

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070021-0

20 JULY 1979

(FOUO 10/79)

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JPRS L/8576

20 July 1979

# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 10/79)



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INTERNATIONAL

ACADEMICIAN ATTACKS WESTERN SCHOLARSHIP ON AZERBAJDZHAN

Moscow ISTORIYA SSSR in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 196-204

[Article by Azerbaydzhani SSR Academy of Sciences Academician A. S. Sumbatzade: "On the Distorted Interpretation of Some Problems of Azerbaydzhani History in the Bourgeois Press"]

[Text] Like the entire Transcaucasus, together with Iran, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia, Azerbaydzhani is part of the Near and Middle East. For this reason its history is as ancient as the history of that entire region, considered one of the earliest centers of human civilization.

In their books, articles, encyclopedias, and other publications, contemporary bourgeois historians frequently distort many events, facts, and phenomena of deep antiquity and most modern times. In this connection we would like to discuss in particular some problems of Azerbaydzhani history as presented in the bourgeois press.

We know that as early as the ninth-seventh centuries BC the Mana state had existed on the territory of southern Azerbaydzhani. At the beginning of the seventh century BC it was conquered by Media and, together with it, was part of the Persian Achaemenid Empire in the middle of the sixth century BC. Following the fall of the latter, as a result of the campaigns of Alexander the Great, in the 30's of the fourth century BC, the state of Atropatena developed on the territory of southern Azerbaydzhani, which included part of the territory of northern Azerbaydzhani to the Kura River. All this clearly proves the erroneousness of the statement in the article on Azerbaydzhani in the Columbia Viking Desk Encyclopedia to the effect that "in the distant past the rulers Van and Urartu ruled the area."<sup>1</sup> It is well known that "even though at the beginning of the eighth century BC a number of campaigns were mounted on the territory of contemporary Azerbaydzhani and Iranian Kurdistan by the Urartu kings, they were unable to consolidate their positions firmly in the areas south of Urmiya Lake. In the eighth century the local tribes were united within the quite big Mana kingdom which successfully repelled the attempts on the part of Urartu and of the Assyrians to conquer the Urmiya area."<sup>2</sup> "The Mana kingdom became a strong and independent state covering the virtually entire territory of today's southern Azerbaydzhani."<sup>3</sup>

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A confusing picture is presented in the history of the appearance on the territory of southern Azerbaydzhan of a second state--Atropatena. "The Persian king Atropates," the Columbia Viking Desk Encyclopedia states, "created here an independent kingdom after 328 BC."<sup>4</sup> Yet, Atropates was merely the representative of the Achaemenide king in southern Azerbaydzhan. Following the fall of the Achaemenide Empire, Atropates pledged obedience to Alexander the Great and thus was allowed to rule his satrapy. Subsequently, he indeed established here an independent country--Atropatena--named, according to one of the versions, after him.<sup>5</sup> "The name 'Atropatena,' distorted by the Arabs, became the basis for the current name 'Azerbaydzhan.'"<sup>6</sup>

In the course of over six centuries (fourth century BC-third century AD) Atropatena was either fully independent or semi-independent mainly from the Parthian state, until, finally, the end of the third century, it became "part of the Sassanid kingdom and became one of its richest provinces."<sup>7</sup> At that time the kingdom of Caucasian Albania appeared in the northern part of Azerbaydzhan, whose capitol was initially Kabala and, subsequently, Partava, or Bard.

The author of the article "Azerbaydzhan" in the Encyclopedia of Islam acknowledges that from the time of the Mongolian conquest of Southwestern Asia to the middle of the 16th century the territory of Azerbaydzhan was the nucleus of a number of big countries in the Middle East. Thus, "with the advent to power of Il', the Kahn of Khulaga, Azerbaydzhan became the center of a huge empire stretching from Oxus to Syria. Initially, the Mongols settled in Maraga and, subsequently, in Tebriz, which became a center for commercial and cultural life. After the Mongols and their heirs, the Dzhalaïrîds, once again Azerbaydzhan was conquered by the Turkomans who had come back from the west. After 1502 Azerbaydzhan became the main bastion of the Sethevides, who came from Ardebil and who initially spoke the local Iranian dialect."<sup>8</sup> This fact is acknowledged in the article on Azerbaydzhan in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which states that Azerbaydzhan "was the cradle of the Sethevides dynasty."<sup>9</sup>

Let us emphasize that the overwhelming majority of Western encyclopedias distort the very name of the people of Azerbaydzhan. The ethnic name Azerbaydzhani is replaced in such editions by names such as "Tatars" or "of Tatar origin,"<sup>10</sup> "Azerbaydzhani Tatars,"<sup>11</sup> or "Muhammadan Tatars."<sup>12</sup> We know that initially the name Tatars was given to the "northern groups of Mongolian tribes which roamed the territory of today's northeastern Mongolia, the Amur region, and Manchuria in the sixth to the ninth centuries. The word "Tatars" entered Europe in the 13th century with the Tatar-Mongolian invasion. Between the 13th and 14th centuries it was applied to some Eurasian nations within the Golden Horde."<sup>13</sup> However, according to historical sources, the term "Tatars" was not applied toward the Azerbaydzhanis at least until the 19th century. This is confirmed by numerous data found in Russian sources and works by Western European scientists, and travelers, and memoirs of officials who visited Azerbaydzhan in those times.<sup>14</sup> As a rule, 16th-17th

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century Russian sources called the Azerbaydzhani either "Kyzylbash" or simply "Persians."<sup>15</sup> In the 18th century the ethnic name Tatars was not applied to the Azerbaydzhani. Exceptionally valuable in this respect is Peter the Great's "Manifesto," issued in 1722 in Astrakhan' preceding his "Persian campaign," justifiably described in diplomatic circles in the capitol as the "Shemakhinskaya expedition."<sup>16</sup> This Manifesto, translated into oriental languages, Azerbaydzhani in particular, and printed in Arabic in letters especially designed by Dmitriy Kantemir, distinguishes among four nationalities in the Transcaucasus and Iran: "Farsi, Ajemi, Armenians, and Georgians."<sup>17</sup> The last two are obvious. The Farsis refer to Persians and the Ajemis to the Azerbaydzhani.

A similar confusion displayed in Western publications is noted also in the case of the ethnic names of Turks and Azerbaydzhani. Thus, for example, a number of publications describe the Azerbaydzhani as "local Turks,"<sup>18</sup> "Turks-Azers,"<sup>19</sup> or "Azerbaydzhani Turks."<sup>20</sup> Some publications acknowledge that the Azerbaydzhani language is original and distinct from Turkish as spoken in Turkey.<sup>21</sup>

A number of bourgeois authors deny the original culture of the Azerbaydzhani in southern Azerbaydhan, considering it Iranian. Thus, for example, an American encyclopedia states that, ". . . Despite the fact that the predominant human mass (of southern Azerbaydhan--the author) . . . consists of Azerbaydzhani . . . their culture is Iranian."<sup>22</sup>

The groundlessness of such claims was indicated as early as the 1930's by Soviet scientists. A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, in particular, wrote the following of the so-called "Iranian art": "The art we describe as Iranian was the age-old product of different cultural factors involving the active participation of the Persians themselves as well as of other peoples of Iran, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, who were not only their neighbors but who, over a long period of time, were under the same rule."<sup>23</sup> Azerbaydzhani art scientists have convincingly shown the national grounds of the famous Tebriz school of miniatures, long presented as Iranian art.<sup>24</sup> The wealth of Azerbaydzhani calligraphy is extensively described in the book by A. Yu. Kaziyev.<sup>25</sup> The originality of another area of Azerbaydzhani art--rug making--was noted by the German scientist J. Lettenmair in his book "The Great Book on Eastern Rugs."<sup>26</sup> The topic has been extensively discussed also in the monumental work by the Azerbaydzhani art expert L. Kerimov "Azerbaydzhanskiy Kover" [Azerbaydhan Rugs].<sup>27</sup>

The bourgeois Sovietologists are unsuccessfully trying to convince their readers of the lack of socioeconomic or political prerequisites for the victory of the socialist revolution in the outlying areas of Russia, Azerbaydhan in particular. Thus, W. Kolarz, in an effort to belittle by all possible means the significance of the participants of the Azerbaydzhani working people in the Russian revolutionary movement of the beginning of the 20th century, claims that during the first bourgeois-democratic revolution only one Bolshevik newspaper--KOCH DEVET<sup>28</sup>--was published in Azerbaydzhani.

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Let us immediately point out that between 1904 and 1907 three other Bolshevik newspapers were published in Azerbydzhan in Baku alone: GUMMET (1904-1905), TEKAMYUL' (1906-1907), and YELDASH (1907). We must emphasize that at that time no more than 10 newspapers could be legally published in the Azerbaydzhan language.<sup>29</sup>

After W. Kolarz, in his book "Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia," S. Zenkovsky claims, totally groundlessly, that "only a few educated Tatars and Azerbaydzhanis were familiar with the theories of Marx and Lenin."<sup>30</sup> Yet, the mere enumeration of Bolshevik newspapers published in the Azerbaydzhan language in 1917-1920 proves quite convincingly how extensively Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Bolshevism were being disseminated among the toiling Azerbaydzhan masses. GUMMET, ZNAMYA SPRAVEDLIVOSTI, GOLOS TRUDA, ZHIZN' NARODA, SVOBODA, IZVESTIYA BAKINSKOY KONFERENTSII, TRUD, RABOCHIY I KUL'TURA, KOMMUNIST, OKTYABR'SKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA, BEDNOTA, GOLOS PRAVDY, BEDNOTA AZERBAYDZHANA, FAKEL, and TOVARISHCH were the titles of the Bolshevik press in Azerbaydzhani indicating the total groundlessness of the claims formulated by R. Pipes that, allegedly, "the Marxist influence among the Russian Muslims was quite limited and wherever it existed (Vladikavkaz, Baku, and Kazan') it was of a Menshevik nature."<sup>31</sup>

Firm Bolshevik-Leninists came out of the working people of the Transcaucasus: M. Mamed'yarov, B. A. Dadashev, M. B. Kasumov, Khanlar Safaraliyev, M. Aydynbekov, B. Sardarov, and many others. S. M. Efendiyev, M. Azizbekov, N. Narimanov, and others made a great contribution to the propaganda and dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideas in Muslim circles. It was precisely the Mensheviks among the Baku Azerbaydzhanis whose influence was small. They were more influential among the Azerbaydzhanis in Tbilisi (A. Karayev, S. Agamaly ogly, and I. Abilov). However, they too, after moving to Baku, joined the Bolshevik ranks. The same could be said of the left-wing S.R. Azerbaydzhanis (M. Vezirov, R. Akhundov, R. Guseynov, Kh. Zeynally and others) who joined the Bolshevik party in the period of the struggle for the establishment of a Soviet system in Baku and in Azerbaydzhani. One of them--Mir Gasan Vezirov--was among the 26 Baku commissars killed by the Anglo-S.R. executioners in Akhcha-Kuyma, on 20 September 1918.

The bourgeois Sovietologists are very reluctant to acknowledge that between 1918 and 1920 forces were being raised ready to put an end to the anti-people's bourgeois-landowning regime of the Musavatists, not only in proletarian Baku and the the great Baku proletariat, but among the toiling peasantry of Azerbaydzhani, and insure the establishment of a Soviet system in Azerbaydzhani. Characteristic in this respect is the claim by American Sovietologist F. Kazcmzade who claims that the "nationalistic attraction of the 'Musavata'" was so strong that no force within Azerbaydzhani itself could oppose it."<sup>32</sup>

Yet, the facts prove the opposite--the maturity of the revolutionary situation in Azerbaydzhani and the extent to which the toiling masses were fully resolved to overthrow the anti-people's Musavatist regime and raise in



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Azerbaijan the Red Flag of the Soviet system. Thus, in a 22 May 1919 letter to V. I. Lenin, A. I. Mikoyan emphasized that "social contradictions in Azerbaijan are more severe; there are greater class grounds for a coup, and there is greater dissatisfaction with and hatred for the existing government."<sup>33</sup> As early as the end of 1919 a representative of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities wrote to Moscow that "Today, Azerbaijan--the center of the future Soviet revolution in the Transcaucasus--is a bubbling caldron of revolutionary enthusiasm. One cannot trust one's own eyes. From November 1918 to February this year I criss-crossed the country four times; the growth of Bolshevik feelings among the peasant Muslim masses is totally amazing. I did not come across people not sympathizing with the Bolsheviks. The revolutionary stress is overwhelming. . . . Everyone is looking at Moscow. The countryside is secretly arming itself."<sup>34</sup> After discussing the 27 April letter of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee "On Transferring the Power to the Communists," at its extraordinary session the Azerbaijani parliament accepted the conditions by majority vote.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, how could there be a question of any power of attraction of the Musavat and of imposing on Azerbaijan the Soviet system from the outside?

The purpose of such claims is to convince the readers that the Soviet system was established in Azerbaijan as a result of its "seizure" by Soviet Russia. Such a falsification of the history of the establishment of the Soviet system in Azerbaijan has been reflected in Western encyclopedias as well. Thus, for example, one of them states that, "In 1918 Azerbaijan became an independent republic headed by the Musavatist Party. As a result of the difficult international (the military intervention of friendly Turkey and hostile Britain and war with Armenia) and the domestic (constant enmity between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and a Bolshevik underground in Baku) situation, the existence of the republic was unstable and in 1920 the Red Army easily seized Azerbaijan."<sup>36</sup> Another publication equates the Turkish occupation of Azerbaijan in 1918 with the calling of the Red Army by the government of Soviet Azerbaijan in 1920.<sup>37</sup>

One of the latest works by bourgeois Sovietologists on the history of revolutionary events in 1918 in Azerbaijan is the book by R. Syuni "The Baku Commune of 1917-1918. Class and Nation in the Russian Revolution." This work has already been critically reviewed by the republic's press.<sup>38</sup> However, the extremely gross distortions of the history of the great Baku commune it contains deserves a more thorough analysis and sharp criticism.

Only in individual cases do encyclopedias and other Western publications provide a less distorted picture of the establishment of the Soviet system in Azerbaijan. Thus, for example, The Encyclopedia of Islam states that "on 28 April 1920 a Soviet system was proclaimed in Baku without military opposition and Azerbaijan became one of the three Transcaucasian republics."<sup>39</sup> Another encyclopedia points out that "in April 1920 local communists came to power in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan was proclaimed a Soviet Socialist Republic which, in 1922, joined the Armenian and Georgian republics in the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, which became one of the first four members of the USSR."<sup>40</sup>

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In 1926 H. Buxton, who had visited the Transcaucasus both prior to and following the institution of the Soviet system, published his book. Objectively assessing the significance of the creation of the Transcaucasian Federation in 1922, the author wrote that, "The federation of the three republics is the most necessary achievement of the Soviet Government in the Transcaucasus."<sup>41</sup>

The Leninist theory of the national problem in the Transcaucasus is being subjected to the fierce attacks of the bourgeois falsifiers. Since 1970 Columbia University has offered a "Program for the Study of Soviet National Problems," particularly a program related to "Turko-Soviet research," headed by Edward Allworth. In 1970 and 1973 two works edited by him were published: "Soviet Nationality Problems," and "The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia,"<sup>42</sup> in which the national policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government is presented in a distorted fashion. Such "works" have been frequently subjected to substantiated critical analysis in the studies by Soviet scientists.<sup>43</sup>

From 30 November to 2 December 1967 a conference on "Russian Pressure on Asia," whose proceedings were published in 1972 as a collection entitled "Russia and Asia. Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian People," was held at Stanford University in the United States. Among other materials, the collection included an article by Bennigsen entitled "Muslims in the European Part of Russia and the Caucasus," which includes a great deal of data on the history of Azerbaydzhan.<sup>44</sup> The author acknowledges that Baku was one of the biggest centers of the revolutionary movement in pre-revolutionary Russia. At the same time, however, he tries to prove that the city was just about "the only place in the world where socialist ideas could penetrate among the Muslim workers" (p 150). Yet, historical facts confirm that the ideas of socialism met with the broadest possible response among the toiling Muslims not only of the entire Transcaucasus but in areas such as in Central Asia, along the Volga, and others, where, as in Baku, the toiling masses actively struggled for a Soviet system. A. Bennigsen emphasizes the impossibility of restraining the use of local languages (meaning Azerbaydzhani) as though such an objective had been set at all. He cites as an example the fact that according to the 1959 population census only 1.2% of the Azerbaydzhanis did not consider the Azerbaydzhani language as their native language. Let us note that this is an inaccuracy, since, according to the 1959 census, the share of individuals who did not consider Azerbaydzhani their native language was not 1.2 but 2.4%.<sup>45</sup> According to the 1970 census, compared with 1959, the indicator dropped to 1.8%. At the same time, in 1970 16.6% of the Azerbaydzhanis pointed out that they are fluent in a second, the Russian, language.<sup>46</sup> Therefore, it is a question not of pitting the native (in this case Azerbaydzhani) language against the Russian language or of reducing the one at the expense of the other, but of mastering both languages.

The bourgeois Sovietologists are doing everything possible to distort the reasons which motivated many peoples of the USSR, including the Azerbaydzhanis, who used an Arab script before the revolution, to adopt the Latin alphabet in the 1920's.<sup>47</sup> Let us emphasize in this connection that the

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question of replacing the Arab with the Latin alphabet had been raised by the outstanding Azerbaydzhani playwright and philosopher M. F. Akhundov as early as the 19th century. In this connection let us give justice to Guy Imart who published in 1967 in Paris an article on the life and activities of the outstanding governmental and cultural leader of Azerbaydzhan S. Agamaly ogly-- the initiator and organizer of the effort to replace the Arabic with the Latin alphabet in Azerbaydzhan and subsequently, in tens of other republics and oblasts in the USSR.<sup>48</sup> The well-known American linguist W. C. Townsend as well assessed as a positive phenomenon the conversion of the Azerbaydzhani and a number of other peoples of the USSR from the Arab to the Latin alphabets and, subsequently, to the Russian alphabet. As though summing up his two visits to Azerbaydzhan, he wrote that, "Thus, a cultural revolution came to Azerbaydzhan. It not only changed the external appearance of the Azerbaydzhani and his way of life, replacing the veil and the national clothing with European clothing, the donkeys with buses, and horses with airplanes, but also changed his spiritual world. Everything changed-- traditions, customs, homes, relations among members of a family, and social relations among people."<sup>49</sup>

Some bourgeois authors noted the successes achieved by the national republics of the USSR in the development of their economy and culture, and the fruitfulness of the implementation of the Leninist national policy in the USSR. Thus, in his article "What Is Taking Place in Soviet Asia?" published in 1971, G. Wheeler wrote that, "Of all changes which occurred over the past 50 years in the former colonial territories of Asia and Africa, the most significant is that of the implementation of the Soviet national policy in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia."<sup>50</sup> In 1977 he returned to this topic in his article "The Turkish Languages in Soviet Muslim Asia." In his view the Soviet linguistic policy is the only example of development and classification of the languages of small nations.<sup>51</sup>

The Western press has published a number of articles reflecting the condition of the sciences and arts in Soviet Azerbaydzhan, as a whole giving a positive assessment of the achievements of the Azerbaydzhani people in this area under the Soviet system. Thus, in 1959 the CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW carried an article entitled "The Development of Historical Science in Azerbaydzhan."<sup>52</sup> The author described the condition and development of the science of history in Soviet Azerbaydzhan, noting its achievements. He used Soviet publications as well in his study.

Ever more frequently works are published abroad on individual monuments of Azerbaydzhan literature, arts, and so on. Such studies are contributions to strengthening the friendship and reciprocal understanding among nations. Thus, in 1970, the lyrical poem of the brilliant Azerbaydzhani 12th century poet Nizami Gyandzhevi "Chosroes and Chirin," translated and extensively prefaced by Henri Masse,<sup>53</sup> was published in French. The famous Italian scientist A. Bombaci wrote a work published by UNESCO in 1970 on the book by Fyzuli "Leyla and Mejnun."<sup>54</sup> The following year he published the article "Place and Date of Fyzuli's Birth," a biography of the outstanding 16th

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century Azerbaydzhani poet Mukhammed Fyzuli.<sup>55</sup> Again in 1971 I. Mundhenc published in Hamburg the book "Friedrich Bodenstedt and Mirza Shaffi in Azerbaydzhani Literature."<sup>56</sup> In 1967 the "Comedies" of the outstanding Azerbaydzhani writer and philosopher M. F. Akhundov<sup>57</sup> were published in Paris. In 1972 H. W. Brands published in Frankfurt am Main (FRG) the article "19th Century Azerbaydzhani Satirical Poetry."<sup>58</sup> The author visited Baku and, in addition to his work, wrote a number of encyclopedic articles on the history of Azerbaydzhani literature.

In 1972 R. Burri published in Paris "The Quadrains of Nesimi," the outstanding Azerbaydzhani poet and philosopher of the 14th century, whose 600th birthday was recently celebrated by our entire country, sponsored by UNESCO.<sup>59</sup> That same year I. Ch. Burgel published in Wiesbaden the book "Nesami on Language and Poetry."<sup>60</sup>

In 1974, translated by G. Lewis, the Azerbaydzhani national epic "The Book of 'Dede Korkut'" was published in English.<sup>61</sup> In 1976 the article by C. Albright "The Azerbaydzhani Ashig and His Performance of Dastan,"<sup>62</sup> was published in the United States. In his article Albright attempted a brief characterization of the performance of the ashugs and their training. He described to the readers the structure of one part of the work entitled "Miradzhname of Abbas Tufarganli." The author considers as the most typical epic work the legend "Kerogly" which, in his words, is very popular among the Turkic peoples of Turkey, Azerbaydzhani, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tatar. It is performed also in Tadzhikistan, Armenia, and so on.

We have named several works by foreign scientists on the science and culture of Soviet Azerbaydzhani confirming that the outstanding successes achieved by the Azerbaydzhani people under the Soviet system, and the artistic monuments of its past riches are becoming accessible to the world's public. The tremendous accomplishments of Soviet Azerbaydzhani--one of the prospering sovereign union republics--prove the entire groundlessness of the attempts on the part of bourgeois "Sovietologists" to distort its past and its present.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Columbia Viking Desk Encyclopedia, 1960, p 72.
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3. Ibid, p 524. On the position held by the Mana kingdom in Azerbaydzhani history see ibid, pp 515, 157, 521, and 522, as well as "Istoriya SSSR" [History of the USSR], vol 1, Moscow, 1966, pp 178, and 183-184; Melikishvili, G. A., "Problems of the History of the Mana Kingdom," VESTNIK DREVNEY ISTORII, No 1, 1949; idem, "Drevnevostochnyye Materialy po Istории Narodov Zakavkaz'ya. Nairi-Urartu" [Ancient Oriental Materials on the History of the Peoples of the Transcaucasus. Nairi-Urartu], Tbilisi, 1954; Kashkay, S. M. "Iz Istории Manneyskogo Tsarstva" [From the History of the Mana Kingdom], Baku, 1977.

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4. Columbia Viking Desk Encyclopedia, p 72.
5. See Sysoyev, V. M. "Kratkiy Ocherk Istorii Azerbaydzhana (Severnogo)" [ Brief Outline of the History of Azerbaydzhana (Northern)], Baku, 1925, p 17.
6. "Vsemirnaya Istoriya," vol II, p 416.
7. "Istoriya SSSR," vol 1, p 415.
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11. DER BROCKHAUS, vol 1, 1928, pp 735-736.
12. Chamber's Encyclopedia. Geddic, 1930, vol 1, p 627.
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17. AVPR [Foreign Policy Archives of Russia], stock SRP, 9.14, sheets 105-107, 1722.
18. The Encyclopedia of Islam, vol 1, p 188.
19. Columbia Viking Desk Encyclopedia, 1960, p 72.
20. Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol 2, pp 931-933.
21. Ibid.
22. The Columbia Viking Desk Encyclopedia, 1956, p 129.
23. Yakubovskiy, A. Yu. "Masters of Iran and Central Asia under Timur" (3rd International Congress on Iranian Art and Archeology. Reports.) Moscow-Leningrad, 1939, p 277.

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25. Kaziyev, A. Yu. "Khudozhestvennoye Oformleniye Azerbaydzhanskoj Rukopisnoj Knigi XIII-XVII Vekov" [Artistic Presentation of Azerbaydzhani 13th-17th Century Manuscripts], Moscow, 1977.
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INTERNATIONAL

FORMER JURIST CITES USSR CRIME STATISTICS

Frankfurt/Main POSEV in Russian No 5, May 79 pp 46-52

[Article by Friedrich Neznanskiy: "Statistics on Crime in the USSR"]

[Text] We publish below data carefully concealed by the government, namely classified statistics on crime in the USSR. The author of the article worked for 10 years in the USSR Procuracy and then for 15 years in the Moscow Collegium of Attorneys.

The task of "overtaking and surpassing America" was repeatedly assigned by the party leadership from the time of the First Five-Year Plan. It is common knowledge that this task was fulfilled in a number of indices, such as per capita production of coal and cement for example. It is far less well known that this task threatens to be fulfilled in less favorable indices such as the number of homicides for example, and probably in a number of other criminal offenses.

It must be said from the start that the figures I shall cite here are difficult to compare with the American statistics. My figures for the USSR refer to convictions while most of the American ones refer to "crimes known to the police," only a small part of which go to court. But there are more or less comparable figures on the number of victims of criminal homicides.

In 1976, 15,878 persons were killed by criminals in the USSR and 18,780 in the United States. Calculated per 100,000 of the population, the difference is not very great, namely 6.0 homicides in the USSR and 8.8 in the United States. It must be noted here that the United States is by no means exemplary in the field of crime, although in some countries like Mexico, for example, (but also in Puerto Rico and some southern states of the USA) the number of homicides per unit of population is twice as high as the United States average. But in most of the countries for which we have reliable statistics the number is far lower.

For example in England, Belgium, Italy, Israel, France, the FRG, Sweden, Switzerland and even Poland the number of homicides per 100,000 of the population fluctuates around 1.0, and it is even lower in Denmark, Spain and Norway. And so when you consider that Russia under normal circumstances is more comparable with Europe than with the United States, we have 6 times more homicides than the "norm."

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Lack of Published Information

While frequently and readily publishing figures on the state of crime in the West and especially in the United States, the USSR has not published its own crimes for 50 years now, although Brezhnev said at the 25th Party Congress that "The party has no secrets from the people." Indications of the absolute figures were given for the last time in 1928, in the collection "Results of the 10 Years of Soviet Government in Figures, 1917-1927" (Moscow, 1928, p 109), which stated that "In 1924 the national and provincial courts of the Union tried 2.5 million cases, but in 1925 there were only 1.4 million of them."

If we believe the published data, this number continued to decrease until the present time, although only comparative figures are given.

"Minister of internal affairs Shchelikov noted that in 1972 crime was reduced throughout the whole country, while the number of most dangerous crimes was reduced by 4.6 percent, including first degree murders, robberies from the person, robberies and thefts of state, public and personal property." (PRAVDA 17 March 1973)

"Crimes per 10,000 of the population were reduced by 2 times in the postwar years." (SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, No 11, 1972, p 39)

"Crime was reduced by 2 times in 4 years after the end of the war and by 15 percent in the next 15 years." ("Soviet Court Statistics," 1976, p 294)

It would seem that the leaders of Soviet justice can be congratulated upon their progress. But actually all is not as well on the "judicial front" as they say and write. Crime prevention is the Soviet Union's fifth problem after the military, international, economic and national "difficulties" the Soviet government is experiencing in our time.

In the last 15 years in the USSR such a legal science as criminology has gained recognition, studying crime, its composition, structure, evolution and causes, the conditions contributing to it, the criminal personality, and crime prevention methods.

The Soviet criminologists I. Karpets, V. Kuznetsov, S. Ostroumov, N. Kuznetsova and N. Struchkov are trying to reveal the causes of crime in the USSR, but they are doing it timidly, with an eye to the "top," and evading the main consideration, namely that many crimes in the USSR flow from the very nature of socialism and the Soviet way of life. In evading the main point they talk about such causes as remnants of the past in people's consciousness and foreign influence upon their minds. And they indicate the existence of nonantagonistic socioeconomic contradictions in social experience as a secondary cause only.

The Soviet official circles are unwilling to publish statistics on crime in the USSR because then they would have to admit that it is vast and because analysis of these statistics would inevitably show that no significant curtailment of crime is possible under the conditions of socialism.

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I should like to part the curtains of secrecy a little and present some figures on crime in the USSR that I obtained in the GUMZ (Main Administration of Places of Confinement, formerly GULAG) of the USSR MVD and the Central Staff of the GUUR (Main Administration of Criminal Investigation) of the USSR MVD:

## Statistics on Convictions for 1976

Table 1

Kinds of Crimes	Persons Convicted in 1976	% of Total
1. Hooliganism	235,215	24.1
2. Crimes against the person	168,013	17.2
3. Embezzlement of state property	156,451	16.0
4. Crimes against private property	151,934	15.6
5. Motor transport crimes	97,388	10.0
6. Economic crimes	43,653	4.5
7. Crimes against administrative order	38,445	3.9
8. Service crimes	37,669	3.9
9. Crimes against justice	13,892	1.4
10. Other	33,430	3.4
Total	976,090	100%
Minor crimes	879,265	
Cases tried by comrades' courts	805,070	
Grand total	2,660,425	

According to Table 1, the courts and tribunals of the USSR convicted 976,090 persons during 1976. Let us see for what reasons they were convicted.

It is evident from the table that hooliganism is the queen of crimes in the USSR. I consider this a purely "Soviet" crime with no direct equivalent in the West. An ordinary quarrel in a communal flat, a fight because of jealousy, an exchange of insults between two fellow workers are colored as disturbances of the public peace. Such clashes are very often described as malicious hooliganism instead of matters of private complaint (although the law so provides).

Many theorists and practical workers, such as Prof of the Academy of Militia V. Malandin, Chief Counselor of Justice L. Parkhomenko, and Gen of the Militia E. Abramov have complained because almost one-third of those convicted of hooliganism are actually husbands turned in by their wives for punching them in settling disputes.

I could cite thousands of examples even from my own personal experience. Here, let us say, is the case of Nikolay Romanov. In 1976 he was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment by the Zhdanovskiy Rayon Court under Article 206 Section 3 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. The crime consisted of Romanov's expression of dissatisfaction with the conduct of his wife, a salesperson in the liquor department of a

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store who often did not come home until morning and then in an intoxicated condition. The victim, the wife, seized upon the moment when not she but her husband got drunk and called the militia. Of course Romanov directed all his anger against his wife, but it also affected the guardians of order. What is more the accused snatched a kitchen knife from the table. The court noted in the sentence that although at the start the offender's intention was to settle the hostile personal relations, he later turned to actions expressing a clear disregard for society, since obscene language was heard in the presence of the militia and neighbors in the apartment house. Consequently he should not be found guilty under Article 112 of the Criminal Code, carrying a penalty of up to 1 year, but under Article 206 Section 3 of the Criminal Code, carrying a penalty of up to 7 years' imprisonment.

Hooliganism often turns out to be an "elementary school" for commission of more serious crimes. The breakdown of hooliganism (simple, malicious and grossly malicious in degree) is as follows: simple, up to 40 percent; malicious, 45-50 percent; and grossly malicious, 10-12 percent. In addition, group hooliganism varies between 20 and 25 percent. It is characteristic of juveniles, rural crimes, and urban street hooliganism at night.

The case of Tovanets and the Demin brothers in Maloyaroslavets in 1975 may serve as an illustration. A group of juveniles terrorized the town. They were active in a cinema and a club, beating up small boys and girls. The victims appealed to older juveniles for help, who beat up the initiators of the fights. But the defenders who beat up the latter were also with them, and the older brothers, who were also with the original victims, took their own measure of preventive action. On a cold October day Tovanets and the Demin brothers chased the "terrorists" into a cold pond and did not let them go for a good hour. In court they said, "If the militia does not fight hooliganism, we decided to establish order in the city ourselves." The "fighters for a model communist city" were sentenced to 3 years with an assignment to buildings of the national economy.

Hooliganism is a unique barometer of the climate of Soviet society. According to the coefficient of convictions the incidence of hooliganism in the cities and workers' settlements is 1.5 times higher than in the villages. One-third and more of all instances occur in houses and apartment buildings. In 65 percent of the cases the victims are known to the offender. From 30 to 35 percent of the offenses are committed in streets and yards and 25 percent in public places. Over 25 percent of them occur on days off and 60 percent in free time after work. In leisure hours minor hooliganism accounts for 95 percent of all manifestations, most often between 6 and 10 in the evening. All this indicates that hooliganism is a typical crime related to the disorganization and low standards of leisure and of society as a whole. The total recidivism of hooliganism is higher than that of all crimes.

About 95 percent of all those convicted of hooliganism are men and only 5 percent are women. Up to 80-90 percent of them committed the crimes while drunk and four-fifths of them drink regularly. Criminological studies made by jurists and psychiatrists in a number of rayons of Moskovskaya Oblast in 1976-1977 established the fact that about 30 percent of the male working population of such

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cities as Orekhovo-Zuyevo, Pavlovo-Posad and Voskresensk are chronic alcoholics on record with psychiatrists.

Crimes against the person are in second place after hooliganism. They include first degree murders, serious bodily harm, rapes and other encroachments upon life, health and dignity of the person. Soviet juveniles have contributed their share to this. They commit a large number of homicides, rapes and serious bodily injuries. Officially homicides account for about 9 percent of all crimes against the person. As we have already said, 15,978 persons were killed by criminals in the whole country in 1976.

The homicides are committed chiefly on days off, on state and religious holidays, and on days of family celebrations and ceremonies. From 33 to 50 percent of them are committed from hooligan motives, 17-20 percent for revenge, 12-14 percent out of jealousy, only 8-9 percent from mercenary motives (24 percent in 1930), and 3 percent to cover another crime. Three percent are accompanied by rape and 4 percent are infanticides.

From 46 to 48 percent of the homicides, 30 percent of the serious bodily injuries, and 25 percent of the rapes are committed in apartment houses and private dwellings. Over 40 percent of the homicides and serious bodily injuries and more than 20 percent of the rapes are committed on the streets. Note that the rapes are of a pronounced "seasonal" character, 65-70 percent of them being committed from May to September.

In 40 percent of the homicides household piercing and cutting objects were used, in 8 percent of them a handmade cold gun, and in every fourth case such "chance" weapons as stakes, bricks or heavy objects. About 30 percent of the homicides are committed with firearms (mostly shotguns).

Some 97 percent of the homicides from hooligan motives are committed in a state of drunkenness. In Moscow and suburbs from two to three first degree murders are committed every 24 hours.

According to the number of convictions, embezzlement of state and public property is in third place, not far behind crimes against the person. This is one of the few kinds of crimes that Brezhnev mentioned in his report at the 25th party congress: "They (the laws) must counteract the existing facts of defrauding the government, attachments, and embezzlement of socialist property..." (Publishing House of Political Literature, 1976, p 99). But even the Soviet criminologists admit that "over the last 10 years the number of embezzlements has not markedly declined." ("Criminology," 1976, p 332) If the number of convictions for embezzlement in 1962 is taken as 100 percent, it was 98 percent in the next 5-year period and 77 percent in the one after that.

Embezzlements are broken down into three groups:

- Embezzlements by theft, robbery or piracy;
- Embezzlements committed by way of conversion, speculation or abuse of office;

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- Minor embezzlements.

The breakdown is as follows: One-half of all convictions for embezzlement are for embezzlements by theft (Article 89 of the Criminal Code), one-fifth are for embezzlements by way of speculation, conversion and abuse of office (Article 92 of the Criminal Code), and one-fourth are for minor embezzlements (Article 96 of the Criminal Code). The other kinds taken together account for 4 percent of the convictions. One out of 200 plunderers is convicted of embezzlements on a particularly large scale. Group embezzlements account for about 56 percent. For example, in the case of embezzlement of vegetables and fruits from the Leninskiy Rayon Produce Procurement Office, 30 persons were indicted, and 100 persons in the case of the Moscow Transportation Agency. Cases against 50-100 persons have been investigated in the operations of the Moscow City Procuracy, the RSFSR Procuracy, the USSR Procuracy, the USSR MVD, the Investigation Administration of the GUVD /Main Administration of Internal Affairs/ of the Moscow Gorispolkom, and the Transport and Air Militia. Cases larger in volume are sometimes broken down, contrary to law, into smaller cases.

In number of convictions, crimes against citizens' private property are not far behind crimes against public property. Criminologically, these crimes are subdivided into nonviolent encroachments (theft, fraud and simple robbery) and encroachments with violence to the person.

Of those convicted of brigandage and robbery, city dwellers account for 81.1 percent and villagers 18.9 percent. About 60 percent infringe upon private property and 40 percent upon state property. The methods of committing fraud against state and public property are as follows:

- Obtaining valuable items in a clothing rental shop and selling them, 29 percent;
- Obtaining pay increases with false documents, 9 percent;
- Obtaining money with false documents, 29 percent;
- Obtaining pensions with false documents, 7 percent;
- Other methods, 26 percent.

Methods of defrauding citizens of their private property:

- Obtaining money under pretext of purchasing scarce goods for the victim, 38 percent;
- Borrowing money, 12 percent;
- Obtaining money under pretext of doing some one a service, 10 percent;
- Fraud by technical means (palming off a "doll" instead of money), 10 percent;
- Machinations with fraud (card games), 8 percent;
- Obtaining money through use of superstition, 7 percent;

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- Other methods, 15 percent.

Motor transport crimes account for increasing percentages. They amount to three-fourths of all crimes resulting from negligence. The other fourth are official negligence, violation of labor safety rules, and negligent homicide. Motor transport crimes include:

- Hitting pedestrians, 37 percent;
- Collision of transport means, 25 percent;
- Overturning transport means, 17 percent.

About 45 percent of those killed or wounded by motor vehicles are pedestrians, one third of them having been drunk. About 15 percent of the victims are children.

Economic crimes are the next category according to number of convictions. Nineteenths of them are mercenary crimes: defrauding purchasers and customers (Article 156 of the Criminal Code), speculation (Article 154 of the Criminal Code), unlawful private enterprise activity and commercial middleman operations (Article 153 of the Criminal Code), and illegal manufacture, sale or storage of alcoholic beverages (Article 158 of the Criminal Code).

V. Lenin explained the causes of speculation very simply:

"A landowner government (under a czar) and a capitalist government (under the most free and democratic republic) always and everywhere ... help the speculators and the rich to make a profit at the expense of the ruined poor." (Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 38, p 375)

What would Vladimir Il'yich say today when he saw tens of thousands of Soviet people, who were born in the years of Soviet power and have not seen a live capitalist, trading in dachas, machines, building materials, clothing and food products?

Prof V. Tanasevich writes:

"Under modern conditions speculation arises and spreads because of the shortage of goods and the inability of the trade organizations to properly adjust the sale of the provisions and industrial and other commodities at their disposal." ("Criminology," Moscow, 1976, p 352)

Here, as anywhere, the explanation of the causes of crime leads to legal problems, which are related to economics and economics is related to politics. The thousands of transactions concluded every day near the Southern Harbor in Moscow, where the motor vehicles of private traders are sold, serve as an example.

Service crimes were widespread in the 1920's and 1930's, amounting to 31 percent of the total in 1934. By 1970 their proportion was down to 2.1 percent and in



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the next few years it rose again somewhat to 3.9 percent. Negligence accounts for one-half of the service crimes, abuse of office over one-third, and graft about one-eighth. This category also includes exceeding authority and official forgery. Workers of the economic apparatus predominate, primarily trade workers and officials with material responsibility.

Crimes against administrative order are things apart and the number of convictions for them is no less than that of the convictions for service crimes. Many violations of "administrative order" are of a pronounced political nature. They include "deliberate dissemination of falsehoods discrediting the Soviet system," (Article 190<sup>1</sup> of the Criminal Code), desecration of the flag, organization and participation in group activities disrupting the social order, and resistance to a government representative (Articles 190-193 of the Criminal Code).

And finally, the crimes against justice are to be noted. In the Shcharanskiy case alone 21 violations of the Code of Procedure can be counted. But among the crimes against justice we will find almost no cases on deliberate indictment of an innocent person, deliberately unjust sentencing, deliberately false arrest, knowingly false charges or forced testimony. Instead of those the cases concern failure to report a crime, refusal of a witness to testify, embezzlement of property under duress, escape from prisons, unwarranted return of an exile, and concealment of crimes.

At the Conference of Workers of the Administrative Organs in 1976, Minister of Justice V. Terebilov said that judicial errors now amount to 1 percent (that is, every 100th case). Accordingly, even by official admission about 10,000 innocent people a year are sentenced to various terms.

Besides the above-mentioned basic statistics on crime in the Soviet Union, there are additional ones that are intentionally left out of the general account. These are minor criminal offenses such as minor embezzlements, small-scale speculation and minor hooliganism.

In 1976, 879,265 such cases were recorded.

The statistical organs of the USSR (the Central Statistical Administration (TsSU) under the USSR Council of Ministers, the divisions of judicial statistics of the USSR Ministry of Justice and the USSR Procuracy, and the Main Scientific Research Center for Management and Information of the USSR MVD) regard these crimes as "misdemeanors" and do not include them in the general statistical abstract on crime.

Furthermore about a million cases of "private accusation" are erroneously left out of the "statistics." The comrades' courts of the Soviet Union considered 280,000 of them.

Our Table 1 indicates that if these two categories of cases are included, the grand total of major and minor crimes for 1976 will reach 2,660,425. Note that these are only crimes penalized by courts and do not include the undoubtedly very large number of crimes not brought to trial.

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The matter of unrecorded and latent crime in the USSR is quite another thing. And there is even "planned" crime too. Once when I was attending a conference of builders of the RSFSR I was considerably astonished when the minister of construction announced from the rostrum that the increase in the volume of operations for the republic was set at 200 percent and that officials who exceeded this limit would be called to account for it.

If one takes the Soviet laws seriously, Soviet trade, public catering, the hotel economy, health protection, institutions for sports and entertainment, higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, the procurement system for agricultural products, the various sectors of industry, housing construction and housing administration, the transportation network and many other things are infested with mass organized crime. Abuses of office, bribery, embezzlements, attachments to plans, and fraud are committed everywhere, every hour and on a large scale. All this is the Soviet "white collar" crime, which is never mentioned in the Soviet press in application to the USSR. No less than 20 million Soviet people have been drawn into the orbit of concealed crimes.

## Statistics on Number of Convicts as of 1 January 1977

Table 2

Kinds of Crimes	Number of Convicts	% of Total
1. Hooliganism	354,723	22.0
2. Crimes against the person	322,475	20.0
3. Embezzlement of state property	257,980	16.0
4. Crimes against private property	257,980	16.0
5. Motor transport crimes	96,742	6.0
6. Economic crimes	80,618	5.0
7. Crimes against administrative order	64,495	4.0
8. Service crimes	64,495	4.0
9. Crimes against justice	24,185	1.5
10. Other	88,685	5.5
Total	1,612,378	100%
On buildings of the national economy	495,711	
Grand total	2,108,089	

According to Table 2, on 1 January 1977 some 1,612,378 persons were serving sentences in the corrective-labor institutions of the USSR, and 495,711 more were serving sentences on the so-called "construction jobs of the national economy," in accordance with Ukase of the PVS /Presidium of the Supreme Soviet/ of 12 June 1970. According to the statements of Soviet jurists, this is a suspended sentence, but actually the treatment on these construction jobs differs little from that in a corrective-labor colony.

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Upon comparing the distribution according to kinds of crimes of persons convicted in 1976 (Table 1) and of persons serving sentences (Table 2), we shall see that the proportions of the various kinds of crimes are on the whole analogous. The main difference is that a higher percentage of convicts are "doing time" for crimes against the person. This is explained by the longer terms of imprisonment.

If we single out the crimes occasioned for the most part by the nature of the Soviet system (such as embezzlement of state property, economic crimes, service crimes, crimes against administrative order, etc.) we shall see that at least one-third of the convicts are serving sentences for petty crimes which are occasioned by the nature of the Soviet system and which play a very insignificant part in a normal, open society. As in other areas as well, the system makes great efforts to overcome difficulties created by itself.

But it would be wrong to believe that the public opinion of the democratic forces of the West has no effect upon government circles in the USSR. I know it for a fact that Ukase of the USSR PVS of 8 February 1977 freeing almost 400,000 persons from labor camps was passed under pressure of the free-thinking forces of the Western countries. Minister of Internal Affairs Shchelokov, who initiated this important law, talked about this at a conference. And note that this was not the general prosecutor, the chairman of the Supreme Court, or the minister of justice, but the minister of internal affairs!

The 25 percent reduction of the number of convicts in labor-corrective institutions (a very extraordinary occurrence) remained little known in the West because it did not apply to political prisoners. At the start of 1977, 10,358 of the convicts in labor-corrective institutions were political prisoners. Most of them were convicted under articles of the Criminal Code not applying to political crimes. In Table 2 they are included in the categories of "crimes against administrative order" and "other" crimes.

By way of a summary, we may attempt a comparison of the total numbers of convicts in the USSR and the United States. There are 263,000 persons in the federal and state prisons of the United States, plus about 140,000 persons held for short terms in jails of municipal and other local departments. In all there are about 400,000 convicts, or 1.8 per 1,000 of the population. In the USSR, including the construction jobs of the national economy but excluding those released according to the law of 8 February 1977, there are 1.7 million convicts, or 6.6 per 1,000 of the population. Of course 1.7 million is not the 15 million who served terms in GULAG, but it is still 3.5 times as many as in the United States, computed per unit of population.

Realizing that mass crime harbors a huge destructive force, the Soviet government has taken a number of crime-prevention measures since Stalin's death and especially in the last decade. Analysis of these measures and of the construction of the repressive machine is another subject.

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TRAINING WORKERS FROM CENTRAL ASIA

Moscow VOPROSY EKONOMIKI in Russian No 5, May 79 pp 84-91

[Article by M. Orazgel'dyyev, Ashkhabad: "Training Personnel from the Local Population of the Central Asian Republics"]

[Text] During the modern phase of communist construction, the qualitative factors in economic development are becoming especially important. This applies equally to the labor force; to a great extent, the rate of growth in public production and an increase in its efficiency are dependent upon the level of work force utilization. The correspondence between the primary units of productive forces--between the labor force and the means of production--is a necessary condition for accelerated development of public production. The contemporary period is characterized by an accelerated rate of scientific and technological progress which is levying increased demands on the qualitative characteristics of employees, primarily on their level of education and specialized training.

The decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress assigned the mission of increasing the training of skilled personnel from the local population. This provision is extremely important for the Central Asian republics where the problem of supplying local nationals for the new enterprises has not been solved.

The improvement in manpower quality via training of skilled personnel--including those from the local population in the Central Asian republics as well as in other regions of the country--is based upon a wide network of higher and secondary educational institutions, schools, vocational-technical schools and also upon training directly at enterprises and kolkhozes. The scale of personnel training has been intensively expanded, especially in recent years. The number of specialties and vocations for which skilled workers and specialists are being trained has also increased. At present, personnel are being trained in 164 specialties in the higher educational institutions and secondary specialized educational institutions of Turkmenia

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alone as compared to 138 in 1964. In Kirgizia, higher educational institutions are training highly skilled personnel in 86 specialties and secondary specialized institutions are training personnel in 120 specialties. A significant number of well-trained workers and highly-skilled specialists are being brought into the different sectors of these republics' national economies on an annual basis.

As a result, the significant increase in the educational level for the entire population, including workers, should be pointed out. Thus, by the beginning of 1976, there were 779 people with a higher and secondary education per 1,000 of those employed in the Uzbek SSR; the figure was 763 for the Kirgiz SSR, 737 for the Tadzhik SSR and 795 for the Turkmen SSR.

Based on the increased educational level and the modernization of equipment and production techniques, the number and percentage of skilled workers is constantly increasing and worker skill levels are also increasing. From 1960 through 1970, the percentage of skilled workers in the Uzbek SSR's industry increased from 43.3 to 59.1. According to the data from a one-time estimate of the vocational composition of the work force, the percentage of skilled and highly skilled workers (workers in the third category or higher) in Turkmenia's industry was 62.4 in 1972; it was 65.8 in construction, 72.4 for railway transportation and 43 percent in communications. The kolkhoz workers' level of general and vocational training also increased noticeably.

The change in the ratio between physical and mental labor is the most important indication of the qualitative improvement in the work force. Thus, the number of people primarily employed in physical labor as a percentage of total people employed in the Central Asian Republics declined from 83.2 percent in 1959 to 76.2 percent in 1970. Moreover, skilled personnel, including those from the local population, are being trained at a higher rate than the national average. National cadres of skilled workers and specialists have been created in all the Central Asian Republics; they comprise a significant part of the people employed in the national economy. Local national blue and white collar workers presently make up more than 52 percent of the total number of workers and specialists employed in the national economy in the Uzbek SSR.

In spite of the success which has been achieved, the degree of qualitative development in manpower resources and the work force's level of general and specialized training--especially for cadres of local nationals--do not meet the modern demands of a quickly-growing national economy in the Central Asian republics. Therefore, on the one hand, the national economy's

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requirements for manpower are not being completely met in these republics and, on the other hand, the population's requirements are not being met at work. With the significant reserves of unused manpower, a number of the national economy's sectors, primarily industrial sectors, are systematically experiencing personnel shortages.

It should also be pointed out that the level of skilled workers in the Central Asian republics is still lower than the national average; this is indicated by the workers' lower average grade category in all the industrial sectors. Due to the insufficient level of development in the work force, especially its level of vocational training, the labor of a certain part of the able-bodied population is not being used in the Central Asian republics. These republics have the highest percentage of the able-bodied population not employed in public production in the country. Thus, this index is presently over 17 percent in Turkmenia. Of course, to a great extent, this situation is caused by the indigent population's high fertility and large families; however, as shown by the data from a random sample of the unemployed and also by the material from the 1970 Census, it is precisely the insufficient level of training which is one of the primary reasons for the able-bodied population's relatively low level of employment in public production. Therefore, increasing the level of general and vocational training is a very important condition for drawing the unemployed into public production.

Current production capacity is not being completely used due to poor manpower training. The figures for work shifts are presently low in the industries of these republics; moreover, a downward trend is observed in them. The shortage of skilled personnel and specialists is the primary reason for this.

Thus, the insufficient development of manpower in this region leads to significant losses in public labor and to under-utilization of production capacity; it has a negative effect on increasing the efficiency of public production.

Low geographical, vocational and social mobility is characteristic of the population of the Central Asian republics, especially the rural population. Again, the relatively low level of general and specialized training is one of the primary reasons for this. The creation of national cadres, including workers for industrial sectors, is still the most important, contemporary problem for generating manpower in these republics.

In spite of the increased level of vocational training for the work force, the local population's industrial work skills are still insignificant; this is indicated by the low percentage of national

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cadres in the national economy's industrial sectors. The percentage of national cadres in the Uzbek SSR's industry is more than 1.6 times lower than the percentage of the local population to the republic's total population. With a percentage of indigenous population to total population of 65.6 in Turkmenia, their percentage among those employed in industrial sectors was 36.7 percent as of 1 June 1973; this included 35.5 percent in industry, 37.7 percent in construction, 34.8 percent in transportation and 37.4 percent in communications. This is explained to a certain extent by the disparity between the geographical location of the industrial sectors and the places where the indigent population lives, as well as by current national traditions. In rural areas and in the small and medium size cities where the indigent population primarily lives, the level of development for industry and other industrial sectors is relatively low. Personnel are hardly trained at all for industry and other industrial sectors in the majority of the small and medium size cities or in the rural vocational-technical schools; therefore, young people from the country do not have sufficient industrial work skills and they do not serve as a source of manpower for non-agricultural sectors. Thus, with significant reserves of manpower resources in Turkmenia, especially in rural areas, elements of the Interkolkhoz Construction Association are experiencing manpower shortages.

An increase in the level of general and specialized training will play a large role in the intensive transition to non-agricultural sectors by the indigent population of the Central Asian republics. Numerous data attest to this fact. First of all, the educational level of the rural population--the overwhelming majority of which are people from the indigent nationalities--is a great deal lower than the corresponding level for the urban population. According to the 1970 Census, per 1,000 people employed in the national economy of the Central Asian republics, there were 123 people with a higher and incomplete higher education and 123 people with a secondary specialized education among the urban population; the respective figures for the rural population were 44 and 45, or 2.7 times smaller.

Like all the other people of our country, the people of Central Asia have achieved a great deal of success in mastering the Russian language. Data from the 1959 and 1970 censuses show that the percentage of Uzbeks, Kirgiz, Tadzhik and Turkmen who called Russian their native or second language increased during the period between the censuses. The entrance examinations to higher and secondary specialized educational institutions also indicate an improvement in Russian language instruction in the schools and they indicate a steady increase in young

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people's level of knowledge. However, a poor knowledge of Russian is still an important cause of the low rate of people moving from the country to the city.

A further improvement in Russian language instruction, especially in rural schools, is required in the interest of increasing the local population's social and geographical mobility and in the interest of efficiently redistributing the population between the country and city. Evidently, there will be increased training of young people from Central Asia as skilled personnel and specialists in other areas of the country in the future; this will also bring about a further improvement in Russian language instruction.

It should be pointed out that, under the conditions in the Central Asian republics, population migration from the country to the city is not as important in itself as is creating conditions to improve the rural population's mobility based on changes to its lifestyle. This primarily presupposes inculcating the indigent population with a broad range of industrial work skills and getting it used to non-agricultural work. Evidently, a solution to this urgent and complex problem should be based upon setting up physical facilities to acquire industrial work skills in the localities--locating industries and industrial types of production in rural areas and in small and medium size cities, introducing mechanization of agricultural production, widely developing agro-industrial integration; increasing the scale of personnel training, bringing the network of educational institutions closer to the places where rural young people are concentrated, increasing the number of "urban" vocations; and increasing economic incentives for the indigent population to transfer to non-agricultural, industrial sectors.

In recent years, a certain amount of work has been done in the Central Asian republics to bring industrial production closer to rural areas and to small and medium size cities. However, the practice of primarily locating industrial production and economic and cultural facilities in major cities is still dominant; this leads to difficulty in manpower utilization. Under these conditions, there is an acute need to locate industrial enterprises on a more widespread basis in small and medium size cities where there are significant reserves of manpower. When systematic training is being set up for the unemployed and when manpower freed from agriculture is being retrained for non-agricultural sectors, including industrial enterprises, these manpower resources can be replenished with cadres of workers from the local population.

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Of course, the siting of productive forces is accomplished by not only considering the effect of the labor factor but also by considering the effect of a number of other factors: the existence of a raw material base, power and water resources, etc. However, the development of power engineering and transportation has reduced the dependence of siting production on these factors; as scientific and technological progress develops, this trend will increase. Therefore, the presence of manpower resources is presently the primary, determining factor in siting production in Central Asia.

Industrial production can be developed in the small and medium size cities and in rural areas of the Central Asian republics via processing of agricultural produce and the construction materials industries; there are local raw materials and the possibility of an unlimited market for setting up and developing these sectors. However, the volume of production for the light, food and a number of other industrial sectors should not be limited to local demand; they can also include supplying the requirements in other areas of the country. The development of these enterprises and small industries will not only make it possible to draw significant contingents of the able-bodied population into public production but they will also make it possible to make more complete and efficient use of these republics' very rich natural resources and climatic conditions. By drawing new, irrigated land into agriculture, the Central Asian republics can become a major food and vegetable center for the country, a center which supplies the central part of Russia, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East with fresh fruit and vegetables as well as produce processed from them.

The development of enterprises from sectors of Group B in the localities will not only be of economic importance but also of great social importance--it will facilitate the swift and efficient development of industrial work skills among the indigent population and it will increase its mobility. Developing and siting enterprises which are simple technologically--this is the way to create conditions for more widespread development of complex production: machine building, radio equipment, instrument making, electronics and other sectors.

With contemporary conditions in Central Asia--where the population still does not have a high degree of mobility--it would be advisable to proceed with the construction of small enterprises in the localities and also with locating branches and individual shops of major industrial enterprises there.

However, preferential location of new construction in rural areas does not solve the problem of stimulating the rural population to

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relocate in cities. A high natural increase in rural population, freeing manpower from agriculture due to increased labor productivity, the demand for manpower in cities, etc. are the primary factors which induce people to relocate from the country to the city. This problem will become more critical in the future since the process of freeing people employed in agriculture will noticeably increase.

The indigent population is distinguished by its high level of acclimatization to the region's cities. Thus, in Kirgizia, the degree of acclimatization for the Kirgiz who came from rural areas to the republic's cities is almost 25 percent higher than the average for all migrants and 56 percent higher than that for the Russians and Ukrainians who came here. In the Turkmen SSR, the level of acclimatization for the new settlers from the republic's countryside is 15-20 percent higher than that for settlers from rural areas in other republics.

Preliminary vocational training for the rural population in "urban" vocations both in localities and by sending young rural people to urban vocational-technical schools and also to courses of instruction at enterprises by granting them certain privileges and economic incentives is one of the most important conditions for increasing the intensity of relocating people from the country to the city. However, the current scale of personnel training in Central Asia does not completely support the national economy's requirements for skilled manpower. In the Central Asian republics, a large gap has now appeared between the number of young people who are entering the able-bodied age and their opportunities for specialized and vocational training. Thus, the number of young people annually reaching able-bodied age in Uzbekistan and Turkmenia presently exceeds the possibility of being accepted by an educational institution by a factor of approximately three.

In the interest of increasing efficient utilization of manpower resources and of providing a more complete supply of skilled manpower for the national economy, all the young people reaching able-bodied age should be involved in some form of specialized or vocational skill training.

Technological progress is advancing more and more new requirements on the forms and methods for training and retraining personnel. Experience shows that skilled workers are usually trained at fixed educational institutions and at vocational-technical schools, especially schools which provide a secondary education. The number of students studying in the secondary school curriculum was 48.6 percent in the Uzbek SSR and 45.9 percent in the Tadzhik SSR in 1977. This figure was 40.6 percent for Turkmenia in 1975.

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The necessary conditions are being established to accomplish an enormous socio-economic task--universal secondary education.

In contrast to many areas, all sources of additional manpower for non-agricultural sectors are very important in the Central Asian republics--young people reaching able-bodied age, the able-bodied population employed in domestic and private subsidiary farming and drawn into public production and the able-bodied population freed from agriculture. In connection with this, it is necessary to set up a differentiated system for training the different categories of the able-bodied population: expanding the existing network of schools, setting up new courses, schools, secondary specialized and higher educational institutions--both for day and evening programs--and bringing them closer to the places where people from the indigenous nationalities are concentrated. It is necessary to increase the acceptance of young rural people, including the young women of the indigenous nationalities, to higher educational institutions and secondary specialized educational institutions by establishing certain privileges for them when they enter.

It is also extremely important to set up training for young working people. In spite of the significant increase in the population's general educational level, a rather large part of the workers only have a primary education. For example, over 31 percent of the young people working in Turkmenia (employed in all sectors of the national economy) do not have a secondary education; 80 percent of them are not involved in evening studies.

The solution to the problem of increasing the level of general and specialized training for young people in the Central Asian republics requires further improvement in the geographical location of educational institutions by considering the low mobility of the indigenous population. Almost all the higher and secondary specialized educational institutions are located in the capitals, oblast centers and large cities. At the same time, the network of educational institutions is not sufficiently developed in the outlying areas. Given the poor mobility of the population, this creates difficulties for young rural people, especially for the young women of the indigenous nationalities who have a serious interest in education.

In spite of the fact that young women from the local nationalities make up almost half of the young people annually reaching able-bodied age in these republics, the percentage of them among students of higher and secondary specialized educational institutions

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is still extremely low. For Turkmenia, this figure is presently 12.3 percent for students of higher and secondary specialized educational institutions and only 3.3 percent for students of vocational-technical educational institutions. In a number of Central Asian republics, specifically in Turkmenia, young women are saddled with housework. The low level of vocational training for young women and their lack of a specific vocation and specialty are some of the primary reasons for this negative phenomenon in Central Asia.

The number of early marriages is still relatively high in Central Asia; therefore, it is important that young women from the indigenous nationalities obtain a vocation and specialty before they get married, immediately after completing secondary schooling or even before completing it. In this respect, improving the vocational training organization and vocational guidance for young students, especially rural students, is becoming extremely important. The specific conditions of the Central Asian republics dictate the need to introduce vocational education into rural general education schools on a more widespread basis in the near future in order to train students for all the narrow vocations and specialties.

It is possible to teach the popular vocations to students in the senior classes in many of the rural schools in the Central Asian republics. It is evidently necessary to set up training for the vocations of tractor driver, driver, electrician, construction and other workers' specialties required in the national economy on a more widespread basis in rural schools and inter-school polytechnical training centers. Special attention must be devoted to vocational training for young women. In the modern stage of economic development, there is an urgent requirement that worker and specialist training must meet the national economy's pattern of demand for personnel. The current training system in the Central Asian republics does not completely meet these requirements. Primary school education is widely developed in these republics; Central Asia lags behind the other regions of the country in its level of development for other forms of training, especially in specialized and vocational training. The number of students in vocational-technical schools, secondary specialized educational institutions and higher educational institutions per 10,000 population is significantly lower than the national average in the Central Asian republics. In the 1976-77 school year, there were 192 students in higher educational institutions and 179 in secondary specialized educational institutions per 10,000 people for the USSR as a whole; the figures for Central Asia were 161 and 129, respectively. The number of skilled workers trained in (graduated from) vocational-technical educational institutions was 82

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for the USSR and 57 for Central Asia in 1976. The number of specialists in the sectors of the national economy in the Central Asian republics is also lower. There were 194 specialists with higher and secondary specialized educations per 1,000 people employed in the country's national economy in 1975. The figure in the Uzbek SSR was 180; it was 187 in the Kirgiz SSR 177 in the Tadzhik SSR and 166 in the Turkmen SSR.

The disparity between the general and vocational specialized educational systems is one of the reasons that, with the reserves of manpower with a relatively high general educational level, the national economy in the Central Asian republics is experiencing shortages in skilled workers and specialist personnel. This can be explained to a great extent by the fact that the overwhelming majority of those completing general education schools are placed in jobs in agriculture and only a small part of them are placed in jobs in non-agricultural sectors. For example, over 70 percent of the people completing general education schools in Turkmenia in 1976 were placed in agricultural jobs.

Meanwhile, the objective conditions (the significant number of young people in the total population and in the working population, the large demand for personnel and the high percentage of unemployed) demand that the level of development for specialized and vocational training should not be lower than the national average in the Central Asian republics.

Improved training for skilled national cadres is also advantageous from the point of view of the national economy--it would reduce expenditures on organizing recruiting and placement of workers from other republics and it would noticeably reduce manpower turnover since the people arriving from the country's other republics and regions are more susceptible to turnover. A sharp increase in training skilled personnel from the local population could lead to a reduction in the flow of manpower from the country's central and eastern regions to Central Asia; the balance of manpower resources in these regions is extremely tense without this flow.

Our conditions which will make it possible for the Central Asian republics to meet the national economy's needs for skilled worker and specialist personnel with its own manpower resources should be established within the next decade. However, this does not mean that personnel training should be set up for all vocations and specialties in this region or in one of the Central Asian republics. It is obvious that, as before, personnel will have to continue to be trained in other regions and republics for individual vocations and specialties where demand is not high.

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The practice of sending young people from the Central Asian republics to national construction sites merits serious attention and expansion. This measure should be viewed as a unique form for training personnel in economic regions which have valuable experience in economic and cultural construction.

The increased requirements for a quality work force are bringing about a need to improve several aspects of planning. First of all, the location of new construction requires thorough consideration of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of current manpower resources. Manpower must be trained ahead of time for new industrial enterprises and for economic and cultural construction facilities, before they are brought on-line. Day and evening schools and courses for training personnel from local nationalities should be established in cities and regions of new construction. The manpower and facilities of the appropriate national ministries and departments must be brought into this work.

The high natural growth rates in the population of the Central Asian republics raises the issue of the feasibility of using the young people of these republics in other regions of the country in the future. It is obvious that this must proceed in the direction of expanding training for skilled personnel in the Central Asian republics themselves and in the direction of organizing and training skilled personnel from the young people of Central Asia in the areas where they are used. In order to increase the possibilities for young people from the Central Asian republics to enter higher educational institutions, secondary specialized educational institutions and vocational-technical schools in other regions of the country, it is necessary to improve the general educational training of students, especially Russian language instruction, and to expand the preparatory departments at higher educational institutions.

The age-sex composition of the able-bodied population is a very important index of the qualitative characteristics of the labor force. Sex and age population groups differ in physical data, educational level and degree of vocational and speciality mobility. The sex and age manpower requirements for individual sectors are different. The demand for work for different age-sex groups among the population is also not the same. A consideration of these special features is highly significant in supplying the national economy with manpower and in more fully utilizing manpower resources.

From this point of view, it should be pointed out that the sector pattern of public production has developed successfully

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in the Central Asian republics. The most important sectors of the national economy, including industry, which primarily anticipate using female labor (light, food, etc.) have developed sufficiently. Along with this, there will be a great deal of work on further improving the economic structure in a number of cities and regions. Measures to further increase employment for women should provide for an improvement in their working conditions, the gradual elimination of women working on jobs which do not correspond to their psycho-physiological features, expanded employment for women in skilled jobs and widespread organization of vocational training for women.

A more complete utilization of manpower resources and supplying the national economy with manpower presuppose detailed consideration of the special features of the population's age structure, and primarily the ratio between the population's young, middle-aged and elderly age groups. In the future, the number of people employed in the national economy will be primarily increased by young people with sufficiently high education. In order to prevent certain difficulties in supplying manpower for jobs which are least attractive by nature and by working conditions, it is necessary to further improve the structure of production and increase the level of mechanization of manual, unskilled and low skilled jobs. All of this will have a favorable effect on the efficient utilization of manpower resources.

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