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JPRS L/8564  
10 July 1979  
FOUO No. 641

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BOKASSA'S PRESENCE AT KIGALI SUMMIT REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 May 79 p 7

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "From One Summit to the Other"]

[Text] A year ago, almost to the day, the fifth Franco-African summit gathered in Paris amid the agitation over and obsession with destabilization. Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaire, arrived in the French capital in combat dress; he came direct from Shaba where, again, rebels had infiltrated, manhandling his troops. Some of the chiefs of state present at the summit then decided to come to the aid of the Kinshasa regime. France, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal, and Togo sent troops. To observers, that summit has remained the "summit of fear."

The atmosphere was completely different at the sixth Franco-African summit, held this year on 21 and 22 May in Kigali, capital of Rwanda. The obsession with destabilization was gone. The inter-African force sent to Zaire in 1978 is packing up (see page 18). And the chiefs of state talked economics: renewal of the Lome convention; the meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which is sitting at Manila until 1 June; and Franco-African cooperation. Serenity would thus have reigned in Kigali had it not been for the eruption into the news of one of the participants, Bokassa I, Emperor of Central Africa.

Surrounded by the press, let in by his peers, Bokassa I denied from the time of his arrival that he had ordered the massacre of children (see "What I believe" by Bechir Ben Yahmed, page 14).

The emperor's presence in Kigali embarrassed the other chiefs of state. Questioned about what he thought, Senegalese President Leopold Sedar Senghor said only that in his opinion Bokassa did not order massacres of children.

The Paris summit in 1978 was notable for Mobutu and the process of destabilization. Will the Kigali summit of 1979 be remembered for Bokassa I and for incriminating dictators?

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

KAMOUGUE SAID TO BE RELYING ON LIBYAN BACKING

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 May 79 pp 20, 21

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "Qadhafi's New Man"]

[Text] Libreville, July 1977: the Palace of Congresses was the scene of one of the most stormy sessions of the 14th summit meeting of the OAU. Before the embarrassed African chiefs of state, the head of Libyan diplomacy, 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, launched a regular attack on the Chadian regime represented by Felix Malloum, president of the republic, and Wadal Kamougue, minister of Foreign Affairs.

The words uttered by his Libyan colleague were so violent that Lieutenant Colonel Kamougue rose, seized the microphone and hurled the following at the Libyan delegation: "Disillusion yourselves, gentlemen, We shall never submit ourselves to the imperialism of Libyan petrodollars." Tension reached its peak and insults rained all over. In the middle of the confusion, Edem Kodjo, at that time Togolese minister of Foreign Affairs, tried to calm down his Chadian colleague. Kamougue's reaction was brutal: "You can go to hell!" he hurled at him.

A year later, the OAU held its 15th summit meeting in Khartoum. 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki repeated the offense by making a frontal attack on Kamougue and by challenging his qualifications as a representative: "This former Foreign Legion sergeant does not represent Chad but, rather, the Sara minority," he hurled from the speaker's platform. Most of the representatives of countries of Black Africa had difficulty in concealing their indignation, but this time they succeeded in calming Wadal Kamougue. The assembly concluded that Libya had chosen forever its camp in the imbroglio dividing Chad. But this was without taking into account the about-faces characteristic of the political strategy of the unpredictable Colonel Qadhafi.

Less than a year after the Khartoum rows, yesterday's enemies are now embracing each other. The unbelievable occurred on 5 May, when Kamougue took a seat on board a Libyan aircraft to go to Tripoli. In view of the abrupt

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turn of events, especially the discarding of his leading protege, Col Mu'amar Qadhafi decided to conclude an alliance with the devil. Kamougue, the former champion of Chadian integrity, until recently Libya's pet aversion, sought Tripoli's support to impose broad autonomy of the south, the prelude to a possible secession.

In the troubled history of the Chadian rebellion, Libya served as the main sanctuary for the various opponents. From Derdei (spiritual chief of the Toubou) to Ahmat Acyl, all went through Tripoli, before slamming the door on the inflexibility and annexionist aims of their hosts. Abba Siddick had been let go for not having been able to prove himself in the field. It is true that the original FROLINAT leader was more fond of ideological combat. When he could no longer benefit from Libya's logistical support, he took refuge in Algiers, giving way to the Hissein Habre-Goukouni Oueddei pair who were, moreover, to split at the time of the denouement of the Claustre Affair, in 1976.

To tell the truth, Hissein Habre's nationalism ended by irritating the Libyans. In fact, Habre did not conceal his opposition to the occupation of the Aouzou strip by Qadhafi's troops. That amounted to signing his eviction notice. Goukouni, who was Derdei's son, alone became the "Libyans' man." Not for long, because his desire to conclude an agreement with the N'Djamena government was poorly received by his protectors.

The events that broke out in February 1979 in the capital of Chad, by causing a confrontation between the two components of the ephemeral national union government, were to result in enabling Goukouni to get out of Libya's ascendancy.

Colonel Qadhafi, therefore, did not have any illusion when he warmly greeted his coming into power. Moreover, Tripoli went back on its decision a few weeks later, calling the new government in Chad illegal. Better still, the Libyan leader then exposed to the light of day his constant concern, which is to bring about a split of Chad by every possible means.

Irony of fate: one of those who were fiercely opposed to this undertaking, is now agreeing to play into the hands of Tripoli. It is true that Wadal Kamougue was a fervent defender of territorial integrity.

This alumnus of the Brazzaville military academy, who is not at all a diplomat, pleaded for Chadian unity for over 2 years in international organizations. Kamougue, who was the principal coordinator of the 2 April 1975 putsch that overthrew President Ngarta Tombalbaye, is convinced that he incarnates legitimacy of government authority, to a considerable degree. Undoubtedly, that is why he displayed inflexibility at the time of the negotiations with the rebels. His opposition to Hissein Habre is notorious. It would have been unthinkable to see both men at the same table in a cabinet meeting. In August 1978, he was ousted from the government, but he was entrusted with command of the gendarmeries, the best organized military force that enabled General Malloum to prevent a downfall in February 1979.

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His dismissal that occurred immediately after the formation of the new government resulted from a settlement of accounts. Kamougue was, in fact, dismissed from his duties while he was in Sahn, where he had gone to negotiate the winning over of southern officials to the N'Djamena regime. The 48 hours granted him by the members of the provisional Council of State to carry out his mission were not enough to break down reticences. But his prolonged stay seemed suspicious to the men who, moreover, were not very sympathetically inclined toward him. Consequently, he did not hesitate to grab the pole held out to him by Colonel Qadhdhafi, who was irritated by Goukouni for having stated that he was ready to make an alliance with Israel to fight against the Libyan leader. This surprising alliance upset has now brought together yesterday's enemies. Even Abba Siddick has become reconciled with Qadhdhafi.

Will the 600 gendarmes who have been withdrawn to Moundou, in the southern part of the country, for the sake of demilitarization of N'Djamena, be sufficient to contain the advance of the "loyalist troops"? It is difficult to see how effective Libyan support might be to the advocates of independent self-government in the south. Moreover, only yesterday, Kamougue was presented as being responsible for the massacres of Chadian Muslims on whose behalf Libya is claiming to intervene.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SPANISH KING'S TRIP TO AFRICA ANALYZED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 27 May 79 p 21

[Article by Jose Oneto]

[Text] The future of the former Spanish Sahara and the subject of the Canary Islands are the principal purposes of the King and Queen's trip to Africa, the first trip made by a Spanish chief of state to that continent.

The official visits of King Juan Carlos to the Ivory Coast, Guinea Conakry and Senegal, involving the first contact by Madrid with an immense continent which had important ties with Spain in a not-too-distant-colonial past, should be considered within the framework of a new foreign policy strategy vis-a-vis the Third World which also has millions of potential consumers.

Moreover, in the strictly political sector, the subjects of the Sahara and the Canary Islands which were brought up during two successive assemblies of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) are topics which are giving real political meaning to the monarchs' trip.

Barely a week after the trip to Algiers by Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, days after the visit to Madrid by the Mauritanian prime minister, Mohamed Ould Bousseif, and on the eve of Juan Carlos' trip to Rabat to talk with King Hassan II of Morocco, the journey to Africa takes on a clear political intention, all the more so now that the subject of the Sahara's future which was under Madrid's control until 1975 has been brought up again.

Last week before the start of the Moroccan offensive against the sovereign cities of Ceuta and Melilla, King Juan Carlos made a personal telephone call to Hassan II to definitely set the date of an official visit which had been postponed in deference to Madrid's foreign policy. Last week in Algiers, Adolfo Suarez solemnly recognized the POLISARIO [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saquia, El Hamra and Rio de Oro]; the King personally set the date of his visit to Rabat; and Madrid received the prime minister of Mauritania to obtain information concerning Nouakchot's desire to reach an agreement with the POLISARIO to end the war which is destroying his country.

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An entire strategy is involved which is not unknown to the King and concerning the development of which, particularly during the stage of Francoism, he was not as promptly informed as should have been necessary.

Now the three countries visited (the Ivory Coast, Guinea Conakry and Senegal) are connected with the subject of the Sahara through important positions within the Organization of African Unity, an organization which is keeping the subject of the Canary Islands permanently pending, because of Algerian pressure. Of the three countries, perhaps, it is the Ivory Coast which has been maintaining the clearest position with respect to the Spanish archipelago so much so that President Houphuet-Boigny from the outset sustained the thesis that the Canary Islands claim was not only "untimely" but also the Ivory Coast was prepared to do battle in Africa to defend its Spanishness.

Senegal's position, as expressed by President Leopold Sedar Senghor, has also been crystal-clear on the subject of the Canary Islands: "Since the Canary Islands are one of the regions of the Spanish Kingdom, the people of this archipelago have the same duties as the other regions of Spain."

Finally, the socialist Guinea of Sekou Toure was the most active country when the subject of the Canary Islands was brought up at the conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was held in Khartoum. The first meeting of the Spanish minister of Foreign affairs, Marcelino Oreja, with President Sekou Toure last summer was especially tense, particularly when the Guinean president, using simply geographic criteria for his argument, defended the thesis that because the Canary Islands are opposite the continent of Africa they belong to the continent. On the basis of this argument, Cordoba and Granada, former provinces of the caliphate, could be claimed by the government of Rabat.

After having observed the hardest position with respect to the future of Africanized Canary Islands, the government of Conakry seems to have softened its positions.

With the new understanding between Madrid and Algiers, the practical disappearance of the Canary independence movement and the silence of leader Antonio Cubillo, who is a paralytic in an Algerian clinic, the future of the Canary Islands has entered a new "tempus" and is unlikely to be brought up in the halls of the Organization of African Unity.

More serious, more important, perhaps, is the subject of the Sahara which, with the change in Mauritania's position and the new Spanish position of recognizing the POLISARIO, is entering new terrain where peace seems nearer. Without a doubt, the King's trip to Africa will contribute to this.

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BELGIAN-BORN MERCENARY ARRESTED IN THE SEYCHELLES

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 May 79 pp 15-16

[Article: "A Mercenary Named Lefevre"]

[Text] Who was that Belgian "tourist" recently arrested in the Seychelles? Our special correspondent in Victoria conducted an investigation locally. Here is what he discovered.

He is Belgian and was born on 2 April 1932 in Jumet (Charleroi) where his current home address is 5 rue d'Argenteuil. He is 1.8 meters tall, has blue eyes and a black mustache and beard. He has three passports: one Belgian and two Comorian, the latter signed in June 1978 in Moroni by Said Ahmed Saidali, director of the minister of the interior's personal staff. His Belgian passport, No P. 020 334-22935, shows that from January to April 1979, he traveled frequently between Keyna, the Comoros, Mayotte, Reunion, and the Seychelles.

His name is Alfred Lefevre. He successfully completed his training at the Schaffen paratroop training center on 13 October 1951. He is a mercenary, a hired assassin. There is every indication that he has been involved in numerous commando operations in Africa and the Arab countries. In fact, he does not deny this and admits he belonged to the group of mercenaries commanded by the woefully famous Bob Denard who overthrew the Ali Soilih regime. When he was arrested in late April on Mahe Island by Seychelles authorities, he was carrying, an "order" dated 25 July 1978 appointing him second lieutenant and signed by Colonel Said Mustapha M'Hadjiu -- one of Bob Denard's aliases -- who was then commander in chief of the Comorian armed forces and military police. Also found in his baggage was a whole collection of photographs in which he is flanked by "comrades" -- some of them women -- all armed to the teeth. But the most compromising item was found among his clothes, namely a uniform identical in every respect to those worn by Seychelles officers, with helmet, beret, and various insignia and badges. He also had letters allegedly written by girls from Moroni, but these were actually coded messages.

This Lefevre is unquestionably a tough customer. When initially interrogated, he promptly and calmly admitted he was a mercenary and intended to join Ian Smith's troops in Salisbury. But he swore he had no intention whatever of

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organizing any kind of action against the Seychelles. In that case, what was he doing there? Merely sightseeing like any other tourist, he explained. With a Seychelles officer uniform in his suitcase, a uniform that would probably have enabled him to mount a "coup" or organize an attempt on the lives of key Seychelles officials. Lefevre argued that these uniforms are readily available in Mombassa, Kenya, and he had bought his "as a souvenir." Come, come now! What was his assigned mission in the Seychelles? He had none. He had come there from Reunion and was going to leave for Nairobi from where he proposed to join his pals in Rhodesia. What connections did he have with the three individuals, carrying German passports, who had preceded him to the Seychelles some 2 weeks earlier and had left in a hurry when they felt they were under surveillance? He said he did not know what his questioners were talking about and could not understand why they wanted to implicate him in "alleged venture" about which he knew absolutely nothing. After that, as a good "professional" he practically no longer answered any questions. He now seems to be quietly awaiting his release: the Belgian consul in Mombassa has requested that he be set free, and "they" have already tried to organize his escape. He is mistaken in his expectations. Albert Rene, the Seychelles chief of state, told us: "We are determined to keep him in custody. We cannot release an individual who openly declares he is going to join Ian Smith's racist forces for the purpose of massacring our African brothers."

How did the Seychelles authorities become suspicious of Alfred Lefevre and subsequently arrest him? It seems that he was imprudent and made a few mistakes. There is no doubt that ever since "they" attempted to launch mercenary raids from Mombassa last year, the Seychelles security forces have been on permanent alert, and not only these forces. Aware of the threats hanging over them, all the people of the Seychelles are organized, under the leadership of their party, in an effort to spot subversive agents whether they be natives or foreigners.

## Disastrous Curiosity

If he had been a tourist, Lefevre would have spent his time swimming and getting a suntan in these paradise-like islands. But instead he appeared to be primarily interested in the country's armed forces. Wherever he went, he would ask questions about the Seychelles troops, their strength, location, weapons, field exercises, mobility, and the kind and amount of foreign assistance they were receiving. He also inquired about the movement of Seychelles and foreign ships in the archipelago. He was curious about everything. He even tried to develop contacts with persons he did not know, but whom he no doubt believed were well-placed, and introduced himself to them under an assumed name. In short, he was a rather peculiar tourist. Authorities kept him under surveillance for a short time and then arrested him. Upon examining his baggage, they realized they had done well. At present, the investigation is progressing normally, but what he has said and what was found in his possession already warrant his detention and would amply justify his conviction.

President Albert Rene is quite firm on this point: he intends to take a series of measures and reform present laws to enhance the government's ability to repress

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subversive activities against his country. He is even considering the death penalty for those who organize such activities, particularly for mercenaries. "And I mean not only those who will be caught during an operation," said President Albert Rene. "I mean all mercenaries we can arrest. And such legislation ought to be enforced in all countries threatened by mercenaries, in other words, actually enforced by all progressive countries who are the favorite targets of mercenaries."

Congo-Leopoldville (Katanga), Nigeria (Biafra), South Yemen, Guinea-Conakry, the Comoros, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique, Madagascar, and now the Seychelles. All of these aforementioned countries are just so many projects for these soldiers of fortune financed, armed, trained, and "remotely controlled" by various intelligence agencies who are prepared to do anything to destabilize the governments of countries that have recently gained their independence, countries determined to extricate themselves from imperialist and neocolonialist control once and for all.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EDF AID TO AFRICA IN 1978 REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 pp 1290-1291

[Text] In 1978 the European Development Fund (EDF) provided aid in the form of subsidies or special loans for almost 200 projects in countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. This aid, granted under the terms of the Lome Agreement, has particularly made it possible to engage in many activities in the fields of vocational training, infrastructure, farming, industry and trade. We also note that the EDF made many grants to deal with exceptional situations (natural calamities, refugee aid, etc.).

The details on these different grants are given below (when a figure is followed by an asterisk, it refers to a loan rather than a subsidy):

EDF Grants to ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific] Countries in 1978  
(In thousands of EEC units of account [UC]; 1 UC = about \$1.30.)

Social Development

Rwanda: National Teaching Institute, 279 and 1,700; emergency aid by mail against cholera, 80.

Congo: N'Kay Hospital, 75 and 1,635.

Somalia: Integrated training program, 700; training, 800.

Madagascar: Training of staff personnel and developers for the decentralized collectives, 2,590.

Zaire: Recycling of National Institute for Vocational Training teaching and technical personnel, 770; higher teaching institutes of Kikwit and Mandaka, 8,000; emergency aid for the repatriation and resettlement of Zairian refugees, 4,000; emergency aid to combat the effects of the drought in Lower Zaire and the cholera epidemic in Kivu, 300.

Botswana: Emergency aid, 1,600.

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Cameroon: Equipment for six industrial technology vocational schools, 57 hand crafts and 35 home economics sections, 2,500.

Cape Verde: Training, 50.

Central African Empire: Multiannual 1976-1980 training program, 1,170.

Djibouti: Multiannual training program, 640.

Ethiopia: Practical education, 2,100.

Gambia: Construction and equipping of Briskama College, 1,531; emergency aid grants, 300 and 500.

Guinea: Equipment for the agronomy departments, 850; emergency aid grants, 2,735 and 300; equipment and technical assistance for the Secondary Maritime Polytechnical Institute, 1,970.

Guinea-Bissau: Emergency aid grants, 300 and 167; construction and equipping of two schools at Farim and Catio, 1,000.

Kenya: Reinforcement of medical facilities in the district of Machakos, 2,300.

Lesotho: Development of the Mphaki Region, 2,000; emergency aid, 230; training, 820; development of rural mail service, 1,500.

Liberia: Rural center for medical training, 1,330.

Malawi: Construction and equipping of hospitals in the districts of Mangochi and Nsanje, 4,000.

Mali: Emergency aid grants, 300 and 500.

Mauritania: Emergency aid grants, 1,007 and 300; multiannual training program, 370.

Niger: Training, 1,880 and 500.

Papua New Guinea: Multiannual training program (1978-1980), 1,200.

Sao Tome e Principe: Training, 90.

Senegal: Emergency aid grants, 300 and 3,385; construction of elementary schools, 1,938; construction and equipping of an operating unit at the main hospital in Dakar, 1,092.

Sierra Leone: Integrated medical teaching and training program, 1,500.

Sudan: Multiannual training program, 5,000; emergency aid grants, 15 and 250.

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Swaziland: Financing for the multiannual training program (1976-1980), 2,000.

Tanzania: Emergency aid, 55.

Chad: Social medicine program, 714; renovation of Moundou and Bongor secondary schools, 1,090; construction and equipping of the Amtimam Secondary School, 385.

Tonga: Multiannual training program (1976-1980), 20.

Zambia: Emergency aid for Angolan, Zimbabwean and Zambian refugees, 1,340.

Surinam: Multiannual training program, 1,500; semi-university level education in Paramaribo, 1,100.

Western Samoa: Multiannual training program (1976-1980), 110.

Bahamas: Multiannual training program (1976-1980), 43.

Barbados: Scholarships (1976-1980), 200; construction and equipping of Saint Peter Medical Center, 402.

Burundi: Emergency aid, 80.

Comoro Islands: Training, 30.

Fiji: Multiannual training program, 100; emergency aid grants, 300 and 1,200.

Grenada: Multiannual training program (1976-1980), 80.

Jamaica: Elementary education, 930.

Netherlands Antilles: Multiannual training program (1976-1980), 2,450.

Solomon Islands: Fishermen training center, 280.

Regional Projects: Telecommunications training center (Fiji-Tonga-Western Samoa), 1,500; emergency aid for displaced persons and refugees from the Horn of Africa, 3,000; emergency aid grants to combat locusts in the East African countries, 1,300 and 300; regional cooperation for the OCAM's [Afro-Malagasy-Mauritian Common Organization] African and Mauritian Institute for Statistics and Applied Economics, 900; UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] emergency aid for refugees from Botswana, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Tanzania, 4,700; multiannual training program (1976-1979): French zone, 100; Dutch zone, 100; British zone, 100; construction of buildings for the African Information Sciences Institute (IAI), 500.

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Facilities

Somalia: Development of the port of Mogadishu, 548 and 260.

Zaire: Akula breakwater, 1,599; Penetungu-Lubutu road, 14,000\*.

Madagascar: Development of medical facilities, 1,410.

Botswana: Lobatse-Ramatlabana road, 4,945.

Cameroon: Realignment of Douala-Edea rail line, 10,000\*.

Cape Verde: Provision of drilling equipment and collection of urban rubbish, 1,200.

Central African Empire: Improvement of river transport, 2,500.

Ivory Coast: Village water systems, 9,400\*; Bada-Marabadiassa road, 1,495\*.

Djibouti: Extension of Djibouti sanitation system, 310.

Gabon: Improvements and complementary equipment for the commercial port of Owendo, 2,577\*.

Ghana: Abcisso-Axim road, 12,800.

Guinea-Bissau: Supplying of equipment and river and port transport, 3,830; construction of 50 wells in the Cabu Region, 400.

Upper Volta: Development of Volta valleys, 1,857.

Kenya: Development of sites in Mathare Valley, 1,375.

Lesotho: Village water systems, 700.

Mali: Koutiala-Sikasso road, 13,330.

Niger: Construction and equipping of maternity hospitals and rural dispensaries, 3,270.

Sao Tome e Principe: Supplying of road-construction equipment, 300.

Senegal: Creation of the Dakar industrial free zone, 590.

Sudan: Construction of the Babanousa Railroad, 9,000\*.

Chad: Maintenance of blacktop roads, 2,890; village water supply program, 4,270.

Tonga: Purchase of road-construction equipment, 1,430.

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Zambia: Development of parcels, 2,400.

Western Samoa: Construction of Magiagi hydroelectric plant, 2,353.

Fiji: Vanua Levu road, 2,850\*; breakwaters on various islands, 1,474.

Grenada: East coast road, 1,440.

Seychelles: Rural water supply networks, 260.

Trinidad and Tobago: Lambeau Hill water supply system, 600\*.

Cayman Islands: Cayman Brac Airport, 330\*.

Caribbean Islands: Rural roads on Saint Lucia, 800; northern region water distribution project, 430\*; unit for the utilization of land and water resources, 162; road repair on Saint Kitts, 1,200.

British Virgin Island: Fort Hill water supply system, 300\*.

Regional Projects: Aboisso-Axim road between Ivory Coast and Ghana, 10,000\*.

Industrial and Commercial Development

Zaire: Ubangi Oil-Palm Development Company (Gosuma Oilworks), 1,787\* and 1,213\*; installation of machinery and extension of the Bulu (Ubangi) cacao plantation, 3,010 and 1,970\*.

Benin: Replacement of equipment destroyed during a fire, 20; construction and equipping of a center for the promotion of hand crafts at Cotonou, 1,075.

Central African Empire: Implementation of the Office for the Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses (OPPME), 765 and 535\*.

Ivory Coast: Trade promotion program, 1,008.

Ghana: Trade promotion, 1,010.

Guinea: Reestablishment of Sanoyah textile complex, 10,000 and 20,000\*.

Liberia: Trade promotion project, 300.

Tanzania: Expansion of Arusha factory (KILTEX [expansion unknown]), 6,550.

Chad: Njamena industrial zone, 267.

Tonga: Credit line for Tonga Development Bank, 130\*.

Surinam: Trade promotion, 500.

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Western Samoa: Credit line for Development Bank of Western Samoa, 840\*.

Bahamas: Credit line for Development Bank, 690\*.

Barbados: Trade promotion, 100; tourism project, 100.

Fiji: Credit line for Fiji Development Bank, 700\*; and for Native Development Corporation, 900\*.

Trinidad and Tobago: Trade promotion program, 700\*.

Netherlands Antilles: Trade and tourism projects, 800.

Belize: Credit line for Development Finance Corporation, 400\* and 55.

Regional Projects: Creation of a Sierra Leone-Liberia industrial project promotion unit, 900; financing of the program for participation in ACP-nation commercial and international conferences (1978-1980), 6,402; financing of regional trade promotion projects, 3,000; Industrial Development Center budget (1979), 2,581; Investment Forum at the Dakar Fair, 180 (all ACP nations); study of tourism in the Caribbean, 200.

Rural Development

Madagascar: Agricultural improvement, 1,250 and 893; development of nut growing, 5,757.

Zaire: Completion of Butuhe tea-growing project, 330.

Benin: Reinforcement of Atakora structures, 2,858.

Botswana: Rural improvements, 1,810.

Cameroon: Northeastern Benue perimeters, 3,670 and 433\*; Djuttiska tea-growing project, 1,420 and 1,420\*; Logone and Chari irrigated rice cultivation, 4,097.

Cape Verde: Soil development and protection project for the Joa Varela Region, 557.

Central African Empire: Drainage and development of a stockraising zone at Bambari, 1,244.

Ivory Coast: Grand Bereby Para rubber plantation, 4,855\*.

Djibouti: Rural water supply and provision of drilling equipment, 650; pilot perimeter and agricultural development, 515.

Ethiopia: Development of fishing industry, 1,513.

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Upper Volta: Development of rice cultivation, 2,968; development of stock-raising, 1,550.

Kenya: Irrigation, 10,618\*; integrated development of Machakos Region, 17,700.

Malawi: Pilot tobacco project for small growers in northwestern Mzimba, 2,200; dairy at Blantyre, 2,100.

Mali: Segou rice, 8,640; development of stockraising in the south, 1,820.

Mauritania: Intensification of farm production in the Senegal Valley, 800.

Uganda: Improvement of the artificial insemination program, 155.

Swaziland: Irrigation canal for a sugar-growing project, 3,500\*.

Chad: Development of stockraising, campaign against the tsetse fly and sleeping sickness, 3,200.

Zambia: Crossbreeding ranch at Bakota, 1,825.

Burundi: Completion of project for the "extension of tea cultivation and the Ijenda tea factory," 4,317 and 2,460\*.

Comoro Islands: Promotion of small-scale stockraising, 300.

Republic of Guiana: Upper Demerara forest project, 450 and 5,000\*.

Saint Lucia: Development of stockraising, 1,000.

Regional Projects: Caribbean Agricultural and Research Board experimental farms in the Caribbean, 1,500.

General Studies and Various Projects

Benin: Studies relating to geological cartography and mineral exploration north of the 11th parallel, 1,640.

Ghana: Credit line granted the National Investment Bank of Ghana, 1,880\*.

Senegal: Hydrogeological study of the Casamance Basin, 1,000.

Sudan: Development studies in the Jonglei Canal Region, 2,100.

Regional Projects: Regional telecommunications network (Fiji-Western Samoa-Tonga), 4,300; determination of overall cost of THE EEC/ACP COURRIER for 1979, 524.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SOVIET-AFRICAN TRADE STATISTICS DETAILED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 pp 1292-1293

[Text] Commercial exchanges between the USSR and the rest of the world in 1978 came to 70,195.5 million rubles<sup>1</sup>, i.e., 455,568.8 million French francs.<sup>2</sup> The balance of trade was positive, the rate of coverage of imports by exports coming to 103.1 percent.

Trade with developing countries totaled 55,538.8 million francs, including 37,164.3 million francs in exports, which yields a rate of coverage of 202.2 percent.

The situation is different, however, for the African Continent, where Soviet imports have been greater than exports in the past 2 years. Although the first commercial operations were carried out as early as 1923 with Egypt, and in 1928 with Morocco and Algeria, the real take-off for trade occurred at the beginning of the 1960's. It was first thanks to Nasser's Egypt, then to Sekou Toure's Guinea and Nkrumah's Ghana. In 1965 these three countries accounted for 86 percent of the Soviet exports and 87 percent of the imports carried out with all the African countries.

The Stagnation of Soviet-African Trade Is Due to the Retreat of Its Principal Partners

After a considerable development of trade up to the beginning of the 1970's, stagnation can be observed during the last 5 years (figures in millions of French francs):

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Soviet exports	4,149.1	3,739.5	3,566.9	4,041.3	4,111.4
Soviet imports	4,417.7	5,621.6	4,277.6	4,569.6	4,579.3

1. Source: Official Statistics of the USSR

2. 1 ruble = 6.49 French francs (exchange rate of April 1979)

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Foreign Trade of the USSR  
(figures in millions of French francs)

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1978
Total trade:					
Exports	32,497.4	47,748.2	74,765.4	155,978.7	231,311.4
Imports	32,875.7	47,068.7	68,567.5	173,092.2	224,257.4
Trade with Africa:					
Exports	552.9	1,716	3,385.8	3,739.5	4,111.4
Imports	905.4	1,328.5	3,133.4	5,621.6	4,579.3
Share of Africa in the USSR's foreign trade (in %)					
Exports	1.70	3.59	4.53	2.40	1.78
Imports	2.75	2.82	4.57	3.25	2.04

The exchanges of the years 1974-1978 are at the same level. The share of African countries in Soviet trade has gone down, from 4.5 percent in 1970 to 2 percent in 1978. The primary reason is the reduction of exchanges with the countries which traditionally assured the main part of Soviet-African trade.

Soviet exports went down twofold with Egypt and by 20 percent with Algeria, the two principal African outlets, between 1974 and 1978. Soviet imports reflect a similar trend. The three chief suppliers in 1974--Egypt, Nigeria, and Algeria--reduced their exports in 1978 by 2.2 times, 4.2 times and 17 percent, respectively.

Ten Chief African Customers of the Soviet Union  
(in millions of French francs)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Egypt	1,955.4	1,700.4	1,296.7	1,319.4	957.3
Algeria	715.8	728.8	852.8	800.7	573.1
Nigeria	139.5	157.7	155.1	223.9	489.3
Ethiopia	16.9	20.8	23.4	145.4	416.7
Morocco	351.1	296.6	358.9	362.8	367.3
Libya	185	122	105.1	135	336.2
Angola	--	--	34.4	449.1	310.2
Guinea	145.4	127.9	151.2	161	133.7
Mozambique	--	--	--	38.3	112.9
Tunisia	52.6	22.7	64.3	43.5	62.3

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Ten Chief African Suppliers of the Soviet Union  
(in millions of French francs)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Egypt	2,769.9	2,909.5	2,146.9	1,876.3	1,285
Ghana	159.7	300.5	417.3	682.1	710
Libya	--	--	--	499.1	693.1
Ivory Coast	127.2	126.6	95.4	164.2	386.2
Algeria	398.5	874.2	382.3	255.7	332.9
Morocco	214.2	267.4	326.4	320	307.6
Guinea	31.8	93.5	173.9	183.7	174.6
Cameroon	--	225.2	216.8	185.6	113.6
Nigeria	456.9	545.2	172.6	1.9	109

## Reorientation of Trade

The USSR has a more and more extended field of action in Africa. The main part of the exchanges is as always with north Africa, but its importance is diminishing in favor of other regions which are gradually increasing their share. This is especially true for west Africa, which is becoming a more and more important pole of attraction for the USSR. It is the only region of Africa where trade has continued to grow over the past 5 years. In fact, exports to the USSR doubled during this period while imports increased by 30 percent.

Origin of Soviet Imports  
(in percent)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
North Africa	8	74	70	67	60
West Africa	8	19	21	24	34
East Africa	2	3	2	3	2
Central Africa	2	4	5	4	3
Southern Africa	-	-	2	2	1
[first column illegible]					

Destination of Soviet Exports  
(in percent)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
North Africa	79	77	76	66	56
West Africa	16	15	17	15	21
East Africa	4	7	5	6	12
Central Africa	1	1	1	1	1
Southern Africa	-	-	1	12	10

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The other African regions have very little trade with the Soviet Union; this holds for Central Africa as well as East Africa with the exception of Ethiopia, where equipment was supplied in 1977 and 1978. In southern Africa, only Angola and Mozambique received Soviet equipment in these last years. Trade with French-speaking Africa did not grow, thus reflecting the general trend.

Soviet Trade With French-speaking Africa  
(in millions of French francs)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Soviet exports	1,497.9	1,379.1	1,599.1	1,620.6	1,311.6
Soviet imports	867.1	1,663.4	1,283.1	1,258.4	1,394.1

The year 1978 was rather mediocre because Soviet exports did not exceed the 1977 figure, nor did imports exceed the 1975 performance.

## Africa Exports More Than It Imports

The balance of trade of all the African countries taken together is positive in trade with the Soviet Union. Ratios of exports to imports were as follows:

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Import/export ratio in %	106.4	150.3	120.0	113.2	111.4

The breakdown by countries shows the following extremes:

	Export-Import Ratio in 1978 (in %)	Balance of Exchanges in 1978 (in millions of French francs)
Chief countries with a deficit:		
Algeria	57.9	-240.2
Angola	20	-247.9
Nigeria	22.3	-380.3
Ethiopia	6.7	-388.8
Chief countries with a surplus:		
Egypt	134	+327.7
Ivory Coast	10-fold	+346.6
Ghana	23-fold	+678.8
Libya	2-fold	+356.9

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Africa's positive balance of trade is explained by its capacity to supply agricultural and mineral materials. Without being able to give exact figures for 1978 because of the lack of statistics, we can say on the basis of previous years that the African countries supply a large number of products to the USSR: Egypt, cotton fiber; Guinea, bauxites; Algeria, wine; Ghana and Ivory Coast, cocoa; Morocco, oranges; Libya, minerals and metals. One can expect that the carrying out of the agreement between Morocco and the USSR for joint exploitation of phosphates will further accentuate the imbalance in trade in favor of Africa.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

WEST GERMAN AID DETAILED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 May 79 pp 1235-1236

[Text] As an introduction to its annual meeting, the Afrika-Verein [association] held a press conference in Hamburg on 4 April which at the same time was a kind of préface to the Fourth Symposium of the Afrika-Kollegium [council] held on 6 April by university professors as well as experts in foreign trade and transactions with Africa in the presence of a representative from the [West German] federal government.

The following subjects were taken up during the press conference: Current raw materials policy; North Africa: The conflict of interests between Algeria and Morocco; problems of African transportation and especially maritime traffic; trade between Germany and Africa in 1978; the symposium however essentially revolves around questions of maritime transportation with Africa.

We would like to present here some points on German-African trade.

In 1978, there were major changes in commerce between West Germany and Africa. For more than ten years, West Germany's purchases in Africa had exceeded German exports. But at the end of 1978, this trade volume revealed a surplus in favor of the GDR.

German imports dropped from DM17.9 billion in 1977 to DM15.6 billion in 1978 whereas German exports went up slightly from DM15.9 billion to DM16 billion. The drop in imports was caused by the reduction in petroleum purchases from Libya but also Algeria and Nigeria. German imports from Kenya also were considerably reduced. Increases in sales of German commodities were also recorded in dealing with petroleum producing countries. Thus, the deficit with these countries declined or was turned into a surplus in favor of West Germany, in other words, totalling DM0.4 billion in 1978.

Compared to total German imports, the African share was 6.4 percent in 1978 whereas the African share in total German exports was 5.6 percent. Looking only at the African developing countries, the rates in 1978 were 5.4 percent for imports and 4.5 percent for exports.

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## Direct Private German Investments

German private direct investments in Africa came to DM3.12 billion at the end of the first half of 1978 (first half of 1977: DM2.94 billion), including DM2.47 billion in the developing countries and DM645 million in the industrial countries. The portion of these investments as compared to the total German investments was 5.68 percent (first half of 1977: 5.9 percent). The principal African beneficiaries of these investments were: the Canary Islands, the Republic of South Africa, Libya, Nigeria, and Algeria. With DM787 million, the Canary Islands are the principal beneficiary of these German investments. Remarkable increases must also be reported for Morocco (up 58.7 percent), Tunisia (up 12.7 percent), Cameroon (up 11.2 percent), and Kenya (up 1.5 percent).

Table 1. Trade Between FRG and Africa  
(in millions of DM)

	German purchases		German sales	
	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
Canary Islands	81.9	81.9	141.3	139.4
Morocco	410.3	408.2	486.5	416.5
Algeria	2,728.6	2,341.2	2,501.6	2,552.8
Tunisia	384.6	443.8	528.1	568.6
Libya	5,026.9	3,416.5	1,507.8	1,631.2
Egypt	193.3	273.3	1,363.7	1,350.7
Sudan	122.5	78.5	299.5	288.6
Mauritania	55.1	26.1	48.2	38.7
Mali	25.8	26.2	28.9	26.6
Upper Volta	10.1	8.7	21.7	23.1
Niger	1.7	18.3	24.8	36.5
Chad	29.5	14.2	9.5	9.0
Cape Verde	0.07	0.0	4.5	7.2
Senegal	40.6	29.2	81.5	65.5
Gambia	0.3	0.4	13.4	13.8
Guinea-Bissau	0.5	0.2	6.6	8.3
Guinea	98.6	69.9	13.8	18.1
Sierra-Leone	26.7	25.7	21.9	31.7
Liberia	438.8	452.6	749.2	242.8
Ivory Coast	632.2	733.7	227.2	250.1
Ghana	259.0	233.2	381.9	300.2
Togo	66.6	59.9	46.5	130.6
Benin	10.0	6.2	54.7	41.1
Nigeria	2,553.1	2,450.1	2,990.1	2,876.9
Cameroon	287.4	305.6	118.8	127.3
Central African Empire	6.9	5.1	15.4	8.5
Equatorial Guinea	12.2	1.2	0.9	2.0
Sao Tome and Principe	8.9	20.2	1.9	1.7
Ceuta and Melilla	0.0	0.4	14.5	16.4
Gabon	140.0	256.6	74.4	40.9

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	German purchases		German sales	
	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
Congo	55.2	69.1	38.1	24.1
Zaire	274.7	253.8	204.4	181.4
Rwanda	29.7	31.0	14.8	33.3
Burundi	45.0	25.1	14.5	26.4
Angola	26.7	11.6	169.4	159.7
Ethiopia	56.7	36.8	80.7	91.1
Djibouti	0.0	0.0	4.6	7.2
Somalia	0.2	0.4	31.0	40.0
Kenya	514.4	389.5	279.5	408.4
Uganda	52.7	40.0	99.4	62.9
Tanzania	202.6	166.8	175.2	239.8
Seychelles	0.1	0.0	1.5	1.7
Mozambique	32.9	25.8	104.9	63.1
Madagascar	87.9	54.2	53.9	72.1
Reunion	0.9	0.2	23.3	23.5
Mauritius	22.8	16.9	35.4	33.3
Comoro Islands	1.0	2.5	2.6	0.9
Zambia	284.5	147.1	137.9	123.9
Rhodesia	1.1	0.9	2.7	2.1
Malawi	16.4	21.6	13.4	18.3
Republic of South Africa	2,555.3	2,455.4	2,598.2	3,082.1
Botswana	0.8	1.5	3.8	2.1
Lesotho	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.3
Swaziland	7.0	15.3	1.0	2.3
Africa, total	17,923.9	15,554.7	15,876.6	15,965.1

Table 2. Direct Private German Investments  
(in millions of DM)

<u>Country</u>	<u>as of</u> <u>31 Dec 76</u>	<u>as of</u> <u>31 Dec 77</u>	<u>as of</u> <u>30 Jun 78</u>
Republic of South Africa	576.2	627.3	645.2
Egypt	126.0	152.5	162.3
Algeria	158.2	199.4	210.3
Libya	334.3	355.2	355.3
Morocco	25.1	33.4	53.0
Mauritania	0.5	0.5	0.5
Somalia	17.3	17.3	17.3
Sudan	4.8	6.5	6.5
Tunisia	36.3	49.0	55.2
Ethiopia	8.0	7.8	7.8
Angola	0.9	1.0	0.9
Benin	0.9	0.9	0.8
Botswana	1.3	1.9	1.9

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<u>Country</u>	<u>as of</u> <u>31 Dec 76</u>	<u>as of</u> <u>31 Dec 77</u>	<u>as of</u> <u>30 Jun 78</u>
Burundi	1.8	1.8	1.8
Ivory Coast	41.2	48.2	48.1
Gabon	11.0	12.6	13.0
Gambia	0.4	4.8	5.3
Ghana	7.7	9.5	9.7
Guinea	30.5	30.5	30.5
Cameroon	27.4	27.7	30.8
Canary Islands	825.7	817.4	787.0
Kenya	70.2	73.8	74.9
Congo	11.5	12.7	12.7
Lesotho	-	2.4	3.4
Liberia	140.5	158.1	158.1
Madagascar	7.3	11.4	11.4
Malawi	7.7	10.1	10.3
Mali	3.0	3.3	3.3
Mauritius	9.6	9.8	10.0
Mozambique	0.4	0.4	0.4
Niger	11.4	11.4	11.4
Nigeria	181.8	208.4	216.3
Upper Volta	-	1.8	2.1
Rhodesia	1.7	1.7	1.7
Rwanda	1.4	1.8	1.8
Zambia	13.3	13.1	13.1
Senegal	10.1	10.5	10.5
Seychelles	4.7	4.8	4.8
Sierra Leone	1.4	1.5	1.5
Swaziland	2.3	2.3	2.3
Tanzania	22.9	23.9	24.6
Togo	7.4	11.8	11.8
Chad	2.0	2.0	2.0
Uganda	10.7	10.7	10.7
Zaire	76.4	79.6	79.6
Other countries	2.5	0.6	0.6
Africa, total	2,835.7	3,073.1	3,122.5

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TRANSPORT, TRAFFIC STRATEGY PLANNED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 May 79 p 1228

[Text] The conference of African transportation and communications ministers concluded its activities on 13 May after adopting a joint strategy for the African Transportation and Communications Decade which began last year. Conference chairman Youssouf Ahmed (Ethiopia) declared that this meeting made it possible to open the way to increased cooperation between African states.

Among the resolutions adopted by the conference, on the basis of recommendations from experts, we might single out the following:

Improvement of highway access routes to the sea for countries that have no outlet to the sea, within a period of 4 years;

Entry into force, wherever possible, of the airline network reorganization plan proposed by the African Airline Company Association;

Development of railroad connections since the continent presently has 80,80,706 kilometers of railroad for a surface area of 29.6 million square kilometers;

Launching port development projects, especially concerning the training of skilled personnel;

Development of African radio broadcasting to compensate for its "slow" spread during the last decade.

The ministers furthermore deplored the fact that, in most of the sectors involving transportation and communication, the national systems of the African countries were designed independently of each other. This situation, they feel, can be corrected with the help of substantial investments and effective and coordinated planning.

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The African Transportation and Communications ministers are planning to meet again this year in New York in order possibly to submit their projects to an international consortium of money lenders.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OMVS DECISIONS REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 May 79 p 1245

[Text] On the occasion of the meeting of the council of ministers of the OMVS (Senegal River Development Organization)--which, as we know, consists of Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal--in Dakar, on 10 May, Malian industrial development minister Lamine Keita confirmed that the cornerstone laying of the Diama Dam is scheduled for next November. The cornerstone for another dam, at Manantali, is to be laid in 1980.

The minister recalled that the OMVS had obtained more than half a million dollars for the construction of these two dams whose total costs, not including electrical equipment but allowing for inflation, has been estimated at \$650 million by the time the job is finished.

In the course of its Dakar meeting, the OMVS council of ministers accepted the proposals contained in the offers submitted for the construction of the Manantali Dam and invited the OMVS high commissioner to start the bidding competition.

It also noted with satisfaction the favorable conditions for participation in the African Development Fund in connection with the implementation of the OMVS program.

Mr Keita also stated that relations between the OMVS and the new Mauritanian government are as good as under the old regime and that Nouakchott will, next July, host the next meeting of the organization's council of ministers.

The OMVS council of ministers also amended the charter of the Inter-state Research and Development Committee. The new charter broadens the authority of that committee which is a subsidiary organ of the OMVS and which is charged with studying and proposing research programs. This reform will

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permit the committee to emphasize above all the link between research and development efforts conducted in the Senegal River Basin.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, PLANNING POLICIES REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 May 79 p 30

[Article by Mahdi Elmandjra: "Inter-African Ties"]

[Text] The Conference of Ministers of Transportation, Communications and Planning, which met in Addis Ababa 9-12 May, studied the problems of transportation and communications in Africa for the next 10 years. The idea had been approved at the Conference of Ministers of the Economic Commission for Africa, held in Kinshasa in February 1977, and was supported by the United Nations General Assembly. Major topic: to adopt an overall strategy and pinpoint a series of priority projects for putting the first phase into effect. Basic objective: "The independence, autonomy and international cooperation of African states in the area of transportation and communications."

The cost of this first phase (4 years) has been estimated at some 5 billion dollars. Priority will be given to projects which are "national but having a subregional impact." This is why almost 10 percent of the total expense foreseen will be assigned to these projects.

The executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa underlined the fact that "the system of transportation and communications inherited from the colonization period was conceived so as to permit the African countries to communicate with the outside world and not with each other." The truth of this was shown by the fact that, after the end of the conference, the majority of the African participants took airplanes to Europe in order to return to their own countries.

M Michel Doo Kingue, regional director of the United Nations Development Program, insisted on the necessity of creating production units of equipment goods on a multinational basis.

Beyond the definition of an overall strategy, this meeting will have served to reinforce awareness of the importance of transportation and communications in the area of development and of economic and social integration. The task remains of finding 5 billion dollars to put a pan-African policy into effect, and of finding the political will to achieve it.

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Transportation in Africa

Highway Transportation

Principal highways of the African network: 31,519 km

Transition roads: 45,832 km

Trans-African highways projected: Tripoli-Luanda; Nouakchott-Cairo;  
N'Djamena-Massawa; Beira-Lobito-Luanda.

Maritime Transportation

Conveying of Africa's international trade: 95 percent by way of water  
97.5 percent by foreign-  
flag vessels

Tonnage of African merchant fleets: 6 million

Share of Africa in the total world merchant fleet: 0.7 percent

Share of Africa in total world maritime trade: 13.7 percent

Number of African ports: 80 (including 49 international ports)

Air Transportation

Share of Africa in international passenger traffic: 5 percent (1977)

Share in freight traffic: 3.3 percent (1977)

Share of intraregional passenger traffic in total African passenger  
traffic: 30 percent (1977)

Share of intraregional freight traffic in total African freight traffic:  
4 percent (1977).

Railroad Transportation

Network: 80,706 km

Electrified lines: 6,500 km (9 percent)

Density: 2.65 km per 1,000 sq km (Europe: 60 km per 1,000 sq km)

Countries having no railroad (= 10): Gambia, Niger, Somalia, Chad,  
Rwanda, Burundi, Central African Empire, Libya, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial  
Guinea.

(1) Source: Document E/CN, 14/TRANS/136/Rev 2--12 May 1979--Economic Com-  
mission for Africa.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

SECRET ANGOLA-SOUTH AFRICA MEETINGS--Secret meetings between Angolan and South African experts have been taking place regularly since the beginning of the year at the Angola-Namibia border. The goal of these meetings is to ensure the security of the oil installations belonging to the Portuguese firm ARGO and the U.S. firm SUN OIL, which are prospecting in the Atlantic outside the Angolan coast and are threatened by UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) raids, an organization which is supported by South Africa. Discussions are also being conducted on the operation and administration of the Angolan Ruacana dam, on the border river of Cunene. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 964, 27 Jun 79 p 33]

MAURITANIAN LEADER ARRESTED IN SENEGAL--The head of the Walgougui Front, supposedly fighting for the self-determination of Mauritanian blacks (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 956), is accused of trafficking in arms and foreign currency. By arresting [Alioune] Diawo -- better known to his former gendarme friends under the name of "Prince of Walo" -- Senegal seems to want to show the new Mauritanian government that it had no involvement whatsoever in the recent ethnic incidents. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 May 79 p 36] 10042

MALI-EGYPT COOPERATION AGREEMENT--A general economic and technical cooperation agreement and an addition to the trade agreement of 29 July 1966 was signed at Bamako on 7 May between Mali and Egypt. The new accord provides new impetus for cooperation between these two countries and marks the end of the visit to that country, from 29 April until 7 May, of a delegation from the Arab Republic of Egypt, headed by Mr Hamdi Nassif, minister plenipotentiary. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1304] 5058

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

FRENCH-ANGOLAN RELATIONS--"Unlimited credits from France to Angola in the domain of prospecting and developing Angolan petroleum reserves . . ." This is the substance of the formal promises made last week by the French minister of foreign trade to Jorge de Morais, the Angolan petroleum minister, who had just arrived in Paris following a particularly fruitful trip to Brazil. The welcome given by the official French authorities, the French oil companies and certain banking institutions in France, was warm. Several French political observers grant particular importance to the development of economic relations between the two countries after the normalization of political relations between Paris and Luanda. [Excerpt] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 198, 28 May 79 p 41] 12,116

RECRUITMENT OF PORTUGUESE TEACHERS--The People's Republic of Angola is interested in recruiting 5,300 Portuguese cooperation teachers. According to the ANOP [Official Angolan Press Agency], this question was debated recently at Lisbon by the Portuguese ministers of foreign affairs and of education, Mr Freitas Truz and Mr Valente de Oliveira as well as by the ambassador of the People's Republic of Angola in the Portuguese capital, Mr Adriano Sebastiao. The main problems seem to spring from the fact that it is impossible for Lisbon to find the number of teachers requested for all levels of education within the deadlines desired by Luanda. The government in Luanda would have wanted the Portuguese cooperation officers to be ready for the next school year in Angola, in May. Lisbon feels that this kind of recruiting could take place only after the end of the Portuguese school year in July. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1327] 5058

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CAPE VERDE

PIRES: AGRICULTURAL REFORMS WILL NOT FOLLOW FOREIGN MODEL

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 188, 28 May 79 pp 20, 21

[Interview with Pedro Pires, prime minister of Cape Verde, by Augusta Conchiglia, in Praia. Date of interview not given.]

[Excerpts] In one month the people of Cape Verde will celebrate the fourth anniversary of their liberation and accession to national sovereignty. Four years of difficulties and obstacles of every kind but also 4 years of exploits and hopes for the construction of a new society. Our special envoy begins her report today with an interview with the chief of the Praia Government.

[Question] On next 5 July it will be 4 years since Cape Verde became independent. What have you accomplished?

[Answer] Four years is a very short time to change the situation of a country, and above all a country like ours. In the first place it doesn't have any natural resources and in the second place it doesn't even have the colonial heritage of economic infrastructures. What we have is literally nothing and it is by beginning with that nothing that we are trying to set up a viable economy.

Furthermore, we have suffered from a drought which was disastrous for agriculture. The former colonists never took any preventive measures against drought and it has damaged our soil to the point where we have to struggle for the physical conservation of our islands. In order to repair the damage created by colonialism and its sudden cessation we will need several decades.

[Question] Can it be assumed that the standard of living rose after independence? Do the people eat better?

[Answer] By and large, yes. In our country, which periodically suffers from drought, it is imperative to set up reserves of food if we are to avoid hardship. That is what we have done.

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It is also necessary to control the price of food so that it will cost the same throughout the entire country and so that the purchasing power of the workers will stay the same. We have not been entirely successful in this because the prices of imported articles keep going up, which is not the case with wages.

However, we are doing all we can to maintain the current prices of staples and avoid speculation. And, from the fact that we have given work to tens of thousands of unemployed, the purchasing power of the families has increased.

[Question] You are now obliged to import 90 percent of your food needs. How do you think that you can eliminate that dependence?

[Answer] We don't think that we can eliminate it completely. We don't have enough water. We would have to set up a modern, intensive agriculture, and we don't have the means. All we can hope for is to become less strictly dependent by developing agriculture and cattle breeding as much as possible.

[Question] Are you planning to carry out an agrarian reform?

[Answer] Yes, but that is a very complex problem. From one region to another, from one island to another, the customs of production are different and they are in general deeply rooted. There are fewer large proprietors and the state has acquired large areas of land which was formerly privately owned. Just after independence we expropriated, purely and simply. Then we indemnified. There is still sharecropping and leasing of land, however. At the same time, the relations between the sharecroppers or tenants and the owners are no longer what they were. The contract executed between them is in conformity with the laws of the country and they argue as two equals. Besides, there are thousands of small proprietors who farm their little plots for themselves.

[Question] Do the large landowners make up a separate class and exercise political pressure?

[Answer] No, because there are too few of them to constitute a class. On Santiago, for example, there are less than 20 of them. Those are not the people who present a problem as far as an agrarian reform is concerned. If a peasant has more land than he needs to support his family, the question is to decide what to do with the excess. That is the real problem we have not yet solved.

[Question] Have cooperatives been discussed? What is really the situation?

[Answer] It is impossible to create cooperatives overnight and just by decree. As I have told you, our peasants have their customs. Moreover, almost all the tenants and sharecroppers hope to become owners. It is out of the question for us to decree transfers of ownership. For the moment, the state

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can only make credit available to the farmers and the problem remains the same. We must find an original way to solve it. The topography, the climate and the traditions of the country are such that none of the agrarian reforms carried out more or less successfully elsewhere can be applied here.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

BOKASSA'S RULE BELIEVED NEARING AN END

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 May 79 pp 18-19

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado, Jean-Marc Zaidi: "Bokassa I's Last Battle"]

[Text] This Ngarangba Prison, in Bangui, where political prisoners and common law prisoners often share the same "quarters," is called Hell. Some prisoners have spent 3 or 4 years in the black of the cells without air or light. Undernourishment breaks down all resistance and real epidemics work havoc, at times, among the inmates.

This is the hell in which children 8 to 16 years old were shut up during the night of 18-19 April 1979. On the morning of 18 April, they numbered 250, living together with the common law prisoners. During the day, a good 100 of them died. Smothered in the small cells in which they had been piled up. Dying under a bloody beating administered by the men of the Imperial Guard, armed with rocks, clubs, boots and bayonets. On the following night, the bodies were buried in a common grave. One witness states that he had counted 62 corpses. The count has not ended.

It took a month for this scandal to break out and for international opinion to be informed, thanks to that real bugbear of every totalitarian regime, Amnesty International. On 14 May 1979, that humanitarian organization, whose headquarters are in London (Great Britain), made a partial revelation of the facts: arrested for having "protested against the obligation imposed on them to wear a uniform" that their parents would have had to buy, school children died in the Ngarangba Prison. "Some children were stoned by the Imperial Guards to punish them for having thrown stones at the imperial car. Others were hit with bayonet blows. Others died under whip blows or blows from nail-studded clubs."

It all began last January. The International Children's Year was only 20 days old at that time. Bangui, the Central African capital, was seized by a protest. Emperor Bokassa I decided that all school children should wear a uniform "to distinguish them from other children not attending school who often were bandits." But, in contrast with the imperial pomp, Bangui

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has become an anemic city. Unemployment and taxes, inflation and corruption ended by cleaning out students' parents completely. On 20 and 21 January, elementary and high school students went into the street to protest against the imperial decision. The emperor's special guard, the only military body that has ammunition, was ordered to stop the demonstration. Those men, who were trained by Israeli officers -- including the famous General Gonnem, who later changed over to diamond trading -- know only one method: to shoot into the mob.

According to reliable sources, 400 persons died; 1,000 according to travelers coming from Bangui.

The January killings have not, however, weakened the protest movement. Since then, some schools have not, at any rate, reopened their doors. In the manner of Soweto, high school students lay ambushes against isolated policemen who venture in civilian clothes into some districts.

On 8 April, the emperor had students and teachers arrested, in order to break the strike at the Boganda High School. Included among them were the principal, Nicolas Gotoas, and the director of the Normal School, Alphonse Blague, and a banker, Daniel Nditifei. After having been deported and placed under house arrest in their respective villages, they were brought back to Bangui later. Because the students were threatening to go on strike again. But especially because the undesirables had begun to make the excesses of Bokassa I known in their family circles and their villages.

The emperor seeks, in turn, to put a definite stop to what risks becoming an insurrection. He chose to subdue the hardest districts in Bangui, especially Malimaka and Boy-Rabe, traditionally inclined to rebel to the point of having been pounded with mortar fire from the nearby airport at the time of the January demonstrations. He entrusted General Inga with the task of arranging some "punch operations" with the Imperial Guard. On 18 April, in the evening, the districts of Malimaka, Boy-Rabe, Zande and Nzakara were surrounded, combed. The results are known. Parents who hastened, on 19 April, to the Ngarangba Prison, were not authorized to see their children. On that same day, Bokassa I stated, in a public address, that he is always the "father and protector of children who are the country's future."

On 20 April, the emperor tried to have a popular support demonstration organized in the Boganda Stadium. This time, Bokassa understood. The empire is tottering. On 21 April, Bangui announced that Bokassa I had escaped from an attempt on his life! It was said that his car was riddled with bullets in the street. The Central African opponents state that everyone knows that "the emperor constantly wears a bulletproof vest and travels only in an armored vehicle. Therefore, no one would get the idea to hazard" that kind "of attempt."

Actually, these upsets, these crimes and these productions strongly resemble the end of a reign. The movement by elementary school and high school

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students has served as an indicator and the murder of children has, perhaps, sounded the knell of the "Bokassa" empire.

Therefore, the emperor has waged his last battle. A battle without glory that covered the first months of the Imperial Children's Year with blood.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

ESTABLISHMENT OF LIBERATION FRONT ANNOUNCED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1283

[Article: "The Central African Empire's Ambassador in Paris Announces the Creation of a Front for the Liberation of the Ubanguians"]

[Text] During a press conference held on 22 May, the Central African Empire's ambassador in Paris, Lt Gal Sylvestre Bangui, has announced that he considered his resignation (which he had submitted several months ago and which Emperor Bokassa had refused) to be effective as of that date. Based on direct testimony from soldiers who took part in the massacre of children in the Central African Empire's capital, during the night of 18 to 19 April, the diplomate has acquired the conviction that the revelations made on 14 May by Amnesty International were true. The ambassador has mentioned horrible details on how the children and youth were killed and secretly buried by the imperial guard.

The ambassador, who has asked for political asylum in France and has stated that he would be at the disposal of Amnesty International for any additional information or assistance, has announced the creation of a Front for the Liberation of the Ubanguians; this, he states, is "a peaceable organization which abhors coups d'etat, has no political ambitions, and shall use popular pressure to obtain a free regime." The ambassador intends to go to Africa, not to ask heads of states for assistance, but to hear their opinion and advice. He said he was prepared to start a dialogue with the Central African Empire's authorities and to meet with a delegation from Bangui in the near future. According to the ambassador's statements, his aim is not to overturn Marshal Bokassa but to obtain, if not a republic, at least "a constitutional monarchy and a social and enlightened government such as there is in Morocco."

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

FRENCH CIVIL, FINANCIAL AID TO BE CONTINUED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1283

[Article: "Central African Empire: The Ambassador Accuses"]

[Text] The Central African Empire's ambassador in Paris has confirmed publicly that the massacre of children and youth denounced by Amnesty International did actually take place in Bangui during the night of 18 to 19 April. Neither the denials of the Central African Empire's government, nor the absurd statements made by Emperor Bokassa on his arrival in Kigali had seemed convincing. The fact that it is not possible to tell with any certainty how many were killed--Amnesty International mentions 50 to 100--does not in any way make crime less horrible.

Its denunciation by the Empire's ambassador in Paris has forced African heads of states, who were meeting on the occasion of the 6th Franco-African Conference, to examine the question of violations of human rights perpetrated by African regimes. In spite their reluctance to set aside the celebrated principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of their neighbors, they have decided to set up an investigation commission which should include magistrates and jurists from Ivory Coast, Togo, Rwanda, Senegal and Liberia.

Surely, it should be Africa's responsibility to defend its honor. Immediately after publication of Amnesty International's communique, Nairobi's two dailies had made their position clear and violently attacked the head of the Central African Empire. "Were such cruel and barbaric acts perpetrated in South Africa or in Rhodesia, where white minority regimes govern against the will of the black majority, independent Africa as a whole would have branded them as murderers and criminals," THE NATION wrote. It then goes on: "But Emperor Bokassa happens to be a black man, and his country a member of OAU, therefore his crimes are ignored or hushed up, thus exposing Africa to derision when its leaders condemn the violations of human rights which take place in southern Africa."

This is about what two French-language newspapers, FRATERNITE-MATIN in Abidjan and LE SOLEIL in Dakar, had written in February 1977 when it

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became known that Marshall Idi Amin Dada had murdered the Anglican archbishop in Kampala, Dr Janani Luwum, and two ministers of the Ugandan government.

"It is high time for the world to denounce the atrocities committed by Bokassa and to ask that an end be put to his reign," THE STANDARD of Nairobi writes for its part. "This," the newspaper goes on, "is the position which the OAU should take. If Bokassa were still in power at the time of the next summit, the African heads of states should not feel that denouncing him publicly would be in contradiction with the principles of the OAU, they should preach the cause of democracy, liberty and the respect of human life in the Central African Empire."

Shall the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of other states always prevail at the expense of the respect for the most elementary of human rights, the first of which is surely the children's rights to life? This is the question asked by Mr Edmond Kayser, the founder of "Terre des Hommes", in a letter to the director of the UN department of human rights. "Although you cannot get rid of the murderers," he writes, "you could at least condemn them publicly."

The committee of non-governmental organizations for the International Children's Year has asked that all those who have any influence assume their responsibilities and intervene with the Bangui government.

No country has a more special responsibility to the people of the Central African Empire than France, and all of Africa and the world know that it is the strongest supporter of Emperor Bokassa and his regime. The French government is now belatedly distancing itself from its troublesome protege. It was noticed in Kigali that the French ambassador refrained from meeting the Emperor on his arrival at the airport, that the French delegation turned him the cold shoulder, and that Mr Giscard d'Estaing did not meet him privately.

After the revelations made by the Central African Empire's ambassador in Paris, and pending the report of the investigation commission, France is suspending all military or paramilitary aid to the Empire. However, civil and financial aid to the people of the Empire, who need it urgently, will continue.

"The duty of a country like France is not to distribute censure in order to gain a good conscience," the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated on 16 April before a National Assembly, "it is to help its partner states to reach a level of development where poverty and injustice have no place, thus effectively ensuring the full development of the individual and the full exercise of his fundamental rights."

France's aid accounts for half the Empire's budget: 106 million French francs in 1976, 148 millions in 1977. Since January of this year, France

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is said to have lent the Bangui government over 60 million French francs to enable it to pay its civil servants and to cover its most urgent expenditures. To put an end to this aid would amount to increase the misfortune of a people who is already suffering under the wastefulness of the regime by which it is governed.

Mr Jean-Francois Poncet had also stated: "Such facts, if proven, can only raise indignation, not only in France, but in Africa itself... When this has been cleared up, in all objectivity, France, with all respect due to the sovereignty of all states, shall use its influence in an efficient and discreet manner to ensure that human rights are respected."

Now that it is no longer possible to have any doubt, too much discretion would be unpardonable, and France's duty is to make sure that the people of the Central African Empire receive in full the aid intended for them, and that they recover as soon as possible "the full exercise of their fundamental rights."

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CHAD

GOVERNMENT CUTTING SEPARATISTS OFF FROM FRONTIERS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 May 79 p 21

[Article by Marc Yared: "Toward Another Biafra?"]

[Text] The Southern Chad separatists are said to be about to proclaim the "independence" of the areas subject to their control. The armed forces of the central government would then rush to win rebel positions. This sinister prospect is reminiscent of a conflict that exploded in neighboring Nigeria in May 1967.

In both countries, 45 percent of the population is -- also was formerly -- Muslim, settled primarily in the north and forming the most compact religious group in contrast with sizable Christian and animist minorities establish primarily in the oil-bearing south. An ambitious, dynamic, widely Christianized southern ethnic group from which most of the countries officials are recruited, maintained for a long time the unification formula. That was true of the Ibo in Nigeria, native primarily to Biafra, and of the Sara in Chad. But this elite group, losing ground, fears, rightly or wrongly, the "Islamic peril," embodied in the northern ethnic groups with a warlike tradition: Nigerian Hausa or Chadian Toubou.

The spark setting off the conflagration was the same in both countries, at an interval of 12 years: call for a holy war and sectarian massacres. At the end of 1966 and early in 1967, tens of thousands of Christian Ibo suspected of wanting to take over the machinery of state were massacred in northern Nigeria. At the end of 1978 and early in 1979, over 10,000 Muslims accused of wanting to monopolize government authority were exterminated in southern Chad. In both cases, these minigenocides were followed by an exodus of inhabitants toward their respective regional stronghold. Actual demographic partition thus preceded and caused the separatist objectives.

In Chad, just as in Nigeria, the leader of the Southerners is a lieutenant colonel who has held important posts within the central administration. In 1966, Ojukwu was military governor of eastern Nigeria. Until August 1978, Kamougue was minister of Foreign Affairs and then commander in chief

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of the Chadian gendarmerie. But the cause of the separatists is far from bringing about unanimity in the region controlled by them. Although they are Christians, the Ibibo rejected Ibo oppression and some of their leaders sides with the Nigerian federal government. Likewise, the present Chadian minister of Foreign Affairs, Capt Koumbamba Dering, has broken his ties with his coreligionists in favor of partition. A number of his followers are rebelling against Sara domination.

In order to liquidate the rebel stronghold, the N'Djamena government seems to have to follow the same strategy as the one that was so successful recently for the Lagos authorities. It consists of cutting off the separatists' access to neighboring countries, of isolating them. Thus, 10 years ago the Nigerian Army finally smothered Biafra. On 11 May, the Chadian Army took position along the road connecting the three southern prefectures with Cameroon, in order to achieve the same result.

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COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

RADIO SEMINAR--A seminar on information and technology, organized under the aegis of the administration of Radio Comoros with the assistance of UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund], was held in Moroni from 10 to 24 May 1979. Organized in the interest of the personnel of Radio Comoros, this seminar was attended by Boubacar Seck (from Senegal), a UNICEF expert, and Omar Tamou, general manager of Radio Comoros. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1323] 2662

FRENCH MILITARY AID--France has donated military equipment including 15 vehicles (Land Rovers) and military uniforms to the Comoros. "This initial lot of materiel that we have just received from the French Government will enable the Comorian armed forces to have military capability for fulfilling their task," Maj Ahmed Mohamed, chief of staff of the Comorian armed forces, declared on 21 April 1979. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 1979 p 1323] 2662

FIRST ANNIVERSARY--The Comoros celebrated the first anniversary of the counter coup d'etat of 13 May 1978 which toppled the regime of Ali Soilih. Various religious, sports, cultural, and artistic events, which got under way on 11 May, continued until 20 May 1979. On the occasion of that anniversary President Ahmed Abdallah, in a message to the nation, after issuing an official appeal in favor of democracy and liberty as well as the country's development, wished to thank "his true friends," Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Gabon, for the support evidenced since the outset on 13 May 1978 and in particular Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates "which are helping us to develop the country and absorb unemployment. France promised us its aid and has gradually set up its financial cooperation and personnel cooperation programs," he added. "Too many bonds bind us to France for us not to trust President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. He is familiar with the situation of all the countries which France has led to independence. He is acquainted with our situation and will know how to evaluate and respond to our trust with dignity." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1323] 2662

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GABON

XENOPHOBIA, WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION REPORTED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 188, 28 May 79 p 19

[Article by Sam Essono: "Flies Buzzing in Bongo's Ears"]

[Text] Decidedly, Omar-Albert Bongo will never change. Shouldn't he have changed his skin after the sudden expulsion of nearly 9,000 Benin citizens resident in Gabon in July 1978? The result of that act is that he is now facing an international opinion grown indignant over his methods.

However, Gabon's chief of state has just started his anti-foreign campaign up again without even a word of warning. An order has been given to the minister of the interior and to the forces of order to establish systematic controls over persons (foreigners in particular) and vehicles throughout the country and to fire in case of necessity. Those controls, the presidential directive explains, "are not to exempt anyone, not even the members of the diplomatic corps." Besides, it is expressly required that "all foreigners residing in the country without a labor contract are to be expelled, even if Gabon has signed agreements for free entry with their countries of origin."

After the great carnival that the court followers organized from last 24 to 27 January under the guise of the Special Congress of the Gabonese Democratic Party [GDP], a dull refusal to listen has spread over the entire country.

What Coalition?

In addition to the scant credit the Gabonese are now showing with regard to their leaders, a great amount of discontent is noted, caused by the very poor living conditions in the cities. According to COSYGA (Gabonese Labor Confederation), which disputes the official figure of an 8-percent rise in prices and prefers the figure of 18.5 percent, which is still below the true figure: "A basic food like the plantain banana, whose price per kilogram is officially fixed at 90 CFA [African Financial Community] francs, is now selling at 450 CFA . . . . That increase is not a particular case," the bulletin of the labor organization makes clear. "It indicates much more exactly the kind of price increases for local products or products imported for current consumption." The chief of state has had only one answer to the criticisms that come

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in from all sides. It is the contemptuous comment: "I have no concern with the flies that buzz around my table." One suspects that this is a sentence which must exasperate public opinion to the point of making people want to smash everything.

They have also told us about the case of a large national company, the OPRAG (Office of Ports and Roadsteads of Gabon), where balances have not been recorded since the 1976 fiscal year and where, as if by enchantment, the documents on day-to-day treasury balances have disappeared.

All these considerations underlying the problems of daily life are, in fact, at the base of the new upsurge of vandalism in the country as well as its insecurity. Bongo cannot ignore that. Incapable of satisfying the aspirations of his people, it has been necessary for him to find scapegoats.

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GHANA

ECONOMIC, DEVELOPMENT LOAN PROSPECTS DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 15 Jun 79 p 1608

Excerpts During his 11 months in office, (5 July 1978 to 4 June 1979), Gen Akuffo had succeeded in obtaining renewed credits for his country. The austerity budget promulgated last September and the monetary reform in March of this year involving the exchange of the currency fostered the economic and financial recovery of the country and consequently also foreign confidence.

However, in Ghana as in Nigeria, austerity measures have sometimes constituted a heavy burden for the population, and particularly in Ghana, certain enterprises and certain personalities were rather unhappy about the stringent review process to which their accounts had been subjected. The fact that a great deal of malfeasance was made public thanks to the liberalization of the information process may have contributed toward prompting the new leaders to step in for the purpose of punishing those who had only been exposed thus far. At least, this is what came out from their initial statements.

While watching for new developments, one should acknowledge some of the positive elements registered under the previous regime, notably those that are relevant to the country's economic development.

Besides the French Government's authorization to the COFACE expansion unknown to accord new guarantees to Ghana, the announcement of a promise by six countries to contribute \$630 million to the Oppon Manso steel factory in the Western region should be noted. Of the total \$1,460 million in investments which this project represents, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Brazil have reportedly decided to contribute \$200, \$250 and \$180 million respectively, and Poland, the Netherlands and India another contribution of an unspecified amount.

The World Bank has agreed to grant a \$23 million loan for the extension and the improvement of the telecommunications system, specifically for the telephone network.

The World Bank and the EEC have decided to grant \$19 and \$6 million respectively to the National Investment Bank (NIB) to enable it to grant credit terms to various projects which will either foster exports or save foreign exchange through local manufacturing.

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The Netherlands have granted 5 million cedis (the equivalent of 4 million florins) for the extension of the telecommunications system and the training of the rural population.

The FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] has decided, in conjunction with the PNUD [UNDP] to assist Ghana in the field of animal husbandry, with the emphasis on sheep and goats.

The FRG has decided to make new investments, especially in the field of transportation on the Volta Lake.

The Ghanaian press has noted that West German volunteers have been active in Ghana since 1965, and that there are at present about 30 of them in the country in various locations.

The press also lists the various West German assistance organisms which have been active in Ghana: The African Bureau (an association for adult education), the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Catholic and Protestant Churches, the Carl Duisberg society, the student exchange service and the national foundation for international development.

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GHANA

BRIEFS

FRG TRANSPORTATION ASSISTANCE--The West German ambassador to Ghana, Mr Herbert Weil, recently revealed that his country pledged to invest DM 75 million in the integrated transportation project on Lake Volta. This project is intended to facilitate connections between the country's north and south which are cut by this artificial lake. It provides for the utilization of shipping units for passengers, vehicles, and goods as well as the installation of pier facilities and the construction of a better access road leading to the lake from Akosombo. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1313] 5058

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MADAGASCAR

DIFFICULTIES WITH FRANCE REPORTED LESS CRITICAL BUT PERSISTENT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-27 May 79 pp 24-25

[Article by Elie Ramaro]

[Text] Some circles are seeking to present a distorted image of the relations between France and Madagascar. Are they the victims of some unfortunate delusions, or are they engaging in some malicious schemes? As a matter of fact, things are less than idyllic between Paris and Antananarivo, and a real disservice would be done by trying to pretend the opposite, or by attempting to evade the problems.

Indeed, a major bone of contention still persists between the two countries, adding to the existing obvious difference between their political regimes.

From a worldwide viewpoint, the Malagasy government has some questions about France's total sincerity on the subject of its military deployments in the Indian Ocean. Speaking to Didier Ratsiraka last September, President Giscard d'Estaing declared: "While maintaining a presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Reunion Department, which it has shaped during three centuries of history, France harbors no ambition of a political or military nature, you may be assured of it." But how then does he justify the presence in Reunion of the French paratrooper regiment which had previously been stationed in Antananarivo and which, as the Malagasy well know, had a mission essentially directed towards "an outside intervention"? From the remarks of the French chief of state, should we conclude that France is devoid of any political or military interest in that entire area, or that it goes no further than the mere protection of European petroleum and of its routes, while all chiefs of staff, admirals or authorized strategic experts keep writing column after column justifying the presence of the French military fleet in the Indian Ocean, using the traditional geo-political and military considerations?

Furthermore, the Malagasy have known for a few years that the issue of the very status of Reunion has been reopened by a major portion of the island's

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public opinion, taking the form of demands for autonomy by the "Party Communiste Reunionnais" [Communist Party of Reunion] and by various political organizations. A movement for independence even appeared in recent years and was taken over by the Organization of African Unity.

Finally there is the permanent presence of a sizable French base in Djibouti, at the entrance to the Red Sea, also the occupation of Mayotte and of a series of small islands located in the Mozambique Canal, which Madagascar considers to be within its natural sphere of influence and its sovereignty. On that last point, in fact, the Malagasy Government intends to make another appeal to the United Nations and also at the next summit meeting of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] in Monrovia next July. At that time, a report will be given by the ad hoc committee created by that inter-African organization.

The operation instigated by Ahmed Abdallah and the mercenary Bob Denard, in May 1978, to overthrow Ali Soilih, head of the revolutionary Comorian regime, also could not go unnoticed by the Malagasy authorities, who, during the year 1978, had to face several attempts to upset the political balance, originating from South Africa and from Reunion. "It is important for us to radically put an end to this," Didier Ratsiraka openly told his French counterpart in September 1978. "Nowadays it seems to be an established practice to accomplish all misdeeds by hiring dirty work professionals, and by following a strategy of 'fait accompli...'"

Other topics also cause problems between Antananarivo and Paris: For instance, the reparations demanded by French economic circles following the nationalization of French interests. On that subject, the Malagasy position also remains quite firm: The principle of a "fair and equitable indemnity" is admitted, as Christian Remi Richard has repeatedly affirmed. However, it excludes companies that have settled in Madagascar since colonial times, and have had plenty of time to amortize their capital, and even do more.

Tired of Waiting...

The same thing applies to the brain drain which, according to Madagascar's accusation, France is allowing to happen, particularly by agreeing to have Malagasy students in France engage into studies of long duration and high specialization, and sometimes unrelated to the needs expressed by the Malagasy nation. [This also applies to] the Malagasy community in France, partly made up of bourgeois who preferred to leave the country after the fall of Philibert Tsiranana's regime, and who represent a "lobby" [in English in text] inclined to "nostalgia" for a past way of life, often associated with the former colonial community in Madagascar. [It also applies to] the fate of Malagasy veterans, who are being discriminated against in comparison to their former war comrades from France.

Another hurdle stands in the way of total normalization of Franco-Malagasy relations: It is the problem of restitution of cultural treasures.

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Although perhaps not of vital importance, still, psychologically, in the eyes of the Malagasy people, this problem is of major concern, which the French often do not realize. In fact, this is one of the issues raised by Madagascar as early as 1972, even before the creation of the Second Republic. Authorities in Antananarivo indeed estimate that excessive quantities of objects and documents were taken by French researchers or collectors during colonial times or during the "Franco-Malagasy" period that followed, as they were taking advantage of a total lack of control.<sup>1</sup> Some leaks of cultural treasures have even given rise to illegal trafficking in precious gems, rare woods and sculptures, archives etc...

In 1973 France practically refused to discuss the matter. Therefore, last March, Malagasy negotiators in Paris renewed their efforts, with the support, among others, of recently adopted UNESCO resolutions regarding the need to return cultural treasures "borrowed" from colonized countries. In this respect, the Malagasy people are not the only ones tired of waiting, and UNESCO's group of African countries intends to rekindle the matter with all necessary vigor...

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<sup>1</sup>Since 1973, on the other hand, legislation regarding removal of cultural treasures or artifacts has been toughened to the utmost.

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MADAGASCAR

ROLE, ACTIVITIES OF SECREN DETAILED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1323

[Article: "Role and Activities of SECREN"]

[Text] The heir of the military arsenal of Diego Suarez, SECREN [Naval Construction and Repair Company] of Antsiranana, wishes to diversify its own naval repair and construction activities and to become better known. This national company was established in February 1975 and its capital stands at 2.6 billion FMG [Malagasy francs].

Heading its executive committee is Col Hubert Andrianasolo, general manager of OMNIS [National Military Office for Strategic Industries]. In a recent interview with the TARATRA news agency he expressed his wish that SECREN should first and foremost satisfy all national needs and, to increase monetary receipts, he emphasized the need for increasing local and foreign orders.

Talking of the diversification of the company's activities Colonel Andrianasolo expressed the hope of seeing the creation of an ocean salvaging company and of participating in the outfitting of a new fishing enterprise in Tanzania. Right now SECREN is busy with jobs involving metals, plastics, and wood. Thus, it was able to produce the furniture for the Ambohitsorohitra palace. SECREN's major activities are as follows:

1. Careening and repair of vessels (60 percent of SECREN's operations). Nearly 1,000 commercial vessels a year are careened. The fairing basin can accommodate ships of 30,000 tons. For larger vessels the repairs are carried out in the roadstead. The craft repaired are mostly from Madagascar but many others from Tanzania, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia come to Antsiranana.
2. Naval construction. This activity represents 30 percent of the company's operations. It is highly diversified. SECREN's production includes tugs, coastal freighters, barges, outboard motor boats, light sailing boats with drop keels, and even pedal boats. This department works essentially for the Malagasy Maritime Transportation Company and for the Malagasy navy. The

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company's executives are seeking foreign markets and have to meet South African and Kenyan competition.

Among SECREN's other activities let us note those of its Studies Office whose function is to plan the modifications called for by ships in service.

Because of its various functions the general service group has an important role: It takes care of logistical support for the careening work (the fairing of hulls and paint jobs). It also takes care of maintaining the property of SECREN. This department is headed by a senior engineer of equipment planning and techniques.

The electric and electronic projects department, in addition to its activities connected with naval repair and construction (electronic and electrical equipment), generates electric power for the city of Diego Suarez by means of its power station, maintains its electric network, and repairs the city's high-tension network. The power station produces more than 6 million kilowatt-hours of electricity.

Finally, SECREN has a technical training school department which provides the training and recruitment of skilled workers. It also provides retraining courses. Each year, 15 apprentices are recruited through a competitive examination. The maximum age is 18 years and the training period, 2 years.

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

MIG 21'S--In the Indian Ocean Soviet-built Mig 21 aircraft are beginning to replace the Mig 17's, loaned on a temporary basis to Madagascar by North Korea.  
[Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 28 May 79 p 33] 2662

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MALI

BRIEFS

DISSIDENT FRONT ESTABLISHED--A Front for the Liberation of Northern Mali was established in Tripoli with Libyan blessing and assistance. Created by Moorish and Arab leaders, this movement refuses to accept the administrative and political authority of the Bamako government. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 963, 20 Jun 79 p 40]

CCCE SELINGUE DAM FINANCING--An agreement on a loan amounting to F 6.2 million or 620 Malian Francs, was signed at Bamako on 11 May between the government of Mali and the CCCE (Central Economic Cooperation Fund). This agreement will permit the financing of the construction of a transformer and the completion of miscellaneous supplementary facilities at the Selingue Dam. It was signed on the Malian side by Mr Ousmane Diallo, director for international cooperation, and on the French side by Mr Boyer, CCCE manager at Bamako. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1304] 5058

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MOZAMBIQUE

SOUTH AFRICAN CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMY STRESSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1327

[Text] Continuing our review of the economic situation in Mozambique, which we began in our issue No 1749, dated 18 May, p 1266, we will first of all look into problems concerning industry.

In this sector, a slow improvement is now in progress, as recently reported by FINANCIAL TIMES. A new tire factory, in which the American General Tire Company has an interest, was opened early in the year at Maputo. A textile mill will begin operations in Nampula by the end of the year. Various enterprises resumed their manufacturing activities. But the government deliberately decided to close others down, for example, the metal processing plant most of whose raw materials had to be imported. At Beira, a car body assembly plant will be converted to produce agricultural tools.

Exports of cement to neighboring countries (Tanzania, Madagascar) are picking up again. The port of Nacala, where a new cement depot is being built, will export about 20,000 tons of this product this year, twice as much as last year.

On the other hand, various ambitious construction projects, started by the Portuguese just prior to independence, were not continued. Most of the big buildings under construction at Maputo, Nampula, and Nacala stand there, unfinished, in the condition they were in four years ago. Generally, the urban housing situation revealed a great need for maintenance and repair.

The skilled manpower shortage can be felt in all sectors. In the railroad sector, there were 7,500 Portuguese prior to independence; now there are only 350 foreigners (Portuguese, Indians, East Germans, Soviets, and Cubans) at this time. The banking sector is liable to encounter some difficulties by the end of the year; the contracts of the Portuguese employees are then scheduled to expire. This explains why the government in Maputo recently signed an agreement with the GDR so that the latter would provide the technical assistance necessary to keep the banking sector going which has now been nationalized, with the exception of a single establishment.

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The current government-controlled system is that, even if the necessary cadres were available, the enterprise managers would have difficulty employing them. To be able to get something started, they must in effect have prior agreement from the FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] cell--the only party existing in Mozambique--which exists in every public or private enterprise. We have thus heard the case of a company in Maputo which had to wait for many months before being authorized to hire a qualified accountant.

In the present situation, with agriculture in trouble and industry barely beginning to catch its breath again, Mozambique is forced to cooperate with South Africa. While Mozambican citrus fruit production is improving, this is due, in the field of agriculture, to South African technical aid. Maputo was thus able to export 500,000 crates of citrus fruit.

But it is in the field of transportation that South African assistance to Mozambique is most apparent; Mozambique is furthermore trying to persuade professional experts from neighboring countries to ship as many of their exports and imports via the railroad and ports of Mozambique. In practice this means that the problem of productivity has been solved.

It is evident in any case that the railroads and ports of Mozambique are among the items that constitute an important portion of government investment expenditures.

The delivery of 14 locomotives by Brazil enabled Mozambique to return to South Africa the ten diesel engines which had been loaned to it. Other locomotives are being purchased. The railroad line linking the east of Transvaal to Maputo is equipped with a traffic control center and has new rails while the ballast is being restored. All of these operations are being carried out by South African companies; by the time they are completed, the daily capacity in one direction will be increased to 50,000 tons, three times the current daily average.

Concerning the ports, the authorities intend to purchase 120 units of hoisting equipment, pilot boats, tugboats, and cranes. A pier for roll-on-roll-off vessels is being built at Beira by Construcoes Tecnicas, a Portuguese enterprise. A South African shipping company is contributing to the improvement of the loading installations which handle more than half of Malawi's foreign traffic. Maputo permits the shipment of chrome, citrus fruit, vermiculite, vanadium, and steel from South Africa, as well as imports of sulfur and vehicles going to South Africa.

Mozambican ports still suffer from the inadequacy of equipment maintenance. Not so long ago, only six out of the 34 hoisting equipment units at the ports were in operating condition at Nacala. To push the freight cars, equipment is being used in Beira which was never designed for this purpose. At Matola, the terminal for bulk shipments located near Maputo, one

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of the two conveyor belts, used for loading chrome and iron mineral, has been out of commission since last November; without massive investments, it is unthinkable that this installation could load more than 3.5 million tons of mineral per year (as against two million tons last year and four million tons in 1973).

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ADDENDUM: This is a reprint of article in  
JPRS L/8474, 22 May 79, (FOUO No 636) pp 14-  
24 to include additional translated material

NIGER

PRESENT DAY NIGER'S URANIUM DEPOSITS DISCUSSED

Uranium Only One Factor

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Apr 79 pp 37-39, 41

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] The regime of Col Seyni Kountche is getting ready to celebrate the fifth anniversary of its ascent to power next 15 April. Five years marked by two severely repressed coups d'etat are coming to a close in an economic situation full of hope. It is true that the uranium boom accounts for a great deal of this. However, the rigorous management of the leadership team also deserves to be noted. Will the Army seize this occasion to erase all the aftereffects of the April 1974 coup d'etat and bring about a national reconciliation? This is the question that everyone is asking. The reply will soon be known. Join us after the festivities that the town of Dosso is to host.

After 10 hours of driving to the east of Niamey, the brush-covered savanna suddenly gives way to a quiet little town burned by the sun, overshadowed here and there by the high foliage of the callcedrats [translation unknown], mimosas and flamboyants: Dosso. Up to now, this conglomeration of 10,000 inhabitants, languishing under a veil of dust-laden mist, seems inexorably condemned to decadence. It lives only on its glorious past.

In fact, Dosso was the cradle of the Djermas, one of the two principal ethnic groups that inhabit Niger. The white palace with the blue and yellow figurines of the reigning family, the Djermakoyes, who succeeded each other from father to son at the head of that decadent royal house, is still the heart of the city. However, here is Dosso getting ready to write another glorious title over its escutcheons. According to the principle of rotation, it is this city which is to host, on 15 April 1979, the festivities marking the fifth anniversary of the ascent of the Army to power (15 April 1974). Battalion Commander Adamu Harouna, prefect of Dosso, an officer with the carriage of an athlete, few words and abrupt gestures, directed with an iron hand the construction of the necessary infrastructures for welcoming and hosting nearly 2,000 guests. On this occasion, the authorities wished

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to show proof of the change that has taken place in the country under the aegis of the Army. It is true that the political landscape of Niger has changed a great deal in five years. The presidential palace in Niamey, an imposing edifice whose Soudano-Mauresque architecture is reflected in the waters of the river, is now only the shadow of itself. Formerly the seat of a feverish activity, it is now totally deserted. Outside of the rare official receptions that he offers there, the current president, Colonel Seyni Kountche, obstinately camps in the official residence of the chief of staff of the Niger Army, while the palace remains closed and forbidden to the public. In order to show this very clearly, armed soldiers dressed in short uniforms, nonchalant and debonnaire, watch before its entrance. In the garage, dozens of Mercedes (including two Mercedes 600s), unused after the events of April 1974, very gently gather dust, abandoned to the effects of time.

The building of the former National Assembly is not unaffected. Certainly, the deputies of the former regime were sent back to their professional occupations. The studio apartments which served them as residences during the sessions have been closed. Because, a neighbour tells us, "certain dignitaries of the new regime had a tendency to change the deputies' residence into a house of assignation." However, the building still houses the services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Battalion Commander Moumoumi Djermakoié Adamou, the foreign minister, has taken the armchair of ex-president Boubou Hama. The official residence that the latter used to occupy on the river-bank today serves as a reception hall for the members of the government. As for the immense assembly hall where the deputies huddled together, from time to time it serves as a meeting place for cadre conferences.

The men who presided over the destinies of Niger for 15 years have all left the front of the stage. Furthermore, all of the country's influential political personages were arrested during the night of 14-15 April 1974. Pulled from their beds while sound asleep, those dignitaries were first transported in jeeps to the Tondibia Cadet Camp, some ten kilometers from Niamey, and then for the most part transferred the next day to the city of the Entente Council, not far from the French embassy. It was from there they were taken to different military camps in the interior (Agadez, Zinder, Tahoua, etc.) as political detainees.

Political detainees who, under the African sun, did not have a great deal to complain about. Housed in relatively comfortable villas customarily reserved for officers, the dignitaries of the former regime led a life rather of men on retreat inside the military camps than a prisoner's life. Adequately fed, they passed the best part of their time playing cards or billiards or bowling. Some of them got together to talk over their ideas on human destiny, while others, disillusioned, preferred to withdraw into isolation in order to meditate on the fragility of political power. This is unusual in Africa. However, generally they all finally agreed to definitively renounce all political activity once they were freed. This

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was a promise that they hurried to forget, of course, as soon as they saw once again the light of liberty.

As for the invalids, they were admitted to the hospital at Niamey. And in cases of complication they were transported to Paris. Some former ministers were thus cared for in the French capital before they were returned to their detention camps. It doesn't matter that certain ones, like Mr Mouddour Zacara, former finance minister, died in detention. As for the others, most of them have today recovered their freedom.

The technocrats promoted by ex-president Diiori Hamani were the first ones freed. They were liberated a few months after their arrest, even when they were not returned to their ministerial posts, because they were connected with the leadership of important state corporations or of central administrations. Then it was the turn of the leaders of the RDA (African Democratic Rally, whose former president Diiori was the first in line) to breathe the air of liberty.

Leaving aside some former deputies and ministers, like Mr Harou Kouka (Public Works) and Leopold Kaziende (National Defense), ex-president Boubou Hama was by far the most illustrious figure. They were freed in small groups and since then they have lived a life of peaceful retirement in Niamey. The only problem is that certain of them, such as Dr Harou Kouka, have not been authorized to take up their professions again; and that a man like Mr Boubou Hama, who worked in politics for a quarter of a century, is curiously at present without a roof. He is obliged to live at the house of his son. Should the government of Colonel Kountche abandon those men to their fate? Without aid and without resources!

#### Mysterious Fate of Detainees

Certainly not. In view of their advanced ages, there are good chances that, faithful to the African traditions particularly devoted to assistance for the aged, the authorities of Niger will not delay in giving them assistance. In one way or another....

However, other former detainees have not delayed in making their reconversions effective. Thus, the predecessor of Colonel Kountche in the post of chief of staff of the Niger Army, Col Balla Arbe, has devoted himself since his liberation to trade between Maradi and Kono (Nigeria). In the meantime, a half-dozen personalities are still under detention in the company of ex-president Hamani Diiori. And, with them, some ten militiamen who had particularly distinguished themselves in repression. President Kountche, who has the only decision-making power in this area, categorically refuses to announce the date of their liberation. "I shall not reveal that date to anyone," he told us last March, with an air that was half amusement and half irritation.

Certainly, the chief of state and his comrades in the Supreme Military Council (CMS, the Supreme Organ of the State) hesitate to take that step.

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It is true that the hostility that some of their compatriots, who were severely tested earlier, continue to harbor toward the leaders of the former regime justifies in part this watchful waiting.

Strong, Structured Army

Thus the memories of the excesses committed by former Interior Minister Diambala Maiga have not been totally effaced from popular memory. It has even happened that the chief of state has received delegations arriving from the interior of the country especially to demand that one or another former dignitary be kept in prison. The reason? Five years after the fall of Mr Hamani Diori's regime, certain citizens of Niger are still calling for revenge.

Nevertheless, everything allows us to believe that the latter group will not stay in prison forever. In spite of the thick veil of mystery that surrounds the debates of the CMS on this painful question, it is still permitted to believe that those unfortunate people will certainly not be long in recovering their freedom. For example, Mr Djibo Bakari, former leader of the Sawaba, who was arrested in 1975. Today, more than ever, the Niger Army needs to erase from its memory the themes and the stigmata of its April 1974 coup d'etat. In a country where inflexibly tolerant spirits are rather inclined toward indulgence, if not forgetfulness and pardon, than toward revenge and the humiliation or the gratuitous putting to death of one's opponent, public opinion understands less and less the indefinite prison residence of Diori, Djibo and their companions. Certainly, people are pleased, even proud to know that they are well treated (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 807). "We are not barbarians in Niger," a young official told us, although his family had for all of that suffered under the former regime. However, in a general way, everyone would prefer to declare: "Among us there are no political prisoners."

The Army seems more and more disposed to turn the page as it considers itself stronger and better structured. The companions of the first hour who had shown some slight inclination to rebel against the advances of the regime have been pitilessly eliminated. Such was the case of Major Sani Souna Sido, who had the reputation of being the man who really overthrew Diori. Arrested for plotting in July 1975, he was detained in the Agadez military camp until he died in 1978 of the aftereffects of an epileptic seizure.

In March of 1976 it was the turn of Battalion Commander Moussa Bayere and Captain Sidi Mohamed to attempt a coup d'etat. At the head of the cadets of the Tonidibia camp, they had no trouble in surrounding the staff, from which they tried to rally the officer corps to their cause. But they failed not far from there, before the residence of the chief of state. Arrested, they were tried at the same time as several civilians, including Mr Ahmed Mouddour, the secretary general of the Confederation of Unions of Niger, and Mr Idrissa Boube, director of the National Secret Police. All were condemned to death and shot in a rather expeditious manner. Other



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recalcitrant companions were to know a kinder fate. Such was the case of Lieutenant Cyrille, who is still in prison, and above all that of Major Idrissa Arouna, who, after being long considered as the number two man of the regime, suddenly fell into disgrace. He was appointed several months ago to represent his country in Peking.

"Power Not a Game"

All of these terrifying activities have had the effect of making the CMS, and with it the officer corps, more coherent and more solidly ranged behind their leader, Col Seyni Kountche. Furthermore, the latter today seems confident and more assured. Certainly, with his sharp features, his severe and penetrating look, the chief of state of Niger still exudes austerity and correctness. Five years of exercising the supreme power have not changed him in either his physical appearance or his habits. Lean body, energetic gestures and his strict military habit bear witness, if there is any need for it, that he has not gained a kilo. Up and about every day at the first glimmerings of dawn to begin an overflowing schedule which is not completed until very late that evening, Seyni Kountche flees from trivia and denies himself any distractions.

This rigorous life repels and upsets even his closest collaborators. It is reported that some of his relatives, unhappy about his behavior, no longer speak to him. For those among them who are so brave as to knock at his door, he orders in a dry and peremptory way: "Let them come to see me in the village during my vacation." As he does not give himself more than a few rare moments of leisure each year, this reply is equivalent to a declaration that he will not receive them. When one of his close relatives, an employee in his government, had been compromised in an affair of deviation of funds, he took pains to demand the most severe punishment for the guilty person. Such is the appearance of the man who has been presiding for five years without drum or trumpet but with a faultless rigor over the destinies of Niger. Was he aware of the size of the task before he rose to the supreme power? "I knew," he replies, that "power was not a game, but a burden and a responsibility that it was necessary to prepare for with rigor and application."

Development, Social Justice

On the other hand, the chief of state has now conquered the timidity and the clumsiness of the staff officer. By the tone of his voice as well as by his manners and his gestures, one feels the presence of a confident man, sure of himself and perfectly at ease in his role. Even if, in the course of the conversation, he shows that he has not entirely lost his proud and touchy side, nor even the suspicious mania of the military man, he makes a visible effort to overcome those handicaps. He seeks to put his conversation partner at ease and lead him to share the contained passion which entirely devours him: The development of his country with unity and social justice.

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This is a subject that is particularly in style in the salons of Niamey. The uranium boom leaves no one indifferent. Everyone, and not only in Niamey, knows furthermore that thanks to its rich mining potential, this country will become one of the most prosperous in Africa by the end of the next decade. Which means that the citizens of Niger are now being particularly courted. Businessmen, experts and financiers show up from all directions, jostling each other at the Niamey airport before running across each other in the ministerial antechambers. Some Western banks such as the National Bank of Paris (French) and the City Bank (American), drawn by the odor of royalties, are applying for the opening of agencies on the spot.

The oil companies are not idle. Technicians of Conoco, Texaco and Esso have been prospecting for years around the basins of the Niger River and Lake Chad. The "indications that have been found allow us to have real hope as of this moment," a high official informed us. Curiously, the French ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants of France] Company, which several years ago had abandoned its research activity, has suddenly come back in force. To start drilling again alongside its American sisters.

Doesn't the attraction of the great wealth to be extracted from the subsoil run the risk of having a harmful effect on the Niger people? Carried away by the vertigo of petroleum and uranium (to speak only of those two minerals), aren't the compatriots of Col Seyni Kountche going to desert their fields and pastures and crowd themselves into cities that are less and less well equipped to accommodate them? This situation is all the more worrisome since it risks annihilating the great efforts undertaken in the course of recent years to struggle against the drought and to develop agriculture. The beautiful experiments in integrated cultivation attempted around Lakes Tabalak and Baga might have no tomorrow. Extensive irrigation projects, such as those being carried out at this moment at Nkonni, might be threatened. The shores of the important storage lake, where some 30,000 farmers drawn from several surrounding villages should come together, might someday be depopulated to the profit of the Arlit strip mine or the oil fields of the Lake Chad basin.

#### Mitigating Effects of Drought

This is a problem which is painfully demanding the attention of the Niger leaders. "We do not want to be at the mercy of a single export product or even of mineral products alone," President Kountche told us. How to avoid it, though. All the work that has been done to mitigate the effects of the drought and to create conditions for the development of agriculture is being continued by the chief of state. Good intentions are not lacking. They are there, however: Every year that goes by is marked by a higher percentage of ore exports in the foreign trade balance. The process seems inexorable.

Another subject for worry for the Niger leaders, which is only the natural consequence of the phenomenon mentioned above: corruption and the perversion

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of moral values. Up to now the citizens of Niger have lived modestly, if not frugally. Isn't the sudden injection of capital likely to overturn that Sahelian way of life and awaken an appetite for money? "I shall use the most extreme measures against corruption and its misdeeds," Colonel Kountche told us. In fact, strict measures are being prepared. And the chief of state alternately sends out warnings and patriotic appeals. However, is it sufficient to keep those cadres from temptation by warning them against bribery, a deeply entrenched phenomenon all over the Third World?

#### Reconciliation Around Army

In fact, such scourges are easier to combat in an open society where free democratic debate contributes to moralizing political standards. However, President Kountche does not believe that Africa is completely ripe for such institutions. At the same time that he recognizes that the vocation of the Army is to stay in its cantonments, he thinks that it has a role to play in the current phase of developing a mentality. "The greatest democracy that we need at this moment is the democracy of the granary," he declared in a peremptory tone. To be understood by that is that Africans right now need to satisfy their hunger more than anything else. And that they are happy enough when they have enough grain in their granaries. "Democracy? I am in complete agreement. Yes, in two, even three generations," Seyni Kountche concludes in a burst of laughter that goes a long way toward expressing his ideas on that subject.

As of this moment, the concern of the chief of state is more than anything else to bring about unity and national reconciliation around the Army. Convinced that his compatriots have an unhappy memory of the fratricidal struggles which formerly opposed the partisans of Djibo Bakari and those of Hamani Diori, he declares: "The Nigeriens do not want to hear political parties mentioned." Then, after a moment of reflection, he returns to the subject, not without letting a malicious smile play around the corner of his mouth: "Oh, that will certainly happen some day. Very naturally... when conditions are ripe.... Yes, later...."

National unity? The leaders of Niger visibly fear "destabilizing maneuvers" teleprompted from abroad. Above all since the wealth of the subsoil cannot be sold without arousing jealousy and covetousness. The case of Chad is there to prove it. That is why, in Niamey, they follow the evolution of the situation and the armed conflicts in the entire subregion with very special attention, and they are pleased to insist on the fact that Niger is a little neutral country, hopeful above all to maintain relations of good neighborliness with all nations without regard for their political and ideological options. "Our only ideology," the chief of state declared, "is to act against the drought and against hunger. To drag Niger out of its underdevelopment. All the rest is nothing more than a jumble of words that we cannot understand." In spite of the fact that the Niger leaders feel some uneasiness about the domineering designs of some of their powerful neighbors. Wedged between three rather strong powers--on the African scale--

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(Algeria, Libya, Nigeria), Niger seems to be having a harder and harder time keeping its neutrality intact. Nevertheless Colonel Kountche and his comrades in the CMS are more than ever resolved to keep themselves out of the political rivalries that are tearing the region apart.

An Eagerly Awaited Event

Moreover, that is what explains their lack of enthusiasm about any idea of a defense pact or even an alliance of a political nature. However, it is not out of the question that in the course of the important speech that President Kountche will give on 15 April he may provide greater details on the political line that Niger intends to follow after the turning point marking the completion of the first five years of military power. An eagerly awaited event. And not only by the Nigeriens, even if many of them will be impressed by the fine arch of triumph, the magnificent grass-covered stadium and all the infrastructures which the city of Dosso has built in record time among its palm trees.

Without counting the fact that the issue of the confrontation which will put face to face the cultural groups of the different regions of Niger on this occasion is now arousing more interest than political questions. Nothing surprising about that. Not having power to participate in a democratic debate, in Niger as elsewhere in Africa the Africans are passionately interested in sports. There is nothing degrading in that. Provided that they can grow out of it.

In Niger, the austerity preached by President Kountche is not an empty word. This is born out by the fact that the Mercedes belonging to the fleet of the former Hamani Diori regime have been put up on blocks or sold to private citizens. The ministers now roll down the streets of Niamey only in model 504's and the service chiefs in 2 CV's. The latter have rights to only 4 liters of gasoline daily. Contrary to what happens in other African countries, here no one plays games with playboys and plutocrats!

Uranium: Modern Gold Rush

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Apr 79 pp 50, 52

[Article by Ph. B]

[Text] If the soil of Niger is poor, the subsoil is on the contrary very rich. Uranium, cassiterite, phosphates, coal, iron, copper... and perhaps oil: so many deposits exploited or still untouched which sweep away the opinion of a colonial governor for whom Niger was "a country of sands, without a future."

A recent industry (1971), uranium mining is a trump card for the country. An oxygen tank, delivered in the nick of time, it is the symbol of the economic take-off and of the beginning of Niger's modernization. The reasonably assured resources come to 74,000 tons and the supplementary

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estimated resources would probably amount to 86,000 tons. At the close of 1978 production was calculated at 2,200 tons. With rapidly increasing world demand, and the ore prices being regularly reevaluated (in 1979: 24,500 francs CFA [African Financial Community] a kilo), the effects of the uranium exploitation on Niger's economy are for that reason very important.

The uranium deposits, which were discovered by the French Atomic Energy Commission [CEA], are found principally along the southern and western borders of the Air Massif (northern part of the country). The first deposit to be exploited dates from the beginning of the 1970s. The Air Mining Company [SOMAIR], created in 1968, exploits with a strip mine at Arlit (250 kilo-meters south-southeast of Agadez) the ore inside a perimeter measuring 6 kilometers by 3. At present, two deposits are known: Arlit, which is exploited (reserves: 10,000 tons) and Ariege, whose discovery dates from 1976 (reserves: 10,000 tons). A third deposit--that of Artois--is now being cored (reserves estimated at between 20,000 and 25,000 tons). In 1978 the production of SOMAIR rose to 1,800 tons approximately (1,441 tons in 1977) and the steady production expected when production has reached its peak will be between 2,000 and 2,500 tons per year. The product is exported as a concentrate of sodium uranate which titrates about 70 percent uranium.

However, since 31 August 1978, a second company, COMINAK (Akouta Mining Company)--created in 1974--is exploiting an underground mine at Atouta, 10 kilometers southwest of Arlit. The exploitable reserves are on the order of 44,000 tons. At the end of 1978 production rose to 350 tons of uranium (or 450 tons of magnesium uranate). The objective for 1979 is to reach 1,750 tons and, after 1980, 2,000 to 2,200 tons a year. These two companies--SOMAIR and COMINAK--are soon to be joined by the Mining Company of Tassa N'Taghalgue [SMTT]. This company will exploit the Arni deposit, located four kilometers southwest of Arlit, where the exploitable reserves amount to some 20,000 tons of uranium. The first production could occur in 1981 or 1982.

Other deposits are the objectives of prospecting: permits have been granted to an entire gamut of foreign companies, the state hoping to diversify its partners in the development of its mining industry. Such is the case of the Imouraren deposit, located less than 100 kilometers south of Arlit and where the exploitable reserves are probably on the order of 66,000 tons. And on the horizon for 1985 are the projects of West Afasto (southwest of the Arlit concession), East Afasto (on the eastern border of Arlit), Djado (on the border of the Tibesti massifs) and that of Abokorun-Azelik (see the table).

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## Uranium Production

Year	Tons of Uranium
Before 1972	410.5
1972	867.0
1973	948.3
1974	1,116.9
1975	1,305.5
1976	1,460.2
1977	1,609.0
1978	<u>2,200.0</u>
Total	9,917.4

## Capacity for Uranium Production (projected figures)

1979	3,850
1980	4,100
1981	4,300
1982	9,000
1983	9,000
1984	9,000
1985	9,000
1990	9,000

## Large Income from Uranium

At the beginning of the 70's, uranium provided little income for Niger. France was at that time the only master of the game, the participation of the state of Niger in SOMAIR amounting to only 8 percent (it then rose to 16 percent and is 33 percent today). The only purchasing country, France unilaterally fixed the purchase price of the ore and as a counterpart invested an annual compensation on the order of 1 million CFA francs.

Today the situation has turned around. Following new agreements with France, signed in 1974, Niger decides the uranium prices. Every year (between October and December), the sales price is determined by the Niger government, the directors of the SOMAIR and COMINAK companies and the stockholders of those two companies, who are the ones who buy the ore.

The starting point is not a world price because there does not yet exist any uranium "OPEC." However, a de facto rule is determined on the basis of the contracts that are signed throughout the world. The sales price is then fixed between x and y dollars. Starting with those relatively fluid data, Niger and its partners fix the price: 24,500 CFA francs per kilo in 1979 as opposed to 23,500 in 1978 and 20,000 in 1977.

For the ways in which payments are made, a partial payment, called a provisional payment, is now made which corresponds to 80 percent of the

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value of the delivery determined by the seller's samples. The buyers, who are the SOMAIR and COMINAK stockholders, must pay the invoice in less than two months. During that period, they proceed to a contradictory sampling. After an agreement (which sometimes requires resorting to arbitration), the selling price of the ore is definitively established and the buyers have 45 days--added to the 2 months--to pay the balance.

In a few years, uranium has thus become the primary export product of Niger (about 70 percent of all export receipts). The continual increase in production and sales and the constant upward movement of prices permit the country to show appreciable budget receipts. Niger's income under the heading of uranium has thus increased from 400 million CFA francs in 1974 to 4 billion in 1975, then to 7.6 billion in 1976 and 10.5 billion in 1977. Those receipts are increasing in such an impressive way that, over and above the tax on profits, the royalties paid on production and the customs duties paid for exports, Niger--in its role as owner of 33 percent of the shares of SOMAIR and 31 percent of the shares of COMINAK--sells its part in production back to its partners.

With a yearly production on the order of 5,000 to 6,000 tons of metallic uranium in the 80's, Niger will become one of the first-rank world producers (in 1978, world production amounted to 30,000 tons). The role that this country will play in providing energy for the industrialized nations can be seen. On the other hand, the covetousness of the industrialized nations with regard to Niger is clearly visible.

The result is that the authorities are practising a "prudent realism." The rate of production is wisely regulated and the revenues taken from the ore are devoted to the development of the country. The sales feed a National Investment Fund [FNI] which grants priority to the development of the rural sector, to health and to education, as well as to purchasing state participation in the capital of diverse companies.

#### Other Mineral Resources

However, mining prospects are not limited to uranium.

The production of cassiterite (tin ore), at El Mecki, Taraoudji, Timia, Agolak and Guissat has been held at the same level since 1974: 117.5 tons of concentrate in 1976 compared to 127.5 tons in 1975 and 126 tons in 1974. Exports, specifically to Belgium and Nigeria, rose to 110 tons in 1976 compared to 120 tons in 1974. The exploitation of two coal deposits, located at Anou-Areren, 50 kilometers northwest of Agadez, began under the aegis of the Niger Coal Company of Anou-Areren [SONICHAR]. The reserves are estimated at nearly five million tons (but of mediocre quality) and they should serve for producing the necessary electricity to supply the uranium plants at Air and the city of Agadez.

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The prospective coal production is calculated at 120,000 tons in 1982, and it will be raised to 275,000 tons in 1987.

Close to the mine a steam generating plant with two generators of 16 megawatts each is under construction. It will produce 120 million kilowatts. The works of uncovering the deposit were begun at the end of 1977 and they will be completed in 1979.

Some calcium phosphate deposits have been surveyed 150 kilometers to the south of Niamey. They are part of a "phosphate province" covering Benin, Niger and Upper Volta, inside a perimeter which corresponds to the national park of the W [translation unknown]. The coring campaigns are being carried out by the BRGM (Bureau of Geological and Mining Research) in connection with ONAREM (National Office of Mineral Resources). Reserves amounting to 500 million tons are spoken of.

Indications of Petroleum

The iron deposit at Say and its exploitation--about 650 million tons titrating 51 to 53 percent iron--is currently under study. The study is being conducted by the ONUDI (Organization of the United Nations for Industrial Development) at the request of the Niger-Nigerian Cooperation Commission.

Some petroleum has been found in the Tin Touma well (N'Guimi district). Four groups of companies: Texaco-Esso, Texaco-Esso-Global, Conoco-Shell and Niger Sun Oil-Phillips Oil Global, began in fact in 1975 to carry out positive drilling. The authorities, however, are remaining prudent and discreet.

Research is continuing, a permit has been granted to ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] and Esso has begun a new drilling campaign. Whatever the reserves may be, between now and 1989 Niger could have enough fuel available at least for its own consumption. This resource, added to uranium, would make Niger into an economically rich country and would reduce to zero its imports of hydrocarbons which every year amount to about four billion CFA francs.

Akouta: Second Uranium Mine

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Apr 79 p 53

[Text] Seen from the air, Akouta in no way breaks the uniformity of the desert. Located in the heart of the northern part of the African continent, on the southern boundaries of the Hoggar and connected by tracks to the closest agglomerations (Ifrouane: 120 kilometers; Agadez: 250 kilometers), this spot is the opposite of Arlit--which is a greenish crater, a living rent in that sterile zone. Here, the only things visible are a factory building and the urban zone of Akodan, which is being completed. However, there is a connection between Akouta and Arlit: uranium.



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Reserves: 44,000 tons

For the underground deposit of Akouta, the adventure begins later than that of Arlit. Following studies on the prospect of radioactive minerals carried out jointly by the French Commission for Atomic Energy [CEA], URANIGER [expansion unknown]--later dissolved and replaced by the National Office of Mineral Resources [ONEREM]--and Japan (OURD: Overseas Uranium Resources Development), a preliminary report was submitted favorable to the exploitation of the site. This report was presented to the authorities in 1974. It estimated the reserves at 44,000 tons of an ore whose assays vary from 2 to 5 kilos a ton. In addition, the ore contains molybdenum.

On 12 August of the same year, a company was constituted. This was COMINAK (Mining Company of Akouta), where the state of Niger, the CEA and OURD are found side by side. In 1975 Spain (ENUSA [National Uranium Enterprise, Inc.]) will join them, having bought a part of CEA's shares.

The project was started, and it was finished on 1 August 1978. The underground mine is near to a factory manufacturing sulphuric acid (45,650 tons will be produced per year) which has been operational since 1 January 1978. The first shipment of magnesium uranate left Akouta on 31 August 1978.

The remarkable aspect of how this deposit was put under exploitation was that the periods of time between the first studies and the effective exploitation were practically nil. A delay of only two months was observed! "A slowdown due to the defectiveness of certain vats, which had to be entirely redone, and chiefly due to the problems of shipping the material from Cotonou," the secretary general of COMINAK indicates. Moreover, expenses committed by the treasury between 1978 and 1979, established at 43 billion CFA francs, were raised to 45.5 billion. A financing which was effected in three ways:

Starting with the company's own capital (the social capital of 3.5 million CFA francs and advances made by the stockholders, which amounted to 7 billion); by medium-term credits agreed on by the banks and guaranteed by the stockholders; finally, by two credits for a total value of 9.9 billion yen, invested by OURD (Japan).

Two Thousand to 2,200 Tons Yearly

Today, 1,191 people work at Akouta (35 engineers including 2 from Niger; 185 skilled workers including 18 from Niger; 971 laborers from Niger). By the end of 1979 the number of jobs will rise to 1,574 and in 1980 to 1,750. Between 31 August and 31 December 1978, 350 tons of uranium were produced there. That production will rise to 1,700 tons in 1979 and will reach a sustained annual rate of 2,000 to 2,200 tons beginning in 1980.

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**Insufficient Roads**

If the people responsible for COMINAK are satisfied with the functioning of the mine, they complain nevertheless about the poorness of the routes of communication. The Akouta deposit is 1,100 kilometers from Niamey and 3,200 kilometers from the port of Cotonou. Ninety percent of the transportation of material is taken care of by surface routes. This does not happen without constant problems: a break in loading (ship to Cotonou, then railroad between Cotonou and Parakou, and then a road), bad roads which are cut during the rainy season, long delays for customs inspection in the port of Cotonou... Also, the average time for a shipment between a supplier and Akouta is about four months.

The volume and the weight of the transported material limit the use of aerial transport. "Only in a case of emergency or for material of small size do we call upon airplanes," a representative of COMINAK insists. "And even if we wanted to transport heavier and bulkier freight, we could not do so. Air Niger still does not have any large cargo planes but only some DC-4s and DC-6s," he adds.

There is still one hope: The uranium road, 700 kilometers long, financed by the mining partners, which will connect Tahoua-Agadez and Arlit.

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TOGO

BRIEFS

FAC AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE--France and Togo on 14 May at Lome signed an aid agreement amounting to 105 million CFA [African Financial Community] for the financing of an integrated agricultural development project in the southern part of Togo. The agreement was signed by Mr Akakpo-Ahiany, Togolese minister of foreign affairs, and Mr Bertrand Desmazieres, French ambassador to Togo. This project, subsidized by the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund], is subdivided into four segments: It will permit the strengthening of the organization and involvement of the peasants with a view to their regrouping into village associations, to conduct activities in the plantations and on the crop by providing production equipment through an agricultural service, and it will also assure the construction of roads, dispensaries, wells, etc. The project furthermore will include a study of an irrigated rice cultivation area and will finally conduct tests on hybrid coconut plantations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1308] 5058

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UGANDA

IDI AMIN'S POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS DISCUSSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Apr 79 pp 29-31

[Article by Marc Yared]

[Text] Abruptly sent to the rescue to hold Idi Amin Dada's hand in the face of attacking Ugandan opponents and Tanzanian forces, Libyan troops departed just as suddenly. Mouammar Qadhafi's military intervention in Uganda backfired: his defeat by Tanzanian forces was proportional to the threats which he made 3 weeks ago in regard to Julius Nyerere, whose own means of support remains a mystery. After rushing headlong into battle, Idi Amin Dada yielded ground while waiting to move out. The movement to replace him is under way. But actually nothing is at stake. For our contributor Marc Yared had to wade through a veritable labyrinth to clearly make out the shape of the Ugandan opposition. Other figures are cropping up beside the best-known presumed successor, former President Milton Obote, overthrown by Idi Amin Dada in 1971. It appears that it will be difficult to replace Amin Dada because there are many candidates and especially because the legacy is hardly brilliant.

The leaders of the Ugandan opposition are waiting to settle in their capital of Kampala in order to immediately form a provisional government. It remains to be seen whether the Ugandan opposition will manage to come to an agreement on a platform and an administration.

Just 1 month ago, according to certain sources there were 28 small groups and movements (there were "only" 18 according to others) with the avowed aim of overthrowing the tyrant of Kampala. A common feature: until January, they all recruited their cadres and most of their militants from among the hundreds of thousands of Ugandans exiled in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Gambia, Nigeria, Great Britain, the United States and Canada. Divergent factors: ethnic hostilities, ideological rifts and personal rivalries.

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In simple terms, two major factions, recently irreconcilable, can be distinguished within the opposition.

Conservative groups, generally Catholic and monarchist, which continue to be nostalgic for the small kingdoms which formed Uganda during the first years of independence. The Ugandan National Organization (UNO), the Freedom Group (FG) and the Ugandan Action Group (UAG) especially include supporters of the former kingdom of Buganda, a southern region which was reputedly the richest in Uganda and inhabited by the Baganda tribe, the largest in the country. The UNO was founded in May 1977 by an intellectual, Mr Roger Mukasa. The FG was established in the United States by a lawyer, Mr Joshua Luyimbaze-Zake, former minister of the Royal Bugandan Government. The UAG, which is particularly active, is led by Mr Paul Muwanga, a veteran of Ugandan political life and ambassador to Paris before going into exile in Great Britain in 1975.

Other monarchist movements find recruits among minority tribes. This is the case of the Ugandan National Movement (UNM), which particularly includes militants who are natives of the western region of Ankole. Just 4 months ago, the UNM was led by Mr John Barigye, son of a former king of Ankole and ambassador from Uganda to Bonn until 1973, prior to choosing exile in Zambia. Mr Barigye was replaced as head of the UNM by Mr Edward Rugumayo, General Idi Amin's former minister of education. Finally, the Organization of the Return is composed of Ugandans who are natives of the western region of Kigezi. It is led by Bishop Kivengere, formerly based in the United States.

At the other end of the political spectrum are the left-wing parties, which especially include members of the Lango and Acholi tribes established in the north. The Ugandan People's Congress (UPC), of socialist allegiance, is led by former Minister of State Dr Milton Obote, who took refuge in Dar es Salaam beginning in 1971. It is this movement which tried in late 1972 --unsuccessfully--to liberate Uganda by launching a military expedition from Tanzania. For the first time since 1972, Dr Obote made an appeal in Dar es Salaam on 11 and 18 January 1979 for a general insurrection against the government.

The Revolutionary Organization of Ugandans in Exile (ROUE), established in May 1978 and recruiting its supporters in both Kenya and Tanzania, probably benefited from the technical assistance of Israeli military experts and the financial support of American evangelist Billy Graham. ROUE is led by Lieutenant Colonel David Oyite Ojok, exiled to Tanzania since 1971.

The Marxist Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) was founded in 1971. Its leader is Mr Yoweri Museveni, a brilliant leader of the student movement. It was FRONASA which organized the abortive revolt of the Tororo garrison on 2 March 1979.

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There have long been conflicts between Catholic monarchists, most often Bagandan, and leftists, Lango and Acholi for the most part. The former reject former President Milton Obote's reinstatement as head of a liberated Uganda, since in their eyes he is guilty of having destroyed the kingdom of Buganda.

In the beginning of 1979, a liberal movement known as the Organization for Free Ugandans (OFU), composed of intellectuals and members of liberal professions, alone tried to reduce the differences between the opposition's two hostile camps. The OFU was also simultaneously led by a Bagandan, Dr Yusufu Lule, former vice chancellor of the University of Makerere, and by an Acholi, Dr Martin Aliko, a famous dentist currently practicing in Kenya. According to certain sources, it was the OFU which established in February the Save Uganda Movement (SUM), a clandestine guerrilla group which became famous for its acts of sabotage in Kampala.

Reconciliation among the various opposition factions took place in two periods. First, slightly more than a year ago, President Julius Nyerere, although an intimate friend of Dr Obote, agreed to diversify his support, welcoming and bringing into Tanzania liberal or monarchist organizations such as the OFU and UNO.

An initial general congress, secretly held in Dar es Salaam on 31 January 1979, led to a fiasco, since pro- and anti-Obote elements could not agree on a joint platform. Being unable to put off the military counteroffensive against Idi Amin's troops any longer and anxious to give a Ugandan cover to this operation, President Nyerere then gave the green light to Obote's supporters. On 19 February, 932 guerrillas under the command of Lieutenant Colonels Ojok and Okello crossed the border at the side of the Tanzanian Army. The war of liberation had begun . . .

Following the initial victories against the tyrant of Kampala, all opposition movements tried to get on the bandwagon. The "Mwalimu" in turn made new concessions. It no longer required Dr Obote's highly controversial presence at the general congress of the Ugandan revolt. It was at that time that 200 opposition delegates, including university professors, businessmen and guerrillas and representing 150,000 Ugandan exiles, met on 15 March in Moshi in northern Tanzania.

The Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) was established. At its head was an advisory board chaired by Mr Edward Rugumayo (UNM) and an 11-member executive council chaired by Mr Yusufu Lule (OFU). The principal members of the executive council are Mr Paul Mwanga (UAG), in charge of military affairs, Lieutenant Colonel Tito Okello (UPC), chief of operations, and Mr Yoweri Museveni (FRONASA). The FLNO has been setting up its administration since 27 March in the liberated zones of the southwest, inhabited by 3 million people, and has chosen the city of Masaka as its provisional general headquarters.

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It is still too early to know the name of Idi Amin's future successor as head of Uganda. Mr Yusufu Lule, chairman of the executive council, will very likely be the next chief of state if the revolutionaries have their way. Because of his advanced age (68 years old), his moderation, his belonging to the majority Bagandan tribe populating the first territories liberated, his former duties at the University of Makerere, the most respected in East Africa, Mr Lule is the statesman most suited to be accepted unanimously. But who will be the strong man of the new government? Obote, who remains the best known, although not the most popular? Museveni and Ojok, brilliant revolutionaries "with long teeth"? Everything will depend on President Nyerere's attitude. But who hasn't noticed that Mr Benjamin Mkapa, his right arm and diplomatic chief, has participated--and not only on the sidelines--in the Ugandan revolutionary congress of Moshi?

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UGANDA

IDI AMIN'S POLITICAL LEGACY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Apr 79 p 14

[Article by F. V.]

[Text] Will Idi Amin Dada's departure put an end to the use of violence as a means of resolving political differences in Uganda? Those who consider the general to be personally responsible for the country's political practices think so. There is no lack of ambitious demagogues in the world, appealing to the pettiest passions. But it is only in certain nations that the right conditions exist for tyrants to be able to lead a considerable political and military force, to crush all their opponents and to exercise absolute power. Uganda is one of those nations, having inherited the conditions of division from British colonization.

To stimulate cotton and then coffee growing and to be allied with a stable social class, Great Britain had issued titles of ownership to the nobility of Buganda. Thus it created a class of property owners whose wealth and power grew with the development of exports and the impoverishment of their tenant farmers. The Asians, whom Great Britain brought in to build the railroad, remained and settled as merchants, ruining the wealthy Ugandan shopkeepers and one of the most prosperous crafts industries in Africa.

The Protestant and Catholic missions developed a unique educational system in the area. On the eve of independence, Uganda had more universities per inhabitant than any other country in black Africa. This Christian elite was contemptuous of the class of peasants, rich or moderately rich, which emerged above the tenant farmers.

The way in which Uganda became "the pearl of Africa" (to use Sir Winston Churchill's expression) thus produced hatred. Each faction appealed to ethnic and religious ties, as well as to the resentment which had built up in the past.

The army was no exception. As long as it served the interests of Great Britain, it maintained its unity and preserved order. With independence, it became the manifestation of local forces. Groups were formed to place

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the army in the service of this or that faction. Idi Amin understood the advantage to be derived from that. He would use it until his downfall.

The new Ugandan government is the result of the most balanced possible proportioning of the various oppositions to Idi Amin. At its head is Yusuf Lule, a man who had opposed Milton Obote, but who remained above his passions in exile and has constantly tried to unite opposing factions. The force on which he relies is currently reduced to a Tanzanian army of 12,000 men. Opposing him are all those who have benefited, in one way or another, from the regime of Idi Amin. They often came from formerly despised social classes, but quickly rose socially under the general-president who defied--to the point of murdering them--the members of the elite who were products of Christian education.

Yusuf Lule's government is trying in the short term to avoid vengeance and settlements of accounts. A return to violence would force the leaders, regardless of their virtues, to establish a system of police supervision and in turn to seek security with their native tribes. Both the Westernized humanist Milton Obote and the unscrupulous boor Idi Amin made use of the process, each in his own way.

It is certainly because President Nyerere has understood and wanted to avoid this mechanism that he has not insisted on his friend Obote being put in power. And it is for this same reason that Yusuf Lule insisted, on the day after Idi Amin's downfall, that the law be scrupulously respected and that no one be allowed to take the law into his own hands.

The provisional government has given itself 2 years to form an army respectful of the constitution, recruited from among the population in general and not from among certain tribes. But however meticulous the regional and ethnic proportioning may be in the army and administration, the most important thing is that political forces learn to share power and to respect democratic principles. Perhaps the 8 years of the general's rule will have served as a lesson for the Ugandan political class.

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UGANDA

RECOVERY PLANS FOR UGANDAN ECONOMY DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 pp 1171-1173

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Prospects for Ugandan Economic Rebuilding"]

[Text] The arrival of Tanzanian troops, flanked by some Ugandan National Liberation Front commando units, at the Tororo station on the Kenyan frontier marked an important turning point in the initially personal conflict pitting the wretched Mwalimu, concealing a keen determination beneath the gentle naivete of a country vicar, and Marshal and President for life Idi Amin Dada, whose athletic frame, ferocious truculence and lack of morality have too often overshadowed the fact that under his rule, the exceptional human and natural resources of the country remained, happily, unchanged.

This arrival was of immediate importance: it meant safeguarding the national electric and industrial potential--the Owen Falls installations in particular are still intact--and the reestablishment of rail links with Nairobi and Mombasa, interrupted since the beginning of the war, but slowed down additionally by the technical and monetary difficulties resulting from the emergence of the East African Community in 1977, which difficulties the Tanzanian military successes did not resolve. In accessory fashion, they were to put an end to the speculation prevailing recently in London about Ugandan coffee, adding 45 pounds per ton to the price, although the existence of major stocks in Mombasa avoided the risk of an "accordion effect" in the deliveries. The increased demand which will be produced by a halt to the American boycott will, it is true, constitute a new reason for maintaining or adding to these increases.

This was the end of the military operations with immediate economic effects, not to be confused with the end of the hostilities, which could only result in the definitive exclusion, by means of a knockout, of Marshal Idi Amin Dada. No one knows at present what has become of him. The presence of his family in Iraq was reported, where it seems that he himself took refuge in the course of an aerial odyssey also reported to have taken him to Libya. The reasons for his probable return to Uganda have not been made really clear: a demonstration of personal stubbornness, which cannot be ruled out,

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for "Big Daddy" was in his time a determined soldier, or a decision born of despair, with its veritable origin in the refusal of his allies of yesterday to be compromised by offering him hospitality?

Whatever the case, the fact that he is surrounded by 3,000 Ugandan army soldiers, the last units of a phalanx which cannot expect to be pardoned, and which seems to have established itself within the Moyo-Atiak-Pakwach-Arua rectangle, on the triple Ugandan, Zairian and Sudanese frontier, leads to the fear, in view of the slow nature of the advance of the Tanzanian troops, that the suffering of the people caught between the cruelty of the vanquished and the demands of a victorious army living off the country may not end so soon. The extension of the sacrifice this campaign entails for Tanzania, given an already tight budget situation, could also lead it to seek compensation on the spot.

The enormity of Idi Amin Dada as a personality also conceals the political consequences and the issue at stake in his resistance or fall, on the one hand, and on the other, the economic reality in a state which has suffered a terrible hemorrhage, but probably not ruined on the scale of the massive stupidity of its tyrant.

Political Aspects of the Fall of a Regime

The military and financial support provided to Idi Amin Dada by Iraq, Libya and the Palestinians is but the contemporary aspect of the latent conflict which developed in this part of Africa between 1918 and 1945, between the Arab world and Great Britain, concerned with protecting the mining and agricultural wealth of its possessions in East Africa from Islamic expansionism, by means of a political barrier of which Ethiopia and Somaliland were for a long time the eastern element and Kenya the main bulwark. This is still the case today, even though the United States, the FRG and the other nations of the European Economic Community have taken over economically from Britain to a great extent.

When that nation favored the coming of Idi Amin Dada to power, replacing Milton Obote, whose socialist tendencies seemed worrisome to its interests, it apparently did not attach enough importance to the fact that he was a member of one of the minority ethnic groups in Uganda won over to the Moslem religion. The key figure himself doubtless failed to realize the consequences, which others would speedily analyze for him. And this led to the political development of the Ugandan government in the course of these recent years, marked by its break with Israel and the confirmation of sympathies with the "hard-line" Arab countries and, through them, the USSR. It also led to the collapse of British commercial positions in Uganda, and its assets in the country, which dropped between 1971 and 1978 from 100 to 10 million pounds sterling, while at the same time the expulsion of the Anglo-Asiatics deprived Britain of its principal agents of influence. The blocking of the traditional financial aid provided by London to Kampala (about three million pounds per year) and the diplomatic break following

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the Entebbe affair marked the end of this unhappy period. At its conclusion the number of British nationals in what had been one of the jewels of the Empire in Africa came to fewer than 200, while the representation of British interests in the Ugandan capital was provided--a sign of the times--by the French embassy.

The overthrow of President Idi Amin Dada's regime by Mr Nyerere's troops put these problems in a different light today. British diplomats did not wait for that to encourage international opposition to this regime, promoting the boycotting of Ugandan exports by the large American or international coffee companies, such as Folger, Maxwell, General Foods, Nestle and Hill Brothers, which suspended their purchases in the spring of 1978 even before the decision by the Carter administration.

Parallel to this, agreement had been obtained from the European Communities Commission, which had paid out to Kampala a million pounds sterling for the stabilization of cotton exports in 1976, for the blocking of the Ugandan allocation package in the fourth EDF [European Development Fund], an unprecedented procedure for an organization for which independence in the cooperative actions pertaining to the relations of its members with the beneficiary nations is the golden rule, the tendency being even to compensate for reductions occurring on the level of bilateral relations, as was the case with Benin.

In view of this diplomatic action, President Nyerere's military offensive could not but arouse an echo of keen sympathy in London. Mr Callaghan's government must have been one of the first to recognize the government of Mr Yusuf Lule, and it took action immediately afterward with the Brussels Commission with regard to removal of the block on the four-year program, the allocation to Uganda of urgent aid in foodstuffs dispatched by air from Nairobi and Mombasa, and aid in the amount of 300,000 units of account for the purchase of medicines, without prejudice to the step of convoking the members of the commission to urge them to develop extraordinary aid for the disaster victims.

Is this remarkable zeal on the part of Great Britain likely to cause a reaction on the Arab side? It is impossible to say. Libya and Iraq, disillusioned by the behavior of their Ugandan protege, would doubtless hesitate to undertake a new crusade in favor of a man whose crimes could not be overlooked just because he shares their religion. The division currently prevailing in the Arab world would not make this any easier. It seems moreover that, on the Tanzanian side, there is an awareness of the risks to be avoided in this connection and that Milton Obote, who has taken refuge in Dar-es-Salaam, was excluded from the position of power for which he was naturally a candidate because of the enmity he had aroused in the Middle East. Will Professor Yusuf Lule, who deserted Islam, have better luck with the countries in the Arab League? What is to be feared, on the other hand, if the resistance by Idi Amin Dada in the Northwest should be prolonged, is

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unofficial support from Sudan, perhaps more motivated by the desire to avoid an overflow onto its territory than by religious solidarity.

Is Reestablishment of the East African Community Possible?

As to the forms of association which should prevail between Tanzania and Uganda from now on, one might think that the resurrection of the East African Community would have the approval of London, with the balancing of Tanzanian appetites by the economic weight and the Western sympathies of Kenya. As of the present, this is the solution insistently mentioned in the three capitals by a numerous, active and high-quality contingent of Ugandan emigres, almost all of whom sought refuge in Great Britain, beginning with the new prime minister himself.

The formula, a direct product of the colonial past--it was then called the Conference of Governors, and later the East African High Commission--comprised, represented, through the creation of a common economic space and the unification of major services--central bank, ports, railroads, aviation, telecommunications and research--a powerful tool for the penetration by and influence of British technical aid. But is its reestablishment possible?

The crumbling of the great technical "corporations" has led in all sectors to unequal treasury and profitability situations, making reunification difficult. Indeed Uganda, because of its position as an enclave, has always favored the community, Marshal Idi Amin Dada even having gone so far, after its dissolution in 1977, as to propose a bilateral successor to Kenya. But it must be remembered that if one sets aside the transit activities toward Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, the extent to which the three partners supplement each other economically is limited. In the finest hour of the community, trade among the nations did not exceed seven percent of foreign trade as a whole. Further, the balance was only positive for Kenya, which met the need due to food shortages in Tanzania. The administration of the community was moreover burdensome and costly: it included nearly 12,000 employees, whose wages were covered to the extent of 50 percent by Kenya, 30 percent by Tanzania and 20 percent by Uganda, the distribution of these quotas being a subject of disagreement between the first two.

To summarize, reestablishment of the technical structures seems difficult, as does that of the administrative bodies of the community, for which Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam are not eager, since they now see their true partners in different directions. One cannot however exclude the possibility that President Nyerere, who will have to make his excuses to the OAU for the disturbing precedent he has just been guilty of with regard to the principle of the inviolability of the "colonial frontiers," would resign himself to a non-structural community plan, which would clear him of all suspicion of imperialism and even perhaps allow him to find a counterpart, without being too obvious, for the expenditures to which he agreed but which have not been paid out. A system of periodic conferences among the three chiefs of state, with precise tariff agreements, the lack of which moreover was the great

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weakness of the old community, would perhaps be able to offset the prejudice of Kenya, which is hardly anxious to encourage the introduction of the political bacilli of its neighbors to the south into its territory.

The French Position

It is in this still variable political context that the French economic position in Uganda must be evaluated. It is far from negligible, for France, which exported to it products worth 190 million French francs (in particular vehicles and transmission equipment) and purchased coffee and ores (copper, wolfram and cobalt) worth 35 million francs, is as a result the third most important customer today and the seventh-ranking supplier.

The development of our trade relations with Kampala in the course of recent years is obviously linked with the eclipse of Great Britain and also the boycotting of Uganda, beginning last year, by American firms. Making exception of the tragic Airbus affair in Entebbe, it should moreover be remembered that the small French colony in Uganda, made up of diplomats, missionaries, businessmen and cooperative assistants (17), i.e. about 100 persons in all, did not suffer from the ferocious eccentricities of the former chief of state, and the recent hostilities have not done any harm to any of its members.

In the months to come, it will be interesting to follow the effects of events on the implementation of our contracts and the results of the various negotiations in which our firms are engaged. The dissolution of the East African Railways and the related establishment of the Uganda Railways Corporation facilitated the contract signed in 1978 by the corporation for seven 2,000-horsepower diesel locomotives, the most powerful in Africa, to be delivered by Alstom for 45 million francs, 30 to be paid in cash by Uganda and the balance covered by a five-year loan from the Societe Generale, with COFACE guarantees. The deliveries are scheduled for the autumn of 1979. Another purchase of railroad stock, still larger, is under study. It will be possible to judge the attitude of the new authorities toward us from how that develops.

The Regie Renault, which earned a very popular position for itself in Uganda with the victory by Rodrigues and Balimmujako in the 30 TS in 1978 in the "Rally of the Economic War," in which Idi Amin Dada himself and his wife Sarah participated, has signed a contract, not yet carried out, in the amount of 20 million francs for the delivery of Saviem trucks. Thomson-CSF, in negotiations with the Ugandan government for the radar equipment for the Entebbe airport, found itself forced by events to order the withdrawal of the technicians entrusted with the study. Another public works equipment transaction in an amount equivalent to the Saviem contract is planned for the modernization of the road network. The Degremont firm seems well placed for the extension of the Kampala water supply system, managed by the National Water and Sewerage Corporation, financed by a 45 million Ugandan shilling loan from the Islamic Development Bank (a Ugandan shilling is worth 0.60

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French francs). Finally, French firms are interested in the rebuilding of a sugar refinery in Lugazi, as well as the expansion and modernization of the textile complex in M'Bale, with a six million dollar loan from Abu-Dhabi.

The reentry of Anglo-Saxon competition on the market will not alter the transactions on which agreements have already been reached, but it may make others more difficult. Similarly, the reunification of the old technical departments of the East African Community would be likely, should it occur, to be reflected in a certain monopolization of the supply function to the detriment of our builders.

These dangers would of themselves justify increased vigilance and more frequent intervention, which might be extended to agriculture, in which certain sectors, such as cotton and coffee-growing, have in recent years suffered a decline in yield and quality less to be blamed on the negligence of the authorities than on the collapse, difficult to repair in the short run, of the research and staffing system which Great Britain had developed and succeeded in maintaining throughout the community period. There are needs in this connection which without a doubt France is currently best situated to meet on the African market. Negotiations have already been undertaken in this connection, in particular with regard to cotton.

Ugandan Economic Recovery

The conditions under which our economic activities in Uganda should be pursued henceforth, whether investments or exports of goods and services are involved, should also be evaluated as a function of the losses caused by the recent hostilities. In this connection, the picture of a country bled and ruined for years by the folly of a dictator and stripped of any financial resources of its own would probably be an exaggeration.

The dictatorship and the hostilities which followed had a murderous effect on men. They certainly did not improve the condition of the road infrastructure. They served to hinder the normal exercise of farm activities, threatened or destroyed certain harvests, but the yield in any given year causes the shortages in the preceding ones to be forgotten, and nothing in this sector is beyond repair. The energy potential, hydroelectric equipment and the industrial infrastructure in general did not suffer. To a certain extent, the deflationary policy pursued by the government in the mining sector, for the copper in Kilembe in particular, which accounted for up to 10 percent of the total Ugandan exports, dropping to only 3.5 percent in 1978, may have benefited the country through the possibility of liquidating stocks it created in a period when the difficulties encountered in the marketing of Zairian copper added to the advantage provided by continuing high prices.

It should not be forgotten, in assessing the administration by the fleeing government, that Idi Amin Dada was not alone in power, but was surrounded by a team of administrators of indisputable value, which he had no difficulty

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in rallying in a country in which mission work, both Catholic and Protestant, dates back more than a century, and in which the elite, because of this fact, bear witness to quite a remarkable intellectual level.

The whims of the dictator obviously did not make their work smooth. Some of them, such as Mr Kajura, governor of the Central Bank of Uganda, who was imprisoned in Luzira at the end of 1978, paid with their freedom and perhaps their lives for their devotion to the country. In Paris, Mr Loubega, former minister of foreign affairs, is well remembered, where he visited last year and engaged in a number of talks at the Quai d'Orsay--a clear-thinking man with a very open spirit, entirely aware that his duties held more threats than advantages for him.

These are the men who, between the bloody vagaries of the dictator, provided a relative balance in the daily life of the Ugandan economy and probably made it possible to safeguard the essential.

In addition, the decline in farm production which the minister of planning, Mr Moses Ali, was courageous enough to report publicly in 1978, can be ascribed above all to economic circumstances and the disappearance of technical structures, for which the Ugandan government was responsible to a very small extent. The aging of the coffee plantations and the lack of cadres account for a 35 percent drop in production. Nor could one blame the government for the earnings which were not realized as a result of the breakdown in American purchase contracts, when the United States had in 1977 paid \$250 million for almost 95 percent of the Ugandan coffee crop, itself accounting for 80 percent of the export total.

Uganda is not alone in having experienced this decline in farm figures, and the situation in Tanzania is no better. If coffee production declined from 230,000 tons to 149,000 in 1975, the volume climbed again to 164,000 tons in 1977, including 12,600 tons of Arabica, simply because of the 65 percent increase seen in prices in 1976. Since that date, foreign sales have brought in 2 billion 942 million Ugandan shillings, or 1,765,200,000 French francs, as compared to 1 billion 160 million in 1971. Restabilization of prices maintained the value at 1 billion 170 million francs in 1978. These values, however, are obtained by extrapolation, the greater part of the Arabica, which comes from the province of Bugisu, having been smuggled to Kenya and Sudan, and the difficulties of shipping the Robusta to Mombasa, and a very small part of it to Djibouti and Aden by air, having delayed the sale of the harvest until the American firms made their decision.

The decline in cotton production has been steady since 1973-74. From 400,000 bales, the volume dropped to 133,400 in 1975-76, with an additional 45 percent decline occurring in 1977, when the total was only 74,300 bales. The production of tea, tobacco and sugar followed the same downward curve, although at a slower rate and with a temporary recovery in 1975, although there was no lack of concern on the part of the administration which, on the contrary, multiplied its efforts to improve ginning equipment, to guarantee



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a supply of fertilizers and insecticides and decreeing the standardization of fuel prices so that production distribution could be carried out at a normal rate.

Setting aside the aging of the plant stock, which we mentioned above, the truth is that these drops in production in Uganda resulted from the galloping inflation (50 percent) experienced in the course of the past 3 years, itself related to the energy crisis, to which a landlocked nation is more sensitive than others. Here, as in other continental African countries where agriculture predominates, the population reacts by retreating to the traditional sector, imported products being out of reach and the increase in domestic prices of foodstuffs making it more profitable to cultivate them than export products. With a rural population of 90 percent, Uganda obtained a third of its monetary income and 50 percent of its global income from farm production. The situation was reflected as a whole in a decline in the first of these percentages, with the latter remaining the same or even tending to rise.

The industrial situation reflects the same popular reaction, the main difficulty lying in the scarcity of a labor force turning by preference from the factories to its food crops. However, government incentives, included in the 1977-1980 three-year plan, were not lacking. To be obtained either from foreign financing or domestic resources, 560 million Ugandan shillings were allocated for the modernization of spinning mills, 260 million for the sugar refineries, and 100 million for the other food industries. The wood industry benefited from allocations of about 98 million, the paper industry 58 million and the metallurgical industry (iron, corrugated tin and pipe) 150 million. Mining production, which has a very wide range of rare materials such as wolfram, tin, beryllium and cobalt, received an allocation of 60 million Ugandan shillings to increase both the tonnage and to improve exploitation conditions. And finally, 80 million was included for an ancient cement facility producing 130,000 tons per year, so as to increase its output to 300,000.

Whatever damage was done to this economy, the financial situation of this large country with a population of 11 million is such that one can regard it as one of the solid factors on the African continent. Eloquent witness to this is provided by a per capita gross national product of \$240, a development budget from domestic resources of 2 billion 100 million French francs, equal to three-quarters of the operational budget, a trade balance surplus of 928 million francs, a foreign debt of 112 million dollars, on which the service accounts for only 0.2 percent of the gross domestic product, and 1.6 percent of the exports of goods and services, although the balance of payments surplus, 700 million francs below the trade balance surplus, reflects a certain flight of capital.

The quality of its population and the variety of its production are such that Uganda, which has already benefited from a number of foreign contributions, will not have difficulty in finding others which still may be

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needed to bind up its wounds. It is understandable that Great Britain, linked to this country by a sentimental attachment, is attempting to help find them. It would not be desirable, however, if excessive publicity going even beyond the suggestions of the Ugandan government and discouraging possible investments by painting too black a picture, were to prove more harmful than useful to it in the end.

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