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# West Europe Report

(FOUO 50/79)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DEFENSE POLICY, FORCES, WEAPONS SURVEYED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jul-Aug 79 pp 8-19, 48

[Unattributed article: "France's Defense Policy" ]

[Text] France's defense policy is characterized by continuity. It was defined by General de Gaulle, set forth in the White Paper on Defense in 1972, and debated in parliament at the time of the vote on the law on military planning.

Its primary objective is to safeguard the independence of the nation.

It therefore excludes any systematic alinement with the diplomatic positions of another country, or another group of countries, and intends France to retain complete freedom to decide on the appropriateness, timing, and modalities of committing its armed forces in the event of crisis or conflict.

However, it does not signify neutralism, withdrawal, isolation, for France's security is inseparable from the international context. It depends in a very direct way upon stability in Europe. That is why, while rejecting any idea of returning to NATO's integrated structure, it remains a fully participating member of the Atlantic Alliance.

The security of France can also be affected by crises or tensions threatening raw materials and energy supply sources, as well as the great maritime transportation currents indispensable for the country's good economic health.

It is these facts that govern France's military strategy.

It is based on the deterrent and combat capabilities conferred by the existence of mutually enhancing nuclear and traditional armed forces.

The French strategic concept is essentially defensive. The point is to deter an aggressor from attacking France by convincing it that a major military action on its part would be likely to unleash strategic retaliation in the very heart of its own territory and to cause material damage and losses of

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human life disproportionate to the gains it could expect. The intention is thus to prevent a war.

But the threat must be a credible one to be taken into consideration. Now, there obviously exists a level of aggression below which recourse to nuclear weapons would not be plausible.

An aggressor could therefore be tempted to evade deterrence and to nibble dangerously at our positions through a series of minor actions for which it would not be plausible to brandish the nuclear threat. That is why strategic nuclear capability must be complemented by traditional forces of sufficient size to check any minor action or force the adversary to engage in strength in such a way that there would be no doubt as to its intentions of offense.

However, an aggressor with great numerical superiority at its command could be tempted to take advantage of it to eliminate our traditional capability at its own convenience and back us rapidly into a fail-safe situation.

That is where tactical nuclear armament comes in, with its dual role.

First, by its very existence in the heart of the combat corps, it imposes on the adversary a constant threat of use and prevents its taking full advantage of superiority in conventional means.

Then, it serves to deliver the last official warning by the political authorities, giving the aggressor notice to expect the unleashing of strategic weapons if it persists in its undertaking.

So the strategic concept is an over-all one, since it is intended to deter at all levels of aggression, delays fail-safe, and is based on the principle that modern deterrence rests not only on a strategic arsenal but on tactical nuclear weapons also, intended to enhance its threat, and also on ground, sea, and air forces capable of fighting with the greatest possible effectiveness, and determined to do so if need be.

It is also specific to France, because it establishes a direct connection between the threat of use or the actual use of tactical nuclear weapons and the unleashing of strategic retaliation. It is therefore different from the Russian and American concepts which attempt, on the contrary, to dissociate the use of the tactical from the strategic nuclear.

France possesses today an effective nuclear arsenal that enables it to conduct its strategy of deterrence.

French strategic nuclear forces are not trying to race the two greats for power and number of vectors, but aim at attaining adequacy.

Their technical credibility requires that they be kept at a very high technological level to preserve their survival and penetration capabilities in the

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face of detection, attack, and defense systems.

They are linked in three complementary components:

Missile-launching submarines patrolling in the depths of the sea are now assured of invulnerability

The missiles on the Albion plateau have in their favor an almost instantaneous reaction time and the fact of being stationed on our own territory: an attack on this site would be of unmistakable significance

The aircraft are extremely versatile in their uses; they can be put on alert, deployed to stress the intentions of the government, and recalled after take-off.

Tactical nuclear armament is at a meaningful level. The Plutons, both the air force and the aeronaval aircraft, are equipped with nuclear weapons intended for battlefield objectives.

The presence of these tactical nuclear forces alongside the traditional forces increases the deterrent significance of the latter and their ability to give battle.

#### Air Strength

Mirage IV, AN [Nuclear Weapon] 22

#### The Bomber Wings

The Mirage IV arms system is historically the first section of the French deterrent nuclear arsenal.

The Mirage IV is capable of attacking strategic or tactical targets and also of effecting long-range photographic reconnaissance missions. France presently has about 50 aircraft of this type at its disposal.

Originally conceived for very high speed, high altitude bombing, it moves at a cruising speed of Mach 0.9, to reach a climbing speed of Mach 2, at a ceiling in excess of 15,000 meters. It can effect fully autonomous missions over 1,500 kilometers from its departure base.

Owing to its sophisticated navigation system and to the use of jammers, it is capable of operating with adequate effectiveness whatever the weather conditions, and of evading the adversary's interceptors and ground-air defenses.

It carries the AN 22 nuclear load, with a power in excess of 60 kilotons, the first nuclear weapon produced by our country.

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A portion of these resources are on constant alert and can accomplish a nuclear mission upon very short notice.

The versatility of an aircraft and the presence of a man on board make the manned air force an irreplaceable instrument at the government's disposal for assuring the political handling of a crisis.

The Supply Wing

It is composed of 11 C135 F aircraft distributed among three squadrons. In-flight refueling of the Mirage IV from the C135 F can be accomplished in all weathers, day and night, thus endowing the Mirage IV, in a nuclear configuration, with an action radius of over 3,000 kilometers.

Modernization of the Weapons System

The modernization, as decided upon in 1975, of the Mirage IV aircraft, will make it possible to keep them active at least until 1985. The modifications which have occurred affect simultaneously the weapons system, the navigation apparatus, the penetration and resistance capability. The achievement of electronic counter-measures has broadly enhanced the operational qualities of the Mirage IV.

In addition, studies are in progress to examine the feasibility of adapting the ASMP [Medium Range Air to Ground Missile] to the Mirage IV.

However, this is a timely moment to develop a third component capable of bringing in advantages comparable to those of the manned vectors.

The studies begun two years ago show that a new generation of semi-mobile missiles or aerodynamic missiles could be involved, with the latter possibly site-interchangeable or airborne.

The "S 11" Strategic Ground to Ground Ballistic Missiles (SSBS)

Installed on the Albion plateau in Upper Provence, the SSBS carry a nuclear charge of 150 kilotons power and can reach targets at a distance of 3,000 kilometers.

These missiles, spread over a 30 kilometer radius, are buried in silos encased in reinforced concrete, and capped by a hermetically sealed door, also made of concrete, weighing 140 tons. Dispersal, burial, and reinforcement protect the missiles from all presently known forms of attack.

Fire control is assured from two control posts deeply embedded in the mountain and connected with decision and implementation centers by a redundant and highly protected ensemble of diversified communications systems.



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Nuclear warhead being lowered into silo.

Power: 150 kilotons  
Range: 3,000 kilometers  
Number of units: 18  
Propulsion: two explosive stages  
Weight: 32 tons  
Length: 15 meters  
Diameter: 1.5 meters

The SSBS nuclear component, installed on our own soil, expresses the minute-by-minute, second-by-second constant presence of the deterrent that a major attack could under no circumstances check.

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**Strengthening the Credibility of the Strategic Nuclear Missiles on the Albion Plateau**

The transformation of the strategic ground to ground ballistic system on the Albion plateau was undertaken in order to increase its fire-power by putting into service a missile with a megaton thermonuclear warhead and increasing its defense penetration capability.

The first S3 artillery unit will be placed in service in 1980, and the second in 1982. The swing from S2 to S3 will bring a very noteworthy increase in effectiveness to the SSBS force, since its capacity will be multiplied eight-fold and the reaction time reduced fivefold, and since the range will be on the order of 3,500 kilometers.

**Mirage IIIE - Jaguar A - AN 52**

An important element of our deterrent policy, the AN 52 nuclear weapon can constitute, within the framework of an open conflict, the last military warning given an aggressor before commitment of the strategic nuclear force: Mirage IV, nuclear submarines, ground to ground ballistic missiles.

Two types of aircraft act as carriers for the AN 52 weapon: the Mirage IIIE and the Jaguar.

Like that of any nuclear weapon, its use can only be undertaken on the order of the president of the republic.

**The Mirage IIIE Squadrons**

Stationed at Luxeuil, in Upper Saone, the Dauphine and Lafayette squadrons, which constitute the fourth fighter wing, have 29 aircraft at their disposal.

The Mirage IIIE is an all-weather, low altitude interceptor aircraft.

Moving at a maximum speed of Mach 2, at a ceiling of 16,000 meters, it is equipped with a Cyrano II intercept radar and has an action radius of 200 to 900 kilometers, depending on the mission configuration and profile.

**The Jaguar A Squadrons**

The Jaguar is a supersonic tactical support twin jet, capable of operating from improvised airfields of about 1,000 meters.

On a tactical mission, autonomously and at low altitude, it can attack targets situated over 700 kilometers from its base; its convoy range, which is over 3,500 kilometers, can be greatly increased because of its in-flight refueling capability.

It reaches a climbing speed of Mach 1.5 and its ceiling is 15,000 meters.

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Structurally equipped with two 30 millimeter cannons, it can carry a military cargo of about 4,000 kilograms, which can include, besides nuclear weapons, traditional weapons (bombs, rockets, air to ground missiles).

The 7th wing, stationed at Saint-Dizier, uses the nuclear attack Jaguars.

Tomorrow, the Mirage 2000

The Mirage 2000, the air force's future combat aircraft, synthesizes the most advanced techniques. Exceptionally maneuverable, it uses the most modern arms now in service, and can operate from 1,200 to 1,500 meter strips. It will be equipped with a medium range air to ground missile.

Sea Strength

Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarines (SNLE) in service:

The Redoutable (active service 1971)  
The Terrible (active service 1972)  
The Foudroyant (active service 1974)  
The Indomptable (active service 1975)

Submarines under construction or nearing completion:

(Redoutable type): the Tonnant - commission to active service planned for 1980

The Inflexible: submarine dimensions more or less identical, performance improved - new weapons system

Specifications:

Displacement: 7,500 tons  
Length: 128 meters  
Beam: 10.60 meters  
Power: 16,000 horse power  
Speed: above 18 knots

Armament:

Each SNLE of the Redoutable type has 16 M20 missiles with the following specifications:

Mass: 18 tons  
Range: over 3,000 kilometers  
Nuclear warhead: 1 megaton.

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### Evolution of Sea Strength

#### The New Missile-launching Nuclear Submarine

The decision to begin construction in 1979 of a new generation SNLE, the "Inflexible," was definitively made by the president of the republic in September 1978 after three years of study.

It appeared indispensable to assure coordination between launching this new SNLE and putting the multiple warhead rockets of the M4 arms system into service.

#### Improvement of the "Inflexible"

The precision and autonomy of its navigation devices will be increased by the use of a new over-all navigation system.

It will be provided with perfected computers and much more elaborate counter-measure and underwater detection systems. With respect to acoustical concealment of the submersible, the advances currently planned concern a new propeller, improvement of the superstructures, and the suspension system of the auxiliaries.

It should be added that a new tactical weapon will increase the defense capability of the SNLE, and that operational diving safety will be improved, that the reliability, ease of maintenance, and simplicity of operation of on-board equipment will be increased.

The new SNLE will enter the operational cycle in 1985. Though submersibles were studied during the decade of 1960, the new submarine "Inflexible" is a vessel of the decade of 1980. A new generation is involved. Though it has the same displacement as the present SNLEs, it differs from them in its weapons and navigation systems.

#### The M4 Missile

The M4 missile has a range of about 4,000 kilometers and is equipped with several separate 150 kiloton nose cones reinforced against the effects of a nuclear explosion. It takes French deterrence through a decisive phase on the level of effectiveness. The M4 missile, comprising multiple loads, capable of reaching several targets, presents a very clear improvement over the M20 missile with a single megaton load that can reach only one target.

#### After the "Inflexible"

#### Installation of the M20 Weapons System on the SNLEs

The program set by General de Gaulle included five missile-launching nuclear submarines. The fifth vessel of this type will be finished in 1980, and

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there will then, with five vessels in service, be four armed SNLEs in the operational cycle at all times, which will guarantee a constant minimum of two submarines on sea-patrol. These submarines will all be equipped, as of 1979, with the M20 weapons system, which includes missiles equipped with megaton thermonuclear loads, with decoys of over 3,000 kilometers' range.

Super Etendard and the AN 52 Weapon

The aircraft carrier Clemenceau is already, and the aircraft carrier Foch, after modernization in 1980, will be, equipped to launch the Super Etendard carrying tactical nuclear weapon 52.

Specifications of the Super Etendard:


Launching weight: 11.9 tons  
Speed: in excess of Mach 1  
Low altitude  
Weapons: cannons [ firing explosive shells ], rockets, Magic air to air missiles, air to surface AM 39, nuclear weapon (AN 52).

On 1 April 1979, 13 Super Etendard are with the fleet.

By 1 January 1980, 24 will be operational.

Ground Strength

The Pluton



Composition - Installation

Five Pluton nuclear artillery regiments constitute the ground component of nuclear armament.

They are stationed in the north and east of France.

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#### Chain of Command

Only the president of the republic can make the decision to use nuclear weapons. He has at his personal disposal specific technical devices which physically guarantee him control of these weapons.

The army is charged with coordinating the discharge of nuclear weapons.

The army corps are responsible for the operational use of the regiments.

#### Organization of a Pluton Regiment


A Pluton regiment consists of a group of 1,000 men disposing of 300 vehicles.

Three artillery batteries, with two Pluton ramps each, constitute the means of discharging nuclear weapons.

The command and service battery comprises in particular two command and liaison teams who dispose of high performance communications systems, permitting delivery of movement and firing orders under the requisite conditions of secrecy and speed.

The safety and nuclear transportation battery is responsible for the delivery of missiles and weapons.

#### The Pluton Weapon System



The Pluton missile has a range of 120 kilometers and carries a nuclear load of about 20 kilotons. It is guided by an inertial control unit and is thus independent of any contact with the ground during its flight.

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The launching ramp is mounted on the AMX 30 chassis which includes all the optical and electronic equipment required for firing, as well as the missile loading crane. The fully equipped system is mobile. Firing can take place a few minutes after stopping.

#### The Air Force

The effectiveness of a nation's air strength rests on four basic principles: constant alert, immediate reaction capability, mobility, and fire power.

For perfect reconciliation of these defense imperatives, the French air force is organized according to a dual structure:

a functional structure, composed of seven large specialized commands comprising operational units grouped to accomplish a specific mission, and which for this purpose dispose of their own personnel and materiel (in particular equipment)

a territorial structure, constituted by four air regions, which in addition to strictly operational responsibilities (air traffic, operational defense of the territory, and defense of sensitive points), take care of the routine needs of the great commands, thus constituting support for them.

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The point at which the functional and territorial structures converge is at the level of the air base. At this level, the base commander has under his authority all units stationed on the base; he is responsible for their preparedness and for execution of orders to use each command concerned, specialized or regional.

This organization enables the air force

to assume air defense of the national space;

to maintain immediate response capability against any attack on the territory or its land and sea approaches, combining if need be its actions with those of the other two armed forces;

to maintain overseas intervention capability.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM VOICED ON INDUSTRIAL NATIONS' FUTURE

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 10 Aug 79 pp 15, 17, 83-85

[Interview with Thierry de Montbrial, director of the French Institute of International Relations, date not given]

[Text] A wave of pessimism engulfed the West with the appearance in 1972 of the report of the Club de Rome--an association of economists and managers--entitled "The Limits of Growth." This document predicted that the industrialized world would collapse beginning in 1980, after having exhausted all the raw materials. One of the reporters of the Club de Rome, Thierry de Montbrial, director of the French Institute of International Relations, in an interview with PARIS MATCH, attempts to separate what is true from what is excessive in these apocalyptic views. He asks the questions: Is the world really threatened by shortages? Is it not instead suffering from the difficulty 140 to 150 nations--most of recent creation--have of coordinating their policies when urgent problems arise: Were they able to do so, the crises could perhaps be overcome. Ten years [as published] after the great scare, a more lucid look.

[Question] In 1972, the Club de Rome had forecast the rapid exhausting of the world's resources. Are you economists who are close to the Club de Rome more optimistic now?

[Answer] I will begin with a historical anecdote. At the end of the 18th Century, it was thought that the English coal mines were in the process of being exhausted! That notion of the exhausting of natural resources is, therefore, extremely subjective and, above all, dependent upon the state of the technology. The Club de Rome's warning in 1972 has to be rethought in 1979 in the following manner: we are living in a world which is prone to consume increasingly more raw materials, particularly energy raw materials. Technology, although it is making a lot of progress, is not progressing at the same rate. If there is not a basic change, either in the behavior of people or in technology, of necessity the day will come when there will be shortages.

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[Question] In 1972, the Club de Rome recognized the fact that technical innovations, new discoveries, could solve energy problems or problems of the exhausting of mineral deposits. However, it questioned whether these discoveries can be made in time and thought that the catastrophe would take place before hand.

[Answer] That in fact is the heart of the real problem. With regard to these questions of technologies, one distinction should be made. There is the utilization of existing technologies and new technologies. An example of utilization of existing technologies is the production of synthetic fuel. It is a technology which has been known for a long time, as Nazi Germany attained self-sufficiency during the war by manufacturing the gasoline it needed from coal. At present, in South Africa, enormous efforts are being exerted to achieve self-sufficiency, thanks to pilot synthetic gasoline plants. In a few years South Africa will be able to meet its total needs with synthetic gasoline. The Carter plan also foresees the development of synthetic gasoline. The problem--we see it clearly--is not a problem of availability of resources since, theoretically, we can manufacture as much gasoline as we wish from coal which exists in very large quantities that will last for years. The problem is the cost--extremely high--of these technologies. And yet, if we do not put these technologies to work sufficiently soon, we run the risk of facing shortages.

[Question] At that time, the Club de Rome said very clearly: "We will not get there." Now there is a change. We hope to get there before the crisis.

[Answer] It is on this point that I, personally, and with many others, differ with the Club de Rome's pessimism. The Club de Rome emitted a cry of alarm in 1972, because it was convinced of the danger. The Club de Rome had reason to say: "If nothing is done, there will be a catastrophe." Personally I think the catastrophe is not absolutely inescapable. But the probability that it will occur is very high, in fact, if action is not taken in time. Those are terribly weighty decisions which cost enormous amounts of money. What is more, such decisions involve many changes in peoples' life-styles. With regard to technologies, one more comment: "It is one thing to utilize existing technologies and take action in time; it is quite another to count on entirely new inventions which, by definition, are unimaginable. There are some inventions upon which we can more or less count, such as thermonuclear fusion; there are others which, by definition, we cannot anticipate.

[Question] One question on the subject of bituminous schists. It seems that there is a lot of this material in the Paris basin. We are given assurance that nearly 10 million tons of fuel can be obtained from it. Do you have an opinion on this subject?

[Answer] Yes, of course. The question of bituminous schists is a good example in France. The problems are as follows: first, we still do not know

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how much that will cost. The estimates which have been made regularly for the last 10 years fluctuate enormously. The estimated costs of producing gasoline from bituminous schists in fact increase much more quickly than the cost of OPEC oil. That means we have not yet sufficiently mastered the technical aspects of the problem, even though we are close to being able to do so.

Another much more serious objection--and here we again encounter the concerns which were originally those of the Club de Rome--is that exploitation of the bituminous schists will pose absolutely colossal environmental problems. Exploitation of the bituminous schists literally means moving mountains. We know how to do it, at least theoretically. But we do not know at what cost, at what price and above all we do not know how to do this and limit the consequences for the countryside.

[Question] And what about pollution?

[Answer] Exploitation of the bituminous schists will not cause any more pollution than other technologies. Above all it is an environmental problem.

[Question] A little while ago you spoke about thermonuclear fusion as one of the solutions envisaged for the production of energy for factories and fixed installations. Where are we now in this regard?

[Answer] That is an area in which there is a certain amount of agreement among scientists. With respect to thermonuclear fusion, there are things that we know for sure, namely that it exists and operates in nature. That is already an important result. I am not talking about the H bomb, which by definition is an example of uncontrolled fusion, but about the stars. We know how to reproduce fusion on a reduced scale, at the experimental level. What we are not certain we can do is to bring about fusion with a yield higher than the fuel mass [unite], that is, we are not certain that we can produce more energy by fusion than the amount consumed to produce the phenomenon. There is almost unanimous agreement in the scientific community which has concluded that in the present and foreseeable state of affairs it will not be before 2015 or 2020 at the earliest that we will be able to start practicable exploitation of a fusion process. It would be totally unreasonable for the moment to count on fusion as a normal source of energy. Another obstacle: although there are already many ecological problems--heaven knows how much talk there is about them--for the production of energy by fission, a fortiori we have reason to believe that fusion will also pose such problems. For the immediate future, it will be the well thought out utilization of fission-produced energy.

[Question] By that do you mean the extension of the technologies of nuclear reactors and fast-breeder reactors?

[Answer] There is an improved technology, the fast-breeder reactors, which permits, as we have often said, the extraction of 50 to 60 times the energy

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per unit of uranium consumed. Since you are speaking of France, it has been estimated that with the uranium resources we have available in our territory, if all these resources were utilized to produce energy with fast-breeder reactors, we would have reserves of energy at our disposal at least equal to those of Saudi Arabia in equivalent oil.

[Question] France has made the decision to equip itself with fast-breeder reactors as opposed to Carter who has refused to experiment with this technology in America. We are, therefore, well in the lead in this sector. We have reason to believe that with the dawn of the year 2000 we will be quite independent with regard to part of our energy, at least electric energy.

[Answer] It is true that we are building fast-breeder reactors, and it is true that we have a technological lead vis-a-vis other countries, including the United States. But we should not be too optimistic. First, it is not certain that we will not have exploitation problems, because we are still in the development stage of these technologies; and it is only through experience that we learn about the geotechnical problems. Next, even the most optimistic persons rule out the hypothesis according to which we would rely exclusively on this source of energy. On the contrary, I feel that everyone thinks the future will be a certain mix of different technologies. One of the things we have to regret is having placed too much confidence in a single form of energy.

Let us say, if all goes well, we should be capable of producing a certain fraction of our energy with fast-breeder reactors; however, even so we should not count too much on this.

[Question] With the hope of thermonuclear fusion and with the more certain hope of fast-breeder reactors, one could say that dependence on oil will be lessened and that, therefore, there is no reason to panic, particularly since oil reserves are in the process of reevaluation. Certain individuals who were talking about 50 years of reserves are now talking about 70 and even 100 years.

[Answer] On the question of evaluation or reevaluation of reserves, there are a certain number of comments to be made. Following publication of its first work in 1972, the Club de Rome was reproached for concluding that natural resources: oil, energy, raw materials, were a kind of cake of very limited size which was destined to disappear if it were eaten. The truth of the matter is that this is not the way things are. The reserves, whether we are talking about oil or any other raw material, are not a well-defined stock of the products considered. The reserves are estimates made at a certain point in time of the resources we have available, at a certain cost with given technologies. As we consume, or as we produce, or invent, we are constantly reevaluating these reserves. The fact that the reserves increase is something quite normal. It has always been that way; it will always be that way.

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[Question] The horizon of real shortages has been pushed back almost to infinity, since every time the cost increases, exploitable resources are found at that cost. What is the limit, if there is one?

[Answer] There, too, the real problems are two in number. First, there is the problem of cost. Our industrialized Western economies were based on the fact that the fraction of the national efforts devoted to the search for raw materials even so was very modest. The question is one of knowing whether, progressively, the fraction of the economic effort to be devoted to the acquisition of natural resources is to take an enormous proportion of the total national effort. The second question is that of delays. If it takes 10 to 15 years between the time we decide to exploit such and such deposit or such and such new technology and the time when this deposit or this technology begins to effectively produce, we run the risk of making errors in calculation; and errors in calculation lead to temporary crises such as the one we are experiencing at the present time. There is no reason to fear absolute physical shortages of no matter what; however, there is reason to fear increasingly frequent crises of adaptation. Over the long-term, everything is always resolved; however, as the economist Keynes put it: "In the long-term we will all be dead." Even though we know that over the long-term paradise awaits us, we need to know what is going to happen in the coming 10 or 15 years.

[Question] If the cost of searching for raw materials for energy or any other production increases, there is, if we must devote a greater part of our efforts to the search for raw materials, does that mean there will be a drop in the standard of living?

[Answer] Absolutely.

[Question] And for a rather long time, perhaps?

[Answer] Exactly. We have entered a period in which the only way to solve our problems without having to constantly face up to crises which create unbearable disorders and tensions within society is to change our consumption behavior in the broadest sense and, consequently, to live more modestly. Therefore, to reduce the standard of living and at the same time to make an effort to develop our energy and raw materials resources.

[Question] We consume 4 billions tons of oil per year. How long will the reserves last at this rate?

[Answer] Several years ago, they were saying 20 to 30 years. Today the effective reserves have been reevaluated to between 200 and 300 billion tons. That is equal to 70 years. But the question is always the same--excuse me for repeating it--at what cost? Because oil which costs a quarter of a dollar to produce, as is the case in Saudi Arabia, and oil at the bottom of an ocean, which would cost \$30 to produce, are economically quite different.

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Moreover, even if there were oil beneath the Antarctic, and that is not certain, and even if we knew at what cost we were going to produce it, the time between discovery and extraction would be several years. In all these cases, it is a question of planning in time. Time is the essential variable.

[Question] What you are implicitly emphasizing is that pessimistic forecasts are no longer in style and that we now recognize the fact that there is enough oil perhaps for 100 more years. At what cost? The question may be asked; but in the final analysis oil exists. We know that a search will be made for it.

[Answer] I am quite in agreement and all the more so because oil can be obtained in many ways, including synthetically from coal. Therefore, there is no reason to be concerned about the availability of oil products, let us say hydrocarbons. Not now, nor in 20 years, nor in 100 years, nor in 200 years. The reasons for concern are of another order: having what we want at the right time.

[Question] According to certain specialists, in some layers of the earth there are quantities of methane--that is, combustible gas--colossal quantities dwarfing the present stocks of known natural gas which, therefore, renders the energy problem soluble for all times. Reportedly, this methane is to be found at a great depth in layers of saltwater.

[Answer] It is still the same problem. The methane does in fact exist. Everyone agrees in saying that in the final analysis the energy problem is solved for all time since we have an almost infinite quantity of hydrogen in the universe. The Club de Rome's error, or more exactly the interpretations which may have been made of the initial theses of the Club de Rome, is having presented the problem as being physical in nature when it is of an economic and sociological nature.

[Question] It is also said that the Club de Rome's sin is not having had confidence in the innovation possibilities of science and having made a judgment based on a given state of affairs as if that state of affairs was to remain static.

[Answer] Yes. You are speaking of man's inventive capacity. I would say more generally adaptation capacity. I think that man has a fabulous capacity for adaptation, at all levels. What the Club de Rome did that was useful, during that period at the beginning of the 1970's was to show that there are limits to optimism. These limits demonstrate that complex problems (and increasingly complex problems) cannot be solved over the short-term. When I say increasingly complex, I am saying that curves are more difficult to negotiate and that inertia is greater. We should not negotiate a curve in the same way with a light automobile and an exceptional 40-ton trailer truck [convoy].

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[Question] OPEC tried to justify the increases in oil prices of \$20 and more by saying that it was the marginal cost of new and difficult deposits. Is that a valid pretext?

[Answer] I do not believe that the present OPEC prices are justified on the economic level. I believe that the chiefs of state who met in Tokyo were quite right in saying so. If in fact we did not have enough oil and had to exploit the bituminous schists, it would be normal for the price of Arabian oil to equal the cost of the marginal source, namely the bituminous schist.

Today, in reality, there is enough oil. If we are having difficulties it is because OPEC is artificially limited its production. If it were not for this limitation, we would have a much lower price.

[Question] OPEC is, therefore, pocketing the money which should go into exploration and the exploitation of new deposits?

[Answer] I agree with you. They are pocketing what in economics is called what the market will bear. Oil income is now diverted and often wasted.

[Question] Therefore, there is not enough investment in oil exploration or in technologies which permit its manufacture. That is the result of the OPEC price increases, and that is the new peril which threatens us over the long-term.

[Answer] It is the result of OPEC policy and also the result of shortages on the part of certain governments of the industrialized countries. And that unfortunately was the case in the last 5 or 6 years in the United States. It was incapable, for many reasons having to do with American domestic politics, taking the steps which could have permitted them to face up the situation. Now we can hope, but unfortunately it is nothing more than a hope, that the new measures taken by the Carter Administration will permit a solution to the problem.

Carter's idea, if I understand it correctly, is to create a kind of energy NASA, that is, to invest considerable sums, \$140 billion over a 5-year period.

[Question] In the Club de Rome's report, there was another chapter besides energy, a chapter on world food supplies. Rather serious famines are forecast for the 1980-1990 decade. The perspectives seem to have changed considerably. Food shortages during this period are not forecast. Famines because of poor distribution are forecast but not because of shortages. Is there a way to improve the situation?

[Answer] This question of food is also a problem of production effectiveness. Just one example: the Soviet Union. Everyone agrees on estimating at about 10 percent the amount of grain production lost due to elementary management mistakes in the USSR. Some 20 million tons of wheat rot, almost literally, on the roadsides. Such waste is extremely widespread throughout the world.

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[Question] Could we say that the specter of great famines, which were so prevalent in the 1970's, is disappearing?

[Answer] It is difficult to make a balanced judgment of that kind of thing. Let us take the example of the Vietnam refugees, because, unfortunately, that is a present day phenomenon. One of the reasons the people are fleeing from Indochina is because they are dying from hunger. Consequently, the inability of a certain number of countries to solve the basic problems of life and survival is being translated today into a few spectacular crises. Everything depends upon knowing what kind of linkage we make between the events. I read somewhere that Cambodia was probably the only country in the world where one could say with certainty that there was famine.

[Question] Another question, still along the lines of the Club de Rome's report: overpopulation. According to the 1972 forecasts, the population explosion will bring about an ecological and food catastrophe. Today demographic experts are making less distressing forecasts. Can we reasonably be optimistic?

[Answer] The reevaluation in question is rather marginal because, on the whole, from now until the end of the century, more or less, the increase in world population will not be too far from the 1972 predictions.

The optimism/pessimism pendulum is in the process of moving in the other direction. I do not believe that the figures have changed fundamentally in the population sector.

[Question] The fears expressed in 1972 concerning shortages of raw materials and energy, the exponential increase in population, the threats of famine have been attenuated or are expressed in a more reasonable manner. Can new fears spring up today which were not envisaged at that time? For example, the threat of deforestation which would have consequences for the composition of the atmosphere.

[Answer] Let us say that there are two kinds of new fears. There are fears of a physical kind and fears which are, in my opinion, much more basic and, unfortunately, more justified, namely fears of a geopolitical kind.

Deforestation is a good example of fears of a physical kind. Why? Once again it is a problem of time. A forest is natural wealth which many people say is renewable. The problem is that it takes 100 years to make a forest, while it takes a few days to destroy one. What is much more serious is the fact that the soils become sterile, which is an almost irreversible evolution; I say almost because I can accept the fact that technologies may revitalize sterile soils; however, we have not reached that point. What is happening in the Sahel is probably very serious. All of these fears have been partially justified. That said, we must not on the other hand exaggerate them, because the earth itself is in the process of permanent evolution; periods of glaciation during which France was covered with ice will probably be produced again in



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several centuries; nor should we overexaggerate the fears connected with physical developments; everything is a matter of degree [measure]. In addition to those questions, there are problems of thermal pollution.

What is thermal pollution? It is an excess amount of carbon monoxide or dioxide which at a certain point in time would produce irreversible changes in the atmosphere. Since we cannot deal with all the questions at one and the same time, just as we cannot from one day to the next change civilizations and sweep away all technologies, it is a problem for the 21st Century and not the 20th. That does not mean we should not be thinking about it now. The real new fears, which in my opinion are entirely justified for the time being, are of a geopolitical kind. For we are going through a phase of international relations, in the broadest sense of the term, during which at one and the same time we are much more interdependent and the world is much more split up than previously so that no country is in a position to govern the system, in the cybernetic meaning of the term.

Up to the decade of the 1960's, let us say from the end of the 1940 war until the end of the 1960's, the structure of the world was extremely simple. You had the two superpowers on the one side. Each one had its camp within which it maintained order in a very general sense; as for the Third World countries, they were still in the colonization stage or at the beginning of decolonization. This entire system was highly structured. It was a well-ordered structure.

Today the relative weight of the two great powers has diminished considerably. A considerable number of new actors have appeared upon the international stage, with the attainment of independence by the developing countries; and that entire world is very nearly incapable of maintaining structured relations with the other nations, at a time when growing interdependence demands coordinations. That is what is serious.

The real drama of our time, if I may use this excessive term, is that we know fairly well what the solutions are to the problems but are tangled up in an international network, that includes some 140 to 150 states which do not know too well how to go about regulating their affairs.

[Question] But which know very well how to go about creating a cartel.

[Answer] There are certain subgroups which know how to take advantage of circumstances to advance their own short-term interests. However, what we do not know how to do, for the time being, is to manage the earth in the general interest. And that is what is serious.

[Question] In certain countries of the world, deforestation is due to the fact that there is no heating material other than wood. Entire forests are burned, whose destruction damages the quality of the atmosphere. There should be an understanding at the world level so that these peoples can be supplied with coal or oil.

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[Answer] I could make a similar observation about the fishing sector. There is a certain number of countries, notably the Soviet Union--I am sorry I have to mention it again--which are known for the manner in which they systematically despoil certain fishing regions without paying attention whatever to the irreversible consequences such a practice may have. Unfortunately, what we do not at present know how to do is come to understandings at the international level; in a system that is so split up and divided, such as our present system, this is practically impossible. The real challenge of the coming years is to find the means, the procedures capable of bringing real solutions to the problems of the earth.

[Question] Are you optimistic?

[Answer] No.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PCI PROBLEMS IN TURIN SYMPTOMATIC OF PARTY AT LARGE

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 27 Jul 79 p 3

[Article by Walter Tobagi: "The Italian Communist Party (PCI) Misses Its 1950 Years."]

[Text] Turin. What is this Turin communism which regularly resurfaces in all the sacred histories of the party? "It is the most 'worker' and 'worker oriented' party: it can be compared, in the Soviet Communist Party, with the party in Leningrad," answered Piero Fassino, in charge of the commission on manufacturing plants. His face is thin and his eyes move quickly, like those of the brightest boy in the class. But why has this left-leaning PCI lost votes right in the most popular electorate, namely that of the workers? Fassino isn't even 30 years old. He is very active and has done his homework: he lists those explanations repeated so often in these past weeks.

Then he insists on one point: "We have taken up moral positions. We stated that one should not moonlight, without being aware that one out of every four workers has a second job. Problems are not solved by moralisms: it is necessary to understand why the worker does this, which necessities force him to..."

While not wishing to unduly burden the reader with citations, one may nevertheless remember that Gramsci spoke of a "frontier city." This is still a very valid definition: a frontier city with a frontier communist party. The electoral defeat (from 40 to 34 percent) is a symptom of a more profound illness. Turin's society is changing: FIAT has brought about an impressive industrial re-organization: unemployment is practically nonexistent, while terrorism for most is a daily nightmare. The PCI can barely keep pace with the changes. "It was the opposition party par excellence: now it has radically changed its function," noted the historian Massimo Salvadori. "It is veering toward a socialist bent. An opposition party? For real?"

The stories of the grandiose workers' resistance in the 1950s smack of rhetoric. The [creation] of the Valletta empire coincided with the semidecline of communist presence in Italy's largest manufacturing plant. In the summer of 1969, eve of the mythical Hot Autumn, there were 180 PCI members in the Mirafiori plant, which has 60,000 dependents. It is necessary to reflect on that

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figure if one wishes to understand the mutation: now party members at the Mirafiori plant total over 2,000. And the card carriers for the Turin federation including both city and county total over 46,000 with almost 80 percent workers or retired former workers.

Talented Young Persons

The numbers are there, reflected by an impetuous growth but they are also proof of a given long-term fragility: however, the Turin PCI remains a small party if compared with the Bologna or even the Milan structures. At the height of the electoral success in 1976, for every party member there were 16 voters. The party had become a great collection of nonconflicting opinions, but it could not hope to aspire to an effective hegemony in the society. Moreover, the 1975-76 success saw the transfer to public administration positions of some of the best managers. At the head of the federation thus were many young persons with great talent, who perhaps lacked experience, however.

The leadership cadre question is a matter that still has to be resolved. The regional secretary, Bruno Ferrero, has become a European parliamentarian. Many make mention of the classic promoteatur, ut amoveatur: Ferrero had voiced opinions which were not covered or agreed upon prior to the congress, criticizing in particular the rules dealing with internal party life. Now who will fill his position? Will a replacement be found in Turin? Could the fact that regional elections are but 10 months away perhaps help the situation? [Perhaps] if a director were to come in from the outside, he might lose too much time becoming acquainted with the situation. Not everyone, however, is in agreement; and rumors abound.

The name Gianni Cervetti has come to the fore: he was formerly responsible for national organization. Or, if Cervetti were to return to Milan, Gianfranco Borghini might be transferred from Lombardy to Turin, to fill the position of regional secretary. Hypotheses aside, there exists a veritable dilemma: at the last meeting of the Central Committee (CC), mayor Diego Novelli requested that an old custom of the 1950s be brought back, when there was a "constant, permanent rapport between a group of important comrades in leadership positions and major regional groupings." Reading between the lines: one of the party's VIPs should be directly involved with the Piedmontese PCI.

In the Via Chiesa Della Salute offices, where the federation is headquartered, no signs of nervousness are evident. The party, granted, has sustained a loss, but everyone wants to avoid improvised answers: meetings upon meetings take place. The 48 [PCI] officials canvass the neighborhoods gathering up opinions.

"The party is attempting to open up, to correct the blunders of these years," said Giuliano Ferrara, officer in charge of culture. Further still: "In 10 years the class has undergone a radical change, but our analysis methods are antiquated."

To speak of a workers' class as a compact, homogeneous reality serves no purpose. Renzo Giannotti, the federation's secretary stated: "We were unable to form meetings in the plants regarding equal rent. There were workers who rented

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and thought one way, and workers who owned houses and thought in an opposite manner, and workers who were in public housing who worried about different things altogether." The moral is that "parties and labor unions have difficulty in dealing with an ever differentiated labor class."

Giannotti looks like a young monsignor, learned and intelligent. He managed to attend a finishing course in Moscow in the years between Khrushchev and Brezhnev. He believes in the party, which must be characterized by "a great openness toward society, but also must play a pedagogical role: this is the great original selling point of the PCI."

#### Alien Values

However, he states that reality does change: recently, in fact, "the influence of mass media has increased on electors and even on party members." The party is no longer a mystical separate body, closed within itself: it is more and more influenced by a changing society's characteristics, and it takes in values which are alien to worker and communist tradition. It is a nightmare for Novelli, a mayor with a journalism background: he exemplifies, with a face of sadness almost like Moro's, the city's contradictions. "Consumerism," laments Novelli, "has entered into the peoples' thought process. And it is here that the party function has been found to be lacking."

The nostalgia is directed back to the party of the 1950s, when it was the center of political militance and was, as well, the school of life. In the brewing of the past decade, this iron-fire quality has been lost. Novelli pushes demagogical pronouncements aside: "It is not enough to have a PCI card to be a communist. It is time, it is time to put the brain to work, and not to yell slogans alone." And he remembers those days, long ago when years of exemplary militancy were needed in order to be accepted into the federal committee. The Turin office of UNITA [the PCI daily] gave a great party when that honor was bestowed on Paolo Spriano.

Is it possible to return to that discipline? Novelli defends the zeal with which the PCI has tried to restore a given amount of order in the administration of the city, choosing to ignore even the most disjointed situations: a case in point is the example of a low-rent housing project where 132 families have gone so far as to refuse to give their names.

These administrative problems weigh on the party's choices. In the years that Berlinguer postulated on the "compromesso storico" [Historic Compromise], the Turin communists did not hesitate to set up left-wing juntas ranging from county to regional levels. They can boast of more than one success. However, these governing responsibilities have brought about the need to assume a "more responsible" attitude. And with what result? [The result being] that the party ended playing a role of mediation: it resembled the assembly of a constellation of diverse realities." This is the opinion of Fausto Bertinotti, the CGIL [Italian Labor General Committee] regional secretary, who is considered to be one of the most knowledgeable experts of labor and communist left.

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Within the PCI, furthermore, differing political positions exist. The most notable example of this can be found in the 39th section, which has always contested the party line and cited Leninist orthodoxy. It is a workers' section, with 250 members, established in 1952: secretary since its inception has been Dino Rebbio, a retiree with a long and sharp nose.

He greeted me by saying: "We do agree to give interviews to bourgeois newspapers." Then, he mellowed a bit and gave a radical criticism of Berlinguer (he pronounced his name with the accent on the "i"), as well as of the rest of the communist leadership. "The working class," he said, "has class interests which are not understood at PCI higher levels. One cannot say that a policy be not understood. Lenin taught us that 'if a policy is not understood,' that means it is wrong."

Rebbio does not believe in Eurocommunism: he claims that "the Soviet Union and the Eastern countries represent a unit of progress and represent humanity's future." He criticizes Berlinguer's theses on austerity. "How could I be austere? I should refrain from eating ice-cream? I have never owned a car...."

Certainly Rebbio appears to be more an exception within the Turin PCI: his Leninist orthodoxy pushes him to the limits of political heresy. But his harsh opinions against "unequal rent" reflect a discontent which is widespread and may explain the numerous electoral losses of the masses: from the families living in low-income housing to retirees hit by the medicine stamps.

The problem in the Turin PCI, without twisting the political line, is to allow voices such as that of Rebbio to be heard: voices of those who live among the more humble people. Perhaps the editor Giulio Einaudi is right when he suggested that the PCI must "again bind its rapport with the people, with the new emerging classes, and with the second society. It must understand what Toni Negri calls the social worker. It must understand the aspirations, the needs of youth...."

But actually this is not a problem which concerns the Turin PCI alone: it is a dilemma for the party as a whole. [The PCI is] a party that has always attempted to play a leadership role with respect to society, but it must settle accounts with a divided, fragmented society, now infused with values which seem to be in strident contrast to the traditional political commitment of the militant communist. The following is the sad confession of a communist director: "Last Saturday I left home early to go to a meeting. I ran into the long line of cars going to the highway which leads to the beach. They were all going to the beach. I was the only one going in the opposite direction. At that moment I thought that we lost votes because of this also: we continue to hold meetings among ourselves, while the people go to the beach."

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