements of this combat training are the subjects of intensive work during the course of an entire year of training exercises and individual instruction. The navy's readiness to execute specific operational plans undergoes comprehensive testing in the course of independent naval exercises, as well as in maneuvers conducted jointly with services of the armed forces. The largest of these has been the "Deniz kurdu" [transliterated] type standard training exercise. Special emphasis during the conduct of this exercise is placed on organizing cooperation between the various naval and air forces.

Turkish naval forces also participate actively in the annual exercises conducted on the basis of NATO plans in the Southern European theater of operations (exercises such as "Dawn Patrol," "Display Determination" and others), in the course of which the Turkish command devotes its attention primarily to the process of shifting the navy from a peacetime to a wartime footing, to operational deployment and to maintaining communications with headquarters and command posts. Several of each of the various

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classes of ships are usually detached from the Turkish navy to participate in the execution of joint operations within special-purpose naval forces and groups forming part of large NATO naval forces.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

DIFFERING VIEWS ON BERLINGUER'S COMPROMISE

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 7 Sep 79 pp 12-14

[Articles pro and con by Valerio Castelnovo and Pierre Carniti]

[Text] The left, as they say at Montecitorio, doesn't take any summer vacation. Last year it was Bettino Craxi, PSI secretary, who took advantage of the holiday to stir up flagging political ardor with his essay against Leninism and in support of a reevaluation of Joseph Proudhon. This time, in mid-August, it was up to PCI Secretary Enrico Berlinguer to launch the attack: ten solid-set pages in the Party's weekly RINASCITA spelling out once again the basic thrust of his strategy, from the historic compromise to austerity. Pinning his opus to one of Palmiro Togliatti's editorials published in August of 1946, he argues that in order to settle the Italian crisis "the Italian mass parties must work together on a joint plan for recovery and renewal, gathering and giving voice to the common hopes of the great masses of the people from which each draws its electoral support and by which each is followed." Vitally necessary, according to Berlinguer, is "an economic policy that is altogether new, in which degree of development and its quality, its expansion and its end goals are given a new foundation and find further expression in a new kind of intervention by the working class, not merely in the distribution of income, but also in the kind and quality of consumption and hence in the very process of [capital] accumulation."

The issues Berlinguer raised will, whatever else happens, certainly be on center-stage at the

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next two major political conclaves: the DC National Council (meeting in Rome from 4 to 6 September) and the official encounter between Socialists and Communists, slated for the days immediately following those.

This new pitch for the communist strategy has stirred up controversy even among the unions: Giorgio Benvenuto, UIL secretary, fired off a blistering attack on Berlinguer's political blueprint, pulling into the fight even CGIL Secretary Luciano Lama, who had publicly spoken out in support of the PCI leader. Labor is directly involved in its own right anyway by this new call for the austerity line which, according to Berlinguer, is more urgently needed than ever because of the terrifying resurgence of the economic crisis. In the debate touched off by the RINASCITA article, IL MONDO has gone for economic background and political enlightenment to Valerio Castronovo and to CISL Secretary-general Pierre Carniti, who found it necessary, in responding to Berlinguer, to begin with an overall assessment of the political situation.

Valerio Castronovo: 'Togliatti's Mistake All Over Again

Enrico Berlinguer's article in the 24 August issue of RINASCITA in which the PCI secretary beats the drums once again for his historic compromise, contains one new element by contrast with other quite recent stands. The news is the top priority assigned by the Communist leader to the seriousness of Italy's economic crisis, to which he devotes far more attention than to any other issue. The concerns Berlinguer voices in this sense are thoroughly justified, as is his excoriation of the countless ills that have so long beset our country. The trouble is that the political premises and conclusions in his article, raised once again in justification of the cogent points that have so far shaped the strategy of his party's policy-makers, seem singularly vague and contradictory.

First of all, the comparison with the immediate postwar years, and the citation of the "compromise" Togliatti put together then with the Christian Democrats, do not come off as altogether relevant, judging by the way things were going in the area of economic policy. It is, in short, hard to see how the lesson of those years can be adduced in support of the historic compromise argument. Quite the contrary. It is worth recalling that the

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confrontation over the issues of reconstruction, successfully settled with the adoption of a moderate stabilization line, coincided with the death in May 1947 of the three-party DC-Socialist-Communist government.

Berlinguer will admit today that during the postwar period the PCI committed an error of evaluation by failing to perceive the growth potential in the economic system -- in other words, by hewing, precisely because of its ambiguities, too closely to the orthodox Third Internationale line on the imminent collapse of capitalism. And this stymied, among other things, the elaboration of an adequate reform strategy among the left, on the basis of an overall design for economic planning. Yet we must not forget, whatever we do, that the people who shot down every single innovative proposal for "steering the economy" were the DC leadership. While he never took really reactionary positions, De Gasperi and the big guns in the DC, with the backing of the market-economy types, successfully thwarted even the pleas from segments of their own party which favored a Keynesian orientation of economic policy. And then Togliatti was the first to realize, and to reckon with the fact that any structural reforms would have imperilled relations between the PCI and the DC as well as the already rocky road to ratification of the republican constitution.

But let's drop the historical parallels and get down to the suggestions Berlinguer makes for coping with the problems troubling our country today. The PCI secretary's analysis has merit, as we said, in that it points out with exemplary precision the more spectacular symptoms of the "Italian case."

If we move along, however, from Berlinguer's diagnosis to the cure he prescribes, it is impossible to see just how the elimination of corporate waste and privilege, much less the objectives of a "new economic policy" (based on the centrality of the working class and its autonomy in direct control of some of the mechanisms in the production process) could coexist, and come to fruition, with so heterogeneous and antagonistic an alliance of political parties and interests as that inherent in the historic compromise formula. Nor, to tell the truth, do even Berlinguer's prescriptions for an updating of collaboration among the "great progressive and moderate wings" of the antifascist front, help much in untangling the snarls.

Be that as it may, the proposal to pitch into a fight against the evil effects of welfare statism, against organized waste and untrammelled patronage, should include, if we take it literally, a very tough contest, certainly not a privileged relationship or a summit agreement with the Christian Democrats who, although not without help, have provided over recent years, absent evidence to the contrary, a very well-feathered nest

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for the state bourgeoisie and other income or corporate classes. Unless, of course, you think that given the state of affairs we already have, the only chance of managing the system is to make certain, no matter how much it may cost in terms of spiraling inflation, of the survival of a vast political-bureaucratic mass protected in one way or another, or possessed of the clout required to bring very heavy sectorial pressure to bear.

If, though, the Communist leadership's objective (as seen in Berlinguer's proposals) is to ferret out the pockets of fraudulent welfarism and parasitism and to do away with them in favor of expanding the productive base, and, at the same time, to foster the emergence of a meaningful voice for the working class in the process of capital accumulation, then it will have to face up to a tough and specific choice of fields and map out a sound reform strategy. Here again, therefore, we confront the issue of the alternative as well as the closely related question of a joint program for the left as a power in government in an industrially advanced western society. In many respects the essence of the crisis in this country lies not so much in the difficulty of putting together some sort of committee on the public welfare with the indiscriminate participation of all political parties as in the fact that for the past 30 years any and every real chance for a change in the ruling class has been systematically snuffed out.

The historic compromise is certainly not going to resolve that dilemma, and yet the PCI's falling back to a position of isolated opposition would help to worsen it. On the other hand, Berlinguer's reworked "austerity" proposal, posed in terms of a constructive confrontation between "those who are concerned solely with how much to produce and those who are more interested in what to produce and why to produce it," may well remain merely an abstract rhetorical formula, unless there is some accompanying indication as to which social alliances and which operating tools would make it truly feasible.

Pierre Carniti: He's Right: There Is No Alternative

The establishment of the Cossiga government as the result of a stormy and precarious solution to the political crisis should make it possible to halt the decline of the image of our institutions and give us a moment's breathing space before we come to grips with the complex problems of the new political balance and the governability of this country. The future development we can see coming lies in the DC congress, from which we expect a definition of the conditions for a five-party government with "equal dignity" among its majority-party members and its socialist prime minister. After that we will get still another crisis, and a 5-party government. Not even the communist opposition, placing the emphasis on content, would be viewed as incompatible with some sort of agreements in parliament on a measure-

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by-measure basis. Any move by Berlinguer's party into the opposition, in the wake of a national unity crisis, would thus be calculated to increase its bargaining power in an attempt to get back in.

It is certainly difficult for anybody to get a clear idea of the political future of the nation as it is built under the burden of still unsolved problems, between a rock and a hard place. However, as we look at the trends emerging now, we can certainly not help worrying.

First of all, even though I was favorably impressed with Craxi's appointment to form a government, I personally see the whole issue of a "non-confessional prime minister" as misleading and ambiguous. There is certainly need for change and renewal in out politics. The test, though, ought to be not between the church and the unchurched, but rather between one policy and another, between one bloc of society and another.

The answer to the problems of this country's governability, furthermore, is not to be found (without implying considerable underestimation) in carefully measured sharing of power among the parties, much less in the devising of ruses for walling up one party or another. You can indeed, as we have seen, manage to form a government with tricks like these; it is very difficult, though, to get it to work once you have formed it. Political stability cannot in fact be separated from the solution of the more acute of our social problems.

None of this is possible, though, without generating conflict and running into stubborn defenses. without a profound change in economic policy, which must go far beyond the 3-year plan's prescription for an equilibrium determined in advance by the major sectors of the economy on the basis of financial and monetary compatibility, while all the rest becomes unimportant. All the rest, that residual "rest," includes jobs, and it includes the Mezzogiorno. What I mean is that you cannot solve the crisis in this nation's governability by staking everything on a policy of stabilization and consolidation; on the contrary: you need a culture, a strategy, a policy, a solid bloc of power that has chosen as its goals renewal and change. Nor is it mere whimsy to believe that our national unity has swiftly spent its vital energies in attempts to disentangle these knots. Our best energies have been eroded, spent on running after formulas that have never been planned, because in the search for the line of least resistance on the part of the productive middle class, we have stopped trying to imbue our economic and social policy with a scale of values, with aims, and with alternative goals to replace those of a burnt-out culture.

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I am certainly not unaware of the difficulty of bringing off such an operation. Nobody was ever charged with extremism for espousing the views of Fiat or the Bank of Italy, although the contrary example is fairly frequent. It is, however, on this ground that we can face and seek to resolve the social, economic, and political crisis. The energy crisis, further, raises this issue in dramatic terms.

The latest change for the worse is the new rise in prices and rates. This is a resumption of the inflationary spiral that is now moving upward at a rate of 18 percent per year. We well know that inflation is the most perverse and iniquitous kind of income redistribution. Unreliable and outdated as they are, the statistics show that inflation is transferring wealth from the aged to young adults, from the poor to the rich, and from the south to the north.

This trend is not only unfair: it involves very serious political issues. It is not very likely that the elderly and people on pensions will be able to start a revolution, but there may well be very different reactions from unemployed young people, from poor people, and from the fringe populations in the big cities. When injustice is the order of the day, disorder may look like the only way to get more justice.

We must never forget that the problems of defense of democracy, of the state, and of the spread and increase of freedom also run through this bottleneck. Poverty does not need the state to prune back the freedom of the poor. When the spectres of poverty and want do not govern our behavior, we are freer.

Inflation is essentially a reactionary policy, and labor cannot but muster all its forces to fight it because, as inflation heightens divisions and severs communication within society, it threatens labor's very strategy, makes the conflict between those who still have jobs and those who do not irreconcilable, and exacerbates interest-group selfishness and defensive exclusionism. This awareness is felt throughout the united labor movement, but it has not reached such a point as to fall in with the views of those who, even of recent weeks, would shift onto labor's shoulders the burden of adjustments as costly (they would strip labor bare of its defenses) as they are illusory and empty. I am referring here to the renewed offensive against the cost-of-living adjustment in wages. The several proposals offered on this count differ from one another, but they are equally unacceptable.

Mr Reviglio's proposal has still to be determined. From announcements made to date, however, we know that it would involve exclusion of the impact of petroleum price hikes from calculations of the cost of living index, which would be offset by an increase in income tax deductions for family dependents.

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Certainly this is a step in the direction of fiscal equity that can no longer be delayed, but we fail to see why it should be taken out of the hides of employed workers. Confindustria President Carli has taken advantage, so to speak, of the issue's being raised to disguise as a technical solution a proposal that is both paradoxical and provocative. It is paradoxical because it calls, in essence, for a transfer of resources from the state budget to the profits of corporations. It is provocative because, without even making explicit mention of it, it would lead to a complete subversion of the collective bargaining structure.

And lastly (although it actually came first in time) there is the Spaventa proposal which calls for sterilizing three contingency points caused by the oil price increases, and returning them to the workers in the form of a tax cut.

From the angle of worker incomes this proposal looks harmless enough. Even so, it is equally unacceptable, for one basic reason.

The increase in oil prices has in fact nothing to do with the short-term state of the economy: it is not an extraordinary happening to be dealt with by means of suitable technical adjustments but a fundamental alteration in the economic situation.

It marks the end forever of a phase in development (in Italy and throughout the world) based on the use of cheap raw materials and cheap energy. The alternatives, in this case, are these: either slowed economic growth with increased unemployment and imbalances, or -- as I believe -- reconversion of the economy, cutbacks in energy consumption, and a change in our development values coupled with the establishment of collective goals of transforming our society.

The political crisis and the economic crisis are thus closely interrelated. We stand now at a crossroads where content and allegiance affect each other. Organized labor, by its very nature (and if it intends to fight for its autonomy and its unity) cannot but throw its weight on the side of content; but it knows full well that there can be no policy of equality and solidarity without close ties between the political parties that speak for the masses of the people. This means that the communist question is anything but closed, even in the wake of the 3 June elections. It is certainly not for me to overlook the importance of the revisionist issues on which the PCI is now involved in self-questioning, and is being questioned by the other political parties: from the question of international ties to the issue of democratic centralism, and all the way to

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the concept of the state in relation to the articulation of powers within society with all the decline it can bring with it, including that of mistaking the primacy of parties for the primacy of policy. I must say, though, that I find the charge of monism so often levelled against Berlinguer coming back once again with his call for an arrangement or understanding among the people's political parties a rather hasty and thoughtless one. Specifically, I am not swayed by the challenges -- even those from the left and from a part of organized labor -- arguing that by pursuing this strategy the PCI would be negating the alternation of different political parties in government. In my view, this is a flimsy argument, not only because we do not have right now any significant forces calling for a left-wing alternative, but for the far more cogent reason that in a proportional electoral system like ours, with the fragmentation of political party clout, alternation, while it is not theoretically an impossibility, is in fact not feasible, and because the balances and permutations of government are far more complicated than that.

Thanks to this peculiarity, ours has been and in many ways still is a difficult democracy. This view of things, which considers the splitting of the nation and of the working class into opposing blocs incompatible, at this historical phase in our political life, with the problems facing Italian society, does not involve any renunciation of social dialectics. Organized labor, in our view, can never truly be the mirror image of political balancing acts. To us, this is not merely an autonomy requirement: it is a vital issue of democracy for the whole of society.

If the decline in the social dialectic is not the expression of the independent consensus in political synthesis which is reached on every issue, but is rather what you might call the toll the labor movement and the workers are required to pay for the entry of new forces into the majority and into government, this leads not only to unrest, but entails an irreparable impoverishment of political democracy itself. The troubled record of national unity has made it clear, furthermore, that if there is a problem involved in horizontal settlement of differences among the parties, it becomes a lid clapped on tight to smother society's new tensions and vitality, in a subsidence of democracy, if it brings harm to vertical mediation and settlement, by which I mean the delicate articulation of powers and arrangements by which a modern democratic society cannot but be continually enriched.

In substance, the culture of government can be nothing else in relation to the pluralistic culture, because should that happen we should have not a political alternative, but a far chancier alternative to the system. We are confronted here with a Gordian

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knot, even though it really was badly neglected in the discussions and polemics of recent weeks, in which we have chosen to "talk about something else." It is, however, a knot we cannot get around, because the issues of governability and political stability in a democratic system cannot be stated in conflict with the nation's need to become ever more aware of itself and to develop and grow on the foundation of new values and in response to its deepest urges.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

CASTRO-TITO RELATIONSHIP ON EVE OF NONALINED SUMMIT VIEWED

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 30 Aug 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Article by Frane Barbieri: "Tito-Fidel Challenge at Havana"]

[Text] Tito visits Fidel in Cuba: It should have been a historic meeting of two revolutions, designed to symbolize their similarities. When it actually takes place, however, it is more likely to emphasize their differences. The Yugoslav revolution, which proceeded from Moscow's ideological and organizational channel, became its critical negation and the synonym for autonomy with respect to the Soviet bloc, as it took shape. The Cuban revolution, which proceeded from an autonomous inspiration, developed toward the role of the most advanced supporter of Moscow's monocentrist doctrine and strategy.

In terms of protocol, Tito's visit to Havana is somewhat unusual. The Yugoslav leader arrived on the eve of the nonalined conference, having left Belgrade almost 4 days early. The invitation to pay an official visit to the Cuban Government was addressed to Tito in a letter from Castro delivered at Brioni in July by Cuban Vice Premier Rafael Rodriguez. At first it did not seem that Tito was very willing to accept the invitation. It might have appeared that, by undertaking that impromptu visit, Tito was symbolically handing over to Castro the reins of charismatic leader of nonalinement. One cannot rule out the possibility that this was in fact Fidel's specific intention. Then Tito suddenly decided to accept. The reason for this was not any logical convergence of postures on the imminent conference but, on the contrary, the continued existence of the divergences. In the draft final document for the conference, drawn up by Havana as host for the meeting, the Cubans reconfirmed their concept of the "natural alliance" between the nonalined countries and the countries of the Soviet sphere. Despite having received an almost unanimous avalanche of amendments opposed to this approach, the Cubans tried to introduce it into the practical procedures of the organization of the summit. The attempt to discriminate against the deposed Cambodian Government, still recognized by the vast majority of member countries, and the arbitrary invitation extended only to the government installed by the Vietnamese was the most obvious

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challenge, revealing Castro's persistence in applying his own interpretation of nonalignment.

According to Belgrade, this interpretation threatened to overturn the fundamental and original principles of the movement, which after all originated in Yugoslavia, first with the Tito-Nehru-al-Nasir meeting and then with the first conference in 1961. The last survivor of the founding fathers decided to accept the invitation to a prior meeting with Fidel in Havana to clarify the disagreements and to verify the Cubans' intentions. A split or a compromise? This will be shown by the next few days' tete-a-tetes. It is difficult to imagine that Castro is aiming at a split, since he would thus lose the coordinating role due to him this time and would be isolated with no more than eight extremist governments prepared to follow him. Any submissive compromise from Tito seems even more unlikely. The Yugoslav leader sees the safeguarding of his principled opposition to the blocs (which does not mean geometrical equidistance, but a challenging of their dominant role and resistance to the further extension of their areas of influence) as the precondition for safeguarding the movement itself. All the more important now that it is faced with the crisis in the strategies of the major powers, the nonaligned third way is emerging as a stronger and stronger alternative.

The fossilization of Washington and Moscow diplomacy into the old molds of bipolar meetings and clashes is not attenuating the growing world conflicts, but on the contrary is making them more serious and insoluble. The superpowers are showing themselves to be increasingly unable to control and "administer" them. This is proved by the current confusion of both diplomacies.

The nonaligned movement could intervene to settle a large number of these conflicts, even though paradoxically they are taking place mainly on its own territory (or perhaps precisely because of this). The essential precondition for managing to perform this role is precisely to halt any further infiltration by the superpowers into the emergent world. These are the stakes at the Havana summit. This is the subject of the dialog between Tito and Castro. By seeking to resolve it in advance Tito is trying to make it easier for the conference of 89 heads of state to concentrate its efforts on joint plans and actions instead of wasting them on disagreements.

The conference agenda comprises some 50 points. There are three basic issues, however: the program document, the new (north-south) world economic order and the machinery for the movement's coordination. A decisive point in the document will be the extent to which the nonaligned countries manage to express their autonomous position and role and their agreement on the movement's essential outlines, rejecting the "ideological splits" which the Cubans are trying to introduce by distinguishing between the "progressive patrol" and the "conservative" members. Within the context of the north-south relationship, the conference is seeking a

common platform for the Third World, which is itself split between rich and poor, to be set against the developed countries to achieve a reversal of the system of world exchanges, primarily that of raw materials as against manufactured goods. The present opposition between energy blackmail and technological blackmail should lead to a positive outcome in an order which will facilitate a more equable distribution of wealth and a more rapid leveling between developed and underdeveloped countries. In this field the Cubans' theses conflict with Yugoslavia's, inasmuch as Havana proposes, as the optimum outcome from underdevelopment, the Third World's linkage to CEMA, while Belgrade insists on a new global economic order in the world.

The third point regarding the movement's organization concerns the possibility of coordinating it and of avoiding manipulations and the arbitrary imposition of specific trends. Cuba is proposing a small committee with decisionmaking powers, in an attempt to take advantage of the role of coordinating country which it will play after the conference. The majority, led by Yugoslavia, is in favor of a broad committee, in any case one without decisionmaking powers. The decisions should be the result of a general and therefore decisive consensus among all the countries. Technically, in Yugoslavia's view the committee should be open to membership of all the delegations concerned, while Cuba maintains that it should be restricted to just 30 governments elected by the conference, a kind of international politburo.

In connection with these topics, apart from the conceptual differences expressed in the Yugoslav-Cuban dialog, the largest summit of heads of state in all history will also reflect the shifts which have taken place among the movement's various components. The black African countries are emerging, while hitherto that continent's representation has been dominated by the Arabs. Among the Arabs themselves leadership of the nonaligned camp passes from Egypt to Algeria. Asian nonalignment is losing its charismatic leader in India, which has disintegrated politically, while the Kampuchea-Vietnamese conflict prevents the Indochinese group from taking its place. Among them all Tito remains the great mediator. And he has a major trump card up his sleeve: Never has the world's interest in the nonaligned countries been as great. Even governments outside the traditional nonaligned area are asking to be admitted as observers. Yesterday Moscow referred yet again to the "natural alliance," accusing Beijing of "wanting to transfer the nonaligned countries from the socialist to the reactionary camp."

Deng Xiaoping hopes that the movement will "strengthen itself in its irreplaceable function," while Washington is avoiding a veto on the Palestinian issue to avoid being placed in the dock at the summit.

The major world conflicts are shifting into the nonaligned countries' camp. Despite their disagreements, they have every reason for forming an autonomous force to prevent these conflicts from being resolved behind their backs and without their agreement.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

CASTRO SWAYS NONALINED AUDIENCE, DIFFERENCES EMERGING

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 4 Sep 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Article by Frane Barbieri: "Castro Exalts Soviet Aid; Tito Polemical, Does Not Applaud"]

[Excerpts] Havana--The Summit Conference of Nonaligned Countries opened yesterday with a powerful and multicolored image of the emergent world.

Fidel Castro immediately mounted the platform and set about dominating it like a great actor. Opening the summit as duty chairman for 3 years, he gave an entirely individual interpretation of nonalignment. There are two blocs which we reject as an international modus vivendi, but it appears that there is only one imperialism to be combated as the adversary of progress and thus there is only one bloc to oppose. This, in essence, is his thesis which is consistent, moreover, with the policy of "aligned nonalignment" which has always been pursued by the Cuban Revolution--and not without success. Judging from the busy and often agitated debates among the ministers over the past few days during the runup to the conference, one would not have said that Castro's posture is shared by everyone. Indeed, it seems to be backed by only a small minority. Nevertheless, this fact did not emerge during the solemnity of the opening session. Fidel managed to involve the entire assembly in his driving enthusiasm. He managed to make use of the euphoria of the countries setting off toward history, uniting them in their recently discovered awareness that they can even influence it. Thus he pushed into the background the differences--even profound ones--concerning the choice of path to follow toward history.

In his extraordinary oratorical dialectic Castro managed to unite linkage to the USSR with membership of the nonalignment movement, of which he is chairman.

"Are we the USSR's friends?" he asked, answering: "Yes, we are the USSR's friends because we are thankful to it for having guaranteed our survival--not just Cuba, but Vietnam, the Arabs and the Africans owe their survival to socialist solidarity." Others, however, do not have similar merits in

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the eyes of the peoples struggling for freedom. Neither the United States nor China. Stressing that this truth must be basic to the conference document as drafted by the Cuban delegation, Castro asked: "Since when does the United States have the right to interfere in non-alignment and dictate how its documents must be drafted?" He also denied China's right to "offer advice, since it is linked to the interests of capitalism": "Above all it cannot preach to Vietnam which has done more than any other country in our era to elevate anti-imperialist awareness." Polemical almost to the extent of provoking delegations into challenging the address, he skillfully scattered remarks suggestive of an open attitude: "We are radical, but we will not seek to impose radicalism. We have progressed." Thus, by centering his speech--probably the shortest in his life--on two moods, but with a single conceptual line, he managed skillfully to play on the assembly's emotiveness, promoting applause even on points on which, following the previous days' discussions, none could have been expected.

Already by the afternoon, after the session had ended, the enthusiasms prompted by Fidel's great monolog were beginning to abate, or rather the enthusiasm degenerated into conflicting theses and stances. Indeed, we are now witnessing a somewhat paradoxical situation. The summit conference has begun but the ministers' preliminary conference is not yet over. Late in the evening before the summit the foreign ministers agreed that they had reached no agreement. The two Kampuchean representatives Samphan and Samrin, who are waiting outside, are splitting the entire conference. It is already certain that neither of them will be allowed enter. But it has been impossible to reach agreement on the reason why it is impossible to admit both or either of them. The seat will remain vacant, but the decision on the seat has not been ratified since it would be taking for granted the disappearance of the Pol Pot government and would be simplifying the use of who is to succeed it. Indeed, the decision on the "empty seat" was the minimum point of the Cuban-Vietnamese line.

The majority group prevented it so as to leave the deposed government in the picture. Half of the day-and-night meetings have been devoted to or wasted on the Kampuchea issue. Now the bone of contention is being passed to the summit conference, without too many hopes of a solution, and without even an indicative document drafted by the ministers.

Nor has any agreement been reached on the composition and structure of the new coordinating committee. The number of members has been increased from 25 to 35 but it has proved impossible to decide on how the posts are to be shared. The Cubans insisted that none of the new seats be assigned to the European area. This places a query over the election of the Yugoslav, inasmuch as the only post ever granted to Europe has always been held by President Tito and he should now relinquish it in accordance with the rotation principle. Irrespective of this paradox affecting the founder and motive force of the movement, there is the

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Cubans' somewhat forced concept of so-called tricontinentalism of the movement, restricted to the "colored" continents.

Last, the obstacle of the amendments to the Cuban document is increasing. The avalanche is growing larger and larger. Castro has tried to halt it by hinting that he considers it an affront to his country and an attempt to reverse its essential content. He is right, because this is in fact the case: bringing nonalignment back to its original mold from the unilateral deviation toward which Cuba is trying to push it. Castro accentuated this challenge in his opening speech. There is an initial indication that the challenge has been taken up in the fact that, following Fidel's vehement tirade, Tito did not stand to congratulate him, even though he had been assigned the seat next to his on the platform--a platform which is becoming increasingly inflamed.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

EROSION OF CUBAN POSITION AT NONALINED SUMMIT VIEWED

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 4 LD

[Commentary by Frane Barbieri: "Old Tito Defeats Castro; Havana's Postures More Flexible"]

[Excerpt] Havana--It seemed to some diplomats that Tito had lost his sway over the movement which he founded. Then it was discovered that the applause was misleading. When speaking from the platform, many delegation leaders paid tribute to the old statesman, repeating the words first spoken by the Bangladesh president: "His very presence here inspires us, bearing witness to the continuity and validity of our movement's fundamental principles."

Apart from the tributes, the turning point at the conference was expressed in the new boost imparted to its theses. Al-Asad, 'Arafat, Jordan's Husayn and Iraq's Husayn, the representatives of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and then those of Panama, Cyprus and Jamaica: of all the speakers so far 8 out of 10 have insisted that the nonalined movement would not remain nonalined if it failed to safeguard its own "genuine principles of autonomy and opposition to all blocs, rejecting every form of hegemony and domination." Only Ethiopia's Mengistu and Mozambique's Machel asked that "our friends and our enemies be identified" and pointed to the Soviet Union as "the natural ally." Mengistu revealed the real significance of this alliance the day before, when presenting decorations at a public ceremony to the Cuban soldiers who guaranteed his victory in the war in Eritrea and Ogaden (the highest decoration went to Castro's brother Raul).

The safeguarding of pluralist principles against any attempt at revision was also expressed in the specific and incidental issues. For instance, none of the Arabs reintroduced the proposal to expel Egypt. There were angry words from al-Asad, 'Arafat and Husayn of Iraq, but they did not go as far as to press for excommunication. With regard to the thorny Cambodian issue, although both presidents are still outside the door, nobody has dared suggest that Samrin be admitted to the hall.

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Within the assembly the two components of the movement--the rational and the emotive ones--mix and intermingle. In the majority of cases even the rational component is presented under an emotive cover. Within the closed committees at which the principles are being defined the balance of forces seems more distinct. The battle over amendments has now reached the stage where the Cubans' resistance to any attempt to alter their document is about to yield beneath the avalanche of amendments and in view of the danger of the conference ending without an agreed document. The Indians and Yugoslavs are already redrafting the entire preamble on the principles and content of nonalignment. The Arabs have had the document proposed by the Cubans on the Palestinian issue replaced with their own document.

Instead of the Cubans' thesis that the underdeveloped countries' progress must be sought by demolishing the progress made by the developed countries at the underdeveloped countries' expense, the thesis that the new economic order must be based on a balance between developed and underdeveloped countries is now gaining ground. The foreign ministers have again postponed the meeting behind closed doors to find a solution to the problem of Cambodian representation.

Thus Cuba's document will emerge altered in its essential parts; that is, it will no longer be Cuban. It remains to be seen whether the written document or verbal enthusiasm counts more in the movement's future. This question arises inasmuch as this is the first time that the chairmanship has been assigned to a leader who intends to play the role of chairman to the full. According to the rules he should be and should call himself "coordinator." The commentary in the official PRENSA LATINA, however, already presents Fidel Castro as "chairman of the nonaligned movement" (a nonexistent post) and states that he has from the outset "imparted a new character to the movement."

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ITALY

COMMENTS ON CUBAN REACTION TO VANCE REMARKS, KAMPUCHEA

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 7 Sep 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Commentary by Frane Barbieri: "Castro Accused of Distorting Nonaligned Summit"]

[Excerpt] Havana--As if the increasingly inflamed conflicts within the conference were not enough, Cyrus Vance has now entered the nonaligned debate. Viewed from here, he has entered it clumsily (so as not to deviate from the style of recent American diplomacy); the Cubans found it easy to announce at once that Washington's statement on the presence of new Soviet troops on the island was nothing but an imperialist attempt to discredit the nonaligned conference and its host.

The Cubans did not even have to clarify whether the Soviet Army armored division was in fact on their territory. In any case the Soviets are already there, and even if they were not there are the Cubans who have now become the strike force of the Russian military alignment. This was not the topic introduced by Vance at the summit conference. The secretary of state's sally provided a new impetus to the radical group for centering the entire debate on the movement's aims in the struggle against American imperialism, as its "natural enemy." Just as the depleted radical group lacked the arguments to call for nonalignment to shift from its equidistant stance, the Americans came and supplied them. This is what happened yesterday. If Vance had not held his press conference Castro would have had good reason to invent it.

When Cuban officials were asked for a comment they reacted by saying that Washington cannot believe that the Soviets present in Cuba could attack the United States to make it the "second free American state. It is Cuba," they added, "which must defend itself and it is doing so with Soviet aid, but increasingly it is able to do so with its own soldiers, which have been trained extremely well by the Soviet friends."

Vance's impromptu intrusion came at the moment when the prevailing trend at the conference was already that of "genuine" nonalignment, compared to the line which Castro is trying to impose with the strength of his

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chairmanship. Big words were yielding to reasoning. Not only in the committees drafting the documents but also within the assembly, where it has proved easier to emphasize emotions.

Indeed, the extremist group played its last trump with Vietnamese leader Pham Van Dong. The man from Hanoi was radical to the point of aggravation. His request for a revision of the nonaligned countries' antibloc stance could not have been more explicit: "Under present conditions" (that is, increased imperialist and hegemonic pressure, namely from the United States and China) "to envisage the movement's return to its origins, placing the emphasis on the fact that it must be independent and be placed outside the blocs, and to stress that this is our final aim is now deviating the movement from its anti-imperialist ends." This was a reply to Tito and to the increasing numbers of those paying tribute to him from the platform and boosting his theses. The Vietnamese leader also proved directly that the radicals' target is Tito when he insinuated that it was the Yugoslav foreign minister who had obstructed at the runup to the Belgrade conference Hanoi's proposal for a negotiated solution to the Kampuchean issue: At that time the Vietnamese had already occupied the country. The Yugoslav minister asked for permission to reply but it is not known when he will receive it. We were told that he intends to reveal information concerning Yugoslav mediation before the conflict exploded; this mediation was accepted by Pham Van Dong himself in a letter to Tito but fell through because Vietnam invaded Kampuchea during the negotiations on what form it should take. However, the Vietnamese prime minister did not deny in his speech that Kampuchea is firmly controlled by his troops. Indeed, he forecast that they would be there a long time: We are in Kampuchea, he said, to halt Chinese aggression and we will remain there as long as the Chinese threat exists.

The Vietnamese myth could not have crumbled more sadly. There was an aloofness in the hall despite the tribute which Castro paid to the speaker from the chair. The proof came immediately afterward from a speaker above all suspicion, Julius Nyerere, the founding father of the African revolutions. He, too, was keen to emphasize that to grant solidarity and aid to a revolution already under way in a country and to take a nonexistent revolution as a pretext for invading a country are two quite different things. This latter case applies to Kampuchea. Surprising those people who expected him to side with the radicals, Nyerere noted the attempt to "split the nonaligned countries on an ideological basis between progressives and conservatives."

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

'HALF-VICTORY' FOR CASTRO ON KAMPUCHEA ENVISIONED

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 8 Sep 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Commentary by Frane Barbieri: "In Havana, 'Vacant Seat' for Kampuchean People"]

[Text] Havana--Kampuchea has become a "vacant seat" within the nonaligned movement. This seems to be the fairest decision for a land now emptied of its inhabitants. The compromise was reached during a long overnight session of the summit presidency, which comprises 20 heads of state including Tito and Castro. This is how their decision reads: "Until agreement has been reached, Kampuchea's seat, as a member of the movement, will remain vacant. None of its delegations can attend the meetings of any of the movement's bodies."

The statement embodies one of the central problems of this very hard-fought conference. The ministers devoted two-thirds of their time to resolving it and left each other angry without settling anything. It was a foregone conclusion that Cuban duty chairman Malmierca would be unable to persuade his counterparts to admit the Vietnamese-backed Samrin into the hall, but it was also a foregone conclusion that the hosts would not admit Samphan, representing Pol Pot and the Chinese. Behind the argument there lay the Vietnamese armed intervention, that is the safeguarding of the fundamental principle of nonalignment, which is noninterference.

How does this principle emerge from the presidency's decision? Somewhat battered, we would say. Both sides, the interventionists and the anti-interventionists, can interpret it in their own way. One side says: "Samrin is not coming in," while the other side explains: "Pol Pot is out." Assessing the specific consequences, one could say, however, that Castro has gained a victory on this point, or more precisely a half-victory. Fidel met Heng Samrin at the airport with all the honors due a head of state and with a televised ceremony. Now he will probably take him back to the airport quietly, having failed to secure him a place among the delegation leaders. However, Castro did manage to take Kampuchea's seat away from Pol Pot.

In the meantime that country's voice will be represented within the movement by the only real force left in the Khmer land, namely Vietnam, which has already announced from the platform its intention of staying in Kampuchea as long as China exists, that is forever.

Those who supported the principle of condemning intervention eventually had to yield. Obviously the wrong man was behind the right principle. It proved difficult to make the conference fail over Pol Pot. The anti-interventionists headed by Tito yielded, explaining that they could not lend their support to the solution proposed by Cuba, but that they would not be voting against it either. Thus the rule of consensus has been satisfied and the compromise was passed by 15 out of 20 votes. There was another decisive element apart from the impossibility of portraying Pol Pot as a champion of nonalignment. Tito decided to yield partially on a principle to save all the others.

The conference had indeed reached a deadlock. If the Kampuchean issue had been submitted to the assembly, following the ministers' failure, there would have been a repeat of a public debate several days long, without any future. In practice the result would have been a move toward acknowledgment of the impossibility of discussing the issue. There would have been a danger of not voting even on the documents in which, according to the committees, the Cuban "revisionist" formula, however strange that may sound, has been replaced by the concept of "real natural enemies." From the documents the nonaligned countries emerge as "natural allies" only of themselves, in a relationship which they are still finding difficult to put into practice.

Another dispute at the overnight meeting of the movement's most representative leaders was the allocation of the 11 seats on the coordinating committee. In fact only the 11th seat was disputed: whether or not it should go to Europe, which has only one seat, or to Africa. Again a compromise was found: half of the mandate will be fulfilled by a European country, and the other half by an African country. This dispelled the danger (or the Cubans' hope) that Yugoslavia would be unable to find a place among the coordinators, having already been elected on three consecutive occasions to occupy the single European seat. Awaiting the possible future membership of other countries, Cyprus and Malta have agreed to take turns in the half seat--leaving the full one to Tito's minister. It would have been paradoxical to find oneself after the conference faced with a nonaligned movement which had not observed nonalignment par excellence at its summit.

Apart from the top-level disputes there was an indicative press skirmish yesterday. The Cuban agency PRENSA LATINA attacked the major Yugoslav paper POLITIKA and its correspondent Daka Julius for pointing to certain omissions in Castro's speech, such as his failure to mention the blocs, and his emphatic tributes to the USSR.

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Now that the summit has been salvaged and the posts have been allocated, it remains to be seen who will manage to steer it. Yesterday Sekou Toure suggested organizing the movement and its activity by regions. Many countries do not agree with this--first and foremost the Cubans. It would imply a diminution of the coordinating role that Castro has just secured for himself. The summit has produced several candidates for the leadership, not so much for the formal leadership as for the charismatic leadership, which Tito will leave vacant. Castro has an advantage in that he imparted a radical stamp to the meeting, more in its atmosphere than its documents. In the dialog the Yugoslavs have used the finesse of amendments while the Cubans used clubs.

It is impossible to predict which weapon will count the most: for the time being both are coexisting. Therefore, apart from Castro, leaders able to use them both well are emerging. Julius Nyerere for instance, who is strengthened by the fact that black Africa is the continent toward which the numerical and material, as well as the political, grass-roots of the movement are shifting. Castro, too, can consider himself "African" on account of his forays on the continent, but his weakness paradoxically is in Latin America, where he has failed to set foot in any country apart from Nicaragua.

Among the Arabs, united until the next discord, it is the Algerian Chadli Bendjedid who has revealed an ambition to assume the leadership, being far from the fray in the Middle East, close to Europe and with his revolutionary credentials in order. In Asia only India has the position of pretender, but it has no personality to put forward. Tito will not be without a successor. Indeed, there will perhaps be too many people wanting to succeed him.

The blind alley in which the conference found itself made Castro forget Cyrus Vance. For the time being there is no sign of a polemical reply from the Cuban commander in chief. Castro is apparently reserving that topic for his closing speech, on which occasion he will find it extremely useful to emphasize the tough stamp which he has tried to impart to the conference from the outset.

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ITALY

CASTRO'S MANIPULATION OF CONFERENCE, MEDIA VIEWED

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 9 Sep 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Commentary by Frane Barbieri: "Moderates Force Compromise on Castro"]

[Text] Havana--In the end Carter and Brezhnev closed the nonaligned conference. The White House chief with his statements and Brezhnev with his long telegram. The effect was the opposite of what was hoped for by the two world leaders. Carter's remarks helped Castro by providing new ammunition for his oratorical offensive. The possessive tone of Brezhnev's telegram, on the other hand, impeded the Cuban leader, putting the majority of "genuine" nonaligned countries (sometimes inclined even to ingenuousness) on guard against the danger of becoming a purgatory [stage] of the so-called socialist community.

At the end of the conference, awaiting Fidel's closing speech, we managed to gather some brief assessments. The first is from Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong. He said: "The struggle at this conference is between progressive and nonprogressive forces. It is a matter of a revolutionary victory within the movement. The nonrevolutionaries have suffered a defeat. Havana marks the turning point, a new phase is emerging in the history of the movement. Castro has become leader, outlining the direction and plan of action." The second verdict comes from the Yugoslav representative on the Politburo responsible for drafting the final document: "Never has the movement had a better document from the viewpoint of its doctrinal aspects. This is a victory for the genuine principles of nonalignment, detached from the blocs and opposed to the superpowers of both colors."

The paradox lies in the fact that, without overburdening the arguments, they are both right. The conference is mansided and contradictory even in its final image. It took place and achieved its results on three separate and not always linked planes. Indeed, they were hardly ever linked. The first concerns the public image of the summit, the great Babel of continents, races and ideologies. Castro, in his role as director, staged it in accordance with his own conception. He placed only the tenors of the radical school in the foreground, on the ramp

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and under the spotlights. They spoke for hours on end at the key sessions, sometimes even allowing themselves encores. All the rest, 80 out of the 95 leaders, formed the chorus, a blurred vocal background relegated by the director to the shadows. Indeed, a number of protests were presented in writing to Castro for the way in which the debate was manipulated.

Protests were also heard from the platform. The Senegalese prime minister announced: "Without informing us when our turn would come, you have dragged us out of bed to speak at 0400 in the morning so that nobody can hear us. Only the people you like speak at normal hours. But we, too, will be heard. We will not allow you to manipulate the movement. We want to be only each other's natural allies."

The Burmese minister said: "I will forgo my speech since you have allocated all the time to your preferred speakers. I simply want to say that my country will leave the movement if its principles are not observed. It seems to me at this point that it would almost be better to dissolve the movement and refound it on its genuine principles."

There were protests also against the Cuban press and news agency, the conference's official organ. The reports selected only the remarks which coincided with the Cuban line. In the version given by PRENSA LATINA and GRANMA, Tito's speech seemed to be repeating Castro's own words. The telegrams from leaders of the Soviet bloc countries, reported in full, however, occupied more space than the most important speeches. The telegram from Hua Guofeng, on the other hand, earned only a few lines. Fidel brought the presidency to its feet only when one of his acolytes mounted the platform. In any case the choreographic image has been of a conference of warriors willing and able to overthrow the world as if it were nothing but a big Nicaragua.

While the favorite tenors were showing off their high notes, the majority, relegated to the chorus, pondered on their ideas. The Politburo responsible for drawing up the summit's conclusions first dismantled and then completely rewrote the document proposed by the Cubans. A small group called the "cleaning group" designed to clean up the Cuban document and whose very composition was indicative (Yugoslavia, Algeria, India and Cuba--the real balance of forces among the movement's currents) in fact drew up "the nonaligned movement's best document on its doctrine." The Politburo accepted it by consensus. A repercussion within the assembly would have the effect of opening another 5-day debate or wrecking the summit. Cuba's theses could not be approved in a serious debate on the major topics. Even at the Politburo stage 40 of the 52 speakers judged that the stance offered by the Cubans "lacked the essential concepts of nonalignment." Therefore the theses regarding the "natural allies," the socialist countries, disappeared from the document. Involuted sentences concerning obscure associations with the "progressive forces" were also eliminated. In the document presented to the final assembly

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the nonaligned countries are the natural allies only of themselves. There are still two enemies, as the Iranian minister said, pointing to Tito as his inspirational example: "Real nonalignment stems from its resistance to American imperialism and to Stalinism."

Following the initial resistance--sometimes violent and glaring--the Cuban representative, defender of the original document, suddenly gave way. He accepted and cooperated with the new draft. He told the opponents: "I will eventually be accused of converting to moderation." Of course, there has been no conversion. At one point the great director took the decision no longer to insist on a document which could split the conference simply on the internal plane, thus compromising the well-contrived external image. Conferences of this kind often appear just as they have been presented to the public and not as they really took place. Therefore Castro yielded on the second plane to keep the first plane, the public plane, intact. In any case, as the decisive final act of the conference, his closing speech will be heeded more than a complicated and sophisticated document--to which he does not even intend to refer--will be read.

Furthermore, at the moment when he is assuming the chairmanship and the coordination, Castro has no desire to lead a dissolved and split movement, lacerated partly by animosity toward himself. And so we come to the summit's third plane: the machinery of its future functioning.

In determining its internal bodies, the Cubans succeeded in raising the chairman's rank and duties far above those already extant.

The annual conference of foreign ministers as a discussion body was not institutionalized. The fixed meetings of the coordination committee within the United Nations have also been abolished on the pretext that this created first- and second-class members. By abolishing all these filtering bodies, the chairman is acquiring more scope for imparting his own line and interpretations. A document which he did not like would probably not be regarded by Castro as gospel, since he gives a fiery Caribbean interpretation even of the cold Marx.

In sum, of the three bases on which the conference rested, Castro won two. But, while we are counting numbers, it should also be noted how far he is from having a majority. It should also be added right away that Castro is the last politician in the world willing to take minorities into account. In his view nonalignment does indeed represent the great majority of nations, but for this very reason it must be led by a vanguard minority. The majority does not seem entirely willing to allow him to prevail without offering some resistance. Nevertheless, as we said yesterday, the majority is using the subtle finesse while the Castroites are using heavy clubs. Let us wait and see which proves to be the most appropriate and long-lived weapon in this new and spreading phenomenon of nonalignment, which its own components are struggling to interpret and direct. They are sure that history belongs to them, but they do not know how to conquer it: whether to coerce it or whether to bewitch it.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

ENEL'S PLAN TO REACTIVATE HYDROELECTRIC PLANTS

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 21 Aug 79 p 7

[Article by Fabrizio Dragossi: "Everything Being Tried To Reduce Oil Imports --ENEL's Plan To Reopen the Abandoned Electric Power Plants"]

[Text] Rome--With the price of oil going up all the time, and with the well-known difficulties of supply, there is only one watchword in all the Western countries: depend on crude oil as little as possible and develop all alternative sources of energy. In Great Britain and in the United States, coal is being rediscovered and mines abandoned decades ago are being reopened.

In Italy, in addition to the oil problem there is the shortage of electric power: despite the very heavy imports of fuel oil into our country, the electric power plants are not managing to cope with the maximum peak demands. The president of ENEL [National Electric Power Agency], Corbellini, has already announced that next winter there may be long stoppages of supply in order to avoid the general blackout that would paralyze the country. In any case, it is being attempted in Italy too to develop rapidly alternative systems for producing electric power, so as to reduce dependence on oil imports.

In ENEL there is already a precise plan to reactivate dozens of electric power plants abandoned in recent years; the increase in the prices of petroleum products and the outlooks for the future are making them competitive again, even if new technologies to lower operating costs will have to be used in order to put them back into production. One may not, to be sure, speak of future self-sufficiency (we are quite far from that), but simply of a lightening of the oil burden and better utilization of national resources. "The amount of precipitation and the altitude of the territory," says Vincenzo Bevilacqua, assistant central director of ENEL, "mean that our country has high hydropower potential, in comparison with other European countries too." ENEL is already using hydroelectric power plants to produce 25.6 percent of energy today.

From 1963 to the present, a great many small-size hydroelectric power plants have been abandoned because they were not economical; the 3/4-lira per kilowatt-hour cost of petroleum fuel put these mini-power plants, which used small watercourses in the Alps and the Appenines, out of business. There is a total

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of about 700 of these "little power plants" (that is, with power less than 5,000 kilowatts) in Italy, 664 of which belong to ENEL. There are 315 little power plants not in operation, or, as they say in ENEL, "renounced," because in some cases it was simply a matter of electric power company ownership concessions which had never been actually used. Now, there is movement toward an about-face and to get as much as possible into operation.

The cost of operating a thermoelectric power plant is about 30 lire per kilowatt-hour today, and ENEL's plans are to reactivate the "little power plants" which offer costs no higher than 40-45 lire, thus taking future increases in the cost of oil into account also. One of the basic problems to be solved in reactivating the little power plants--again according to Bevilacqua--is precisely that of operating costs. With the traditional systems, a little power plant requires, for example, almost the same number of personnel as a thermoelectric power plant, which naturally produces far more. Because of this, application of remote-control systems is being considered so as to reduce the personnel drastically.

Work is also being done towards standardization of the installations, so as to have the same machinery for all the little power plants, and thus the same spare parts, etc., with reduction of the costs and with the possibility of production programming by the industries in the sector. But what contribution would the "little power plants" make to the electric power needs? The overall productivity is 2 billion kilowatt-hours out of total production of about 170 billion kilowatt-hours. However, all the little hydroelectric power plants together produce a saving of 10 million tons of oil annually, which is about 1/10 of imports.

At the same time, work is also being done on coal, with which, however, there is a serious pollution problem. Within a short time, several thermoelectric power plants will be "converted" to burning coal instead of fuel oil. But the problems are many, and not easy to solve. A large power plant needs about 5 million tons of coal per year to operate, but a maximum of 2 million tons per year arrives in the port of Genoa today: the requisite port facilities are lacking. We also depend on imports for coal, and the operating costs are rather high: 20-21 lire per kilowatt-hour. There are mines in Italy, such as those of the Sulcis, but for the time being it seems a completely uneconomical proposition to reactivate them.

ENEL also has several power plants, of very modest size, that use lignite, mined in the vicinity of the plants. The last alternative category is the geothermal power plants, which use underground heat; they produce 2.4 billion kilowatt-hours per year--that is, 1.8 percent of the total.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PROBLEMS FACING INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE SOUTH REVIEWED

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 14, 23 Aug 79

[Article by Alfonso Madeo: "The Future Is Closed to the South; Tomorrow, the Dole"]

[14 Aug 79, p 2]

[Text] The Southern issue tends to be shaped by Southern contradictions. While this makes the complexity of the issue all the more alarming, the reasons for it seem rather simple. In what way, though?

The Southern question is a complex of problems of different historical kinds and origins that are linked together in a traditional, though dramatic, way and are generally seen as being insoluble. The Southern question expresses the concept of underdevelopment and dependency as a function of the relationship with the industrialized society of the North, not as an irreversible structural matter related to the values of consumerism and technological culture.

The Southern contradiction is characterized by fluidity of content and various disorganizing phenomena that define an interrelationship of conditions that are often indecipherable and composed of variables reflecting the apparent irrationality of a situation that resists being classified according to standard categories. The Southern contradiction is a mass of anomalies, irreconcilabilities, inconsistencies, and rules that do not apply. Thus, we speak of the Southern contradiction when we talk about things in the South that fly in the face of common sense, that are unknown or foreign, unsolved and in themselves unsolvable.

(1) Some 35 percent of the Italian population lives in the South, in a socio-economic situation that has three distinct characteristics: the minority role of industry, the low level of employment, and the prevalence of tertiary activities. A fourth characteristic that might be cited is the importance of traditional agriculture.

Industry supplies jobs for no more than 5 percent of the Southern population. This confirms the failure of the strategy of decentralized industrialization, which has been carried out by government edict. According to recent assurances from SVIMEZ [Association for the Industrial Development of the South], Southern industry is on the move. But not enough to have an effect on incomes. The per capita Southern income is equal to 59 percent that of the Center and North.

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In the 50's, it stagnated at 50 percent. Improvement is apparent only because in the meantime 4.5 million people have emigrated. This is an exodus of Biblical proportions, and an unprecedented loss of human resources. At present, industry is showing signs of fatigue, which is due in part to the general crisis and in part to the crisis in agriculture and construction (4 percent employed).

It is a mistake to think that the tertiary sector has continued to expand in comparison to agriculture and construction. It might be assumed that an interruption of this trend would be a sign of positive change, but a further contradiction in employment derives from it: in the South, every setback never fails to punish the region all the more harshly for this weakness.

(2) In the South live (and vegetate) 40 percent of Italians aged 15 to 24. As a consequence, the South is loaded with the strongest social tensions. The percentage of young people graduating from school is the same as in the North, but in the South, illiteracy or semi-literacy is widespread among adults. For the sociologist, this is a destructive element in the crisis of the nuclear family: when a father is illiterate and the son graduates from school, they become two planets destined to collide and disintegrate, or else they will never meet again. That does not make matters any better.

Is it possible to make working masses out of these people? Is it even thinkable to undertake a massive employment program for idle youth by putting them to work at manual labor in factories or the fields, or in artisans' shops?

The historic lack of employment opportunities works at two levels. When underemployed or unemployed youth become aware of their own social uselessness, their disillusionment turns to hostility towards work and government. The myth of labor degenerates into the myth of the "scum," and voting becomes a chance to protest. As for the family, it clearly suffers from the frustration of being unable to enjoy any social advancement from their son's diploma, into which they invested years of saving and sacrifice.

According to an EEC study, in the future this mass of youth may be put to work in the structure of services in the North. This is obviously a far-off and improbable eventuality. What is interesting is understanding the quality and scope of the changes that are gradually taking place in the education and evolution of the lower classes in regions where there is such a large number of young people, both male and female, who are seeking an identity. The "wild diversity" of needs and demands that cut across this evolutionary trend, sociologists and anthropologists assert, defy any rigid ideological analysis.

(3) It is a prime necessity for the traditional left, since the vote of 3 June, to consider the problem of social change that the mass of youth is bringing about in the society of the South. It is an urgent necessity for democratic institutions really to get back in touch with the complexity and changeability of these phenomena.

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We know from experience that leftist administrations will have enormous difficulties in the South because they are operating in a welfare state. It is to be feared that these difficulties will have a direct effect on the organization of the consensus in next year's elections. This is not to say that in Milan and Turin the system of economic and social assistance is not functioning but that in those cities public assistance is integrated into the system of production and therefore plays a supporting, if not corrective, subsidiary role; but in Southern regions, where there is underdevelopment and poverty, it constitutes an often unique economic resource, makes possible even a survival-level economy, and has a real, determining impact.

Those who hold the central power are those who swim most easily in the ocean of social pensions, subsidies, aid, and grants. Among these, the Christian Democrats have managed to identify themselves with the welfare state, thus reaping votes and credibility. Aside from the failure of the plans for a steel mill, even Gioia Tauro could be transmuted into a baroque monument of welfarism: it would suffice to keep the billions of lire from being swallowed up in the pockets of minority groups and let them trickle instead into the empty coffers of the Calabrian economy.

For leftist administrations it is also becoming harder to communicate with the Southern lower-middle and middle class, which supports the public assistance system, being partly recipients and partly responsible for managing it at the local level. I found very significant what a Lucano unionist said to me: it is one thing to be a lawyer or mathematician in an industrial society and participate actively in a modern industrial culture; it is quite another thing to be a lawyer or mathematician in an underdeveloped society and mired helplessly in the daily grind.

(4) The last few years have been dedicated to the debate on centralism. The South has been central to the strategies of the unions and the leftist parties; it found a valid outlet in the plans for industrial reconversion, which was to stimulate and favor the transformation and transfer of innumerable productive businesses in the South.

Conclusive to the recognition of centralism, many sacrifices have been asked and received from the working class of the "triangle." But the law on reconversion has remained a declaration of intent. Like the one on the orientation of youth to labor, it has not worked. A long digression would be necessary to reanalyze the reasons and the responsibility for these measures' failures. So be it. The workers made their contribution, and the unions, their effort. However, they did not keep the South from missing a second chance. Its centralism is still awaiting the consent of government programs.

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These government programs, in their turn, are yet to be disentangled from incentive criteria that leave things as they are, i.e. the Southerners in the status quo; they shower billions upon "captains of industry," like Ursini and Rovelli, they insidiously presume the existence of pharaos like Gioia Tauro, and they build "cathedrals" and glorify the contradiction.

The unions have documented the fact that in the decade of the 60's the maximum concentration of public investment was made in low-employment, capital-intensive sectors: 70 percent to the petroleum industry, basic chemicals, steel and cement; 30 percent went to the manufacturing industry.

The debate is calling into question the role of the Treasury in the South (it has issued bonds for about 30 trillion lire in 30 years) and is telling the political right, the big private monopolies, that "incentives to industry have become an industry of incentives," as though conservative forces were themselves unrelated to the privileged placement of public capital.

[23 Aug 79, p 2]

I

[Text] What role should be assigned to the underground economy in the South? Many claim it should be given an importance equal or superior to that of the public assistance system in the socio-economic life of this area, which is the most afflicted by depression and disintegration. In short, a high-profile role.

The discovery of the underground economy and the role it plays is a recent one in our country, and it is safe to say that not a few economists and politicians were caught by surprise. The phenomenon has extensions, functions and implications, such as providing explanations for many situations ignored by official statistics.

Aris Accornero writes in "Situazione sociale e diversificazione territoriale" (CESPE [Center for Studies in Economic Policy (for the PCI)]), "The underground economy has a relevance that goes beyond economics and causes surprise at the consistency of actual employment, the level of industrial production, and the amount of income produced." In other words, if we turn the observation around, without such a widespread and productive underground economy, we would not be able to explain how the Southern population manages to survive in its traditional underdevelopment.

According to the latest information (from SVIMEZ (the 1979 Saraceno report), the underground economy employs 1.1 million Southerners. It follows that the underground economy (black market, precarious, minor, home, desultory, clandestine, semiclandestine market or what have you) represents another aspect of the "Southern contradiction. On the one hand, it helps ease tensions

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and meet needs; on the other, it opens the door to a flight en masse from the unions, politics, and society in general.

At the same time, the underground economy offers a lot of new room for maneuver in exploitation and speculation. It deprives the worker of his social function and strengthens dependency ties. It brings back the image of the fantastical "jack of all trades" that is glorified in the worst populist literature and the folk-hero subculture. The art of scrounging a living is being integrated into the mechanism of production and the public assistance system.

But it is still true that the South finds a solution to its problems in the underground connection between the economy and employment. The chairman of the Naples Chamber of Commerce, Enzo Giustino, maintains that it is in this underground activity that the South expresses its ability to restore itself, its initiative and entrepreneurship, and the SVIMEZ report insists that the best policy for the South would have to be developed through research and would have to offer substantial financial support to local businessmen.

Big private capital has resisted investing in the South, and many anti-Southern speeches have been made on the theme, now commonplace, that the lack of initiative and entrepreneurship is a physiological lack, which means that the South can only follow in the footsteps of others and cannot possibly join in creating its own industrial society.

Even if such arguments may have had some validity at one time, they now sound pretentious and ingenuous: the South is rich in entrepreneurship, and that is a fact that can be verified with a minimum of good faith effort; to confuse the lack of structures suitable for sustaining entrepreneurial attitudes with the lack of such attitudes is an unpardonable error, and to persevere in prejudice means that the South will be unfairly penalized.

Sicily offers an illuminating example, as it is a region of plentiful resources. Let us take one: the extension of hothouses for cultivating early fruit has revitalized vast areas of agricultural production and documents a case of spontaneous recycling that produces work and income. Another example: the assignment of useful public work to four youth cooperatives--cleaning up Palermo.

The speeches about lack of initiative could be countered by referring to the fact of the expanding youth agricultural cooperatives, which are equipping themselves to cultivate thousands of hectares of land that has lain fallow or been abandoned. They now represent a mass movement, and it is urgent to give them adequate legislative backing.

II

What is the agriculture-industry-services balance that is most useful to the development of the South? What is the most equitable distribution of land resources? What direction should investment take?

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The debate has centered for too long on only one set of alternatives; industry or agriculture. We know what this has led to. It has been a most grievous, irremediable error. Industrialization, as it has been managed, has built superfluous monsters, "cathedrals in the desert," and has set in motion wild, uncontrollable processes of urbanization. It has not conquered unemployment, it has not discouraged emigration, it has not remedied poverty and the underground economy. Agriculture has been liquidated, which means that in 1978 we were reduced to spending 7 trillion lire to import agricultural products. It is now becoming clear that the choice cannot be a simple one between industry and agriculture. Better late than never.

Inequality and Development

The new alternative is one between types of agricultural production and types of industrial activity. It is now accepted that industrialization must go through a series of experiments, such as the reorganization of resources, the individualization of primary vocations, and the rational distribution of medium-small businesses (labor-intensive), which will give rise to an entrepreneuring class capable of making marketing choices and taking initiatives on its own, so as to save the character of the South and at the same time integrate it into the mainstream of industrial society.

III

Another great error has been to consider the South as being homogeneous. Sicily is not Calabria, nor is it Sardinia. Catania is not Catanzaro, Brindisi is not Matera. History, culture, work, traditions, resources: there are many things that make them different.

What appears to make for harmony in one region does not in another, and it may even have the opposite results. The truth of this statement is obvious, but it has been rarely admitted, let alone respected. Very seldom has Southern policy considered the specific regional, human, and cultural facts of life. Hence it must now be realized that treating a disparate region as a homogeneous whole has produced an "inequality of development" that is making the contradiction all the worse.

The debate is calling forth more articulate points of view. Now it is being said that the South is a "leopard's skin," and that it is necessary to separate the data and reconsider the "question" along sectorial lines, and to find specific values.

Profound social and economic factors are at work transforming the country, and analyses are necessary to insure progress in quality. The difference between rich and poor provinces in the South is slowly diminishing, but the North-South difference remains large. This should not be given a positive interpretation, because the disparity is decreasing most slowly at the bottom, with a gradual decline in the standard of living: the rich provinces are coming down to the level of the poor provinces. They are on a collision course.

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IV

In government programs, official speeches, and declarations of intent, the South is being spoken of more frequently as a category distinct from other national problems, and that sounds funny. They say we should give to hospitals, schools, youth, women, and the South, as though the South were not also schools, youth, and women; as though it were right, paradoxically, to say, we should think of doctors, teachers, engineers, laborers, and Southerners. We have to wonder what category this South fits into: social, geographical, cultural, or what?

V

Those who profess a Southern policy of power and integration have made a notable, constant contribution, for the Southern issue has been confused by Southern contradictions. It goes without saying that the resulting accumulated responsibility is enormous. Traditional academic Southernism, which has been professed in recent decades by intellectual minority groups, is removed from both effective centers of power and the real interests of the lower classes; its conclusions are substantially illusory.

There are many categories of Southernists other than those in power: organicists, apoliticals, whiners, etc. Many are dedicated to self-criticism, somewhat for objective reconsideration, somewhat as a matter of conscience. Some have embraced all causes and all solutions. Others have rejected every proposal made. Above all of them ranges the cohort of those who are content to blame Rome for everything in order to avoid having to make the effort of analyzing the situation and reporting publicly on it. It is a way of not naming names, not singling out any groups, and of remaining silent while pretending to howl.

In conclusion, it would be fitting to ask where we stand on Southern culture on the eve of the 1980's. Does it exist? Where? Is there something to continue, produce or propose that would not be mere sloganeering? What is the economic, social, and civic outlook? European? Mediterranean? Autonomistic? Who will be the movers and shakers? At what level will they operate after so many negative experiences: criticism, agitation, or political opposition? These are not questions inspired by a spirit of provocation; they are meant to express doubt and concern.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BRIEFS

BANK OFFICE IN MOSCOW--A Spanish bank will, for the first time, open an office in Moscow. The Hispano-Americano Bank has now received accreditation from the Gosbank, the Soviet state bank. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 10-16 Sep 79 p 58]

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