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28 August 1979

Korean Affairs Report

(FOUO 2/79)

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KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

AUTHOR CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT'S TREATMENT OF PAK CRITICS

Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Jun 79 pp 274-284

[Article by T.K.: "Barren Soil--Correspondence from the Republic of Korea: Days under House Arrest; Academy Incident"]

[Text] Days under House Arrest. 17 April, 1979 Dispatch.

It is reported in today's papers that the government has announced a 10-to-40 percent hike in the prices of 58 items, including bus and train fares, which have been held in check heretofore. This move is said to have become necessary to implement "the measures for normalization of price structure." Despite this price explosion," it is contended, the workmen's wages must be held in check as an anti-inflation measure. Moreover, there seems no sign the price stabilization may follow this "explosive hike." The true position of the government is that no one really knows how far the prices will soar in a chain reaction this year. While hoarding by buyers and sellers goes on, there seems to be no end to the shortage of daily necessities and the lowering of their quality goes on.

On top of this came the uproar over the Yulsan business group with its 14 affiliated companies and 8,300 employees going bankrupt and an executive being arrested on charges of embezzling 10.5 billion won. And for having advanced a loan of 6 billion won while knowing the group's bankruptcy, the president of the Bank of Seoul and Trust Co. was arrested and the presidents of the Chohung and Hanil (Banks) were dismissed and being investigated. But people who know what is going on at all think that the Yulsan business group is nothing but a scapegoat. Because inflation is the biggest problem, the people's resentment needed to be diverted toward something. This is why the Pak regime singled out the Yulsan business group this time. A friend of mine explained this way:

"Big business firms are all the same. It's been reported that 30 top business enterprises received loans over three times their assets. These figures were presented solely to cover up the fact that 12 big enterprises were

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given loans 10 to 12 times their assets. So they are arresting bank presidents, but that's nothing but a show. Bank presidents have no power. Political power holders make them do everything, and, in a case like this, they are used as scapegoats. In the countryside, complaints are raised because of the failure of the new strain of rice called "Nop'ung" the government forcibly introduced. The government's compensation is nothing but a lip service. The only thing the government could do to ride over this is oppression and manipulation by the [Korean] CIA."

There is a notorious enterprise called Hyundai Construction. This enterprise ran a big advertisement in papers that it would award scholarships totaling 316,960,000 won to high school and college students in the new school year. The ad alone must have cost a huge amount, and I wonder if there was any reason why it had to make such an announcement. Hyundai Construction would not disintegrate like Yulsan. Hyundai is different from an enterprise like Yulsan, which was started by a young president with only a million won in assets in 1975. When told to offer its shares to the public, a representative of the Hyundai group is said to have declared in mock seriousness, "If we do such a thing, both we and the government will fall together." Integrated with the tyranny of the Pak regime, it is safely at peace. According to a journalist friend of mine, Hyundai Construction is supposed to have openly brought in as much as one hundred million dollars from the Middle East, despite the restriction placed to counter inflation, on bringing in foreign exchange. This became an issue once, but everything was smoothly settled. My friend went on to tell me about the real situation of the so-called manpower export to the Middle East, where Hyundai Construction is driving laborers hard under the worst conditions.

At present, there are approximately 84,000 ROK laborers and technicians in the Middle East. And this is supposed to increase to 120,000 this year. The total amount of foreign currency earned in the Middle East last year was eight billion dollars, of which five billion were brought home. In construction projects in the Middle East, 50 percent of the contract price becomes a net income, and because of the low wages of the laborers, the enterprise gets 30 percent of that. As an anti-inflationary measure, the laborers are paid only after their income is deposited in the bank for two years. Thus, aside from their low wage rates the laborers are forced to face a decrease in the net income through inflation.

The base pay of the laborers in the Middle East is 300 dollars a month. With overtime pay added to it, their average monthly pay is about 500 dollars. But, for this money, they have to work an average of 13 hours a day under the broiling sun in 52, 53 degree temperature. About two years ago the base pay was 175 dollars. If a Korean works for a business enterprise of any other country in the Middle East, even an unskilled laborer will get the base pay of 1,000 dollars, plus 21 days of vacation a year. But, most of the ROK laborers are working under the harsh conditions imposed by ROK enterprises under political pressure, with the high wages at home these days,

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plans are being advanced to induce the ROK laborers to stay on their job and to use foreigners for miscellaneous chores. Here my friend raised his voice a little in anger and he went on to say this:

"They work under one-year contract, but work-related hazards and their after-effects are a big problem. Under their working conditions they cannot possibly work more than nine months out of a year. This is the reason why they are worn out by the time they return home. In order to shorten the term of works, subcontracts are let, and workloads exceed the standards prevailing in Japan. It is simply a labor concentration camp. It is said in private that 26 died last year, but of course, there were probably more. They make wine from fruits and stuff, drink and without ever rising, die. In that heat, under those working conditions, there are many who just collapse and die on the spot. This is a serious human rights issue. A reserve officer who was an army colonel commands each unit. The sprouting discontent is nipped in the bud, but it is whirling around at the bottom. The companies fear lest the situation become a domestic issue, but the National Assembly is but a servant-girl for the power holders and the press is about the same. Wouldn't somebody somewhere abroad take up this issue and investigate it for us?"

Once isolated from international scrutiny, the Pak regime commit these cruelties. Thus the trade deficits of the Pak regime may be eliminated, and the power that be and the big business may eulogize the blessings of this world. And the foreign exchange thus earned will probably flow out as funds to purchase weapons, which will please the United States.

In fact, news is circulating in the streets of Seoul that this foreign exchange pleases the United States and is thus prompting President Carter to visit the ROK. The ROK government decided at a ROK-US Commerce and Industry Ministers conference to make a 2.2 billion-dollar purchase of U.S. goods for the purpose of "alleviating the pressure of the U.S. control of imports from the ROK." The ROK has reportedly decided to buy machinery and petrochemicals also from the United States, which it has heretofore imported from Japan. Thus 38 representatives of big enterprises, led by the ROK Minister of Commerce and Industry, hurriedly went to the United States. And it is also reported that the ROK and the United States will launch joint development projects in the Middle East and Africa, in which the United States provides technology and the ROK manpower. The dollar seems to have power after all. Thus newspapers in the ROK suddenly changed their headlines, saying, "ROK-US Relations Highest in History." In order to welcome this trade delegation, American Vice President Mondale sent his own plane to New York. Papers reported that the New York Times mobilized its publisher and all leading staff members in giving a huge reception to welcome the delegation. Faced with these events, a friend of mine engaged in the democratization movement said in distress:

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"This is really absurd. Pretty soon they will probably announce President Carter's visit to the ROK. With that 2.2 billion dollar officially received, you know. The Pak regime is planning to do the same to European countries, too. The American ambassador to the ROK is supposed to have said that the American ambassador is in Korea not to protect the human rights of the Koreans but to protect the interests of American businessmen. Thirty-six American missionaries in Korea and 250 American missionaries in Japan sent letters to President Carter expressing their opposition to the president's proposed visit to the ROK. The letter from Korea was discovered by the CIA at the airport and copied. Pak Chong-hui was enraged and screamed that all will be deported. First two Catholic priests whose visas would expire were to be deported. But the American ambassador in Seoul contended that U.S. citizens had the freedom to write to their president, thus quieting the situation, and the only thing the priests suffered was to have their visas extended only by three months, instead of the customary six. Some people say that the American ambassador did assert himself for a change, but others, reacting cynically, say that that was nothing but the ambassador's move to win a point as a diplomat, on the eve of Carter's visit."

It may be said that most of those engaged in the democratization movement are tired of these games played by the United States. I just cannot help feeling that both the United States and President Carter are just intensifying the image of the ugly American. A rumor is going around that even those Americans staying in Korea feel that when Mr. Carter's visit to the ROK is over, a storm of further oppression will blow hard and those Americans who had signed the letter protesting Carter's visit to the ROK will also be adversely affected. Now that the Amin government of Uganda seems to have disappeared, it may be that the bad name of Mr. Pak Chong-hui alone will become more notorious from now on.

"The calm" before President Carter's visit to the ROK is continuing. The Pak regime is employing all sorts of methods of oppression, including detention, arrest, taking house arrest, and surveillance. Still the regime seems to be cautious not to cause any serious incident, if possible. It is an every-day occurrence to be taken to a police station and detained incommunicado there for a week or so. These days especially, with such anniversaries of resistance approaching as the March First independence movement day, Easter on April 15, and the April 19 revolution day, the CIA and police have been very active. Beginning with people like Yun Poson, Kim Tae-chung, and Ham Sok-hon, many in the democratization movement are now placed under house arrest. More than 20 security agents have cordoned off the residences of Yun Po-son and Kim Tae-chung. Often their wives and other family members are not allowed to go out either, and so things like vegetables are being sent in by the police. Sometimes, 20 to 30 armed policemen swarm around the residences of those engaged in the democratization movement, to the point where neighbors become frightened. Among the ministers some like the Reverend Yi Hae-tong of the Hanpit (one Ray) Church are not even allowed to go to their church services. In such instances, of course, their church members are not allowed to visit their ministers, either.

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The health of those imprisoned are deteriorating, too. There are no doctors in the penitentiaries. They say the medical expenses for two to three hundred inmates are only 100,000 won (approximately 40,000 yen in Japanese currency) per month. Furthermore, political prisoners are not allowed to see doctors unless they are on the verge of death. In the case of Kye Hunchu who has fought a long fight, he was allowed to be hospitalized only after more than a week in coma, and is still in critical condition. Poet Yang Song-u is also in danger of death because of an excessive loss of blood caused by prolapse of the anus. Writers as well as the mother of [the imprisoned poet] Mr. Kim Chi-ha, have been appealing to authorities but they have continuously ignored them.

You may say freedom for Kim Tae-chung lasted only 10 days after his release from prison. Even now, when a foreign reporter comes to visit him, the twenty or so agents disappear quickly. Interviews with foreign reporters is permitted to make it appear that he is free. A rumor is going round that in America there are even some newspapers and magazines which carry articles, on how just to cooperate in this. They are trying to make it appear as if the U.S. were interested in Kim and others in the democratic movement so that Carter's Korea visit will be completed smoothly. Mr. Carter, on his part, may be wishing to have a smooth visit, and without harming his own image. So, the U.S. embassy is trying to soothe democratization movement people by approaching them and inquiring about their situations, thus giving appearance of interests in them, while the Pak regime keeps them immobile by arresting them or placing them under house arrest. Amid all this, the American President who has advocated human rights is coming to confirm and bless Korea's "calm", its stability, security, peace, and freedom. This may represent some well calculated politics. But, it looks to me like the most inhumane insanity. Maybe power in any country is that cruel.

We can say that Mr. Kim Tae-chung has begun another prison life in his small house. Even his granddaughter is not allowed to visit him in his house. (We have included the appeal Kim Tae-chung has written himself at the end of this article. But, the situation has grown worse now). On April 10, sixty people representing the families of prisoners of conscience closed in on the house of Mr. Kim Tae-chung. There was a clash with the agents there. In the end the sixty people sat down in front of the house and staged a sit-down demonstration. In the turmoil, Mr. Kim Tae-chung came out to the door, and the demonstrators could exchange greetings with him. Because of this, twenty people were taken to the police station. The demonstration was staged to confirm the non-freedom of Mr. Kim Tae-chung and to let the people know about it. Once, a few who made a call on Mr. Yun Po-son who was suffering from a cold rushed inside the gate while the guard was dozing off. But later, they were surrounded by a large unit of policemen, and interrogated. Mr. Ham Sok-hon once got away from his house and went to the countryside, but was caught and sent back to his house. Tired of these battles, those engaged in the democratization movement may not find the time to map their future plans. A friend of mine told me this recently:

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"To leave some resisting people in a section of the church may be for the purpose of making the fighting people surface and watch them. They probably think that this would in the end prevent a large scale mass revolt. They deliberately allow the masses to lay their hope on the powerless few. By oppressing and imprisoning these few, they create fear among the public. Also, by keeping them on the surface, their contacts can be grasped clearly, too. I think an open non-violence movement has now reached its limits. A non-violence movement is possible only when there is a definite law and in which the mobilization of the masses is possible. In the present-day ROK, we are placed in a situation of violence, in which CIA agents come to our houses and sits there, lock us up and watch all of our moves. Aren't we all in a prison without bars?"

Academy Incident

How long are we going to shout

With masks on?

How long are we going to show unbecoming behavior

With masks on?

This is a stanza of the anonymous poem "A Battle Cry" carried in "the Human Rights News" issued by the Human rights Committee of the Council of the Korean Christian Churches. How long on earth are we going to cry out in the name of human rights, non-violence, or Christianity on this barren land? Yi Hu-rak, who was CIA Director at the time of the Kim Tae-chung kidnaping, became a National Assemblyman. Kim Chae-kwon, who was then a CIA minister in Japan, took back his real name Kim Ki-wan and became the president of Hanguls Insurance Company. Yi Ho, who was then the ROK Ambassador to Japan, became the chairman of the Constitution Committee, and is supposed to sit in judgment on constitutional violations. I don't know whether there can be trials for constitutional violations under the Yusin Constitution of the one-man dictatorship, but, in any event, rewarding for kidnaping Mr. Kim Tae-chung is probably over.

Under these circumstances, the New Democratic Party, which calls itself an opposition party, is in a really miserable shape. With the party convention scheduled in May, Kim Yong-sam, former party head, is challenging Yi Ch'ol-sung, the incumbent head, who has been trying to be faithful in keeping his party a friendly party of the ruling party, but Kim's prospects seem gloomy. It has been decided that the chairmanship of the National Assembly will go to Paek Tu-chin, one of the president-appointed Yujonghoe National Assemblymen. In defiance the NDP declared that it would boycott the opening ceremony of the National Assembly, but soon relented. In the face of the intimidation by the ruling party that such a boycott would be regarded as the rejection of the current system, that is, a crime of recting

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the Yusin Constitution, the NDP gave in after a three days of defiance. Of course, it was because the CIA was watching behind the scene. The only thing that happened was that 23 National Assemblymen, including Kim Yong-sam, walked out in protest against voting in the election of the assembly chairman.

Recently, there was an incident in which some family members of prisoners of conscience staged a sit-down demonstrations in front of the headquarters of the NDP. They demanded that the party, if it called itself an opposition party, at least submit a proposal for the release of political offenders at the National Assembly. Yi Ch'ol-sung, head of the party, hid himself and did not come out. After six hours of demonstration, the demonstrators left, having obtained a promise for the party's action. Of course, this was not reported in any newspapers; it ended up as a rumor. Under the circumstances where everything is under the surveillance and direction of the CIA, there cannot be any National Assemblyman who dares to take up that matter. Schools also seem to be quiet with the new school year begun. But, in colleges and universities, there is smoldering discontent with the fact that only the government can express an opinion about the North-South problems. So, surveillance over schools has been further intensified. This may be attributed to the spring season, in which resistance activities are launched frequently, but it may also be a precautionary oppression for Mr. Carter's visit to the ROK. At Seoul National University, this happened. All students who wanted to join circle activities were ordered to submit to the school authorities their pictures and resumes. Because of this, not a single one remains now out of the forty-three circles existing until then. The school authorities are joyous, believing that its plan worked, but, others fear that all of them might have gone underground.

Yonsei University scheduled the mid-term examinations in spring, saying spring should be a season for study. But students protested and it was withdrawn. At Koryo University, 10 students were arrested for planning a demonstration against Carter's proposed visit, but all but one were released. The remaining one was tried in a summary court. And the trial date happened to be 16 March, the day the demonstration was originally scheduled, and the defendant requested that he be allowed to read out a statement. The judge then hurriedly sentenced him to 29 days and declared the court adjourned.

While surveillance and oppression are going on at schools this way, buying-up campaigns are being launched widely against the students. When the CIA or police fails in handing money to students, the money then is delivered often through the hands of the school authorities in the form of scholarship. A practice like this is being applied also for those engaged in the democratization movement. While oppression goes on, some positions are being offered for the purpose of soothing. During the current semester, two of the dismissed professors, who had been ostracized, were allowed to

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return to their universities. Measures like this were taken in order to show that such a generous action may be taken any time when a dismissed professor behaves well and keeps quiet. It is said that some of those in the democratization movement were offered positions as advisers to the Seoul Municipal Government, but that they rejected the offer.

Meanwhile, a controversy has arisen over forcing young political offenders, who finished their prison sentences and were released, into active military service. In fact some of these young men have already been pressed into military service. According to the military conscription law, anyone sentenced to six months or longer or had such a sentence suspended is exempted from active service or even reserve corps. But, the government authorities do not allow them to return to college, and are trying to force them into military service, without restoring their civil rights. This is not only to separate them in the military for three years, but also torture them in harshest training and tours of duties. Against this, the young people are resisting unceasingly. They demand that, if they are to be drafted into military service at all, they should be dropped from the list of conscripts, be returned to school, and then be drafted. The armed forces in the ROK are simply a means to retain political power. Military training is forced on high school and college students. As soon as they enter colleges, they have their heads shaved immediately, are subjected to harsh ten-day training. This is a kind of brain washing and intimidation. What creative force in the world can grow under such a terror rule?

As for the labor disputes going on these days, one can cite the YH Trading Company Incident. It is quite amazing that this incident was reported in the newspapers. The company unilaterally gave out a public notice of its closing as of 30 April. So, about 500 workers are supposed to have begun a sit-in demonstration. The president of the company fled to the United States, taking 3 million dollars worth of goods with him, and consequently, the company was driven to bankruptcy. It is very strange that such a demonstration of workers was allowed to be reported by the press. This company exported wigs and textile products. Despite the public notice of bankruptcy, the bank which is said to have advanced loans to the tune of 4 billion won to this company has not done anything about the situation and just kept silence. No attempts have been made to let the bank take charge of the company's property or to sell the company to a new owner. But, when 470 workers staged a strike, a mobile police unit raided them, manhandling female workers injuring 200. Eighty of them were fairly seriously injured and five were hospitalized with serious injuries. One worker is still in coma. This happened on 13 April. The workers' sit-in is still continuing.

It is generally believed that the incident broke out at the YH Trading Co. because the union activities of female workers had been quite intense in this company. In 1977, the labor union of the P'yonghwa market was destroyed. In 1978 there was the Tongil Textile Company incident, and in

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1975 the YH Trading incident occurred. In this way, they are destroying one by one all of the hotbeds of union activities. The actual method employed varied. In the case of the P'yonghwa market, the workers' classroom was closed and the female workers who had defied the closing and Madama Yi So-son, who was respected by these workers as their mother, were thrown into jail, thus, pulling down the foothold of the union activities. At the Tongil Textile Co. they caused the feces and urine incident in which 126 workers were dismissed. And, then came the YH Trading's public notice of closing business. In the meantime, in an effort to seal off activities of the Korean Industrial Mission, they threw the affiliated ministers into jail and launched oppression. It seems likely that the CIA now believes that the mission is beyond recovery.

Thus, in the end, the arm of oppression is reaching the Christian Academy. This organization, aided by West German churches, nurtures intermediate groups under a long-range plan with the motto of freedom, equality, and humanization. So, the organization is also engaged in the education of workers and farmers. The incident involving this organization began on 1 March, when the officer in charge of the social problems of women was arrested. More than 25 people were either arrested, detained, or taken to police stations. Six members of the Academy staff and a scholar who was doing research on rural problems were arrested. Among those who were taken to police stations were the Rev. Kang Won-yong, director of the academy, and some branch heads of labor unions.

The oppression of the Christian Academy began when the Pak regime came to have a sense of crisis stemming from educating farmers and workers. This is a manifestation of the Pak regime's determination to root out and destroy even such undertakings. Before cooking up this case, the CIA continued to intimidate church people telling them that the church should keep silent toward the incident, because it was a major spy case, a case involving ideology. A friend of mine who is familiar with the details of the history of the incident told me as follows:

"Husband of Han Myong-suk, who was arrested first, is in prison serving a 15-year sentence for his involvement in the Revolutionary Party for Reunification case in 1968. The authorities arrested Han in an attempt to fabricate charges of rebuilding the RPR, but it did not work. Then they tried to cook it up as a plot for internal disturbance. They tried to accuse the Academy staff of plotting to overthrow the government and if successful, to establish a workers and farmers regime, to be headed by the Rev. Kang Won-yong. This was because for an incident to be in violation of the National Security Law, there must be a plan for forming a power structure following the success of an internal disturbance plot. But, again, it did not look convincing. So, it seems that they are now planning to fabricate another case and link it to the academy. This tantamount to fabricate another People's Revolutionary Party case. They arrested Professor Pak Hyon-ch'ae who specializes in rural problems, and are trying to

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link him to those aged people who had been involved in the "Minjok Ilbo" case of 1961 immediately after the Pak Chong-hui's coup d'etat. Thus, at least six persons were arrested, and some say that these include those who were involved in the People's Party for Revolution case. In this way, by linking them to the PPR case, they are trying to allege that these people are related to the academy's education of farmers. The PPR case, which in 1964, was revealed to have been trumped up, is thus returning like a ghost again and again. On 9 April 1975, eight people were suddenly executed who were involved in the Democratic Youth-Student League case. Now they are trying to revive the PPR this April, a season for resistance.

The Pak regime, feeling uneasy about its dictatorship, is now making a scapegoat of innocent people again in order to stay in power. If they are being charged with plotting internal disturbance, a violation of the National Security Law, there is no knowing when they may or may not be executed. No one knows their whereabouts. Some say that they are being interrogated at the Police Headquarters, but probably like the people executed in 1975, they are being tortured to the extent that their appearance will change. They are probably trying these people to admit the charges fabricated by the CIA, by subjecting them to unbearable physical and mental pains. My friend went on:

"When the church leaders called on him in connection with this incident, the deputy director of the CIA told them that the staff members of the academy had read subversive literature. This represents very weak evidence. It is said that the academy staff had in their possession books entitled "Korean Women's Reader" which was widely read right after the [1945] liberation, and "Social Reformers" in English. Among the books in English, there were books by Marx and Lenin, and the pages of the Communist Manifesto were torn off, and in addition, they had some North Korean pamphlets, but these cannot be substantiated. Also, they are supposed to have listened to radio broadcasts from North Korea. All this evidence cited have now power of persuasion, just like those cited in the fabricated cases. The CIA's objective is to propagandize the point that church affiliated organizations are infiltrated by the communists. It is trying to put a red label on the democratization movement, farmers' movement, and labor movement of the churches and to keep the people away from them. When they escort those engaged in the labor and union movements sponsored by churches and of the academy to the police, they intimidate them by linking them with spies and communists. In a climate like this, no wholesome movement can grow up. This is an utterly barren era, and barren soil."

In reality, none of those arrested or detained had received instructions from the north, or had attempted to organize an underground party. The CIA fears that the church people may take a tough stand because of this, and say that the Christian Academy is not involved in this incident at all. It may have taken international reaction into consideration. The director of the CIA, who was formerly a CIA Minister in Japan, publicly stated to

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the church people that there were scandals among the male and female staffers of the academy. By raising moral questions, they were trying to have the church detach itself from the case; it is a dirty trick. With a sigh my friend went on:

"Those presently implicated in this are all good people. They are conscientious and virtuous. They are trying to make shameless persons of these people. This is their usual means when they know the church people are weak on this matter. They are also making virtueless people of these patriots. In the Reading Club case, even if you charge them with a violation of Article 4 of the Anti-Communist Law, the maximum penalty is only seven years for acting in concert with an anti-state organization. So they are spreading propaganda that these people are communists and shameless resources. These people may well harbor some ideas which can be regarded as socialism. It may be true that they tried to nurture the strength of the masses. Any such acts are interpreted as communist-oriented as far as the Pak regime is concerned, and the people involved are communists and impure elements. Because of this ignorant and terroristic government, the ordeals of these conscientious people will continue endlessly. It may be that the CIA is wishing to trump up the charges as big as possible."

When the Christian Academy movement became relatively successful, there followed this crackdown. To the Pak regime, the discontent of workers and farmers create unbearably uneasy feelings. What with the Iranian situation, the Pak government feels terrified in its heart in the face of an alliance of religion and the masses. There is no knowing what terrible charges are going to be trumped up during the one month before those arrested may be brought to a trial. Depending on the situation, this case may be used as a means of oppression at home before Carter's visit to Korea. The Pak regime will never be able to ignore those watchful eyes of the people overseas being kept on this matter.

After the academy case, what fabrication next? The Friday Prayer Society and the Galilee Church may also be wrecked. In any event, because of the cruel determination of the Pak regime, mass movements will become increasingly unproductive, while the good people who placed their hope on them will surely be subjected to unbearable sufferings and darkness. The situation will worsen in which those intellectuals who want to deal with the North-South problems from an objective and national point of view will be labeled as communists. The only thing which the Pak regime is concerned in connection with the North-South issue is the political effect it needs to oppress the masses. To this end, what the Pak regime wants most are the likes of the meeting with President Carter and the so-called summit talks between North and South Korea. The Pak regime believes that these are most effective in oppressing and deceiving the people.

The ROK people will be further divided under the slogans of economic development, independent national defense, and anti-communism. This is an era of out-and-out insanity, in which the poor people are regarded as mobs

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and the democrats are regarded as crazy people. But, the climate is such that the truly insane people harboring these insane notions can call themselves the most patriotic and most reasonable. World powers, including Japan, the United States and Europe, will probably go along with this. It may be that the more dollars the Pak regime earns in places like the Middle East, by imposing those harsh working conditions, the more prominent this tendency becomes. This is an era of decadence. Will the terrors of the Pak regime continue to survive for the time being in the midst of this history of insanity?

Letter of Request from Mr. Kim Tae-chung

To: Cardinal Kim Su-hwan, Seoul Diocese

(Copy to: Mr. Mun Ch'ang-chun, Chairman of the Catholic Committee on Justice and Peace)

To: The Rev Kim Kwan-sok, President, Council of the Christian Churches.

Copy to: The Rev Cho Nam-ki, Chairman, Human Rights Committee of the Council)

I pray that you always enjoy excellent health with the grace of the Lord.

What I wish to inform you about is the fact that my human rights and those of my family are being violated illegally, and no resolution has been arrived at no matter how much I protest. In particular, we have been under house arrest since March 1, and we are not even free to communicate with the outside world, let alone go out. I hereby note details of these facts to bring them to your attention. I would be happy if you, my brothers under the Lord, render special cooperation in settling this matter.

Note

I. Facts of Infringement Upon Human Rights

1. Surveillance. Following my release from prison on 27 December, 1978, several watch posts were built around my house, and a 24-hour surveillance has been on for the movements in the house as well as the people coming in and going out of the house. I am also aware of the fact that the watch posts are equipped with field glasses, radios, movie cameras, and several cars.

2. Trailing and Wiretapping. Whenever I and my wife go out, one or two cars of the intelligence agency follow us, and all our telephone conversations are being monitored.

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3. Intimidation and Buying Off Schemes. Visitors to my house are intimidated either prior to the visit or after the visit to stop either the current visit or future contacts, and attempts are made to buy off visitors or just intimidate them.

4. House Arrest. Finally, since 1 March we have been forcibly placed under illegal house arrest.

(1) For the 15 out of the 26 days, from 1 March to present, I was under house arrest. (2) The police authorities of our district not only failed to provide the legal grounds of the house arrest but also acknowledged the illegality of it. And yet, they have been enforcing it on the pretext of "orders from above". (3) At first, the police tried to justify the house arrest by citing Paragraph 1, Article 2 of the Regulations Governing the Protection and Observation of Parolees. It was made clear later that this provision means that "when anything abnormal is detected on the behaviors of the subject, that must be reported to the public prosecutor immediately," and that the provision does not allow the police to exercise any right to enforcement actions. Thus the police at last acknowledged the illegal nature of the house arrest. Especially, there is no question that it is illegal to place my wife under house arrest, or to prohibit the people in general from visiting my house. (4) In enforcing the house arrest, there have been frequent over-mobilization. Sometimes, over 100 persons in seven or eight vehicles including buses, were mobilized, and often the passage of passers-by are prohibited, with some vehicles always blocking our garage. (5) In a nutshell, my house has become a prison already, and if this situation continues, I would rather be placed in prison again. Above all, I feel sorry for those people around us. The peace of our home has been lost completely and there are some members of my family who are suffering from mental or physical illnesses brought on by tension. (6) Furthermore, the police do not allow normal religious activities for me or my wife including going to church on Sundays. My wife was not even allowed to attend her mother's memorial service held for the family on the 24th.

II. Appeal for Settlement

I will leave everything to you, requesting that you take the most appropriate action. In addition, it is respectfully requested that the human right organization of your church take the following actions in particular on my behalf:

1. Legal Action. All these illegal actions are perpetrated jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the police. Therefore, when you sue, please make direct your action against the persons in charge of these two.

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2. Protest. Please request that the organs concerned take action immediately to put an end to the illegal situation. If this is not done, please request that I be imprisoned again.

I would be grateful if you make this letter of mine public and widely disseminate it.

26 March, 1979.

Kim Tae-chung (Seal)

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S.KOREA/MILITARY AFFAIRS

ROK WARSHIPS LIKELY TO BE PERMITTED TO VISIT JAPANESE PORTS

Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 27 Jul 79 p 2

[Daily summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo]

[Text] Seoul, 26 Jul, Special Correspondent Shinohara--At the 26 July press conference, JDA Director General Yamashita revealed that he was asked by ROK National Defense Minister No, "Will an ROK [Navy] training squadron be permitted to call at a Japanese port when it starts on a long distance cruise"? The director conveyed his intention to welcome it. According to a source accompanying Yamashita, the ROK had for a long time hoped for a training squadron to call at a Japanese port. In the summer of last year, the ROK sounded out [Japan's intention] on the problem of having such a squadron call at Sasebo on its way home from the U.S. But reportedly the plan was not realized because of the Japanese circumstances. In view of the fact that Director General Yamashita has promised National Defense Minister No to approve a training squadron to call at a Japanese port, the same source accompanying the director general thinks that ROK warships' stop-over in Japan may be realized next year.

According to Director General Yamashita, National Defense Minister No stated that he will welcome a Japanese training squadron to call at an ROK port. Yamashita's reply, "I will study it in a forward-looking way." Thus, the possibility is strong that there will be mutual visits by training squadrons between Japan and the ROK as a part of the proposed strengthening of defense-level exchange between the two countries.

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S. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

BRIEFS

SAUDIS TRAINING KOREANS--Intensive military training is being given, by the Saudi Arabian Army, to 100,000 Koreans who are employed by Abu Dhabi.
[Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 24 Aug 79 p 78]

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S. KOREA/FOREIGN TRADE

JAPAN-ROK-USSR TRADE TO BE REALIZED WITH MITSUBISHI AS INTERMEDIARY

Tokyo THE NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 11 Jun 79 p 1

[Text] Mitsubishi Corporation (President Bunichiro Tanabe) has decided to embark on a three-way trade arrangement with the Soviet Union and South Korea, which have no diplomatic relations. This became possible because Mitsubishi was under strong pressure from powerful South Korean companies, and also because the Soviet Union considers that there are no special problems with regard to where goods are purchased. For the time being, types of goods and the amount of money will probably be very limited, but in due course Mitsubishi hopes to serve as a commercial base for the three-way trade.

When Mitsubishi Corporation sounded out the Soviet Union on exports of South Korean goods to the Soviet Union, the Soviet stance was: "There will be no problem where we purchase goods because we are going to buy Japanese goods." Mitsubishi also considers that there will be no problem with goods which are handled solely as Japanese goods.

Nevertheless, it is certain that goods marked "made in Korea" are not desirable; therefore, South Korea will probably sell them under the name of original equipment manufacturer (OEM).

Up to now, goods exported from South Korea are mostly textiles. Soviet exported goods are mainly marine products and processed marine products, but coal and steel sought by the ROK will likely be excluded because they are considered strategic goods.

It is not unlikely that the volume of transactions will grow quickly in this three-way trade because of Soviet consideration for North Korea, but now that Mitsubishi, which had been rather passive toward the three-way trade, has begun to launch into it, the three-way trade with the USSR and the ROK is seen as finally starting to move forward.

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N. KOREA/MILITARY AFFAIRS

DPRK, ROK NAVAL FORCES COMPARED

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese Jun 79 pp 34-42

[Article by Kimio Aotani, military analyst: "The ROK Navy and the DPRK Navy"]

[Text] The Korean Peninsula, surrounded on three sides by water, can be said to have a very long coastline for its land area (219,000 square kilometers).

The eastern seacoast is comparatively regular and is about 1,729 kilometers long. The western and southern coasts are very irregular. The western coast extends about 4,718 kilometers and the southern coast is about 2,244 kilometers long. The combined length of the seacoast is 8,691 kilometers.

Scattered beyond this long seacoast are 3,962 islands of various sizes, large and small. Furthermore, these islands are numerous on the western and southern coasts where there are many irregularities.

When the Korean Peninsula was divided into North and South at the 38th parallel on 15 August 1945, the result was that the South, like a reduced version of the Korean Peninsula, was left surrounded on three sides by water and possessing many islands and a very long coastline compared to North Korea.

Since these geographic conditions presented many difficulties for naval defense, the South began to build its navy before the North. The South began to build a navy the year it was liberated. It was not until July of the year following liberation that the North began building its naval forces.

Thus, with help from the United States or the PRC and Soviet Union, the navies of the ROK and the DPRK have developed through many changes until today, and although they are small, they are respectable naval forces responsible for naval defense, ship escorts, protection of fishing vessels and so forth.

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1. Current Status of ROK and DPRK Naval Forces

Both the ROK and the DPRK are said to be basically oriented toward ground forces and it seems that the construction of their navies seems to lag behind that of the army or the air force.

The current status of their naval forces is as shown in Chart I.

CHART I

Current Status of ROK and DPRK Naval Forces

	ROK	DPRK
Total Troop Strength:	642,000	512,000
Breakdown of Troop Strength:		
Army:	560,000	440,000
Navy:	50,000 (20,000 marines)	30,300
Air Force:	30,000	45,000
Total Vessels:	118	435
Total Tonnage:	83,400 tons	58,300 tons
Major Vessels:		
Destroyers:	9	0
Escort Vessels:	7	3
Submarines:	0	(4 "W" Class 15 (kk "R" Class (10 "Komar" 18 (Class (8 "Osa" Class
Missile Patrol Vessels:	8	18 (Class (8 "Osa" Class
Subchasers:	6	16
Torpedo Gunboats:	34	303
Large and Medium Minesweepers:	8	0
Small Minesweepers:	1	0
Landing Craft:	8	0
Landing Ships:	13	70
Naval Aircraft	23 (S-2) Antisub- marine Patrol Planes Several helicopters	0

(Note) Based on Military Balance 78-79 and JANE'S NAVAL YEARBOOK 78-79.

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By looking at this chart, the first thing which can be said is that for both North and South, naval troop strength constitutes only about six percent of total troop strength (for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force it is 15.7 percent) and, as stated above, the building of the navy lags behind and is far out of balance with that of the army and air force.

Secondly, the ROK Navy has the greater tonnage despite the fact that it has a small number of vessels, but the DPRK Navy has rather low tonnage compared to its large number of vessels.

The average tonnage per ROK vessel is 710 tons and the average tonnage per DPRK vessel is a small scale 134 tons. That is to say, the ROK Navy is composed mainly of comparatively large ships while the DPRK Navy is made up mainly of small types of vessels.

In other words, one can say that while the ROK Navy has ocean-going types of vessels, the DPRK Navy has coastal types. Thirdly, from the viewpoint of different types of vessels, the DPRK Navy possesses submarines, which the ROK Navy does not have. Moreover, the DPRK Navy is composed mainly of high-speed missile craft and torpedo gunboats.

From the viewpoint of effectiveness, these could be said to be mainly used for surprise attacks.

In contrast, the ROK Navy possesses mainly destroyers which generally have anti-aircraft, submarine and ship capabilities and it also possesses, on the average, tactical capabilities for patrolling, mining tactics, amphibious operations and so forth. However, because of their comparatively large size, these vessels cannot turn quickly, and they have the additional disadvantage of being few in number. This also seems to be the reason for a calling for a build-up of small, high-speed vessels to counter the DPRK Navy.

The point is related to point three. Since the ROK Navy does not possess submarines, it does have naval air units composed mainly of antisubmarine patrol planes as a means of counteracting submarines. Furthermore, because of the geographical conditions mentioned above, the ROK Navy has marine units for defense of its many large and small islands.

In particular, the island of Paengnyongdo and the other islands of the so-called "five West Sea islands," which are close to DPRK territory and are far from ROK territory, are in the ROK Navy's defense zone.

From this point of view, it would seem that the navies of the two countries in their current state were organized by giving direct expression to the geographical conditions of their environments and the strategic intentions arising from those conditions.

However, except for the most recently constructed vessels, the naval craft of both the North and South are growing obsolete. For example, the DPRK's

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submarines date from the 1950's and the destroyers which are the main strength of the ROK Navy are said to be already 30 years old. The equipment of the two navies is also said to be generally growing obsolete.

Nevertheless, although both navies have their respective strengths and weaknesses, it would seem that in the overall perspective the DPRK Navy is somewhat superior to the ROK Navy.


2. Command Structure and Organization in the Two Navies

Command structure and organization of the ROK and DPRK navies is as shown in charts 2 and 3, respectively. Here, too, just as in the preceding paragraphs, various characteristics of the respective navies can be seen.

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Chart II

Command Organization of the ROK Navy



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
Chart III

Command Organization of the DPRK Navy

Minister of the People's Armed Forces

Chief of General Staff

Commander of the Navy



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Looking first at the ROK Navy we see that all of its naval power is subordinated to Fleet Headquarters, several groups or squadrons have been formed for the different types of vessels, and these are also part of a composite naval force which is subordinate to a joint U.S. and ROK Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters is located at Chinhae.

Next there are the marines. Previously these troops had been under the unified command of a Marine Corps Commander who was under the command of the Naval Chief of General Staff; however, as part of a simplification of the structure, Marine Corps Headquarters was dissolved on 10 October 73 and the structure was revised so that the Naval Chief of Staff commands directly.

For this reason, one of the two deputy chiefs of the general staff who assist the chief of general staff, is specially charged with marine corps matters.

The ROK naval air units are made up of S-2 anti-submarine patrol planes and helicopters. Several years ago these were transferred from the Air Force to form "a navy with wings" in name as well as fact.

Regional Naval Headquarters were established on the basis of the "Law on Naval Bases" which was revised on 31 December 1973. It is possible to see this as further strengthening of the functions of the former defense office.

That is, the law stipulates, "Tactical bases, including forward bases and radar bases, shall be established as tactical bases to support military supply and naval tactics in the various naval zones, and regional naval headquarters shall be located at tactical bases."

Previously, the names "defense bases," "defense office," and "naval defense" had been used, and the terminology and the mission was expanded to "naval tactics."

It is not known how many naval regions have been delineated but probably the division is about the same as when the defense office existed. Also, with regard to the actual units needed for naval operations, on the basis of the function and characteristics of the naval regions, the required naval ships are dispatched by fleet headquarters, to be under the regional command.

Thus, the vessels which have been dispatched carry out missions such as patrol of oceans, protection of fishing boats, defense against the DPRK's fast attack craft or carry out operations to resupply five islands in the West Sea [Yellow Sea] and other places.

The Control Office is the entity which manages Chinhae military port, the operational base of the ROK naval fleet. Located here are not only the fleet headquarters but also many organizations related to the navy such as educational organizations and supply facilities. The Control Office is charged with rear support, legal and managerial control for these entities.

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On the other hand, in the DPRK Navy, Naval Headquarters is not able to exercise a unified command over the entire fleet because of the North's special geographical characteristics. Consequently, the DPRK is divided broadly into Eastern and Western fleets and there are several individual bases under the command of the respective fleet headquarters. To each of the bases are assigned a torpedo squadron, a defense squadron and other units. The units are made up of several individual formations and the formations are composed of several vessels.

The zones of responsibility of the individual bases are not known.

3. Major Dispositions

As stated above, Fleet Headquarters exercises unified command over the ROK Navy and dispatches ships as required by mission to the command of regional naval headquarters. Consequently, the disposition of the ROK Navy is not always fixed. However, judging from geographical conditions of the environment and the frequency with which naval hostilities have occurred in the past, one would think that more emphasis is placed on the western coast than on the eastern coast.

Furthermore, about 5,000 marines are stationed in the five West Sea [Yellow Sea] Islands, mainly on Paengnyongdo. A landing brigade is stationed on the Kimp'o peninsula and a landing division is stationed behind the eastern coast at P'ohang. Thus, the marines are in strategic readiness. Furthermore, it seems that, as in the past, about a company of marines is stationed along with Navy personnel at each regional naval headquarters.

In contrast to the disposition of the ROK Navy, it seems that the DPRK has placed somewhat more weight on the eastern coast in the disposition of its navy. This can be seen in the Pueblo incident of January 1968 and in the downing of the EC 121 in April of the following year.

Beginning in August 1977, the DPRK established a 200-mile maritime economic zone on its Japan Sea side and went on to set up a military warning zone, a rarity world-wide, which is a military sea boundary within the economic zone extending 50 miles from a direct baseline.

Furthermore, within the last several years the DPRK has moved its disposition forward by completely converting Sagot-ri and Haeju on the west coast and Changjon on the east coast which had been forward bases and by increasing naval vessels.

These indications, as was mentioned earlier, may be taken to mean that the DPRK Navy suggests plainly the possibility of a surprise attack.

Certainly, one has to say that even though the DPRK Navy is small, it is dangerous and not to be taken lightly.

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Chart 4 is a map showing the disposition of major bases of both ROK and DPRK navies.

4. Characteristics of the Two Navies

In addition to the special characteristics stated above, the ROK and DPRK navies have the characteristics given below.

The ROK Navy:

- 1) Gained combat experience by sending marines and ships into the war in Vietnam;
- 2) Gives each year the graduates of its Naval Academy experience on the ocean by sending them for 2 to 3 months on a long distance training cruise to the United States, South America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East;
- 3) Has raised the level of its training by carrying out landing, anti-submarine and mining exercises jointly with the United States Navy and Marines several times a year.

In contrast, the DPRK Navy has no long distance training cruises nor does it conduct joint exercises with navies of other nations which would correspond to the ROK navy's training.

Nevertheless, the DPRK navy has its own special characteristics which the ROK Navy does not have.

- 1) The DPRK Navy has stationed shore batteries at points on its eastern and western coasts. It has also deployed shore to ship (Samlet) missiles and thereby hopes to have complete coastal defenses.

In January 1967 the ROK Naval vessel PC56 was sunk off the DPRK's eastern coast; it was sunk by the DPRK's shore batteries.

In the ROK, the army is mainly in charge of this sort of coastal defense.

- 2) As stated above, for the past several years, the DPRK has been pushing its bases forward, and in its most forward bases it has constructed anchorages in caves to protect them from enemy attack and hide them from reconnaissance by satellite, etc. It can be said that this could be possible only if the DPRK vessels are small types.

- 3) In addition, political education in the DPRK Navy is carried out thoroughly by organizations of the Political [Committee] to the same extent that it is carried out in the army and air force.

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4. Auxiliary Naval Strength of the ROK and DPRK

In this context auxiliary naval strength is like that of Japan's Maritime Safety Agency or merchant ships and so forth, which can be used directly as naval strength in time of emergency. It also refers either to the unique naval reserve force of the ROK and the DPRK or to the [DPRK's] naval Red Worker--Peasant Militia.

Let us look first at the ROK.

First there is the "Maritime Police Force" which is equivalent to Japan's Maritime Safety Agency. This is under the Headquarters of National Police of the Ministry of Home Affairs. It has a total of over 900 members, possesses about 20 vessels, and its headquarters are in Pusan.

Prior to restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the ROK, when Japanese fishing boats were seized from time to time, the seizures were made by this Maritime Police (which at the time was called the "Coast Guard").

Secondly, the ROK has its naval reserve. This was formed with people involved in coastal fisheries, along with the formation of a local reserve force on land on 1 April 1968. Its strength, however, is not known.

Thirdly, the ROK has merchant ships. According to JANE'S NAVAL YEARBOOK 1978-79, the ROK has more than 1,000 such vessels and a total tonnage of over 2.49 million tons, and there it may be possible that this will gradually increase in the future.

Next we have the DPRK Navy.

First, the DPRK has the Naval Red Worker-Peasant Militia which is made up of coastal fishermen. It is already known that North Korean fishing boats are armed with machine guns, etc. The fact that the (P'yongsin-cu) (146 tons), which came to Shimonoseki seeking asylum on 17 September 1966 was armed with machine guns, automatic small arms and hand grenades, is fresh in our memory. The strength of this force, however, is not known.

Secondly, the DPRK has the vessels, under the control of the Liaison Department of the Korean Workers Party, operating against Japan and the ROK. These operational vessels are very small and weigh only about 40 to 80 tons, but they have extremely high speed and are armed with machine guns, recoilless rifles, etc. These boats, disguised as fishing boats, operate in the dead of night by approaching the South Korean or Japanese coasts and they unload or take back guerrillas and operative agents.

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There are said to be some tens of these craft and they seem to be based at Chongjin, Wonsan and Namp'o.

Finally, there are the DPRK's merchant ships. Compared to the ROK, the DPRK has very few merchant ships. According to JANE'S NAVAL YEARBOOK 1978-79, the DPRK has 19 merchant ships with a total tonnage of about 90,000 tons. As is evident in Premier Kim Il-song's New Year speech and in the budget report to the Supreme People's Assembly, this figure, too, can be expected to become gradually larger.

6. Trends in the ROK and DPRK navies

At the beginning of the 1970's, in order to counter the fast missile patrol boats and fast ships of the DPRK, the ROK began building its own fast patrol boats and introduced and equipped itself with anti-ship missiles from the West.

On the other hand, beginning in the 1970's the DPRK began to build and commission escort ships and submarines.

Judging from this trend, it seems that the ROK Navy will tend toward gradual reduction in the size of its ships, while the DPRK Navy will gradually move toward larger vessels.

However, JANE'S NAVAL YEARBOOK 1978-1979 reports that the ROK Navy has one escort ship under construction and construction of three more vessels is being planned. If this is true the ROK Navy would not at all seem to be tending toward smaller ships.


It would seem that because of the demands of the era, i.e., for the sake of naval defense which is of ever increasing importance because of establishment of the 200-mile economic zone, the expansion of territorial seas and increased ocean going traffic, accompanying expansion of trade with foreign countries, both the ROK and DPRK Navies will continue to be built up but will retain a balance between large and small craft.

In particular, the pattern would be for submarines which are now lacking in the ROK Navy to be introduced in the next 2 or 3 years. If this is realized, it would seem safe to say that a long term aspiration of the ROK Navy will have been achieved.

However, the ROK Navy which has to defend longer coastline than North Korea seems to be quantitatively one step behind the DPRK Navy. Rectification of this situation is the pressing task of the ROK Navy. The DPRK Navy, however, will not ignore this, and the question is how long this see-saw game can actually continue.

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- (1) Changsan'got
- (2) Paengnyongdo
- (3) Taechongdo
- (4) Sochongdo
- (5) Kirindo
- (6) Changnindo
- (7) Ongjin
- (8) Sunwido
- (9) Haeju
- (10) Yongmaedo
- (11) Taeyonpyongdo
- (12) Soyonpyongdo
- (13) Udo



Area and Population (End of 1972)

Island Name	Area (km ²)	Population	Households
Paengnyongdo	45.6	8,674	591
Taech'ongdo	12.6	2,233	403
Sochongdo	2.9	158	
Taeyonpyongdo	6.2	2,431	472
Soyonp'yongdo			
Udo	very small	0	0

Slightly smaller than Japan's (Miyake Island)

1. Shortest distance between Paengnyongdo and North Korea and Inchon:

- (1) 14 kilometers to Changsan'got in North Korea
- (2) 180 kilometers to Inchon in South Korea

1. Shape of Paengnyongdo:

- (1) 12 to 13 kilometers east to west; 15 kilometers north to south; covered mostly by mountains 50 to 100 meters in height; almost no streams.
- (2) Beaches which when dry become as hard as concrete and can be used as a natural landing strip.

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N. KOREA/MILITARY AFFAIRS

ARTICLE DISCUSSES POLICIES, CONDITIONS IN KPA

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese Jul 79 pp 68-75

[Article by Kimio Aotani, military researcher: "Kim Il-song's Private Army: Korean People's Army"]

[Text] I. Society That Places Kim Il-song's Teachings as the Priority.

Presently, North Korea is vigorously calling to dye the entire society with Kim Il-song's "chuche thought."

That thought is now regarded as "the encyclopedic thought which can boldly overcome any existing principles and notions," and it is regarded to be "absolute and unconditional."

Accordingly, "the teachings of Kim Il-song" are something of supra-legal nature, and they take precedence over all things.

Still more, when it comes to "the Korean People's Army" which is called "the Party's army" or even "Kim Il-song's army", needless to say things are done according to the thinking and instruction of Kim Il-song.

Having these things in mind, I would like to examine the reality of the military system of North Korea.

II. Military Service System.

"The Socialist Constitution" of North Korea promulgated in December, 1972 extols the people's duty to defend the fatherland in the following manner:

"The defense of the fatherland is the utmost duty and honor of the citizens. The citizen must defend the fatherland and must serve in the military according to the provisions of law." (Article 72) The compulsory military service is thus explicitly stated. Furthermore, it is determined that "all citizens aged 17 years and above shall have the right to vote and the right to be elected. The citizens serving in the military shall have the right to vote and the right to be elected." (Article 52) (In South Korea, it applies only to the right to vote from age 20.)

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According to the old constitution, the right to vote and the right to be elected were given at the age of 18, and "the regulations concerning the people's military service" proclaimed in 1956 also provided the ages of conscription and military call to be 18-25 years for peace time and 18-45 years for wartime. In reality, however, it appears that persons at the age of 20 were conscripted on the grounds that if extremely young people were enlisted in the army, its quality would go down. Later, due to tensions, the enlistment age was apparently lowered to age 18; but after the enactment of "the Socialist Constitution", it was thought to have been lowered to age 17.

According to the statement made by a soldier who defected to South Korea in 1977, the enlistment age was lowered even further, to age 16 from around 1975.

Article 29 of the constitution which prohibits child labor, stipulates that "the age that citizens can start to work is 16. Children who have not reached the working age are prohibited from working," and this may be the reason for lowering the age to 16. Sixteen is the age at which one graduates from the five-year higher middle school, and it is possible to think that conscription at age 16 as one form of cut-off point.

Soldiers thus conscripted are required to serve, according to "the regulations on military service in the People's Army," for 3 and a half years in the army and for 4 years in the navy and air force as the period of active duty. In reality, however, one cannot be discharged from the army unless he has served for 8-10 years, which is 2 to 3 times the stipulated length; and when it comes to personnel in the special services, it is customary to have an extension of 1 to 2 years in addition to that.

This sort of long-term service inevitably causes the aging of the troops, but one may also consider that this is necessary in order to convert the army into "a cadre army" in preparation for emergency stipulated by "the four major military policies" or to train the all-powerful soldiers capable of fighting a "one a match for a hundred" or a "one a match for a thousand" battle.

After completing this long-term service, persons who were discharged from the army at the ages of 25-28 must perform military service as the core of the Red Worker-Peasant Militia at reassigned working places until about age 45.

In regard to the conscription, the way North Korea conscripts officers from that of South Korea where the qualified persons who are of draft age are all drafted after the physical examination. In North Korea, 16-year-olds are called individually and are enlisted; later their service-status, branches of service, and assignments are determined on the basis of physical examination, ability and other considerations.

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However, the relatives of those who fled to South Korea, the sons of former landlords, or those who have recently returned from Japan are excluded from the designation of enlistment as "impure elements."

Also excluded from conscription are those technicians indispensable for economic construction, special personnel, or sons and brothers of important officials of the government and the party.

There are women's corps in the People's Army (said to be 30 percent of the total military force), but it is not clear whether the same conscription age and length of service apply to them.

III. Rank, Promotion System, and Retirement

North Korea calls rank "military title," and it has adopted a four-rank system. In promotion, "party loyalty" seems to have the highest priority.

(1) Rank (Military Title)

1. The rank of Marshal: Marshal, Vice Marshal
2. The General Officers: General, Colonel General, Lieutenant General, Major General
3. The Field Grade Officer: Senior Colonel, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major
4. The Company Grade Officer: Captain, Senior Lieutenant, Lieutenant, Junior Lieutenant
5. The Noncommissioned Officers: Master Sergeant, Senior Sergeant, Sergeant, Junior Sergeant
6. Soldiers: Private First Class, Private

Currently only Kim Il-song who is the supreme commander of the People's Armed Forces of North Korea is "Marshal"; Ch'oe Yong-kon who was considered as the number two man in North Korea used to be vice marshal, but now no one seems to hold that position after his death.

Usually, senior colonel and colonel are called "high ranking military officers," and other officers from lieutenant colonel down are called "military officers." Noncommissioned officers are at times called "primary level leaders," and those from master sergeant down are usually called "noncommissioned officers and privates."

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(2) Promotion

Promotion is given with various factors taken into consideration, such as the length of service, military service records, the nature of origin, and party life in the army, but in reality priority is given to party members. Specifically, it appears that promotion is given when vacancies are created at the upper ranking positions, and in actual practice the minimum required length of service for promotion is disregarded.

1. Promotion of Military Officers

As for promotion of military officers, it is done by advancing qualified persons when vacancies occur at the upper ranking positions of an organization; it is recommended through the chain of command and finally announced by the minister of the People's Armed Forces (the minister of defense) with the consent of the General Political Bureau after a documents review at the Bureau of Cadres of the General Staff.

Military titles from colonel above are conferred after being reviewed and conferred by the Central People's Committee.

As for the promotion of merit soldiers, a special promotion of 1 to 2 ranks can be given by the order of the minister of the People's Armed Forces through the decision of the Central People's Committee.

In the promotion of merit soldiers and political officers, there is no consideration given to such a thing as length of service.

The relationship between the military titles and the duties is as shown on the chart below.

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<u>Military Title</u>	<u>Duties and Functions</u>	
	<u>Commanding Position</u>	<u>Staff Position</u>
Jr Lieutenant	Platoon Commander	
Lieutenant	Vice Commander of Company	
Sr Lieutenant	Company Commander	Battalion Staff Officer
Captain	Commander of Independent Company	Battalion Chief of Staff, Section-Chief of the Regimental Staff
Major	Battalion Commander, Commander of DMZ Security Company	Regimental Staff Officer
Lt Colonel	Vice Commander of Regiment, Commander of Independent Battalion	Respective Section-Chiefs of the Regimental Staff, Staff-Personnel in Division
Colonel	Regimental Commander	Operational Section Chief Division
Sr Colonel	Vice Commander of Division	Division Chief of Staff, Staff-Personnel of Army Corps
Major General	Division Commander, Vice Commander of Army Corps	Staff Officer of General Staff
Lt General	The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Air Force, The Commander of Army Corps	Bureau-Chief of General Staff and Ministry of People's Armed Forces, Vice Chief of General Staff
Colonel General	Commander of Army Corps	Bureau-Chief of Ministry of People's Armed Forces, Vice Chief of General Staff
General	Minister of People's Armed Forces, Chief of General Staff	Chief of General Political Bureau

2. Promotion of Noncommissioned Officers and Privates

Although it is stipulated that the length of service for promotion from private to private first class is 2 years, almost no one seems to get promoted unless vacancies occur in the organization of the upper ranks. Thus, discontent is said to be rising because one must serve as a common private for 4-5 years.

The criteria of selection for promoting include: the nature of one's origin, strong party loyalty, dedication to the military service, and performance of core roles at given units. The designation is made by the battalion commander for the rank of private, by the regimental commander for sergeant and junior sergeant, by the division commander or the equivalent to senior sergeant and above.

Specifically, promotion for the ranks of sergeant and above is given in principle to those who have completed the noncommissioned officer's school, thus having the qualification of noncommissioned officer; but in special cases, promotion is given also to those who are able and have met all the political requirements. Conversely, no matter how excellent one's qualification and ability may be, he can be excluded from the subjects of promotion if there is even the smallest infraction of the political requirements.

3. Retirement

The retirement of military officers from colonel down is stipulated as follows, but it is unclear whether it is practiced as stipulated.

The age of 55 for colonel, 50 for lieutenant colonel, 45 for major, 40 for captain, 37 for senior lieutenant, and the age of 31 for lieutenant and junior lieutenant.

Again, it is not clear about the military officers from senior colonel and above, but the oldest person in the military at the present time is the 72 year-old General Ch'oe Hyon, a member of the Political Committee of the KWP, a member of the Central People's Committee, a vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, and the former minister of the People's Armed Forces.

IV. Remunerations and Supplies

(1) Remunerations

Remuneration consists of the basic salary and other supplementary pay and allowances, and a considerable disparity seems to exist between the well-paid top and the meagerly paid bottom. Although there is an opinion that a salary was increased after October, 1970, it is not yet confirmed. Shown below are, therefore, the salaries and supplementary pay prior to the time. (1 won is about 130 Japanese yen)

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1. The Basic Salary (in won). general=350, colonel general=280, lieutenant general=230, major general=180-200, senior colonel=150, colonel=110, lieutenant colonel=90, major=85, captain=75, senior lieutenant=70, lieutenant=65, junior lieutenant=60.

Master sergeant=7 (however, 50 for those in a long period of service), senior sergeant=5.6 (40 for long service), sergeant=4.2 (35 for long service), junior sergeant=2.8, private first class=1.8, private=1.4.

2. The Positional Salary. In North Korea, position has precedence over rank, and if one holds an upper ranking position, he is paid a salary commensurate with the position. For instance, should a junior lieutenant be appointed to the position of company commander, he would be paid the basic salary of senior lieutenant.

3. Military Title Stipend. It is paid only to the general military officers. It is paid with a difference of 2 won for each of the consecutive ranks. For example, 5 won for junior lieutenant, 7 won for lieutenant, and so forth, and it covers up to lieutenant colonel.

In lieu of this, a thing called "supplementary stipend for intelligence" seems to be paid to colonel and above.*

4. Service Allowance. As additional pay, 5 percent of the basic salary is paid to those who served 3 years or more, and 10 percent of the basic salary is paid to those who served 7 years or more.

5. Family Allowance. It is paid only to military officers. A uniform payment of 10 won is given regardless of the number of dependents.

6. As other allowances, special service allowance is paid to the members of tank crew, servicemen on the sea, and aircraft pilots; technical personnel allowance is paid to army surgeons, ship engineers, and the aircraft ground crew. The amount of these allowances is not clear.

(2) Supplies

The supply of the People's Army is based on the fixed quantity system and it is said to be administered with differentiation on the basis of rank and the branch of service, ranging from No 1 to No 17.

It is fixed at 700 grams a day for ordinary noncommissioned officers and privates, and even this is made of rice and miscellaneous grains in a 50-50 proportion. Furthermore, because a saving of 150-200 grams is forced

*Translator's note: In the original it is printed "below" instead of "above". It seems to be an error.

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on them in order to provide wartime emergency reserve, voracious young soldiers seem to have difficulty in filling their hungry stomachs. Also, as for supplementary foods, meat and vegetables are supposed to be produced at the supplementary work farm of each military unit. But because of production shortage, each unit can only manage to feed 200 grams or less of the staple food along with radish soup at each meal, and these conditions seem to produce an increasing number of persons suffering from malnutrition. It is reported that one can just barely taste meat, at best, once every 3-4 months.

Moreover, even though the main food is fixed at 700 grams a day, it varies according to the branches of service--in the case of light infantry unit, for example, the proportion between rice and miscellaneous grains is fixed at 7:3. The supply conditions that can be ascertained thus far (on the basis of rules and regulations) are shown below.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Amount of Main Food (g)</u>	<u>Amount of Calorie Intake</u>
1.	Private - Lt. Colonel	700	3,711
2.	Colonel - Sr. Colonel, Scouts	700	4,354
3.	Generals	770	4,992
4.	Aircraft Pilot		6,541
8.	Anti-South Political Operatives		
9.	Submarine Crew		6,691
10.	Tank Crew	800	4,754
12.	Member of DMZ Security Company	800	4,449

V. Services and Duties

(1) Daily Routine

The general daily routine of the People's Army in the summer is as shown below.

0500-0510 waking up/ 0510-0540 washing up and cleaning/ 0610-0620 morning roll call/ 0620-0710 breakfast/ 0720-0750 preparation for lesson/ 0800-0850 first lesson period/ 0900-0950 second lesson period/ 1000-1050 third lesson period/ 1100-1150 fourth lesson period/ 1200-1250 lunch/ 1300-1350 afternoon nap/ 1400-1450 fifth lesson period/ 1500-1550 sixth lesson period/ 1600-1650 seventh lesson period/ 1700-1750 eighth lesson period/ 1800-1920 caring of weapons and equipment/ 1920-2010 dinner/ 2020-2110 group cultural entertainment/ 2110-2140 free time/ 2140-2155 evening roll call/ 2200-0500 bed time.

This daily routine is said to be determined by the regimental commander on the basis of the situation of the unit, and in the winter time the afternoon nap is excluded, and the wake up time is also changed to 6 o'clock.

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Thus, reportedly, one is not allowed to neglect 1 minute or even 1 second from the time he gets up in the morning till the time he goes to bed at night. Notably, there are some seemingly favorable times such as "group cultural entertainment" or "free time" provided after the evening meal, but these are mostly applicable when general meetings of the Party or the Socialist Working Youth League are held, but the fact of the matter is the free time must be used to prepare for the next day, and there is not even any time to think about getting a pass.

According to a certain officer's statement: (1) it is common for the officers to stay up all night for duty, but the noncommissioned officers and privates can go to bed at 2200 since they have fewer meetings than the officers. However, because they too have watch-duties and others, their time for sleep is 4-5 hours a day on the average. (2) It would be a big mistake to think that one can at least relax on Sunday. Such things as "the day of assisting rural village," "the day of patriotic labor" are cleverly set up, and all the officers, noncommissioned officers and privates are mobilized 100 percent for group labor. (3) If there is ever a time to rest, it would be the once-in-a-month athletic game, in which one is obliged to attend either as an athlete or spectator. (4) After Kim Il-song gives an on-the-spot guidance, meetings will follow day and night for a week. (5) Most of the officers live in the barracks, and it is considered to be a lucky month if they get to sleep at home 2-3 days a month. These are the reports.

In this way, the daily routine is the continuation of tension, day after day, having no leeway even for a minute or a second.

(2) Pass and Furlough

According to "the instructional manual of internal regulations," there is a system of pass (reportedly there is no differentiation among the officers, and noncommissioned officers and privates), but it appears that none is practiced in reality. If the pass is ever used, it is used for going out of camp for official business. But even in this case, the noncommissioned officers and privates are reportedly never permitted to go out by themselves; they must always be accompanied by the officers.

Also, even though there are the following kinds of furlough, they do not appear to be practiced as stipulated; and it is considered to be good if one can have one of these once in 5-6 years.

1. Regular Furlough. Once a year, for 14 days excluding the time spent for the roundtrip.
2. Special Furlough. A 14-day leave is given when a member of his immediate family dies, excluding the time spent for the roundtrip.

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3. Commendation Furlough. A 15-day furlough given in the form or reward to those who accomplish meritorious services in battle, excluding the time spent for the roundtrip.

Although passes for these furloughs are issued under the name of commanding officers at the level of regimental commander and independent battalion commander or above, its procedures are reportedly extremely difficult. There are even cases where when one reached home on a special furlough, it was more than 20 days after the death, and the system appears to be becoming a source of discontent.

In order to eliminate even a small degree of discontent and complaints arising from such system of pass and furlough, "observation tour team" is organized to conduct a tour of the rear line once a year for the noncommissioned officers and privates and once in every 3 years for the officers.

This is not a leisurely sightseeing tour, however. Its purpose is to make them realize the correctness of the party policies after going through a pre-arranged course of factories and farms; it is thus done entirely as a means of political education.

(3) Discipline

Needless to say, there is a demand for strict discipline in the army of North Korea as in the armies of all countries. Particularly when it comes to "the army of Kim Il-song" and "the army of the Party", it is not necessary to restate that "the teachings of Kim Il-song" take priority more than they would in the general society.

At the 10th Plenum of the 5th Central Committee of the KWP held in the middle of February, 1975, Kim Il-song taught "the Five Major Teachings" in order to develop and strengthen the People's Army: 1. strong and tenacious revolutionary spirit; 2. surprising and skillful tactics; 3. iron-like physical strength; 4. 100 percent markmanship; 5. steel-like discipline, and demand to carry out "steel-like discipline."

Two and a half years later, at "the KPA Agitators' Conference" held on 30 November 1977, which was attended by more than 6,000 officers and enlisted men of the People's Army, once again demanding strict discipline, Kim Il-song presented "the 16 articles of oath to be observed by military servicemen of the People's Army" as shown below, and emphasized that the military men should be made to arm themselves strongly with the Party's church thoughts and its policies. It is comparable, in a sense, to the Five Articles of the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers in the former Japanese army.

First, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall always observe the military regulations thoroughly.

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Second, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall always have familiarity with their weapons and shall take excellent care of them.

Third, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall carry out military orders thoroughly under whatever circumstances.

Fourth, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall carry out without fail the duties assigned by the Party and political organizations.

Fifth, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall strictly guard the confidential information of the nation, military secrets and the organizational secrets of the Party.

Sixth, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall abide thoroughly by the socialist law and order of the nation.

Seventh, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall participate without fail in military and political trainings and shall enthusiastically learn therefrom.

Eighth, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall love the people and shall in no way encroach upon their properties.

Ninth, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall strive all-out for the protection and economization of national properties and military supplies.

Tenth, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall love their comrades much like their own brothers and shall establish completely good tradition of unity and solidarity among men from top to below within the army.

To carry out these "teachings of Kim Il-song", a round-the-clock vigilant attitude is firmly maintained without allowing a minute or even a second of free time.

Kim Il-song once said, "the People's Army is a school for communist education." Indeed, when one's behavior is restricted for 24 hours, it can be said that the People's Army is the best place for the theory and practice of communist education.

(4) Party Life in the Army

Within the People's Army, not being an exception from the practice of the armies of many socialist countries, there are "party organizations" and "the Socialist Working Youth League organizations." Politics takes priority and education of political ideology is equally emphasized in military training.

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It is currently known that 100 percent of the officers and 40 percent of the noncommissioned officers and privates are party members. Those who are not members of the Party are under obligation to join "the Socialist Working Youth League" or, if female, "the Women's Union."

Party members get privileged treatment in every respect. For this reason, the highest aspiration of the noncommissioned officers and privates from the moment of their enlistment in the army is, reportedly, to get a party-card by the time of their discharge from the army.

If one does not have a party-card, he can not be assigned to a good job, nor can he find a suitable marriage partner.

For this reason, party political activities are carried out with extreme vigor within the army. According to the case of a certain naval officer, the party meetings within the military seem to comprise the following 16 meetings:

1. The Party Cell General Meeting;
2. the Party Branch Organization Meeting;
3. the Primary level Party Meeting;
4. the Primary Level Party Committee Meeting;
5. the Base Party Standing Committee Meeting;
6. the Base Party Representatives Meeting;
7. the Base Party Activists' Meeting;
8. the Naval Headquarters Party Representatives Meeting;
9. the Naval Headquarters Party Activists' Meeting;
10. the Cell Committee Meeting;
11. the Cell Expanded Committee Meeting;
12. the Open Party General Meeting;
13. the Primary Level Party Expanded Meeting;
14. the Party Consultative Meeting;
15. the Party Members' Lecture Class;
16. the Revolutionary Tradition Research Seminar.

Besides these, when other types of meetings are included, the number of various types of meetings is said to total 37.

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder one collapses at the meetings.

Furthermore, one can not just remain silent and listen to others at these meetings; one must self-criticize his own behavior and remarks, as well as criticize the shortcomings of others. By doing so, he is considered to be a man of strong party loyalty.

Thus, it appears that something utterly unthinkable in the armies of the Western nations is being carried out vigorously.

Particularly when "the teachings of Kim Il'song" are newly presented, it is considered proper to hold all-night debates on how to carry them through, and to investigate the results day after day.

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VI. Rewards and Punishments

(1) Awards and Decorations

There are 3 types of awards and decorations: the title of honor, decoration, and commendation; and they are as shown in the table below.

<u>Classification</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Subjects, etc.</u>	<u>Privilege</u>
<u>Title of Honor:</u>			
<u>Group</u>	"Guard title	Unit which distinguished itself in war	
	"Red Flag Company"	Given to model companies having excellent records in political and battle training; established to strengthen "Company" which is the smallest basic unit of the army	
	Hero of the Republic	The highest honor, one who displayed a heroic quality by accomplishing meritorious deed	Given simultaneously with the National-Flag Decoration First-Class, gold medal and the certificate of commendation. The privilege of livelihood is given, including the family, and receives annual salary.
<u>Decoration:</u>			
	Kim Il-song Decoration	Those who contributed to the upholding of Kim Il-song's authority in and out of the country	
	National Flag Decoration (1-3 classes)	Those who displayed a heroic quality in the armed or ideological struggles either in war or peace time	Receives annual salary and the privilege of free public transportation
	Liberty and Independence Decoration	Commanding officers of company commander or above who displayed bravery, boldness and resilience in the battle fields for national independence	Same as above

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	Fighting Soldier Honor Decoration, First Class	Noncommissioned officers and privates who accomplished a deed commensurate to the one by the officers receiving the National Flag Decoration	Same as above
	Same as above, Second Class	Those who contributed to the development of the army and battle distinction	Privilege of free bus and train transportations
Medals:	Military Merit Medal (gold medal)	Those who accomplished meritorious service in battle	
	Commemorative Medal for the War of Fatherland's Liberation	Those who fought bravely in the battle fields of the 25 June War	
Commendation:	Oral Commendation	Orally given to those who surpassed the labor target in front of troops	
	Order Commendation	Those who have a long service record in the military and those who were faithful in political activities	
	Honor Commendation	Be able to take picture in front of the Colors	
	Leave Commendation	Commendee is allowed to have a leave of 1 day-and-night, 2 or 3 days	
	Cancellation of punishment	Past punishment is nullified	
	Material Commendation	Given in the case of catching spies	
	Commendation Message	Inform home or the former place of work of commendation	
	Display of Name	Display the names of those having excellent records at military schools and organizations	

(Note) Approximately same commendations are applicable to the military officers.

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(2) Punishment

As for punishment, there are two kinds: the equivalent of what is called "disciplinary action" in the West, and "criminal punishment."

Belonging to the disciplinary actions are the following:

1. Notice; 2. warning; 3. unscheduled duty; 4. severe reprimand;
5. leave restriction; 6. demotion; 7. forced discharge; 8. suspension of right; 9. expulsion from the party.

Further, there are detailed provisions of criminal punishment in Chapter 23 of the "Criminal Law" of North Korea, titled "The Crimes Concerning the Military Affairs," containing 36 articles.

However, this law was enacted on 3 March, 1950, and some revisions seem to have been made since then, but it is not clear if it is still being applied or not.

VII. Support

In Article 61 of "the Socialist Constitution" this support is extolled as follows:

"The revolutionary fighters, the surviving family members of the deceased revolutionary fighters, the surviving family members of the deceased patriotic fighters, the remaining family members of the members of the People's Army, and the disabled veterans of war shall receive special protection from the society and the state."

Having thus given assurance to their concerns and worries, the officers and enlisted men of the People's Army are expected to make their best effort in the military service without getting anxious about the future.

For example, disabled soldiers are classified into 1-3 classes, according to the degree of wounds and sicknesses. The soldier belonging to Class-1 who is unable to work is given free housing, pension, 800 grams of food a day for himself and 400 grams of food a day for each member of his family he supports.

Also, light workshops such as factories producing daily-goods are set up for those wounded soldiers who are able to work. Moreover, for the education of children of the war dead, "revolutionary institutes" are set up in various localities to enroll them, and the state gives support for their daily living and all other things.

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N. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

DPRK OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON UNIFICATION, OTHER ISSUES

Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 22 Jun 79 p 4 OW

[Report on interview with Hyon Chun-kuk, vice chairman of the DPRK Committee for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, who is currently visiting Japan at the invitation of the Japan Socialist Party, by ASAHI SHIMBUN editor Hiroshi Iwatara on 21 June]

[Text] [Question] The north-south dialog remains suspended. Why?

[Answer] "It is because the two sides basically differ on the unification issue. Our position is that unification should be sought through peaceful dialog, whereas South Korea is seeking 'two Koreas,' namely perpetuation of division, despite its lipservice to unification."

[Question] The ROK side wants a dialog between responsible authorities. What about this?

[Answer] "Our delegation includes government representatives at the ministerial level and representatives of the Korean Workers Party, the most authoritative organization in our country. What other authoritative representatives do they want included in our delegation?"

[Question] The ROK side wants a dialog only between government authorities.

[Answer] "The unification issue involves the interests of our whole nation. Therefore, representatives of various political parties, democratic personages and overseas compatriots should participate in the dialog. The South Korean authorities want to exclude representatives other than government authorities from the dialog because they want to monopolize the handling of the unification issue. Because they are opposed by the people, they apparently do not want anything said that would be to their disadvantage."

[Question] Kim Yong-sam, president of South Korea's new Democratic Party, has expressed his desire to have a dialog with the north.

[Answer] "As already clarified by Vice President Kim Il, our country welcomes the move. Whether or not this dialog materializes depends on the New Democratic Party. The South Korean authorities should not exert unfair pressure."

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[Question] U.S. President Carter is scheduled to visit South Korea in the near future. What comments do you have on this?

[Answer] "Our country regards the visit as being detrimental to the promotion of unification, and therefore, we are opposed to the visit. First, the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea is the basic obstacle to unification, but it is anticipated that the U.S. President's forthcoming visit will result in strengthening the U.S. policy of maintaining U.S. troops in South Korea. Second, the visit will support the South Korean authorities who are suppressing human rights and pursuing a splittist policy. This is an unfortunate situation for South Korean democratic personages. Third, the visit will add strength to the line on U.S.-Japan-South Korea military integration."

[Question] Has there been any progress made in U.S.-DPRK relations?

[Answer] "Our country has been calling for a dialog with the United States for the past several years, but there has been no answer. We hope the United States will soon make response. The United States is probably not responding because of certain apprehensions. It may fear that when Korea is reunified, it will become a satellite of some country. But a unified Korea will pursue a neutral, nonaligned policy. Also, the United States and Japan may be worried about their investments in South Korea in the event Korea is unified. We have no intention of seizing foreign investments after unification is achieved. Rather we will protect them."

[Question] What is the DPRK's policy toward Japan?

[Answer] "We expect two things from Japan. First, we do not want Japan to support the 'two Koreas' policy pursued by the United States and South Korea. Second, since we want to promote personnel exchanges, especially mutual visits by politicians, we want Japan to make a positive response. The doors of our country are wide open. If Liberal Democratic Party Dietmen and many other Japanese politicians visit our country, we will welcome them. We want Japan to open its doors wider."

[Question] Does that mean the DPRK is not considering normalizing its relations with Japan for the time being?

[Answer] "That is right. At this time, when the United States and South Korea are calling for cross-recognition to perpetuate 'two Koreas,' if we propose establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan, it would be seized upon as an opportunity to promote cross-recognition."

[Question] The DPRK's delinquency in settling its trade accounts has become an issue in Japan-DPRK trade.

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[Answer] "True, we do have some unfavorable balance of payment in our foreign trade. But, the main reason for it is that foreign countries do not buy the goods we want to sell them in sufficient quantities. Certainly, we have debts in our trade with Japan but the amount is not very large. Compared with South Korea's accumulated debt to Japan, our debts are minuscule. It is surprising that so much is being made of our debts. We have no intention of reniging on our obligations. There is a good prospect for repayment in the near future. Nevertheless, we want Japan to buy more from us. We hope to export nonferrous metals and fishery products."

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