

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

21

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8626

21 August 1979

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 645



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

For further information on report content
call (703) 351-3165.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8626

21 August 1979

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 645

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Crisis in Central Africa Reported
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 4 Jul 79)..... 1

Revitalization of OCAM Attempted
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Jul 79)..... 3

Difficulties of African Development Bank Described
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Jul 79)..... 5

Poorly Conducted Negotiation, by Samir Charbi
Fordwor Cornered, by Mehdi Malek

Briefs

 OAU Summit Expense 9

 Gabon-Rhodesia-South Africa Link 9

 Congolesse-Zairian Cooperation 9

ANGOLA

Africanist Weighs Alternatives for Unity, Peace
(Norbert Courbey; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1 Aug 79)..... 10

Good Diplomatic Relations With FRG
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jul 79)..... 12

Briefs

 Neto on Investment Code 13

CAPE VERDE

Pereira: Every Country Free To Ask External Support
(Aristides Pereira Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE,
23 Jul-5 Aug 79)..... 14

- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
CHAD	
Briefs	
Kamougue Demands French Troops' Withdrawal	17
CONGO	
Draft Constitution Approved by Voters on 8 July (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 Jul 79).....	18
MADAGASCAR	
Madagascar's Ratsiraka Discusses International Issues (Didier Ratsiraka Interview; AFRIQUE ASIE, 9-22 Jul 79).....	21
MALI	
Briefs	
Opposition to Defense Pact	24
MOZAMBIQUE	
Agricultural Situation Looking Somewhat Better (Augusta Conchiglia; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jul 79).....	25
Briefs	
Guerrilla Activities Reportedly Increasing	28
RHODESIA	
Briefs	
Israeli Intelligence Network	29
SENEGAL	
Dynamism, Power of Mourides Stressed (Sylviane Kamara; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Jul 79).....	30
Briefs	
Senghor Concerned About Arab Countries' Division	33

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
ZAIRE	
Stringent Measures Adopted Against Speculation in Coffee (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 Jul779)...	34
Briefs Containerized Transport	36

- c -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 4 Jul 79 p 29

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] Central Africa is on the move or rather on the way down. With the exception of Cameroon, all of the countries in the region are going through an especially difficult crisis.

The case of Chad is well known. In the absence of an upsurge of national conscience from the cadres and political leaders, this country is running the risk of bursting apart beneath the burden of foreign appetites. In the Central African Empire and in the Congo, the situation is not much better. Political assassinations are an everyday occurrence. Functionaries occasionally wait months before being paid. Large urban agglomerations such as Kinshasa and Brazzaville are short of foodstuffs, while factories are working at less than capacity due to the lack of spare parts, if not fuel. Even formerly prosperous Gabon is not completely unscathed. The price of foodstuffs has gone sky-high. Fortunately, Gabon is enjoying solid political stability, which is far from being the case elsewhere. Political shockwaves in Bangui in January are still causing ripples. In Brazzaville, the trial of former President Yhombi Opango, who has been under house arrest in a villa in the parachutist camp, is still being awaited. In Kinshasa, authorities have been obliged to raise salaries, against the advice of the International Monetary Fund, but even this has not prevented wildcat strikes in both the public and private sectors. People elsewhere are unhappy to see their purchasing power decrease from month to month. Everywhere inflation, with its customary retinue of scarcity and injustice, is rampant, with no improvement in sight; on the contrary, things are getting worse by the day.

Paradoxically, leaders seem rather unconcerned. Some do not appreciate the gravity of the situation, while others seem to be completely out of their depth. However, none are ready to toss in the towel. To cover up their failures, not to say their incompetence, in the face of an unprecedented crisis, some among them continue shouting slogans which no longer evoke and echo among the people, or occasionally wear themselves out in pointless wrangling, as in Brazzaville.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Central Africa is made up of small states (with the obvious exception of Zaire) which, alas, do not try hard enough to draw together and cooperate, at least on the economic level, while none of them has at their disposal a self-sufficient domestic market. However, UDEAC (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa) has sufficiently proved itself to serve as an embryo for greater economic cooperation, as the states of west Africa have demonstrated, being joined together in the ECOWAS (Economic Community of the West African States). Relations between states are often very low-key: the Central African Empire does not have good relations with the Congo. The latter, in spite of the recent visit of President Sassou Nguesso to Kinshasa, remains very cold towards Zaire. Cameroon and the Gabon are taking their time to resolve their secret rivalry.

Thus central Africa sinks every day a little deeper into economic depression, the liquifaction of state authority and disunity. It is true that this region has neither the leaven of ethnic and religious cohesion nor the foundations inherited from the pre-colonial empires of west Africa. But central Africa has going for itself its immense mining, agricultural and forest potential. It ought to exploit these in the best interests of its people.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

9330
CSO: 4400

2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

REVITALIZATION OF OCAM ATTEMPTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Jul 79 p 33

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani]

[Text] One of the oldest institutions of independent, French-speaking Africa, the Afro-Malagasy-Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM), which has changed acronyms six times in 18 years, keeps on stuttering, feeling its way, mixing together the greatest hopes with the bitterest deceptions.

OCAM held its 10th summit meeting in Cotonou, Benin, the 26th and 27th of June, pointing towards the nth reorganization of its secretaryship-general (located in Bangui) and the hope of ridding itself of its contradictions. At the eighth summit meeting (in Bangui, 1974) the nine member states (Benin, the Ivory Coast, the Central African Empire, Upper Volta, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo) took an oath to no longer talk politics, this subject being consigned to other tribunes, in order to silence "useless (ideological) quarrels." But, barely 5 minutes after having been elected president on 26 June 1979, the Benin head of state, Colonel Matthieu Kerekou, gave a speech in which he touched upon all the hot spots on the continent, from the Sahara to southern Africa.

Shortly afterwards, the five heads of state in attendance (from Benin, Upper Volta, Niger, Rwanda and Togo), all of them in the military, shut themselves up for a long closed session. The discussion, occasionally quite lively, concerned the political situation in Ghana. It was indeed on 26 June that the new masters of Accra sent before a firing squad, among other officers, two former presidents, General Akuffo and General Afrifa. In Cotonou, these executions were considered an affront, all the more serious in that, less than a week earlier, ministers and jurists from the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Togo had been assured that Akuffo and Afrifa would be spared.

The shock was so great that the summit meeting was almost reduced to the single closed session discussions. Colonel Kerekou had to use all his powers of persuasion to convince his colleagues to abide by the conference's agenda. The annoyance felt by the hosting president was proportionate to the trouble the Beninians had gone to to welcome the organization in a

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

dignified manner. One need only mention the construction, on a beautiful beach lined with coconut trees, of an OCAM village (which cost 3 billion francs CFA), with a conference hall, 11 luxurious villas for the heads of state and various annexes. The 11 villas were intended to house, in addition to representatives of the 9 member states, observers from Burundi and the Seychelles, who had been invited with an eye to their eventual joining. But the latter did not send any delegates, leaving to their fate welcoming banners and flags strewn throughout the city: the Seychelles were in the midst of elections and Burundi stumbled against a last minute "misunderstanding" with Rwanda.

It is true that this invitation to Burundi and the Seychelles was considered a--political--manceuvre intended to strengthen the progressive wing of OCAM. The absence of Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny and of Senegal President Leopold Sedar Senghor did not go over any better. Insistent entreaty was made to Houphouet-Boigny to wait until the last minute to make his announcement so as not to definitively torpedo the meeting (cf. JEUNE AFRIQUE No 965). In order to prove its "good faith" and its "Ocamian" convictions the Ivory Coast, through its minister of foreign affairs, Simeon Ake, has proposed to organize the 11th summit meeting at Abidjan (in 1981).

But it was not only a question of--politics--in this apolitical organization. The outgoing president, Gen Juvenal Habyarimana, Rwanda head of state, drew up a far from complacent balance sheet on OCAM. An ad hoc committee was set up to study a new reorganization which must take into account the fact that some members are not paying their dues, foremost among them the Central African Empire, which houses the head office. There results from this a lack of funds which creates difficulties for OCAM with the 16 "common undertakings" which were entered upon at its founding. Two among the better known ones, which date from 1961, henceforth are completely independent: Air Africa and the African Postal Telecommunications Union (APTU).

Unless it catches its second wind, OCAM may find itself relegated to being a simple "think tank." It is, moreover, having some trouble just now getting two ambitious projects underway: a local agricultural machine industry and a multinational navigation company formed by west African countries.

This fluctuation between ideas and acts has even had repercussions on the election of the secretary general. Even though his second mandate had expired, Dr Sydney Moutia (Mauritius) had not placed the question on the agenda, which mission shocked the heads of states. Rwanda was asked to name a new secretary general who would take up his duties on 1 November. The great favorite is the Rwandi Amri Saed, presidential adviser and the only Mussulman with important duties in his country. In order to nip backstage runors in the bud, the Mauritians denied to the heads of state that they would leave OCAM if the secretary general was taken away from them. Some people were even doing their best to come up with a seventh acronym for this Afro-Malagasy-Mauritian Common Organization...

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

9330
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-~~AFRICAN~~ AFFAIRS

DIFFICULTIES OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK DESCRIBED

Poorly Conducted Negotiation

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 11 Jul 79 p 36

[Article by Samir Gharbi]

[Text] The 48 member states of the African Development Bank (ADB) are to announce their decision on the amendment to the statutes adopted by their finance ministers, composing the council of governors, who met at Abidjan from May 14 to 18. Once ratified by at least 75 percent of the total votes cast, the principal result of this change will be to permit the participation of non-African states (the leading nations being the United States, Japan, the German Federal Republic, Canada and France) in the capital assets and the management of the ADB.

This opening was not a new idea. Several times since the founding of the bank in 1964, the question was discussed without being supported by a majority. However, the Western nations and even the World Bank exerted increasing pressure and the world economic crisis changed certain facts. Furthermore, in 1976, the presidency of the Board of Directors escaped from the hands of Ghana's Kwame Donkoh Fordwor who had worked during 5 years for the International Monetary Fund; a branch of the World Bank and who was personally in favor of the opening up of the capital.

Even in the opinion of Dr Horst Moltrecht, West German coordinator of the non-Africa states which had been invited to participate in the capital of the ADB, the operation was organized "in a very short time", thanks to President Fordwor. The machinery had been put in motion after the resolution taken by the Council of Governors in May 1978 at Libreville. President Fordwor immediately organized four multilateral conferences with the interested non-African states --- in Washington, (September 30, 1978), Rabat (November 27-29 1978), Abidjan (January 11-12, 1979) and London (February 13-14, 1979). In all, there were nine days of negotiations in less than a year. It should be pointed out, for purposes of comparison, that the negotiations for the African Development fund (ADF), which has specially assigned to receive the contributions of the rich non-African nations, had lasted for nearly 3 years.

5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

What were the results? The non-African states agreed to the condition that the seat of the ADB be located within a member African state and that its president always be a national of a member African state. Nevertheless, this agreement was subject to the proviso that the president be elected not only by a majority of the total vote but also by a majority of the votes of the non-African states. It was also conceded that the operations of the ADB be carried on by the member African states authorize the non-African states which contribute to the African Development Fund (ADF) to become members of the ADB, acquiring a portion of its capital. However, the non-African states would like this "linking" with the contribution to ADF be revised in the future.

On the other hand, the capital of the ADB (1.22 billion units of account [UC], one UC being worth approximately \$1.20), 100% of which is held by the Members of African States (MAS), should reach a value of 5.25 billion UC's by 1986 (75 percent for the MAS, i.e., 3.5 billion UC's and 25 percent for the Non-African States (NAS), i.e., 1.75 billion UC's). This capital, which is called subscribed capital, is subdivided into two parts. The first portion (25 percent) must be invested by all the member states in convertible currency, the second portion (75 percent) constituting the capital which is subject to call. This is the guarantee which permits the ADB to meet its obligations in case of difficulties.

In this case also, the future members of the NAS have issued two types of reserves. On the one hand, the 25 percent-75 percent division must not create a precedent for future increases of capital. Such revision, by leading to an increase in the portion payable in currency could only increase the financial burden of the MAS and would run counter to the goal sought by the proponents of "opening", namely, to relieve the MAS. On the other hand, the NAS specify that the liberation of their capital which is subject to call shall be subordinated to their own legislative and budgetary practices. Thus, the ADB, in case of some unforeseen difficulty, will not be assured of being immediately protected by having recourse to the MAS. This contradicts the widespread idea that entry of the NAS is intended to improve the financial position that will facilitate recourse of the ADB to the international capital market.

Another major contradiction appears between the idea of departure (furnishing of foreign resources to relieve the financial position of the MAS) and the result upon arrival. With the increase in capital, the 48 member states have to invest 570 million additional UC's between 1981 and 1986 to constitute their portion of 25 percent. In contrast to this, the NAS will only pay out 437 million UC's which represent their share of 25 percent. But how can it be expected that the 48 MAS will be able to invest within 5 years more than they have in 10 or 15 years? What would the NAS do in case the MAS were not able to pay their share? They would block theirs or offer to make up the deficit in exchange for an increase in their power.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The division of power is a function of the division of capital, that is, two thirds and one-third of the voting rights. However, the NAS have demanded and obtained "special majority votes" in order to protect their rights. Moreover, they are not satisfied to have obtained 3 seats out of 12 on the Board of Directors. They want to have 6 out of 18. They also want, in connection with recruitment of the professional staff, the ADB to grant "appropriate consideration" to the candidates who are natives of the NAS. The aim of the management of the ADB is to multiply the level of activity by a factor of more than six, to go from 770 million dollars of loans granted from 1967 to 1978 to 5 billion dollars from 1981 to 1986. The World Bank, with all of its means, has reached the volume of business which it does in Africa at the present time (one billion dollars per year) only after 30 years of activity.

One can wonder whether the opening up of capital could not have been negotiated more favorably. In the form that it is now being presented for ratification by the African States, the risk is being run of creating an additional subject of discord at the summit meeting of the OAU in Monrovia.

Fordwor Cornered

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 11 Jul 79 p 37

[Article by Mehdi Malek]

[Text] At the end of a stormy session, the Board of Directors of the ADB decided on June 28 to remove President Kwame Donkoh Fordwor from office in accordance with Article 36 of the bylaws, following a long struggle. The board designated one of the four vice presidents, F.O.O. Sogunro of Nigeria, to serve as acting president until the next annual governors' assembly in 1980, although it is possible for the matter to be settled before that date. In any case, in a dispatch made public on July 2 at Abidjan, home office of the bank, Abdoulaye Kone, minister of economy, finance and planning of the Ivory Coast and presently president of the Council of Governors of the ADB, recalled the principle of "dialog and persuasion" which has always prevailed in the ADB. At the same time, he let it be known that he had called for a special session of the Council of Governors to meet at Abidjan on July 23, 24 and 25, to be preceded by a meeting of the committee of this council (Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Morocco) beginning July 8. Meanwhile, the Board of Directors has been requested to suspend its decision as being too "hasty."

It appears that the Board of Directors entertained certain grievances with regard to President Fordwor which were not completely without foundation (J.A. No 964). In particular, he was accused of exercising prerogatives which, according to the regulations of the bank, are within the province of the Board of Directors. In this manner, the Washington office was established

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

and its head appointed without asking the board to pass on this matter. The same thing occurred with regard to the appointment of the representative of Sifida to the board who, contrary to the tradition providing that these duties should be performed by a vice president of the ADB, was an unemployed international official. Furthermore, it happens that the fortunate winners of these posts were citizens of Ghana, as is the president.

The Board of Directors of the ADB also believed that the changes made to the organization chart should have received its prior approval as is required by the constitution.

Even more serious was the accusation that the president did not submit an account to the Board of Directors of his many trips abroad which cost an average of \$1500 (plus 300,000 CFA francs) per day! Moreover, the president submitted resolutions to the Council of Governors which had not previously been discussed by the Board of Directors. Positions that were contrary to those adopted by the Board of Directors were taken by the president before the Council of Governors. Mr Fordwor was also accused of exhibiting personal animosity towards certain members of the Board of Directors which led him to go as far as requesting their being replaced by the Council of Governors.

All of the abovementioned points appeared in the memorandum which the Board of Directors had sent to the president on June 1 and which requested him to furnish a frank explanation to the Board by June 16. The latter was never received. President Fordwor, after having informed the Board of Directors that he was reserving his response for delivery to the Council of Governors, finally (upon the advice of an African chief of state) sent this body a 20-page memorandum while refusing to discuss the matter at all. It was almost necessary to drag him forcibly before the Board of Directors which easily spotted the untruths contained in his memorandum.

In addition to the facts, there are two basic principles which are involved in this crisis. The first is the necessary submission of the president to the Board of Directors. This is the rule in similar institutions, including the World Bank. In fact, the Council of Governors is the equivalent of the General Assembly of Stockholders and it is the Board of Directors, and it alone, which in all public or private companies, be they national or international, is responsible to the general assembly. Therefore the president must be appointed by the Board of Directors, to which he must regularly account for execution of the policy determined by the board. The second principle is the necessity for determination of the policy of a multinational institution by a body of men. It is not possible to place full responsibility for its management on the shoulders of just one man. When, in 1969, the same crisis occurred in the same way to the ADB, the Council of Governors decided to observe the regulations and President Mamoun Beheiry of Sudan was obliged to resign.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

8

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7619
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

OAU SUMMIT EXPENSE--The total cost for organizing the 16th Summit of the OAU is estimated at more than 80 million dollars. The initial ceiling of 60 million planned for the construction of the conference hall, the 50 villas of the chiefs of state, and the Africa Hotel was exceeded because of the long rainy season and many strikes at the worksites. [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Aug 79 p 27]

GABON-RHODESIA-SOUTH AFRICA LINK--According to diplomatic sources in Libreville, Air Gabon has started a cargo shuttle operation to handle traffic with Salisbury and Pretoria. Cooperation between Omar Bongo's government and the racist régimes in Southern Africa is still growing steadily. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jul 79 p 78] 6182

CONGOLESE-ZAIRIAN COOPERATION--On 11 June Colonel Denis Sassou Nguesso, the president of the People's Republic of Congo, carried out an "official visit of friendship" to Kinshasa that lasted for several hours. The Congolese president, making his first foreign visit since being appointed head of state, spoke privately with President Mobutu Sese Seko. A joint communique sanctioning this visit takes into account the willingness of both nations to strengthen their economic cooperation in matters of security as well as in the sociocultural domain. Regular meetings between the two heads of state are also planned within the framework of this cooperation. This meeting had, moreover, been prepared for by a joint Zairian-Congolese Commission which had met in Kinshasa toward the end of May. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Jun 79 p 1614] 8117

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

AFRICANIST WEIGHS ALTERNATIVES FOR UNITY, PEACE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 969 1 Aug 79 p 9

[Article by Norbert Courbey: "Which Road for Angola?"]

[Text] In his essay, "Success in Angola," Professor Immanuel Walerstein admits that in 1975, Holden Roberto's FNLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA "were well implanted in certain parts of the country." This was the conclusion reached by OAU investigative commissions and by the Ecumenical Council of Churches. For an organization such as the MPLA, which was seeking, above all, the good of the Angolan people, one question was paramount: "Would it be better, in the interest of the country, to share power with them--since they represent part of the people--or should they be eliminated and power concentrated in the MPLA's hands?"

The question deserved careful examination: each alternative should be weighed in order to choose the lesser of the evils, obviously for Angola, and not for such or such a party or group. The MPLA decided to seize power for itself. It opted thus for a prolonged civil war in place of a political struggle which would almost certainly have included armed skirmishes. I believe that the course of the political struggle would have been better for Angola.

In 1975, Angola was emerging from a long period of political censorship. Each of the three movements included numerous dedicated militants, even among the officials, despite the fact that some of them were veritable criminals and agents provocateurs. The fact that one of these movements was a bit more "qualified to govern" does not justify the elimination of the other two, as also does the fact that this or that movement may be penetrated by agents from the CIA, the KGB or South Africa.

It is stated that the MPLA called on the Cuban troops so that South Africa would not occupy Luanda. But who is to say whether South Africa would have become bogged down into a war in Angola? However, let us admit that the occupation of Luanda could have become reality. True patriots would then have banded together against the common enemy. Examples of fighters who abandoned the capital to continue the struggle from the bush rather than call in foreign forces abound.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Recourse to the Cuban soldiers, whose generosity I do not doubt, provoked a different kind of war, in which the country's blood is being aimlessly spilt in a fratricidal struggle. That is not to say that national unity precludes an appeal to foreign military assistance if this is necessary to repulse an invasion. However, it should be definitely outlawed if the purpose is to squash those political parties which are "well implanted in certain regions."

The MPLA is again faced by the alternative of either continuing the struggle against the UNITA and the FNLA until their total destruction, or coming to terms with them, which would entail freedom of expression for each party as well as sharing in the power. Is not Angola's interest to be found in peace?

On an international scale, this choice would reinforce unity in Africa and in the non-aligned movement; it would follow the path of unity in the Third World. One may object that such or such a movement became discredited through collaboration. Nevertheless, the political history of humanity abounds with instances of excellent servants of the state who had, at one time or another, collaborated with the enemy.

In case the MPLA decides to pursue the policy of eliminating the other two movements, it is opting for a civil war which will continue for a long time.

It is also opting for the presence of Cuban troops, as well as for a rift among the patriots, since a foreign army of 25,000 men could not bring about national unity in Angola. On the other hand, according to Walerstein, a reconciled Angola would be a neo-colonial Angola. This is not serious. A country's independence derives mainly from its degree of self-sufficiency in the production of foodstuffs, from the volume and the diversity of its income, from the level of conscience achieved by its elite, etc. A peaceful Angola would certainly be far less dependent than an Angola in a state of civil war.

Be that as it may, I have attempted to ask some questions essential to Angola and which, I believe, have been overlooked, rather than bring some ready answers. In politics, passion and prejudice often lead to results that are diametrically opposed to those that one desired. The Angolan experience seems to be a case in point.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

GOOD DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH FRG

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French N° 192 23 Jul 79 p 78

[Text] A large delegation from the Federal Republic of Germany headed by the chief of the African Section of the Foreign Affairs Ministry was expected in Luanda to complete drafting a joint declaration calling for establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Angola.

The negotiations leading up to this decision were long and difficult, because it was clear that so long as OTRAG maintained a satellite-spy base in Zaire, there could be no question, for Luanda, of normalizing relations with Bonn, despite many efforts by German diplomats and emissaries and the discreet intervention of their Western allies. But once President Mobutu asked that the base be dismantled -- and there were rumors that his decision had been encouraged by the German Social Democrats who were in power -- the way for normalization of relations between Bonn and Luanda was suddenly open.

It was the Angolan ambassador to Paris, Mr Luis d'Almeida, who conducted the secret negotiations with the German leaders. He spoke with the head of the German diplomatic corps, Mr Gensher, who apparently played an important rôle in meeting the Angolan demands, notably on the OTRAG issue. It is generally known that the Schmidt government was getting heavy pressure on this score from major German corporations eager to get a share of the many industrial and economic projects President Agostinho Neto's government had in mind. The fact remains, though, that from the Angolan point of view, no condition conflicting with the MPLA's positions of principle was raised by the German government.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

6182
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

BRIEFS

NETO ON INVESTMENT CODE--A new investment code will be published in Angola. It constitutes the implementation of the "economic orientation" law adopted at the end of June by the MPLA's political bureau. The code authorizes the repatriation of foreign companies' earnings, provides indemnization guarantees in the event of nationalization and even provides for certain tax and customs duties exemptions. President Neto had to put his full authority on the line to have this code passed: his Cuban economic counsellors did not approve of it. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 968 25 Jul 79 p 41]

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CAPE VERDE

PEREIRA: EVERY COUNTRY FREE TO ASK EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jul-5 Aug 79 pp 67-69

[Interview with Aristides Pereira by Simon Malley in Praia, date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] The question of the unification between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde with the PAIGC as leader is awakening the curiosity of political and diplomatic observers in West Africa. The secretary general of the party is the chief of state of Cape Verde and his Guinean counterpart, President Luis Cabral, is his deputy in the PAIGC. But what about the process of organic unification?

[Answer] By opening to debate the question of unity between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, one touches on the very existence of the PAIGC. We are ceaselessly working toward this goal, which, to us, is essential. We are also very much aware of the efforts we must still make to achieve it, because we do not wish to end up with failure. We have seen too many such attempts in Africa and their sorry results. This is why we are proceeding very gradually, at times through our respective countries, at times through our party. We believe we have achieved concrete results.

However, one must acknowledge geographical realities and even human ones, and account for them. If one undertakes a serious study of the history of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, the methods used by Portuguese colonialism gave a specific character to each country. There are, of course, common sources bringing us together. For instance, there are almost no Guineans without relatives in Cape Verde, and vice-versa. There are also other factors to be taken into account, such as the degree of education and evolution of these two peoples. We must plan very carefully, avoiding undue haste, the cause of so many failures.

[Question] You are coming from Luanda, where the first summit between the chiefs of state of the former Portuguese colonies was held. What took place there? Had this meeting a specific goal, or was it only aimed at opening a new page in the history of these five countries?

[Answer] We could not expect too much from a first meeting such as this one. We had simply thought that, in view of our common past of struggle to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

achieve our independence, and in consideration of the personal ties uniting the present leaders of these five countries, the fact of meeting, discussing, and exchanging views could only reinforce us. We also emerged from this conference convinced that together, we could seriously contribute to the support of African liberation movements in the achievement of independence and in the economic development of the continent.

[Question] Are you considering the establishment of organizational structures, as, for instance, a common system of defense?

[Answer] First of all, I do not believe, given each of our own realities, the specificity of our problems and the distances that separate us, that a structured organization would be viable, at least for the time being. However, thanks to such conferences, we will enhance our cooperation, particularly in the economic and educational fields, as well as in others. We did not discuss an organization of common defense because the main objective of this first summit in Luanda was economic cooperation, even if problems of security and war in Southern Africa were carefully reviewed. Concerning Africa in general and other international problems, there are obviously some slight differences in our respective positions, which derive from conditions pertaining to each of us, but we did reach an agreement on essential questions.

[Question] What would you do if Cape Verde were threatened by aggression? What should those African countries do, such as Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, which are attacked daily? Western powers become the racists' accomplices, but any recourse to the socialist powers' assistance is immediately thought of as vassalage to the Soviet Union...

[Answer] We hold one fundamental principle. Any independent country has the unequivocal right to appeal to the country of its choice to defend its sovereignty if threatened. Of course, we do believe in international legality. This legality is still, in our opinion, the best defense. However, it does not preclude recourse to military assistance by friends and allies. Any country which is attacked or threatened has the right to ask for such assistance. And it would be both unjust and false to accuse them of being agents of Moscow if they appeal to socialist countries.

(Aristides Pereira thinks for a moment and then continues).

In the event Cape Verde were threatened, we would first arm our people to make them conscious and proud of defending themselves. This would not preclude recourse to assistance from other countries, but we would rather first count on our own resources. We would of course ask for assistance from those countries which would readily provide it, but we would, above all, defend ourselves without help.

[Question] However, at the time of the second war of liberation in Angola, you did send PAIGC military units to fight with the MPLA. This was a manifestation of the PAIGC's internationalist policy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] Of course... As for a structured, organized African army, I believe that it is impossible to establish it. But allow me to be specific: each country is sovereign. It knows, it must know, what to do. If it appeals to the socialist countries, which helped us during our war of liberation, it must fear being accused by this one or that of being used as a base by the Soviet Union or Cuba. This is neither the intention nor the objective of the country under attack. It simply and wholeheartedly wishes to preserve the independence and freedom acquired at such high cost. As for the avenue chosen by its people for its development, it has no accounts to give to anyone else and has no use for labels.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

CSO: 4400

16

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

BRIEFS

KAMOUGUE DEMANDS FRENCH TROOPS' WITHDRAWAL--Kamougue, chief of the Chadian Gendarmerie, sent the Elysee a plain-spoken formal notice: withdraw the French army or you will be responsible for everything which may happen to your nationals. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 3 Aug 79 p 81]

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONGO

DRAFT CONSTITUTION APPROVED BY VOTERS ON 8 JULY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Jul 79 pp 1960, 1962

[Excerpts] On 8 July, the Congolese voters named 63 deputies to the People's Assembly, as well as representatives to the regional and local councils, from the slates presented by the single party that uses the name of "scientific socialism," the Congolese Labor Party (PCT). They were also able to approve the draft constitution worked out as a result of holding the PCT's third special convention last March.

Considering the nature of the election, the only surprise to be expected was the number of votes in favor of the government. We recall that in 1973, at the time of a similar referendum, 73.47 percent of the voters approved the constitution, with 21.13 percent opposed. Today, the preliminary results indicate an "overwhelming majority" (95 percent) for the "red vote" (= "yes"), and a 99 percent rate of participation. This change is not necessarily for the better.

A Socialist Decentralized Constitution

The People's Republic of the Congo is on its sixth constitution since it gained independence as part of French Equatorial Africa.

The constitution of 8 July 1979 returns to certain definitions of the 1973 constitution; in particular, it makes the Congo into a "People's Republic" (Art. 1). Its "principle" is Lincoln's famous phrase: "government of the people, by the people, and for the people" (Art. 6).

The chief innovation of this constitution lies in the administrative decentralization it guarantees. Outside the People's National Assembly, the "supreme agency of government authority" (Art. 40), which is elected by popular vote for 5 years, and the Council of Ministers, the "supreme executive agency" (Art. 75), "the regions and communes are decentralized local communities endowed with moral individuality and financial independence" (Art. 84). They are "administered by agencies representing the government authority called People's Councils" (Art. 85). "The organization and operation" (Art. 86) and the "by-laws, methods of election, and prerogatives of the People's Councils" (Art. 87) are not specified in the constitution, but are the subject of "special laws" (Art. 87). 18

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The president, elected for 5 years by the PCT convention, is also chairman of the party's central committee and plays a supposedly impersonal role: he "embodies national unity and sees to the observance of the constitution and the normal operation of the public institutions" (Art. 62). It is the prime minister, the "head of government," who "directs, coordinates, and controls the activity of the ministers" (Art. 77) within the Council of Ministers, whose eminent position we have already mentioned.

These phrases, far from being empty, have a special resonance in a country that has experienced several presidential regimes and two periods of unambiguous military dictatorship. The analysts who see in Congolese political life simple ethnic confrontations between the North and South will be helpless: although the present president, like his predecessors, can pass for a representative of the Mbochis, the most dynamic ethnic group of the Congolese North (but by no means the only one), what is to be done with a prime minister who is a native of the South, and put at the head of the "supreme executive agency"? At the very least, a regional balance is conceivable. The decisive part played by the Congolese youth and intellectuals is, moreover, always underestimated in a superficial study of things.

"The representatives of the people," says the constitution (Art. 5), "are directed to rely upon the people,...to listen to their opinions and to submit to their control." One of the plagues of Congolese politics and economics is an excessively large civil service (including para-governmental companies), whose privileges are strengthened by the economic crisis, thus aggravating the crisis itself. It is this "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" that was recently denounced in ETUMBA by a members of the central committee of the Union of Congolese Socialist Youth (UJSC), who said: "On 8 July, we shall not vote for money, tribe, or landowners." The establishment of "people's authorities" surely represents a hope of future control for the young and lower-class people who suffer from inflation, from the deterioration of the economy, and from all kinds of bureaucracy. Their dissatisfaction largely explains the convening of the PCT's third special convention last March. The government remains aware of the importance of these demands.

The State and the Private Sector

In order to meet them, the constitution states that "the chief means of production are the property of the people" (Art. 30). "The land" is also "the property of the people, and all deeds and customary rights are abolished" (Art. 31). However, "private property and the right of the inheritance of goods, except for land, are guaranteed" (Art. 33).

Social relations and the status of the private sector, whether domestic or foreign, are also mentioned by the lawmakers: "... the government directs economic life and development according to a general plan [and], relying on the government and cooperative economic sectors, [exercises] a general control over the private sector....The government relies on the union and employee organizations, on the cooperatives, and if necessary on other organizations of the working masses" (Art. 32).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

These specifications remain incomplete and, moreover, the recent strikes of the CFCO have shown that there could be a conflict between the Congolese workers and the Brazzaville authorities.

Last May, at a meeting with representatives of the private sector, the prime minister very successfully gave a long description of the Congolese authorities' idea of the relation between the public and private sectors of the economy. Going back to the government's former statements, Mr Goma said that he was in favor of a "continuing dialogue" between the authorities and the leaders of the private sector.

"Areas of intervention" will be reserved for the private sector, he said, specifying that private activity in agriculture was still possible and even very desirable for the introduction of new crops or the valorization of agricultural products.

Aside from the role of the joint state-private enterprises, the private sector still has a future in the working of rock salt and forest products, or in mineral prospecting. Arrangements for private intervention can be studied in industry, where the existing companies are not in danger. Trade and public works also have a place left for private enterprises, except for construction, a branch in which Sonaco [National Construction Company] has a monopoly.

Thus the Congolese authorities seem -- from their statements, their actions, and the constitution they have just submitted for the people's approval -- to be conscious of the contradictory requirements implied by a situation of political and economic crisis.

The constitution and its results are intended to settle the political crisis by a marked return to legality and self-expression by the people, after two and a half years of uncertainty.

The economic crisis can be settled only by a renewed struggle against poor management and privileges, as in a frank dialogue with the private sector, for the irreplaceable dynamism. From this point of view, the decentralization proposed today may be an interesting experiment, and an original and correct one in any case, for how can the problems of the Congolese Corvette be compared with those of Pointe-Noire?

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., 1979

8429
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

MADAGASCAR'S RATSIRAKA DISCUSSES INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Paris AFRIQUE ASIE in French 9-22 Jul 79 pp 25-27 LD

["Exclusive" interview with Madagascan President Didier Ratsiraka by Simon Malley: "Maneuvers Aimed at Weakening Havana Summit Are Bound To Fail"--date and place not specified]

[Excerpt] [Question] Two events of major importance directly concerning Africa will soon take place--an OAU summit in Monrovia and a summit of non-aligned countries in Havana. What results do you expect from the OAU summit?

Didier Ratsiraka: At every OAU summit the same problem arises because member states lack consistency. They lack the political will to first achieve independence in order to eventually be able to do something of primary importance, namely liberate the continent politically and economically.

Therefore, from compromise to compromise, they will find themselves bound hand and foot at the mercy of imperialist interests. They are no longer able to either oppose or even criticize any activities on the part of imperialists or their allies on the continent, such as South Africa and Rhodesia, to mention only those two. Others are not free of their movements and cannot oppose self-determination and independence for West Sahara [as published].

Last year, I stated at the Khartoum OAU summit that it is necessary to first achieve political and economic independence to acquire as a result means for an independent policy and that it is necessary to clearly distinguish between imperialists, that is, our enemies, on the one hand and our objective allies and friends on the other.

Once this is achieved, the course will be set and the task confronting us clearly determined.

[Question] May I take this opportunity to ask you again about your views on the creation of an intervention force by progressive countries, irrespective of whether such a force would be controlled by the OAU or not....

21

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Didier Ratsiraka: Until the objectives which I have just mentioned are achieved it would be illusory to try to create this kind of force. For who is progressive or socialist and who is not? If it were possible to answer this question without risk of error, the conference of African progressive countries, which we wanted to organize last year, would have taken place a long time ago. In the present situation only bilateral alliances are possible, or, at the very most, we could create a progressive defense force against imperialism.

[Question] Still on the subject of this intervention force, what are your views on the internationalist aid given by Vietnam to Cambodian liberation forces and by Tanzania to Ugandan liberation forces?

Didier Ratsiraka: This question is connected with the previous one and I have already answered it in part. However, I would like to add that we have always militated in favor of negotiations and a peaceful solution to conflicts arising between socialist countries. When the Sino-Vietnamese conflict broke out I sent telegrams to Chairman Hua Guofeng and Leonid Brezhnev. I asked the former to "restore" peace showing respect for the sovereignty and integrity of Vietnamese national territory. And I asked the latter not to intervene directly in this conflict because this could lead to a Sino-Soviet war which would result in heavy losses for both countries. Now any weakening of the Soviet Union would be bound to benefit imperialist powers and international reaction. It would certainly harm world revolution.

Having said this, you will have realized that we did not condemn the aid given by Vietnam to the Cambodian people's forces. As for recognition of the new Kampuchean regime, we believe that if it is sufficiently popular it will be recognized in due course. I will not accept any criticisms on this, for what could be said of all those countries which claim to be socialist and revolutionary but which refuse to recognize the Saharan Arab Republic?

As for the Ugandan-Tanzanian conflict, at the time of his visit to Dar es Salaam our foreign minister officially condemned Amin Dada's aggression against Tanzania.

Everything is therefore clear. As for recognizing the Kampala regime, we lack information which would enable us to make a decision right now.

[Question] You have concretely demonstrated your internationalist solidarity with the Seychelles people by sending troops there in order to thwart plots hatched against them by mercenaries and their masters. Is this an indication of a change in your policy? Can it be seen as a precedent?

Didier Ratsiraka: World imperialist and reactionary forces are logical. They help one another and coordinate their efforts and their policy. We have always striven for the unification and consolidation of world socialist and progressive forces.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Our solidarity with the Seychelles is a result of this mental attitude. It constitutes neither a change nor a new departure in our policy but an illustration and practical implementation, among others, of its militant and revolutionary nature. If this aspect of our policy may seem new, it is because, first of all, we had no opportunity in the past to make it known. Furthermore, we lacked the necessary means to do so. However, it should be remembered that aid for and mutual aid among progressive and socialist countries have always been a constant factor in our policy. We have never ceased to give concrete support to liberation movements in the third world, including the popular movement for the liberation of Angola, the Mozambique liberation front, the Zimbabwe African People's Union, the Zimbabwe African National Union, Vietnam, the PLO, the Polisario, the Southwest African People's Organization and the African National Congress. In any case, the PLO, the Polisario and the Zimbabwe African People's Union either already have or will soon have offices or permanent representatives in Antananarive.

[Question] As far as the summit of nonaligned countries in Havana is concerned, you must be aware of maneuvers aimed at weakening the movement and neutralizing its future Chairman Fidel Castro. What attitude will Madagascar adopt in Cuba?

Didier Ratsiraka: An attitude similar to the attitude which we have always adopted and which has been based on principles to which we have always claimed as our own. We believe that the movement of nonaligned countries should be a powerful instrument to be used in support of our struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism. The movement, to which most UN members belong and which possesses huge mineral and agricultural resources, must strive to insure the complete liberation of the third world; it must wage a struggle in support of peace, justice and democracy throughout the world, and it has the necessary resources to do so.

Therefore, Madagascar will do everything in its power to strengthen it and endow it with more authority. By indulging in maneuvers with a view to dividing it, delaying the Havana summit or getting it cancelled, and excluding Vietnam from it, the imperialists and their lackeys have proved "a contrario" that nonaligned countries constitute a real force capable of opposing their desire to dominate and exploit. However, we feel sure that these maneuvers are bound to fail.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique Asie

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MALI

BRIEFS

OPPOSITION TO DEFENSE PACT--Mali is the only country still opposed to the establishment of a defense pact within the CEDEAO [Economic Community of West African States]. It is believed that the proximity of Algeria may be the cause of this reticent attitude. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Aug 79 p 28]

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOZAMBIQUE

AGRICULTURAL SITUATION LOOKING SOMEWHAT BETTER

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French N° 192 23 Jul 79 pp 70,71

[Excerpts from article titled "Development Strategy" by Augusta Conchiglia]

[Text] In spite of systematic attacks from the racists, the economic and political situation is steadily improving as the 5th year of independence dawns.

Forty-five cooperatives, 55 "machambas" (cooperative fields), and 18,000 fruit trees planted. That was the score when, on 25 June (the anniversary of independence), the first 6-month season of socialist rivalry came to an end in the northern Province of Cabo Delgado.

Led by FRELIMO among the peasants whom it sought to persuade to adopt a collective labor organization, this campaign of course was ultimately aimed at far grander targets than these concrete results achieved in the field.

Cabo Delgado Province, which shares a border with Tanzania (and where the armed struggle for liberation started) is going through an attempt to transform it by giving new individual responsibility to each of its inhabitants, such as integration into a "basic unit for national planning," in which the government is looking for solutions to problems shared by all the people.

Change in Town

The idea is to do away with routine work and to call on the people's own imagination and creativity. This way, say FRELIMO leaders, the workers, who can see most clearly what their region needs, and what it can make available to other regions of the country, will understand that it is urgently necessary to increase production and to intensify trade.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Achieving balance in the very uneven development of the nation's regions (imbalance is particularly marked between towns and the rural areas), breaking out of the subsistence economy pattern in the country districts and developing collective ownership and work practices are goals FRELIMO set for the nation at the beginning of independence. They have now been partially achieved and, in January 1979, President Samora Machel could say that the economic balance between towns and rural areas was no longer so flagrantly tilted toward the towns.

An automobile assembly plant near Beira has been remodeled into a farm machinery factory, and its size and flexibility are such that it has been said that its construction constituted "the first heavy industry attack." This first achievement is proof that the policy adopted here, which gives agriculture top priority, has not remained a dead letter. In spite of natural catastrophes, in spite of the destruction wrought by Rhodesian air raids and saboteurs, farm production (and industrial production as well) is up sharply.

Mechanization of farming is moving right along, particularly in the many state state-run farms that have taken over land abandoned by colonists or by the big Portuguese agribusinesses. Even so, last June in the Limpopo Valley they had to mobilize 40,000 people to get in the rice crop... by hand!

The harvest, which was 32,000 tons in 1977, this year hit 56,000 tons. That means the country came very close to meeting the goal of 60,000 tons which the Party had set for 1980.

Current estimates indicate that a third of all peasants (or about 3 million people) are working collectively. Ten percent of them work on the state machambas and in cooperatives. Others, hundreds of thousands of them, work in communal villages.

Political Progress

Since August 1978, when Joaquim de Carvalho, then Agriculture Minister, was ousted from the Party and from his position, priority has gone to the state-run sector, to "solutions from the people."

The sum of 100 billion escudos has been earmarked for building communal villages, which are destined to become the basic units of government by the people. Some will be built close to state farms, and the farm workers who will move into them with their families can also set up and run their own cooperatives.

When it comes to food supplies for the towns, as of now it is the state-run machambas which provide the bulk of them.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

As for marketing farm products, no easy matter because of the paucity of infrastructures, a special agency, the GAPPO [expansion unknown] has been set up to handle that.

President Machel is optimistic as to the nation's economic future.

Politically, too, the situation has improved. FRELIMO, which declared itself a party at its third congress in 1977, completed its new organization on 11 December 1978. New members, carefully chosen, have been admitted to Party ranks, following "close examination of their lives and behavior on the job and in everyday life." Cells have been established in factories, cooperatives, schools, distribution centers, hospitals, communal villages, the army, and the police.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

6182
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES REPORTEDLY INCREASING--"We must destroy the enemy before he destroys us": FRELIMO leader Samora Machel, who has held power in Mozambique for 4 years, is facing increased activities by the guerrilla movement. The spokesman for the rebels is a Mozambican born in Portugal, Orlando Christina [as published], 51 years old, a former member of the special Portuguese services. The "Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana" [National Mozambican Resistance] has been conducting numerous sabotage activities during the past 6 months. Its equipment, which is of Soviet manufacture, comes from FRELIMO stocks. Samora Machel is accusing the Rhodesians of providing "sanctuary" to the movement. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 23 Jul 79 p 20]

CSO: 4400

28

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RHODESIA

BRIEFS

ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE NETWORK--Israel has just established a veritable intelligence network in Salisbury under the direction of a former infantry colonel. This branch of Mossad was set up with the approval of Bishop Muzorewa who asked the Israeli agents to help him track down and eliminate his PF enemies. According to Rhodesian sources, it is possible that Salisbury could become Mossad's main station for the Indian Ocean and southern Africa.
[Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jul 79 p 78]

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

DYNAMISM, POWER OF MOURIDES STRESSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Jul 79 pp 60, 61

[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "Powerful and Courted"]

[Excerpts] They are rich, powerful, feared and respected. Regardless of whether they are farmers or distinguished citizens, socialists or democrats, they are brothers and Sheikh Bamba is their master.

The very recent brotherhood of the Mourides, established at the end of the 19th century by Ahamadu Bamba, is by far at the head of the Muslim movements in Senegal at present, owing to its tremendous dynamism. Tidjaniya and Qadiriya, those brotherhoods that came from the north, have had to give way to it. The brotherhood, which formerly was rural and peasant, has won the cities and intellectual circles. The Mouride wave has swooped down on schools and high schools where they join and federate among disciples of Sheikh Bamba. The success encountered by the Mouride movement stems both from the personality of its founder and from the socioeconomic program, resulting from an orthodox religious thinking, that he was able to put into practice. Because Sheikh Bamba, a visionary and dogmatic, was also and primarily a pragmatist. Although his life has become legendary, his life is known very well, nevertheless, in its first reality.

The founder of the Mouride movement left his disciples a heritage whose full importance is judged today. In the purely religious field, Sheikh Bamba endeavored primarily to be orthodox. His aim was to go back to the basic truth of Islam. His method was to apply the prophet's precepts to the letter. And, first of all, the precept recommending that the believer, the Mouride (candidate), work. Small farmers, making up the bulk of his troops, launch out into an attack on the bush. They clear ground, plant and harvest. Peanut production has quintupled under their driving force. The Mourides have become merchants in those regions where Tidjanes at Qadires monopolize agriculture. Disciples working on daara (production cells) pay a tithe to the brotherhood and donate workdays to the fields belonging to the collectivity.

30

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Mourides are so rich that, in 1919, the colonial administration borrowed 500,000 CFA [African Financial Community] francs from them to raise the franc. In 1924, they assembled the sum of 6 million francs for building the large Touba mosque. This wealth, resulting from the work of the talibes (disciples), has always stirred up feelings. Some persons accuse the Mouride marabouts of exploiting their brothers and of keeping money for themselves. The fact remains that the achievements of the brotherhood are very visible. In 1945, it financed the Diourbel-Touba railroad section. It built mosques, schools, the Al-Azhar Institute at Touba, ports. The library in the holy city cost 500 million CFA francs. The UNESCO Cultural Week a little less. The sheikhs and the caliphs support a horde of needy persons, assist merchants and distribute scholarships to students.

But, although the call the work put out by Sheikh Bamba has been widely heard, this is not true of its corollary in the mind of the sheikh: man's social equality. A progressive idea, especially in a country whose social structure is based on castes.

When he proclaimed that every man must work with his hands, when he abolished slavery and castes, Sheikh Bamba was a true revolutionary. From men divided in castes, he made sheikhs, while noblemen, mere disciples, worked the land and even iron and wood.

But, in this field, the frame of mind did not follow and the caste spirit is still especially deeply rooted in Senegal, even among the Mourides. A more successful innovation by Sheikh Ahamadu Bamba pertains to stressing national languages. Differently from the heads of the other brotherhoods, a Mouride marabout addresses the faithful in their language and not in Arabic.

Deeprootedness in Senegalese culture, the keystone of "Bambian" thinking, is found even in clothing. The Mourides have created their fashion--Xar-sanni at the beginning of the century, 3 Abdou recently. This Mouride three-piece garment has enjoyed huge success in Senegal where young persons have sacrificed their jeans to it.

This concern for not cutting the Muslim off from his traditional culture finds its peak in the Baye Fall phenomenon. The Baye Fall are semipagan Mourides. In accordance with Ceddo tradition, they drink, wear their hair long and a large number of amulets.

When he set up this community, Sheikh Ibra Fall, a companion of Sheikh Bamba, aimed at giving pagans a feeling for a single god without compelling them to abandon their customs immediately. This tolerance, which seemed to be an aberration in the eyes of some, has enabled the Mouride community to spread as far as India and Jamaica. On the occasion of a reggae [as published] tournament in Senegal, Jimmy Cliff became a Baye Fall.

At present, the dynamism and the power of the Mourides are so great that nothing can be done without them. The reforestation campaign was marking

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

time. In one single day, at the call of their caliph general, the Mourides planted 600,000 trees. In 1968, high school and elementary school students refused to stop their strike. The government appealed to the caliph. Within 24 hours, the movement stopped, because discipline is one of the essential bases of Mouridism. If the sheikh decides, the community must obey. The present caliph, Serigne Abdou Lahad Mbacke, has retreated with regard to the power maintained vigorously by his predecessor, El Hadj Falilou Mbacke. Certain political demonstrations formerly held on occasion of Magal (holiday celebrating, annually, Sheikh Bamba's departure for Gabon) have been abolished. This discreetness is understandable when it is realized that, in Touba, Abdou Diouf, the prime minister, maintains contact with Abdoulaye Wade and Sheikh Anta Diop, both at the head of opposition parties.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

10,042
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

BRIEFS

SENGHOR CONCERNED ABOUT ARAB COUNTRIES' DIVISION--President Senghor is concerned about the division of the Arab countries regarding the Middle East and the Sahara. That runs the risk of delaying by a year the effective start of the African Socialist International of which the Senegalese chief of state is the sponsor. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Aug 79 p 27]

CSO: 4400

33

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAIRE

STRINGENT MEASURES ADOPTED AGAINST SPECULATION IN COFFEE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Jul 79
p 1992

[Unattributed Article: "Stringent Measures Against Speculation
in Coffee"]

[Text] In Zaire a counter-thrust has been aimed at coffee speculation, with the coming into effect of a new regulation concerning the commercialization of this product, the AFP announced in an official letter dated 9 July.

Under the terms of five circulars made public on that day in Kinshasa, revealing the measures adopted by the Executive Council (the Government) within the framework of the reorganization of the national "green gold" market, only those Zairians, whether individuals or corporate bodies currently possessing or exploiting a coffee plantation or processing plant, will be qualified to buy and to export this product. They will, moreover, have to receive the approbation of the Zairian Coffee Bureau.

These measures, which were requested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), charged with setting up a "stabilization plan" intended to revitalize the Zairian economy in connection with the "Mobutu Plan," will restrain fraudulent exportation of coffee, of which the Zairian Government's dead loss amounted to about \$280 million in 1977, whereas the exportation of this 88,500 tons of coffee should have brought some \$400 million into the public treasury.

This problem, moreover, was to be studied jointly this week by the Zairian Executive Council and by those officials responsible for the sectors concerned in the coffee harvest season, in particular the banking sector. In fact, many business enterprises and a good number of private individuals, faced with the impossibility of getting their money out of the country (as the zaire

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[unit of currency] is non-convertible) had fallen into the habit of balancing their books by what is modestly called "making coffee" here. Not to mention all those--foreigners or nationals--who took advantage of this system in order to round off their own pay checks, or simply to make themselves rich at a small cost to them.

The struggle against fraudulent exports, that peculiarly Zairian scourge, is one of the goals of the IMF and the Bank of Zaire, moreover, aimed at revitalizing the Zairian economy. It is known that a team of Belgian experts will be established in Zaire in the near future, with a task of setting up better controls in the Customs Office, where efficiency has been nearly at the zero level up to the present time.

Lastly, the Zairian Coffee Bureau plans to furnish a solid corps of leaders for the farmers by putting at their disposal agricultural experts who will advise them. In support of this action, the Bureau plans to install hotbeds and nurseries in the principal production regions, which in the order of importance are: Upper Zaire, Kivu, Equator, Bandundu, Eastern Kazai and Lower Zaire.

(In fact, it is a question of the enforcement of measures adopted as a result of the creation--through an ordinance passed on 7 March 1979--of the Zairian Coffee Bureau which, shortly after its creation, had established the conditions under which buyers and exporters would receive official approbation. We published the details of these measures in our issue of last 1 June, pp 1499-1500).

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979

8117
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAIRE

BRIEFS

CONTAINERIZED TRANSPORT--The use of international containers in Zairian foreign trade is growing, both for imports and for exports. The following statistics for the first third of 1979 give an indication of the ceaseless progress being made in this new mode of shipment. Some 1730 containers weighing 18,270 tons were registered as imports at Matadi (and to this must be added 177 empty containers to be loaded with our exports). The monthly average thus moves up from 410 loaded containers weighing 5356 tons to 577 containers weighing 6090 tons. Some 593 containers weighing 7259 tons were loaded at Kinshasa for shipment to the interior, chiefly to Shaba. Exports coming from the interior were shipped in 226 containers weighing 4283 tons, whereas when the ships were being loaded at Matadi, a total of 1258 containers was registered, with a total weight of 17,989 tons (plus 279 empty containers). Here, too, the monthly average, which was 237 containers weighing 3911 tons, has now risen to 419 loaded containers weighing 5996 tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Jun 79 p 1614] 8117

CSJ: 4400

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY